Stephanus 107

107a and I ask to win it in even greater measure for what I am about to say.

Critias: And yet I know full well that the excuse I am about to offer is one of high ambition and rather boorish in view of what the occasion demands; still, it must be made. For that what you have said was not well said—who in his right mind would attempt to maintain? But that what is about to be said stands in greater need of indulgence, being the harder task—this I must try to make clear in some way. For when a man speaks of the gods to human beings, it is easier for him to seem to speak adequately 107b than when he speaks of mortal things to us. The inexperience and deep ignorance of the hearers about matters of which they know nothing give a great abundance of material to anyone who is to say anything about them; whereas the gods—we know how things stand with them. To make my meaning clearer, follow me along this line. What has been said by all of us must be some sort of imitation and representation; let us consider the image-making of painters, in what they do with divine and human bodies, 107c as regards the ease and the difficulty of appearing to spectators to have been adequately imitated; and we shall see that in the case of earth and mountains and rivers and forests and the whole heaven and the things that are and move within it, in the first place we would be glad if anyone could imitate even a small part of it in some likeness; and besides, since we know nothing precise about such things, we neither examine nor test what is painted, 107d but make use of an unclear and deceptive shadow-painting in our dealings with them. But when anyone tries to represent our own bodies, we quickly perceive what has been left out, because of the understanding that is always at our side, and we become harsh judges of the man who does not render every single likeness in full. The same thing, then, one must see happening with accounts as well: heaven and the divine we accept gladly even when they are said to be only slightly probable, whereas mortal and human things we examine with precision. Given, then, what is now being said on the spur of the moment, 107e if we cannot render what is fitting in every respect, indulgence is owed; for we must conceive that mortal things are not easy but hard to represent to the satisfaction of opinion.

107a and I claim the right to get it to an even larger degree, for what I am going to say.

Critias: And yet I almost know that I am about to ask for an indulgence that is very proud of itself and ruder than it should be. Still I must say it. What sane person would claim that what you said was not well said? But that what will be said needs more indulgence, because it is harder, this I must try to show in some way. For Timaeus, when someone speaks to humans about the gods, it seems easier for him to speak well enough 107b than when he speaks to us about mortal things. The listeners' lack of experience and their deep ignorance about the things they know so little of give plenty of help to anyone who is going to say something about them. But about the gods we know how things stand with us. To make what I mean clearer, follow this line of thought with me. Everything that all of us have said must surely be an act of copying and making likenesses. Let us look at the way painters make images of divine and human bodies, 107c and see how easy or hard it is for them to seem to the people looking to have copied them well enough. Then we shall see the following. As for earth, mountains, rivers, woodland, the whole heaven, and the things that are and move around it, first we are satisfied if anyone can copy even a little of them in a likeness. And besides, since we know nothing precise about such things, we neither examine nor test the paintings. 107d We use a vague and misleading shading for them instead. But when someone tries to copy our own bodies, we notice keenly what is left out, because we always have that understanding close at hand, and we become harsh judges of anyone who does not reproduce every single similarity. The same thing, you must see, happens with accounts. The heavenly and the divine we accept even when they are said to be only slightly like the truth. The mortal and the human we examine strictly. So, for the things now being said on the spot, 107e if we cannot reproduce the fitting in every way, we must be forgiving. We must think of mortal things not as easy but as hard to copy so as to look right.

107a in respect of the discourse I am about to deliver.

Critias: I am sufficiently aware that the request I am about to make is decidedly presumptuous and less civil than is proper, but none the less it must be uttered. For as regards the exposition you gave, what man in his senses would attempt to deny its excellence? But what I must somehow endeavor to show is that the discourse now to be delivered calls for greater indulgence because of its greater difficulty. For it is easier, Timaeus, to appear to speak satisfactorily to men about the gods, 107b than to us about mortals. For when the listeners are in a state of inexperience and complete ignorance about a matter, such a state of mind affords great opportunities to the person who is going to discourse on that matter; and we know what our state is concerning knowledge of the gods. But in order that I may explain my meaning more clearly, pray follow me further. The accounts given by us all must be, of course, of the nature of imitations and representations; and if we look at the portraiture of divine and of human bodies as executed by painters, 107c in respect of the ease or difficulty with which they succeed in imitating their subjects in the opinion of onlookers, we shall notice in the first place that as regards the earth and mountains and rivers and woods and the whole of heaven, with the things that exist and move therein, we are content if a man is able to represent them with even a small degree of likeness; and further, that, inasmuch as we have no exact knowledge about such objects, we do not examine closely or criticize the paintings, but tolerate, in such cases, an inexact 107d and deceptive sketch. On the other hand, whenever a painter tries to render a likeness of our own bodies, we quickly perceive what is defective because of our constant familiar acquaintance with them, and become severe critics of him who fails to bring out to the full all the points of similarity. And precisely the same thing happens, as we should notice, in the case of discourses: in respect of what is celestial and divine we are satisfied if the account pocesses even a small degree of likelihood, but we examine with precision 107e what is mortal and human. To an account given now on the spur of the moment indulgence must be granted, should we fail to make it a wholly fitting representation; for one must conceive of mortal objects as being difficult, and not easy, to represent satisfactorily.

It is because I wish to remind you of these facts,