Poetics

[Bekker 1447a][Bekker 1447a line 8]Let us discuss poetry itself and its kinds, the particular capacity each kind has, how plots should be constructed[Bekker 1447a line 10]if the poetry is to be successful, how many and what sorts of parts it consists of, and likewise all the other matters belonging to the same inquiry, beginning naturally with first principles.

Epic poetry, then, and the making of tragedy, as well as comedy, dithyrambic poetry, and most music for the flute and the lyre, all happen to be, taken as a whole, imitations.[Bekker 1447a line 15]But they differ from one another in three respects: they imitate either by different means, or different objects, or in a different manner and not in the same way.

For just as some people imitate many things by producing likenesses with colors and shapes—some[Bekker 1447a line 20]through skill and others through practice—while others do so through the voice, so too, in all the arts mentioned, imitation is produced through rhythm, language, and melody, these being used either separately or in combination.

For example, flute music and lyre music use melody and rhythm alone, as do any[Bekker 1447a line 25]other arts that happen to have the same capacity, such as the art of playing panpipes.

The art of dancers uses rhythm by itself, without melody, since dancers too imitate character, emotion, and action through rhythms formed into figures.

But the art that uses only plain language, and the one that uses metrical language, whether[Bekker 1447b][Bekker 1447b line 8]combining different meters with one another or using a single kind of meter, happen to have no name even now.

For we have no[Bekker 1447b line 10]common name to give to the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and the Socratic dialogues, nor to an imitation that someone might produce in trimeters, elegiac couplets, or any other such meters.

People do, however, attach the making to the meter and call some writers elegiac poets and others epic poets, naming them poets not[Bekker 1447b line 15]according to their imitation but collectively according to their meter.

For even if writers present a medical or scientific subject in meter, people customarily call them poets. Yet Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common except meter, so it is right to call the former a poet, but the latter a natural philosopher rather than[Bekker 1447b line 20]a poet.

Likewise, even if someone were to produce an imitation by combining every kind of meter, as Chaeremon did in his Centaur, a mixed rhapsody composed in every kind of meter, he should still be called a poet. Let these matters, then, be distinguished in this way.

There are also some arts that use all the[Bekker 1447b line 25]means mentioned—I mean rhythm, song, and meter—as do dithyrambic poetry, nome poetry, tragedy, and comedy. They differ, however, in that some use all these means simultaneously, while others use them at different times.

These, then, are what I call the differences among the arts in the means by which they produce imitation.

[Bekker 1448a][Bekker 1448a line 1]Since those who imitate imitate people in action, and since these people must be either admirable or inferior—for characters almost always conform to these two categories alone, since everyone differs in character through vice and virtue—they must be represented either as better than we are, or worse,[Bekker 1448a line 5]or just like us, as painters do.

Polygnotus portrayed people as better, Pauson as worse, and Dionysius as like us.

It is clear that each of the imitations mentioned will also have these differences and will be different by imitating different objects in this way.

For these dissimilarities can occur in dancing, flute playing, and[Bekker 1448a line 10]lyre playing, as well as in language and unaccompanied verse. Homer, for example, represents people as better than we are; Cleophon as like us; and Hegemon of Thasos, who was the first to compose parodies, and Nicochares, the author of the Deiliad, as worse.

The same is true of dithyrambs and[Bekker 1448a line 15]nomes, as one might imitate †earth† and Cyclopes, as Timotheus and Philoxenus did.

It is through this very difference that tragedy is distinguished from comedy: comedy aims to imitate people worse than those of the present day, while tragedy aims to imitate people better.

There is also a third difference among these arts: the manner in which someone might[Bekker 1448a line 20]imitate each of these objects.

For it is possible to imitate the same objects by the same means sometimes by narrating, either becoming someone else, as Homer does, or remaining oneself without changing, or by presenting all †the imitators† as acting and engaged in action.

Imitation, then, involves these three differences,[Bekker 1448a line 25]as we said at the beginning: the means, the objects, and the manner.

Thus, in one respect Sophocles would be the same kind of imitator as Homer, since both imitate admirable people, but in another respect he would be the same kind as Aristophanes, since both imitate people acting and doing things. This is also why some say these works are called dramas: because they imitate people doing things.

For this reason,[Bekker 1448a line 30]the Dorians lay claim to both tragedy and comedy. Comedy is claimed by the Megarians—both those here, who say that it arose during their democracy, and those from Sicily, since the poet Epicharmus came from there and lived much earlier than Chionides and Magnes. Tragedy is also claimed by some[Bekker 1448a line 35]of the Dorians in the Peloponnese. They offer the words themselves as evidence.

They say that they call the outlying villages kōmai, while the Athenians call them dēmoi, implying that comic performers were called kōmōdoi not from kōmazein, “to revel,” but because, being excluded in disgrace from the city, they wandered from village to village.[Bekker 1448b][Bekker 1448b line 1]They also say that they use dran for “to do,” while the Athenians use prattein.

Let this, then, suffice concerning the differences in imitation, both how many there are and what they are.

Two causes appear to have given rise to poetry as a whole,[Bekker 1448b line 5]and both are natural.

First, imitation is natural to human beings from childhood, and in this respect they differ from the other animals: a human being is the most imitative of animals and acquires the first lessons through imitation. Second, everyone takes pleasure in imitations.

Evidence for this is what happens[Bekker 1448b line 10]with works of art. We take pleasure in looking at the most exact images of things that are painful for us to look at in themselves, such as the forms of the most repulsive animals and of corpses.

The reason for this too is that learning is most pleasant not only for philosophers but equally for everyone else, though they share in it only to a limited[Bekker 1448b line 15]extent.

This is why people take pleasure in looking at images: as they view them, they happen to learn and reason out what each thing is—for example, “That person is this one.”

For if someone has not happened to see the subject before, the image will give pleasure not as an imitation but because of its workmanship, its color, or some other cause of that sort.

[Bekker 1448b line 20]Since imitation, melody, and rhythm are natural to us—and it is clear that meters are parts of rhythms—those who were naturally most gifted in these things gradually developed them from the beginning and produced poetry out of improvisations.

Poetry then divided according to the poets’ own characters.[Bekker 1448b line 25]The more dignified imitated noble actions and the actions of noble people, while the less elevated imitated the actions of inferior people, at first composing invectives, just as the others composed hymns and encomiums.

We cannot name any such poem by anyone before Homer, though it is likely that there were many.

But beginning with Homer,[Bekker 1448b line 30]examples can be given, such as his Margites and other works of that kind. In these, the iambic meter also appeared because it was appropriate. This is why it is now called “iambic”: because in this meter people used to lampoon one another.

Thus, among the ancient poets, some became poets of heroic verse and others poets of iambic verse.

And just as Homer was the supreme poet of serious subjects[Bekker 1448b line 35]—for he alone not only composed well but also produced dramatic imitations—so too he was the first to indicate the form of comedy, dramatizing not invective but the ridiculous. For the Margites stands in the same relation to comedies as the Iliad[Bekker 1449a][Bekker 1449a line 1]and the Odyssey stand to tragedies.

Once tragedy and comedy had appeared, poets were drawn to one or the other kind of poetry according to their own natural disposition. Some became writers of comedy instead of iambic verse,[Bekker 1449a line 5]while others became producers of tragedy instead of epic poets, because these forms were greater and more honored than the earlier ones.

Whether tragedy has by now sufficiently developed all its forms or not, judged both in itself and in relation to theatrical performances, is another question.

At any rate, tragedy originated in improvisation,[Bekker 1449a line 10]as did comedy: tragedy from those who led off the dithyramb, and comedy from those who led the phallic songs, which even now remain customary in many cities. Tragedy then grew little by little, as poets developed whatever aspect of it had become apparent.

After undergoing many changes,[Bekker 1449a line 15]tragedy ceased changing once it had attained its own nature.

Aeschylus was the first to increase the number of actors from one to two; he reduced the role of the chorus and made spoken dialogue take the leading role. Sophocles introduced three actors and scene painting.

There was also the matter of scale. Developing from short plots and[Bekker 1449a line 20]ridiculous language, because it had evolved out of the satyric form, tragedy acquired dignity only at a late stage, and its meter changed from the tetrameter to the iambic meter.

At first poets used the tetrameter because the poetry was satyric and more suited to dancing. But once speech was introduced, its own nature discovered the meter appropriate to it, since the iambic is the most[Bekker 1449a line 25]conversational of the meters. Evidence for this is that in conversation with one another we speak iambic rhythms most often, but hexameters only rarely and only when departing from the natural rhythm of speech.

