Part I, Chapter XIV, 1

OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURAL LAWS, AND OF CONTRACTS

The Right of Nature, commonly called Jus Naturale by writers, is the liberty each person has to use his own power as he wills for the preservation of his own nature—that is, his own life—and consequently to do whatever in his own judgment and reason he conceives to be the most suitable means of preserving it.

Liberty, in the proper sense of the word, means the absence of external impediments. Such impediments may often take away part of a person's power to do what he wishes, but cannot prevent him from using the power left to him as his judgment and reason direct.

A Law of Nature (Lex Naturalis) is a precept or general rule discovered by reason, by which a person is forbidden to do what destroys his life or takes away the means of preserving it, or to omit what he thinks will best preserve it. For though writers on this subject commonly confuse Jus and Lex, Right and Law, the two must be distinguished. Right consists in the liberty to act or refrain; Law determines and binds a person to one of the two. Thus Law and Right differ as much as obligation and liberty, which cannot coexist in the same matter.

Since the condition of mankind, as declared in the preceding chapter, is a condition of war of everyone against everyone, in which each is governed by his own reason, and nothing he can use is incapable of helping him preserve his life against his enemies, it follows that in this condition everyone has a Right to everything, even to another person's body. Therefore, so long as this natural Right of everyone to everything endures, no one, however strong or wise, can be sure of living through the span nature ordinarily allows human beings.

Consequently, it is a precept or general rule of reason that “Everyone ought to seek peace as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, he may seek and use every help and advantage of war.” The first branch of this rule contains the first and fundamental Law of Nature: “Seek peace and follow it.” The second contains the sum of the Right of Nature: “Defend ourselves by every means we can.”

From this fundamental Law of Nature, commanding us to seek peace, is derived a second Law: “A person should be willing, when others are willing too, to lay down his right to all things, so far as he judges necessary for peace and his own defense, and be content with as much liberty against others as he would allow others against himself.” For as long as everyone keeps the Right to do anything he likes, everyone remains in the condition of war. But if others will not lay down their Right as he does, there is no reason for anyone to divest himself of his own: that would expose him as prey, which no one is bound to do, rather than dispose him to peace. This is the Law of the Gospel: “Whatever you require others to do to you, do that to them.” And it is that law of all people, “Quod tibi feiri non vis, alteri ne feceris.”

To lay down one's Right to anything is to divest oneself of the liberty of hindering another person from benefiting from his own Right to it. Someone who renounces or transfers his Right gives no other person a Right he did not already have, since everyone has by nature a Right to everything; he merely stands out of that person's way, so that the latter may enjoy his original Right without hindrance from him, though not without hindrance from someone else. Thus what one person gains when another gives up his Right is simply a reduction of impediments to the use of his own original Right.

A Right is laid aside either by simply renouncing it or by transferring it to another. One simply renounces it when one does not care who receives the benefit; one transfers it when one intends the benefit for some particular person or persons. After a person has abandoned or granted away his Right in either way, he is said to be obliged or bound not to hinder those to whom the Right is granted or abandoned from enjoying it; he ought, and it is his duty, not to undo his own voluntary act. Such hindrance is injustice and injury, being sine jure, without Right, since the Right has already been renounced or transferred. Thus injury or injustice in worldly disputes is much like what scholars call absurdity in their arguments. As contradicting what one maintained at the outset is called an absurdity in an argument, so voluntarily undoing what one voluntarily did at the outset is called injustice or injury in the world. A person simply renounces or transfers his Right by declaring or signifying, through some voluntary and sufficient sign or signs, that he does so, or has done so, to the person who accepts it. These signs may be words alone, actions alone, or—as is most often the case—both words and actions. They are the bonds by which people are bound and obliged: bonds whose strength comes not from their own nature, for nothing is more easily broken than a person's word, but from fear of some evil consequence of breaking them.

Whenever someone transfers or renounces his Right, he does so either in consideration of some Right transferred to him in return or for some other good he hopes to obtain. The act is voluntary, and every voluntary act has some good for oneself as its object. Accordingly there are certain Rights no person can be understood, by words or other signs, to have abandoned or transferred. First, no one can lay down the right to resist those who assault him by force to take his life, for no one can be understood to aim thereby at any good for himself. The same holds for wounds, chains, and imprisonment: there is no benefit in submitting to these, as there can be in allowing someone else to be wounded or imprisoned; moreover, when one sees others advancing against him with violence, one cannot know whether they intend to kill him. Finally, the motive and end of renouncing or transferring Right is nothing but the security of one's person, both life itself and the means of preserving it without becoming weary of living. Thus if someone appears by words or other signs to deprive himself of the very end for which those signs were intended, we should not understand that he meant or willed it, but that he did not know how those words and actions would be interpreted.

The mutual transferring of Right is what people call a Contract.

There is a difference between transferring the Right to a thing and transferring, or delivering, the thing itself. The thing can be delivered along with the transfer of Right, as in buying and selling for ready money, or exchanging goods or lands; or it can be delivered afterward.

