Laelius on Friendship

SECTION 1Quintus Mucius the augur used to tell many stories about his father-in-law, Gaius Laelius, from memory and with great charm, and he never hesitated to call him “the Wise” in every conversation. My own father, after I had assumed the toga of manhood, placed me under Scaevola’s guidance with the understanding that, as far as I could and was permitted, I should never leave the old man’s side. And so I committed to memory many arguments he presented wisely, as well as many things he said briefly and aptly, and I tried to become better educated through his wisdom. After his death, I attached myself to Scaevola the pontiff, whom I venture to call the one man in our state most outstanding in both intellect and justice. But I will speak of him another time; now I return to the augur.

SECTION 2Among the many occasions on which he spoke at length, I particularly remember him sitting at home in his semicircular seat, as was his custom, when I was with him along with only a very few close friends, and falling into a discussion of a subject that was then on nearly everyone’s lips. For you surely remember, Atticus—and all the more because you were very close to Publius Sulpicius—how much astonishment and complaint there was among the people when Sulpicius, as tribune of the plebs, became divided by deadly hatred from Quintus Pompeius, who was then consul, although he had lived with him in the closest and most affectionate friendship.

SECTION 3And so, when Scaevola happened to mention that very subject, he recounted to us a conversation on friendship that Laelius had held with him and with his other son-in-law, Gaius Fannius, son of Marcus, a few days after Africanus’s death. I committed the substance of that discussion to memory and have set it out in this book in my own manner. For I have presented the men themselves as speaking, so that I would not have to keep inserting “I said” and “he said,” and so that the conversation might appear to be taking place face-to-face among people actually present.

SECTION 4For you often urged me to write something about friendship, and the subject seemed to me worthy both of everyone’s attention and of our own close relationship. So I willingly did as you asked, in the hope of benefiting many people. But just as in Cato the Elder, the book on old age that was written for you, I presented the aged Cato conducting the discussion, because no character seemed better suited to speak about that period of life than a man who had lived to a very advanced age and had flourished in old age beyond all others, so too, since we had learned from our fathers that the friendship of Gaius Laelius and Publius Scipio had been especially memorable, Laelius seemed to me a suitable character to discuss the very points about friendship that Scaevola remembered him discussing. Somehow, this form of dialogue, founded on the authority of distinguished men of earlier times, seems to carry greater weight. Indeed, when I read my own work, I am sometimes so affected that I think it is Cato speaking, not I.

SECTION 5But just as I, an old man, then wrote to an old man about old age, so in this book I, a most devoted friend, have written to a friend about friendship. Then the speaker was Cato, than whom almost no one in those days was older or wiser; now Laelius, who was regarded as wise and was renowned for the glory of his friendship, will speak about friendship. I would like you to turn your attention away from me for a little while and imagine that Laelius himself is speaking. Gaius Fannius and Quintus Mucius come to their father-in-law after the death of Africanus. They begin the conversation, and Laelius responds. His entire discussion concerns friendship, and as you read it, you will recognize yourself.

SECTION 6FANNIUS. That is true, Laelius; for no man was better or more illustrious than Africanus. But you should realize that everyone’s eyes are fixed on you alone. They both call you wise and consider you so. This distinction was once given to Marcus Cato, and we know that Lucius Acilius was called “the Wise” in our fathers’ time, but each of them was called so in a different sense. Acilius was thought to be skilled in civil law, while Cato possessed experience in many fields, and people repeated many examples of how, both in the Senate and in the Forum, he had either foreseen things wisely, acted resolutely, or answered incisively. For that reason, in his old age “the Wise” had already become virtually a surname for him.

SECTION 7But you are considered wise in another sense—not only by nature and character, but also through study and learning—and not in the way the general public uses the word, but as educated people normally apply the name “wise.” We have heard that in all the rest of Greece there was no one like that, for those who examine these matters more precisely do not count the men called the Seven among the wise. At Athens, we have heard of only one, and he was even judged the wisest of men by Apollo’s oracle. People believe that your wisdom consists in regarding everything that concerns you as depending on yourself and in considering the accidents of human life inferior to virtue. And so they ask me—and, I suppose, they similarly ask Scaevola here—how you are bearing the death of Africanus, especially because on the most recent Nones, when we came, as usual, to the gardens of Decimus Brutus the augur for our regular meeting, you were not present, although you had always been most conscientious in observing that day and performing that duty.

