Stratagem 38
Original German
Wenn man merkt daß der Gegner überlegen ist und man Unrecht behalten wird; so werde man persönlich, beleidigend, grob. Das Persönlichwerden besteht darin, daß man von dem Gegenstand des Streites (weil man da verlornes Spiel hat) abgeht auf den Streitenden und seine Person irgend wie angreift: man könnte es nennen argumentum ad personam, zum Unterschied vom argumentum ad hominem: dieses geht vom rein objektiven Gegenstand ab, um sich an das zu halten, was der Gegner darüber gesagt oder zugegeben hat. Beim Persönlichwerden aber verläßt man den Gegenstand ganz, und richtet seinen Angriff auf die Person des Gegners: man wird also kränkend, hämisch, beleidigend, grob. Es ist eine Appellation von den Kräften des Geistes an die des Leibes, oder an die Thierheit. Diese Regel ist sehr beliebt, weil Jeder zur Ausführung tauglich ist, und wird daher häufig angewandt.1 Nun frägt sich welche Gegenregel hiebei für den andern Theil gilt. Denn will er dieselbe gebrauchen, so wirds eine Prügelei oder ein Duell oder ein Injurienproceß.
Man würde sich sehr irren, wenn man mein[t] es sei hinreichend selbst nicht persönlich zu werden. Denn dadurch daß man Einem ganz gelassen zeigt, daß er Unrecht hat und also falsch urtheilt und denkt, was bei jedem dialektischen Siege der Fall ist, erbittert man ihn mehr als durch einen groben, beleidigenden Ausdruck. Warum? Weil wie Hobbes de Cive, c. 1, sagt: Omnis animi voluptas, omnisque alacritas in eo sita est, quod quis habeat, quibuscum conferens se, possit magnifice sentire de seipso. — Dem Menschen geht nichts über die Befriedigung seiner Eitelkeit und keine Wunde schmerzt mehr als die dieser geschlagen wird. (Daraus stammen Redensarten wie „die Ehre gilt mehr als das Leben“ u. s. w.) Diese Befriedigung der Eitelkeit entsteht hauptsächlich aus der Vergleichung Seiner mit Andern, in jeder Beziehung, aber hauptsächlich in Beziehung auf die Geisteskräfte. Diese eben geschieht effective und sehr stark beim Disputiren. Daher die Erbitterung des Besiegten, ohne daß ihm Unrecht widerfahren, und daher sein Greifen zum letzten Mittel, diesem letzten Kunstgriff: dem man nicht entgehn kann durch bloße Höflichkeit seinerseits. Große Kaltblütigkeit kann jedoch auch hier aushelfen, wenn man nämlich, sobald der Gegner persönlich wird, ruhig antwortet, das gehöre nicht zur Sache, und sogleich auf diese zurücklenkt und fortfährt ihm hier sein Unrecht zu beweisen, ohne sein[er] Beleidigungen zu achten, also gleichsam wie Themistokles zum Eurybiades sagt: παταξον μεν, ακουσον δε. Das ist aber nicht Jedem gegeben. Die einzig sichere Gegenregel ist daher die, welche schon Aristoteles im letzten Kapitel der Topica giebt: Nicht mit dem Ersten dem Besten zu disputieren; sondern allein mit solchen die man kennt, und von denen man weiß, daß sie Verstand genug haben, nicht gar zu Absurdes vorzubringen und dadurch beschämt werden zu müssen; und um mit Gründen zu disputiren und nicht mit Machtsprüchen, und um auf Gründe zu hören und darauf einzugehn; und endlich daß sie die Wahrheit schätzen, gute Gründe gern hören, auch aus dem Munde des Gegners, und Billigkeit genug haben, um es ertragen zu können Unrecht zu behalten, wenn die Wahrheit auf der andern Seite liegt. Daraus folgt, daß unter Hundert kaum Einer ist, der werth ist daß man mit ihm disputirt. Die Uebrigen lasse man reden was sie wollen, denn desipere est juris gentium, und man bedenke was Voltaire sagt: La paix vaut encore mieux que la vérité: und ein Arabischer Spruch ist: „Am Baume des Schweigens hängt seine Frucht der Friede.“
Das Disputiren ist als Reibung der Köpfe allerdings oft von gegenseitigem Nutzen, zur Berichtigung der eig[nen] Gedanken und auch zur Erzeugung neuer Ansichten. All[ein] beide Disput[anten] müssen an Gelehrsamkeit und an Geist ziemlich gleichsteh[n]. Fehlt es Einem an der erst[en], so versteht er nicht Alles, ist nicht au niveau. Fehlt es ihm am zweiten, so wird die dadurch herbeigeführte Erbitterung ihn zu Unredlichkeit[en] und Kniffen [oder] zu Grobheit verleiten. [2]
Zwischen der Disputation in colloquio privato s. familiari und der disputatio sollemnis publica, pro gradu u.s.w. ist kein wesentlicher Unterschied. Bloß etwa, daß bei letzterer gefordert wird, daß der Respondens allemal gegen den Opponens Recht behalten soll und deshalb nöthigenfalls der praeses ihm beispringt; — oder auch daß man bei letzterer mehr förmlich argumentirt, sein[e] Argum[ente] gern in die strenge Schlußform kleidet.
