Part II, Chapter XXIX, 1

OF THOSE THINGS THAT WEAKEN OR TEND TO DISSOLVE A COMMON-WEALTH

The Dissolution of Common-wealths Proceeds from Imperfect Institution

Though nothing made by mortals can be immortal, if men possessed the reason they claim to possess, their Common-wealths might at least be secured against death from internal diseases. For by the nature of their institution they are designed to live as long as mankind, or the Laws of Nature, or justice itself, which gives them life. When they dissolve through internal disorder rather than external violence, the fault lies not with men as their material but with men as their makers and organizers. Men grow weary at last of disorderly jostling and cutting one another down, and long with all their hearts to be formed into one firm, enduring edifice. Yet lacking both the art of making suitable laws by which to square their actions and the humility and patience to have the rough, awkward edges of their present greatness trimmed away, they cannot, without a very skilled architect, be assembled into anything but a rickety building, one scarcely able to last their own lifetime and sure to collapse on the heads of their descendants.

Among the infirmities of a Common-wealth, therefore, I put first those arising from imperfect institution, which resemble the diseases of a natural body caused by defective generation.

One such infirmity is this: “In order to acquire a kingdom, a man is sometimes content with less power than is necessarily required for the peace and defense of the Common-wealth.” When the power laid aside must be taken up again for public safety, the act appears unjust and disposes great numbers of men to rebel when opportunity offers. Similarly, children conceived by diseased parents are liable either to untimely death or to break out in boils and scabs as they purge the ill quality inherited from their flawed conception. When kings deny themselves some such necessary power, they do so not always—though sometimes—through ignorance of what their office requires, but often in the hope of recovering that power whenever they please. In this they reason badly: those who seek to hold them to their promises will be supported against them by foreign Common-wealths, which for the sake of their own subjects miss few opportunities to weaken their neighbors. Thus the Pope supported Thomas Beckett, Archbishop of Canterbury, against Henry the Second: William the Conqueror, when he was received, had exempted churchmen from subjection to the Common-wealth by taking an oath not to infringe the liberty of the Church. Similarly the French supported the barons in their rebellion against King John: William Rufus had increased their power to a degree inconsistent with Sovereign Power in order to gain their help in transferring the succession from his elder brother to himself. Nor does this happen only in monarchy. Though the ancient Roman Common-wealth styled itself “The Senate and People of Rome,” neither Senate nor People claimed the whole power. This first brought about the seditions of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius Saturnius, and others; later the wars between Senate and People under Marius and Sylla, and again under Pompey and Caesar, ending in the extinction of their democracy and the establishment of monarchy.

The people of Athens restricted themselves in just one action: on pain of death, no man was to propose renewing the war for the island of Salamis. Yet if Solon had not had word spread that he was mad and then proposed the war in verse to the crowds gathered around him, dressed and acting like a madman, Athens would have had an enemy perpetually ready at the very gates of the city. Such harm and such evasions are the fate of all Common-wealths whose power is limited in even the smallest degree.

Second, I observe the diseases of a Common-wealth that arise from the poison of seditious doctrines. One such doctrine is “Every private man is judge of good and evil actions.” This is true in the condition of mere nature, where there are no civil laws, and even under civil government in cases not determined by law. Otherwise it is plain that the measure of good and evil actions is civil law, and their judge the legislator, who is always the representative of the Common-wealth. This false doctrine inclines men to debate the commands of the Common-wealth within themselves and question them, then to obey or disobey as their private judgments see fit. In this way the Common-wealth is divided and weakened.

Another doctrine hostile to civil society is “Whatever a man does against his conscience is sin.” It rests on the presumption that he may make himself judge of good and evil. For a man's conscience and his judgment are the same thing; conscience, like judgment, can be mistaken. Thus one who is subject to no civil law sins whenever he acts against his conscience, since his own reason is his only guide; but the same is not true of one living in a Common-wealth, since the law is the public conscience by which he has already agreed to be guided. Otherwise, with private consciences—which are only private opinions—differing so widely, the Common-wealth must be torn apart, and no one would dare obey Sovereign Power any farther than seemed right in his own eyes.

It has also commonly been taught that “Faith and sanctity are attained not by study and reason but by supernatural inspiration or infusion.” If this is granted, I cannot see why anyone should give a reason for his faith, why every Christian should not also be a prophet, or why anyone should take the law of his country rather than his own inspiration as the rule of his actions. Thus we fall back into the error of presuming to judge good and evil for ourselves, or making judges of private men who claim supernatural inspiration, to the dissolution of all civil government. Faith comes by hearing; hearing comes through the circumstances that bring us into the presence of those who speak to us. All these circumstances are arranged by God Almighty; yet they are not supernatural, merely too numerous in their convergence on each result for us to observe. Faith and sanctity are indeed uncommon, but they are not miracles. They are brought about through education, discipline, correction, and other natural means by which God works them in his elect at the time he thinks fit. These three opinions, destructive of peace and government, have in this part of the world proceeded chiefly from the tongues and pens of unlearned divines, who join the words of Holy Scripture together in ways contrary to reason and do everything they can to persuade men that sanctity and natural reason cannot coexist.

