Section 9
Original German
§ 9.
Müßte unsre Anschauung von der Art sein, daß sie Dinge vorstellte, so wie sie an sich selbst sind, so würde gar keine Anschauung a priori stattfinden, sondern sie wäre allemal empirisch. Denn was in dem Gegenstande an sich selbst enthalten sei, kann ich nur wissen, wenn er mir gegenwärtig und gegeben ist. Freilich ist es auch alsdann unbegreiflich, wie die Anschauung einer gegenwärtigen Sache mir diese sollte zu erkennen geben, wie sie an sich ist, da ihre Eigenschaften nicht in meine Vorstellungskraft hinüber wandern können; allein die Möglichkeit davon eingeräumt, so würde doch dergleichen Anschauung nicht a priori stattfinden, d. i. ehe mir noch der Gegenstand vorgestellt würde: denn ohne das kann kein Grund der Beziehung meiner Vorstellung auf ihn erdacht werden, sie müßte denn auf Eingebung beruhen. Es ist also nur auf eine einzige Art möglich, daß meine Anschauung vor der Wirklichkeit des Gegenstandes vorhergehe und als Erkenntniß a priori stattfinde, wenn sie nämlich nichts anders enthält, als die Form der Sinnlichkeit, die in meinem Subject vor allen wirklichen Eindrücken vorhergeht, dadurch ich von Gegenständen afficirt werde. Denn daß Gegenstände der Sinne dieser Form der Sinnlichkeit gemäß allein angeschaut werden können, kann ich a priori wissen. Hieraus folgt: daß Sätze, die blos diese Form der sinnlichen Anschauung betreffen, von Gegenständen der Sinne möglich und gültig sein werden, imgleichen umgekehrt, daß Anschauungen, die a priori möglich sind, niemals andere Dinge als Gegenstände unsrer Sinne betreffen können.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 9.
If our intuition had to be of such a kind that it represented things as they are in themselves, no intuition a priori could occur; it would always be empirical. For I can know what is contained in the object in itself only when it is present and given to me. Even then, admittedly, it is incomprehensible how the intuition of a present thing should allow me to cognize it as it is in itself, since its properties cannot migrate into my power of representation. But even granting this possibility, such intuition would not occur a priori, that is, before the object was represented to me; for without this no ground could be conceived for my representation’s relation to it, unless that representation rested on inspiration. There is therefore only one way in which my intuition can precede the actuality of the object and occur as cognition a priori: if it contains nothing but the form of sensibility, which in me as subject precedes all the actual impressions through which I am affected by objects. For I can know a priori that objects of the senses can be intuited only in accordance with this form of sensibility. It follows that propositions concerning this form of sensible intuition alone will be possible and valid for objects of the senses; and conversely, that intuitions possible a priori can never concern anything other than objects of our senses.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 9.
If our intuition had to be of a kind that represented things as they are in themselves, no a priori intuition would occur at all. It would always be empirical. For I can know what an object contains in itself only when it is present and given to me. Even then, admittedly, it is incomprehensible how the intuition of a present thing could let me know it as it is in itself, since its properties cannot migrate into my power of representation. But even if we grant this possibility, such intuition would still not occur a priori, that is, before the object was represented to me. Without that, no ground could be conceived for my representation's relation to the object, unless it rested on inspiration. So there is only one way my intuition can precede the object's actuality and occur as a priori cognition: it must contain nothing but the form of sensibility, which in me as subject precedes all the actual impressions through which objects affect me. For I can know a priori that objects of the senses can be intuited only in conformity with this form of sensibility. It follows that propositions concerning only this form of sensible intuition will be possible and valid for objects of the senses. Conversely, intuitions that are possible a priori can never concern anything other than objects of our senses.
About this section
Section 9 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 14 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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