Introduction: The idea of a critique of practical reason
Original German
Einleitung. V:15 A 29 Von der Idee einer Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.
Der theoretische Gebrauch der Vernunft beschäftigte sich mit Gegenständen des bloßen Erkenntnißvermögens, und eine Kritik derselben in Absicht auf diesen Gebrauch betraf eigentlich nur das reine Erkenntnißvermögen, weil dieses Verdacht erregte, der sich auch hernach bestätigte, daß es sich leichtlich über seine Grenzen unter unerreichbare Gegenstände, oder gar einander widerstreitende Begriffe verlöre. Mit dem praktischen Gebrauche der Vernunft verhält es sich schon anders. In diesem beschäftigt sich die Vernunft mit Bestimmungsgründen des Willens, welcher ein Vermögen ist, den Vorstellungen entsprechende Gegenstände entweder hervorzubringen, oder doch sich selbst zu Bewirkung derselben (das physische Vermögen mag nun hinreichend sein, oder nicht), d. i. seine Causalität, A 30 zu bestimmen. Denn da kann wenigstens die Vernunft zur Willensbestimmung gelangen und hat so fern immer objective Realität, als es nur auf das Wollen ankommt. Hier ist also die erste Frage: ob reine Vernunft zur Bestimmung des Willens für sich allein zulange, oder ob sie nur als empirisch-bedingte ein Bestimmungsgrund derselben sein könne. Nun tritt hier ein durch die Kritik der reinen Vernunft gerechtfertigter, obzwar keiner empirischen Darstellung fähiger Begriff der Causalität, nämlich der der Freiheit, ein, und wenn wir anjetzt Gründe ausfindig machen können, zu beweisen, daß diese Eigenschaft dem menschlichen Willen (und so auch dem Willen aller vernünftigen Wesen) in der That zukomme, so wird dadurch nicht allein dargethan, daß reine Vernunft praktisch sein könne, sondern daß sie allein und nicht die empirisch-beschränkte unbedingterweise praktisch sei. Folglich werden wir nicht eine Kritik der reinen praktischen, sondern nur der praktischen Vernunft überhaupt zu bearbeiten V:16 haben. Denn reine Vernunft, wenn allererst dargethan worden, daß es eine solche gebe, bedarf keiner Kritik. Sie ist es, welche selbst die Richtschnur zur Kritik alles ihres Gebrauchs enthält. Die Kritik der A 31 praktischen Vernunft überhaupt hat also die Obliegenheit, die empirisch bedingte Vernunft von der Anmaßung abzuhalten, ausschließungsweise den Bestimmungsgrund des Willens allein abgeben zu wollen. Der Gebrauch der reinen Vernunft, wenn, daß es eine solche gebe, ausgemacht ist, ist allein immanent; der empirisch-bedingte, der sich die Alleinherrschaft anmaßt, ist dagegen transscendent und äußert sich in Zumuthungen und Geboten, die ganz über ihr Gebiet hinausgehen, welches gerade das umgekehrte Verhältniß von dem ist, was von der reinen Vernunft im speculativen Gebrauche gesagt werden konnte.
Indessen, da es immer noch reine Vernunft ist, deren Erkenntniß hier dem praktischen Gebrauche zum Grunde liegt, so wird doch die Eintheilung einer Kritik der praktischen Vernunft dem allgemeinen Abrisse nach der der speculativen gemäß angeordnet werden müssen. Wir werden also eine Elementarlehre und Methodenlehre derselben, in jener als dem ersten Theile eine Analytik als Regel der Wahrheit und eine Dialektik als Darstellung und Auflösung des Scheins in Urtheilen der praktischen Vernunft haben müssen. Allein die Ordnung in der Unterabtheilung der Analytik wird wiederum das Umgewandte von der in der A 32 Kritik der reinen speculativen Vernunft sein. Denn in der gegenwärtigen werden wir von Grundsätzen anfangend zu Begriffen und von diesen allererst, wo möglich, zu den Sinnen gehen; da wir hingegen bei der speculativen Vernunft von den Sinnen anfingen und bei den Grundsätzen endigen mußten. Hievon liegt der Grund nun wiederum darin: daß wir es jetzt mit einem Willen zuthun haben und die Vernunft nicht im Verhältniß auf Gegenstände, sondern auf diesen Willen und dessen Causalität zu erwägen haben, da denn die Grundsätze der empirisch unbedingten Causalität den Anfang machen müssen, nach welchem der Versuch gemacht werden kann, unsere Begriffe von dem Bestimmungsgrunde eines solchen Willens, ihrer Anwendung auf Gegenstände, zuletzt auf das Subject und dessen Sinnlichkeit, allererst festzusetzen. Das Gesetz der Causalität aus Freiheit, d. i. irgend ein reiner praktischer Grundsatz, macht hier unvermeidlich den Anfang und bestimmt die Gegenstände, worauf er allein bezogen werden kann.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation directly from Kant's German, Akademie-Ausgabe V (1913), pages 1–163, including all eighteen author notes. Original page and section references are retained.
Introduction. V:15 A 29 The idea of a critique of practical reason.
