Book II, Chapter I: A dialectic of pure practical reason in general
Original German
Zweites Buch. A 192 V:107 Dialektik der reinen praktischen Vernunft.
Erstes Hauptstück. Von einer Dialektik der reinen praktischen Vernunft überhaupt.
Die reine Vernunft hat jederzeit ihre Dialektik, man mag sie in ihrem speculativen oder praktischen Gebrauche betrachten; denn sie verlangt die absolute Totalität der Bedingungen zu einem gegebenen Bedingten, und diese kann schlechterdings nur in Dingen an sich selbst angetroffen werden. Da aber alle Begriffe der Dinge auf Anschauungen bezogen werden müssen, welche bei uns Menschen niemals anders als sinnlich sein können, mithin die Gegenstände nicht als Dinge an sich selbst, sondern blos als Erscheinungen erkennen lassen, in deren Reihe des Bedingten und der Bedingungen das Unbedingte niemals angetroffen werden kann, so entspringt ein unvermeidlicher Schein aus der Anwendung dieser Vernunftidee der A 193 Totalität der Bedingungen (mithin des Unbedingten) aus Erscheinungen, als wären sie Sachen an sich selbst (denn dafür werden sie in Ermangelung einer warnenden Kritik jederzeit gehalten), der aber niemals als trüglich bemerkt werden würde, wenn er sich nicht durch einen Widerstreit der Vernunft mit sich selbst in der Anwendung ihres Grundsatzes, das Unbedingte zu allem Bedingten vorauszusetzen, auf Erscheinungen selbst verriethe. Hiedurch wird aber die Vernunft genöthigt, diesem Scheine nachzuspüren, woraus er entspringe, und wie er gehoben werden könne, welches nicht anders als durch eine vollständige Kritik des ganzen reinen Vernunftvermögens geschehen kann; so daß die Antinomie der reinen Vernunft, die in ihrer Dialektik offenbar wird, in der That die wohlthätigste Verirrung ist, in die die menschliche Vernunft je hat gerathen können, indem sie uns zuletzt antreibt, den Schlüssel zu suchen, aus diesem Labyrinthe herauszukommen, der, wenn er gefunden worden, noch das entdeckt, was man nicht suchte und doch bedarf, nämlich eine Aussicht in eine höhere, unveränderliche Ordnung der Dinge, in der wir schon jetzt sind, und in der unser Dasein der höchsten Vernunftbestimmung V:108 gemäß fortzusetzen, wir durch bestimmte Vorschriften nunmehr angewiesen werden können.
Wie im speculativen Gebrauche der reinen Vernunft jene natürliche A 194 Dialektik aufzulösen und der Irrthum aus einem übrigens natürlichen Scheine zu verhüten sei, kann man in der Kritik jenes Vermögens ausführlich antreffen. Aber der Vernunft in ihrem praktischen Gebrauche geht es um nichts besser. Sie sucht als reine praktische Vernunft zu dem praktisch Bedingten (was auf Neigungen und Naturbedürfniß beruht) ebenfalls das Unbedingte, und zwar nicht als Bestimmungsgrund des Willens, sondern, wenn dieser auch (im moralischen Gesetze) gegeben worden, die unbedingte Totalität des Gegenstandes der reinen praktischen Vernunft, unter dem Namen des höchsten Guts.
Diese Idee praktisch, d. i. für die Maxime unseres vernünftigen Verhaltens, hinreichend zu bestimmen, ist die Weisheitslehre, und diese wiederum als Wissenschaft ist Philosophie in der Bedeutung, wie die Alten das Wort verstanden, bei denen sie eine Anweisung zu dem Begriffe war, worin das höchste Gut zu setzen, und zum Verhalten, durch welches es zu erwerben sei. Es wäre gut, wenn wir dieses Wort bei seiner alten Bedeutung ließen, als eine Lehre vom höchsten Gut, so fern die Vernunft bestrebt ist, es darin zur Wissenschaft zu bringen. Denn einestheils würde die angehängte einschränkende Bedingung dem griechischen Ausdrucke (welcher Liebe zur Weisheit bedeutet) angemessen und doch zugleich hinreichend sein, die Liebe zur Wissenschaft, mithin aller A 195 speculativen Erkenntniß der Vernunft, so fern sie ihr sowohl zu jenem Begriffe, als auch dem praktischen Bestimmungsgrunde dienlich ist, unter dem Namen der Philosophie mit zu befassen, und doch den Hauptzweck, um dessentwillen sie allein Weisheitslehre genannt werden kann, nicht aus den Augen verlieren lassen. Anderen Theils würde es auch nicht übel sein, den Eigendünkel desjenigen, der es wagte sich des Titels eines Philosophen selbst anzumaßen, abzuschrecken, wenn man ihm schon durch die Definition den Maßstab der Selbstschätzung vorhielte, der seine Ansprüche sehr herabstimmen wird; denn ein Weisheitslehrer zu sein, möchte wohl etwas mehr als einen Schüler bedeuten, der noch immer nicht weit genug gekommen ist, um sich selbst, vielweniger um andere mit sicherer Erwartung eines so hohen Zwecks zu leiten; es würde einen Meister in Kenntniß der Weisheit bedeuten, welches mehr sagen will, als ein bescheidener Mann sich selber anmaßen wird, und Philosophie würde so wie V:109 die Weisheit selbst noch immer ein Ideal bleiben, welches objectiv in der Vernunft allein vollständig vorgestellt wird, subjectiv aber, für die Person, nur das Ziel seiner unaufhörlichen Bestrebung ist, und in dessen Besitz unter dem angemaßten Namen eines Philosophen zu sein, nur der vorzugeben berechtigt ist, der auch die unfehlbare Wirkung derselben (in Beherrschung seiner selbst und dem ungezweifelten Interesse, das er vorzüglich A 196 am allgemeinen Guten nimmt) an seiner Person als Beispiele aufstellen kann, welches die Alten auch forderten, um jenen Ehrennamen verdienen zu können.
