Section 39
Original German
§ 39.
Anhang
zur reinen Naturwissenschaft.Von dem System der Kategorien.
Es kann einem Philosophen nichts erwünschter sein, als wenn er das Mannigfaltige der Begriffe oder Grundsätze, die sich ihm vorher durch den Gebrauch, den er von ihnen in concreto gemacht hatte, zerstreut dargestellt hatten, aus einem Princip a priori ableiten und alles auf solche Weise in eine Erkenntniß vereinigen kann. Vorher glaubte er nur, daß, was ihm nach einer gewissen Abstraction übrig blieb und durch Vergleichung unter einander eine besondere Art von Erkenntnissen auszumachen schien, vollständig gesammlet sei, aber es war nur ein Aggregat; jetzt weiß er, daß gerade nur so viel, nicht mehr, nicht weniger, die Erkenntnißart ausmachen könne, und sah die Nothwendigkeit seiner Eintheilung ein, welches ein Begreifen ist, und nun hat er allererst ein System.
Aus dem gemeinen Erkenntnisse die Begriffe heraussuchen, welche gar keine besondere Erfahrung zum Grunde liegen haben und gleichwohl in aller Erfahrungserkenntniß vorkommen, von der sie gleichsam die bloße Form der Verknüpfung ausmachen, setzte kein größeres Nachdenken oder mehr Einsicht voraus, als aus einer Sprache Regeln des wirklichen Gebrauchs der Wörter überhaupt heraussuchen und so Elemente zu einer Grammatik zusammentragen (in der That sind beide Untersuchungen einander auch sehr nahe verwandt), ohne doch eben Grund angeben zu können, warum eine jede Sprache gerade diese und keine andere formale Beschaffenheit habe, noch weniger aber, daß gerade so viel, nicht mehr noch weniger, solcher formalen Bestimmungen derselben überhaupt angetroffen werden können.
Aristoteles hatte zehn solcher reinen Elementarbegriffe unter dem Namen der Kategorien323.1 zusammengetragen. Diesen, welche auch Prädicamente genannt wurden, sah er sich hernach genöthigt, noch fünf Postprädicamente beizufügen323.2, die doch zum Theil schon in jenen liegen (als prius, simul, motus); allein diese Rhapsodie konnte mehr für einen Wink für den künftigen Nachforscher, als für eine regelmäßig ausgeführte Idee gelten und Beifall verdienen, daher sie auch bei mehrerer Aufklärung der Philosophie als ganz unnütz verworfen worden.
Bei einer Untersuchung der reinen (nichts Empirisches enthaltenden) Elemente der menschlichen Erkenntniß gelang es mir allererst nach langem Nachdenken, die reinen Elementarbegriffe der Sinnlichkeit (Raum und Zeit) von denen des Verstandes mit Zuverlässigkeit zu unterscheiden und abzusondern. Dadurch wurden nun aus jenem Register die 7te, 8te, 9te Kategorie ausgeschlossen. Die übrigen konnten mir zu nichts nutzen, weil kein Princip vorhanden war, nach welchem der Verstand völlig ausgemessen und alle Functionen desselben, daraus seine reine Begriffe entspringen, vollzählig und mit Präcision bestimmt werden könnten.
Um aber ein solches Princip auszufinden, sah ich mich nach einer Verstandeshandlung um, die alle übrige enthält und sich nur durch verschiedene Modificationen oder Momente unterscheidet, das Mannigfaltige der Vorstellung unter die Einheit des Denkens überhaupt zu bringen, und da fand ich, diese Verstandeshandlung bestehe im Urtheilen. Hier lag nun schon fertige, obgleich noch nicht ganz von Mängeln freie Arbeit der Logiker vor mir, dadurch ich in den Stand gesetzt wurde, eine vollständige Tafel reiner Verstandesfunctionen, die aber in Ansehung alles Objects unbestimmt waren, darzustellen. Ich bezog endlich diese Functionen zu urtheilen auf Objecte überhaupt, oder vielmehr auf die Bedingung, Urtheile als objectiv-gültig zu bestimmen, und es entsprangen reine Verstandesbegriffe, bei denen ich außer Zweifel sein konnte, daß gerade nur diese und ihrer nur so viel, nicht mehr noch weniger, unser ganzes Erkenntniß der Dinge aus bloßem Verstande ausmachen können. Ich nannte sie wie billig nach ihrem alten Namen Kategorien, wobei ich mir vorbehielt, alle von diesen abzuleitende Begriffe, es sei durch Verknüpfung unter einander, oder mit der reinen Form der Erscheinung (Raum und Zeit), oder mit ihrer Materie, so fern sie noch nicht empirisch bestimmt ist (Gegenstand der Empfindung überhaupt), unter der Benennung der Prädicabilien vollständig hinzuzufügen, so bald ein System der transscendentalen Philosophie, zu deren Behuf ich es jetzt nur mit der Kritik der Vernunft selbst zu thun hatte, zu Stande kommen sollte.
