Thomas Paine · Complete work
Of the Present Ability of America, with Some Miscellaneous Reflections, 1
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I have never met with a man, either in England or America, who hath not confessed his opinion, that a separation between the countries, would take place one time or other: And there is no instance, in which we have shewn less judgment, than in endeavouring to describe, what we call, the ripeness or fitness of the Continent for independance.
As all men allow the measure, and vary only in their opinion of the time, let us, in order to remove mistakes, take a general survey of things, and endeavour, if possible, to find out the very time. But we need not go far, the inquiry ceases at once, for, the time hath found us. The general concurrence, the glorious union of all things prove the fact.
It is not in numbers, but in unity, that our great strength lies; yet our present numbers are sufficient to repel the force of all the world. The Continent hath, at this time, the largest body of armed and disciplined men of any power under Heaven; and is just arrived at that pitch of strength, in which no single colony is able to support itself, and the whole, when united, can accomplish the matter, and either more, or, less than this, might be fatal in its effects. Our land force is already sufficient, and as to naval affairs, we cannot be insensible, that Britain would never suffer an American man of war to be built, while the continent remained in her hands. Wherefore, we should be no forwarder an hundred years hence in that branch, than we are now; but the truth is, we should be less so, because the timber of the country is every day diminishing, and that, which will remain at last, will be far off and difficult to procure.
Were the continent crowded with inhabitants, her sufferings under the present circumstances would be intolerable. The more sea port towns we had, the more should we have both to defend and to lose. Our present numbers are so happily proportioned to our wants, that no man need be idle. The diminution of trade affords an army, and the necessities of an army create a new trade.
Debts we have none; and whatever we may contract on this account will serve as a glorious memento of our virtue. Can we but leave posterity with a settled form of government, an independant constitution of its own, the purchase at any price will be cheap. But to expend millions for the sake of getting a few vile acts repealed, and routing the present ministry only, is unworthy the charge, and is using posterity with the utmost cruelty; because it is leaving them the great work to do, and a debt upon their backs, from which they derive no advantage. Such a thought is unworthy a man of honor, and is the true characteristic of a narrow heart and a pedling politician.
The debt we may contract doth not deserve our regard if the work be but accomplished. No nation ought to be without a debt. A national debt is a national bond; and when it bears no interest, is in no case a grievance. Britain is oppressed with a debt of upwards of one hundred and forty millions sterling, for which she pays upwards of four millions interest. And as a compensation for her debt, she has a large navy; America is without a debt, and without a navy; yet for the twentieth part of the English national debt, could have a navy as large again. The navy of England is not worth, at this time, more than three millions and an half sterling.
The first and second editions of this pamphlet were published without the following calculations, which are now given as a proof that the above estimation of the navy is just. See Entic’s naval history, intro. page 56.
The charge of building a ship of each rate, and furnishing her with masts, yards, sails and rigging, together with a proportion of eight months boatswain’s and carpenter’s sea-stores, as calculated by Mr. Burchett, Secretary to the navy.
£
[pounds
sterling]
For a ship of 100 guns = 35,553
90 = 29,886
80 = 23,638
70 = 17,785
60 = 14,197
50 = 10,606
40 = 7,558
30 = 5,846
20 = 3,710
And from hence it is easy to sum up the value, or cost rather, of the whole British navy, which in the year 1757, when it was at its greatest glory consisted of the following ships and guns:
Ships. Guns.
Cost of one. Cost of all.
Cost in £ [pounds sterling]
6 100
35,553 213,318
12 90
29,886 358,632
12 80
23,638 283,656
43 70
17,785 764,755
35 60
14,197 496,895
40 50
10,606 424,240
45 40
7,558 340,110
58 20
3,710 215,180
85 Sloops, bombs
and fireships, one
with another, at } 2,000 170,000
------------
Cost
3,266,786
Remains for Guns
233,214
------------
3,500,000
No country on the globe is so happily situated, or so internally capable of raising a fleet as America. Tar, timber, iron, and cordage are her natural produce. We need go abroad for nothing. Whereas the Dutch, who make large profits by hiring out their ships of war to the Spaniards and Portuguese, are obliged to import most of the materials they use. We ought to view the building a fleet as an article of commerce, it being the natural manufactory of this country. It is the best money we can lay out. A navy when finished is worth more than it cost. And is that nice point in national policy, in which commerce and protection are united. Let us build; if we want them not, we can sell; and by that means replace our paper currency with ready gold and silver.