1 [Dabei am Rand die Notiz:] Siehe Foliant p 261 [in unsr. Ausg. Bd. VII u. VIII].
2 Spic[ilegia] 334 [in unsr. Ausg. Bd. VII u. VIII].
Musean translation
Machine-assisted, directly from Deussen’s German edition (1923).
When one notices that the opponent is superior and one is going to come away wrong, become personal, insulting and rude. Becoming personal consists in leaving the subject of the dispute, where one's game is lost, to attack the disputant and his person in some way. This may be called an argumentum ad personam, as distinct from the argumentum ad hominem. The latter departs from the purely objective subject to hold to what the opponent has said or conceded about it. In becoming personal, however, one abandons the subject altogether and directs the attack against the opponent's person: one becomes hurtful, spiteful, insulting and rude. It is an appeal from the powers of the mind to those of the body, or to brutishness. This rule is very popular because everyone is capable of carrying it out, and it is therefore frequently employed.1 The question now is what counterrule holds for the other party. If he wishes to use the same rule, there will be a brawl, a duel or legal proceedings for insult.
One would be greatly mistaken to think it enough merely to avoid becoming personal oneself. For by showing someone quite calmly that he is wrong, and therefore judges and thinks falsely—as happens in every dialectical victory—one embitters him more than through a rude, insulting expression. Why? Because, as Hobbes says in de Cive, c. 1: “All the mind's pleasure and all its cheerfulness consist in having others with whom to compare oneself and thereby form a high opinion of oneself.” Nothing matters more to a person than the satisfaction of his vanity, and no wound hurts more than one inflicted upon it. Hence sayings such as “Honor is worth more than life,” and so forth. This satisfaction of vanity arises chiefly from comparing oneself with others in every respect, but principally in intellectual powers. This very comparison takes place effectively and very forcefully in disputation. Hence the defeated person's bitterness, though no injustice has been done him, and his resort to the last resource, this last stratagem. Mere courtesy on one's own side cannot avert it. Great composure, however, can help even here: as soon as the opponent becomes personal, calmly reply that this is irrelevant, return at once to the subject, and continue proving him wrong there without heeding his insults. In effect, say what Themistocles said to Eurybiades: “Strike, but listen.” Not everyone, however, has this gift.
The only safe counterrule is therefore the one Aristotle already gives in the last chapter of the Topica: do not dispute with the first person who comes along, but only with people one knows to have enough understanding not to advance utter absurdities and be shamed by them; enough to dispute with reasons rather than pronouncements of authority, and to listen to and engage with reasons; and, finally, people who value truth, willingly hear good reasons even from the opponent's mouth, and possess enough fairness to bear coming away wrong when truth is on the other side. It follows that scarcely one person in a hundred is worth disputing with. Let the others say what they please, for folly is a right of all peoples. Remember what Voltaire says: “Peace is worth still more than truth.” And an Arabic saying runs: “On the tree of silence hangs its fruit, peace.”
