Book 4, Chapter 37

79 “Where, then, are those who call irascibility useful—can insanity be useful?—or natural? Can anything be in accordance with nature if it happens in defiance of reason? If anger were natural, how could one person be more irascible than another? How could lust for revenge end before revenge had been taken? Or how could anyone regret what he had done in anger? We see this in King Alexander: after killing his friend Clitus, he could scarcely refrain from taking his own life, so powerful was his remorse. Once these things are understood, who can doubt that this movement of the soul too is wholly a matter of belief and will? Who could doubt that infirmities of the soul, such as avarice and the desire for glory, arise because great value is set on the thing from which the soul’s sickness comes? From this we must understand that every disturbance too rests on belief.

80 “And if confidence—that is, the soul’s firm trust—is a kind of knowledge and a weighty belief that does not assent rashly, fear too is a lack of confidence in the face of expected and impending evil; and if hope is the expectation of good, the expectation of evil must be fear. Like fear, then, the other disturbances are evils. Therefore, just as steadiness belongs to knowledge, disturbance belongs to error. Those called naturally irascible, compassionate, envious, or anything of that kind have, as it were, an unhealthy constitution of soul, but they can still be cured. So we are told of Socrates: Zopyrus, who professed to discern each person’s nature from his appearance, listed many vices in him before a gathering. The others laughed at him, recognizing none of these vices in Socrates. But Socrates himself came to his support, saying that he had indeed been born with those vices, but had cast them out by reason.

81 “Therefore, just as even someone in the best of health may seem naturally more prone to a particular disease, so different souls incline more toward different vices. As for those said to be vicious not by nature but through their own fault, their vices consist of false beliefs about good and evil things, making different people more prone to different movements and disturbances. But a chronic condition, as in the body, is harder to dislodge than an agitation: a sudden swelling of the eyes is cured more quickly than a long-standing inflammation is driven away.”

79 “What now of those who pronounce anger useful or natural? Does madness have a use? Could something opposed by reason possibly accord with nature? If anger belonged to nature, why would it affect one person more readily than another? Since it’s a wish for revenge, why would it stop before revenge came? Why would anyone feel remorse for angry deeds? Take King Alexander: after he killed his companion Clitus, remorse nearly drove him to kill himself. With these facts before us, surely we can’t doubt that this mental movement too depends entirely on belief and choice. Mental illnesses such as greed or hunger for glory plainly grow from valuing their objects highly—the very objects making the mind sick. This should teach us that belief underlies every disturbance as well.

80 “Confidence means firm mental trust. If it is a sort of knowledge, a solid belief held by someone who doesn’t accept things rashly, then fear is distrust concerning an evil expected and threatening. Hope expects good; expecting evil must therefore mean fear. Fear is bad, and the other disturbances are bad as well. Knowledge gives steadiness, then, while error gives disturbance. Those we call naturally angry, pitying, envious, and so forth have something like an unhealthy mental constitution. They can nevertheless be healed. The story of Socrates is an example. At a gathering, Zopyrus, who claimed he could tell anyone’s character from their looks, attributed a collection of faults to Socrates. Everyone else laughed, finding no such faults in him. Socrates defended Zopyrus: he said those qualities were inborn in him, but reason had enabled him to throw them off.

81 “So even someone enjoying excellent bodily health may seem naturally more prone to a particular disease. In the same way, different minds are more inclined to different defects. But for those said to be defective through fault rather than nature, their defects consist of false beliefs about good and bad things, so that one person is more prone to one sort of mental movement and disturbance than another. As in the body, a condition that has grown old is harder to drive out than a disturbance. A sudden swelling of the eyes is cured sooner than a long-standing inflammation is removed.”