Das Wesentliche aber in diesem System der Kategorien, dadurch es sich von jener alten Rhapsodie, die ohne alles Princip fortging, unterscheidet, und warum es auch allein zur Philosophie gezählt zu werden verdient, besteht darin: daß vermittelst desselben die wahre Bedeutung der reinen Verstandesbegriffe und die Bedingung ihres Gebrauchs genau bestimmt werden konnte. Denn da zeigte sich, daß sie für sich selbst nichts als logische Functionen sind, als solche aber nicht den mindesten Begriff von einem Objecte an sich selbst ausmachen, sondern es bedürfen, daß sinnliche Anschauung zum Grunde liege, und alsdann nur dazu dienen, empirische Urtheile, die sonst in Ansehung aller Functionen zu urtheilen unbestimmt und gleichgültig sind, in Ansehung derselben zu bestimmen, ihnen dadurch Allgemeingültigkeit zu verschaffen und vermittelst ihrer Erfahrungsurtheile überhaupt möglich zu machen.
Von einer solchen Einsicht in die Natur der Kategorien, die sie zugleich auf den bloßen Erfahrungsgebrauch einschränkte, ließ sich weder ihr erster Urheber, noch irgend einer nach ihm etwas einfallen; aber ohne diese Einsicht (die ganz genau von der Ableitung oder Deduction derselben abhängt) sind sie gänzlich unnütz und ein elendes Namenregister ohne Erklärung und Regel ihres Gebrauchs. Wäre dergleichen jemals den Alten in den Sinn gekommen, ohne Zweifel das ganze Studium der reinen Vernunfterkenntniß, welches unter dem Namen Metaphysik viele Jahrhunderte hindurch so manchen guten Kopf verdorben hat, wäre in ganz anderer Gestalt zu uns gekommen und hätte den Verstand der Menschen aufgeklärt, anstatt ihn, wie wirklich geschehen ist, in düstern und vergeblichen Grübeleien zu erschöpfen und für wahre Wissenschaft unbrauchbar zu machen.
Dieses System der Kategorien macht nun alle Behandlung eines jeden Gegenstandes der reinen Vernunft selbst wiederum systematisch und giebt eine ungezweifelte Anweisung oder Leitfaden ab, wie und durch welche Punkte der Untersuchung jede metaphysische Betrachtung, wenn sie vollständig werden soll, müsse geführt werden: denn es erschöpft alle Momente des Verstandes, unter welche jeder andere Begriff gebracht werden muß. So ist auch die Tafel der Grundsätze entstanden, von deren Vollständigkeit man nur durch das System der Kategorien gewiß sein kann; und selbst in der Eintheilung der Begriffe, welche über den physiologischen Verstandesgebrauch hinausgehen sollen, (Kritik S. 344, imgleichen S. 415) ist es immer derselbe Leitfaden, der, weil er immer durch dieselbe feste, im menschlichen Verstande a priori bestimmte Punkte geführt werden muß, jederzeit einen geschlossenen Kreis bildet, der keinen Zweifel übrig läßt, daß der Gegenstand eines reinen Verstandes- oder Vernunftbegriffs, so fern er philosophisch und nach Grundsätzen a priori erwogen werden soll, auf solche Weise vollständig erkannt werden könne. Ich habe sogar nicht unterlassen können, von dieser Leitung in Ansehung einer der abstractesten ontologischen Eintheilungen, nämlich der mannigfaltigen Unterscheidung der Begriffe von Etwas und Nichts, Gebrauch zu machen und darnach eine regelmäßige und nothwendige Tafel (Kritik S. 292) zu Stande zu bringen325.1.
