Book 5, Chapter 13
Original Latin
Unde igitur ordiri rectius possumus quam a communi parente natura?
37 quae, quicquid genuit, non modo animal, sed etiam quod ita ortum esset e terra, ut stirpibus suis niteretur, in suo quidque genere perfectum esse voluit. itaque et arbores et vites et ea, quae sunt humiliora neque se tollere a terra altius possunt, alia semper virent, alia hieme nudata verno tempore tepefacta frondescunt, neque est ullum quod non ita vigeat interiore quodam motu et suis in quoque seminibus inclusis, ut aut flores aut fruges fundat aut bacas, omniaque in omnibus, quantum in ipsis sit, nulla vi impediente perfecta sint.
38 facilius vero etiam in bestiis, quod is sensus a natura est datus, vis ipsius naturae perspici potest. namque alias bestias nantis aquarum incolas esse voluit, alias volucres caelo frui libero, serpentis quasdam, quasdam esse gradientis, earum ipsarum partim solivagas, partim congregatas, inmanis alias, quasdam autem cicures, non nullas abditas terraque tectas. atque earum quaeque suum tenens munus, cum in disparis animantis vitam transire non possit, manet in lege naturae. et ut bestiis aliud alii praecipui a natura datum est, quod suum quaeque retinet nec discedit ab eo, sic homini multo quiddam praestantius; etsi praestantia debent ea dici, quae habent aliquam comparationem, humanus autem animus decerptus ex mente divina cum alio nullo nisi cum ipso deo, si hoc fas est dictu, comparari potest.
39 hic igitur si est excultus et si eius acies ita curata est, ut ne caecaretur erroribus, fit perfecta mens, id est absoluta ratio, quod est idem virtus. et si omne beatum est, cui nihil deest, et quod in suo genere expletum atque cumulatum est, idque virtutis est proprium, certe omnes virtutis compotes beati sunt.
Et hoc quidem mihi cum Bruto convenit, id est cum Aristotele Xenocrate Speusippo Polemone. sed mihi videntur etiam beatissimi.
40 quid enim deest ad beate vivendum ei, qui confidit suis bonis? aut, qui diffidit, beatus esse qui potest? at diffidat necesse est, qui bona dividit tripertito.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
“Where, then, can we begin more fittingly than with nature, our common parent?
37 “Whatever she brought forth—not only living creatures, but also whatever sprang from the earth and rested on roots of its own—she intended to be perfect of its kind. So trees and vines, and the lower plants that cannot lift themselves far above the ground, are some of them always green, while others, stripped bare in winter, put out leaves when warmed by spring. There is none that does not flourish through an inward movement, with its own seeds enclosed within it, producing flowers or crops or berries. In each of them everything is complete, so far as lies within its own power, unless some force prevents it.
38 “In animals, because nature has given them sensation, her own power can be discerned even more easily. She intended some animals to swim and inhabit the waters, others to fly and enjoy the open sky; some to crawl, others to walk. Among these animals, some roam alone, others gather together; some are fierce, others tame; some live hidden and covered by earth. Each of them holds to its own function and, unable to pass into the life of a different creature, remains within nature’s law. Just as nature has given each kind of animal some special quality, which it keeps as its own and never abandons, so she has given the human being something far more excellent. Yet we should call things more excellent only where some comparison is possible, whereas the human mind, drawn from the divine intelligence, can be compared with nothing other than God himself, if it is permissible to say so.
39 “If this mind is cultivated, then, and its vision so tended that errors do not blind it, it becomes a perfect intelligence—that is, fully developed reason, which is the same as virtue. And if everything that lacks nothing is happy, and everything that is filled and complete in its own kind is happy, and if that is the distinctive character of virtue, then certainly everyone who possesses virtue is happy.
“On this I agree with Brutus—that is to say, with Aristotle, Xenocrates, Speusippus, and Polemo. But I think such people are supremely happy as well.
40 “For what does someone who trusts in his own goods lack for a happy life? Or how can someone who does not trust in them be happy? Yet anyone who divides goods into three kinds must lack that trust.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
“Where could we better begin, then, than with nature, our common parent?
37 “She has wanted everything she produces to be complete in its own kind. That applies not only to animals but also to things that grow from the earth and are supported by their roots. So among trees, vines, and the smaller plants that can’t rise far above the ground, some stay green all year. Others lose their leaves in winter and grow them again when spring warms them. Every one of them thrives through some movement within itself, with its own seeds enclosed in it, and produces flowers, crops, or berries. Everything in every one of them is complete, as far as it can be, if no force gets in the way.
38 “We can see nature’s own power even more easily in animals, because she has given them sensation. She wanted some animals to swim and live in water, others to fly and enjoy the open sky, some to crawl, and some to walk. Among these animals, some range alone, others gather in groups. Some are wild, some tame, some hidden away and covered by earth. Each keeps to its own function. Unable to change over to the life of a different kind of creature, it stays within nature’s law. Nature has given different animals their own special qualities, and each keeps its own without departing from it. In the same way, she has given human beings something far superior. Yet we should call things superior only when there’s something to compare them with. The human mind, drawn from the divine mind, can be compared with nothing but God himself, if it’s permissible to say so.
39 “So when this mind has been developed, and its vision has been looked after so that errors don’t blind it, it becomes a perfect mind. That is, it becomes fully developed reason, which is the same thing as virtue. Everything that lacks nothing is happy, everything that is full and complete in its own kind. That completeness is precisely what belongs to virtue. So everyone who possesses virtue is certainly happy.
“On this I agree with Brutus—that is, with Aristotle, Xenocrates, Speusippus, and Polemo. But I think such people are also as happy as anyone can be.
40 “What could someone lack for a happy life if he trusts the good things he has? And how could someone be happy if he doesn’t trust them? Yet anyone who divides good things into three classes is bound to lack that trust.”
About this section
Book 5, Chapter 13 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 161 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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