Mouseiaan open library of the ancient world

Book 1, Chapter 27

27 of 189 parts in Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero

Original Latin

66 ‘Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest; nihil enim est in animis mixtum atque concretum aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur, nihil ne aut umidum quidem aut flabile aut igneum. his enim in naturis nihil inest, quod vim memoriae mentis cogitationis habeat, quod et praeterita teneat et futura provideat et complecti possit praesentia. quae sola divina sunt, nec invenietur umquam, unde ad hominem venire possint nisi a deo. singularis est igitur quaedam natura atque vis animi seiuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis. ita, quicquid est illud, quod sentit quod sapit quod vivit quod viget, caeleste et divinum ob eamque rem aeternum sit necesse est. nec vero deus ipse, qui intellegitur a nobis, alio modo intellegi potest nisi mens soluta quaedam et libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et movens ipsaque praedita motu sempiterno. hoc e genere atque eadem e natura est humana mens.’

Ubi igitur aut qualis est ista mens?

67 —ubi tua aut qualis? potesne dicere? an, si omnia ad intellegendum non habeo quae habere vellem, ne is quidem quae habeo mihi per te uti licebit? non valet tantum animus, ut se ipse videat, at ut oculus, sic animus se non videns alia cernit. non videt autem, quod minimum est, formam suam (quamquam fortasse id quoque, sed relinquamus); vim certe, sagacitatem, memoriam, motum, celeritatem videt. haec magna, haec divina, haec sempiterna sunt; qua facie quidem sit aut ubi habitet, ne quaerendum quidem est.

Musean translation

Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.

66 “‘No origin for souls can be found on earth. In souls there is nothing mixed or compounded, nothing that seems born or fashioned out of earth, nothing even moist, airy, or fiery. For none of these substances contains the power of memory, understanding, or thought, capable of retaining the past, foreseeing the future, and embracing the present. These powers alone are divine; nor will any source ever be found from which they could come to human beings except a god. The soul, then, has a distinctive nature and power, separate from these familiar, recognized substances. Thus whatever it is that feels, understands, lives, and flourishes must be heavenly and divine, and for that reason eternal. Indeed, the very god whom we conceive cannot be conceived except as a mind, unbound and free, removed from every mortal compound, perceiving and moving all things and itself endowed with everlasting motion. The human mind belongs to this same kind and nature.’”

“Where, then, is that mind, and what is it like?”

67 “Where is yours, and what is it like? Can you tell me? If I lack everything I should like to have for understanding it, will you deny me the use even of what I have? The soul has not the power to see itself; but, like the eye, it sees other things without seeing itself. What it does not see is its own shape, which matters least—though perhaps it sees that too, but let us leave that aside. Certainly it sees its power, insight, memory, motion, and speed. These are great, divine, everlasting things. What its features are, or where it lives, is not even a question we need to ask.”

Plain English translation

Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.

66 “‘Look for the source of souls on earth, and you won’t find it. They contain no blend or compound, nothing apparently formed or grown from earth—not even anything wet, airy, or made of fire. For these substances have no capacity for remembering, understanding, or thinking. They cannot keep the past in mind, see ahead, or grasp what’s happening now. Only these abilities are divine. Nothing but a god will ever explain how they reach us. So the soul has its own distinct power and substance, apart from the ordinary substances familiar to us. Whatever does the feeling and understanding, whatever lives and has energy, must belong to heaven and be divine; consequently it must last forever. Even our conception of a god is possible only as an unfettered, independent mind. We separate it from every mortal mixture: it perceives all things, sets them all in motion, and moves forever itself. Human intelligence is of that very kind, of that very substance.’”

“Then where is this mind? What sort of thing is it?”

67 “Tell me that about your own. Where is it? What sort of thing? Can you answer? I may lack some of the means of understanding it that I’d like. Will you therefore stop me using the means I have? The mind cannot look at itself; neither can an eye, but both can see other things. Its own shape escapes it, and that matters least. Perhaps it can even see that—let’s put that aside. At least it recognizes its strength and quick perception, its memory, its movement and speed. In these lie its greatness, its divinity, its everlasting life. There’s no need even to inquire about its outward appearance or its dwelling place.”

About this section

Book 1, Chapter 27 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 27 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.

Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the Roman tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.

Download the complete work as JSON · Retex Markdown