Book 1, Chapter 33

80 “These arguments can be refuted. They reveal a failure to understand that, when we speak of the eternity of souls, we mean the mind, which is always free from every turbulent movement, not those parts in which grief, anger, and desire reside. The man against whom these arguments are directed considers those parts removed and separated from the mind. Again, resemblance is more apparent among animals, whose souls lack reason; among human beings resemblance is more evident in bodily form, and it makes a great difference to the soul itself what kind of body it inhabits. Many things arise from the body to sharpen the mind, many to dull it. Aristotle indeed says that all men of genius are melancholy, so I need not resent being somewhat slow myself. He lists many examples and, as though the point were established, explains why this happens. But if things generated in the body have so powerful an influence on the mind’s disposition—and whatever they may be, they are what produces resemblance—then resemblance supplies no compelling reason why souls must be born. I pass over cases of dissimilarity.

81 “I wish Panaetius could be here—he lived with Africanus. I would ask him which of his relatives was resembled by the grandson of Africanus’s brother: in appearance he may have resembled his father, but in his way of life he resembled all the most depraved people so closely that he easily surpassed them in wickedness. Whom, too, did the grandson of Publius Crassus resemble, that wise and eloquent man, that foremost citizen? Or the grandsons and sons of many other illustrious men whom there is no need to name?

“But what are we doing? Have we forgotten that, after saying enough about eternity, our present purpose was to show that even if souls perished, there would still be no evil in death?”

“I remembered it well enough, but I was quite willing to let your discussion of eternity carry you away from our subject.”

80 “These arguments can be answered. They come from someone who doesn’t realize that when we speak of souls lasting forever, we mean the mind, which is always free from emotional disturbance. We don’t mean the parts in which distress, anger, and desires operate. The man these arguments are aimed at considers those parts separate and cut off from the mind. Besides, resemblance is more obvious in animals, whose souls lack reason. In human beings, resemblance shows up more in bodily shape. And it makes a great difference to a soul what sort of body it’s placed in. Many things arise from the body that sharpen the mind, and many that dull it. Aristotle actually says all highly gifted people have a black-bile temperament, so I needn’t mind being a little slow myself. He lists many examples and, treating the matter as settled, explains why it happens. Now, if things produced in the body have such a powerful effect on the mind’s condition, and if these things, whatever they are, cause the resemblance, then resemblance doesn’t force us to conclude that souls are born. I won’t go into the lack of resemblance.

81 “I wish Panaetius could be here—he lived with Africanus. I’d ask him which of his relatives Africanus’s brother’s grandson resembled. In looks, perhaps his father; in his way of life, all the worst criminals, to such an extent that he easily outdid them. I’d ask the same about the grandson of Publius Crassus, that wise, eloquent, leading citizen, and about the grandsons and sons of many other famous men whom there’s no need to name.

“But what are we doing? Have we forgotten“that our present task, after saying enough about eternity, was to show that even if souls perish, there’s still nothing bad about death?”

“I did remember. But I was happy to let you stray from the subject when you were talking about eternity.”