Again, one of the parties to a Contract may deliver the thing he has contracted to give and leave the other to perform his part at a specified later time, trusting him meanwhile. In that case the Contract on the first party's part is called a Pact, or Covenant. Or both parties may contract now to perform later. In these cases the future performance of the trusted party is called keeping a promise, or faith; a voluntary failure to perform is a violation of faith.

When the transfer of Right is not mutual, but one party transfers it in hope of gaining friendship or service from another or his friends, or of winning a reputation for charity or magnanimity, or of relieving the pain of compassion, or of receiving a reward in heaven, this is not a Contract but a gift, free gift, or grace: words signifying the same thing.

Signs of a Contract are either express or inferred. Express signs are words spoken with an understanding of their meaning. Such words may refer to the present or past, as “I give,” “I grant,” “I have given,” “I have granted,” “I will that this be yours”; or to the future, as “I will give,” “I will grant.” These future-tense words are called a promise.

Inferred signs sometimes follow from words, sometimes from silence, sometimes from actions, and sometimes from refraining from action. In general, an inferred sign of any Contract is anything that sufficiently shows the will of the contracting party.

Words alone, if they refer to the future and contain a bare promise, are not a sufficient sign of a free gift and therefore create no obligation. For future-tense words such as “Tomorrow I will give” show that I have not yet given, and consequently that my Right has not passed but remains mine until I transfer it by some other act. But if the words refer to the present or past, as “I have given, or do give, to be delivered tomorrow,” then my Right to tomorrow's thing is given away today by force of the words, even without further evidence of my will. There is a great difference in meaning between Volos Hoc Tuum Esse Cras and Cros Dabo, that is, between “I will that this be yours tomorrow” and “I will give it to you tomorrow.” For “I will” in the former expression signifies a present act of the will; in the latter, a promise of a future act of the will. Thus the former words, spoken in the present, transfer a future right; the latter, spoken of the future, transfer nothing. If, however, there are signs besides words of the will to transfer a Right, then even a free gift may be understood to pass by future-tense words. If someone offers a prize to whoever first reaches the end of a race, the gift is free, and though his words refer to the future, the Right passes: had he not wanted his words understood in this way, he should not have let them run.

Signs of Contract Are Words Referring to the Past, Present, and Future. In Contracts, Right passes not only when the words refer to the present or past, but also when they refer to the future. Every Contract is a mutual transfer or exchange of Right. Consequently, someone who merely promises, having already received the benefit for which he promises, is understood to intend that the Right pass; otherwise the other party would not have performed first. For this reason, in buying and selling and other acts of Contract, a promise is equivalent to a Covenant and therefore binding.

ON THE FIRST AND SECOND LAWS OF NATURE, AND ON CONTRACTS

The Right of Nature, commonly called Jus Naturale by writers, is each person's freedom to use his own power as he chooses to preserve his own nature—that is, his life. He may therefore do whatever his own judgment and reason tell him is best for preserving it.

Liberty, in the word's strict sense, means the absence of outside obstacles. Such obstacles can often take away part of a person's power to do what he wants. They cannot stop him from using whatever power he has left as his judgment and reason direct.

A Law of Nature, or Lex Naturalis, is a rule discovered through reason. It forbids a person to do anything that destroys his life or takes away his means of preserving it. It also forbids him to neglect whatever he thinks will best preserve his life. Writers on this subject often confuse jus and lex, Right and law, but these should be kept distinct. A Right is freedom to do something or not do it, while a law settles the choice and binds a person to one course. Law and Right thus differ as obligation and liberty do. In the same matter, these are incompatible.

As explained in the previous chapter, humanity's natural condition is a war of everyone against everyone. Each person follows his own reason, and anything he can use may help him stay alive against his enemies. So in that condition each person has a Right to everything, even another person's body. As long as everyone keeps this natural Right to everything, no one, however strong or wise, can be sure of living as long as people normally live.

Reason therefore gives us this general rule: “Everyone should seek peace as far as he hopes to achieve it. When he cannot achieve it, he may seek and use every means and advantage of war.” The first part is the first and fundamental Law of Nature: “Seek peace and pursue it.” The second sums up the Right of Nature: “Defend ourselves by every means we can.”

The fundamental Law of Nature commands people to seek peace. From it follows a second law: “A person should be willing, when others are willing too, to give up his right to everything insofar as he thinks this necessary for peace and his own defense. He should accept only as much liberty against others as he would allow them against himself.” As long as everyone keeps the Right to do whatever he likes, everyone remains in a state of war. But if others will not give up their Right too, no one has reason to give up his own. That would leave him open to attack, which no one is required to do, instead of putting him on the path to peace. This is the law of the Gospel: “Whatever you require others to do to you, do to them.” And it is the universal rule, “Quod tibi feiri non vis, alteri ne feceris.”

