Section 58
Original German
§ 58.
Eine solche Erkenntniß ist die nach der Analogie, welche nicht etwa, wie man das Wort gemeiniglich nimmt, eine unvollkommene Ähnlichkeit zweier Dinge, sondern eine vollkommne Ähnlichkeit zweier Verhältnisse zwischen ganz unähnlichen Dingen bedeutet357.1. Vermittelst dieser Analogie bleibt doch ein für uns hinlänglich bestimmter Begriff von dem höchsten Wesen übrig, ob wir gleich alles weggelassen haben, was ihn schlechthin und an sich selbst bestimmen könnte; denn wir bestimmen ihn doch respectiv auf die Welt und mithin auf uns, und mehr ist uns auch nicht nöthig. Die Angriffe, welche Hume auf diejenigen thut, welche diesen Begriff absolut bestimmen wollen, indem sie die Materialien dazu von sich selbst und der Welt entlehnen, treffen uns nicht; auch kann er uns nicht vorwerfen, es bleibe uns gar nichts übrig, wenn man uns den objectiven Anthropomorphism von dem Begriffe des höchsten Wesens wegnähme.
Denn wenn man uns nur anfangs (wie es auch Hume in der Person des Philo gegen den Kleanth in seinen Dialogen thut) als eine nothwendige Hypothese den deistischen Begriff des Urwesens einräumt, in welchem man sich das Urwesen durch lauter ontologische Prädikate der Substanz, Ursache ꝛc. denkt (welches man thun muß, weil die Vernunft, in der Sinnenwelt durch lauter Bedingungen, die immer wiederum bedingt sind, getrieben, ohne das gar keine Befriedigung haben kann; und welches man auch füglich thun kann, ohne in den Anthropomorphism zu gerathen, der Prädicate aus der Sinnenwelt auf ein von der Welt ganz unterschiedenes Wesen überträgt, indem jene Prädicate bloße Kategorien sind, die zwar keinen bestimmten, aber auch eben dadurch keinen auf Bedingungen der Sinnlichkeit eingeschränkten Begriff desselben geben): so kann uns nichts hindern von diesem Wesen eine Causalität durch Vernunft in Ansehung der Welt zu prädiciren und so zum Theismus überzuschreiten, ohne eben genöthigt zu sein, ihm diese Vernunft an ihm selbst als eine ihm anklebende Eigenschaft beizulegen. Denn was das Erste betrifft, so ist es der einzige mögliche Weg, den Gebrauch der Vernunft in Ansehung aller möglichen Erfahrung in der Sinnenwelt durchgängig mit sich einstimmig auf den höchsten Grad zu treiben, wenn man selbst wiederum eine höchste Vernunft als eine Ursache aller Verknüpfungen in der Welt annimmt: ein solches Princip muß ihr durchgängig vortheilhaft sein, kann ihr aber nirgend in ihrem Naturgebrauche schaden. Zweitens aber wird dadurch doch die Vernunft nicht als Eigenschaft auf das Urwesen an sich selbst übertragen, sondern nur auf das Verhältniß desselben zur Sinnenwelt und also der Anthropomorphism gänzlich vermieden. Denn hier wird nur die Ursache der Vernunftform betrachtet, die in der Welt allenthalben angetroffen wird, und dem höchsten Wesen, so fern es den Grund dieser Vernunftform der Welt enthält, zwar Vernunft beigelegt, aber nur nach der Analogie, d. i. so fern dieser Ausdruck nur das Verhältniß anzeigt, was die uns unbekannte oberste Ursache zur Welt hat, um darin alles im höchsten Grade vernunftmäßig zu bestimmen. Dadurch wird nun verhütet, daß wir uns der Eigenschaft der Vernunft nicht bedienen, um Gott, sondern um die Welt vermittelst derselben so zu denken, als es nothwendig ist, um den größtmöglichen Vernunftgebrauch in Ansehung dieser nach einem Princip zu haben. Wir gestehen dadurch: daß uns das höchste Wesen nach demjenigen, was es an sich selbst sei, gänzlich unerforschlich und auf bestimmte Weise sogar undenkbar sei; und werden dadurch abgehalten, nach unseren Begriffen, die wir von der Vernunft als einer wirkenden Ursache (vermittelst des Willens) haben, keinen transscendenten Gebrauch zu machen, um die göttliche Natur durch Eigenschaften, die doch immer nur von der menschlichen Natur entlehnt sind, zu bestimmen und uns in grobe oder schwärmerische Begriffe zu verlieren, andererseits aber auch nicht die Weltbetrachtung nach unseren auf Gott übertragenden Begriffen von der menschlichen Vernunft mit hyperphysischen Erklärungsarten zu überschwemmen und von ihrer eigentlichen Bestimmung abzubringen, nach der sie ein Studium der bloßen Natur durch die Vernunft und nicht eine vermessene Ableitung ihrer Erscheinungen von einer höchsten Vernunft sein soll. Der unseren schwachen Begriffen angemessene Ausdruck wird sein: daß wir uns die Welt so denken, als ob sie von einer höchsten Vernunft ihrem Dasein und inneren Bestimmung nach abstamme, wodurch wir theils die Beschaffenheit, die ihr, der Welt, selbst zukommt, erkennen, ohne uns doch anzumaßen, die ihrer Ursache an sich selbst bestimmen zu wollen, theils andererseits in das Verhältniß der obersten Ursache zur Welt den Grund dieser Beschaffenheit (der Vernunftform in der Welt) legen, ohne die Welt dazu für sich selbst zureichend zu finden360.1.