In point of manning a fleet, people in general run into great errors; it is not necessary that one fourth part should be sailors. The Terrible privateer, Captain Death, stood the hottest engagement of any ship last war, yet had not twenty sailors on board, though her complement of men was upwards of two hundred. A few able and social sailors will soon instruct a sufficient number of active landmen in the common work of a ship. Wherefore, we never can be more capable to begin on maritime matters than now, while our timber is standing, our fisheries blocked up, and our sailors and shipwrights out of employ. Men of war, of seventy and eighty guns were built forty years ago in New-England, and why not the same now? Ship-building is America’s greatest pride, and in which, she will in time excel the whole world. The great empires of the east are mostly inland, and consequently excluded from the possibility of rivalling her. Africa is in a state of barbarism; and no power in Europe, hath either such an extent of coast, or such an internal supply of materials. Where nature hath given the one, she has withheld the other; to America only hath she been liberal of both. The vast empire of Russia is almost shut out from the sea; wherefore, her boundless forests, her tar, iron, and cordage are only articles of commerce.
In point of safety, ought we to be without a fleet? We are not the little people now, which we were sixty years ago; at that time we might have trusted our property in the streets, or fields rather; and slept securely without locks or bolts to our doors or windows. The case now is altered, and our methods of defence, ought to improve with our increase of property. A common pirate, twelve months ago, might have come up the Delaware, and laid the city of Philadelphia under instant contribution, for what sum he pleased; and the same might have happened to other places. Nay, any daring fellow, in a brig of fourteen or sixteen guns, might have robbed the whole Continent, and carried off half a million of money. These are circumstances which demand our attention, and point out the necessity of naval protection.
Some, perhaps, will say, that after we have made it up with Britain, she will protect us. Can we be so unwise as to mean, that she shall keep a navy in our harbours for that purpose? Common sense will tell us, that the power which hath endeavoured to subdue us, is of all others, the most improper to defend us. Conquest may be effected under the pretence of friendship; and ourselves, after a long and brave resistance, be at last cheated into slavery. And if her ships are not to be admitted into our harbours, I would ask, how is she to protect us? A navy three or four thousand miles off can be of little use, and on sudden emergencies, none at all. Wherefore, if we must hereafter protect ourselves, why not do it for ourselves? Why do it for another?
The English list of ships of war, is long and formidable, but not a tenth part of them are at any one time fit for service, numbers of them not in being; yet their names are pompously continued in the list, if only a plank be left of the ship: and not a fifth part, of such as are fit for service, can be spared on any one station at one time. The East and West Indies, Mediterranean, Africa, and other parts over which Britain extends her claim, make large demands upon her navy. From a mixture of prejudice and inattention, we have contracted a false notion respecting the navy of England, and have talked as if we should have the whole of it to encounter at once, and for that reason, supposed, that we must have one as large; which not being instantly practicable, have been made use of by a set of disguised Tories to discourage our beginning thereon. Nothing can be farther from truth than this; for if America had only a twentieth part of the naval force of Britain, she would be by far an over match for her; because, as we neither have, nor claim any foreign dominion, our whole force would be employed on our own coast, where we should, in the long run, have two to one the advantage of those who had three or four thousand miles to sail over, before they could attack us, and the same distance to return in order to refit and recruit. And although Britain by her fleet, hath a check over our trade to Europe, we have as large a one over her trade to the West-Indies, which, by laying in the neighbourhood of the Continent, is entirely at its mercy.