Disputation, as a friction between minds, is certainly often of mutual benefit: it corrects one's own thoughts and produces new views. But both disputants must be fairly equal in learning and intellect. If one lacks the former, he does not understand everything and is not at the same level. If he lacks the latter, the bitterness this causes will tempt him into dishonesty and tricks, or rudeness.2
There is no essential difference between disputation in private or familiar conversation and solemn public disputation for a degree and the like. Only, perhaps, that in the latter the respondent is always required to remain in the right against the opponent, so the presiding officer comes to his aid if necessary; or that in the latter one argues more formally, readily clothing one's arguments in strict syllogistic form.
1 [The note beside this in the margin:] See Foliant p 261 [in our edition, volumes VII and VIII].
2 Spic[ilegia] 334 [in our edition, volumes VII and VIII].
Plain English translation
Machine-assisted, independently translated directly from Deussen’s German edition (1923).
If you see that the opponent is better at this and you are going to lose, get personal, insulting and rude. This means leaving the issue, where your case is lost, and attacking the person arguing with you. We could call it an argumentum ad personam. It differs from an argumentum ad hominem, which leaves the strictly objective issue to focus on what the opponent has said or accepted about it. A personal attack abandons the issue altogether and attacks the opponent as a person. It becomes hurtful, spiteful, insulting and rude. It turns from mental powers to physical powers, or to animal behavior. This is popular because anyone can do it, so it is used often.1 What can the other person do in response? If they use the same method, it turns into a fight, a duel or a court case over insults.
It would be a great mistake to think it is enough not to get personal yourself. Calmly showing someone that they are wrong, and therefore thinking and judging wrongly, as every victory in a debate does, makes them more bitter than a rude insult would. Why? As Hobbes says in de Cive, c. 1, “All pleasure and joy in the mind depend on having others to compare ourselves with, so we can think highly of ourselves.” People value nothing more than satisfying their vanity, and no wound hurts more than a wound to it. This produces sayings like “Honor matters more than life.” Satisfying vanity mainly comes from comparing ourselves with others, in every respect, but especially in mental abilities. Debating makes that comparison happen very effectively and strongly. This is why the defeated person feels bitter even though no wrong has been done to them. They turn to the last resort, this final trick. Being polite yourself will not stop it. But great calm can help here too. As soon as the opponent attacks you personally, calmly say that it is irrelevant. Return immediately to the issue and keep showing why they are wrong, ignoring their insults. In effect, answer as Themistocles answered Eurybiades: “Hit me, but listen.” Not everyone can do this.
The only safe response is therefore the one Aristotle gives in the last chapter of the Topica. Do not argue with just anyone. Argue only with people you know have enough understanding not to produce complete absurdities and be embarrassed by them. They must be able to argue with reasons rather than declarations of authority, and to listen to reasons and engage with them. Finally, they must value truth, welcome good reasons even from the opponent, and be fair enough to bear losing when truth is on the other side. This means that barely one person in a hundred is worth debating. Let the rest say what they want. Being foolish is everyone's right. Remember Voltaire's words: “Peace is worth even more than truth.” An Arabic saying goes, “Peace hangs as the fruit on the tree of silence.”
The friction between minds in debate can often help both people correct their thoughts and develop new ideas. But the two must be fairly equal in learning and mental ability. If one lacks learning, they will not understand everything and will not be at the same level. If they lack mental ability, the resulting bitterness will lead them into dishonesty and tricks, or rudeness.2
There is no essential difference between a debate in private, familiar conversation and a formal public debate for a degree or a similar purpose. Perhaps the differences are that in the public debate the respondent is always supposed to beat the opponent, so the presiding official helps if necessary, and that the arguments are more formal, often put into strict syllogistic form.
1 [Note in the margin beside this:] See Foliant p 261 [in our edition, volumes VII and VIII].
2 Spic[ilegia] 334 [in our edition, volumes VII and VIII].
About this section
Stratagem 38 is part of The Art of Being Right by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 43 of 43 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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