To give up one's Right to something is to give up the freedom to prevent another person from using his own Right to it. Someone who renounces or transfers a Right does not give anyone else a Right they lacked before, because by nature everyone had a Right to everything. He merely steps aside so that the other person can use his original Right without interference from him, though others may still interfere. When one person gives up a Right, the benefit to another is simply that he faces fewer obstacles in using the Right he already had.

A person gives up a Right either by renouncing it outright or by transferring it to someone else. He renounces it outright when he does not care who benefits. He transfers it when he means a particular person or group to benefit. Once he has given away his Right in either way, he is obliged, or bound, not to prevent those people from enjoying it. He has a duty not to undo his own voluntary act. To interfere would be injustice and injury, or sine jure, because he has already renounced or transferred the Right. Injury or injustice in ordinary disputes resembles what scholars call an absurdity in an argument. An argument is absurd if someone contradicts the position he first defended. In ordinary life, it is unjust or injurious to undo voluntarily what one first did voluntarily. A person renounces or transfers his Right by declaring or indicating, through one or more adequate voluntary signs, that he is doing so or has done so to someone who accepts it. Those signs can be words, actions, or, most often, both. These are the bonds that oblige people. Their strength comes not from their own nature—for nothing is easier to break than a person's word—but from fear of bad consequences if the bonds are broken.

Whenever someone transfers or renounces a Right, he does so either in return for a Right transferred to him or for some other good he hopes to gain. This is a voluntary act, and the aim of everyone's voluntary actions is some good for himself. Some Rights therefore cannot be understood to have been surrendered or transferred, whatever words or other signs a person uses. First, no one can give up the right to resist someone who attacks him by force to take his life. No one could be understood to hope for any good from doing that. The same holds for wounds, chains, and imprisonment. Enduring these brings no benefit, unlike allowing someone else to be wounded or imprisoned. Also, when people use violence against a person, he cannot know whether they intend to kill him. Finally, the whole purpose of giving up and transferring Rights is to keep a person safe in his life and in the means of preserving it without becoming weary of living. If someone's words or other signs seem to strip him of the very goal those signs were meant to serve, we should not understand him to mean or want that. Rather, he did not understand how his words and actions would be interpreted.

The mutual transfer of Rights is called a contract.

Transferring a Right to a thing is different from transferring, or delivering, the thing itself. The thing can be delivered along with the Right, as when buying and selling for immediate payment or exchanging goods or land. It can also be delivered later.

One party to a contract may deliver the thing he agreed to give and trust the other to perform his part at a set later time. In that case, the contract is called a pact or Covenant from the first party's perspective. Alternatively, both parties may agree now to perform later. In either case, someone trusted to perform later is said to keep his promise, or keep faith, when he performs. If he deliberately fails, he violates faith.

Sometimes a transfer of Rights is not mutual. One person gives a Right hoping to gain friendship or service from another person or that person's friends, to gain a reputation for charity or generosity, to ease his own distress at another's suffering, or to gain a reward in heaven. This is not a contract but a gift, free gift, or act of grace. These terms mean the same thing.

Signs of a contract may be explicit or inferred. Explicit signs are words spoken with an understanding of their meaning. Such words may refer to the present or past: “I give,” “I grant,” “I have given,” “I have granted,” or “I want this to be yours.” They may refer to the future: “I will give” or “I will grant.” Words referring to the future are called promises.

An inferred sign may come from words, silence, actions, or refraining from action. More generally, anything that sufficiently shows a party's intention is an inferred sign of a contract.

Words alone that refer to the future and make a bare promise are not enough to show a free gift and do not create an obligation. If I say, “Tomorrow I will give,” this shows that I have not yet given anything. My Right has therefore not passed to anyone else and remains mine until I transfer it by another act. But if I speak of the present or past, saying, “I have given, or now give, what will be delivered tomorrow,” I give up tomorrow's Right today. The words alone can do that, even without any other evidence of my intention. There is a great difference between Volos Hoc Tuum Esse Cras and Cros Dabo—that is, between “I want this to be yours tomorrow” and “I will give it to you tomorrow.” In the first sentence, “I want” describes a present act of will. In the second, it promises a future act of will. So the first transfers a future Right now, while the second promises something in the future and transfers nothing now. But when signs besides words show an intention to transfer a Right, words about the future can transfer it even when the gift is free. For example, someone offers a prize to the first person to finish a race. This is a free gift, and his words refer to the future, yet the Right passes to the winner. If he did not mean his words to be understood that way, he should not have let the contestants run.

Words referring to the past, present, and future can all be signs of a contract: In a contract, a Right passes not only with words referring to the present or past, but also with words referring to the future. Every contract is a mutual transfer or exchange of Rights. Someone who promises after receiving the benefit for which he promises is therefore understood to intend the Right to pass. Otherwise the other party would not have performed first. For this reason, in buying, selling, and other contracts, a promise is equivalent to a Covenant and creates an obligation.