Some method might be fallen on to keep up a naval force in time of peace, if we should not judge it necessary to support a constant navy. If premiums were to be given to merchants, to build and employ in their service ships mounted with twenty, thirty, forty or fifty guns, (the premiums to be in proportion to the loss of bulk to the merchants) fifty or sixty of those ships, with a few guardships on constant duty, would keep up a sufficient navy, and that without burdening ourselves with the evil so loudly complained of in England, of suffering their fleet, in time of peace to lie rotting in the docks. To unite the sinews of commerce and defense is sound policy; for when our strength and our riches play into each other’s hand, we need fear no external enemy.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete 1776 Bradford-edition English text (introduction, four sections and the appendix) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
I have never met a man, in England or America, who has not admitted that the countries will separate sooner or later. And in nothing have we shown less judgment than in trying to describe what we call the Continent’s ripeness or fitness for independence.
Since everyone accepts the measure and differs only over its timing, let us survey our circumstances and, if possible, discover the very moment for it. But we need look no further: the moment has found us. The general agreement, the glorious convergence of all things, proves it.
Our great strength lies not in numbers but in unity; yet our numbers now suffice to repel the force of the whole world. At present the Continent has a larger body of armed and disciplined men than any power under heaven. It has reached precisely that degree of strength at which no single colony can sustain itself, while all the colonies united can accomplish the task; either more or less than this might prove fatal. Our land forces are already sufficient. As for naval affairs, we cannot fail to see that Britain would never allow an American warship to be built while the Continent remained in her hands. A hundred years from now, therefore, we would be no further ahead in that branch than we are today. Indeed, we would be further behind, for the country’s timber diminishes daily, and what remains in the end will be distant and hard to obtain.
If the Continent were crowded with inhabitants, its suffering in our present circumstances would be unbearable. The more seaport towns we had, the more we would have to defend and the more we would stand to lose. Our present population is so well proportioned to our needs that no one need be idle. The decline of trade supplies an army, and an army’s needs create a new trade.
We have no debts; whatever we incur for this cause will stand as a glorious memorial of our virtue. If only we can leave posterity a settled form of government, an independent constitution of its own, any price will be cheap. But to spend millions merely to have a few contemptible acts repealed and the present ministry driven out is not worth the cost. It is the utmost cruelty to posterity, leaving them the great work still undone and a debt on their backs from which they gain nothing. Such a thought is unworthy of a person of honor; it is the mark of a narrow heart and a petty politician.
The debt we may incur deserves no concern if the work is accomplished. No nation ought to be without a debt. A national debt is a national bond, and when it bears no interest it can never be a grievance. Britain is burdened with a debt of more than one hundred and forty millions sterling, on which she pays more than four millions in interest. In compensation for her debt she has a large navy. America has neither debt nor navy, yet for one twentieth of the English national debt she could have a navy twice as large. England’s navy is now worth no more than three and a half millions sterling.
The first and second editions of this pamphlet appeared without the following calculations, now offered as proof that the preceding estimate of the navy is sound. See Entic’s naval history, introduction, page 56.
The cost of building a ship of each rate and furnishing it with masts, yards, sails, and rigging, together with a proportionate supply of boatswain’s and carpenter’s stores for eight months at sea, as calculated by Mr. Burchett, Secretary to the navy:
£ [pounds sterling]
For a ship of 100 guns = 35,553
90 = 29,886
80 = 23,638
70 = 17,785
60 = 14,197
50 = 10,606
40 = 7,558
30 = 5,846
20 = 3,710
From these figures it is easy to total the value—or rather the cost—of the entire British navy, which in the year 1757, at the height of its glory, consisted of the following ships and guns:
Ships. Guns.
Cost of one. Cost of all.
