Paradox 1

Paradox I

Only what is morally honorable is good.

SECTION 6

Chapter 1

I fear that some of you may think this discourse has been drawn from the discussions of the followers of Socrates rather than from my own convictions. Nevertheless, I shall say what I believe, and say it more briefly than so great a subject allows. By Hercules, I have never counted these people’s money, magnificent houses, wealth, power, or the pleasures to which they are so tightly bound among things good or worth pursuing. For I saw that those who had these things in abundance still craved most keenly the very things they possessed in plenty. The thirst of desire is never quenched or satisfied; and those who possess these things are tormented not only by the longing to increase them but also by the fear of losing them.

SECTION 7

Here I often find myself questioning the wisdom of our ancestors, those men of such exemplary self-restraint. They thought these frail and changeable things [the components of wealth] should be called “goods,” though in practice and conduct their judgment was very different. Can anything good be harmful to anyone? Or can someone possess good things in abundance without being good himself? Yet we see that all these possessions are such that wicked people have them and good people lack them.

SECTION 8

So let anyone laugh who wishes: sound reasoning will nevertheless carry more weight with me than popular opinion. I shall never say that someone has lost his goods if he has lost livestock or household furnishings. And I shall often praise that wise man—Bias, I believe—who is numbered among the Seven. When the enemy captured his native Priene and the others fled carrying away many of their possessions, someone urged him to do the same. “That is precisely what I am doing,” he said, “for everything that is mine I carry with me.”

SECTION 9

He did not even regard as his own these playthings of fortune that we go so far as to call goods. “What, then,” someone will ask, “is good?” If an action done rightly, honorably, and virtuously is truly said to be done well, then only what is right, honorable, and virtuous is, in my judgment, good.

SECTION 10

Chapter 2

But these arguments may seem rather tiresome when pursued at too leisurely a pace. The lives and deeds of the greatest men have cast a clear light on them [these matters that seem to be discussed in language more subtle than necessary]. For I ask you: do the men who left us this republic, so splendidly founded, seem to have given any thought to silver as an object of greed, to pleasant surroundings for their enjoyment, to furnishings for luxurious living, or to banquets for pleasure? Set each one [of the kings] before your eyes.

SECTION 11

Would you begin with Romulus? Or, after the establishment of liberty, with the very men who established it? By what steps, I ask, did Romulus ascend to heaven? By what these people call goods, or by his achievements and virtues? Again, do we suppose that Numa Pompilius’s sacrificial ladles and little earthenware vessels were less pleasing to the immortal gods than the fern-embossed bowls of the Salian priests? I pass over the remaining kings: apart from Tarquin the Proud, they all stand on an equal footing.

SECTION 12

If someone were to ask Brutus what he had sought in freeing his country, and likewise ask his fellow conspirators what they had aimed at and pursued, would any one of them seem to have had pleasure, riches, or indeed anything whatever as his purpose except the duty of a brave and great-hearted man? What drove Gaius Mucius to attempt to kill Porsenna, without any hope of saving himself? What power held Cocles alone on the bridge against the whole enemy army? What sent Decius the father, and Decius the son, into the enemy’s armed ranks after solemnly devoting their lives to death? What end did Gaius Fabricius’s self-restraint pursue, or Manius Curius’s frugal way of life? What of those two bulwarks of the Punic War, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio, who believed they must bar the Carthaginian advance with their own bodies? What of the elder Africanus? What of the younger? What of Cato, whose lifetime fell between theirs? What of countless others—for examples from our own country abound? Did they ever think that anything in life was worth seeking except what appeared praiseworthy and glorious?

SECTION 13

Chapter 3

Let those who mock this discourse and its doctrine come forward, then, and judge for themselves whether they would rather resemble one of those men whose marble houses gleam with ivory and gold, who abound in statues, paintings, embossed gold and silver, and Corinthian works of art, or Gaius Fabricius, who possessed none of these things and wished to possess none.

SECTION 14

As for these possessions, which pass now to one person, now to another, people can generally be brought without difficulty to deny that they are good things. But they cling tenaciously to this claim and defend it with care: pleasure is the highest good. To my ears, that is the language of beasts, not human beings. When a god—or nature, the mother, so to speak, of all things—has given you a mind, than which nothing is more excellent or more divine, will you so debase and degrade yourself as to suppose there is no difference between you and some four-footed animal? Can anything be good that does not make its possessor better?

SECTION 15

For the greater a person’s share in goodness, the more praiseworthy that person is; nor is there any good in which its possessor cannot honorably take pride. But which of these qualities belongs to pleasure? Does it make a man better or more praiseworthy? Does anyone exalt himself by boasting and proclaiming that he has enjoyed pleasures? Yet if pleasure, defended by so many advocates, is not to be counted among good things—and the greater it is, the more it dislodges the mind from its proper place and balance—then surely to live well and happily is nothing other than to live honorably and rightly.

