Stratagem 3
Original German
Die Behauptung [1] welche beziehungsweise, κατα τι, relative aufgestellt ist, nehmen, als sei sie allgemein, simpliciter, ἁπλως, absolute aufgestellt, oder wenigstens sie in einer ganz andern Beziehung auffassen, und dann sie in diesem Sinn widerlegen. Des Aristoteles Beispiel ist: der Mohr ist schwarz, hinsichtlich der Zähne aber weiß: also ist er schwarz und nicht schwarz zugleich. —
Das ist ein ersonnenes Beispiel, das Niemand im Ernst täuschen wird: nehmen wir dagegen eines aus der wirklichen Erfahrung.
Exempel. In einem Gespräch über Philosophie gab ich zu, daß mein System die Quietisten in Schutz nehme und lobe. — Bald darauf kam die Rede auf Hegel, und ich behauptete er habe großentheils Unsinn geschrieben oder wenigstens wären viele Stellen seiner Schriften solche, wo der Autor die Worte setzt, und der Leser den Sinn setzen soll. — Der Gegner unternahm nicht dies ad rem zu widerlegen, sondern begnügte sich das argumentum ad hominem aufzustellen „ich hätte so eben die Quietisten gelobt, und diese hätten ebenfalls viel Unsinn geschrieben“‘. —
Ich gab dies zu, berichtigte ihn aber darin, daß ich die Quietisten nicht lobe als Philosophen und Schriftsteller, also nicht wegen ihrer theoretischen Leistungen, sondern nur als Menschen, wegen ihres Thuns, bloß in praktischer Hinsicht: bei Hegel aber sei die Rede von theoretischen Leistungen. — So war der Angriff parirt.
Die ersten drei Kunstgriffe sind verwandt: sie haben dies gemein daß der Gegner eigentlich von etwas anderm redet als aufgestellt worden: man begienge also eine ignoratio elenchi, wenn man sich dadurch abfertigen ließe. — Denn in allen aufgestellten Beispielen ist was der Gegner sagt wahr: es steht aber nicht in wirklichem Widerspruch mit der These, sondern nur in scheinbarem; also negirt der von ihm Angegriffene die Consequenz seines Schlusses: nämlich den Schluß von der Wahrheit seines Satzes auf die Falschheit des unsrigen. Es ist also direkte Widerlegung seiner Widerlegung per negationem consequentiae.
Wahre Prämissen nicht zugeben, weil man die Konsequenz vorhersieht. Dagegen also folgende zwei Mittel, Regel 4 und 5.
1 [Daneben am Rand:] Sophisma a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. Dies ist des Aristoteles zweiter elenchus sophisticus εξω της λεξεως: — το ἁπλως, η μη ἁπλως, αλλα πη, η που, η ποτε, η προς τι λεγεσθαι. De sophist. elenchis, c. 5.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted, directly from Deussen’s German edition (1923).
Take an assertion1 made in a particular respect, relatively, as though it had been made generally, without qualification, absolutely; or at least understand it in an entirely different relation, and then refute it in that sense. Aristotle's example is: the Moor is black, but white in respect of his teeth; therefore he is black and not black at the same time.
This is an invented example that will deceive no one in earnest; let us take one instead from actual experience.
Example. In a conversation about philosophy, I conceded that my system defended and praised the Quietists. Soon afterward the conversation turned to Hegel, and I maintained that he had written mostly nonsense, or at least that many passages in his writings were such that the author supplied the words and the reader was supposed to supply the meaning. The opponent did not attempt to refute this ad rem, but contented himself with the argument ad hominem that “I had just praised the Quietists, and they too had written much nonsense.”
I conceded this, but corrected him: I praised the Quietists not as philosophers and writers, not for their theoretical achievements, but only as human beings, for their conduct, solely in a practical respect. In Hegel's case, however, theoretical achievements were at issue. Thus the attack was parried.
The first three stratagems are related. They have this in common: the opponent is actually speaking of something other than what was asserted. To let oneself be dismissed in this way would therefore be to mistake the point at issue. For in all the examples given, what the opponent says is true; but its contradiction of the thesis is only apparent, not real. The person attacked therefore denies the consequence of the opponent's inference: the inference from the truth of his proposition to the falsity of ours. This is thus a direct refutation of his refutation by denying the inference.
Refusing to concede true premises because one foresees the consequence. Against this, the following two remedies, rules 4 and 5.
1 [Beside this in the margin:] The fallacy of passing from a qualified statement to an unqualified one. This is Aristotle's second sophistical refutation independent of wording: speaking absolutely, or not absolutely but in a certain respect, or place, or time, or relation to something. De sophist. elenchis, c. 5.
Plain English translation
Machine-assisted, independently translated directly from Deussen’s German edition (1923).
Take a claim1 that was made only in a particular respect as if it were general, unqualified and absolute. Or understand it in some entirely different respect, then refute it that way. Aristotle's example is that a Moor is black but has white teeth. So he is black and not black at the same time.
That is an invented example that would not really fool anyone. Instead, take a case from actual experience.
Example. While discussing philosophy, I admitted that my system defended and praised the Quietists. We soon started talking about Hegel. I said most of what he had written was nonsense, or at least that many passages left the author to provide the words and the reader to provide their meaning. The opponent did not try to refute this claim on its own terms. He simply used my earlier admission against me: “You have just praised the Quietists, and they also wrote a lot of nonsense.”
I accepted this but corrected him. I was not praising the Quietists as philosophers or writers, for their theoretical work. I praised them only as people, for what they did, in a practical respect. With Hegel, we were discussing theoretical work. This blocked the attack.
The first three tricks are related. In each, the opponent actually talks about something different from the original claim. If we let that dispose of our claim, we miss the point of the argument. In all the examples, what the opponent says is true, but it only seems to contradict the claim. It does not really do so. The person attacked therefore denies the opponent's inference: that because his statement is true, ours must be false. We directly refute his refutation by denying that conclusion follows.
Someone refuses to accept true premises because they can see what follows from them. The next two methods, rules 4 and 5, deal with this.
1 [In the margin beside this:] The fallacy of treating a qualified statement as an unqualified statement. This is Aristotle's second sophistical refutation that does not depend on wording: speaking absolutely, or not absolutely but in a particular respect, place, time or relation. De sophist. elenchis, c. 5.
About this section
Stratagem 3 is part of The Art of Being Right by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 8 of 43 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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