There was also the increase in the number of episodes. As for the other features and the way each is said to have been embellished,[Bekker 1449a line 30]let what has been said suffice, since it would perhaps be a great task to go through every detail.

Comedy is, as we have said, an imitation of people who are inferior, though not in every kind of vice; rather, the ridiculous is one part of the ugly.For the ridiculous is[Bekker 1449a line 35]a kind of error and ugliness that is painless and not destructive, as, for example, a comic mask is something ugly and distorted without causing pain.The developments of tragedy, then, and those through whom they came about have not been forgotten, but comedy, because it was not[Bekker 1449b][Bekker 1449b line 1]taken seriously from the beginning, went unnoticed; for it was only at a late date that the archon granted a chorus to comic poets, and before that the performers were volunteers.Once comedy had already acquired certain forms of its own, those called its poets are remembered. But who introduced masks, prologues, or[Bekker 1449b line 5]a plurality of actors, and other such things, is unknown.The making of plots originally came from Sicily,while among the Athenians Crates was the first to abandon the iambic form and begin composing speeches and plots of a general kind.Epic poetry, then, followed tragedy insofar as it is an imitation of serious subjects[Bekker 1449b line 10]in metrical language; but they differ in that epic uses a single meter and is narrative.They also differ in length: tragedy tries as far as possible to fit within a single circuit of the sun, or to exceed it only slightly, whereas epic poetry is unlimited in time, and differs in this respect,although[Bekker 1449b line 15]at first poets did this in the same way in tragedies as in epics.Some of their parts are the same, while others are peculiar to tragedy.Therefore, anyone who knows what makes a good or bad tragedy also knows about epics; for everything epic poetry has belongs to tragedy, but not everything belonging to tragedy is found in[Bekker 1449b line 20]epic poetry.

We will speak later about the imitative art that uses hexameters and about comedy. Let us now speak about tragedy, taking up from what has been said the definition that emerges of its essential nature.Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious,[Bekker 1449b line 25]complete, and of a certain magnitude, in language embellished with each kind of embellishment used separately in the different parts, performed by people acting and not through narration, accomplishing through pity and fear the purification of such emotions.By “embellished language” I mean language possessing rhythm and melody,and by “each kind used[Bekker 1449b line 30]separately” I mean that some parts are carried out through meter alone and others, in turn, through song.Since the imitation is performed by people acting, the arrangement of the spectacle must first of all be one part of tragedy; next come song and diction, since these are the means through which the imitation is performed.By “diction” I mean the actual composition of the[Bekker 1449b line 35]metrical language, while the meaning of “song” is entirely evident.And since tragedy is an imitation of an action, and an action is performed by certain agents, who must necessarily be people of a certain kind in both character and thought—for it is through these that we also say[Bekker 1450a][Bekker 1450a line 1]actions are of a certain kind, and it is according to these that everyone succeeds or fails—the imitation of the action is the plot, for by “plot” I mean the[Bekker 1450a line 5]organization of the events; “characters” are that according to which we say the agents are people of a certain kind; and “thought” is found in all the things they say when they prove something or express a judgment—every tragedy must therefore have six parts, according to which the tragedy is of a certain quality. These are plot, character, diction,[Bekker 1450a line 10]thought, spectacle, and song.The means by which they imitate comprise two parts, the manner in which they imitate one, and the objects they imitate three; beyond these there is nothing.With these forms, then, † not a few of them †, so to speak, have been used; for † everything has spectacle †, as well as character, plot, diction, song, and thought.[Bekker 1450a line 15]The greatest of these is the organization of the events. For tragedy is an imitation not of human beings but of actions and life[Bekker 1450a line 20].The agents therefore do not act in order to imitate characters; rather, they include character for the sake of the actions. Consequently, the events and the plot are the end of tragedy, and the end is the most important thing of all.Moreover, there could be no tragedy without action, but there could be one without character.[Bekker 1450a line 25]For most modern tragedies are without character, and in general many poets are like this, just as among painters Zeuxis stands in relation to Polygnotus: Polygnotus is a good painter of character, while the painting of Zeuxis has no character at all.Furthermore, if someone sets out in succession speeches expressive of character and well made in[Bekker 1450a line 30]diction and thought, he will not produce what was the function of tragedy. A tragedy that uses these elements less well but has a plot and an organization of events will accomplish that function much more fully.In addition, the most powerful means by which tragedy moves the soul are parts of the plot: reversals and[Bekker 1450a line 35]recognitions.Further evidence is that those attempting to compose tragedies become capable of achieving precision in diction and character before they can organize the events, as was true of almost all the earliest poets.The plot, then, is the first principle and, as it were, the soul of tragedy; character comes second(for the same is also true[Bekker 1450b][Bekker 1450b line 1]in painting: if someone were to smear on the most beautiful colors at random, he would not give as much pleasure as if he had drawn an image in outline).Tragedy is an imitation of an action, and chiefly for the sake of the action it is also an imitation of the agents.Thought comes third. This[Bekker 1450b line 5]is the ability to say what is possible and appropriate, which, in speeches, is the function of political and rhetorical art.The ancient poets made their characters speak politically, but poets now make them speak rhetorically.Character is that which reveals choice—what sort of choice it is;[Bekker 1450b line 10]therefore speeches in[Bekker 1450b line 10a]which the speaker does not choose or avoid anything at all possess no character—while thought is present in statements in which speakers prove that something is or is not the case, or express some general judgment.Fourth among † the parts of speech † is diction. By “diction,” as was said earlier, I mean expression through the use of words, which has the same function both in metrical language and[Bekker 1450b line 15]in prose.Of the remaining parts, song is the greatest of the embellishments.Spectacle is emotionally compelling, but it is the least artistic and the least proper to the art of poetry; for the power of tragedy exists even without a performance and actors, and, moreover, the art of the stage designer is more authoritative than that of the poets in producing[Bekker 1450b line 20]the visual effects.

Now that these matters have been defined, let us next discuss what sort of organization the events should have, since this is both the first and the greatest part of tragedy.We have established that tragedy is an imitation of a complete and whole action[Bekker 1450b line 25]possessing a certain magnitude, since something can be whole without possessing any magnitude.A whole is that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end.A beginning is that which does not itself necessarily come after something else, but after which something else naturally is or comes to be.An end, by contrast, is that which itself naturally comes after something else,[Bekker 1450b line 30]either necessarily or for the most part, but after which there is nothing else.A middle is that which itself comes after something else and has something else after it.Well-organized plots, therefore, must neither begin at a random point nor end at a random point, but must use the forms just described.Moreover, since a beautiful thing—whether an animal or any[Bekker 1450b line 35]object composed of parts—must not only have those parts arranged in order but must also possess a magnitude that is not arbitrary, for beauty consists in magnitude and order,neither could an extremely small animal be beautiful, since our perception of it becomes confused because it occurs in an interval of time that is nearly imperceptible, nor could an extremely large one be beautiful, since[Bekker 1451a][Bekker 1451a line 1]our perception of it does not occur all at once, and its unity and wholeness escape the observers’ view—as, for example, if there were an animal ten thousand stades long.Thus, just as bodies and animals must possess magnitude, but a magnitude that can easily be taken in as a whole, so[Bekker 1451a line 5]plots too must possess length, but a length that can easily be remembered.The limit of length in relation to dramatic competitions and the audience’s perception does not belong to the art itself; for if a hundred tragedies had to compete, they would compete against water clocks, † as they say happened once on another occasion †.But the limit determined by the very nature[Bekker 1451a line 10]of the action is this: a greater length is always more beautiful in respect to magnitude, so long as the whole remains clear. To give a simple definition, a sufficient limit of magnitude is the length within which, as events follow one another according to probability or necessity, a change can occur from misfortune to good fortune or from good fortune to misfortune.[Bekker 1451a line 15]

A plot is not unified, as some people think, merely because it concerns one person. Many indeed infinitely many things happen to one person, and some of them do not constitute any unity. In the same way, one person performs many actions from which no single action results.Therefore, all those poets seem[Bekker 1451a line 20]to have gone wrong who have composed a Heracleid, a Theseid, and similar poems. They suppose that, because Heracles was one person, the plot too should appropriately be one.But Homer, just as he excels in other respects, also seems to have understood this point correctly, whether through art or natural talent. For in composing the Odyssey,[Bekker 1451a line 25]he did not include everything that happened to Odysseus—for example, his being wounded on Parnassus and his pretending to be insane at the muster—since, when either one happened, it was neither necessary nor probable that the other should happen. Instead, he organized the Odyssey around one action of the kind we are describing, and likewise the Iliad.[Bekker 1451a line 30]Therefore, just as in the other imitative arts a single imitation is an imitation of one thing, so too the plot, since it is an imitation of an action, must be the imitation of one action, and that a whole one. Its component events must be organized in such a way that, if any part is moved or removed, the whole is disrupted and disturbed; for something whose presence[Bekker 1451a line 35]or absence makes no perceptible difference is no part of the whole.

