Book 5, Chapter 8
Original Latin
21 Vellem id quidem, sed habeo paulum, quod requiram. ego enim adsentior eorum quae posuisti alterum alteri consequens esse, ut, quem ad modum, si, quod honestum sit, id solum sit bonum, sequatur vitam beatam virtute confici, sic, si vita beata in virtute sit, nihil esse nisi virtutem bonum. sed Brutus tuus auctore Aristo et Antiocho non sentit hoc; putat enim, etiamsi sit bonum aliquod praeter virtutem.
Quid igitur?
22 contra Brutumne me dicturum putas?
Tu vero, ut videtur; nam praefinire non est meum.
Quid cuique igitur consentaneum sit, alio loco. nam ista mihi et cum Antiocho saepe et cum Aristo nuper, cum Athenis imperator apud eum deversarer, dissensio fuit. mihi enim non videbatur quisquam esse beatus posse, cum in malis esset; in malis autem sapientem esse posse, si essent ulla corporis aut fortunae mala. dicebantur haec, quae scripsit etiam Antiochus locis pluribus, virtutem ipsam per se beatam vitam efficere posse neque tamen beatissimam; deinde ex maiore parte plerasque res nominari, etiamsi quae pars abesset, ut vires, ut valetudinem, ut divitias, ut honorem, ut gloriam, quae genere, non numero cernerentur; item beatam vitam, etiamsi ex aliqua parte clauderet, tamen ex multo maiore parte optinere nomen suum.
23 haec nunc enucleare non ita necesse est, quamquam non constantissime dici mihi videntur. nam et, qui beatus est, non intellego quid requirat, ut sit beatior—si est enim quod desit, ne beatus quidem est—, et quod ex maiore parte unam quamque rem appellari spectarique dicunt, est ubi id isto modo valeat; cum vero tria genera malorum esse dicant, qui duorum generum malis omnibus urgeatur, ut omnia advorsa sint in fortuna, omnibus oppressum corpus et confectum doloribus, huic paulumne ad beatam vitam deesse dicemus, non modo ad beatissimam?
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
21 “I wish so too, but I still have a small question to ask. I agree that the propositions you have stated follow from one another: just as, if only what is honorable is good, it follows that virtue produces a happy life, so, if happiness lies in virtue, nothing but virtue is good. But your friend Brutus, following Aristo and Antiochus, does not hold this view. He thinks virtue sufficient even if there is some good besides virtue.”
“Well then?
22 “Do you think I am going to argue against Brutus?”
“Yes, apparently you will. It is not for me to set limits.”
“Let us leave for another occasion the question of what is consistent with each person’s position. I have often disagreed with Antiochus on these matters, and recently with Aristo, when I stayed with him at Athens during my military command. It seemed to me that no one could be happy while suffering evils; yet the wise person could suffer evils if any bodily misfortunes or strokes of fortune were evils. They used to make the following arguments, which Antiochus has also written in several places: virtue alone can produce a happy life, but not the happiest life; most things take their names from the greater part of what they are, even when some part is missing—strength, health, wealth, honor, glory, for example, are judged by their general character, not by counting their components. In the same way, even if a happy life limps in some respect, it still retains its name through its much greater part.
23 “There is no great need to disentangle these arguments now, although they do not seem to me entirely consistent. For one thing, I do not understand what a happy person requires to become happier: if something is lacking, he is not even happy. As for their assertion that everything is named and judged by its greater part, there are cases where that principle holds. But since they say there are three kinds of evil, suppose someone is assailed by every evil of two kinds: everything in his fortunes is adverse, and his body is overwhelmed and exhausted by every kind of pain. Shall we say that he lacks only a little of a happy life, let alone the happiest?”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
21 “I’d like that too, but let me raise a small question. Yes, I accept that the two statements you’ve put forward imply each other. Make moral rightness the only good, and you have to accept that virtue makes life happy. Put happiness in virtue, and you have to rule out any good apart from virtue. Your Brutus, though, follows Aristo and Antiochus on this, and disagrees. He thinks virtue can do it even when other good things exist.”
“What then?
22 “Do you think I’m going to argue against Brutus?”
“That’s for you to decide. It isn’t my place to set limits.”
“Let’s leave the question of consistency with each person’s views for another occasion. Antiochus and I have often disagreed about this. I also disagreed recently with Aristo, when I stayed at his house in Athens as a military commander. My view was that nobody could be happy while suffering evils. Yet if bodily conditions or changes of fortune count as evils, even the wise person may suffer them. They answered with arguments Antiochus has put in writing in several places. Virtue, they said, can make life happy on its own, though not as happy as possible. They went on to say that most things take their names from what makes up most of them, even with a part missing. Take strength, health, wealth, honor, or fame: we assess their kind, not a numerical total. Similarly, a life might limp in one part and still earn the name happy from the far larger part.
23 “There’s no pressing need to go through those details now. Still, the reasoning seems rather inconsistent to me. What more does a happy person need in order to become happier? I can’t understand that: if he lacks something, he isn’t happy to begin with. Their claim that we name and judge each thing by its larger part does work in some cases. But remember their three kinds of bad things. Imagine a person suffering every evil of two kinds. Nothing in his fortunes goes his way, and pain of every sort crushes and wears out his body. Shall we say that he lacks only a little of what makes life happy, never mind what makes it as happy as possible?”
About this section
Book 5, Chapter 8 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 156 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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