Eben dieses System zeigt seinen nicht gnug anzupreisenden Gebrauch, so wie jedes auf ein allgemeines Princip gegründete wahre System auch darin, daß es alle fremdartige Begriffe, die sich sonst zwischen jene reine Verstandesbegriffe einschleichen möchten, ausstößt und jedem Erkenntniß seine Stelle bestimmt. Diejenige Begriffe, welche ich unter dem Namen der Reflexionsbegriffe gleichfalls nach dem Leitfaden der Kategorien in eine Tafel gebracht hatte, mengen sich in der Ontologie ohne Vergünstigung und rechtmäßige Ansprüche unter die reinen Verstandesbegriffe, obgleich diese Begriffe der Verknüpfung und dadurch des Objects selbst, jene aber nur der bloßen Vergleichung schon gegebener Begriffe sind und daher eine ganz andere Natur und Gebrauch haben; durch meine gesetzmäßige Eintheilung (Kritik S. 260) werden sie aus diesem Gemenge geschieden. Noch viel heller aber leuchtet der Nutzen jener abgesonderten Tafel der Kategorien in die Augen, wenn wir, wie es gleich jetzt geschehen wird, die Tafel transscendentaler Vernunftbegriffe, die von ganz anderer Natur und Ursprung sind, als jene Verstandesbegriffe (daher auch eine andre Form haben muß), von jenen trennen, welche so nothwendige Absonderung doch niemals in irgend einem System der Metaphysik geschehen ist, wo daher jene Vernunftideen mit Verstandesbegriffen, als gehörten sie wie Geschwister zu einer Familie, ohne Unterschied durch einander laufen, welche Vermengung in Ermangelung eines besondern Systems der Kategorien auch niemals vermieden werden konnte.
323.1. 1. Substantia. 2. Qualitas. 3. Quantitas. 4. Relatio. 5. Actio. 6. Passio. 7. Quando. 8. Ubi. 9. Situs. 10. Habitus.
323.2. Oppositum, Prius, Simul, Motus, Habere.
325.1. Über eine vorgelegte Tafel der Kategorien lassen sich allerlei artige Anmerkungen machen, als 1) daß die dritte aus der ersten und zweiten in einen Begriff verbunden entspringe, 2) daß in denen von der Größe und Qualität blos ein Fortschritt von der Einheit zur Allheit, oder von dem Etwas zum Nichts (zu diesem Behuf müssen die Kategorien der Qualität so stehen: Realität, Einschränkung, völlige Negation) fortgehen, ohne correlata oder opposita, dagegen die der Relation und Modalität diese letztere bei sich führen, 3) daß so wie im Logischen kategorische Urtheile allen andern zum Grunde liegen, so die Kategorie der Substanz allen Begriffen von wirklichen Dingen, 4) daß, so wie die Modalität im Urtheile kein besonderes Prädicat ist, so auch die Modalbegriffe keine Bestimmung zu Dingen hinzuthun, u. s. w.; dergleichen Betrachtungen alle ihren großen Nutzen haben. Zählt man überdem alle Prädicabilien auf, die man ziemlich vollständig aus jeder guten Ontologie (z. E. Baumgartens) ziehen kann, und ordnet sie classenweise unter die Kategorien, wobei man nicht versäumen muß, eine so vollständige Vergliederung aller dieser Begriffe als möglich hinzuzufügen, so wird ein blos analytischer Theil der Metaphysik entspringen, der noch gar keinen synthetischen Satz enthält und vor dem zweiten (dem synthetischen) vorhergehen könnte und durch seine Bestimmtheit und Vollständigkeit nicht allein Nutzen, sondern vermöge des Systematischen in ihm noch überdem eine gewisse Schönheit enthalten würde.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 39.
Appendix
to Pure Natural Science.On the System of Categories.
Nothing can be more welcome to a philosopher than to be able to derive from a single a priori principle the manifold of concepts or principles that had previously appeared scattered through the use he had made of them in concreto, and in this way unite everything in a single cognition. Previously he merely believed that what remained to him after a certain abstraction, and seemed through mutual comparison to constitute a particular kind of cognition, had been collected in its entirety; but it was only an aggregate. Now he knows that precisely this much, neither more nor less, can constitute that kind of cognition, and sees the necessity of his division, which is comprehension; only now does he have a system.
To seek out from common cognition the concepts that have no particular experience at their foundation, yet occur in all experiential cognition, of which they constitute, as it were, the mere form of connection, required no greater reflection or insight than to seek out from a language the rules of the actual use of words in general, and so collect elements for a grammar. In fact, the two investigations are very closely related. Yet this does not enable us to give a reason why each language has precisely this formal constitution and no other, still less why precisely this many formal determinations of it, neither more nor less, can be found in general.
