Book 4, Chapter 9
Original Latin
20 Voluptatis autem partes hoc modo describunt, ut malevolentia sit voluptas ex malo alterius sine emolumento suo, delectatio voluptas suavitate auditus animum deleniens; et qualis est haec aurium, tales sunt oculorum et tactionum et odorationum et saporum, quae sunt omnes unius generis ad perfundendum animum tamquam inliquefactae voluptates. iactatio est voluptas gestiens et se efferens insolentius.
21 Quae autem libidini subiecta sunt, ea sic definiuntur, ut ira sit libido poeniendi eius qui videatur laesisse iniuria, excandescentia autem sit ira nascens et modo existens, quae θύμωσις Graece dicitur, odium ira inveterata, inimicitia ira ulciscendi tempus observans, discordia ira acerbior intimo animo et corde concepta, indigentia libido inexplebilis, desiderium libido eius, qui nondum adsit, videndi. distinguunt illud etiam, ut libido sit earum rerum, quae dicuntur de quodam aut quibusdam, quae κατηγορήματα dialectici appellant, ut habere divitias, capere honores, indigentia rerum ipsarum sit, ut honorum, ut pecuniae.
22 Omnium autem perturbationum fontem esse dicunt intemperantiam, quae est [a] tota mente a recta ratione defectio sic aversa a praescriptione rationis, ut nullo modo adpetitiones animi nec regi nec contineri queant. quem ad modum igitur temperantia sedat adpetitiones et efficit, ut eae rectae rationi pareant, conservatque considerata iudicia mentis, sic huic inimica intemperantia omnem animi statum inflammat conturbat incitat, itaque et aegritudines et metus et reliquae perturbationes omnes gignuntur ex ea.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
20 “They describe the subdivisions of pleasure as follows. Malice is pleasure in another’s misfortune without any advantage to oneself; sensory delight is pleasure that soothes the soul through sweetness of sound. The pleasures of sight, touch, smell, and taste are like this pleasure of hearing: all belong to one kind, pleasures poured, as though liquefied, through the soul. Vaunting is pleasure that leaps up and carries itself with excessive arrogance.
21 “The subdivisions of lust are defined as follows. Anger is lust to punish someone who seems to have injured us unjustly; a flare of temper is anger coming into being, newly arisen, called θύμωσις, ‘an outbreak of anger,’ in Greek; hatred is entrenched anger; enmity is anger watching for the moment of revenge; discord is a more bitter anger conceived deep in the heart and soul; craving is insatiable lust; longing is lust to see someone not yet present. They make this further distinction: lust concerns things predicated of a person or persons, what dialecticians call κατηγορήματα, ‘predicates,’ such as having wealth or gaining office; craving concerns the things themselves, such as offices or money.
22 “They say that the source of all disturbances is intemperance: a defection of the whole mind from right reason, so completely turned from reason’s prescriptions that the soul’s impulses can in no way be governed or restrained. Just as temperance calms the impulses, brings them into obedience to right reason, and preserves the mind’s considered judgments, so its enemy, intemperance, inflames, confounds, and excites the soul’s entire condition. Consequently distress and fear and all the other disturbances are born from it.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
20 “They describe the kinds of pleasure this way: ill will is pleasure at someone else’s misfortune, with no gain to oneself. Sensory enjoyment is pleasure that soothes the mind through something pleasant to hear. What hearing does here also has its parallels in sight, touch, smell, and taste. These pleasures all belong to one kind: they seem to melt and pour through the mind. Swaggering is pleasure that gets carried away and shows itself off too boldly.
21 “They define the kinds under craving as follows. Anger is a craving to punish someone thought to have caused an unjust injury. A flare-up is anger just beginning and coming into existence, called thymōsis in Greek. Hatred is anger grown old; enmity, anger watching for a chance for revenge; discord, a fiercer anger conceived deep in the mind and heart; insatiable want, a craving that can’t be filled; longing, a craving to see someone who isn’t yet here. They also make this distinction: craving concerns statements made about a particular person or people, what logicians call katēgorēmata—for example, having wealth or gaining office. Insatiable want concerns the actual things, such as offices or money.
22 “They say the source of all disturbances is lack of self-control. This is the whole mind’s desertion of right reason, turning so far from reason’s instructions that its impulses can’t be governed or held in at all. Self-control calms our impulses, makes them obey right reason, and preserves the mind’s considered judgments. Its enemy, lack of self-control, does the opposite: it sets the mind’s entire condition on fire, confuses it, and stirs it up. So distress, fears, and all the other disturbances arise from it.”
About this section
Book 4, Chapter 9 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 119 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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