Book 3, Chapter 16
Original Latin
34 Principio male reprehendunt praemeditationem rerum futurarum. nihil est enim quod tam optundat elevetque aegritudinem quam perpetua in omni vita cogitatio nihil esse quod non accidere possit, quam meditatio condicionis humanae, quam vitae lex commentatioque parendi, quae non hoc adfert, ut semper maereamus, sed ut numquam. neque enim, qui rerum naturam, qui vitae varietatem, qui inbecillitatem generis humani cogitat, maeret, cum haec cogitat, sed tum vel maxime sapientiae fungitur munere: utrumque enim consequitur, ut et considerandis rebus humanis proprio philosophiae fruatur officio et adversis casibus triplici consolatione sanetur, primum quod <nihil ei accidit nisi quod> posse accidere diu cogitaverit, quae cogitatio una maxime molestias omnis extenuat et diluit, deinde quod humana humane ferenda intellegit, postremo quod videt malum nullum esse nisi culpam, culpam autem nullam esse, cum id, quod ab homine non potuerit praestari, evenerit.
35 Nam revocatio illa, quam adfert, cum a contuendis nos malis avocat, nulla est. non est enim in nostra potestate fodicantibus is rebus, quas malas esse opinemur, dissimulatio vel oblivio: lacerant, vexant, stimulos admovent, ignis adhibent, respirare non sinunt, et tu oblivisci iubes, quod contra naturam est, qui, <quod> a natura datum est, auxilium extorqueas inveterati doloris? est enim tarda illa quidem medicina, sed tamen magna, quam adfert longinquitas et dies. Iubes me bona cogitare, oblivisci malorum. diceres aliquid, et magno quidem philosopho dignum, si ea bona esse sentires, quae essent homine dignissima.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
34 “To begin with, they are wrong to criticize reflection on future events. Nothing so blunts and lightens distress as the lifelong, constant thought that nothing is incapable of happening; as meditation on the human condition; as reflection on life’s law and on obedience to it. This brings about not perpetual mourning, but freedom from mourning. For someone reflecting on the nature of things, on life’s changes, on the weakness of humankind, does not mourn while considering them, but is then most fully performing wisdom’s task. He achieves both results: in considering human affairs he enjoys philosophy’s proper work, and in adversity he is healed by a threefold consolation. First, <nothing happens to him except what> he has long considered capable of happening—a thought which by itself does most to diminish and dissolve every trouble. Second, he understands that human fortunes must be borne as a human being should bear them. Finally, he sees that there is no evil except fault, and no fault when something happens that no human being could have prevented.
35 “But that recall of the mind he offers, when he diverts us from contemplating evils, amounts to nothing. When things we think evil are stabbing at us, neither ignoring them nor forgetting them lies in our power. They tear at us, harass us, prick us with goads, set fires against us, and give us no breathing space. Yet you command us to forget, which is contrary to nature, while wresting away the help for long-standing grief <which> nature has given! The medicine brought by the passage of time is certainly slow, but it is powerful nonetheless. You tell me to think of good things and forget evils. You would be saying something, and something worthy of a great philosopher, if you understood as good the things most worthy of a human being.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
34 “To start with, they’re wrong to criticize thinking ahead about future events. Nothing does so much to blunt and ease distress as a lifelong habit of thinking that anything can happen: considering the human condition, the terms of life, and how to accept them. This doesn’t make us grieve all the time. It keeps us from grieving at all. Someone thinking about the nature of things, life’s changes, and human weakness isn’t grieving while doing so. On the contrary, they’re performing wisdom’s task particularly well. They achieve both things at once. By considering human affairs, they get the benefit of philosophy’s proper work. And when misfortune comes, they’re healed by a three-part consolation. First, nothing has happened to them that they haven’t long considered possible. That single thought does more than anything else to reduce and dissolve every trouble. Second, they understand that human troubles must be borne in a human way. Finally, they see that nothing is bad except wrongdoing, and there’s no wrongdoing when something happens that a human being couldn’t have prevented.
35 “That redirection he offers, turning our attention away from looking at troubles, is worthless. When things we think bad are stabbing at us, we can’t simply ignore or forget them at will. They tear at us, torment us, drive in their goads, burn us, and won’t let us breathe. And you tell us to forget! That’s against nature. Would you wrest away the help nature provides when pain has lasted a long time? Time and the passing days bring a treatment that’s slow, certainly, but powerful all the same. You tell me to think about good things and forget the bad. You’d be saying something significant, something worthy of a great philosopher, if you meant by good things those most worthy of a human being.”
About this section
Book 3, Chapter 16 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 92 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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