Book 5, Chapter 17
Original Latin
49 Atque hoc sic etiam concluditur: nec in misera vita quicquam est praedicabile aut gloriandum nec in ea, quae nec misera sit nec beata. et est in aliqua vita praedicabile aliquid et gloriandum ac prae se ferendum, ut Epaminondas: Consiliis nostris laus est attonsa Laconum, ut Africanus: A sole exoriente supra Maeotis paludes Nemo est qui factis aequiperare queat.
50 quod si <est>, beata vita glorianda et praedicanda et prae se ferenda est; nihil est enim aliud quod praedicandum et prae se ferendum sit. quibus positis intellegis quid sequatur. Et quidem, nisi ea vita beata est, quae est eadem honesta, sit aliud necesse est melius vita beata; quod erit enim honestum, certe fatebuntur esse melius. ita erit beata vita melius aliquid; quo quid potest dici perversius? Quid? cum fatentur satis magnam vim esse in vitiis ad miseram vitam, nonne fatendum est eandem vim <in> virtute esse ad beatam vitam? contrariorum enim contraria sunt consequentia.
51 Quo loco quaero, quam vim habeat libra illa Critolai, qui cum in alteram lancem animi bona imponat, in alteram corporis et externa, tantum propendere illam bonorum animi lancem putet, ut terram et maria deprimat.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
49 “The argument can also be concluded in this way. In a miserable life there is nothing to proclaim or glory in, nor is there in a life that is neither miserable nor happy. Yet in some life there is something to proclaim, glory in, and openly display. Epaminondas says:
“‘By our counsels the Spartans’ glory has been shorn.’
“And Africanus:
“‘From the rising sun above the Maeotian marshes,“‘No one can equal the deeds I have done.’
50 “If that is so, a happy life is something to glory in, proclaim, and openly display, for there is no other life to proclaim and openly display. Once these points are established, you understand what follows. Moreover, unless a happy life is also an honorable life, there must be something better than a happy life: they will surely admit that an honorable life is better. Thus there will be something better than a happy life. What more perverse claim could be made? Again, when they admit that vices have sufficient power to make life miserable, must they not admit that virtue has the same power to make life happy? For contrary consequences follow from contraries.
51 “Here I ask what force there is in Critolaus’ famous balance. He places the goods of the mind in one pan, bodily and external goods in the other, and thinks that the pan containing the mind’s goods sinks so much lower that it outweighs earth and seas.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
49 “Here’s another way to reach the conclusion. There’s nothing worth boasting or being proud of in an unhappy life, or in a life that’s neither unhappy nor happy. Yet some life does contain something worth boasting about, being proud of, and displaying openly. Take Epaminondas: “‘Our plans have shaved away the Spartans’ glory.’ “Or Africanus: “‘From where the sun rises above the Maeotian marshes, “‘There’s no one who can match my deeds.’
50 “Given that, it must be happiness that we should take pride in, speak up about, and put on display. Nothing else qualifies to be spoken up about and displayed. You can see the conclusion once we’ve accepted those premises. There’s another point. Suppose a happy life isn’t also a morally right one. There would have to be something better than happiness, since they’ll surely agree that moral rightness would be better. Something better than happiness! Could a statement turn things upside down more completely? Again, they acknowledge that faults can make a life thoroughly unhappy. Surely they must acknowledge the same power in virtue to make it happy. Opposites lead to opposite results.
51 “Here I ask what weight that pair of scales of Critolaus has. He puts the mind’s good qualities in one pan, and bodily and external goods in the other. He thinks the pan holding the mind’s goods outweighs the other so much that it would drag down the earth and seas.”
About this section
Book 5, Chapter 17 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 165 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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