Paradox 5

Paradox V

Only the wise man is free, and every fool is a slave

[All wise men are free, and all fools are slaves.]

SECTION 33

Chapter 1

Let this man, then, be praised as a commander—or even called one, or thought worthy of the name! How, or over what free man, will someone exercise command when he cannot command his own desires? Let him first rein in his lusts, scorn pleasures, restrain his anger, curb his greed, and drive away the other corruptions of his mind. Then let him begin commanding others, once he himself has ceased obeying the most wicked masters: dishonor and moral baseness. As long as he obeys them, he must not be considered a commander, or even a free man at all. For the most learned thinkers have admirably maintained this principle. I would not appeal to their authority if I had to address some uncultivated audience; but since I am speaking before men of sound judgment, to whom these ideas are not unfamiliar, why should I pretend that any labor I have devoted to these studies has been wasted? These most learned men have declared, then, that no one but the wise man is free.

SECTION 34

For what is freedom? The power to live as you wish. Who, then, lives as he wishes except the man who lives rightly, who takes joy in duty, whose path through life has been considered and planned? A man who obeys even the laws not out of fear, but follows and honors them because he judges this the surest course to his well-being; who says nothing, does nothing, and, in short, thinks nothing except willingly and freely; whose every purpose and every undertaking originates in himself and is directed back to himself, and for whom nothing carries greater weight than his own will and judgment. Even Fortune herself, who is said to wield the greatest power, yields to him, if, as a wise poet said, “She is fashioned for each by his own character.” Only the wise man, then, enjoys the privilege of doing nothing unwillingly, nothing in distress, nothing under compulsion.

SECTION 35

Although establishing this requires a fuller discussion, the following point is brief and must be admitted: no one is free unless he is disposed in this way. All wicked men, therefore, are slaves. This is less startling and paradoxical in substance than in expression. For these thinkers do not call them slaves in the sense of human property that has come to belong to masters through a debt-bond or some other provision of civil law. But if slavery is, as indeed it is, the obedience of a broken and abased spirit that has no will of its own, who can deny that all the fickle, all the covetous, and, in short, all the wicked are slaves?

SECTION 36

Chapter 2

Am I to call a man free when a woman commands him? When she imposes laws on him, prescribes his conduct, orders and forbids whatever she pleases? When he can deny none of her commands and dares refuse nothing? She demands: he must give. She calls: he must come. She throws him out: he must go. She threatens: he must tremble. I think that man must be called not merely a slave but a thoroughly worthless slave, even if he was born into the most distinguished family. Equally foolish are those who take excessive delight in statues, paintings, chased silver, Corinthian works of art, or magnificent buildings. “But we,” someone says, “are the leading men of the state.” You are not even the leading men among your fellow slaves.

SECTION 37

In a great household, some slaves consider themselves more refined—though slaves they remain—such as the hall stewards; while those who handle these objects, who polish, oil, sweep, and sprinkle, do not occupy the most honorable station in slavery. So, in the state, those who have surrendered themselves to a craving for such things occupy almost the lowest station of slavery itself. “I have waged great wars,” he says, “and held great commands and governed great provinces.” Then show a spirit worthy of praise. A painting by Aetion holds you spellbound, or some statue by Polyclitus. I pass over where you took it from and how it came into your possession. When I see you gazing, marveling, and crying out in admiration, I judge you a slave to every sort of foolishness.

SECTION 38

“Are those things not delightful, then?” They are; we too have educated eyes. But I beg you, let their charm be regarded not as a chain for grown men, but as an amusement for children. What do you suppose? If Lucius Mummius, who himself had scorned all Corinth, saw one of these men fondling a Corinthian chamber pot with the utmost longing, would he think him an outstanding citizen or an attentive hall steward? Let Manius Curius come back to life, or any of those men whose country houses and homes contained nothing splendid, nothing adorned, except themselves. Suppose he saw someone who had received the highest honors the people could bestow, scooping little bearded mullets from a fishpond and handling them, and boasting of his abundance of moray eels. Would he not judge this man so thoroughly a slave that he would think him unworthy of any substantial responsibility even within a household of slaves?