In Ansehung der Dialektik der reinen praktischen Vernunft, im Punkte der Bestimmung des Begriffs vom höchsten Gute (welche, wenn ihre Auflösung gelingt, eben sowohl als die der theoretischen die wohlthätigste Wirkung erwarten läßt, dadurch daß die aufrichtig angestellte und nicht verhehlte Widersprüche der reinen praktischen Vernunft mit ihr selbst zur vollständigen Kritik ihres eigenen Vermögens nöthigen), haben wir nur noch eine Erinnerung voranzuschicken.
Das moralische Gesetz ist der alleinige Bestimmungsgrund des reinen Willens. Da dieses aber blos formal ist (nämlich allein die Form der Maxime als allgemein gesetzgebend fordert), so abstrahirt es als Bestimmungsgrund von aller Materie, mithin von allem Objecte des Wollens. Mithin mag das höchste Gut immer der ganze Gegenstand einer reinen praktischen Vernunft, d. i. eines reinen Willens, sein, so ist es darum doch nicht für den Bestimmungsgrund desselben zu halten, und das moralische Gesetz muß allein als der Grund angesehen werden, jenes und dessen Bewirkung oder Beförderung sich zum Objecte zu machen. Diese Erinnerung ist in einem so delicaten Falle, als die Bestimmung sittlicher A 197 Principien ist, wo auch die kleinste Mißdeutung Gesinnungen verfälscht, von Erheblichkeit. Denn man wird aus der Analytik ersehen haben, daß, wenn man vor dem moralischen Gesetze irgend ein Object unter dem Namen eines Guten als Bestimmungsgrund des Willens annimmt und von ihm dann das oberste praktische Princip ableitet, dieses alsdann jederzeit Heteronomie herbeibringen und das moralische Princip verdrängen würde.
Es versteht sich aber von selbst, daß, wenn im Begriffe des höchsten Guts das moralische Gesetz als oberste Bedingung schon mit eingeschlossen ist, alsdann das höchste Gut nicht blos Object, sondern auch sein Begriff und die Vorstellung der durch unsere praktische Vernunft möglichen Existenz V:110 desselben zugleich der Bestimmungsgrund des reinen Willens sei: weil alsdann in der That das in diesem Begriffe schon eingeschlossene und mitgedachte moralische Gesetz und kein anderer Gegenstand nach dem Princip der Autonomie den Willen bestimmt. Diese Ordnung der Begriffe von der Willensbestimmung darf nicht aus den Augen gelassen werden: weil man sonst sich selbst mißversteht und sich zu widersprechen glaubt, wo doch alles in der vollkommensten Harmonie neben einander steht.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation directly from Kant's German, Akademie-Ausgabe V (1913), pages 1–163, including all eighteen author notes. Original page and section references are retained.
Book II. A 192 V:107 Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.
Chapter I. On a Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason in General.
