Book 3, Chapter 32
Original Latin
77 Erit igitur in consolationibus prima medicina docere aut nullum malum esse aut admodum parvum, altera et de communi condicione vitae et proprie, si quid sit de ipsius qui maereat disputandum, tertia summam esse stultitiam frustra confici maerore, cum intellegas nihil posse profici. nam Cleanthes quidem sapientem consolatur, qui consolatione non eget. nihil enim esse malum, quod turpe non sit, si lugenti persuaseris, non tu illi luctum, sed stultitiam detraxeris; alienum autem tempus docendi. et tamen non satis mihi videtur vidisse hoc Cleanthes, suscipi aliquando aegritudinem posse ex eo ipso, quod esse summum malum Cleanthes ipse fateatur. quid enim dicemus, cum Socrates Alcibiadi persuasisset, ut accepimus, eum nihil hominis esse nec quicquam inter Alcibiadem summo loco natum et quemvis baiolum interesse, cum se Alcibiades adflictaret lacrimansque Socrati supplex esset, ut sibi virtutem traderet turpitudinemque depelleret,—quid dicemus, Cleanthe? tum in illa re, quae aegritudine Alcibiadem adficiebat, mali nihil fuisse?
78 quid? illa Lyconis qualia sunt? qui aegritudinem extenuans parvis ait eam rebus moveri, fortunae et corporis incommodis, non animi malis. quid ergo? illud, quod Alcibiades dolebat, non ex animi malis vitiisque constabat? ad Epicuri consolationem satis est ante dictum.
Musean translation
Complete machine-assisted translation from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
77 “In consolation, then, the first medicine will be to teach that there is either no evil or a very small one; the second, to discuss the common condition of life, and anything particular to the mourner’s own situation; the third, that it is the height of folly to wear oneself out with grief in vain when one understands that nothing can be gained. Cleanthes, indeed, consoles the wise person, who has no need of consolation. For if you persuade a mourner that nothing is evil unless it is shameful, you will have removed not his mourning but his folly; yet this is the wrong time to teach. Nor, it seems to me, has Cleanthes sufficiently recognized that distress can sometimes be taken on precisely because of what he himself admits to be the greatest evil. For what shall we say of Socrates and Alcibiades? As we are told, Socrates persuaded him that he was worth nothing as a man, and that there was no difference between Alcibiades, born to the highest rank, and any common porter. When Alcibiades tormented himself and tearfully begged Socrates to impart virtue to him and drive out his shamefulness—what shall we say, Cleanthes? That there was no evil in the thing that distressed Alcibiades?
78 “And what are we to make of Lyco’s remarks? Diminishing distress, he says it is caused by trifling things, the disadvantages of fortune and the body, not evils of the soul. What then? Did not the thing that pained Alcibiades consist in the soul’s evils and faults? Enough has already been said about Epicurus’ consolation.”
Plain English translation
Complete independent machine-assisted translation directly from the Latin. Latin transcription by the Perseus Project, Trustees of Tufts University, CC BY-SA 4.0.
77 “So the first treatment in consolation will be to teach that there is either nothing bad or very little. The second is to discuss both life’s general conditions and anything in the mourner’s own situation that needs discussion. The third is to show that it’s utterly foolish to wear yourself out with pointless grief when you understand it can achieve nothing. Cleanthes, in fact, consoles a wise person, who doesn’t need consolation. If you persuade someone mourning that nothing is bad unless it’s morally wrong, you won’t have removed their grief but their foolishness. And this isn’t the right time for teaching. Besides, I don’t think Cleanthes saw clearly enough that distress can sometimes be taken on because of the very thing he himself admits is the greatest evil. What are we to say about this? Socrates persuaded Alcibiades, as we’re told, that he amounted to nothing as a human being, and that there was no difference between Alcibiades, with his very high birth, and any porter at all. Alcibiades tormented himself, weeping and begging Socrates to give him virtue and drive out his moral failings. What are we to say then, Cleanthes? That there was nothing bad in the thing distressing Alcibiades?
78 “Now look at Lyco’s way of talking. In playing distress down, he says minor things arouse it—bodily setbacks and reversals of fortune, rather than evils in the mind. But wasn’t Alcibiades grieving over precisely his mind’s faults and evils? We’ve discussed Epicurus’ way of consoling quite enough already.”
About this section
Book 3, Chapter 32 is part of Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 108 of 189 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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