Book 5, Chapter 9
Original Latin
24 Hoc illud est, quod Theophrastus sustinere non potuit. nam cum statuisset verbera, tormenta, cruciatus, patriae eversiones, exilia, orbitates magnam vim habere ad male misereque vivendum, non est ausus elate et ample loqui, cum humiliter demisseque sentiret. quam bene, non quaeritur, constanter quidem certe. itaque mihi placere non solet consequentia reprehendere, cum prima concesseris. hic autem elegantissimus omnium philosophorum et eruditissimus non magnopere reprehenditur, cum tria genera dicit bonorum, vexatur autem ab omnibus primum in eo libro quem scripsit de vita beata, in quo multa disputat, quam ob rem is, qui torqueatur qui crucietur, beatus esse non possit. in eo etiam putatur dicere in rotam— id est genus quoddam tormenti apud Graecos—beatam vitam non escendere. non usquam id quidem dicit omnino, sed quae dicit, idem valent.
25 possum igitur, cui concesserim in malis esse dolores corporis, in malis naufragia fortunae, huic suscensere dicenti non omnis bonos esse beatos, cum in omnis bonos ea, quae ille in malis numerat, cadere possint? vexatur idem Theophrastus et libris et scholis omnium philosophorum, quod in Callisthene suo laudarit illam sententiam: Vitám regit fortúna, non sapiéntia. negant ab ullo philosopho quicquam dictum esse languidius. recte id quidem, sed nihil intellego dici potuisse constantius. si enim tot sunt in corpore bona, tot extra corpus in casu atque fortuna, nonne consentaneum est plus fortunam, quae domina rerum sit et externarum et ad corpus pertinentium, quam consilium valere?
26 An malumus Epicurum imitari? qui multa praeclare saepe dicit; quam enim sibi constanter convenienterque dicat, non laborat. laudat tenuem victum. philosophi id quidem, sed si Socrates aut Antisthenes diceret, non is qui finem bonorum voluptatem esse dixerit. negat quemquam iucunde posse vivere, nisi idem honeste sapienter iusteque vivat. nihil gravius, nihil philosophia dignius, nisi idem hoc ipsum ‘honeste sapienter iuste’ ad voluptatem referret. Quid melius quam: fortunam exiguam intervenire sapienti? sed hoc isne dicit, qui, cum dolorem non modo maxumum malum, sed solum malum etiam dixerit, toto corpore opprimi possit doloribus acerrumis tum, cum maxime contra fortunam glorietur? quod idem melioribus etiam verbis Metrodorus:
27 ‘occupavi te’ inquit, ‘Fortuna, atque cepi omnisque aditus tuos interclusi, ut ad me adspirare non posses.’ praeclare, si Aristo Chius aut si Stoicus Zenon diceret, qui, nisi quod turpe esset, nihil malum duceret; tu vero, Metrodore, qui omne bonum in visceribus medullisque condideris et definieris summum bonum firma corporis adfectione explorataque <eius> spe contineri, Fortunae aditus interclusisti? quo modo? isto enim bono iam exspoliari potes.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
24 “This is the position that Theophrastus could not sustain. Having decided that flogging, torture, agony, the destruction of one’s country, exile, and the loss of children carry great weight toward a bad and miserable life, he did not dare to speak loftily and grandly while his convictions were low and abject. Whether he was right is not the question; he was certainly consistent. I therefore dislike the practice of criticizing conclusions once you have granted the premises. This man, the most refined and learned of all philosophers, meets with little criticism when he declares that there are three kinds of good. Yet everyone attacks him, first of all for his book on the happy life, in which he argues at length why someone under torture and in agony cannot be happy. He is even supposed to say there that happiness does not mount the wheel—a form of torture among the Greeks. In fact, he says that nowhere at all, but what he does say amounts to the same thing.
25 “Can I, then, after granting him that bodily pains are evils and the shipwrecks of fortune are evils, be angry when he says that not all good people are happy? For the things he counts as evils can befall every good person. The same Theophrastus is assailed in the books and lectures of all the philosophers because, in his Callisthenes, he praised this saying:
“‘Fortune rules life, not wisdom.’