Pure reason always has its dialectic, whether considered in its speculative or its practical use. For it demands the absolute totality of conditions for a given conditioned thing, and this can be found only in things in themselves. But all concepts of things must be referred to intuitions, which for us human beings can never be other than sensible. They therefore allow us to cognize objects not as things in themselves, but merely as appearances, in whose series of conditioned things and conditions the unconditioned can never be found. Hence an unavoidable illusion arises from applying this rational idea of the A 193 totality of conditions, and thus of the unconditioned, to appearances as though they were things in themselves—as they are always taken to be in the absence of a critique to warn us. Yet this illusion would never be noticed as deceptive if it did not betray itself through a conflict of reason with itself in applying to appearances its principle of presupposing the unconditioned for everything conditioned. Reason is thereby compelled to trace this illusion to its source and discover how it can be removed, which can be done only through a complete critique of the entire faculty of pure reason. Thus the antinomy of pure reason, revealed in its dialectic, is in fact the most beneficial error into which human reason could ever have fallen. For it finally drives us to seek the key to escape from this labyrinth; once found, that key also discloses what we did not seek but nevertheless need: a view into a higher, unchanging order of things, in which we already exist, and in which we can now be instructed by definite precepts to continue our existence in accordance with reason's highest vocation. V:108
How this natural A 194 dialectic is to be resolved in the speculative use of pure reason, and error arising from an otherwise natural illusion prevented, can be found at length in the critique of that faculty. But reason fares no better in its practical use. As pure practical reason, it likewise seeks the unconditioned for the practically conditioned, which rests on inclinations and natural need. It seeks this not as the determining ground of the will, but, even when that ground has been given in the moral law, as the unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason, under the name of the highest good.
To determine this idea sufficiently for practice—that is, for the maxim of our rational conduct—is the doctrine of wisdom. This in turn, as a science, is philosophy in the sense in which the ancients understood the word: for them it was instruction in the concept of what the highest good consists in, and in the conduct through which it is to be attained. It would be good to leave this word with its old meaning, as a doctrine of the highest good, insofar as reason strives to make it a science. For, on the one hand, the limiting condition appended to it would accord with the Greek expression, which means love of wisdom, while also sufficing to include under the name of philosophy love of science, and hence all A 195 speculative cognition of reason insofar as it serves reason both for that concept and for the practical determining ground. Yet it would not let us lose sight of the chief end for whose sake alone philosophy can be called a doctrine of wisdom. On the other hand, it would also be well to discourage the self-conceit of anyone who dared claim the title of philosopher for himself by presenting him, in the very definition, with a standard of self-assessment that would greatly lower his pretensions. For to be a teacher of wisdom would surely mean something more than to be a pupil who has still not advanced far enough to guide himself, much less others, with a sure expectation of attaining so high an end. It would mean being a master in the knowledge of wisdom, which is more than a modest person will claim for himself. Philosophy, like V:109 wisdom itself, would thus always remain an ideal, represented completely and objectively in reason alone, but subjectively, for the individual, only the goal of his unceasing striving. Only someone who can also exhibit in his own person, as an example, wisdom's unfailing effect—in mastery of himself and the unquestionable interest he takes above all A 196 in the common good—is entitled to profess that he possesses this ideal under the arrogated name of philosopher. The ancients too required this if that honorable name was to be deserved.
With regard to the dialectic of pure practical reason in determining the concept of the highest good, we need preface only one further reminder. If its resolution succeeds, this dialectic, no less than that of theoretical reason, promises the most beneficial effect: the contradictions of pure practical reason with itself, candidly set out and not concealed, compel a complete critique of its own faculty.
The moral law is the sole determining ground of the pure will. But since it is merely formal, requiring only the form of the maxim as universally legislative, it abstracts, as a determining ground, from all matter, hence from every object of willing. Thus, although the highest good may be the entire object of pure practical reason, that is, of a pure will, it must not on that account be taken as its determining ground. The moral law alone must be regarded as the ground for making the highest good, and its realization or promotion, our object. This reminder is important in so delicate a matter as the determination of moral A 197 principles, where even the slightest misinterpretation corrupts dispositions. For the Analytic will have shown that, if we assume any object under the name of a good as the determining ground of the will prior to the moral law, and then derive the supreme practical principle from it, this would always bring about heteronomy and displace the moral principle.
But it goes without saying that, if the moral law is already included in the concept of the highest good as its supreme condition, then the highest good is not merely an object: its concept and the representation of its existence V:110 as possible through our practical reason are also, at the same time, the determining ground of the pure will. For then it is in fact the moral law, already included and thought in this concept, and no other object, that determines the will according to the principle of autonomy. This order of the concepts concerning the determination of the will must not be lost from view; otherwise we misunderstand ourselves and believe we are contradicting ourselves where everything stands together in the most perfect harmony.
Plain English translation
Complete machine-assisted Plain English translation made independently and directly from the same German text, including all eighteen author notes.
Book II. A 192 V:107 Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.
Chapter I. On a Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason in General.
