Book 4, Chapter 31

“So much for belief in evils.

65 “Let us now consider belief in goods, that is, delight and desire. To my mind, the entire account of disturbances of the soul rests on a single point: all are within our power, all are taken on through judgment, all are voluntary. This error must therefore be torn away, this belief removed. Just as supposed evils must be made more bearable, so things thought great and delightful must be made less exciting. Goods and evils have this in common: even if it is difficult to persuade someone that none of the things disturbing the soul should be counted either as goods or as evils, a different treatment must still be applied to each movement. One method must correct the malicious person, another the lover, another again the anxious person, another the timid.

66 “It would be easy, following the most widely approved account of goods and evils, to deny that an unwise person could ever feel delight, since he could never possess any good. But we are speaking now in ordinary terms. Let the things thought good—office, wealth, pleasures, and the rest—indeed be goods; even so, exultant, exuberant delight in possessing them is shameful, just as, though laughter may be allowed, guffawing is still censured. The soul’s outpouring in delight has the same defect as its contraction in pain; desire in pursuit displays the same instability as delight in enjoyment. Just as those excessively crushed by vexation are rightly judged unstable, so are those excessively elated by delight. Since envy belongs to distress, while taking pleasure in another’s misfortunes belongs to delight, both are commonly reproved by setting their monstrous and savage character before us. And just as caution is proper but fear is not, so joy is proper but delight is not, since for the sake of instruction we distinguish delight from joy.

67 “We have already said above that a contraction of the soul can never be right, but its elevation can. Hector in Naevius feels joy in one way:

“‘I am glad to be praised by you, Father, a man praised himself.’

“The character in Trabea feels it in another:

“‘The procuress, soothed with silver, will watch my nod,“‘What I wish, what I desire. Coming up, I shall push the door with a finger;“‘The doors will open. When Chrysis sees me unexpectedly,“‘She will hurry joyfully to meet me, longing for my embrace,“‘And give herself to me.’

“How splendid he thinks this, he will now tell us himself:

“‘I shall outstrip Fortune herself with my good fortune.’”

“That’s enough about the belief in evils.

65 “Turn now to supposed goods: desire and delight. To me, one point explains the entire subject of mental disturbance. Every disturbance is ours to control; judgment admits each one, and each is voluntary. We have to uproot this error and take away this belief. Things counted as evils must become bearable; things counted as great, delightful goods must lose their power to excite. Both good and evil cases share another feature. Even if persuading someone that none of the mind’s disturbing objects deserves the name good or bad proves difficult, each particular movement still needs its own treatment. Correcting ill will, love, anxiety, and fear will require four different approaches.

66 “Following the account of good and evil I approve of most, it would be easy to deny that an unwise person can ever feel delight, since they never have anything good. But we’re speaking in everyday terms now. Let’s grant that the supposed goods really are good: offices, wealth, pleasures, and the rest. Even so, leaping, unrestrained delight in possessing these very things is shameful. We may allow laughter but still criticize guffawing. The mind’s outpouring in delight is defective in the same way as its shrinking in pain. Desire shows the same instability in pursuing as delight does in enjoying. People excessively uplifted by delight are rightly judged unstable, just like those excessively crushed by trouble. And since envy belongs to distress, while taking pleasure in others’ misfortunes belongs to delight, we usually correct both by pointing out a certain monstrous cruelty in them. Just as it’s proper to be cautious but not to be afraid, it’s proper to feel joy but not delight. For teaching purposes, we’re distinguishing delight from joy.

67 “Earlier we said that no shrinking of spirit is ever right, though a rising of spirit can be. Compare two ways of feeling joy. Naevius’ Hector says: “‘Father, praise from you delights me: you yourself have won praise.’ “Trabea’s character says instead: “‘Silver will charm the madam; she’ll watch every nod of mine, “‘What I want, what I’m pursuing. Arriving, I’ll tap the door with a finger, “‘And it will swing open. At the sudden sight of me, Chrysis “‘Will come eagerly toward me, craving my arms around her; “‘She’ll surrender herself to me.’ “Now hear how splendid he considers his prospects: “‘My good fortune will leave Fortune herself behind.’”