Book 5, Chapter 5
Original Latin
12 Non mihi videtur ad beate vivendum satis posse virtutem.
At hercule Bruto meo videtur, cuius ego iudicium, pace tua dixerim, longe antepono tuo.
Non dubito, nec id nunc agitur, tu illum quantum ames, sed hoc, quod mihi dixi videri, quale sit, de quo a te disputari volo.
Nempe negas ad beate vivendum satis posse virtutem?
Prorsus nego.
Quid? ad recte honeste laudabiliter, postremo ad bene vivendum satisne est praesidi in virtute?
Certe satis.
Potes igitur aut, qui male vivat, non eum miserum dicere aut, quem bene fateare, eum negare beate vivere?
Quidni possim? nam etiam in tormentis recte honeste laudabiliter et ob eam rem bene vivi potest, dum modo intellegas, quid nunc dicam ‘bene.’ dico enim constanter graviter sapienter fortiter.
13 haec etiam in eculeum coiciuntur, quo vita non adspirat beata.
Quid igitur? solane beata vita, quaeso, relinquitur extra ostium limenque carceris, cum constantia gravitas fortitudo sapientia reliquaeque virtutes rapiantur ad tortorem nullumque recusent nec supplicium nec dolorem?
Tu, si quid es facturus, nova aliqua conquiras oportet; ista me minime movent, non solum quia pervulgata sunt, sed multo magis, quia, tamquam levia quaedam vina nihil valent in aqua, sic Stoicorum ista magis gustata quam potata delectant. velut iste chorus virtutum in eculeum impositus imagines constituit ante oculos cum amplissima dignitate, ut ad eas cursim perrectura nec eas beata vita a se desertas passura videatur;
14 cum autem animum ab ista pictura imaginibusque virtutum ad rem veritatemque traduxeris, hoc nudum relinquitur, possitne quis beatus esse, quam diu torqueatur. quam ob rem hoc nunc quaeramus; virtutes autem noli vereri ne expostulent et querantur se a beata vita esse relictas. si enim nulla virtus prudentia vacat, prudentia ipsa hoc videt, non omnis bonos esse etiam beatos, multaque de M. Atilio Q. Caepione M’. Aquilio recordatur, beatamque vitam, si imaginibus potius uti quam rebus ipsis placet, conantem ire in eculeum retinet ipsa prudentia negatque ei cum dolore et cruciatu quicquam esse commune.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
12 “I do not think virtue has sufficient power to make life happy.”
“Yet, by Hercules, my friend Brutus thinks it does; and, with your permission, I put his judgment far above yours.”
“I have no doubt of it. But the question now is not how much you love him; it is the worth of the opinion I have expressed. That is what I want you to discuss.”
“You deny, then, that virtue has sufficient power to make life happy?”
“I deny it absolutely.”
“Well, does virtue provide sufficient resources for living rightly, honorably, and praiseworthily—in short, for living well?”
“Certainly it does.”
“Can you then refuse to call someone who lives badly unhappy, or deny that someone who, you admit, lives well is living happily?”
“Why should I not? Even under torture one can live rightly, honorably, and praiseworthily, and therefore well—provided you understand what I now mean by ‘well.’ I mean with steadfastness, dignity, wisdom, and courage.
13 “Even these qualities are thrown onto the rack, which a happy life cannot approach.”
“What then? Is the happy life alone, I ask you, left outside the prison’s door and threshold, while steadfastness, dignity, courage, wisdom, and the other virtues are dragged to the torturer and refuse no punishment or pain?”
“If you mean to accomplish anything, you must find some new arguments. These leave me quite unmoved, not merely because they are commonplace, but much more because, like certain light wines that lose all their strength in water, these Stoic arguments please more when tasted than when drunk. That chorus of virtues set upon the rack, for instance, presents images of such splendid dignity to our eyes that happiness seems ready to hurry toward them and determined not to let them be abandoned.
14 “But when you turn the mind from that painting, those personified virtues, to the actual truth, the question remains in its bare form: can anyone be happy while being tortured? Let us therefore examine that now. You need not fear that the virtues will protest and complain that happiness has deserted them. For if no virtue is without practical wisdom, practical wisdom itself sees that not all good people are happy as well. It remembers much about Marcus Atilius, Quintus Caepio, and Manius Aquilius. And, if you prefer images to actual things, practical wisdom itself holds happiness back as it tries to climb onto the rack, and declares that happiness has nothing in common with pain and torment.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
12 “I don’t think virtue can do enough to make a life happy.”
“But, by Hercules, my dear Brutus certainly thinks it can. With your permission, I put his judgment far above yours.”
“I don’t doubt it. But we’re not discussing how much you love him. I want you to argue about the view I said I held, and what to make of it.”
“So you’re saying virtue can’t do enough for a happy life?”
“That’s exactly what I’m saying.”
“Then tell me this. Does virtue give enough support to live correctly, morally, and in a way that deserves praise—in short, to live well?”
“Certainly it does.”
“Can you then avoid calling someone unhappy if he lives badly? Or can you admit that someone lives well but deny that he lives happily?”
“Why couldn’t I? Even under torture you can live correctly, morally, and in a way that deserves praise, and so live well. You just have to understand what I mean here by ‘well.’ I mean with steadiness, seriousness, wisdom, and courage.
13 “These qualities can even be thrown onto the torture rack. A happy life doesn’t come anywhere near it.”
“Then what happens? Is a happy life the only thing left outside the door, on the prison’s doorstep? Steadiness, seriousness, courage, wisdom, and all the other virtues are dragged off to the torturer. They refuse no punishment or pain. Is happiness left behind?”
“If you’re going to make any progress, you’ll have to look for some fresh arguments. Those don’t move me at all, not just because they’re so familiar, but much more because those Stoic arguments are like certain light wines: they lose all their strength when you add water. They’re more enjoyable to taste than to drink down. That parade of virtues stretched on the rack, for example, puts some very dignified pictures before our eyes. You’d think a happy life would run straight to them and never let them be abandoned by it.
14 “But move your attention from that painting and those pictures of virtues to the actual facts, and you’re left with this bare question: can anyone be happy while being tortured? That’s what we should examine now. Don’t worry that the virtues will protest and complain that a happy life has deserted them. No virtue can lack good judgment. And good judgment itself can see that not all good people are happy as well. It remembers a great deal about Marcus Atilius, Quintus Caepio, and Manius Aquilius. If you want pictures instead of actual facts, good judgment itself holds happiness back as it tries to climb onto the rack. It says happiness has nothing at all in common with pain and torture.”
About this section
Book 5, Chapter 5 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 153 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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