Book 4, Chapter 26
Original Latin
56 At etiam aemulari utile est, obtrectare, misereri. cur misereare potius quam feras opem, si id facere possis? an sine misericordia liberales esse non possumus? non enim suscipere ipsi aegritudines propter alios debemus, sed alios, si possumus, levare aegritudine. obtrectare vero alteri aut illa vitiosa aemulatione, quae rivalitati similis est, aemulari quid habet utilitatis, cum sit aemulantis angi alieno bono quod ipse non habeat, obtrectantis autem angi alieno bono, quod id etiam alius habeat? qui id adprobari possit, aegritudinem suscipere pro experientia, si quid habere velis? nam solum habere velle summa dementia est.
Mediocritates autem malorum quis laudare recte possit?
57 quis enim potest, in quo libido cupiditasve sit, non libidinosus et cupidus esse? in quo ira, non iracundus? in quo angor, non anxius? in quo timor, non timidus? libidinosum igitur et iracundum et anxium et timidum censemus esse sapientem? de cuius excellentia multa quidem dici quamvis fuse lateque possunt, sed brevissime illo modo, sapientiam esse rerum divinarum et humanarum scientiam cognitionemque, quae cuiusque rei causa sit; ex quo efficitur, ut divina imitetur, humana omnia inferiora virtute ducat. in hanc tu igitur tamquam in mare, quod est ventis subiectum, perturbationem cadere tibi dixisti videri? quid est quod tantam gravitatem constantiamque perturbet? an inprovisum aliquid aut repentinum? quid potest accidere tale ei, cui nihil, quod homini evenire possit<, non praemeditatum sit>? nam quod aiunt nimia resecari oportere, naturalia relinqui, quid tandem potest esse naturale, quod idem nimium esse possit? sunt enim omnia ista ex errorum orta radicibus, quae evellenda et extrahenda penitus, non circumcidenda nec amputanda sunt.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
56 “‘But emulation, jealousy, and pity are useful too.’ Why feel pity rather than bring help, if you can do so? Can we not be generous without pity? We ought not to take distress upon ourselves on account of others, but, if we can, to relieve others of distress. And what use is jealousy of another, or that defective emulation which resembles rivalry? The person who feels emulation is tormented by another’s good because he himself lacks it; the jealous person is tormented by another’s good because someone else has it too. How can it be right to take on distress instead of making an effort, if there is something you want to have? As for wanting to be the only one to have it, that is utter madness.
“And who could rightly praise moderate evils?
57 “How can someone who has lust or desire not be lustful and desirous? Someone who has anger not be irascible? Someone who has anguish not be anxious? Someone who has fear not be timid? Do we therefore think the wise person lustful, irascible, anxious, and timid? We could speak at any length and breadth about his excellence, but most briefly in this way: wisdom is knowledge of things divine and human, and understanding of the causes of each. From this it follows that he imitates the divine and regards all human things as inferior to virtue. Did you say, then, that you thought disturbance could fall upon wisdom as upon a sea exposed to winds? What could disturb such dignity and steadiness? Something unforeseen or sudden? What of that kind could happen to someone for whom nothing that can befall a human being <has not been considered beforehand>? As for their claim that excesses should be cut back while natural feelings are left, what can be natural if it can also be excessive? All these things arise from the roots of error, which must be torn out and extracted completely, not trimmed or lopped.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
56 “You also call emulation, jealousy, and pity useful. If you’re able to help, why choose pity over help? Surely generosity doesn’t require pity. Our task isn’t to burden ourselves with distress on other people’s account; it’s to ease their distress where we can. What benefit comes from jealousy, or from the wrong kind of emulation that resembles rivalry? In emulation, another person’s good hurts because you lack it; in jealousy, it hurts because someone besides you has it. If you want to get something, how could we approve your suffering instead of trying for it? Wanting exclusive possession is sheer madness.
“And who could rightly praise moderate amounts of evil?
57 “With craving or desire in you, how could you avoid being someone who craves and desires? With anger, how avoid a bad temper; with anguish, anxiety; with fear, fearfulness? Must our wise person therefore be craving, angry, anxious, and fearful? The excellence of wisdom could occupy an enormously long account. To put it briefly, though, it is knowing divine and human matters and understanding what causes each thing. This knowledge leads it to copy the divine and rank everything human below virtue. You said you thought disturbances could enter such wisdom, as they enter a sea exposed to winds. What could shake so much dignity and steadiness? An unexpected, sudden event? Nothing possible for human beings can be unexpected to someone who has rehearsed it all beforehand. They tell us to prune the excess and preserve the natural element. But how can something be natural if the same thing can be excessive? Every one of these states springs from errors at its roots. Dig those roots right out: don’t just cut back or lop off their growth.”
About this section
Book 4, Chapter 26 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 136 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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