Book 5, Chapter 38
Original Latin
110 Iam vero motus animi, sollicitudines aegritudinesque oblivione leniuntur traductis animis ad voluptatem. non sine causa igitur Epicurus ausus est dicere semper in pluribus bonis esse sapientem, quia semper sit in voluptatibus. ex quo effici putat ille, quod quaerimus, ut sapiens semper beatus sit.
111 ‘etiamne, si sensibus carebit oculorum, si aurium?’ etiam; nam ista ipsa contemnit. primum enim horribilis ista caecitas quibus tandem caret voluptatibus? cum quidam etiam disputent ceteras voluptates in ipsis habitare sensibus, quae autem aspectu percipiantur, ea non versari in oculorum ulla iucunditate, ut ea, quae gustemus olfaciamus tractemus audiamus, in ea ipsa, ubi sentimus, parte versentur. in oculis tale nil fit; animus accipit, quae videmus. animo autem multis modis variisque delectari licet, etiamsi non adhibeatur aspectus. loquor enim de docto homine et erudito, cui vivere est cogitare. sapientis autem cogitatio non ferme ad investigandum adhibet oculos advocatos.
112 etenim si nox non adimit vitam beatam, cur dies nocti similis adimat? nam illud Antipatri Cyrenaici est quidem paulo obscenius, sed non absurda sententia est; cuius caecitatem cum mulierculae lamentarentur, ‘quid agitis?’ inquit, ‘an vobis nulla videtur voluptas esse nocturna?’ Appium quidem veterem illum, qui caecus annos multos fuit, et ex magistratibus et ex rebus gestis intellegimus in illo suo casu nec privato nec publico muneri defuisse. C. Drusi domum compleri a consultoribus solitam accepimus; cum, quorum res esset, sua ipsi non videbant, caecum adhibebant ducem. pueris nobis Cn. Aufidius praetorius et in senatu sententiam dicebat nec amicis deliberantibus deerat et Graecam scribebat historiam et videbat in litteris.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
110 “Again, disturbances of the mind, anxieties, and distress are soothed by forgetting them as our thoughts are turned toward pleasure. It was not without reason, then, that Epicurus ventured to say that the wise man always has more good than evil, because he always enjoys pleasures. From this he thinks the conclusion we seek follows: the wise man is always happy.
111 “‘Even if he loses his sight or hearing?’ Yes, for he makes light of these losses themselves. Take first that terrible thing, blindness: what pleasures, after all, does it lack? Some even argue that the other pleasures dwell in the senses themselves, whereas what we perceive by sight involves no pleasure located in the eyes: the things we taste, smell, touch, or hear affect the very part in which we sense them. Nothing like this happens in the eyes; it is the mind that receives what we see. And the mind can find delight in many different ways even without the use of sight. I am speaking, of course, of a learned and cultivated man, for whom living means thinking. The wise man’s thought scarcely calls on the eyes to assist its investigations.
112 “For if night does not take away a happy life, why should a day resembling night take it away? That remark of Antipater of Cyrene is somewhat coarse, but its meaning is not absurd. When some women lamented his blindness, he said, ‘What are you doing? Do you suppose there is no pleasure in the night?’ As for the great Appius of old, who was blind for many years, we understand from his magistracies and achievements that, despite his misfortune, he failed in neither private nor public duty. We are told that the house of Gaius Drusus used to be filled with people seeking legal advice: those whose affairs were at stake could not see their own way and called on a blind man to guide them. When I was a boy, Gnaeus Aufidius, a former praetor, spoke in the Senate, stood by his friends in their deliberations, wrote a history in Greek, and saw his way in literature.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
110 “What’s more, forgetting eases emotional disturbances, anxieties, and distress, as the mind turns toward pleasure. So Epicurus had reason to venture the claim that a wise person always has more good things than bad, because he’s always experiencing pleasures. Epicurus thinks this establishes the point we’re investigating: a wise person is always happy.
111 “‘Even if he loses his sight or his hearing?’ Yes, even then. He thinks little of those very things. To begin with, what pleasures does that supposedly dreadful blindness actually lack? Some even argue that the other pleasures reside in the senses themselves, but what we take in by sight doesn’t involve any enjoyment in the eyes. Whatever we taste, smell, touch, or hear involves the very part where we feel it. Nothing like that happens in the eyes: the mind takes in what we see. And the mind can enjoy itself in many different ways even without bringing sight into play. I’m talking about a learned, educated person, for whom living means thinking. And when a wise person thinks, he doesn’t generally call his eyes in to help with his investigation.
112 “If night doesn’t take away a happy life, why should a day that’s like night take it away? Antipater of Cyrene made a rather indecent remark, but the thought behind it wasn’t silly. Some little women were lamenting his blindness. ‘What are you doing?’ he said. ‘Don’t you think there’s any pleasure at night?’ As for the Appius who lived long ago and was blind for many years, his public offices and achievements show that his condition didn’t make him fail in either his private or his public duties. We’ve heard that Gaius Drusus’ house used to be crowded with people seeking advice. They couldn’t see their way through their own affairs, so they took a blind man as their guide. When I was a boy, Gnaeus Aufidius, who’d been praetor, used to give his opinion in the Senate, help his friends when they were deciding what to do, and write a history in Greek. He found his sight in books.”
About this section
Book 5, Chapter 38 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 186 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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