Section 1
Original German
§ 1.
Von den Quellen der Metaphysik.
Wenn man eine Erkenntniß als Wissenschaft darstellen will, so muß man zuvor das Unterscheidende, was sie mit keiner andern gemein hat, und was ihr also eigenthümlich ist, genau bestimmen können; widrigenfalls die Grenzen aller Wissenschaften in einander laufen, und keine derselben ihrer Natur nach gründlich abgehandelt werden kann.
Dieses Eigenthümliche mag nun in dem Unterschiede des Objects oder der Erkenntnißquellen oder auch der Erkenntnißart oder einiger, wo nicht aller dieser Stücke zusammen bestehen, so beruht darauf zuerst die Idee der möglichen Wissenschaft und ihres Territorium.
Zuerst, was die Quellen einer metaphysischen Erkenntniß betrifft, so liegt es schon in ihrem Begriffe, daß sie nicht empirisch sein können. Die Principien derselben (wozu nicht blos ihre Grundsätze, sondern auch Grundbegriffe gehören) müssen also niemals aus der Erfahrung genommen sein: denn sie soll nicht physische, sondern metaphysische, d. i. jenseit der Erfahrung liegende, Erkenntniß sein. Also wird weder äußere Erfahrung, welche die Quelle der eigentlichen Physik, noch innere, welche die Grundlage der empirischen Psychologie ausmacht, bei ihr zum Grunde liegen. Sie ist also Erkenntniß a priori, oder aus reinem Verstande und reiner Vernunft.
Hierin würde sie aber nichts Unterscheidendes von der reinen Mathematik haben; sie wird also reine philosophische Erkenntniß heißen müssen; wegen der Bedeutung dieses Ausdrucks aber beziehe ich mich auf Kritik d. r. V. Seite 712 u. f., wo der Unterschied dieser zwei Arten des Vernunftgebrauchs einleuchtend und gnugthuend ist dargestellt worden. — So viel von den Quellen der metaphysischen Erkenntniß.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 1.
On the Sources of Metaphysics.
If we wish to present a cognition as a science, we must first be able to determine precisely what distinguishes it, what it shares with no other, and what is therefore distinctive to it. Otherwise the boundaries of all the sciences run together, and none can be treated thoroughly according to its nature.
Whether this distinctive character consists in a difference of object, of sources of cognition, of kind of cognition, or of some if not all of these together, it is on this that the idea of the possible science and its territory first depends.
First, as regards the sources of metaphysical cognition, its very concept already entails that they cannot be empirical. Its principles—which include not only its fundamental propositions but also its fundamental concepts—must therefore never be drawn from experience; for it is to be not physical but metaphysical cognition, that is, cognition lying beyond experience. Hence neither outer experience, the source of physics proper, nor inner experience, the foundation of empirical psychology, will underlie it. It is therefore cognition a priori, or cognition from pure understanding and pure reason.
In this, however, it would have nothing to distinguish it from pure mathematics; it must therefore be called pure philosophical cognition. For the meaning of this expression I refer to the Critique of Pure Reason, page 712 and following, where the distinction between these two ways of using reason has been presented clearly and satisfactorily.—So much for the sources of metaphysical cognition.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 1.
The Sources of Metaphysics.
If we want to present a body of cognition as a science, we must first be able to determine precisely what sets it apart: what it shares with no other science and what is therefore distinctive about it. Otherwise the boundaries of all the sciences run together, and none can be treated thoroughly in keeping with its nature.
This distinctive character may consist in a difference in its object, its sources of cognition, its kind of cognition, or some if not all of these together. On it rests, first of all, the idea of the possible science and its territory.
First, as for the sources of metaphysical cognition, its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its principles—which include not only its basic propositions but also its basic concepts—must therefore never be taken from experience. It is meant to be not physical but metaphysical cognition, that is, cognition lying beyond experience. So it will rest neither on outer experience, the source of physics proper, nor on inner experience, the basis of empirical psychology. It is therefore cognition a priori, or cognition from pure understanding and pure reason.
In this respect, however, it would have nothing to distinguish it from pure mathematics. It must therefore be called pure philosophical cognition. For the meaning of this expression I refer to Kritik d. r. V. Seite 712 u. f., where the difference between these two ways of using reason has been presented clearly and adequately.—So much for the sources of metaphysical cognition.
About this section
Section 1 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 4 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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