It is also clear from what has been said that the poet’s task is not to tell what has happened, but what might happen and what is possible according to probability or necessity.For the[Bekker 1451b][Bekker 1451b line 1]historian and the poet differ not in speaking in verse or without verse—for Herodotus’s work could be put into verse, and it would be no less a kind of history in verse than without verse—but in this: the one tells what has happened[Bekker 1451b line 5]and the other what might happen.For this reason poetry is more philosophical and more serious than history; for poetry speaks more of universals, while history speaks of particulars.A universal is the kind of thing that a certain kind of person will probably or necessarily say or do, which[Bekker 1451b line 10]poetry aims at even when it assigns names; a particular is what Alcibiades did or what happened to him.In comedy this has by now become clear: the poets construct the plot through probable events and then assign whatever names occur to them, rather than composing about a particular person[Bekker 1451b line 15]as the iambic poets do.In tragedy, however, they keep to names that have actually existed. The reason is that what is possible is credible. We do not yet believe that things which have not happened are possible, whereas it is clear that things which have happened are possible, since they would not have happened if they were impossible.Nevertheless, even among tragedies, in some there are one[Bekker 1451b line 20]or two familiar names and the others are invented, while in some there are none, as in Agathon’s Antheus; for in that play both the events and the names are invented, and it gives no less pleasure.Therefore one should not insist in every case on keeping to the traditional stories on which tragedies[Bekker 1451b line 25]are based. Indeed, it is ridiculous to insist on this, since even familiar stories are familiar to only a few, yet they nevertheless give pleasure to everyone.It is clear from this, then, that the poet must be a maker of plots rather than of verses, insofar as he is a poet by virtue of imitation, and what he imitates is actions.And even if he happens[Bekker 1451b line 30]to compose about things that have happened, he is no less a poet; for nothing prevents some things that have happened from being such as might probably happen, and insofar as they are such, he is their poet.Of simple plots and actions, the episodic ones are the worst. By an episodic plot I mean one in which the[Bekker 1451b line 35]episodes follow one another with neither probability nor necessity.Such plots are made by bad poets because of their own shortcomings, and by good poets because of the actors; for when they compose competition pieces and stretch the plot beyond its capacity,[Bekker 1452a][Bekker 1452a line 1]they are often forced to distort the sequence of events.Since imitation is not[Bekker 1452a line 2]only of a complete action but also of things that arouse fear and pity, and these arise especially when events occur contrary to expectation but because of one another,the[Bekker 1452a line 5]astonishing will be greater in this way than if the events occur spontaneously or by chance. For even among chance events, those seem most astonishing that appear to have happened as if by design. For example, the statue of Mitys at Argos killed the man responsible for Mitys’s death by falling on him while he was watching it; for events of this kind[Bekker 1452a line 10]do not seem to happen at random.It follows that plots of this kind must be finer.

Some plots are simple and others complex, since the actions of which plots are imitations are themselves naturally of these kinds.By a simple action I mean one in which,[Bekker 1452a line 15]as previously defined, the action is continuous and unified, and the change occurs without reversal or recognition;by a complex action I mean one in which the change occurs with recognition or reversal or both.These must arise from the structure of the plot itself, so that, as a result of what has happened before,[Bekker 1452a line 20]they occur either by necessity or according to probability; for there is a great difference between one event happening because of another and one event merely happening after another.

A reversal is a change by which the action turns into its opposite, as has been stated, and this too, as we say, must occur according to probability or necessity.For example, in the[Bekker 1452a line 25]Oedipus, the messenger comes intending to cheer Oedipus and free him from his fear concerning his mother, but by revealing who Oedipus was, he produces the opposite result.And in the Lynceus, Lynceus is being led away to die, while Danaus follows intending to kill him; but as a result of what has happened, Danaus dies and Lynceus is saved.Recognition[Bekker 1452a line 30]is, as the name itself indicates, a change from ignorance to knowledge, leading either to friendship or to enmity among people destined for good or bad fortune.The finest recognition is one that occurs together with a reversal, as does the recognition in the Oedipus.There are, then, other kinds of recognition as well. Recognition can occur even in relation to inanimate and[Bekker 1452a line 35]chance things, † as has been stated †, and it is also possible to recognize whether someone has or has not done something.But the recognition most integral to the plot and most integral to the action is the one just described; for a recognition and reversal of this kind will produce either pity[Bekker 1452b][Bekker 1452b line 1]or fear—the kinds of actions of which tragedy is assumed to be an imitation—since both bad fortune and good fortune will arise from such events.Since recognition is recognition between certain people, some recognitions involve only one person recognizing the other, when it is already clear who the other person[Bekker 1452b line 5]is; but sometimes both must recognize each other. For example, Iphigenia was recognized by Orestes through her sending of the letter, but another recognition was needed for Orestes to be recognized by Iphigenia.Two parts of the plot, then, are these: reversal[Bekker 1452b line 10]and recognition. A third is suffering. Reversal and recognition have now been discussed.Suffering is a destructive or painful action, such as deaths in full view, extreme agonies, woundings, and things of that kind.

We previously stated the parts of tragedy that must be used as its kinds[Bekker 1452b line 15]of elements. In terms of quantity, however, and the separate sections into which tragedy is divided, they are these: prologue, episode, exode, and choral part;the choral part is divided into parodos and stasimon.These are common to all tragedies, while songs from the stage and laments shared by the chorus and actors are distinctive features.The prologue is a complete part of a tragedy preceding the chorus’s[Bekker 1452b line 20]parodos.An episode is a complete part of a tragedy between complete choral songs.The exode is a complete part of a tragedy after which there is no choral song.Of the choral part, the parodos is the chorus’s first complete utterance.The stasimon is a choral song without anapests or trochees.A kommos is a lament shared by the chorus and those on the[Bekker 1452b line 25]stage.We previously stated the parts of tragedy that must be used as its kinds of elements; in terms of quantity, however, and the separate sections into which tragedy is divided, these are its parts.

What one should aim at and what one should avoid in constructing plots, and from what source tragedy will achieve its effect,[Bekker 1452b line 30]would be the next subject to discuss after what has now been said.Since, then, the structure of the finest tragedy must be not simple but complex, and since it must imitate fearful and pitiable events—for this is distinctive of this kind of imitation—it is clear, first, that decent men should not be shown[Bekker 1452b line 35]changing from good fortune to bad fortune, since this is neither fearful nor pitiable but morally repulsive;nor should wicked men change from bad fortune to good fortune, since this is the most untragic of all outcomes, for it has none of the qualities required: it is neither morally satisfying[Bekker 1453a][Bekker 1453a line 1]nor pitiable nor fearful;nor, again, should an extremely evil man fall from good fortune into bad fortune. Such a structure might indeed satisfy our moral sense, but it would arouse neither pity nor fear, since pity concerns someone who suffers undeservedly, while fear concerns someone like ourselves:[Bekker 1453a line 5]pity concerns the undeserving sufferer, and fear concerns someone like ourselves. Consequently, what happens will be neither pitiable nor fearful.The person between these extremes therefore remains. Such a person is one who is not outstanding in virtue and justice, and whose change to bad fortune is caused not by vice and wickedness but by[Bekker 1453a line 10]some error; he is one of those who enjoy great reputation and prosperity, such as Oedipus, Thyestes, and distinguished men from families of that kind.A well-constructed plot must therefore be single rather than double, as some say, and must involve a change not from bad fortune to good fortune but, on the contrary,[Bekker 1453a line 15]from good fortune to bad fortune, caused not by wickedness but by a great error on the part of someone of the kind described, or someone better rather than worse.What actually happens is evidence of this. At first, poets used to recount whatever plots came to hand, but now the finest tragedies are composed about a few families, such as[Bekker 1453a line 20]those of Alcmaeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus, and all the others who happened either to suffer terrible things or to do them.The finest tragedy according to the principles of the art, then, comes from this kind of structure.That is why those who criticize Euripides because he does this[Bekker 1453a line 25]in his tragedies and because many of them end in bad fortune make the same mistake. For this, as has been said, is correct.The strongest evidence is that, on the stage and in dramatic competitions, tragedies of this kind, if successfully executed, appear the most tragic; and Euripides, even if he does not manage other matters well, nevertheless[Bekker 1453a line 30]appears to be the most tragic of the poets.Second best is the structure that some call the best: one that has a double structure, like the Odyssey, and ends in opposite ways for the better and the worse characters.It is thought to be the best because of the weakness of theater audiences, for poets follow the spectators[Bekker 1453a line 35]and compose according to their wishes.But this is not the pleasure proper to tragedy; it belongs more properly to comedy. There, those who are the bitterest enemies in the plot, such as Orestes and Aegisthus, leave at the end after becoming friends, and no one is killed by anyone.

