Section 3
Original German
§ 3.
Anmerkung
zur allgemeinen Eintheilung der Urtheile in analytische und synthetische.
Diese Eintheilung ist in Ansehung der Kritik des menschlichen Verstandes unentbehrlich und verdient daher in ihr classisch zu sein; sonst wüßte ich nicht, daß sie irgend anderwärts einen beträchtlichen Nutzen hätte. Und hierin finde ich auch die Ursache, weswegen dogmatische Philosophen, die die Quellen metaphysischer Urtheile immer nur in der Metaphysik selbst, nicht aber außer ihr, in den reinen Vernunftgesetzen überhaupt, suchten, diese Eintheilung, die sich von selbst darzubieten scheint, vernachlässigten und wie der berühmte Wolff, oder der seinen Fußstapfen folgende scharfsinnige Baumgarten den Beweis von dem Satze des zureichenden Grundes, der offenbar synthetisch ist, im Satze des Widerspruchs suchen konnten. Dagegen treffe ich schon in Lockes Versuchen über den menschlichen Verstand einen Wink zu dieser Eintheilung an. Denn im vierten Buch, dem dritten Hauptstück § 9 u. f., nachdem er schon vorher von der verschiedenen Verknüpfung der Vorstellungen in Urtheilen und deren Quellen geredet hatte, wovon er die eine in der Identität oder Widerspruch setzt (analytische Urtheile), die andere aber in der Existenz der Vorstellungen in einem Subject (synthetische Urtheile), so gesteht er § 10, daß unsere Erkenntniß (a priori) von der letztern sehr enge und beinahe gar nichts sei. Allein es herrscht in dem, was er von dieser Art der Erkenntniß sagt, so wenig Bestimmtes und auf Regeln Gebrachtes, daß man sich nicht wundern darf, wenn niemand, sonderlich nicht einmal Hume Anlaß daher genommen hat, über Sätze dieser Art Betrachtungen anzustellen. Denn dergleichen allgemeine und dennoch bestimmte Principien lernt man nicht leicht von andern, denen sie nur dunkel obgeschwebt haben. Man muß durch eigenes Nachdenken zuvor selbst darauf gekommen sein, hernach findet man sie auch anderwärts, wo man sie gewiß nicht zuerst würde angetroffen haben, weil die Verfasser selbst nicht einmal wußten, daß ihren eigenen Bemerkungen eine solche Idee zum Grunde liege. Die, so niemals selbst denken, besitzen dennoch die Scharfsichtigkeit, alles, nachdem es ihnen gezeigt worden, in demjenigen, was sonst schon gesagt worden, aufzuspähen, wo es doch vorher niemand sehen konnte.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 3.
Remark
On the General Division of Judgments into Analytic and Synthetic.
This division is indispensable for the critique of the human understanding, and therefore deserves to become canonical within it; otherwise I know of no considerable use it would have anywhere else. Here, too, I find the reason why dogmatic philosophers—who always sought the sources of metaphysical judgments only within metaphysics itself, and not outside it in the laws of pure reason in general—neglected this division, which seems to offer itself of its own accord. They could thus, like the celebrated Wolff or the acute Baumgarten who followed in his footsteps, seek in the principle of contradiction a proof of the principle of sufficient reason, which is plainly synthetic. In Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, by contrast, I already find a hint of this division. For in Book Four, Chapter Three, § 9 and following—having already spoken earlier of the different connections of representations in judgments and of their sources, placing one in identity or contradiction (analytic judgments) and the other in the existence of representations in a subject (synthetic judgments)—he admits in § 10 that our cognition (a priori) of the latter is very limited, and almost nothing. Yet what he says of this kind of cognition is so little determined or brought under rules that we should not be surprised that no one, notably not even Hume, took it as an occasion to reflect on propositions of this kind. For principles that are at once so universal and so determinate are not readily learned from others who had only a dim intimation of them. We must first have arrived at them through our own reflection; afterward we find them elsewhere too, where we certainly would not have encountered them first, since the authors themselves did not even know that such an idea underlay their own observations. Those who never think for themselves nevertheless possess the acumen to ferret out everything, once it has been shown to them, in what was said before, where no one could previously see it.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 3.
Remark
on the General Division of Judgments into Analytic and Synthetic.
This division is indispensable for the critique of human understanding and therefore deserves an established place in it. Otherwise, I know of no considerable use it would have anywhere else. I also find here the reason why dogmatic philosophers neglected this division, which seems to offer itself naturally. They always sought the sources of metaphysical judgments in metaphysics itself, not outside it in the general laws of pure reason. Thus the famous Wolff, or the perceptive Baumgarten who followed in his footsteps, could look in the principle of contradiction for a proof of the principle of sufficient reason, which is plainly synthetic. By contrast, I already find a hint of this division in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Earlier in the work, he had already discussed the different connections of representations in judgments and their sources. There he places one source in identity or contradiction (analytic judgments), the other in the existence of representations in a subject (synthetic judgments). Then, in the fourth book, third chapter, § 9 u. f., he admits at § 10 that our cognition (a priori) of the latter is very restricted and amounts to almost nothing. But there is so little that is definite or brought under rules in what he says about this kind of cognition that we need not be surprised that no one, not even Hume in particular, took it as an occasion to reflect on propositions of this kind. We do not readily learn principles that are both general and definite from others who had only an obscure sense of them. We must first reach them ourselves through our own reflection. After that we also find them elsewhere, where we certainly would not have discovered them first, because the authors themselves did not even know that such an idea underlay their own observations. People who never think for themselves nevertheless have the sharp sight needed to track down everything, once it has been shown to them, in what was said before—where no one could previously see it.
About this section
Section 3 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 6 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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