Auf solche Weise verschwinden die Schwierigkeiten, die dem Theismus zu widerstehen scheinen, dadurch: daß man mit dem Grundsatze des Hume, den Gebrauch der Vernunft nicht über das Feld aller möglichen Erfahrung dogmatisch hinaus zu treiben, einen anderen Grundsatz verbindet, den Hume gänzlich übersah, nämlich: das Feld möglicher Erfahrung nicht für dasjenige, was in den Augen unserer Vernunft sich selbst begrenzte, anzusehen. Kritik der Vernunft bezeichnet hier den wahren Mittelweg zwischen dem Dogmatism, den Hume bekämpfte, und dem Scepticism, den er dagegen einführen wollte, einen Mittelweg, der nicht wie andere Mittelwege, die man gleichsam mechanisch (etwas von einem und etwas von dem andern) sich selbst zu bestimmen anräth, und wodurch kein Mensch eines Besseren belehrt wird, sondern einen solchen, den man nach Principien genau bestimmen kann.
357.1. So ist eine Analogie zwischen dem rechtlichen Verhältnisse menschlicher Handlungen und dem mechanischen Verhältnisse der bewegenden Kräfte: ich kann gegen einen andern niemals etwas thun, ohne ihm ein Recht zu geben, unter den nämlichen Bedingungen eben dasselbe gegen mich zu thun; eben so wie kein Körper auf einen andern mit seiner bewegenden Kraft wirken kann, ohne dadurch zu verursachen, daß der andre ihm eben so viel entgegen wirke. Hier sind Recht und bewegende Kraft ganz unähnliche Dinge, aber in ihrem Verhältnisse ist doch völlige Ähnlichkeit. Vermittelst einer solchen Analogie kann ich daher einen Verhältnißbegriff von Dingen, die mir absolut unbekannt sind, geben. Z. B. wie sich verhält die Beförderung des Glücks der Kinder = a zu der Liebe der Eltern = b, so die Wohlfahrt des menschlichen Geschlechts = c zu dem Unbekannten in Gott = x, welches wir Liebe nennen; nicht als wenn es die mindeste Ähnlichkeit mit irgend einer menschlichen Neigung hätte, sondern weil wir das Verhältniß desselben zur Welt demjenigen ähnlich setzen können, was Dinge der Welt unter einander haben. Der Verhältnißbegriff aber ist hier eine bloße Kategorie, nämlich der Begriff der Ursache, der nichts mit Sinnlichkeit zu thun hat.
360.1. Ich werde sagen: die Causalität der obersten Ursache ist dasjenige in Ansehung der Welt, was menschliche Vernunft in Ansehung ihrer Kunstwerke ist. Dabei bleibt mir die Natur der obersten Ursache selbst unbekannt; ich vergleiche nur ihre mir bekannte Wirkung (die Weltordnung) und deren Vernunftmäßigkeit mit den mir bekannten Wirkungen menschlicher Vernunft und nenne daher jene eine Vernunft, ohne darum eben dasselbe, was ich am Menschen unter diesem Ausdruck verstehe, oder sonst etwas mir Bekanntes ihr als ihre Eigenschaft beizulegen.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 58.
Such cognition is cognition by analogy. This does not mean, as the word is commonly taken, an imperfect similarity between two things, but a perfect similarity between two relations in wholly dissimilar things.357.1 Through this analogy there still remains a concept of the supreme being sufficiently determinate for us, although we have omitted everything that could determine it absolutely and in itself. For we do determine it in relation to the world, and thus to ourselves, and we need nothing more. Hume's attacks on those who wish to determine this concept absolutely, borrowing the materials for it from themselves and the world, do not touch us. Nor can he reproach us with having nothing left once objective anthropomorphism is removed from our concept of the supreme being.