SECTION 39

Can there be any doubt about the slavery of those who, in their desire for money of their own, refuse none of the terms of the harshest servitude? What indignity of service will the hope of an inheritance not accept? What nod of a rich, childless old man does it fail to watch? It speaks to please him, does whatever is ordered, follows at his heels, sits at his side, gives him presents. Which of these actions belongs to a free man?

SECTION 40

Chapter 3

Which, indeed, is the mark even of a slave who is not worthless? And what of that desire which seems more suited to a free man—the desire for public office, military commands, and provinces? What a harsh mistress it is, how imperious, how violent! It forced men who considered themselves the most distinguished to serve Cethegus, a man of no great virtue: to send him gifts, to visit his house at night, to entreat him, and finally to beg. What is slavery, if this can be considered freedom? And when the reign of desire has passed and another master has arisen from the consciousness of wrongdoing—fear—how wretched, how harsh that slavery is! Some rather talkative young men must be served; everyone who appears to know anything is feared as a master. And the judge—what mastery he exercises, what terror he strikes into the guilty! Is not every fear a form of slavery?

SECTION 41

What force, then, is there in that speech of Lucius Crassus, a man of supreme eloquence—a speech more fluent than wise: “Rescue us from slavery”? What is this slavery that besets so illustrious and noble a man? Every timidity of a weakened, abject, and broken spirit is slavery. “Do not allow us to serve anyone.” Does he wish to be set free? Not at all. For what does he add? “Except all of you together.” He wishes to change masters, not to be free. “Whom we both can and ought to serve.” But we, if indeed our spirit is lofty and exalted and richly endowed with virtues, neither ought nor can. Say that you can, since indeed you can; do not say that you ought, since no one owes anything except what it would be dishonorable not to render. But enough of this. Let that man consider how he can be a commander, when reason and truth themselves prove that he is not even free.

Paradox V

The wise alone are free; every foolish person is enslaved.

[All wise people have freedom, and all foolish people are slaves.]

SECTION 33

Chapter 1

Go on, praise this man as a commander! Call him one, or decide he deserves the name! How can he command anyone who's free when he can't control his own cravings? First he should put a bridle on his sexual urges, reject pleasures, hold his temper, check his greed, and get rid of his other mental faults. Then he can start giving orders, once he himself has stopped taking orders from those worst of masters, disgrace and moral ugliness. While he's obeying them, he shouldn't be regarded as a commander—or even as free at all. The most learned men have made this point very well. I wouldn't rely on their authority if I had to speak to an uncultivated audience. But I'm speaking to people with excellent judgment who have heard these ideas. Why pretend any work I've put into these studies was wasted? As those highly educated men have said, wisdom is the only way anyone can be free.

SECTION 34

What does freedom mean? Being able to live the way you want. Who can do that except someone who lives rightly? He likes doing his duty and has thought ahead about the course his life should take. He doesn't follow even the laws because he's scared of them. He respects and follows them because he judges that course best for his well-being. Everything he says, does, and even thinks is freely and willingly chosen. His decisions and actions all start with himself and come back to himself. Nothing counts for more with him than what he himself chooses and judges. Even Fortune, supposedly the most powerful force there is, gives way before him. As the wise poet said, “Each person's character shapes her for him.” So the wise person alone has this advantage: he never acts against his wishes, in distress, or under pressure.

SECTION 35

It takes a longer argument to establish that this is true. But here's a short point you have to admit: unless someone is like that, he isn't free. So all bad people are slaves. The claim sounds stranger and more surprising than the reality behind it. Those thinkers aren't saying bad people are slaves in the legal sense, like human property that has passed to owners through debt bondage or another rule of civil law. But what is slavery? It is obedience by a crushed, degraded mind that has lost its own power of choice. Who can deny, then, that every unstable person, everyone driven by desire—in fact every bad person—is a slave?