“They say no philosopher ever uttered anything more feeble. Rightly so; but I cannot see how anything more consistent could have been said. If there are so many bodily goods, and so many goods outside the body dependent on chance and fortune, does it not follow that fortune, mistress of both external and bodily things, has more power than judgment?
26 “Or would we rather imitate Epicurus? He often says many fine things, but takes no trouble over whether his statements agree consistently with one another. He praises a frugal diet. That is worthy of a philosopher—if Socrates or Antisthenes said it, not a man who has declared pleasure the highest good. He says no one can live pleasantly unless he also lives honorably, wisely, and justly. Nothing could be weightier, nothing more worthy of philosophy—if he did not make those very words, ‘honorably, wisely, and justly,’ refer to pleasure. What could be better than his saying that fortune has little influence over the wise? But is this said by a man who declares pain not merely the greatest evil but the only evil, and who can be overwhelmed throughout his body by the sharpest pains at the very moment he boasts most loudly of defying fortune? Metrodorus says the same thing in even finer words:
27 “‘I have forestalled you, Fortune,’ he says, ‘and captured you. I have blocked every approach of yours, so that you cannot so much as breathe upon me.’ Splendid—if Aristo of Chios said it, or Zeno the Stoic, who considered nothing evil except what was shameful. But you, Metrodorus, who have lodged every good in the entrails and marrow, and have defined the highest good as consisting in a sound bodily condition and a secure expectation of its continuance—have you blocked fortune’s approaches? How? You can be stripped of that good this very moment.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
24 “This was the difficulty that proved too much for Theophrastus. In his judgment, beatings, torture, agonies, the ruin of one’s country, exile, and losing one’s children could do a great deal to make life wretched and bad. With that low, dispirited view, he couldn’t bring himself to speak in a grand, confident way. Whether his view was right isn’t the issue; at least he kept his reasoning consistent. Once you accept someone’s starting points, I don’t usually approve of attacking what follows from them. No philosopher is more refined or learned than Theophrastus. People hardly object when he divides good things into three kinds. Yet everyone attacks him, first over his book about happiness, where he sets out many arguments against calling a tortured, tormented person happy. He’s even supposed to have written there that happiness won’t mount the wheel—the Greeks use that as an instrument of torture. In fact, he never says it, anywhere. But the things he does say have that effect.
25 “If I’ve granted him that bodily pains are bad, and that wrecked fortunes are bad, can I get angry with him for saying that not all good people are happy? Every good person can suffer the things he counts as bad. Theophrastus is also attacked in every philosopher’s books and lectures because, in his Callisthenes, he praised this saying: “‘Fortune runs our lives, not wisdom.’ “They say no philosopher has ever said anything more spineless. They’re right about that, but I don’t see how he could have said anything more consistent. If there are so many good things in the body, and so many outside it, subject to chance and fortune, doesn’t it follow that fortune has more power than judgment? She’s in charge of both external things and things to do with the body.
26 “Should we copy Epicurus instead? Plenty of his remarks are excellent, and he makes them often. He just doesn’t take the trouble to keep them consistent with one another. Consider his praise of eating simply. Certainly a philosopher might say that: Socrates or Antisthenes, for instance, but not a man who has made pleasure the ultimate good. Or take his denial that a pleasant life is possible without moral conduct, wisdom, and justice. Nothing could be weightier or more worthy of philosophy—if only he didn’t turn that very ‘moral conduct, wisdom, and justice’ into something aimed at pleasure. Or what could improve on his remark that fortune plays only a small part in a wise person’s life? But can he say that? Pain, he tells us, isn’t merely the worst evil; it’s the only evil. Even as he boasts most defiantly against fortune, the fiercest pains may press on every part of his body. Metrodorus puts the same claim in finer language still:
27 “‘I’ve got ahead of you, Fortune,’ he says, ‘and caught you. I’ve blocked all your ways in, so you can’t come anywhere near me.’ Splendid—if Aristo of Chios or Zeno the Stoic were saying it. They thought nothing was bad except what was morally wrong. But you, Metrodorus? You’ve put everything good inside our guts and marrow. You’ve defined the highest good as a sound bodily condition and a confident expectation that it will continue. Have you blocked Fortune’s ways in? How? You can be stripped of that good of yours this very moment.”
About this section
Book 5, Chapter 9 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 157 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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