[Bekker 1453b][Bekker 1453b line 1]The fearful and the pitiable can arise from the spectacle, but they can also arise from the very structure of the events, which is preferable and the mark of a better poet.For the plot should be so constructed that, even without seeing the action, a person who[Bekker 1453b line 5]hears the events taking place will shudder and feel pity because of what happens, as someone would when hearing the plot of Oedipus.To produce this effect through the spectacle is less artistic and requires theatrical resources.Those who use spectacle to produce not[Bekker 1453b line 9]the fearful but only the monstrous[Bekker 1453b line 10]have nothing in common with tragedy. For one should not seek every kind of pleasure from tragedy, but only the pleasure proper to it.Since the poet must produce through imitation the pleasure that comes from pity and fear, it is clear that this must be built into the events.Let us therefore determine what kinds of occurrences appear[Bekker 1453b line 15]terrible or pitiable. Such actions must necessarily take place between friends, between enemies, or between people who are neither.If an enemy acts against an enemy, there is nothing pitiable either in what he does or in what he intends to do, except in the suffering itself;nor is there if the people are neither friends nor enemies.But when these sufferings arise within close relationships,[Bekker 1453b line 20]as when a brother kills or intends to kill a brother, a son his father, a mother her son, or a son his mother, or does some other such thing, these are the situations one should seek.Now, one cannot undo the traditional plots—I mean, for example, that Clytemnestra was killed by Orestes and Eriphyle by Alcmaeon—[Bekker 1453b line 25]but the poet must invent for himself and make good use of the tradition. Let us explain more clearly what we mean by “good.”The action may happen in the way the early poets represented it, with the characters acting knowingly and with full awareness, just as Euripides represented Medea killing her children.Or they may[Bekker 1453b line 30]commit the deed but commit the terrible act in ignorance, and only afterward recognize the close relationship, as Sophocles’ Oedipus does. In that case the act lies outside the drama, but it may occur within the tragedy itself, as in Astydamas’ Alcmaeon or in the Telegonus of The Wounded Odysseus.There is also a third possibility besides these:[Bekker 1453b line 35]someone who is about to commit an irreparable act in ignorance may recognize the victim before committing it.Apart from these, there is no other possibility. The deed must either be done or not done, and the characters must either know or not know.Of these possibilities, the worst is for someone knowingly to intend the deed but not perform it. This is morally repulsive and not tragic, since no suffering occurs. That is why no one[Bekker 1454a][Bekker 1454a line 1]writes such a situation, except rarely, as in Antigone, where Haemon intends to kill Creon.The second possibility is to perform the deed knowingly.Better is to perform it in ignorance and then recognize the victim afterward, for the act is not morally repulsive, and the recognition is astonishing.The best possibility[Bekker 1454a line 5]is the last one. I mean, for example, that in Cresphontes Merope is about to kill her son, but does not kill him and instead recognizes him; in Iphigenia the sister is about to kill her brother; and in Helle the son, when about to surrender his mother, recognizes her.This is why, as was said earlier, tragedies concern only a small number[Bekker 1454a line 10]of families. For poets discovered how to produce such effects in their plots not by art but by chance, through searching; they are therefore compelled to turn to those families in which sufferings of this kind happened.Enough, then, has been said about the structure of events and about what kinds of plots there should be.[Bekker 1454a line 15]

As for character, there are four things at which one should aim. The first and foremost is that the characters be good.A work will have character if, as has been said, the speech or action makes some choice evident, whatever that choice may be; and it will have good character if[Bekker 1454a line 20]the choice is good.Goodness is possible in every class of person. A woman can be good, and so can a slave, although perhaps the former is inferior and the latter wholly insignificant.The second thing is appropriateness. A character may be courageous, but it is not appropriate for a woman to be courageous or formidable in this way.The third is likeness. This is different[Bekker 1454a line 25]from making the character good and appropriate, as previously stated.The fourth is consistency. Even if the person who provides the subject for the imitation is inconsistent and such a character is assumed, he must nevertheless be consistently inconsistent.An example of unnecessary badness of character is Menelaus in Orestes;of what is unsuitable and inappropriate, Odysseus’s lament in Scylla and Melanippe’s speech;[Bekker 1454a line 30]and of inconsistency, Iphigenia at Aulis, for the Iphigenia who begs for her life bears no resemblance to the later Iphigenia.In character, just as in the structure of events, one must always seek either necessity or probability,[Bekker 1454a line 35]so that it is either necessary or probable for a person of a certain kind to say or do things of a certain kind, and either necessary or probable that this event should happen after that one.It is therefore clear that the resolutions of plots must also arise from the plot itself,[Bekker 1454b][Bekker 1454b line 1]and not from a stage machine, as in Medea and in the episode concerning the departure by sea in the Iliad.The machine should instead be used for matters outside the drama: either events that happened beforehand and that a human being could not know, or later events[Bekker 1454b line 5]that require prediction and announcement, since we grant to the gods the ability to see everything.There should be nothing irrational in the events; but if there is, it should lie outside the tragedy, as does the irrational element in Sophocles’ Oedipus.Since tragedy is an imitation of people better than ourselves, poets should imitate good[Bekker 1454b line 10]portrait painters. For those painters, while reproducing a person’s distinctive form and making the portrait resemble him, paint him more beautiful. In the same way, when the poet imitates people who are irascible, easygoing, or possess other such traits of character, he must make them, while retaining those traits, decent—† an example of harshness, such as Achilles, good, and Homer †.[Bekker 1454b line 15]These principles, then, must be observed, and in addition the matters contrary to the perceptions that necessarily accompany the poetic art, since errors can often be made in these matters too. Enough has been said about them in the published discussions.

What recognition is has been stated earlier. As for the kinds[Bekker 1454b line 20]of recognition, the first is the least artistic and the one poets use most often through lack of resources: recognition by signs.Some of these signs are congenital, such as the spearhead that the Earthborn bearor stars like those Carcinus uses in Thyestes; others are acquired, and of these some are on the body, such as scars, while others are external, such as[Bekker 1454b line 25]necklaces and, in Tyro, the recognition by means of the little boat.These signs too can be used either better or worse. Odysseus, for example, is recognized by his scar in one way by his nurse and in another by the swineherds.Recognitions introduced merely to establish identity are less artistic, as are all recognitions of this kind; but those that arise from a reversal, such as[Bekker 1454b line 30]the recognition in The Washing, are better.The second kind consists of recognitions invented by the poet, and for that reason they are inartistic. For example, in Iphigenia Orestes reveals that he is Orestes: she is recognized through the letter, while he himself says what the poet, rather than[Bekker 1454b line 35]the plot, wants him to say.This is therefore close to the error just mentioned, since he could have brought some tokens as well. Another example is the voice of the shuttle in Sophocles’ Tereus.The third kind is recognition through memory, when someone perceives[Bekker 1455a][Bekker 1455a line 1]something upon seeing it, as in Dicaeogenes’ Cyprians, where the man wept when he saw the painting, and in Odysseus’s narrative to Alcinous, where he shed tears when he heard the lyre player and remembered; and by these reactions they were recognized.The fourth kind is recognition by inference, as in The Libation Bearers:[Bekker 1455a line 5]“Someone resembling me has arrived; no one resembles me except Orestes; therefore Orestes has arrived.” Another is the recognition concerning Iphigenia proposed by the sophist Polyidus, for he said that it was probable that Orestes would infer that his sister had been sacrificed and that it was now happening to him to be sacrificed as well. Another occurs in Theodectes’ Tydeus: having come in the belief that he would find his son, he himself[Bekker 1455a line 10]perishes. Another is the recognition in The Daughters of Phineus: when they saw the place, they inferred their fate, namely that they were destined to die there, since they had also been exposed there as infants.There is also a kind compounded from the audience’s false inference, as in Odysseus the[Bekker 1455a line 14]False Messenger. The fact that he could string the bow while no one else[Bekker 1455a line 14a]could was invented by the poet and made a premise,[Bekker 1455a line 14b]even if he said that he would recognize the bow, which he had not[Bekker 1455a line 15]seen; but to arrange matters as though he would be recognized by that means is a false inference.The best recognition of all is the one that arises from the events themselves, when the astonishment comes about through probable events, as in Sophocles’ Oedipus and in Iphigenia, for it is probable that she would want to entrust a letter. Such recognitions[Bekker 1455a line 20]alone occur without invented signs and necklaces.Second best are recognitions by inference.

