Book 4, Chapter 17

37 “The person, then, whoever he may be, whose moderation and steadiness give him a quiet soul at peace with itself, so that he neither wastes away in vexation nor breaks under fear, neither burns with thirsty longing for something nor dissolves in the transports of empty excitement—he is the wise person we seek, he is the happy person. Nothing in human affairs can seem to him either unbearable enough to depress his soul or joyful enough to carry it away. What in human affairs could seem great to someone who knows the whole of eternity and the immensity of the entire universe? What could seem great to the wise person, either in human pursuits or in the scant brevity of life, when his mind is always so watchful that nothing unforeseen can happen to him, nothing unexpected, nothing wholly new?

38 “He also casts such a keen eye in every direction that he always sees for himself a dwelling and a place to live without vexation and anguish, so that whatever accident fortune brings, he bears it fittingly and calmly. Whoever does this will be free not only of distress but of all the other disturbances as well. A soul free of these makes people perfectly and completely happy; that same soul, when agitated and torn away from sound and certain reason, loses not only its steadiness but its health.

“We must therefore regard as soft and enfeebled the Peripatetics’ reasoning and discourse. They say that souls must necessarily be disturbed, but prescribe a certain limit beyond which they should not go.

39 “You prescribe a limit to vice? Or is it no vice to disobey reason? Does reason fail to teach plainly enough that a thing is not good which you either desire passionately or exult arrogantly in obtaining; nor, on the other hand, is that an evil which either leaves you crushed and prostrate or, in the fear of being crushed, scarcely master of your mind? Does it not teach that all these excessively sad or excessively glad responses arise from error, and that this error, though it fades with time even in fools—so that, though the thing itself remains the same, they bear it differently when it is old than when it is new—should never so much as touch the wise person at all?

40 “Besides, what is this limit to be? Let us look for a limit to distress, on which so much labor is spent. Fannius records that Publius Rupilius grieved at his brother’s defeat in an election for the consulship. He seems, however, to have exceeded the limit, since he died on that account. He ought, then, to have borne it more moderately. But what if, while he was bearing it moderately, the death of his children had been added? ‘A new distress would have arisen, but a moderate one.’ Still, it would have been a great addition. What if severe bodily pain had then followed, or loss of property, or blindness, or exile? If fresh distress were added for each separate evil, the total would become unbearable.”

37 “Here, then, is the wise person we’re seeking, whoever that may be: moderation and steadiness keep their mind peaceful and reconciled to itself. Troubles don’t eat them away, fear doesn’t break them, thirsty desire doesn’t set them burning, and the leaps of hollow excitement don’t dissolve them. Such a person is happy. No human circumstance can appear unbearably crushing or so wonderfully pleasing that it carries them away. Someone acquainted with the whole of eternity and the vastness of the universe—what human matter could look great to them? What importance could a wise person attach to our pursuits or our minutely short lives? Their mind keeps constant watch: no event can arrive unforeseen, unexpected, or in any way new.

38 “They also direct a sharp gaze every way, always seeing a position and a place for themselves to live without trouble or anguish. So whatever turn of events fortune brings, they can handle it fittingly and calmly. Anyone who does that will be free not only of distress but of every other disturbance too. A mind free of them makes people happy in a complete and unqualified way. The same mind, when stirred up and dragged away from sound, sure reasoning, loses not just its steadiness but its health.

“So we should regard the Peripatetics’ approach and arguments as soft and spineless. They say minds have to be disturbed, but they set a certain limit that one shouldn’t go beyond.

39 “You set a limit on a defect? Or isn’t disobeying reason a defect? Doesn’t reason give clear enough instructions? It tells us that something you either desire passionately or get carried away with once you have it isn’t a good; and that something which either leaves you crushed or barely able to keep your head for fear of being crushed isn’t an evil. It also tells us that error makes all these things seem too sad or too joyful. Time wears down that error even for fools: the facts stay the same, but they take them differently once they’re old than they did when they were fresh. Surely, then, it shouldn’t touch a wise person at all?

40 “And where exactly would you put that limit? Take distress, which gets the largest share of their attention. Fannius records that Publius Rupilius suffered over his brother’s defeat in the consular election. Apparently he went past the limit: it cost him his life. He ought, then, to have borne it more moderately. Suppose he had been doing so and then lost his children. ‘He’d have had a new distress, but only a moderate one.’ That would still add a great deal. Now add severe physical pain, loss of his possessions, blindness, exile. With a further distress for each separate evil, he’d end up with more than he could bear.”