Section 14
Original German
§ 14.
Natur ist das Dasein der Dinge, so fern es nach allgemeinen Gesetzen bestimmt ist. Sollte Natur das Dasein der Dinge an sich selbst bedeuten, so würden wir sie niemals weder a priori noch a posteriori erkennen können. Nicht a priori; denn wie wollen wir wissen, was den Dingen an sich selbst zukomme, da dieses niemals durch Zergliederung unserer Begriffe (analytische Sätze) geschehen kann, weil ich nicht wissen will, was in meinem Begriffe von einem Dinge enthalten sei (denn das gehört zu seinem logischen Wesen), sondern was in der Wirklichkeit des Dinges zu diesem Begriff hinzukomme, und wodurch das Ding selbst in seinem Dasein außer meinem Begriffe bestimmt sei. Mein Verstand und die Bedingungen, unter denen er allein die Bestimmungen der Dinge in ihrem Dasein verknüpfen kann, schreibt den Dingen selbst keine Regel vor; diese richten sich nicht nach meinem Verstande, sondern mein Verstand müßte sich nach ihnen richten; sie müßten also mir vorher gegeben sein, um diese Bestimmungen von ihnen abzunehmen; alsdann aber wären sie nicht a priori erkannt.
Auch a posteriori wäre eine solche Erkenntniß der Natur der Dinge an sich selbst unmöglich. Denn wenn mich Erfahrung Gesetze, unter denen das Dasein der Dinge steht, lehren soll, so müßten diese, so fern sie Dinge an sich selbst betreffen, auch außer meiner Erfahrung ihnen nothwendig zukommen. Nun lehrt mich die Erfahrung zwar, was dasei, und wie es sei, niemals aber, daß es nothwendiger Weise so und nicht anders sein müsse. Also kann sie die Natur der Dinge an sich selbst niemals lehren.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 14.
Nature is the existence of things insofar as it is determined according to universal laws. If nature meant the existence of things in themselves, we could never cognize it, either a priori or a posteriori. Not a priori: for how could we know what belongs to things in themselves, since this can never be accomplished by analyzing our concepts (through analytic propositions)? What I want to know is not what is contained in my concept of a thing—for that belongs to its logical essence—but what, in the thing's actuality, is added to this concept, and what determines the thing itself in its existence outside my concept. My understanding, and the conditions under which alone it can connect the determinations of things in their existence, prescribe no rule to the things themselves. They do not conform to my understanding; rather, my understanding would have to conform to them. They would therefore have to be given to me beforehand, so that I could derive these determinations from them; but then they would not be cognized a priori.
Nor would such cognition of the nature of things in themselves be possible a posteriori. For if experience is to teach me the laws governing the existence of things, then these laws, insofar as they concern things in themselves, would have to belong to them necessarily, even beyond my experience. Now experience does indeed teach me what exists and how it is, but never that it must necessarily be so and not otherwise. Thus it can never teach me the nature of things in themselves.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 14.
Nature is the existence of things insofar as it is determined by universal laws. If nature meant the existence of things in themselves, we could never know it, either a priori or a posteriori. We could not know it a priori. For how could we know what belongs to things in themselves? We can never find this out by analyzing our concepts, that is, through analytic propositions. I do not want to know what my concept of a thing contains, since that belongs to its logical essence. I want to know what the thing's reality adds to this concept, and what determines the thing itself in its existence outside my concept. My understanding, and the conditions under which alone it can connect the determinations of existing things, prescribe no rule to the things themselves. They do not conform to my understanding. Instead, my understanding would have to conform to them. They would therefore have to be given to me beforehand, so that I could learn these determinations from them. But then they would not be known a priori.
Nor could we know the nature of things in themselves a posteriori. Suppose experience is to teach me the laws governing the existence of things. Insofar as these laws concern things in themselves, they would have to belong to them necessarily, even outside my experience. But experience does teach me what exists and how it is. It never teaches me that it must necessarily be this way and not otherwise. So it can never teach me the nature of things in themselves.
About this section
Section 14 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 20 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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