Aristotle had collected ten such pure elementary concepts under the name of categories.323.1 To these, which were also called predicaments, he later found himself compelled to add five postpredicaments,323.2 some of which are already contained in the former (such as prius, simul, motus). But this rhapsody could count, and deserve approval, more as a hint for future investigators than as a systematically developed idea; hence, with the further enlightenment of philosophy, it was rejected as entirely useless.
In investigating the pure elements of human cognition—those containing nothing empirical—I succeeded, only after long reflection, in reliably distinguishing and separating the pure elementary concepts of sensibility (space and time) from those of the understanding. This excluded the 7th, 8th, and 9th categories from that list. The remainder could be of no use to me, because there was no principle by which the understanding could be fully measured and all its functions, from which its pure concepts arise, could be determined completely and precisely.
To discover such a principle, however, I looked for an act of the understanding that contains all the others and differs only through various modifications or moments in bringing the manifold of representation under the unity of thinking in general. I found that this act of the understanding consists in judging. Here the logicians' work lay ready before me, though not yet entirely free of defects, and enabled me to present a complete table of pure functions of the understanding, which were, however, undetermined with respect to any object. Finally I referred these functions of judging to objects in general, or rather to the condition for determining judgments as objectively valid, and pure concepts of the understanding arose. Of these I could be certain beyond doubt that precisely these concepts, and only this many, neither more nor less, can constitute our entire cognition of things from the understanding alone. I rightly called them by their old name, categories, reserving the task of adding in full, under the name of predicables, all concepts derivable from them: whether by combination with one another, with the pure form of appearance (space and time), or with its matter insofar as this is not yet empirically determined (the object of sensation in general). This would be done as soon as a system of transcendental philosophy should be established, in preparation for which I was now concerned only with the critique of reason itself.
But what is essential in this system of categories, what distinguishes it from that old rhapsody, which proceeded without any principle, and why it alone deserves to be counted as philosophy, consists in this: by its means, the true meaning of the pure concepts of the understanding and the condition of their use could be precisely determined. For it became evident that in themselves they are nothing but logical functions, and as such do not constitute the slightest concept of an object in itself. Rather, they require sensible intuition as their foundation, and then serve only to determine empirical judgments with respect to the functions of judging—judgments otherwise undetermined and indifferent with respect to all these functions—thereby giving them universal validity and by their means making judgments of experience in general possible.
Neither their first author nor anyone after him ever conceived of such an insight into the nature of the categories, which at the same time restricted them to mere use in experience. But without this insight, which depends entirely upon their derivation or deduction, they are wholly useless: a wretched list of names without explanation or rule for their use. Had anything of the kind ever occurred to the ancients, the entire study of pure rational cognition, which under the name of metaphysics has ruined so many fine minds over many centuries, would doubtless have come down to us in quite a different form. It would have enlightened human understanding instead of exhausting it, as actually happened, in dark and fruitless brooding, and making it unfit for true science.
This system of categories in turn makes every treatment of any object of pure reason itself systematic, and supplies an indubitable direction or guiding thread as to how, and through which points of investigation, every metaphysical inquiry must be conducted if it is to be complete. For it exhausts all the moments of the understanding under which every other concept must be brought. This is also how the table of principles arose, of whose completeness we can be certain only through the system of categories. Even in the division of concepts that are supposed to go beyond the physiological use of the understanding (Critique, p. 344, and likewise p. 415), it is always the same guiding thread. Since it must always be carried through the same fixed points, determined a priori in the human understanding, it always forms a closed circle, leaving no doubt that the object of a pure concept of the understanding or of reason, insofar as it is to be considered philosophically and according to a priori principles, can be completely cognized in this way. I could not even refrain from using this guidance with respect to one of the most abstract ontological divisions, namely the manifold distinction between the concepts of Something and Nothing, and from producing accordingly a systematic and necessary table (Critique, p. 292).325.1
This same system, like every true system grounded on a universal principle, also displays its usefulness, which cannot be praised enough, in excluding all alien concepts that might otherwise slip in among those pure concepts of the understanding, and assigning every cognition its place. The concepts that I likewise arranged in a table, following the guiding thread of the categories, under the name of concepts of reflection, mingle in ontology, without permission or legitimate claim, among the pure concepts of the understanding. Yet the latter are concepts of connection, and thereby of the object itself, whereas the former are concepts only of the mere comparison of concepts already given, and hence have an entirely different nature and use. Through my division according to law (Critique, p. 260), they are separated from this mixture. But the advantage of that separate table of categories becomes still more striking when, as will happen immediately, we distinguish from it the table of transcendental concepts of reason, which are of an entirely different nature and origin from those concepts of the understanding, and must therefore also have a different form. Yet this indispensable separation has never been made in any system of metaphysics, where those ideas of reason consequently run indiscriminately together with concepts of the understanding, as though they belonged like siblings to one family. In the absence of a distinct system of categories, this confusion could never have been avoided.
