Book 5, Chapter 7
Original Latin
Atqui alterum dici non potest, quin i, qui nihil metuant, nihil angantur, nihil concupiscant, nulla impotenti laetitia ecferantur, beati sint, itaque id tibi concedo; alterum autem iam integrum non est. superioribus enim disputationibus effectum est vacare omni animi perturbatione sapientem.
Nimirum igitur confecta res est;
18 videtur enim ad exitum venisse quaestio.
Propemodum id quidem.
Verum tamen mathematicorum iste mos est, non est philosophorum. nam geometrae cum aliquid docere volunt, si quid ad eam rem pertinet eorum quae ante docuerunt, id sumunt pro concesso et probato, illud modo explicant, de quo ante nihil scriptum est; philosophi quamcumque rem habent in manibus, in eam quae conveniunt, congerunt omnia, etsi alio loco disputata sunt. quod ni ita esset, cur Stoicus, si esset quaesitum, satisne ad beate vivendum virtus posset, multa diceret? cui satis esset respondere se ante docuisse nihil bonum esse nisi quod honestum esset, hoc probato consequens esse beatam vitam virtute esse contentam, et quo modo hoc sit consequens illi, sic illud huic, ut, si beata vita virtute contenta sit, nisi honestum quod sit, nihil aliud sit bonum.
19 sed tamen non agunt sic; nam et de honesto et de summo bono separatim libri sunt, et cum ex eo efficiatur satis magnam in virtute ad beate vivendum esse vim, nihilo minus hoc agunt separatim. propriis enim et suis argumentis et admonitionibus tractanda quaeque res est, tanta praesertim. cave enim putes ullam in philosophia vocem emissam clariorem ullumve esse philosophiae promissum uberius aut maius. Nam quid profitetur? o dii boni! perfecturam se, qui legibus suis paruisset, ut esset contra fortunam semper armatus, ut omnia praesidia haberet in se bene beateque vivendi, ut esset semper denique beatus.
20 sed videro, quid efficiat; tantisper hoc ipsum magni aestumo, quod pollicetur. nam Xerxes quidem refertus omnibus praemiis donisque fortunae, non equitatu, non pedestribus copiis, non navium multitudine, non infinito pondere auri contentus praemium proposuit, qui invenisset novam voluptatem—qua ipsa non fuit contentus; neque enim umquam finem inveniet libido—, nos vellem praemio elicere possemus, qui nobis aliquid attulisset, quo hoc firmius crederemus.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
“Certainly one of those points cannot be denied: people who fear nothing, feel no anguish, desire nothing, and are not carried away by ungoverned joy are happy. I therefore grant you that. The other point is no longer an open question: our previous discussions established that the wise person is free from every disturbance of the mind.”
“Then surely the matter is settled;
18 “for the inquiry seems to have reached its end.”
“Almost, certainly.”
“Yet that is the mathematicians’ practice, not the philosophers’. When geometers wish to demonstrate something, if any of their previous demonstrations bears on it, they take that as granted and proved, and explain only the point about which nothing has yet been written. Philosophers gather together everything relevant to the matter in hand, even if they have discussed it elsewhere. Otherwise, why should a Stoic say much when asked whether virtue has sufficient power to make life happy? He need only reply that he had already demonstrated that nothing is good except what is honorable; once that is proved, it follows that virtue is sufficient for a happy life. And just as this follows from that, so that follows from this: if virtue is sufficient for a happy life, nothing is good except what is honorable.
19 “But that is not how they proceed. They have separate books on the honorable and on the highest good; and although those establish that virtue has sufficient power to make life happy, they nevertheless treat this question separately as well. Every subject must be handled with arguments and reminders peculiar to itself—especially one of such importance. Do not suppose that philosophy has ever uttered a more glorious declaration or made a richer or greater promise. For what does it profess? Good gods! It promises that anyone who obeys its laws will always be armed against fortune, will possess within himself every resource for living well and happily, and in short will always be happy.
20 “But I shall see what it accomplishes; meanwhile, I value the very promise highly. Xerxes, loaded with every prize and gift of fortune, was not content with his cavalry, his infantry, his multitude of ships, or the boundless weight of his gold. He offered a reward to anyone who discovered a new pleasure—and even with that he was not content, for desire will never find an end. I wish we too could offer a reward and bring forward someone who could give us something to strengthen our belief in this.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
“You certainly can’t deny one of those points: people are happy if they fear nothing, aren’t distressed by anything, crave nothing, and aren’t carried away by uncontrolled delight. So I grant you that. And the other point is no longer open to question. Our earlier discussions established that a wise person is free of every mental disturbance.”
“Then surely the matter is settled.
18 “We seem to have reached the end of the question.”
“Nearly, yes.”
“Still, that’s the mathematicians’ way of doing things, not the philosophers’. When geometers want to demonstrate something, they take anything relevant that they’ve proved before as already granted and established. They explain only the point they haven’t previously set out in writing. Philosophers, on the other hand, bring together everything that bears on whatever subject they’re dealing with, even if they’ve discussed it elsewhere. Otherwise, why would a Stoic have much to say when asked whether virtue can do enough for a happy life? He could simply answer that he’d already shown that nothing is good except what is morally right. Once that’s proved, it follows that virtue is enough for a happy life. And just as the second claim follows from the first, the first follows from the second: if virtue is enough for a happy life, then nothing but what is morally right is good.
19 “But they don’t proceed that way. They write separate books on moral rightness and on the highest good. Those establish that virtue has enough power to make a life happy, yet they discuss that question separately too. Each topic needs to be treated with arguments and reminders suited specifically to it, especially one as important as this. Don’t think philosophy has ever made a more magnificent statement or a richer or greater promise. What does she promise? Good gods! She promises that anyone who obeys her laws will always be armed against fortune, will have within himself every resource for living well and happily, and, in short, will always be happy.
20 “I’ll see later what she achieves. For now, I put great value on the promise itself. Xerxes was loaded with all fortune’s gifts and rewards. His cavalry, his infantry, his huge fleet, his limitless weight of gold—none of it satisfied him. He offered a prize to anyone who discovered a new pleasure. Even that didn’t satisfy him: desire will never find an end. I wish we could use a prize to draw out someone who could bring us something to make our belief in this promise firmer.”
About this section
Book 5, Chapter 7 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 155 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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