SECTION 36

Chapter 2

Should I count him free when a woman gives him orders? She sets rules, lays down instructions, commands and forbids whatever she likes. He can't say no to anything she orders and doesn't dare refuse. If she asks for something, he has to hand it over. If she calls, he has to arrive. If she throws him out, he has to go. If she threatens him, he has to shake with fear. I'd call him not merely a slave but a worthless one, even if he comes from the most distinguished family. People who get far too much enjoyment from statues, pictures, decorated silver, Corinthian pieces, and magnificent buildings are every bit as foolish. Someone says, “But we're the community's leading men.” You don't even lead your fellow slaves.

SECTION 37

In a big household, some slaves fancy themselves better turned out, though they're still slaves. Hall stewards, for instance. The ones who handle those objects, wipe and oil them, sweep and sprinkle, don't occupy a particularly honored place among the slaves. In just the same way, people who give themselves over to a craving for these things rank almost at the bottom of slavery in our community. Someone says, “I've fought major wars. I've held great military commands and governed great provinces.” Then display a mind worth praising. Aetion's painting leaves you staring blankly, or a statue by Polyclitus does. Never mind where you took it from or how you got hold of it. When I see you stare, marvel, and shout with delight, I judge you enslaved to every kind of nonsense.

SECTION 38

“So aren't those things charming?” Yes, they are. Our eyes have been educated too. But please, let their charm make them children's amusements, not shackles on adult men. What do you think Lucius Mummius would have made of one of these men handling a little Corinthian chamber pot with desperate longing? He himself had thought nothing of all Corinth. Would he have seen an outstanding citizen or a hall steward looking after things carefully? Bring Manius Curius back to life, or any of those men whose farms and houses contained nothing splendid or decorated except themselves. Let him see a man who has enjoyed the highest honors the people can give, fishing small bearded mullets out of a pond, stroking them, and bragging about all his moray eels. Wouldn't he think the fellow such a slave that he couldn't be trusted with any larger responsibility even in a slave household?

SECTION 39

Can we doubt the slavery of people who want a private purse so badly that they'll accept every condition of the harshest slavery? What unfair treatment won't the hope of inheriting money put up with? What sign from a rich old man without children won't it watch for? It says what he wants to hear, does anything it's told, tags along, sits by him, and brings gifts. Does any of that mark a free man?

SECTION 40

Chapter 3

Does it mark even a slave who isn't worthless? Then consider the supposedly more respectable craving: wanting public honors, military commands, and provinces. What a cruel, overbearing, forceful mistress! It made people who considered themselves the grandest of men serve Cethegus, a man with a far from spotless reputation. They had to send gifts, come to his house at night, appeal to him, and finally beg. If you can call that freedom, what would slavery be? And suppose desire's rule ends and another master takes over: fear, produced by knowing you've done wrong. What a miserable, cruel enslavement that is! You have to serve rather talkative young men. Anyone who seems to know something frightens you like a master. Think of a judge's power and the terror he causes the guilty! Doesn't every fear amount to slavery?

SECTION 41

Then what does that speech by the wonderfully eloquent Lucius Crassus amount to? It has more words than wisdom: “Pull us out of slavery.” What slavery threatens a man with such standing and such noble birth? Every fearful impulse in a weak, low, broken mind is slavery. “Don't let us be anyone's slaves.” Does he want his freedom? Not at all. Look at what he adds: “Except all of you as a body.” He wants a different master, not freedom. “You, whom we're both able and obliged to serve.” But if our minds are great and high and heaped with virtues, we are neither obliged nor able to be slaves. Say you're able, since clearly you are. Don't say you're obliged. Nobody owes anything unless it would be disgraceful not to give it. That's enough about this. Let him work out how he can be a commander when reason and truth themselves establish that he isn't even free.