Book 4, Chapter 4
Original Latin
Sed defendat, quod quisque sentit; sunt enim iudicia libera: nos institutum tenebimus nullisque unius disciplinae legibus adstricti, quibus in philosophia necessario pareamus, quid sit in quaque re maxime probabile, semper requiremus. quod cum saepe alias, tum nuper in Tusculano studiose egimus. itaque expositis tridui disputationibus quartus dies hoc libro concluditur. ut enim in inferiorem ambulationem descendimus, quod feceramus idem superioribus diebus, acta res est sic:
Dicat, si quis volt, qua de re disputari velit.
8 Non mihi videtur omni animi perturbatione posse sapiens vacare.
Aegritudine quidem hesterna disputatione videbatur, nisi forte temporis causa nobis adsentiebare.
Minime vero; nam mihi egregie probata est oratio tua.
Non igitur existumas cadere in sapientem aegritudinem?
Prorsus non arbitror.
Atqui, si ista perturbare animum sapientis non potest, nulla poterit. quid enim? metusne conturbet? at earum rerum est absentium metus, quarum praesentium est aegritudo; sublata igitur aegritudine sublatus est metus. restant duae perturbationes, laetitia gestiens et libido; quae si non cadent in sapientem, semper mens erit tranquilla sapientis.
9 Sic prorsus intellego.
Utrum igitur mavis? statimne nos vela facere an quasi e portu egredientis paululum remigare?
Quidnam est istuc? non enim intellego.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
But let everyone defend his own convictions: judgment is free. We shall hold to our practice. Bound by no laws of any single school which we must necessarily obey in philosophy, we shall always ask what is most probable in each question. We have often pursued this inquiry elsewhere, and recently with particular care at Tusculum. Having set out three days’ discussions, we now complete the fourth day in this book. When we had gone down to the lower walk, as we had done on the preceding days, the conversation proceeded as follows:
“Let anyone who wishes say what subject he would like discussed.”
8 “I do not think that the wise person can be free of every disturbance of the soul.”
“Yesterday’s discussion seemed to show that he could be free of distress, unless perhaps you were agreeing with me simply to suit the occasion.”
“Not at all. I found your argument thoroughly convincing.”
“So you do not think distress can affect the wise person?”
“Certainly I do not.”
“And yet, if that cannot disturb the wise person’s soul, nothing can. What could do so? Fear? But fear concerns things absent, whose presence produces distress. Remove distress, then, and fear is removed. Two disturbances remain: exuberant delight and lust. If these too have no place in the wise person, his mind will always be tranquil.”
9 “That is exactly how I understand it.”
“Which would you prefer, then? Shall we set sail at once, or do a little rowing as though we were leaving harbor?”
“What do you mean? I do not understand.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
But let everyone defend what they believe. We’re free to make our own judgments. I’ll stick to my plan: no single school’s rules will bind me or demand my obedience in philosophy. I’ll always look for the most convincing view on each question. I’ve often done that elsewhere, and lately we’ve done it with particular care at Tusculum. I’ve set out the discussions from three days; this book completes the fourth. We went down to the lower walk, just as we’d done on the preceding days, and this is how it went:
“Anyone who wants to may say what they’d like us to discuss.”
8 “I don’t think a wise person can be free of every emotional disturbance.”
“Yesterday’s discussion seemed to show they could be free of distress. Unless you were agreeing with me just to suit the occasion.”
“Not at all. I found your argument thoroughly convincing.”
“So you don’t think a wise person is subject to distress?”
“I certainly don’t.”
“Well, if that can’t disturb a wise person’s mind, nothing can. What could? Fear? But we fear things when they’re absent that distress us when they’re present. So removing distress removes fear. Two disturbances remain: unrestrained delight and craving. If a wise person isn’t subject to those, their mind will always be calm.”
9 “That’s exactly how I understand it.”
“Which would you prefer, then? Shall we set sail right away, or row a little first, as though we were leaving harbor?”
“What do you mean? I don’t understand.”
About this section
Book 4, Chapter 4 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 114 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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