Book 3, Chapter 4
Original Latin
Videtur mihi cadere in sapientem aegritudo.
Num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines libidines iracundiae? haec enim fere sunt eius modi, quae Graeci πάθη appellant; ego poteram ‘morbos’, et id verbum esset e verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet. nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos Graeci appellant, motus animi rationi non obtemperantis, nos autem hos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus, morbos autem non satis usitate, nisi quid aliud tibi videtur.
Mihi vero isto modo.
8 Haecine igitur cadere in sapientem putas?
Prorsus existimo.
Ne ista gloriosa sapientia non magno aestimanda est, siquidem non multum differt ab insania.
Quid? tibi omnisne animi commotio videtur insania?
Non mihi quidem soli, sed, id quod admirari saepe soleo, maioribus quoque nostris hoc ita visum intellego multis saeculis ante Socratem, a quo haec omnis, quae est de vita et de moribus, philosophia manavit.
Quonam tandem modo?
Quia nomen insaniae significat mentis aegrotationem et morbum, id est insanitatem et aegrotum animum, quam appellarunt insaniam.
9 (omnis autem perturbationes animi morbos philosophi appellant negantque stultum quemquam his morbis vacare. qui autem in morbo sunt, sani non sunt; et omnium insipientium animi in morbo sunt: omnes insipientes igitur insaniunt). sanitatem enim animorum positam in tranquillitate quadam constantiaque censebant; his rebus mentem vacuam appellarunt insaniam, propterea quod in perturbato animo sicut in corpore sanitas esse non posset.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
“I think the wise person is liable to distress.”
“And to the other disturbances of the soul as well—fears, desires, fits of anger? These are broadly the things the Greeks call ‘affections.’ I could call them ‘diseases,’ which would translate their word literally, but would not accord with our usage. For the Greeks call pity, envy, exultation, and joy diseases—all movements of the soul that do not obey reason. We, however, would rightly call these same movements of an agitated soul ‘disturbances,’ I think, whereas ‘diseases’ would not be quite idiomatic—unless you think otherwise.”
“No, I agree with your usage.”
8 “Then do you think the wise person is liable to these?”
“I certainly do.”
“Well, that glorious wisdom is not worth much, if it differs little from insanity.”
“What? Do you consider every agitation of the soul insanity?”
“Not I alone. To my frequent surprise, I find that our ancestors also thought so, many centuries before Socrates, from whom all this philosophy of life and conduct flowed.”
“How, exactly?”
“Because the word ‘insanity’ signifies sickness and disease of the mind—that is, a lack of health and an ailing soul, which they called insanity.
9 “(Philosophers call all disturbances of the soul diseases, and deny that any fool is free of these diseases. But those who are diseased are not sound, and the souls of all the unwise are diseased; therefore all the unwise are insane.) For our ancestors believed that the health of souls lay in a certain tranquility and steadiness. They called a mind deprived of these things insane, because health could no more exist in a disturbed soul than in a disturbed body.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
“I think a wise person can experience distress.”
“What about the other emotional disturbances too—fears, desires, fits of anger? Those are roughly the things the Greeks call pathē, ‘affections.’ I could call them ‘illnesses.’ That would translate the word directly, but it wouldn’t fit our normal usage. The Greeks call pity, envy, excitement, and delight all illnesses: movements of the mind that don’t obey reason. I think we’re right to call these same movements of an agitated mind ‘disturbances.’ Calling them ‘illnesses’ isn’t quite normal usage. Unless you think differently?”
“No, I agree with the way you put it.”
8 “So you think a wise person can experience these things?”
“Absolutely.”
“Then that much-advertised wisdom can’t be worth very much, if it isn’t much different from madness.”
“What? Do you think every emotional upheaval is madness?”
“I’m not the only one. It’s something I often find remarkable, but I understand that our ancestors thought the same, many centuries before Socrates, the originator of all this philosophy about life and conduct.”
“How do you make that out?”
“Because the word insania, ‘madness,’ means that the mind is ailing and sick. In other words, it’s a lack of health, a sick mind, that they called insania.
9 “Philosophers call all emotional disturbances illnesses, and they say that no foolish person is free of them. People who are ill aren’t healthy. All unwise people’s minds are ill. So all unwise people are mad. Our ancestors thought that mental health consisted in a certain calmness and steadiness. When the mind lacked those things, they called it madness. A disturbed mind, like a disturbed body, couldn’t be healthy.”
About this section
Book 3, Chapter 4 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 80 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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