Stratagem 30

The argumentum ad verecundiam. Use authorities instead of reasons, according to the extent of the opponent's knowledge. “Everyone prefers believing to judging,” says Seneca. We therefore have an easy game when an authority respected by the opponent is on our side. The more limited his knowledge and abilities, the more authorities will be valid for him. If these are of the first rank, he will recognize very few authorities, almost none at all. At most he will accept specialists in a science, art or craft of which he knows little or nothing, and even these with suspicion. Ordinary people, by contrast, have deep respect for specialists of every kind. They do not know that someone who makes a profession of a subject loves not the subject but his livelihood, nor that someone who teaches a subject seldom knows it thoroughly: those who study it thoroughly generally have no time left to teach. For the crowd, however, there are very many authorities that command respect. If none is quite suitable, choose one that seems suitable: quote what someone said in another sense or in different circumstances. Authorities the opponent does not understand generally work best. The unlearned have a peculiar respect for Greek and Latin phrases. If necessary, one may not merely twist authorities but falsify them outright, or even cite authorities of one's own invention. Usually he does not have the book to hand and does not know how to consult it either. The finest example is the French curé who, to avoid paving the street in front of his house as the other citizens were required to do, quoted a biblical saying: “paveant illi, ego non pavebo”—“Let them fear; I shall not fear.” This convinced the municipal officials. General prejudices, too, may be used as authorities. For most people think with Aristotle: “What many believe, we affirm to be so”—in the Nicomachean Ethics, I think. Indeed, there is no opinion so absurd that people will not readily adopt it once they have been persuaded that it is generally accepted. Example governs their thinking as it governs their conduct. They are sheep following the lead ram wherever he leads; it is easier for them to die than to think. It is very strange that the universality of an opinion carries such weight with them, since they can see in themselves how opinions are adopted without any judgment, solely through example. But they do not see this, for they lack all self-knowledge. Only the select few say with Plato: “The many have many notions.” That is, the crowd has many foolish notions in its head, and anyone who wished to heed them would have much to do.

The universality of an opinion is, seriously considered, no proof of its correctness, not even a ground of probability. Those who maintain otherwise must assume 1) that distance in time deprives universality of its evidential force; otherwise they would have to recall all the old errors once generally taken for truths, such as the Ptolemaic system, or restore Catholicism in all Protestant countries. 2) That distance in space has the same effect; otherwise the universality of opinion among adherents of Buddhism, Christianity and Islam will embarrass them. (After Bentham, Tactique des assemblées législatives, Vol 2, p 76.)

What is called general opinion is, examined in the light, the opinion of two or three people. We would be convinced of this if we could watch the formation of such a universally accepted opinion. We would then find that two or three people first adopted or advanced and maintained it, and others were kind enough to trust that they had thoroughly examined it. On the assumption that these people were sufficiently capable, a few others first adopted the opinion too. Many more believed these in turn, their laziness advising them to believe at once rather than undertake a laborious examination. Thus the number of these lazy and credulous adherents grew from day to day. Once the opinion had a good number of voices in its favor, those who followed attributed this solely to the cogency of its grounds. Those still remaining were now compelled to accept what was generally accepted, lest they be considered unruly minds resisting universally valid opinions, and impertinent fellows who wished to be wiser than the whole world. Assent now became a duty. The few capable of judging must now remain silent; those allowed to speak are wholly incapable of opinions and judgments of their own, mere echoes of another's opinion, yet all the more zealous and intolerant in defending it. For what they hate in the dissenter is not so much his different opinion as his presumption in wishing to judge for himself—something they never undertake themselves, and secretly know they do not. In short, very few can think, but everyone wants opinions. What remains but to take them ready-made from others instead of making them oneself? Since this is how matters stand, what is the voice of a hundred million people worth? As much as a historical fact found in a hundred historians, when it is then shown that they all copied one another, so that everything ultimately comes back to the statement of one person. (After Bayle, Pensées sur les Comètes, Vol I, p 10.)

“I say it, you say it, and he too has said it at last:After so many sayings, you see nothing but sayings.”

Nevertheless, in a dispute with ordinary people, one can use general opinion as an authority.

In general, when two ordinary minds dispute, one will find that authorities are usually their mutually chosen weapon: with these they strike at one another. If the better mind has to deal with such a person, the wisest course is to accommodate himself to this weapon too, choosing authorities according to his opponent's vulnerabilities. For against the weapon of reasons the opponent is, by hypothesis, a horn-armored Siegfried, bathed in the flood of his inability to think and judge.

In court, disputes are actually conducted only through authorities: the established authority of the laws. Judgment's task is to find the law, the authority applicable to the case at hand.¹ Dialectic nevertheless has ample room to maneuver, since, when necessary, a case and a law that do not actually fit one another are twisted until they are taken to fit; and conversely.

