Book 3, Chapter 23

“‘What need is there, then,’ someone will say, ‘for reason at all, or for that consolation we ordinarily use when we wish to lighten the pain of mourners?

55 “‘For the argument we generally have ready then is that nothing should seem unexpected. Or how will someone endure a misfortune more tolerably from learning that something of the kind must happen to human beings? This argument takes nothing away from the evil’s actual magnitude; it merely adds that nothing has happened that should not have been expected.’ Yet this kind of argument is by no means powerless in consolation; indeed, I am inclined to think it the most powerful. Unexpected events, then, do not have such force that all distress arises from them. They perhaps strike harder, but they do not cause events to seem greater: the events seem greater because they are fresh, not because they are sudden.

56 “There are therefore two ways of discovering the truth, not only about what seems evil, but about what seems good as well. We either investigate the character and magnitude of the thing’s own nature—as we sometimes do with poverty, lightening its burden by argument and teaching how small and few are nature’s wants—or turn our speech from subtle argument to examples. Here Socrates is recalled, here Diogenes, here that line from Caecilius: ‘Wisdom is often found beneath a shabby little cloak.’ For since the force of poverty is one and the same, what reason can be given why Gaius Fabricius could endure it while others deny they can bear it?

57 “This second kind, then, resembles the method of consolation which teaches that what has happened is part of human life. Such a discussion does not merely impart knowledge of humankind; it also indicates that things are bearable which others both have borne and do bear.”

“‘Then why,’ someone will ask, ‘do we need reasoning at all, or the sort of consolation we normally use when we want to ease someone’s grief?

55 “‘At those times, what we usually have ready is the thought that nothing should seem unexpected. Or how will someone bear a setback more easily after learning that something like it must happen to human beings? That argument takes nothing away from the actual size of the trouble. It only adds that nothing has happened that shouldn’t have been expected.’ Yet that kind of talk does help when we’re consoling someone. In fact, I suspect it helps most of all. So unexpected events don’t have such power that all distress comes from them. Perhaps they strike harder, but they don’t make what happens look bigger. Things look bigger because they’re fresh, not because they’re sudden.

56 “There are two ways, then, of finding the truth, not just about things that seem bad, but also about things that seem good. Either we ask about the thing itself—what its nature is and how much it matters—as we sometimes do with poverty, lightening its burden through argument by showing how small and few nature’s needs are; or we turn from precise argument to examples. Here we mention Socrates, here Diogenes, here that line from Caecilius: ‘Wisdom is often found even under a dirty little cloak.’ Poverty has the same force in every case. So what reason can we give for its being bearable to Gaius Fabricius, when others say they can’t bear it?

57 “The second approach is like the method of consolation that teaches that what’s happened is part of being human. That discussion doesn’t just give us knowledge about the human race. It shows that things are bearable if other people have borne them and still bear them.”