In constructing plots and working them out in language, the poet should place them before his eyes as vividly as possible. In this way, seeing everything with the utmost clarity, as though he were present at the events[Bekker 1455a line 25]themselves, he will discover what is appropriate, and contradictions will be least likely to escape him.Evidence of this is the fault for which Carcinus was criticized. His Amphiaraus was returning from a temple, something that escaped the poet because he did not visualize it, but the play failed on the stage when the spectators took offense at it.As far as possible, the poet should also work out the action through gestures;[Bekker 1455a line 30]for, given the same natural disposition, those actually experiencing the emotions are the most convincing: the person in distress shows distress, and the angry person displays anger, most truthfully.That is why poetry requires either a naturally gifted or a mad person: the former are readily adaptable, while the latter are capable of ecstasy.As for stories, both those already composed and those the poet is composing himself, he should first set them out[Bekker 1455b][Bekker 1455b line 1]in general outline, and only then introduce episodes and expand them.What I mean by viewing the general outline can be illustrated by the story of Iphigenia. A certain girl was offered in sacrifice and vanished without her sacrificers knowing how; she was established in another country, where[Bekker 1455b line 5]it was customary to sacrifice foreigners to the goddess, and she received this priesthood. Some time later, it happened that the priestess’s brother came there. The fact that the god’s oracle commanded him to go there, and the purpose for which it did so, lie outside the plot. But after arriving and being seized, when he was about to be sacrificed, he disclosed his identity, whether in the way Euripides represented it or in the way Polyidus did, saying, as was probable,[Bekker 1455b line 10]that it was apparently necessary not only for his sister but also for him to be sacrificed; and from this comes his rescue.After this, once the characters have been given names, the poet should introduce the episodes.He must make sure that the episodes are appropriate, as in the case of Orestes: the madness through which he was captured and[Bekker 1455b line 15]his rescue through purification.In dramas, then, the episodes are brief, but epic is lengthened by them.The story of the Odyssey is not long: a man is away from home for many years, constantly watched by Poseidon, and completely alone; moreover, affairs at home are in such a state that[Bekker 1455b line 20]his property is being consumed by suitors and his son is being plotted against. He himself arrives home after suffering through storms, reveals his identity to certain people, and launches an attack. He is saved, and he destroys his enemies.This, then, is the essential story; everything else is episode.

Every tragedy has one part that is complication and another that is resolution.[Bekker 1455b line 25]The events outside the play, together with some of those within it, often constitute the complication, and the remainder constitutes the resolution.By complication I mean everything from the beginning up to the last part from which the change to good fortune or bad fortune begins; by resolution I mean everything from the beginning of that change to the end.Thus, in Theodectes’ Lynceus,[Bekker 1455b line 30]the complication consists of the preceding events, the seizure of the child, and then the seizure of the parents themselves; the resolution extends from the accusation of murder to the end.There are four kinds of tragedy, since the same number of constituent parts has also been stated:the complex tragedy, whose whole consists of reversal and recognition;the tragedy of suffering, such as the[Bekker 1456a][Bekker 1456a line 1]plays about Ajax and Ixion;the tragedy of character, such as The Women of Phthia and Peleus;and the fourth, †spectacular†, such as The Daughters of Phorcys, Prometheus, and all plays set in Hades.Ideally, the poet should try to include all these qualities; but if that is impossible, he should include the most important and as many as possible, especially[Bekker 1456a line 5]because of the way poets are now subjected to hostile criticism. Since excellent poets have arisen in each particular kind, critics expect a single poet to surpass each of them in the particular excellence that is his own.It is also right to call one tragedy different from or the same as another on no basis so much as its plot—that is, when they have the same complication and resolution.Many poets construct the complication well[Bekker 1456a line 10]but resolve it badly.Both, however, must always be mastered.One must remember what has often been said and not turn a tragedy into an epic structure—by an epic structure I mean one containing many stories—as someone would if he made the whole story of the Iliad into a tragedy.In the epic, because of its length, the parts acquire their appropriate magnitude; but[Bekker 1456a line 15]in dramas the result falls far short of expectation.The evidence is that those who have dramatized the entire sack of Troy, rather than treating it part by part as Euripides did, or the whole story of Niobe, rather than treating it as Aeschylus did, either fail outright or do badly in competition; even Agathon failed for this reason alone.But in reversals and in simple actions, poets achieve the effects they aim at with astonishing success;[Bekker 1456a line 20]for this is both tragic and satisfying to human feeling.This happens when a clever but wicked man is deceived, as Sisyphus was, or when a brave but unjust man is defeated.This is also probable, as Agathon says, since it is probable that many things should happen[Bekker 1456a line 25]contrary to probability.The chorus must also be regarded as one of the actors; it should be a part of the whole and participate in the action, not as in Euripides but as in Sophocles.In the other poets, the choral songs belong no more to the plot than to some other tragedy. That is why their choruses sing inserted songs, a practice of this kind first introduced[Bekker 1456a line 30]by Agathon. Yet what difference is there between singing inserted songs and fitting a speech from one play into another, or even an entire episode?

The other kinds have now been discussed; it remains to speak about language and thought.What concerns thought should be treated[Bekker 1456a line 35]in the work on rhetoric, since it belongs more properly to that field of inquiry.Thought includes everything that must be produced through speech.Its parts are demonstrating and refuting, arousing emotions—such as[Bekker 1456b][Bekker 1456b line 1]pity, fear, anger, and all emotions of that kind—and, in addition, producing impressions of greatness and smallness.It is clear that in the events themselves one must also use the same forms of thought whenever it is necessary to produce effects that are pitiable, terrible, great, or probable.The only difference[Bekker 1456b line 5]is that some things must appear without verbal explanation, while others must be produced in the speech by the speaker and arise as a result of the speech. For what would the speaker’s task be if the required effect appeared by itself and not through the speech?Of the matters concerning language, one field of study is the forms of expression,[Bekker 1456b line 10]knowledge of which belongs to the art of delivery and to anyone who possesses expert command of that art—for example, what a command is, what a prayer is, and what narration, threat, question, answer, and anything else of that sort are.Knowledge or ignorance of these things brings no criticism upon poetry that is worthy[Bekker 1456b line 15]of serious attention. For who could suppose there is an error in what Protagoras criticizes, when he says that, while intending to pray, Homer gives a command in the words, “Sing, goddess, of the wrath”?For telling someone to do or not to do something, he says, is a command.We may therefore leave this issue aside, since it belongs to another field of study and not to poetry.