Pure reason always has its dialectic, whether we consider its speculative or its practical use. For it demands the absolute totality of conditions for something given as conditioned, and this can be found only in things in themselves. But all concepts of things must be related to intuitions. For us human beings, these can never be anything but sensible. They therefore let us cognize objects not as things in themselves, but only as appearances. In the series of what is conditioned and its conditions among appearances, the unconditioned can never be found. An unavoidable illusion therefore arises when reason's idea of the A 193 totality of conditions, and thus of the unconditioned, is applied to appearances as though they were things in themselves. Without a critique to warn us, that is how they are always regarded. This illusion would never be recognized as deceptive if reason did not betray it through a conflict with itself when applying to appearances its principle of presupposing the unconditioned for everything conditioned. This forces reason to trace the illusion to its source and discover how it can be removed. That can be done only through a complete critique of the entire faculty of pure reason. Thus the antinomy of pure reason revealed in its dialectic is actually the most beneficial error human reason could ever have fallen into. It finally drives us to seek the key for getting out of this labyrinth. Once found, that key also reveals something we were not seeking but still need: a view into a higher, unchanging order of things in which we already exist. We can now receive definite instructions for continuing our existence within it in accordance with reason's highest vocation. V:108
The critique of that faculty explains at length how to resolve this natural A 194 dialectic in the speculative use of pure reason and prevent error arising from an otherwise natural illusion. But reason fares no better in its practical use. As pure practical reason, it likewise seeks the unconditioned for what is practically conditioned—what rests on inclinations and natural need. It seeks this not as the determining ground of the will, but, even after that ground has been given in the moral law, as the unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason, under the name of the highest good.
To determine this idea adequately for practice—that is, for the maxim of our rational conduct—is the task of the doctrine of wisdom. This doctrine, in turn, considered as a science, is philosophy in the sense in which the ancients understood the word. For them, it was guidance toward a concept of what the highest good consists in, and toward the conduct by which it can be acquired. It would be good to leave this word its old meaning: a doctrine of the highest good, insofar as reason strives to make it a science. For one thing, the restrictive condition added here would fit the Greek expression, which means love of wisdom. At the same time, it would suffice to include under the name of philosophy the love of science, and thus of all A 195 speculative rational cognition, insofar as reason finds this useful both for that concept and for the practical determining ground. Yet it would keep us from losing sight of the chief aim, the only reason philosophy can be called a doctrine of wisdom. For another thing, it would do no harm to discourage the conceit of someone who dared claim the title of philosopher for themselves. The very definition would hold up a standard for self-assessment that would greatly lower their claims. For to be a teacher of wisdom presumably means something more than being a student who has not yet advanced far enough to guide even themselves, much less others, with a confident expectation of reaching so high an aim. It would mean being a master in the knowledge of wisdom. That is more than a modest person will claim for themselves. Philosophy, like V:109 wisdom itself, would always remain an ideal. Objectively, it is represented completely in reason alone. Subjectively, for the individual, it is only the goal of unceasing effort. Only someone who can also present in their own person an example of wisdom's unfailing effect is entitled to claim possession of it under the self-assumed name of philosopher. That effect consists in self-mastery and the unquestionable interest they take, above all, A 196 in the general good. The ancients too required this for someone to deserve that honorable name.
We need add only one preliminary reminder concerning the dialectic of pure practical reason on the determination of the concept of the highest good. If we succeed in resolving it, we can expect the same highly beneficial result as from resolving theoretical reason's dialectic. For when the contradictions of pure practical reason with itself are honestly presented rather than concealed, they require a complete critique of its own capacity.
The moral law is the sole determining ground of the pure will. But it is merely formal: it requires only that the maxim have the form of universal legislation. As a determining ground, it therefore abstracts from all matter, and thus from every object of willing. So although the highest good may be the whole object of pure practical reason, that is, of a pure will, it must not on that account be taken as the will's determining ground. The moral law alone must be regarded as the ground for making the highest good, and its production or promotion, our object. This reminder matters in so delicate a case as the determination of moral A 197 principles, where even the smallest misinterpretation corrupts dispositions. For the Analytic has shown that if, before the moral law, we assume any object called a good as the determining ground of the will, and then derive the supreme practical principle from it, this will always introduce heteronomy and displace the moral principle.
But it goes without saying that if the concept of the highest good already includes the moral law as its supreme condition, then the highest good is not merely an object. Its concept, and the representation of its existence V:110 as possible through our practical reason, are also the determining ground of the pure will. For in that case, what actually determines the will, according to the principle of autonomy, is the moral law already included and thought in this concept, and no other object. We must not lose sight of this order among concepts concerning the determination of the will. Otherwise we misunderstand ourselves and think we are contradicting ourselves where everything actually fits together in perfect harmony.
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Book II, Chapter I: A dialectic of pure practical reason in general is part of Critique of Practical Reason by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 9 of 12 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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