For if we are only granted at the outset—as Hume, too, speaking as Philo against Cleanthes in his Dialogues, allows—the deistic concept of the original being as a necessary hypothesis, in which the original being is thought through purely ontological predicates of substance, cause, etc., then nothing can prevent us from predicating of this being a causality through reason with regard to the world, and thus passing over to theism, without being compelled to attribute this reason to it in itself as an inherent property. We must make this concession, because reason, driven through the world of sense by nothing but conditions that are always conditioned in turn, can have no satisfaction at all without it; and we can quite properly make it, without falling into anthropomorphism, which transfers predicates from the world of sense to a being entirely distinct from the world. For those predicates are mere categories, which yield no determinate concept of it, but for that very reason no concept restricted to conditions of sensibility either. As regards the first point, assuming in turn a supreme reason as a cause of all connections in the world is the only possible way to advance the use of reason with regard to all possible experience in the world of sense to the highest degree, in thoroughgoing agreement with itself. Such a principle must benefit reason throughout, and can nowhere harm it in its use in nature. Secondly, however, reason is not thereby transferred as a property to the original being in itself, but only to its relation to the world of sense, and anthropomorphism is thus entirely avoided. For here we consider only the cause of the rational form found everywhere in the world, and attribute reason to the supreme being insofar as it contains the ground of this rational form of the world, but only by analogy. That is, this expression indicates only the relation that the supreme cause, unknown to us, has to the world, so as to determine everything in it in the highest degree according to reason. This ensures that we use the property of reason not to think God, but to think the world through it in the way necessary to obtain the greatest possible use of reason with regard to the world according to one principle. We thereby acknowledge that the supreme being, as regards what it is in itself, is entirely inscrutable to us and even unthinkable in a determinate way. We are thus restrained from making a transcendent use of our concepts of reason as an efficient cause, through the will, in order to determine the divine nature through properties that are, after all, always borrowed only from human nature, and from losing ourselves in crude or visionary concepts. On the other hand, we are also restrained from flooding our contemplation of the world with hyperphysical modes of explanation according to our concepts of human reason transferred to God, and from diverting it from its proper vocation: to be a study of mere nature through reason, not a presumptuous derivation of its appearances from a supreme reason. The expression suited to our weak concepts will be that we think the world as if, in its existence and inner determination, it originated from a supreme reason. In this way we partly cognize the constitution belonging to the world itself, without presuming to determine that of its cause in itself; and partly, on the other hand, place the ground of this constitution, the rational form in the world, in the relation of the supreme cause to the world, without finding the world sufficient for this on its own.360.1
In this way the difficulties that seem to oppose theism disappear: we combine Hume's principle of not driving the use of reason dogmatically beyond the field of all possible experience with another principle that Hume entirely overlooked, namely, not to regard the field of possible experience as something that bounds itself in the eyes of our reason. Here the critique of reason marks the true middle way between the dogmatism that Hume opposed and the skepticism he wished to introduce in its place. This is not like other middle ways that one is advised to determine for oneself more or less mechanically—a little from one side and a little from the other—by which no one is taught anything better; rather, it is a middle way that can be determined precisely according to principles.
357.1. Thus there is an analogy between the juridical relation of human actions and the mechanical relation of motive forces: I can never do anything to another without giving them a right to do the very same to me under the same conditions, just as no body can act on another with its motive force without thereby causing the other to react against it with an equal force. Here right and motive force are entirely dissimilar things, yet in their relation there is complete similarity. Through such an analogy I can therefore give a relational concept of things that are absolutely unknown to me. For example, as the promotion of children's happiness = a stands to parental love = b, so the welfare of the human race = c stands to the unknown in God = x, which we call love. This is not as though it had the slightest similarity to any human inclination, but because we can regard its relation to the world as similar to the relation things in the world have to one another. The relational concept here, however, is a mere category, namely the concept of cause, which has nothing to do with sensibility.
360.1. I will say: the causality of the supreme cause is, with regard to the world, what human reason is with regard to the works of its skill. The nature of the supreme cause itself thereby remains unknown to me; I compare only its effect known to me—the order of the world—and the rationality of that effect with the effects of human reason known to me, and therefore call the supreme cause a reason, without thereby attributing to it as its property precisely what I understand by this expression in human beings, or anything else known to me.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 58.