[Bekker 1456b line 20]The parts of language as a whole are these: letter, syllable, conjunction, noun, verb, article, inflection, and statement.A letter is an indivisible sound—not every indivisible sound, but one from which a compound sound can naturally be formed. Animals also make indivisible sounds, none of which I call a letter.The divisions of the letter[Bekker 1456b line 25]are vowel, semivowel, and mute. A vowel is a letter that has an audible sound without contact of the speech organs; a semivowel is a letter that has an audible sound with such contact, such as S and R; and a mute is a letter that, with such contact, has no sound by itself, but becomes audible when combined[Bekker 1456b line 30]with letters that have some sound, such as G and D.These differ according to the shapes and positions of the mouth, aspiration and lack of aspiration, length and shortness, and also acute, grave, and intermediate pitch. The detailed study of these belongs to metrics.A syllable[Bekker 1456b line 35]is a compound sound without meaning, made up of a mute and a letter that has sound. Thus GR without A is †a syllable, and† so is GR with A, as in GRA. But the study of the differences among these also belongs to metrics.A conjunction is a sound without meaning that neither prevents nor produces a single meaningful sound naturally composed of several sounds, and that can be placed both at the ends and in the middle, though it is not fitting for it to stand by itself at the beginning of a statement—for example, “indeed,” “surely,” and “but.” Or it is a sound without meaning that, from several[Bekker 1457a][Bekker 1457a line 1]sounds, neither prevents nor produces a single meaningful sound naturally composed of them, and can be placed both at the ends and in the middle, though it is not fitting for it to stand by itself at the beginning of a statement—for example, “indeed,” “surely,” and “but.” Or it is a sound without meaning that naturally forms one meaningful sound out of several sounds,[Bekker 1457a line 5]each of which is meaningful.An article is a sound without meaning that indicates the beginning, end, or division of a statement—for example, “around,” “about,” and the others. Or it is a sound without meaning that neither prevents nor produces a single meaningful sound out of several sounds and that can naturally be placed[Bekker 1457a line 10]both at the ends and in the middle.A noun is a compound sound with meaning, without reference to time, no part of which has meaning by itself. In compound nouns, we do not use a part as though it also had meaning by itself; for example, in “Theodore,” the element “dore” has no meaning.A verb is a compound sound with meaning and with reference[Bekker 1457a line 15]to time, no part of which has meaning by itself, just as with nouns. For “man” or “white” does not indicate when, but “walks” and “has walked” additionally indicate time, the former the present and the latter the past.An inflection is a form of a noun or verb: one kind signifies “of this” or “to this”[Bekker 1457a line 20]and other such relations; another signifies one or many, as in “men” or “man”; and another corresponds to forms of delivery, such as a question or command. Thus “Did he walk?” and “Walk!” are inflections of a verb according to these forms.A statement is a compound sound with meaning, some parts of which have meaning by themselves.For not every statement is composed of verbs and nouns—the definition[Bekker 1457a line 25]of man, for example—but a statement can exist without verbs; nevertheless, it will always have some part that has meaning. In “Cleon walks,” for example, “Cleon” is such a part.A statement is one in two ways: either because it signifies one thing, or because several parts are joined by conjunction. Thus the Iliad is one[Bekker 1457a line 30]by conjunction, while the definition of man is one because it signifies one thing.

Of nouns, one kind is simple—and by simple I mean one that is not composed of meaningful parts, such as “earth”—and another is compound.Of the latter, one kind is composed of a meaningful and a meaningless part, though these parts are not meaningful and meaningless within the[Bekker 1457a line 33a]noun itself, while another is composed of meaningful parts.There may also be triple, quadruple, and[Bekker 1457a line 35]multiple nouns, like many of the Massaliot names,[Bekker 1457b][Bekker 1457b line 1]“Her-mocaico-xanthus”...Every noun is either ordinary, a foreign word, a metaphor, an ornament, a coined word, an extended word, a shortened word, or an altered word.By an ordinary word I mean one used by a particular people,and by a foreign word one used by another people. It is therefore clear that the same word can be both[Bekker 1457b line 5]foreign and ordinary, though not for the same people: “sigynon” is an ordinary word among the Cypriots, but a foreign word for us.A metaphor is the application of a word belonging to something else, either from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, or by analogy.By transfer from genus to[Bekker 1457b line 10]species I mean, for example, “Here stands my ship,” since lying at anchor is a kind of standing.From species to genus: “Indeed, Odysseus has done ten thousand noble deeds,” since ten thousand is a great number, and here the poet has used it in place of “many.”From species to species, for example, “drawing off his life with bronze” and “cutting with long-edged bronze.” Here[Bekker 1457b line 15]he has called drawing off “cutting” and cutting “drawing off,” since both are kinds of taking something away.By analogy I mean when the second stands in the same relation to the first as the fourth does to the third; the poet will then use the fourth in place of the second, or the second in place of the fourth.Sometimes they also add to the substituted word the term to which the replaced word[Bekker 1457b line 20]belongs. I mean, for example, that a cup stands in the same relation to Dionysus as a shield does to Ares. The poet will therefore call the cup “Dionysus’s shield” and the shield “Ares’s cup.”Or old age stands to life as evening stands to day. The poet will therefore call evening “the old age of day,” or, as[Bekker 1457b line 25]Empedocles does, old age “the evening of life” or “the sunset of life.”In some analogies, one of the corresponding terms has no established name, but the expression can nevertheless be formed in the same way. For example, casting seed is called sowing, but the sun’s casting of its flame has no name. Yet this action stands in the same relation to the sun as sowing does to seed, and so the phrase has been used, “sowing the god-created[Bekker 1457b line 30]flame.”This kind of metaphor can also be used in another way: after applying the alien term, one may deny one of the attributes proper to it.For example, one might call the shield not “Ares’s cup,” but “a wineless cup”...A coined word is one that has not been used at all by anyone else but is introduced by the poet himself. Some words seem to be of this kind, such as[Bekker 1457b line 35]“shoots” for horns and “prayer” for priest.An extended[Bekker 1458a][Bekker 1458a line 1]or shortened word is such that the former either uses a longer vowel than the word normally has or has a syllable inserted, while the latter has had something removed from it.Examples of extension are “polēos” for “poleōs” and “Pēlēïadeō” for “Pēleidou”; examples of shortening are[Bekker 1458a line 5]“kri” and “dō,” and “the appearance of both becomes one.”An altered word is one in which the poet retains one part of the word being named but invents another, as in “the rightward breast” instead of “the right breast.”Of nouns themselves, some are masculine, some feminine, and some intermediate.Masculine nouns are those ending in N, R, and S,[Bekker 1458a line 10]and in letters composed with S; there are two of these, PS and X. Feminine nouns are those ending in vowels that are always long,such as Ē and Ō, and, among vowels that can be lengthened, in A.It follows that masculine and feminine nouns end in an equal number of letters, since PS and X are compound letters.No noun ends in a mute consonant or in[Bekker 1458a line 15]a short vowel.Only three end in I: “meli,” “kommi,” and “peperi.” Five end in Y. Intermediate nouns end in these vowels and in N and S.

The excellence of diction is to be clear without being commonplace.Diction composed of ordinary words is certainly the clearest, but[Bekker 1458a line 20]it is commonplace; examples are the poetry of Cleophon and that of Sthenelus.Diction that uses unfamiliar words is elevated and departs from everyday usage. By unfamiliar words I mean foreign words, metaphor, extension, and everything that departs from the ordinary word.But if someone makes everything of this kind, the result will be either a riddle or[Bekker 1458a line 25]gibberish: if it is composed of metaphors, a riddle; if of foreign words, gibberish.For the essence of a riddle is to connect real things while saying what is impossible. This cannot be done by combining other kinds of words, but it can be done through metaphors, for example, “I saw a man welding bronze with fire[Bekker 1458a line 30]onto a man,” and similar expressions.Compositions made from foreign words are gibberish.Diction must therefore be blended with these elements in some way. The foreign word, metaphor, ornament, and the other kinds already mentioned[Bekker 1458a line 34]will prevent it from being everyday and commonplace, while the ordinary word will provide clarity.No small contribution[Bekker 1458b][Bekker 1458b line 1]to making diction clear without being everyday is made by extensions, shortenings, and alterations of words. Because a form differs from the ordinary word and departs from customary usage, it will keep the diction from being everyday; but because it[Bekker 1458b line 5]shares something with customary usage, it will be clear.Those who criticize this form of speech and ridicule the poet are therefore wrong. One example is the elder Euclides, who said that it would be easy to write poetry if one were allowed to lengthen words as much as one pleased, and who composed iambic lines in the diction itself: “I saw Epichares[Bekker 1458b line 10]walking to Marathon,” and “I would not, † having honored †, take his hellebore.”To appear to use this device deliberately is certainly ridiculous; but moderation is a requirement common to all the parts of diction.For someone who used metaphors, foreign words, and the other kinds inappropriately and deliberately for comic effect[Bekker 1458b line 15]would produce the same result.How great a difference appropriate usage makes can be seen in epic verse by substituting ordinary words into the meter.With foreign words, metaphors, and the other forms as well, anyone who substitutes the ordinary words can see that what we say is true. For example, Aeschylus and Euripides composed[Bekker 1458b line 20]the same iambic line, but Euripides changed just one word, substituting a foreign word for the customary ordinary one, so that one line appears beautiful and the other cheap. Aeschylus wrote in his Philoctetes, “An ulcer that eats the flesh of my foot,”but Euripides substituted “feasts on” for “eats.” And[Bekker 1458b line 25]“Now, being small and worthless and unsightly,”would become, if someone substituted the ordinary words, “Now, being little and weak and ugly.”And instead of “setting down an unseemly seat and a scanty table,”[Bekker 1458b line 30]“setting down a wretched seat and a little table.”And instead of “the shores resound,” “the shores cry out.”Ariphrades also ridiculed the tragedians because they use forms that no one would use in ordinary speech, such as “from the house away” rather than “away from the house,” “of you,” “and I him,” and[Bekker 1459a][Bekker 1459a line 1]“Achilles about” rather than “about Achilles,” and all other expressions of this kind.Because they are not among the ordinary forms, all such expressions keep diction from being everyday; but Ariphrades failed to understand this.It is important to use each of the kinds already mentioned[Bekker 1459a line 5]appropriately, including compound words and foreign words, but by far the greatest thing is to be skilled in metaphor.This alone cannot be learned from someone else, and it is a sign of natural talent, since to make metaphors well is to perceive similarities.Among nouns, compound words are especially appropriate to dithyrambs,[Bekker 1459a line 10]foreign words to heroic verse, and metaphors to iambic verse.In heroic verse all the kinds already mentioned are useful, but because iambic verse imitates speech as closely as possible, the appropriate nouns are those that one might also use in prose: the ordinary word, metaphor, and ornament.[Bekker 1459a line 15]Let what has been said suffice, then, concerning tragedy and imitation through action.

