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Book 4, Chapter 8

118 of 189 parts in Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero

Original Latin

Haec autem definiunt hoc modo: invidentiam esse dicuntaegritudinemsusceptam propter alterius res secundas, quae nihil noceant invidenti.

17 (nam si qui doleat eius rebus secundis a quo ipse laedatur, non recte dicatur invidere, ut si Hectori Agamemno; qui autem, cui alterius commoda nihil noceant, tamen eum doleat is frui, is invideat profecto.) aemulatio autem dupliciter illa quidem dicitur, ut et in laude et in vitio nomen hoc sit; nam et imitatio virtutis aemulatio dicitur— sed ea nihil hoc loco utimur; est enim laudis—, et est aemulatio aegritudo, si eo quod concupierit alius potiatur, ipse careat. obtrectatio autem est, ea quam intellegi ζηλοτυπίαν volo, aegritudo ex eo, quod alter quoque potiatur eo quod ipse concupiverit.

18 misericordia est aegritudo ex miseria alterius iniuria laborantis (nemo enim parricidae aut proditoris supplicio misericordia commovetur); angor aegritudo premens, luctus aegritudo ex eius qui carus fuerit interitu acerbo, maeror aegritudo flebilis, aerumna aegritudo laboriosa, dolor aegritudo crucians, lamentatio aegritudo cum eiulatu, sollicitudo aegritudo cum cogitatione, molestia aegritudo permanens, adflictatio aegritudo cum vexatione corporis, desperatio aegritudo sine ulla rerum expectatione meliorum. Quae autem subiecta sunt sub metum, ea sic definiunt: pigritiam metum consequentis laboris,

19 […] terrorem metum concutientem, ex quo fit ut pudorem rubor, terrorem pallor et tremor et dentium crepitus consequatur, timorem metum mali adpropinquantis, pavorem metum mentem loco moventem, ex quo illud Ennius: ‘tum pavor sapientiam omnem mi exanimato expectorat’, exanimationem metum subsequentem et quasi comitem pavoris, conturbationem metum excutientem cogitata, formidinem metum permanentem.

Musean translation

Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.

“They define these as follows. Enviousness, they say, is distress felt because of another’s prosperity, when that prosperity does the envious person no harm.

17 “(For if someone grieves at the prosperity of a person who harms him—as Agamemnon might at Hector’s—he should not properly be called envious. But if another’s advantages do him no harm, and he still grieves that the other enjoys them, he is certainly envious.) Emulation, however, has two meanings, and the word can signify either praise or blame. The imitation of virtue is called emulation—but we are not using that sense here, since it is praiseworthy. Emulation is also distress when another possesses what one has desired but lacks oneself. Jealousy, by which I mean ζηλοτυπία, is distress because another too possesses what one has desired for oneself.

18 “Pity is distress at the misery of another who suffers undeservedly—for no one feels pity at the punishment of a parricide or traitor. Anguish is oppressive distress; bereavement, distress at the untimely death of someone dear; sorrow, tearful distress; tribulation, toilsome distress; pain, tormenting distress; lamentation, distress accompanied by wailing; anxiety, distress accompanied by brooding; vexation, enduring distress; affliction, distress accompanied by bodily suffering; despair, distress without any expectation of improvement. The subdivisions of fear they define as follows: reluctance is fear of the labor that will follow,

19 “[…] terror is fear that shakes us—hence, just as blushing follows shame, pallor, trembling, and chattering teeth follow terror; alarm is fear of approaching evil; panic is fear that dislodges the mind, giving rise to Ennius’ words, ‘Then panic drives all wisdom from my breast, leaving me senseless’; dismay is fear that follows panic and is, as it were, its companion; confusion is fear that scatters our thoughts; dread is enduring fear.”

Plain English translation

Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.

“They define these as follows. Envying, they say, is distress taken on because someone else is doing well, although that success does the envious person no harm.

17 “Someone who resents the success of a person who is hurting them wouldn’t properly be called envious—Agamemnon resenting Hector’s success, for example. But if someone’s advantages do another person no harm, and that person still resents their enjoyment of them, that certainly is envy. ‘Emulation’ has two meanings: the word can express praise or blame. Imitating virtue is called emulation, but we aren’t using it that way here; that’s praiseworthy. The other kind of emulation is distress when someone else gets what you wanted and you go without. Jealousy, by which I mean the Greek zēlotypia, is distress because someone else too gets what you wanted for yourself.

18 “Pity is distress at the suffering of someone who doesn’t deserve it. No one feels pity when a parent-killer or traitor is punished. Anguish is distress that presses on you; bereavement, distress at the painful death of someone you loved; sorrow, tearful distress; hardship, distress involving toil; pain, distress that tortures you; lamentation, distress with wailing; worry, distress with brooding; lasting trouble, distress that persists; self-torment, distress with bodily suffering; despair, distress without any hope that things will get better. They define the kinds under fear like this: reluctance is fear of work that will follow;

19 “[…] terror is fear that shakes you. Thus shame is followed by blushing, terror by pallor, trembling, and chattering teeth. Dread is fear of an approaching evil; panic, fear that dislodges the mind. Hence Ennius’ line: ‘Then panic knocks all wisdom from my chest and leaves me breathless.’ Loss of nerve is fear that follows panic, its companion, so to speak; bewilderment, fear that drives out one’s plans; lasting fright, fear that stays.”

About this section

Book 4, Chapter 8 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 118 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.

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