Book 3, Chapter 33

79 “Not even this is the strongest consolation, though it is common and often helpful: ‘This has not happened to you alone.’ As I said, it does help, but not always and not everyone, for some reject it. Much depends on how it is applied. We must emphasize how each of those who bore things wisely endured them, not what misfortune each suffered. Chrysippus’ consolation is the strongest in point of truth, but difficult to use in the midst of distress. It is a great task to prove to someone grieving that he grieves by his own judgment and because he thinks he ought to act so. Surely, then, just as in legal cases we do not always use the same issue—that is our term for the kinds of controversy—but adapt it to the occasion, the nature of the dispute, and the person, so in relieving distress we must consider what treatment each person can accept.

80 “But somehow our discussion has wandered from the subject you proposed. You asked about the wise person, to whom nothing free of shamefulness can seem evil, or can seem only so slight an evil that wisdom overwhelms it and it scarcely appears. He adds nothing by opinion to increase distress, nor does he think it right to torment himself as much as possible and wear himself out in mourning—a belief than which nothing could be more perverse. Yet reasoning has taught us, I think, even though we were not now specifically asking whether anything was evil unless it could also be called shameful, to see that whatever evil there is in distress is not natural, but incurred through voluntary judgment and mistaken opinion.

81 “We have treated that kind of distress which is the greatest of all, so that, once it was removed, we might consider the remedies for the others hardly worth much searching.”

79 “A common, often helpful consolation is ‘Others have suffered this as well.’ It isn’t completely reliable either. Useful, yes, as I said—but some reject it; it doesn’t help everyone at every time. The way we offer it matters. Don’t stress the particular trouble each person suffered. Stress the way people of good judgment endured it. For truth, Chrysippus’ comfort has the strongest foundation; for someone in the middle of grief, it’s hard to apply. Persuading a mourner that their own judgment and sense of obligation are responsible for their grief is a formidable undertaking. Think of a lawsuit. We don’t always employ the same ‘issue,’ our term for kinds of disputed question. We adjust to the occasion, the sort of dispute, and the individual. Easing distress calls for the same approach: find out which remedy this particular person can take.

80 “But somehow our discussion has wandered away from your proposal. You asked about a wise person. Such a person can see nothing as bad if it involves no moral wrong, or sees it as so slightly bad that wisdom buries it and it’s barely visible. They don’t invent or add anything to distress through belief, or think it’s right to torment themselves as much as possible and be worn out by grief. Nothing could be more misguided than that. Still, our argument seems to me to have taught us something. We weren’t specifically asking just now whether anything could be bad unless it could also be called morally wrong. Even so, we saw that whatever badness there is in distress isn’t natural: it’s brought on by a voluntary judgment and a mistaken belief.

81 “We’ve dealt with that form of distress which is the greatest of all. Once that’s removed, we thought we wouldn’t have to search very hard for remedies for the rest.”