As for narrative imitation in meter, it is clear that the plots, just as in tragedies, must be constructed dramatically and around a single action that is whole and complete,[Bekker 1459a line 20]with a beginning, middle, and end, so that, like a single whole living creature, it may produce its proper pleasure.Their structures must not resemble histories, in which it is necessary to present not a single action but a single period of time—everything that happened during it to one or more people, each event related to the others only as chance determined.For just[Bekker 1459a line 25]as the naval battle at Salamis and the Carthaginians’ battle in Sicily occurred during the same period without contributing to the same end, so too, in successive periods, one event sometimes happens after another without any single end resulting from them.Yet nearly all poets[Bekker 1459a line 30]do this.Therefore, as we have already said, Homer may appear inspired in this respect also, in comparison with the others, because he did not attempt to make the entire war his subject, although it had a beginning and an end. The plot would have been excessively large and not readily grasped as a whole; or, if he had limited its scale, it would have been overly complicated by its variety.[Bekker 1459a line 35]Instead, he selected one part and used many of the other events as episodes, such as the Catalogue of Ships and other episodes with which he diversifies the poem.The other poets, however, write about one man,[Bekker 1459b][Bekker 1459b line 1]one period of time, and one action with many parts, as did the authors of the Cypria and the Little Iliad.Consequently, only one tragedy, or at most two, can be made from each of the Iliad and the Odyssey, but many can be made from the Cypria and from the Little[Bekker 1459b line 5]Iliad.

Furthermore, epic poetry must have the same kinds as tragedy: it must be either simple, complex, character-based, or[Bekker 1459b line 10]centered on suffering.Its parts also are the same, apart from song and spectacle, for it too requires reversals, recognitions, and scenes of suffering; furthermore, its thought and diction must be good.Homer was the first to use all these elements, and he used them adequately. Each of his poems is constructed accordingly: the Iliad is simple[Bekker 1459b line 15]and centered on suffering, while the Odyssey is complex—for recognition runs throughout it—and character-based. In addition, he has surpassed everyone in diction and thought.Epic poetry differs from tragedy in the length of its structure and in its meter.For length, the limit already stated is adequate: one must be able to take in the beginning[Bekker 1459b line 20]and the end together. This would be possible if epic structures were shorter than those of the ancient poets but extended to the length of the number of tragedies presented at a single performance.Epic poetry has a distinctive and considerable capacity for extending its length, because in tragedy it is impossible to imitate many parts of the action occurring[Bekker 1459b line 25]simultaneously, but only the part performed onstage by the actors; in epic poetry, however, because it is narrative, many parts can be represented as taking place simultaneously, and if they are relevant, they increase the poem’s bulk.Thus epic has this advantage in producing grandeur, varying the experience of the[Bekker 1459b line 30]listener, and introducing diverse episodes; for sameness quickly produces satiety and causes tragedies to fail.Experience has shown that the heroic meter is appropriate. If someone were to compose a narrative imitation in some other meter, or in several meters, it would clearly be inappropriate.For the heroic meter is the most stately and weighty[Bekker 1459b line 35]of the meters, which is why it admits foreign words and metaphors more readily than any other; narrative imitation is itself more elevated than the others.The iambic and the tetrameter,[Bekker 1460a][Bekker 1460a line 1]by contrast, are meters of movement: the latter is suited to dancing and the former to action.It would be still more out of place if someone mixed them, as Chaeremon did.That is why no one has composed a long structure in any meter other than the heroic. As we have said, nature itself teaches us to choose the meter appropriate to it.[Bekker 1460a line 5]Homer deserves praise for many other things, and especially because he alone among poets understands what the poet himself should do.The poet himself should say as little as possible, since it is not by speaking in his own person that he is an imitator. Other poets perform in their own person throughout and imitate only a few things, and only occasionally. Homer, after a brief[Bekker 1460a line 10]introduction, immediately brings in a man, a woman, or some other character, and no one without character, but always someone possessing character.The marvelous should certainly be produced in tragedies, but the irrational, which is the chief source of the marvelous, is more admissible in[Bekker 1460a line 13]epic poetry because the person acting is not visible.For the circumstances surrounding[Bekker 1460a line 15]the pursuit of Hector would appear ridiculous onstage: the others standing still and not joining the pursuit, while Achilles signals them not to; but in epic verse the absurdity passes unnoticed.The marvelous is pleasurable. The proof is that everyone adds to a story when recounting it, in the belief that this pleases the audience.Homer above all has taught the other poets how to tell falsehoods properly.[Bekker 1460a line 20]The method is a false inference. People suppose that when, if one thing exists or occurs, another exists or occurs, then if the later thing exists, the earlier thing must also exist or occur. But this is false. Therefore, if the first thing is false, but if it existed something else would necessarily exist or occur, the poet should add that second thing. Because we know that the second thing is true,[Bekker 1460a line 25]our minds falsely infer that the first is also true. An example is the episode from the Washing Scene.One should prefer probable impossibilities to implausible possibilities.Plots should not be constructed from irrational parts. Ideally, they should contain nothing irrational; but if they do, it should lie outside the action represented in the plot, as with Oedipus’s ignorance of how Laius died, and not within the drama, as with those who report the Pythian Games in the Electra, or the mute man who comes from Tegea to Mysia in the Mysians.[Bekker 1460a line 30]Thus it is ridiculous to say that otherwise the plot would be destroyed, since such plots should not be constructed in the first place. † But if the poet does introduce an irrationality, and it appears that it could occur with greater plausibility, then even an absurdity may be admitted. †For it would be[Bekker 1460a line 35]clear that the irrational circumstances surrounding Odysseus’s exposure in the Odyssey would not have been tolerable[Bekker 1460b][Bekker 1460b line 1]if an inferior poet had composed them. As it is, however, the poet uses his other excellences to conceal the absurdity by making it pleasurable.Diction should be worked out most carefully in the inactive portions that display neither character nor thought, since excessively brilliant[Bekker 1460b line 5]diction in turn obscures both character and thought.