323.1. 1. Substantia. 2. Qualitas. 3. Quantitas. 4. Relatio. 5. Actio. 6. Passio. 7. Quando. 8. Ubi. 9. Situs. 10. Habitus.
323.2. Oppositum, Prius, Simul, Motus, Habere.
325.1. All manner of interesting observations can be made about a presented table of categories. For instance: 1) that the third arises from the first and second combined in one concept; 2) that in the categories of magnitude and quality there is merely a progression from unity to totality, or from Something to Nothing—for this purpose the categories of quality must stand in this order: reality, limitation, complete negation—without correlata or opposita, whereas those of relation and modality carry these latter with them; 3) that just as in logic categorical judgments underlie all the others, so the category of substance underlies all concepts of actual things; 4) that just as modality is no special predicate in a judgment, so the modal concepts add no determination to things; and so on. All such observations have their great usefulness. If, moreover, we enumerate all the predicables, which can be drawn fairly completely from any good ontology—for example, Baumgarten's—and arrange them by classes under the categories, taking care to add as complete an articulation of all these concepts as possible, a merely analytic part of metaphysics will arise. This will contain no synthetic proposition as yet and could precede the second, synthetic part; through its definiteness and completeness it would possess not only usefulness, but, by virtue of its systematic character, a certain beauty as well.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 39.
Appendix
to pure natural science.On the system of categories.
Nothing can be more welcome to a philosopher than being able to derive a variety of concepts or principles from one a priori principle, and in this way bring them all together in one cognition. Before, they had appeared scattered as he used them in concrete cases. He merely believed that he had collected all the concepts left over after a certain abstraction, which, when compared with one another, seemed to make up a special kind of cognition. But this was only an aggregate. Now he knows that just this many concepts, no more and no fewer, can make up that kind of cognition. He understands the necessity of his division, and this is genuine comprehension. Only now does he have a system.
Consider the task of picking out, from ordinary cognition, the concepts that are not based on any particular experience but still occur in all experiential cognition, of which they make up, so to speak, the mere form of connection. This required no more reflection or insight than picking out from a language the rules for the actual use of words in general, and so gathering elements for a grammar. Indeed, the two investigations are very closely related. Yet this does not let us explain why each language has precisely this formal constitution and no other. Still less does it show that precisely this many formal determinations of language in general can be found, no more and no fewer.
Aristotle had collected ten such pure elementary concepts under the name of categories.323.1 Later he found it necessary to add five postpredicaments to these concepts, which were also called predicaments.323.2 Some of the additions, however, are already contained in the earlier ones, such as priority, simultaneity, and motion. But this patchwork could count as, and deserve approval as, a hint for future investigators rather than a systematically worked-out idea. So, as philosophy became more enlightened, it was rejected as entirely useless.
While investigating the pure elements of human cognition, which contain nothing empirical, I succeeded only after long reflection in reliably distinguishing and separating the pure elementary concepts of sensibility—space and time—from those of the understanding. This excluded the 7th, 8th, and 9th categories from that list. The remaining ones were of no use to me. For there was no principle by which the understanding could be fully surveyed, and all its functions, from which its pure concepts arise, could be determined completely and precisely.
To find such a principle, I looked for an act of the understanding that contains all the others. It would differ only through various modifications or functions in bringing the manifold content of representation under the unity of thinking in general. I found that this act of the understanding consists in judging. Here the logicians had already done the work, though it was not yet entirely free of defects. This enabled me to present a complete table of pure functions of the understanding, though these were undetermined with respect to any object. Finally, I related these functions of judging to objects in general, or rather to the condition for determining judgments as objectively valid. Pure concepts of the understanding arose from this. I could be certain beyond doubt that just these concepts, and just this many, no more and no fewer, can make up all our cognition of things through the understanding alone. I rightly called them by their old name, categories. I reserved the task of adding, under the name of predicables, a complete list of all the concepts that can be derived from them. These may be derived by connecting the categories with one another, with the pure form of appearance, space and time, or with its matter insofar as it is not yet empirically determined, that is, the object of sensation in general. I would add these as soon as a system of transcendental philosophy was achieved. In preparation for that system, my present concern was only with the critique of reason itself.
