Book 2, Chapter 18
Original Latin
42 De exercitatione et consuetudine et commentatione dixi. age sis, nunc de ratione videamus, nisi quid vis ad haec.
Egone ut te interpellem? ne hoc quidem vellem: ita me ad credendum tua ducit oratio.
Sitne igitur malum dolere necne, Stoici viderint, qui contortulis quibusdam et minutis conclusiunculis nec ad sensus permanantibus effici volunt non esse malum dolorem. ego illud, quicquid sit, tantum esse, quantum videatur, non puto, falsaque eius visione et specie moveri homines dico vehementius, doloremque [eius] omnem esse tolerabilem.
Unde igitur ordiar? an eadem breviter attingam, quae modo dixi, quo facilius oratio progredi possit longius?
43 inter omnis igitur hoc constat, nec doctos homines solum sed etiam indoctos, virorum esse fortium et magnanimorum et patientium et humana vincentium toleranter dolorem pati; nec vero quisquam fuit, qui eum, qui ita pateretur, non laudandum putaret. quod ergo et postulatur a fortibus et laudatur, cum fit, id aut extimescere veniens aut non ferre praesens nonne turpe est? atqui vide ne, cum omnes rectae animi adfectiones virtutes appellentur, non sit hoc proprium nomen omnium, sed ab ea quae una ceteris excellebat omnes nominatae sint. appellata est enim ex viro virtus; viri autem propria maxime est fortitudo, cuius munera duo sunt maxima: mortis dolorisque contemptio. utendum est igitur his, si virtutis compotes vel potius si viri volumus esse, quoniam a viris virtus nomen est mutuata.
Quaeres fortasse, quo modo, et recte: talem enim medicinam philosophia profitetur.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
42 “I have spoken about training, habit, and practice. Come now, let us consider reason, unless you have something to say on these points.”
“Interrupt you? I would not even wish to: your discourse leads me so strongly toward conviction.”
“Whether suffering pain is an evil or not may be left to the Stoics. With their twisted little chains of reasoning, too fine to reach our actual feelings, they try to prove that pain is not an evil. Whatever it is, I do not think it as great as it seems. I say that people are more violently disturbed by a false image and appearance of it, and that all pain is bearable.
“Where, then, shall I begin? Shall I briefly touch on the same points I made just now, so that the argument may advance further with greater ease?
43 “Everyone agrees—not only the educated, but the uneducated too—that bearing pain patiently belongs to brave, great-hearted, enduring men who rise above human affairs. No one has ever thought that a man who bears it in this way does not deserve praise. Is it not disgraceful, then, either to fear its approach or to fail to bear its presence, when bearing it is both demanded of the brave and praised when achieved? But consider: although all the right dispositions of the mind are called virtues, perhaps this name does not properly belong to all of them. Perhaps they were all named after the one that excelled the rest. Virtus, ‘virtue,’ takes its name from vir, ‘man’; and courage is the quality most characteristic of a man. Its two chief tasks are contempt for death and contempt for pain. We must therefore exercise these qualities if we wish to possess virtue—or rather, to be men, since virtue has borrowed its name from men.
“You may ask how, and rightly: this is the kind of medicine philosophy professes to offer.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
42 “I’ve talked about training, habit, and preparation. Now, if you please, let’s look at reason, unless you want to add anything.”
“Interrupt you? I wouldn’t even want to do that. Your argument is leading me so strongly to believe you.”
“Let the Stoics decide whether being in pain is bad or not. They want to prove that pain isn’t bad with twisted little arguments and tiny deductions that never reach our senses. Whatever pain may be, I don’t think it’s as great as it appears. I say people are more violently disturbed by a false picture and appearance of it, and that all pain can be borne.
“So where should I start? Shall I briefly go back over what I just said, to help the argument move further forward?
43 “Everyone agrees on this, educated and uneducated alike: bearing pain patiently is a mark of men who are brave, great in spirit, enduring, and able to rise above human troubles. No one has ever thought a man who bears it that way doesn’t deserve praise. So isn’t it shameful to dread pain as it approaches or fail to bear it when it’s here, when endurance is both expected from the brave and praised when it happens? Now consider this. We call all the mind’s good dispositions virtues. But perhaps that wasn’t originally the name for all of them. Perhaps they all got their name from the one that stood above the rest. The word ‘virtue’ comes from the word for a man. And a man’s most distinctive quality is courage. Its two chief tasks are to disregard death and pain. So we must practice these if we want to possess virtue—or rather, if we want to be men, since virtue borrowed its name from men.
“You may ask how. And rightly so: philosophy claims to provide that sort of treatment.”
About this section
Book 2, Chapter 18 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 67 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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