Stratagem 35
Original German
der, sobald er praktikabel ist, alle übrigen entbehrlich macht: statt durch Gründe auf den Intellekt, wirke man durch Motive auf den Willen, und der Gegner, wie auch die Zuhörer, wenn sie gleiches Interesse mit ihm haben, sind sogleich für unsre Meinung gewonnen, und wäre diese aus dem Tollhause geborgt: denn meistens wiegt ein Loth Wille mehr als ein Centner Einsicht und Ueberzeugung. Freilich geht dies nur unter besondern Umständen an. Kann man dem Gegner fühlbar machen, daß seine Meinung, wenn sie gültig würde, seinem Interesse merklichen Abbruch thäte; so wird er sie so schnell fahren lassen, wie ein heißes Eisen, das er unvorsichtigerweise ergriffen hatte.
Z. E. ein Geistlicher vertheidigt ein philosophisches Dogma: — man gebe ihm zu vermerken, daß es mittelbar mit einem Grunddogma seiner Kirche in Widerspruch steht, und er wird es fahren lassen.
Ein Gutsbesitzer behauptet die Vortrefflichkei[t] des Maschinenwesens in England, wo eine Dampfmaschine vieler Menschen Arbeit thut: man gebe ihm zu verstehn, daß bald auch die Wagen durch Dampfmaschin[en] gezogen werden werden, wo denn die Pferde seiner zahlreichen Stuterei sehr im Preise sinken müssen; — und man wird sehn. In solchen Fällen ist das Gefühl ein[es] Jeden in der Regel: „quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam.“
Eben so, wenn die Zuhörer mit uns zu einer Sekte, Gilde, Gewerbe, Klubb u. s. w. gehören, der Gegner aber nicht. Seine These sei noch so richtig; sobald wir nur andeuten, daß solche dem gemeinsamen Interesse besagter Gilde u. s. w. zuwider läuft; so werden alle Zuhörer die Argumente des Gegners, seien sie auch vortrefflich, schwach und erbärmlich, unsre dagegen, und wären sie aus der Luft gegriffen, richtig und treffend finden, der Chor wird laut für uns sich vernehmen lassen, und der Gegner wird beschämt das Feld räumen. Ja die Zuhörer werden meistens glauben aus reiner Ueberzeugung gestimmt zu haben. Denn was uns unvortheilhaft ist, erscheint meistens dem Intellekt absurd. Intellectus luminis sicci non est etc. Dieser Kunstgriff könnte so bezeichnet werden „den Baum bei der Wurzel anfassen“: gewöhnlich heißt er das argumentum ab utili. [1]
1 Siehe Cogitata p 280 [in unsr. Ausg. Bd. VII u. VIII].
Musean translation
Machine-assisted, directly from Deussen’s German edition (1923).
This stratagem, whenever practicable, makes all the others unnecessary: instead of acting upon the intellect through reasons, act upon the will through motives. The opponent, and the listeners too if they share his interest, are immediately won over to our opinion, even if it were borrowed from a madhouse. For a single lot-weight of will generally weighs more than a centner of insight and conviction. This is of course possible only in special circumstances. If one can make the opponent feel that his opinion, were it to prevail, would noticeably injure his interest, he will drop it as quickly as a hot iron he had carelessly grasped.
For example, a clergyman defends a philosophical dogma: make him notice that it indirectly contradicts a fundamental dogma of his church, and he will abandon it.
A landowner asserts the excellence of machinery in England, where one steam engine does the work of many people. Give him to understand that carriages will soon be drawn by steam engines too, whereupon the horses of his large stud must fall greatly in price, and we shall see. In such cases everyone's usual feeling is: “How rashly we enact a law unjust to ourselves.”
It is the same when the listeners belong with us to a sect, guild, trade, club, and so forth, but the opponent does not. His thesis may be perfectly correct: as soon as we hint that it conflicts with the common interest of that guild or the like, all the listeners will find his arguments weak and miserable, however excellent they may be, and ours correct and telling, even if plucked from thin air. The chorus will speak loudly for us, and the opponent will leave the field in shame. Indeed, the listeners will generally believe they have voted from pure conviction. For what disadvantages us usually appears absurd to the intellect. The intellect is not a dry light, and so forth. This stratagem might be called “seizing the tree by the root”; it is usually called the argument from advantage.1
1 See Cogitata p 280 [in our edition, volumes VII and VIII].
Plain English translation
Machine-assisted, independently translated directly from Deussen’s German edition (1923).
Whenever this trick is possible, it makes all the others unnecessary. Instead of giving reasons to influence the intellect, give motives to influence the will. The opponent is immediately won over to our opinion, as are any listeners who share the opponent's interests, even if our opinion came from a madhouse. One lot-weight of will usually outweighs one centner-weight of insight and conviction. This works only in particular circumstances. If the opponent feels that their opinion, if accepted, would seriously harm their interests, they will drop it as quickly as a hot iron they carelessly picked up.
For example, a clergyman defends a philosophical doctrine. Let him notice that it indirectly contradicts a basic doctrine of his church, and he will drop it.
A landowner praises machinery in England, where a steam engine does the work of many people. Suggest that steam engines will soon pull carriages too, so the horses in his large stud will fall sharply in value. We will see what happens. In these cases, people generally feel, “How thoughtlessly we make an unfair law against ourselves.”
The same applies if the audience belongs with us to a sect, guild, trade, club or the like, but the opponent does not. However right the opponent's claim is, we need only hint that it harms the group's common interests. The listeners will find the opponent's arguments weak and pathetic, however good they are. They will find ours correct and effective, even if we have made them up out of thin air. The group will speak loudly for us and the opponent will leave in embarrassment. The listeners will usually believe they voted out of sincere conviction. What harms our interests generally seems absurd to our intellect. The intellect is not a dry light, and so on. This trick could be called “grabbing the tree at its root.” It is usually called an argument from usefulness.1
1 See Cogitata p 280 [in our edition, volumes VII and VIII].
About this section
Stratagem 35 is part of The Art of Being Right by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 40 of 43 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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