But the essential feature of this system of categories, which distinguishes it from that old patchwork put together without any principle, is this: it made it possible to determine exactly the true meaning of the pure concepts of the understanding and the condition for using them. This is also why it alone deserves to count as philosophy. For it showed that, taken by themselves, the categories are nothing but logical functions. As such, they do not provide the slightest concept of an object in itself. Instead, they require an underlying sensible intuition. Then they serve only to determine empirical judgments with respect to the functions of judging. Otherwise those judgments are undetermined and indifferent with respect to all these functions. In this way the categories give them universal validity and, through them, make judgments of experience in general possible.
Such an insight into the nature of the categories, which also restricted them to use in experience alone, never occurred either to their first author or to anyone after him. But without this insight, which depends entirely on their derivation or deduction, they are completely useless. They are a miserable list of names without explanation or a rule for their use. Had anything like this ever occurred to the ancients, there is no doubt that the whole study of pure rational cognition would have come down to us in a quite different form. Under the name of metaphysics, that study has spoiled so many fine minds over many centuries. Instead, it would have enlightened human understanding, rather than exhausting it in dark and futile brooding and making it unfit for true science, as actually happened.
This system of categories now makes every treatment of any object of pure reason itself systematic in turn. It provides an unquestionable instruction or guide to how every metaphysical inquiry must proceed, and through which points of investigation, if it is to be complete. For it exhausts all the functions of the understanding under which every other concept must be brought. This is also how the table of principles arose. Only through the system of categories can we be certain that it is complete. Even in dividing concepts that are supposed to go beyond the understanding's use in natural science (Critique, p. 344, and also p. 415), it is always the same guide. It must always pass through the same fixed points, determined a priori in the human understanding. It therefore always forms a closed circle. This leaves no doubt that the object of a pure concept of the understanding or of reason, insofar as it is to be considered philosophically and according to a priori principles, can in this way be completely known. I could not even forgo using this guidance for one of the most abstract ontological divisions: the various distinctions between the concepts of something and nothing. Following it, I produced a systematic and necessary table (Critique, p. 292).325.1
Like every true system founded on a universal principle, this system also shows its inestimable usefulness by excluding all foreign concepts that might otherwise slip in among those pure concepts of the understanding, and by assigning each cognition its place. I had likewise used the categories as a guide to arrange in a table the concepts I called concepts of reflection. In ontology, these mingle with the pure concepts of the understanding without permission or legitimate claim. Yet the pure concepts of the understanding are concepts of connection, and through that, of the object itself. Concepts of reflection are only concepts for comparing concepts already given, and therefore have a quite different nature and use. My systematic division (Critique, p. 260) separates them out from this mixture. But the usefulness of that separate table of categories becomes still more obvious when we distinguish from it the table of transcendental concepts of reason, as we are about to do. Those concepts have a completely different nature and origin from the concepts of the understanding, so their table must also have a different form. Yet this absolutely necessary separation has never been made in any system of metaphysics. In such systems, therefore, ideas of reason and concepts of the understanding are mixed together without distinction, as if they were siblings in one family. Without a separate system of categories, this confusion could never have been avoided.
323.1. 1. Substance. 2. Quality. 3. Quantity. 4. Relation. 5. Action. 6. Being acted on. 7. When. 8. Where. 9. Position. 10. Having.
323.2. Opposition, priority, simultaneity, motion, having.
325.1. A table of categories, once presented, allows all sorts of interesting observations. 1) The third category arises from the first and second combined in one concept. 2) In the categories of magnitude and quality there is only a progression from unity to totality, or from something to nothing. For this purpose the categories of quality must stand in this order: reality, limitation, complete negation. These proceed without correlatives or opposites, whereas the categories of relation and modality do involve them. 3) Just as categorical judgments underlie all others in logic, the category of substance underlies all concepts of actual things. 4) Just as modality in a judgment is not a special predicate, modal concepts add no determination to things, and so on. All such reflections have great usefulness. If we also list all the predicables, which can be drawn fairly completely from any good ontology, for example Baumgarten's, and arrange them in classes under the categories, we must not neglect to add as complete an analysis of all these concepts as possible. This would produce a merely analytic part of metaphysics, containing no synthetic proposition at all. It could precede the second, synthetic part. Through its precision and completeness it would be not only useful but, because of its systematic character, would also possess a certain beauty.
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