Book 3, Chapter 18

“What, then?

39 “Could the prospect and contemplation of this life relieve Thyestes, or Aeetes, whom I mentioned a little earlier, or Telamon, driven from his country, exiled and destitute? It was of him that people asked in astonishment: “‘Is this that Telamon whom glory lately raised to heaven, “‘On whom men gazed, toward whose face the Greeks turned their own?’

40 “If anyone’s ‘spirit has collapsed along with his fortunes,’ as the same poet says, we must seek medicine from those weighty philosophers of old, not from these devotees of pleasure. What abundance of good things do they claim? Let freedom from pain indeed be the highest good—though that is not called pleasure, but we need not discuss everything now. Is this where we are to be taken to ease our mourning? Let pain indeed be the highest evil. Does someone who is not in pain, then, simply because he is free from evil, immediately enjoy the highest good?

41 “Why do we evade the point, Epicurus, instead of admitting that we mean the pleasure which you yourself, when you have put on a brazen face, habitually describe? Are these your words or not? In the very book that contains your whole teaching—and now I shall act as translator, so no one may think I am inventing—you say this: ‘For my part, I have no conception of that good if I remove the pleasures perceived through taste, those perceived through sexual activity, those perceived through hearing songs, and those pleasant movements perceived by the eyes from beautiful forms, or whatever other pleasures are produced in the whole person through any sense. Nor can it be said that the mind’s joy alone counts as a good. For I know the joyful mind in this way: through the hope of obtaining all the things I have mentioned above, so that our nature, possessing them, may be free of pain.’

42 “These are his own words, so anyone can understand what pleasure Epicurus recognizes. Then a little further on: ‘I have often asked,’ he says, ‘those called wise what they would have left among good things if they removed these, unless they wished to pour out empty sounds. I could learn nothing from them. If they wish to spout virtues and wisdoms, they will be speaking of nothing but the way to produce the pleasures I have mentioned above.’ What follows is to the same effect; the whole book, which deals with the highest good, is filled with words and views of this kind.

43 “Is this, then, the life to which you will recall that Telamon, to lighten his distress? And if you see one of your friends stricken with grief, will you offer him a sturgeon rather than some little book by a follower of Socrates? Will you urge him to listen to the notes of a water organ rather than Plato’s words? Will you set out bright and varied things for him to look at? Hold a little bouquet to his nose? Burn perfumes and tell him to wreathe himself in garlands and roses? And if you add something else as well—then you will certainly have wiped away every trace of mourning.”

“Well, then?

39 “Could we ease Thyestes’ pain by holding out that sort of life for him to think about? Or Aeetes’ pain—the man I spoke of just now? Or Telamon’s, driven out of his homeland, poor and in exile? He prompted this astonishment: “‘Is this Telamon, so lately lifted by fame to heaven, “‘The man all watched, the face toward which the Greeks turned theirs?’

40 “The same poet speaks of someone whose ‘mind fell when his fortunes fell.’ For a patient like that, we need a remedy from the weighty philosophers of earlier times, not this pleasure-loving school. What abundance of good things does that school offer? We can allow for now that freedom from pain ranks as the highest good. It isn’t what we call pleasure, but we don’t have to settle every point here. Does turning toward that ease mourning? Allow, too, that pain ranks as the worst evil. If a person isn’t in pain and thus lacks that evil, does enjoyment of the greatest good follow on the spot?

41 “Why dodge the issue, Epicurus? Why don’t we admit we’re talking about the pleasure you yourself talk about once you’ve rubbed the shame off your face? Are these your words or not? In the book that contains your whole system, you say the following. I’ll act as translator now, so no one thinks I’m making it up: ‘For my part, I can’t understand that good if I remove the pleasures perceived through taste; if I remove those perceived through sex; if I remove those perceived through hearing songs; if I also remove those pleasant movements perceived by the eyes from beautiful shapes, or any other pleasures produced in the whole person through any of the senses. Nor can it be said that only the mind’s delight counts as a good. Here’s how I understand a delighted mind: it expects that nature will gain possession of everything I’ve mentioned above and so be free of pain.’

42 “Those are his very words, so anyone can understand what Epicurus means by pleasure. A little later he says, ‘I’ve often asked those who were called wise what they’d have left among good things if they took those pleasures away—unless they wanted to pour out empty words. I’ve learned nothing from them. If they want to gush about virtues and wisdoms, they’ll be describing nothing but the way to produce the pleasures I’ve mentioned above.’ What follows makes the same point. The whole book, which concerns the greatest good, is packed with statements and views like these.

43 “So is that the life you’ll call Telamon back to, to ease his distress? If you see one of your followers crushed by grief, will you give him a sturgeon rather than a little book by a follower of Socrates? Will you encourage him to listen to a water organ rather than to Plato’s words? Will you put bright, colorful things on display for him to look at? Hold a bouquet to his nose? Burn perfumes, and tell him to put on garlands and roses? And if there’s something more too—then you’ll have wiped away all his grief completely.”