Book 3, Chapter 15

“Since Terence has expressed this thought, borrowed from philosophy, so aptly, shall we, from whose springs it was drawn, not both express it better and hold it more steadfastly?

31 “Here we have that unchanging expression which Xanthippe is said to have often praised in her husband Socrates: she always saw him leave home and return with the same face. It was not the stern countenance of that elder Marcus Crassus, who, Lucilius says, laughed once in his whole life, but a tranquil and serene one: that is the account handed down to us. His expression rightly remained the same, since there was no change in the mind that shaped it. I therefore accept from the Cyrenaics these weapons against accidents and events, whose approaching assaults may be broken by long reflection beforehand. At the same time I judge that the evil lies in opinion, not in nature. For if it were in the thing itself, why would foreseen evils become lighter?

32 “But something more subtle can be said on these same matters, once we have examined Epicurus’ view. He holds that everyone who thinks himself amid evils must be distressed, whether those evils were foreseen and expected or have grown old. Evils, he says, neither diminish with age nor become lighter through reflection beforehand. Indeed, it is foolish to reflect on a future evil, or perhaps one that will never even come: every evil is hateful enough when it arrives. But someone who has always thought that some adversity might occur makes it an everlasting evil for himself; and if it will not even occur, he takes on a self-imposed misery to no purpose. Thus he is always in anguish, either suffering the evil or thinking of it.

33 “He places the relief of distress in two things: diverting the mind from thinking about trouble and recalling it to the contemplation of pleasures. For he believes that the soul can obey reason and follow where it leads. Reason therefore forbids us to look at our troubles, draws us away from bitter thoughts, and blunts our gaze as it contemplates our miseries. When it has sounded the retreat from these, it again urges and spurs us to look at diverse pleasures and engage our whole mind with them. Through recollection of past pleasures and hope of future ones, he thinks the wise person’s life is filled with these delights. I have expressed this in my own manner; Epicurus’ followers use theirs. But let us consider what they say, and disregard how they say it.”

“Terence took that from philosophy and expressed it so well. Shouldn’t we, whose springs supplied the water he drew, say it better and believe it more consistently?

31 “That’s the explanation for the unchanging expression Xanthippe reportedly used to praise in her husband Socrates. She said he always looked the same when she saw him leave the house and come back. It wasn’t the expression of that old Marcus Crassus, who, Lucilius says, laughed just once in his entire life. Socrates’ face was calm and clear, as tradition tells us. Naturally it always looked the same, since there was no change in the mind that shaped it. So I accept these weapons from the Cyrenaics against chance and accident: long preparation in thought can break the force of events as they arrive. At the same time, I judge that the badness lies in belief, not in nature. If it were in the thing itself, why would foreseen troubles be easier to bear?

32 “But we can make a more precise argument about these same matters once we’ve looked at Epicurus’ view. He thinks everyone who believes they’re in trouble must feel distress, whether the trouble was foreseen and expected or has been around a long time. Troubles, he says, don’t diminish with time, and anticipating them doesn’t make them easier. In fact, thinking ahead about future troubles is foolish: perhaps they won’t even happen. Every trouble is unpleasant enough once it arrives. Someone who constantly thinks that something bad may happen turns it into a permanent trouble. If it isn’t even going to happen, they take on misery voluntarily and pointlessly. So they are always upset, either by experiencing something bad or by thinking about it.

33 “He makes relief from distress depend on two things: turning attention away from thinking about trouble, and turning it back to considering pleasures. He thinks the mind can obey reason and follow wherever it leads. So reason forbids us to look at troubles, pulls us away from painful thoughts, and dulls our focus on miseries. Once it has sounded the retreat from these, it urges and encourages us again to look at different pleasures and engage with them wholeheartedly. He thinks these fill a wise person’s life, both through the memory of past pleasures and the expectation of future ones. I’ve expressed that in our own manner; the Epicureans express it in theirs. But let’s consider what they say, and not worry about how they say it.”