Book 4, Chapter 28

60 “Every disturbance of this sort may indeed be washed away by calming the soul, when you teach that what gives rise to delight or lust is not a good, and what gives rise to fear or distress is not an evil. Yet the sure and specific cure is to teach that the disturbances themselves are defective in their own right and contain nothing either natural or necessary. We see distress itself eased when we reproach mourners with the weakness of an unmanly soul, and praise the dignity and steadiness of those who endure human circumstances without turmoil. This can happen even to people who think those things are evils, but still believe they should be borne with an even mind. Someone thinks pleasure a good, another thinks money a good; still, the first can be drawn away from intemperance, the second from avarice. That other method of reasoning and discourse, which removes both the false belief and the distress at once, is indeed more useful, but it rarely succeeds and should not be applied to people at large.

61 “There are, moreover, some forms of distress which that medicine cannot possibly relieve. Suppose someone is distressed because he has no virtue, no spirit, no sense of duty, no moral goodness. His anguish is indeed caused by evils, but a different treatment must be brought to bear on him, one that all philosophers can share, even when they disagree on other matters. All ought to agree that movements of the soul turned away from right reason are defective. Thus even if the things that stir fear or distress are evils, or those that stir desire or delight are goods, the agitation itself is still defective. For we want the man we call great-souled and courageous to be steady, calm, dignified, and above all human circumstances. No one who grieves, fears, craves, or exults can be such a man. These feelings belong to people who think human events stronger than their own souls.”

60 “Teaching that the source of delight and craving isn’t good, and the source of fear and distress isn’t bad, can indeed calm the mind and wash away any disturbance of this sort. But the reliable cure directed at the condition itself teaches something else: disturbances are wrong in themselves, neither necessary nor natural in any respect. We actually see sorrow lessen when we confront mourners with the weakness of an effeminate mind, or praise the dignity and steadiness of people who meet human misfortunes without turmoil. That often works even on people who count such events as evils but think they must be faced evenly. A believer in pleasure’s goodness can still be turned from lack of self-control; a believer in money’s goodness can still be turned from greed. The alternative argument, removing both distress and false belief together, would be more beneficial. It rarely succeeds, though, and isn’t suitable for the general public.

61 “Some distress can’t be eased by that medicine at all. Imagine being troubled by a complete lack of virtue, spirit, duty, or moral goodness in yourself. Those really are evils causing your anguish. You need another treatment, one available to every philosopher despite their disagreements elsewhere. They should all accept that mental movements opposed to right reason are wrong. Grant that the objects prompting fear and distress really are bad, or those prompting desire and delight really good: the mental movement remains wrong. The man we call brave and high-minded should, we expect, be steady, composed, dignified, and dismissive of everything human. Sorrow, fear, craving, or leaping delight are incompatible with that character. They mark people who rate the power of human events above that of their own minds.”