Book 2, Chapter 20

46 “For Virtue herself will speak to you in their voice: ‘You have seen boys at Sparta, young men at Olympia, barbarians in the arena, receiving the heaviest blows and bearing them in silence. If some pain happens to wrench at you, will you cry out like a woman, instead of bearing it steadily and calmly?’ ‘It is impossible; nature will not allow it.’ I hear you. Boys bear it, drawn by glory; others bear it from shame, many from fear. Yet we doubt whether nature permits what so many people endure in so many places? She not only permits it: she demands it. For she has nothing more excellent, nothing she seeks more eagerly, than honor, praise, dignity, and decency. I mean these several names to express a single thing; I use several to convey it as fully as possible. What I mean is this: by far the best thing for a human being is what deserves to be sought for its own sake, what springs from virtue or resides in virtue itself, what is praiseworthy in its own right. I would sooner call this the only good than deny it is the supreme good. And as I speak of honor, so I speak in opposite terms of disgrace: nothing is so hideous, nothing so deserving of rejection, nothing so unworthy of a human being.

47 “If you are convinced of this—and you said at the outset that you thought dishonor a greater evil than pain—what remains is for you to command yourself. Though I hardly know how we can say that, as if we were two people, one commanding, the other obeying!”

46 “Through these men Virtue herself addresses you: ‘You’ve watched Spartan boys, young men competing at Olympia, foreigners fighting in the arena. They take terrible blows without a sound. If pain should happen to stab at you, are you going to scream like a woman instead of enduring steadily and quietly?’ ‘I can’t; nature won’t let me.’ So you say. Boys endure for fame; others endure out of embarrassment, and many out of fear. After so many people endure it in so many places, are we still afraid nature might not permit it? She does permit it, and more than that, she requires it. Moral goodness, praise, dignity, honor—she has nothing better and wants nothing more. I’m using several labels for a single thing, to express it as fully as I can. Here’s my meaning: the very best thing a human being can have is something worth choosing for its own sake, something springing from virtue or contained within virtue, deserving praise on its own account. Rather than deny that this is the highest good, I’d say it was the only one. Reverse what I’ve said about moral goodness, and you have the position of shameful conduct. Nothing is more disgusting, more worth rejecting, less worthy of a human being.

47 “If you’re convinced of that—and at the start you did say you thought disgrace was worse than pain—all that’s left is to command yourself. Though I don’t quite know how that expression works. As if there were two of us, one to command and one to obey!”