This kind of cognition is cognition by analogy. Here analogy does not mean, as the word commonly does, an imperfect similarity between two things. It means a perfect similarity between two relations involving things entirely unlike one another.357.1 Through this analogy, a concept of the supreme being remains that is sufficiently determinate for us, even though we have left out everything that could determine it absolutely and in itself. For we still determine it in relation to the world, and thus to ourselves. We need nothing more. Hume's attacks on those who want to determine this concept absolutely, borrowing the materials from themselves and the world, do not affect us. Nor can he accuse us of being left with nothing at all once objective anthropomorphism is removed from the concept of the supreme being.
Suppose, at the outset, we are allowed the deistic concept of the original being as a necessary hypothesis. Hume himself allows this in his Dialogues, speaking as Philo against Cleanthes. In this concept, the original being is thought solely through ontological predicates such as substance and cause. We must do this, because reason is driven through the world of sense by nothing but conditions that are always conditioned in turn. Without this hypothesis it can find no satisfaction. And we can quite legitimately do this without falling into anthropomorphism, which transfers predicates from the world of sense to a being entirely distinct from the world. For those predicates are mere categories. They give no determinate concept of the being, but for that very reason give no concept restricted to conditions of sensibility either. Nothing, then, can prevent us from attributing to this being causality through reason in relation to the world, and so moving on to theism, without being compelled to attribute this reason to it in itself as an inherent property. On the first point, this is the only possible way to develop the use of reason in relation to all possible experience in the world of sense to the highest degree, in complete agreement with itself: we in turn assume a supreme reason as the cause of all connections in the world. Such a principle must benefit reason throughout, and can never harm its use in nature. Second, however, reason is not thereby transferred as a property to the original being in itself, but only to its relation to the world of sense. Anthropomorphism is thus completely avoided. For here we consider only the cause of the rational form found everywhere in the world. We attribute reason to the supreme being insofar as it contains the ground of this rational form of the world, but only by analogy. That is, the expression indicates only the relation that the supreme cause, unknown to us, has to the world, determining everything in it in the most rational way. This keeps us from using the property of reason to think of God. Instead, we use it to think of the world as we must in order to make the greatest possible use of reason regarding it, according to a principle. We thereby admit that what the supreme being is in itself is wholly beyond our investigation, and cannot even be thought in a determinate way. This keeps us from making a transcendent use of our concepts of reason as an efficient cause through the will. We do not determine the divine nature through properties that are always borrowed only from human nature, and so lose ourselves in crude or fanciful concepts. On the other side, it also keeps us from flooding our study of the world with explanations beyond nature, based on our concepts of human reason transferred to God. We do not divert this study from its proper purpose: to be a study of nature alone through reason, not a presumptuous derivation of its appearances from a supreme reason. The expression suited to our weak concepts will be this: we think of the world as if it derived its existence and inner determination from a supreme reason. In this way we partly come to know the character belonging to the world itself, without presuming to determine the character of its cause in itself. On the other side, we place the ground of this character—the rational form in the world—in the relation of the supreme cause to the world, without finding the world sufficient for it on its own.360.1
In this way, the difficulties that seem to stand against theism disappear. We combine Hume's principle—not to extend the use of reason dogmatically beyond the field of all possible experience—with another principle that Hume entirely overlooked: we must not regard the field of possible experience as something that sets its own boundaries in the eyes of our reason. Here the critique of reason marks out the true middle way between the dogmatism Hume opposed and the skepticism he wanted to introduce in its place. This is not like other middle ways, which people recommend determining for oneself in a more or less mechanical fashion—a little from one side, a little from the other—and which teach no one anything better. It is a middle way that can be determined precisely according to principles.
357.1. For example, there is an analogy between the legal relation of human actions and the mechanical relation of moving forces. I can never do something to someone else without giving that person a right to do the very same to me under the same conditions. Likewise, no body can act on another with its moving force without thereby causing the other to react against it with an equal force. Here, right and moving force are entirely unlike things, but their relation is perfectly similar. Through such an analogy I can therefore give a relational concept of things absolutely unknown to me. For example: promoting children's happiness = a relates to parental love = b as the welfare of the human race = c relates to the unknown in God = x, which we call love. This does not mean it has the slightest similarity to any human inclination. Rather, we can represent its relation to the world as similar to the relation things within the world have to one another. Here the relational concept is a mere category: the concept of cause, which has nothing to do with sensibility.
360.1. I will say: the causality of the supreme cause is to the world what human reason is to the works of its skill. The nature of the supreme cause itself remains unknown to me. I compare only its known effect, the order of the world, and that effect's rational character, with the known effects of human reason. I therefore call the supreme cause a reason. But I do not thereby attribute to it, as its property, the very same thing I mean by this expression in human beings, or anything else known to me.
About this section
Section 58 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 68 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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