As for problems and their solutions—how many kinds there are and what they are—the matter would become clear if considered in the following way.Since the poet is a maker of representations, just like a painter or any other maker of images, he must always represent one of the[Bekker 1460b line 10]three possibilities: either things as they were or are, things as people say and believe they are, or things as they ought to be.These things are expressed in language that includes rare words, metaphors, and many modifications of language;for we allow poets these devices. Besides this, correctness is not the same in politics and in poetry, or in any[Bekker 1460b line 15]other art and in poetry.Within poetry itself, error is of two kinds: one is intrinsic to it, and the other is incidental.For if the poet undertook the representation... but lacked the ability, the error belongs to poetry itself; but if the choice was incorrect—for example, representing a horse advancing both right legs at once—or if the error concerns some particular art,[Bekker 1460b line 20]such as medicine or any other art whatever, it is not intrinsic to poetry.Accordingly, criticisms raised in problems must be examined and resolved on the basis of these distinctions. First, those directed against the art itself: something impossible has been represented, and that is an error;but it is correct if it achieves the end of the art itself—for the[Bekker 1460b line 25]end has been stated—if in this way it makes either that part itself or some other part more astonishing. An example is the pursuit of Hector.If, however, the end could have been achieved better, or no less well, in accordance with the relevant art, then it is not correct; for wherever possible, there ought to be no error at all.Furthermore, to which class does the[Bekker 1460b line 30]error belong: errors against the art itself, or errors incidental to it because they concern something else? For it is a lesser error not to know that a female deer has no antlers than to represent one in an inimitable way.Besides these points, if something is criticized for not being true, the solution may be that it is perhaps as it ought to be, just as Sophocles said that he himself represented people as they ought to be, while Euripides represented them as they are. That is[Bekker 1460b line 35]how the problem should be resolved.But if it is neither as it ought to be nor as it is, the solution may be that this is what people say, as with stories about the gods;for perhaps it is neither better to speak of them in this way nor true, but perhaps the matter is[Bekker 1461a][Bekker 1461a line 1]as Xenophanes held; nevertheless, this is what people say.Other things are perhaps not better, but that was how they were—for example, what is said about the weapons: “their spears stood upright on their butt-spikes.” That was the custom then, just as it still is among the Illyrians.As for whether something has been said or done well or not well,[Bekker 1461a line 5]one must not consider only the deed or statement itself and ask whether it is good or bad. One must also consider the person acting or speaking, the person addressed, the time, the means, and the purpose—for example, whether it was done to bring about a greater good or to prevent a greater evil.Some problems must be resolved by looking at the[Bekker 1461a line 10]language. For example, a rare word may explain “the mules first”: perhaps he does not mean the mules but the guards. And concerning Dolon, “who was indeed bad in appearance,” he does not mean that his body was misshapen but that his face was ugly, since the Cretans use “well-formed” to mean “handsome-faced.” Likewise, “mix it[Bekker 1461a line 15]stronger” does not mean “undiluted,” as though for drunkards, but “faster.”Another expression is metaphorical. For example, “Now all the gods and men slept throughout the night,” though at the same time he says, “Indeed, whenever he looked out over the Trojan plain, he marveled at the noise of flutes and pipes.” Here “all” is used metaphorically instead of “many,”[Bekker 1461a line 20]since the whole is a kind of multitude. “She alone had no share” is also metaphorical, since what is best known is called the only one.Some problems are resolved by accentuation, as Hippias of Thasos resolved “we grant him the glory of attaining his prayer” and “one part of which does not rot in the rain.”Others are resolved by division, as in Empedocles: “At once mortal things grew that previously had learned to be immortal, and things previously unmixed were mixed.”[Bekker 1461a line 25]Others are resolved by ambiguity: “More of the night has passed,” since “more” is ambiguous.Others are resolved by customary usage. People call mixed wine “wine,” which gives rise to “a greave of newly wrought tin”; and they call those who work iron “bronzesmiths,” which gives rise to the statement that[Bekker 1461a line 30]Ganymede pours wine for Zeus, though the gods do not drink wine. This, however, might also be metaphorical.Whenever a word seems to signify a contradiction, one must examine how many meanings it could have in the passage. For example, in “there the bronze spear was stopped,” one must ask in how many ways “being stopped there” is possible:in this way or in that way, according to[Bekker 1461a line 35]the interpretation one would most naturally adopt—by taking the directly opposite meaning;or, as[Bekker 1461b][Bekker 1461b line 1]Glaucon says, some people first make an unreasonable assumption, then pass judgment on it themselves and draw conclusions from it; and they criticize the poet as though he had said what they merely think he said, if it conflicts with their own belief.This has happened in the case of Icarius. People suppose that he was a Spartan;[Bekker 1461b line 5]therefore they find it strange that Telemachus did not meet him when he went to Sparta. But perhaps the matter is as the Cephallenians say: they claim that Odysseus married among them and that the name was Icadius, not Icarius; and the problem is probably † due to an error †.In general, what is impossible must be referred either to the requirements of[Bekker 1461b line 10]poetry, to what is better, or to accepted belief.For the purposes of poetry, a convincing impossibility is preferable to something unconvincing but possible;... for people to be such as Zeuxis painted them, but it is better; for the model ought to surpass reality.As for things alleged to be irrational: they must be dealt with in this way, and also by pointing out that sometimes they are not irrational;[Bekker 1461b line 15]for it is likely that unlikely things will happen.Statements that appear contradictory must be examined in the same way as refutations in argument: whether the same thing is asserted, in relation to the same thing, and in the same sense. Accordingly, one must consider either what † he himself † says or what a sensible person would assume.Criticism for irrationality and badness is justified when, without any[Bekker 1461b line 20]necessity, the poet makes use of the irrational, as Euripides does with Aegeus, or of badness, as he does with the character of Menelaus in the Orestes.Criticisms, then, are made on the basis of five kinds of fault: things are called impossible, irrational, harmful, contradictory, or contrary to technical correctness. The solutions must be sought among the[Bekker 1461b line 25]distinctions already stated. There are twelve of them.

Someone might raise the question whether epic representation or tragic representation is superior.For if the less vulgar art is superior, and such an art is always addressed to a superior audience, it is perfectly clear that the art that represents everything through gesture is vulgar;for the performers act as though the audience would not understand unless they themselves added something, and so they make exaggerated movements,[Bekker 1461b line 30]like bad flute players who roll around when they have to represent a discus, and drag the chorus leader when they play Scylla.Tragedy, then, is said to be like this, just as earlier actors regarded their successors. Mynniscus called Callippides an ape because he grossly overacted,[Bekker 1461b line 35]and there was a similar opinion of[Bekker 1462a][Bekker 1462a line 1]Pindarus. As these later actors stand in relation to the earlier ones, so the entire art of tragedy stands in relation to epic.Epic, then, is said to be addressed to refined spectators, who have no need of gestures, while tragedy is addressed to inferior spectators. If tragedy is vulgar, it would obviously be worse.First,[Bekker 1462a line 5]this criticism applies not to the poetic art but to the art of acting, since it is possible to overdo gestures even while reciting epic poetry, as Sosistratus did, and while singing, as Mnasitheus of Opus did.Second, not every kind of movement should be rejected, unless dancing is also to be rejected, but only the movement of inferior performers. This was the criticism made of Callippides, and is now[Bekker 1462a line 10]made of others, on the ground that they imitate women who are not freeborn.Furthermore, tragedy achieves its proper effect even without movement, just as epic does; for its quality is evident through reading. Therefore, if it is superior in other respects, movement need not be an essential part of it.Next, tragedy has everything that epic has(for it can even use epic[Bekker 1462a line 15]meter), and in addition it has music, which is no small part of it and through which its pleasures are produced most vividly.Next, it possesses vividness both in reading and in performance.Furthermore, the end of the representation is[Bekker 1462b][Bekker 1462b line 1]achieved in a shorter length—for what is more concentrated is more pleasant than what is diluted over a long period of time. I mean, for example, what would happen if someone expanded Sophocles’ Oedipus into as many verses as the Iliad.Furthermore, the representation made by epic poets has less unity. The evidence is that multiple[Bekker 1462b line 5]tragedies can be made from any one epic representation. Consequently, if epic poets construct a single plot, it will either appear truncated when presented briefly or diluted when extended to the normal length of the meter. I mean, for example, if it is composed of several actions,as the Iliad has many such parts, and so does the Odyssey—parts that also possess[Bekker 1462b line 10]magnitude in themselves. And yet these poems are constructed as well as possible and are, to the greatest possible extent, representations of a single action.If, then, tragedy surpasses epic in all these respects, and also in fulfilling the function of the art—for they must produce not just any pleasure but the pleasure already specified—it is clear that tragedy would be superior because it achieves the[Bekker 1462b line 15]end more fully than epic.So much, then, may be said about tragedy and epic, about the arts themselves and their kinds and parts, how many there are and how they differ, what causes success or failure, and about criticisms and their solutions....