1 See Cogitata p 116 [in our edition, volumes VII and VIII].

An appeal to authority. Replace reasons with authorities chosen to suit the opponent's knowledge. Seneca says, “Everyone would rather believe than judge.” We therefore have an easy task if we can cite an authority the opponent respects. The less knowledge and ability they have, the more authorities they will accept. Someone with first-rate knowledge and ability will accept very few, almost none. They may accept specialists in a science, art or craft they know little or nothing about, but even then with distrust. Ordinary people, by contrast, deeply respect specialists of every kind. They do not know that people who make their living from a subject love the income, not the subject. Nor do they know that teachers seldom know their subject thoroughly, since people who study it thoroughly usually have no time left to teach. The general public respects many authorities. If none quite fits, use one that seems to fit. Quote something said in a different sense or different circumstances. Authorities the opponent does not understand usually have the greatest effect. Uneducated people have a special respect for Greek and Latin phrases. If needed, you can distort authorities, falsify them, or even invent them yourself. The opponent usually has neither the book available nor the knowledge of how to use it. A fine example is the French parish priest who did not want to pave the street outside his house, as the other citizens had to. He quoted a biblical saying: “paveant illi, ego non pavebo”—“Let them be afraid; I will not be afraid.” This persuaded the local officials. Common prejudices can also serve as authorities. Most people think like Aristotle: “What many believe, we say is so.” I think this is in the Nicomachean Ethics. There is no opinion so absurd that people will not readily adopt it once persuaded that it is widely accepted. They follow examples in their thinking just as they do in their actions. They are sheep following the leading ram wherever he goes. Dying is easier for them than thinking. It is strange that an opinion's wide acceptance matters so much to them. They can see from themselves how people adopt opinions simply by following others, without judging at all. But they do not see it, because they have no self-knowledge. Only the exceptional few say with Plato, “The many have many opinions.” That means the crowd has many foolish ideas in its head, and anyone who tried to pay attention to all of them would have plenty to do.

Seriously considered, an opinion's wide acceptance proves nothing about whether it is right. It does not even make it more probable. People who think otherwise must assume 1) that distance in time removes its force as evidence. Otherwise they would have to bring back all the old errors once widely accepted as truths, such as the Ptolemaic system, or restore Catholicism in every Protestant country. 2) They must assume that distance in space does the same. Otherwise the wide acceptance of different beliefs among Buddhists, Christians and Muslims will cause them difficulties. (Following Bentham, Tactique des assemblées législatives, Vol 2, p 76.)

Look closely at what people call public opinion and it is the opinion of two or three people. Watching how a generally accepted opinion develops would convince us of this. Two or three people first adopt it, put it forward or assert it. Others kindly trust that they have examined it thoroughly. Assuming these people are capable enough, a few more adopt the opinion. Many others then believe these people. Laziness tells them to believe at once rather than do the hard work of checking first. The number of lazy, easily convinced followers grows each day. Once enough people support the opinion, later followers assume it could only have gained that support through strong reasons. The remaining people now have to accept the common belief. Otherwise they would be seen as troublemakers resisting accepted opinion, as arrogant fellows who think they know better than everyone else. Agreement becomes a duty. The few who can judge must now keep quiet. Those allowed to speak cannot form opinions or judgments of their own. They merely echo someone else's opinion, but defend it all the more eagerly and intolerantly. They hate dissenters less for their different beliefs than for daring to judge for themselves. They never try to do that themselves and secretly know it. In short, few people can think, but everyone wants opinions. So what can they do but take ready-made opinions from others instead of making their own? Given this, what are the voices of a hundred million people worth? About as much as a historical fact reported by a hundred historians when we discover that they all copied one another. Everything finally rests on one person's statement. (Following Bayle, Pensées sur les Comètes, Vol I, p 10.)

“I say it, you say it, and finally he said it too:After all this repeating, you see nothing but what was said.”

Even so, you can use public opinion as an authority when arguing with ordinary people.

When two ordinary minds argue, they usually choose authorities as their shared weapon and attack each other with them. A better mind dealing with someone like this should also use that weapon, choosing authorities that exploit the opponent's weaknesses. Against the weapon of reasons the opponent is, by assumption, a Siegfried with horn-like armor, dipped in the flood of his inability to think and judge.

In court, arguments actually rely only on authorities: the established authority of the laws. Judgment finds the law, the authority that applies to the particular case.¹ But dialectic still has plenty of room to work. If necessary, a case and a law that do not really fit can be twisted until people think they fit, and the reverse can happen too.

1 See Cogitata p 116 [in our edition, volumes VII and VIII].