Cost in £ [pounds sterling]
6 100
35,553 213,318
12 90
29,886 358,632
12 80
23,638 283,656
43 70
17,785 764,755
35 60
14,197 496,895
40 50
10,606 424,240
45 40
7,558 340,110
58 20
3,710 215,180
85 Sloops, bombs
and fireships, one
with another, at 2,000 each, 170,000
------------
Cost
3,266,786
Remaining for guns
233,214
------------
3,500,000
No country on earth is so favorably situated, or has so many resources within itself for raising a fleet, as America. Tar, timber, iron, and cordage are her natural products. We need import nothing. The Dutch, by contrast, make large profits hiring their warships to the Spaniards and Portuguese, yet must import most of their materials. We ought to regard the building of a fleet as a branch of commerce, for shipbuilding is this country’s natural industry. It is the best use we can make of our money. A finished navy is worth more than it costs. It is that rare point in national policy at which commerce and protection meet. Let us build: if we do not need the ships, we can sell them and thereby replace our paper currency with ready gold and silver.
People generally make a great mistake about manning a fleet: not even a fourth of its men need be sailors. The Terrible privateer, commanded by Captain Death, fought the fiercest engagement of any ship in the last war, yet had fewer than twenty sailors aboard, though her complement numbered more than two hundred. A few capable, companionable sailors will soon train enough active landsmen in the ordinary work of a ship. We can therefore never be better placed to begin building a naval force than now, while our timber still stands, our fisheries are blockaded, and our sailors and shipwrights are unemployed. Warships of seventy and eighty guns were built in New England forty years ago; why not now? Shipbuilding is America’s greatest pride, and in time she will surpass the whole world at it. The great empires of the East are mostly inland and thus cannot rival her. Africa is in a state of barbarism; and no European power has both so extensive a coastline and such ample domestic supplies of materials. Where nature has bestowed one, she has withheld the other; to America alone she has been generous with both. The vast Russian empire is almost shut out from the sea, so its boundless forests, tar, iron, and cordage remain merely articles of trade.
Can we afford to be without a fleet for our own safety? We are no longer the small people we were sixty years ago. Then we might have left our property in the streets—or rather, in the fields—and slept securely without locks or bolts on doors or windows. Things have changed; our means of defense should advance with our growing property. Twelve months ago, an ordinary pirate could have sailed up the Delaware and forced the city of Philadelphia to pay whatever sum he demanded on the spot; the same could have happened elsewhere. Indeed, any daring fellow in a brig carrying fourteen or sixteen guns might have robbed the entire Continent and carried off half a million in money. These circumstances demand our attention and reveal the need for naval protection.
Some may say that once we have reconciled with Britain, she will protect us. Are we so foolish as to propose that she keep a navy in our harbors for that purpose? Common sense tells us that the power which has tried to subdue us is the least fit of all to defend us. Conquest can be accomplished under the pretense of friendship, and we ourselves, after a long and brave resistance, can at last be tricked into slavery. If her ships are not to enter our harbors, I ask how she is to protect us. A navy three or four thousand miles away can do little good, and none at all in a sudden emergency. If we must protect ourselves from now on, why not do so for ourselves? Why do it for another?
The English list of warships is long and formidable, but not a tenth of them are fit for service at any one time. Many no longer exist, yet their names are grandly retained on the list if so much as a plank survives. And not a fifth of those fit for service can be spared for any one station at any one time. The East and West Indies, the Mediterranean, Africa, and the other regions over which Britain asserts her claims make heavy demands on her navy. Prejudice and inattention have given us a false idea of England’s navy. We have spoken as though we would have to face all of it at once and therefore need a fleet as large as hers. Because that cannot be built instantly, a band of Tories in disguise has used the argument to discourage us from even beginning. Nothing could be further from the truth. If America had only a twentieth of Britain’s naval force, she would still be more than a match for her. For we have and claim no foreign dominions, and could employ our whole force along our own coast. In the long run we would have a two-to-one advantage over those who must sail three or four thousand miles before attacking us and travel the same distance to refit and recruit. And though Britain’s fleet can restrain our trade with Europe, we can restrain her trade with the West Indies just as effectively: lying close to the Continent, those islands are entirely at its mercy.