A fourth opinion contrary to the nature of a Common-wealth is this: “The holder of Sovereign Power is subject to the civil laws.” It is true that all sovereigns are subject to the Laws of Nature, for those laws are divine and cannot be repealed by any man or Common-wealth. But the sovereign is not subject to the laws that he himself—that is, the Common-wealth—makes. To be subject to the laws would be to be subject to the Common-wealth, that is, to the sovereign representative, that is, to himself; this is not subjection but freedom from the laws. By placing laws above the sovereign, this error also places a judge above him with power to punish him, thus creating a new sovereign; then, for the same reason, a third to punish the second, and so on without end, until the Common-wealth is confused and dissolved.

A fifth doctrine tending to dissolve a Common-wealth is “Every private man has absolute property in his goods, excluding the sovereign's right.” A man does indeed have property that excludes every other subject's right; but he holds it only from Sovereign Power. Without its protection, every other man would have an equal right to the same goods. If the sovereign's right is excluded as well, he cannot perform the task for which the subjects appointed him: defending them from foreign enemies and from one another's injuries. Consequently there is no longer a Common-wealth.

And if the subjects' property does not exclude the sovereign representative's right to their goods, still less can it exclude his right to their offices of judgment and execution, in which they represent the sovereign himself.

A sixth doctrine is plainly and directly opposed to the essence of a Common-wealth: “Sovereign Power may be divided.” What is dividing the power of a Common-wealth but dissolving it, when divided powers destroy one another? Men are chiefly indebted for these doctrines to some who profess the law and seek to make it depend on their own learning rather than on legislative power.

As false doctrine can do, so too the example of a different government in a neighboring nation often inclines men to change the form already established. Thus the people of the Jews were stirred to reject God and call on the prophet Samuel for a king after the manner of other nations. Similarly, the smaller cities of Greece were continually disturbed by uprisings of aristocratic and democratic factions, one side in almost every Common-wealth wishing to imitate the Lacedaemonians and the other the Athenians. And I do not doubt that many men welcomed the recent troubles in England in imitation of the Low Countries, imagining that to grow rich they needed only to change the form of their government as those countries had done. Human nature is itself prone to desire novelty. When men are further provoked by the proximity of others who have grown rich through it, they can scarcely help welcoming those who urge them to change; they love the first beginnings, though they suffer from the ensuing disorder. They are like hot-blooded people who, afflicted with an itch, tear at their own skin with their nails until they can no longer bear the pain.

OF THINGS THAT WEAKEN A COMMON-WEALTH OR LEAD TO ITS DISSOLUTION

The dissolution of Common-wealths results from flaws in their founding.

Nothing made by mortal people can be immortal. Still, if people used the reason they claim to have, they could at least protect their Common-wealths from dying of internal diseases. By their nature, Common-wealths are designed to last as long as humanity, the Laws of Nature, or justice itself, which gives them life. So when internal disorder rather than outside violence dissolves them, the fault lies not in people as the material of which they are made, but in people as their founders and organizers. People eventually tire of pushing and hacking at one another without order, and they sincerely want to form one firm, lasting structure. Yet they lack both the skill to make suitable laws that will shape their conduct and the humility and patience to have the rough, awkward edges of their present power trimmed away. Without a very skilled architect, they can build only an unstable structure. It may barely last their own lifetimes and will certainly collapse on their descendants.

Among a Common-wealth's weaknesses, I will first count those caused by flaws in its founding. They resemble diseases of a living body caused by defects at conception.

One such flaw arises when a person accepts less power than is needed to keep the Common-wealth at peace and defend it in order to gain a kingdom. Later, the public safety may require the ruler to take up the power they set aside. Doing so looks unjust and makes large numbers of people ready to rebel when they get a chance. Similarly, children conceived by diseased parents may die early or develop boils and scabs as their bodies expel the unhealthy condition inherited at conception. Kings do not always give up necessary power because they misunderstand their office, though sometimes they do. Often they hope to take it back whenever they please. Their reasoning is poor. Foreign Common-wealths will support those who insist that kings keep their promises, since they rarely miss a chance to weaken neighboring states for their own subjects' benefit. Thus the Pope supported Thomas Beckett, Archbishop of Canterbury, against Henry the Second. William the Conqueror had exempted church officials from subjection to the Common-wealth when he was received as ruler and took an oath not to infringe the Church's liberty. Similarly, the French supported the barons in their rebellion against King John. William Rufus had increased the barons' power to a level incompatible with Soveraigne Power to win their help in taking the succession from his elder brother. Nor does this happen only in monarchies. The ancient Roman Common-wealth was styled the Senate and People of Rome, but neither the Senate nor the people claimed all power. This first caused the uprisings of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius Saturnius, and others. It then caused wars between Senate and people under Marius and Sylla, and again under Pompey and Caesar, ending their democracy and establishing monarchy.