The theoretical use of reason concerned itself with objects of the mere faculty of cognition. A critique of reason with respect to this use properly concerned only the pure faculty of cognition, since this aroused the suspicion, later confirmed, that it could easily lose itself beyond its limits among unattainable objects or even mutually conflicting concepts. The practical use of reason is different. Here reason concerns itself with the determining grounds of the will, which is a faculty either of producing objects corresponding to representations or at least of determining itself to bring them about—whether its physical capacity is sufficient or not—that is, of determining its own causality. A 30 For here reason can at least attain a determination of the will, and to that extent always has objective reality, insofar as willing alone is at issue. The first question here is therefore whether pure reason alone suffices to determine the will, or whether reason can be a determining ground of the will only as empirically conditioned. Now a concept of causality enters here that has been justified by the critique of pure reason, although it cannot be exhibited empirically: the concept of freedom. If we can now find grounds to prove that this property actually belongs to the human will, and thus also to the will of every rational being, this will establish not only that pure reason can be practical, but that it alone, and not empirically restricted reason, is practical unconditionally. We shall consequently have to undertake not a critique of pure practical reason, but only of practical reason in general. V:16 For pure reason, once it has been established that there is such a reason, needs no critique. It is itself what contains the standard for criticizing every use of it. A critique of A 31 practical reason in general therefore has the task of keeping empirically conditioned reason from the presumption of wanting to furnish, exclusively and alone, the determining ground of the will. The use of pure reason, once its existence is established, is alone immanent. Empirically conditioned use, by contrast, when it claims sole authority, is transcendent: it expresses itself in demands and commands that go entirely beyond its domain. This is precisely the reverse of what could be said of pure reason in its speculative use.
Nevertheless, since it is still pure reason whose cognition underlies practical use here, the division of a critique of practical reason must in its general outline be arranged to correspond to that of speculative reason. We shall therefore need a doctrine of elements and a doctrine of method, and within the former, as the first part, an Analytic as the rule of truth and a Dialectic as the presentation and resolution of illusion in the judgments of practical reason. But the order in the subdivision of the Analytic will again be the reverse of that in the A 32 critique of pure speculative reason. For in the present critique we shall begin with principles, proceed to concepts, and only from these, if possible, pass to the senses; with speculative reason, by contrast, we began with the senses and had to end with principles. The reason for this is again that we are now dealing with a will and must consider reason not in relation to objects, but to this will and its causality. The principles of empirically unconditioned causality must therefore come first. Only afterward can we attempt to establish our concepts of the determining ground of such a will, their application to objects, and finally to the subject and its sensibility. The law of causality through freedom—that is, some pure practical principle—must inevitably form the beginning here and determine the objects to which alone it can be referred.
Plain English translation
Complete machine-assisted Plain English translation made independently and directly from the same German text, including all eighteen author notes.
Introduction. V:15 A 29 The idea of a critique of practical reason.
The theoretical use of reason dealt with objects of the cognitive faculty alone. A critique of reason in this use really concerned only the pure cognitive faculty. For this aroused the suspicion, later confirmed, that it could easily stray beyond its limits among unreachable objects or even mutually conflicting concepts. The practical use of reason is different. Here reason deals with determining grounds of the will. The will is a capacity either to produce objects corresponding to representations or at least to determine itself to bring them about, whether or not its physical power is sufficient—that is, to determine its causality A 30. For here reason can at least come to determine the will, and always has objective reality to the extent that only willing is at issue. The first question, then, is whether pure reason alone is sufficient to determine the will, or whether reason can be its determining ground only when empirically conditioned. At this point a concept of causality enters that the Critique of Pure Reason has justified, although it cannot be presented empirically: freedom. If we can now find grounds to prove that this property really belongs to the human will, and likewise to the will of all rational beings, we will have shown more than that pure reason can be practical. We will have shown that pure reason alone, and not empirically limited reason, is unconditionally practical. Consequently, we will have to develop not a critique of pure practical reason, but only of practical reason in general V:16. For pure reason needs no critique once it has been shown to exist. It itself contains the standard for criticizing every use of it. The task of the Critique of A 31 Practical Reason in general is therefore to prevent empirically conditioned reason from the presumption of wanting to be the will's sole and exclusive determining ground. Once pure reason is established as existing, its use is only immanent, which means it stays within its own domain. The empirically conditioned use, by contrast, is transcendent when it claims sole authority. It makes demands and issues commands that go completely beyond its domain. This is exactly the reverse of what could be said about pure reason in its speculative use.
Even so, since the cognition underlying practical use here is still that of pure reason, the division of a critique of practical reason must be arranged, in its general outline, to match that of speculative reason. We will therefore need a Doctrine of Elements and a Doctrine of Method. In the former, the first part, we will need an Analytic as the rule of truth, and a Dialectic to present and resolve illusion in the judgments of practical reason. But the order of the subdivisions of the Analytic will again be the reverse of that in the A 32 Critique of Pure Speculative Reason. For in the present critique we will start from principles, proceed to concepts, and only from these, if possible, to the senses. In speculative reason, on the other hand, we started from the senses and had to finish with principles. The reason is again that we now deal with a will. We must consider reason not in relation to objects, but to this will and its causality. So principles of causality that is empirically unconditioned must come first. Only after that can we try to establish our concepts of the determining ground of such a will, of their application to objects, and finally of their application to the subject and its sensibility. The law of causality through freedom—that is, some pure practical principle—must inevitably come first here. It determines the only objects it can be related to.
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Introduction: The idea of a critique of practical reason is part of Critique of Practical Reason by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 3 of 12 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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