If we judge a permanent navy unnecessary, we might devise a way to maintain a naval force in peacetime. Offer merchants premiums to build and use ships mounted with twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty guns, the premiums proportionate to the cargo space they lose. Fifty or sixty such ships, with a few guardships continually on duty, would sustain a sufficient navy. We would avoid the evil so loudly lamented in England: letting a fleet rot in its docks in peacetime. To unite the sinews of commerce and defense is sound policy; when our strength and our wealth sustain each other, we need fear no foreign enemy.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete 1776 Bradford-edition English text (introduction, four sections and the appendix).
I have never met anyone in England or America who did not agree that the two countries would separate sooner or later. Yet we have shown especially poor judgment in trying to decide when the Continent would be ready for independence.
Everyone agrees that separation will happen. They disagree only about when. So let us look at the situation as a whole and try to identify the right time. We need not look far: the time has arrived. The broad agreement and remarkable unity of all the circumstances prove it.
Our greatest strength lies in unity, not numbers. Even so, we already have enough people to resist the force of the whole world. The Continent now has a larger body of armed, trained men than any other power on earth. We have reached a point where no single colony can support itself, but all the colonies together can succeed. Having either more or less strength than this might have disastrous effects. Our land forces are already sufficient. As for a navy, we must recognize that Britain would never allow an American warship to be built while she controlled the continent. We would be no further along in that field a hundred years from now than we are today. In fact, we would be worse off, because our timber supply is shrinking every day. What remains in the end will be distant and hard to obtain.
If the continent were crowded with people, the suffering caused by our present situation would be unbearable. The more seaports we had, the more we would have to defend and the more we would stand to lose. Our present population suits our needs so well that no one has to be idle. The decline in trade provides people for an army, and the army's needs create new trade.
We have no debts. Any debt we take on for this purpose will stand as a proud reminder of our courage. If we can leave future generations a stable government and an independent constitution of their own, any price will be worth paying. But spending millions merely to repeal a few vile laws and drive out the present ministry is not worth the expense. It would also be extremely cruel to future generations. We would leave them the main task and a debt from which they gained nothing. That idea is beneath a person of honor. It is the mark of a small-minded, petty politician.
If we accomplish our goal, the debt we incur should not worry us. Every nation should have a debt. A national debt binds a nation together, and if no interest is charged on it, it is never a burden. Britain carries a debt of more than one hundred and forty million pounds sterling and pays more than four million in interest on it. In return for that debt, Britain has a large navy. America has neither debt nor navy. Yet for one twentieth of Britain's national debt, America could build a navy twice as large as Britain's. The English navy is currently worth no more than three and a half million pounds sterling.
The first and second editions of this pamphlet did not include the following calculations. They are now provided to show that the estimate of the navy above is accurate. See Entic's naval history, introduction, page 56.
Mr. Burchett, Secretary to the navy, calculated the cost of building a ship of each rate and equipping it with masts, yards, sails, and rigging, along with a share of eight months' supplies for the boatswain and carpenter at sea.
£
[pounds
sterling]
For a ship of 100 guns = 35,553
90 = 29,886
80 = 23,638
70 = 17,785
60 = 14,197
50 = 10,606
40 = 7,558
30 = 5,846
20 = 3,710
From this, we can easily add up the value—or rather, the cost—of the entire British navy. In 1757, at the height of its power, it consisted of the following ships and guns:
Ships. Guns.
Cost of one. Cost of all.
Cost in £ [pounds sterling]
6 100
35,553 213,318
12 90
29,886 358,632
12 80
23,638 283,656
43 70
17,785 764,755
35 60
14,197 496,895
40 50
10,606 424,240
45 40
7,558 340,110
58 20
3,710 215,180
85 Sloops, bomb vessels,
and fire ships, on average,
at 2,000 each, 170,000
------------
Cost
3,266,786
Remaining cost of guns
233,214
------------
3,500,000
No country in the world is better placed to build a fleet or has more of what it needs within its own borders than America. Tar, timber, iron, and rope-making materials grow or are produced here naturally. We need import nothing. The Dutch, by contrast, earn large profits renting their warships to the Spaniards and Portuguese, but must import most of the materials they use. We should regard building a fleet as a commercial enterprise, since shipbuilding is a natural industry for this country. It is the best use of our money. Once built, a navy is worth more than it cost. This is a rare point of national policy where trade and protection come together. Let us build ships. If we do not need them, we can sell them and replace our paper money with actual gold and silver.