The people of Athens bound themselves against just one act: proposing to renew the war over the Island of Salamis was punishable by death. Yet if Solon had not spread word that he was mad, then dressed and acted like a madman and proposed renewal in verse to the people gathered around him, Athens would have had an enemy permanently ready at its very gates. Even a tiny limit on a Common-wealth's power forces such harm or such desperate workarounds.

Second, I observe diseases of a Common-wealth caused by poisonous doctrines that stir rebellion. One is the claim “Every private person can judge which actions are good and which are evil.” This is true in the mere state of Nature, where there are no civil laws. It is also true under civil government when the law has not settled a case. Otherwise, civil law is clearly the standard for judging good and evil actions. The judge is the lawmaker, who always represents the Common-wealth. This false doctrine encourages people to debate the Common-wealth's commands privately and challenge them. They then obey or disobey as their own judgment sees fit. This divides and weakens the Common-wealth.

Another doctrine at odds with civil society says, “Whatever a person does against their conscience is a sin.” It rests on the same assumption that a person may judge good and evil for themselves. A person's conscience is their judgment, and judgment can be mistaken. Someone subject to no civil law does sin whenever they act against their conscience, since they have no rule to follow other than their own reason. But someone living in a Common-wealth is different. The law is the public conscience by which that person has already agreed to be guided. Otherwise, private consciences, which are only private opinions, would conflict and tear the Common-wealth apart. No one would dare obey Soveraigne Power further than seemed right to them personally.

Another common teaching says, “Faith and holiness are acquired not through study and reason but through supernatural inspiration or an infusion from above.” If that were true, I see no reason why anyone should explain their faith, why every Christian should not also be a prophet, or why anyone should follow their country's law rather than their own inspiration. This brings us back to people claiming the right to judge good and evil themselves, or handing that judgment to private individuals who claim supernatural inspiration. The result is the dissolution of all civil government. Faith comes through hearing, and hearing depends on the circumstances that bring us into contact with people who speak to us. Almighty God arranges all these circumstances. They are not supernatural, though so many factors contribute to every outcome that we cannot trace them all. Faith and holiness are indeed uncommon, but they are not miracles. God brings them about in those he has chosen, when he thinks the time is right, through education, discipline, correction, and other natural means. In this part of the world, these three opinions that harm peace and government have spread chiefly through the speech and writing of unlearned theologians. They put words of Holy Scripture together in ways that conflict with reason and do all they can to persuade people that holiness and natural reason cannot coexist.

A fourth opinion incompatible with a Common-wealth is “The holder of Soveraigne Power is subject to the civil laws.” It is true that all Soveraignes are subject to the Laws of Nature. Those laws are divine and no person or Common-wealth can repeal them. But a Soveraigne is not subject to laws the Soveraigne makes—that is, laws made by the Common-wealth. To be subject to those laws would mean being subject to the Common-wealth, and therefore to its Soveraigne Representative, which is oneself. That is not subjection but freedom from those laws. This error puts the laws above the Soveraigne. It therefore also puts a judge above the Soveraigne, with power to punish them, creating a new Soveraigne. The same reasoning would require a third to punish the second, and so on forever, bringing confusion and destroying the Common-wealth.

A fifth doctrine leading to dissolution says, “Each private person has absolute ownership of their goods, excluding even the Soveraigne's Right.” Each person does have property rights that exclude every other subject. Those rights come only from Soveraigne Power. Without its protection, everyone else would have an equal Right to the same goods. But if ownership also excludes the Soveraigne's Right, the Soveraigne cannot carry out the task for which the subjects appointed them: defending people both from foreign enemies and from one another's injuries. The Common-wealth would then cease to exist.

If a subject's ownership of goods does not exclude the Soveraigne Representative's Right over those goods, it is even less possible for a subject to exclude that Right from judicial or executive offices, whose holders represent the Soveraigne.

A sixth doctrine directly contradicts the essence of a Common-wealth: “Soveraigne Power can be divided.” Dividing a Common-wealth's power dissolves it, since divided powers destroy one another. These doctrines come chiefly from some who claim expertise in law and try to make law depend on their own learning instead of on legislative power.

Besides false doctrine, the example of a neighboring country with a different kind of government often makes people want to change their own. The people of the Jews were stirred to reject God and ask the prophet Samuel for a king like the other nations had. The smaller Greek cities, too, were constantly disturbed by aristocratic and democratic factions. In nearly every Common-wealth, one faction wanted to imitate the Lacedaemonians and the other the Athenians. I have no doubt that many people welcomed the recent troubles in England because they wanted to imitate the Low Countries. They supposed that changing the form of government, as those countries had done, was all it took to grow rich. Human nature already makes people want novelty. When neighbors who have grown rich through change stir up that desire, people can hardly avoid welcoming those who urge a change. They love its beginnings even though continuing disorder hurts them. They are like people with hot blood who get an itch and scratch themselves with their nails until they can no longer bear the pain.