Book 4, Chapter 15
Original Latin
34 Quando, ut aliis locis de virtute et diximus et saepe dicendum erit—pleraeque enim quaestiones, quae ad vitam moresque pertinent, a virtutis fonte ducuntur—, quando igitur virtus est adfectio animi constans conveniensque, laudabiles efficiens eos, in quibus est, et ipsa per se sua sponte separata etiam utilitate laudabilis, ex ea proficiscuntur honestae voluntates sententiae actiones omnisque recta ratio (quamquam ipsa virtus brevissume recta ratio dici potest). huius igitur virtutis contraria est vitiositas—sic enim malo quam malitiam appellare eam quam Graeci κακίαν appellant; nam malitia certi cuiusdam vitii nomen est, vitiositas omnium—; ex qua concitantur perturbationes, quae sunt, ut paulo ante diximus, turbidi animorum concitatique motus, aversi a ratione et inimicissimi mentis vitaeque tranquillae. inportant enim aegritudines anxias atque acerbas animosque adfligunt et debilitant metu; idem inflammant adpetitione nimia, quam tum cupiditatem tum libidinem dicimus, inpotentiam quandam animi a temperantia et moderatione plurimum dissidentem.
35 quae si quando adepta erit id quod ei fuerit concupitum, tum ecferetur alacritate, ut ‘nihil ei constet’, quod agat, ut ille, qui ‘voluptatem animi nimiam summum esse errorem’ arbitratur. eorum igitur malorum in una virtute posita sanatio est.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
34 “Since, as we have said of virtue elsewhere and shall often have to say again—for most questions about life and conduct flow from virtue as their source—since, then, virtue is a steady and harmonious disposition of the soul, making those who possess it praiseworthy and itself worthy of praise in its own right and by its own nature, even apart from any advantage, from it arise honorable wishes, judgments, and actions, and all right reason. Indeed, virtue itself may be defined most briefly as right reason. Opposed to virtue is viciousness: I prefer that term to malice for what the Greeks call κακία, since malice names one particular vice, whereas viciousness embraces them all. From it are stirred disturbances which, as we said a little earlier, are turbulent and excited movements of the soul, turned away from reason and deeply hostile to a tranquil mind and life. They bring anxious and bitter distress, and crush and weaken souls with fear. They also inflame them with excessive appetite, which we call sometimes desire, sometimes lust—a kind of loss of self-command utterly at variance with temperance and moderation.
35 “If it ever obtains what it has coveted, it will be so carried away with excitement that ‘nothing it does is steady,’ as that character says who regards ‘excessive pleasure of the soul as the greatest error.’ The cure for these evils, then, lies in virtue alone.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
34 “We’ve spoken about virtue elsewhere, and we’ll often need to speak about it again. Most questions about life and character flow from virtue as their source. Virtue, then, is a steady, consistent disposition of mind. It makes the people who have it praiseworthy, and is itself worth praising simply for what it is, in and of itself, even apart from any advantage it brings. From it come morally right wishes, judgments, and actions, and all right reasoning. In fact, the shortest definition of virtue itself might be ‘right reason.’ The opposite of this virtue is defectiveness. I prefer that word to ‘malice’ for the Greek kakia: malice names one particular defect, while defectiveness covers them all. From it disturbances are stirred up: as we said a little earlier, these are turbulent, agitated movements of the mind, turned away from reason and deeply hostile to a peaceful mind and life. They bring anxious, bitter distress, and they batter and weaken the mind with fear. They also set it on fire with excessive appetite, which we call sometimes desire, sometimes craving. This is a kind of mental loss of control, very far removed from self-restraint and moderation.
35 “If it ever gets what it wanted, it then gets so carried away with excitement that it has ‘no steady idea’ what it’s doing, as in the words of the man who thinks ‘too much mental pleasure is the greatest mistake.’ The cure for these evils lies in virtue alone.”
About this section
Book 4, Chapter 15 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 125 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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