People often make serious mistakes about how many sailors a fleet needs. Not even one fourth of its crews need to be sailors. The privateer Terrible, commanded by Captain Death, fought the fiercest naval engagement of the last war. Yet she had fewer than twenty sailors aboard, though her crew numbered more than two hundred. A few capable, friendly sailors can quickly teach enough active men from land to do the ordinary work aboard a ship. So we could not choose a better time to begin building a navy. Our timber is still standing, our fisheries are blocked, and our sailors and shipbuilders are unemployed. Warships with seventy and eighty guns were built forty years ago in New England. Why not build them now? Shipbuilding is America's greatest source of pride, and in time she will surpass the whole world at it. The great empires of the East are mostly inland, so they cannot compete. Africa remains in a state of barbarism. No European power has both such an extensive coastline and such a large supply of materials at home. Where nature has provided one, she has withheld the other. Only to America has she given both generously. The vast Russian empire is nearly cut off from the sea. Its immense forests, tar, iron, and rope-making materials are therefore merely goods to sell.
For our own safety, should we really be without a fleet? We are no longer the small population we were sixty years ago. Back then we might have left our property in the streets—or rather, in the fields—and slept safely without locks or bolts on our doors and windows. Things have changed. As our property grows, our defenses should improve too. Twelve months ago, an ordinary pirate could have sailed up the Delaware and forced Philadelphia to pay any sum he demanded on the spot. The same could have happened elsewhere. Indeed, any daring man in a brig carrying fourteen or sixteen guns could have robbed the entire Continent and carried off half a million in money. We must take these possibilities seriously. They show why we need a navy to protect us.
Some might say that Britain will protect us once we make peace with her. Could we be foolish enough to expect her to keep a navy in our harbors for that purpose? Common sense tells us that the power that tried to conquer us is the last one we should trust to defend us. It could conquer us while pretending to be our friend. After resisting long and bravely, we could still be tricked into slavery. And if her ships cannot enter our harbors, how will she protect us? A navy three or four thousand miles away is of little use, and in a sudden crisis it is of no use at all. If we must protect ourselves in the future, why not protect ourselves on our own behalf? Why do it on behalf of someone else?
The English list of warships is long and impressive. But at any given moment fewer than one tenth of them are fit for service. Many no longer exist, though their names remain proudly on the list if even one plank survives. Of the ships fit for service, fewer than one fifth can be assigned to any one station at once. The East and West Indies, the Mediterranean, Africa, and other regions Britain claims all place heavy demands on her navy. Prejudice and inattention have given us a false idea of its strength. We have talked as though we would have to face the entire English navy at once, and therefore need one equally large. Since we cannot build that immediately, a group of Tories hiding their allegiance has used the claim to discourage us from even starting. Nothing could be further from the truth. If America had only one twentieth of Britain's naval power, it would still have a great advantage against her. We hold and claim no foreign territory, so we could use our entire force along our own coast. In the long run, we would have a two-to-one advantage over attackers who had to sail three or four thousand miles to reach us, then travel the same distance to repair their ships and replace their crews and supplies. Britain can use its fleet to restrict our trade with Europe. But we can restrict its trade with the West Indies just as much, because those islands lie near the Continent and are entirely at its mercy.
We might find a way to maintain naval strength in peacetime without keeping a permanent navy, if we decide one is unnecessary. Suppose we offered merchants payments to build and use ships fitted with twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty guns. The payments would match the cargo space the merchants lost. Fifty or sixty such ships, together with a few guard ships on permanent duty, would give us a sufficient navy. We would avoid the problem so often complained of in England: a fleet left to rot in the docks during peacetime. It is sound policy to bring the resources of trade and defense together. When our wealth and our strength support each other, we need fear no foreign enemy.