Paradox I

Nothing is good except what is morally right.

SECTION 6

Chapter 1

Some of you may think I'm borrowing this speech from the debates of Socrates' followers instead of expressing what I believe myself. I'm worried about that. All the same, I'll tell you my view, in fewer words than this great subject really needs. By Hercules, I've never thought we should count those people's cash, grand houses, resources, commands, or the pleasures that have such a grip on them as good things or things worth wanting. I could see that, even with all these things pouring in, they were still hungry for exactly what they had so much of. Greed's thirst can never be filled or put to rest. People who own these things suffer from two torments: wanting to add to them and being afraid they'll lose them.

SECTION 7

Here I often wonder how wise our ancestors were, despite their remarkable restraint. They decided to use the word “goods” for these weak, unstable things [the parts of a fortune]. Yet their actual behavior showed that they judged them very differently. Could something good harm a person? Could someone be surrounded by good things and not be good himself? We can see that every one of these possessions turns up in bad people's hands and is missing from good people's lives.

SECTION 8

Laugh if you want. I'll still give a sound argument more weight than what the crowd thinks. When a man loses his animals or his household belongings, I'll never say he has lost what is good. And I'll often speak well of that wise man, Bias, I think, one of the Seven. The enemy took his city, Priene. Everyone else ran away carrying plenty of their belongings, and someone told him to do the same. “I already am,” he answered. “I carry everything I own with me.”

SECTION 9

He didn't even count those toys of fortune as his own, although we go so far as to call them good. Someone will ask, “Well, what is good?” If it's true that we call an action well done when it's done rightly, honorably, and with virtue, my view is that nothing but right, honorable, virtuous conduct is good.

SECTION 10

Chapter 2

Argue these points too slowly and they can become tiresome. The way the greatest men lived and acted has made the points clear [points that seem to be argued in language more subtle than it needs to be]. Let me put a question to you. The men who founded our republic so well and handed it down to us—do you think they were dreaming of silver to satisfy greed, beautiful surroundings to enjoy, household luxuries to indulge themselves, or feasts to give them pleasure? Bring each man [among the kings] to mind.

SECTION 11

Shall we start with Romulus? Or, once the community was free, with the men who freed it? What were the steps that took Romulus up to heaven? Those things that these people label good? Or what he did and the virtues he showed? Consider Numa Pompilius too. Do we think the gods liked his sacrificial cups and little earthenware jars less than the fern-patterned bowls belonging to the Salian priests? I'll pass over the other kings. Apart from Tarquin the Proud, they all stand on the same level.

SECTION 12

Ask Brutus what he was doing when he freed his country. Ask the others who joined him what they had in view and what they were going after. Would you find even one who seemed to have pleasure, wealth, or anything else at all as his goal, rather than doing what a brave, great man ought to do? What made Gaius Mucius set out to kill Porsenna when he had no chance of coming back alive? What kept Cocles on the bridge by himself against every force the enemy had? What sent the elder Decius, and then his son, into the enemy's armed ranks after each had pledged his own life to death? What was the aim of Gaius Fabricius's restraint or Manius Curius's plain diet? Think of Gnaeus and Publius Scipio, the two defenders in the Punic War. They believed they had to put their own bodies in the way of the Carthaginians' advance. Think of the older Africanus and the younger one, and of Cato, whose life came between theirs. Think of countless more—we have plenty of examples at home. Did they imagine they should want anything from life apart from what seemed worthy of praise and distinction?

SECTION 13

Chapter 3

Then let the people who mock this argument and its conclusion come forward and decide for themselves. Would they rather be like one of those men with marble houses shining with ivory and gold, with statues and paintings everywhere, decorated gold and silver, and Corinthian works? Or like Gaius Fabricius, who didn't have any of those things and didn't want them?

SECTION 14

It's usually easy enough to get people to admit that these possessions, which keep changing hands, aren't good things. But there's one position they defend stubbornly and carefully: pleasure is the greatest good. That sounds to me like an animal speaking, not a person. God, or nature—what you might call the mother of everything—gave you a mind, and nothing is more valuable or divine. Will you drag yourself down so far that you see no difference between yourself and a four-legged creature? How can a thing be good if having it doesn't improve you?

SECTION 15

The more goodness someone has, the more praise he deserves. Anything genuinely good allows the person who has it to take honorable pride in it. Does pleasure meet either test? Does it improve a man or earn him more praise? Does anyone make much of himself by boasting and proclaiming how much pleasure he's had? Pleasure has a huge number of advocates. But if even that doesn't belong among good things—and the more intense it is, the further it knocks the mind off balance—then living a good, happy life can only mean living rightly and honorably.