SECTION 8SCAEVOLA. They do indeed ask frequently, Gaius Laelius, just as Fannius has said. But I answer according to what I have observed: that you are bearing with moderation the grief you have suffered from the death of both a supremely great man and your dearest friend; that you could not have remained unmoved, and that it would not have been consistent with your humanity to do so. As for your not being present at our college’s meeting on the Nones, I answer that ill health, not grief, was the reason.LAELIUS. Your answer, Scaevola, is both correct and true. For my personal sorrow should not have kept me from that duty, which I have always performed when my health allowed; nor do I think that any circumstance could ever cause a steadfast man to interrupt the performance of a duty.

SECTION 9As for you, Fannius, when you say that people attribute so much to me—more than I either acknowledge or claim—you speak like a friend, but, as it seems to me, you do not judge Cato correctly. Either no one was ever wise, which I am more inclined to believe, or, if anyone was, he was. To pass over everything else, consider how he bore his son’s death! I remembered Paulus and had seen Gallus; but their sons died as boys, while Cato’s son was a mature and distinguished man.

SECTION 10Therefore be careful not to place above Cato even that very man whom Apollo, as you say, judged the wisest of all. For Cato’s deeds are praised, but the other man’s words.As for me—and now I am speaking to both of you—this is how you should understand the matter: if I were to deny that I am affected by my longing for Scipio, let wise men judge how rightly I would be acting, but I would certainly be lying. For I am affected by being deprived of such a friend as I believe no one will ever have and, as I can confidently affirm, no one certainly ever had. But I do not need a remedy. I console myself, especially with the comfort that I am free from the mistaken belief that causes most people anguish when their friends die. I do not think that anything bad has happened to Scipio; if anything has happened, it has happened to me. But to be deeply distressed by one’s own misfortunes is the mark of a man who loves himself, not his friend.

SECTION 11Who could deny that things turned out splendidly for him? Unless he wished for immortality—which was the last thing he expected—what did he fail to attain that a human being might rightfully desire? While still a young man, through his incredible excellence he immediately surpassed the highest hopes that his fellow citizens had formed of him when he was only a boy. He never sought the consulship, yet he was made consul twice: the first time before the legal age, the second at the proper time for himself but almost too late for the republic. By destroying two cities that were bitterly hostile to this empire, he put an end not only to existing wars but also to wars of the future. Why should I speak of his most gracious character, his devotion to his mother, his generosity toward his sisters, his kindness to his own people, or his justice toward everyone? You know these things. How dear he was to the state was shown by the mourning at his funeral. What benefit, then, could the addition of a few more years have brought him? For although old age is not burdensome, as I remember Cato arguing with Scipio and me a year before his death, it nevertheless takes away that youthful vigor which Scipio still possessed even then.

SECTION 12Therefore, whether measured by fortune or by glory, his life was such that nothing could have been added to it, while the suddenness of his death took away all sensation of dying. It is difficult to say anything about the manner of his death; you see what people suspect. Yet this may truly be said: of all the many days of extraordinary distinction and happiness that Publius Scipio experienced in his life, the most glorious was the day when, after the Senate had adjourned, he was escorted home toward evening by the senators, the Roman people, the allies, and the Latins—the day before he departed from life. Thus, from so lofty a height of dignity, he seems to have gone upward to the gods above rather than downward to the dead below.

SECTION 13For I do not agree with those who have recently begun to argue that souls perish together with bodies and that death destroys everything. The authority of the ancients carries more weight with me: either that of our own ancestors, who assigned such sacred rites to the dead—something they certainly would not have done if they had believed that those rites did not concern them at all—or that of the men who lived in this land and educated with their institutions and teachings the region of Magna Graecia, which has now been destroyed but was flourishing then—or that of the man whom Apollo’s oracle judged the wisest of all. Unlike most people, he did not say one thing at one time and something else at another, but always maintained the same position: that human souls are divine, that when they have departed from the body a return to heaven lies open to them, and that this return is easiest for each person who has been best and most just.

SECTION 14Scipio held the same view. Indeed, as though he had a foreknowledge of what was coming, only a very few days before his death, when Philus and Manilius and several others were present and you too, Scaevola, had come with me, he spent three days discussing the republic. Almost the final subject of that discussion was the immortality of souls, a teaching that he said he had heard from Africanus in a vision during sleep. If it is true that at death the soul of each excellent person flies away most easily, as though escaping from the prison and chains of the body, whose journey to the gods can we suppose was easier than Scipio’s? Therefore I fear that to mourn his fate would be the conduct of an envious person rather than a friend. But if the other view is truer—that souls and bodies undergo the same destruction and no sensation remains—then, just as there is nothing good in death, there is certainly nothing bad either. For when sensation is lost, the result is the same as if he had never been born at all. Yet we rejoice that he was born, and this state too will celebrate his birth for as long as it exists.

SECTION 15Therefore, as I said above, things turned out as well as possible for him, but less favorably for me, since it would have been fairer for me, having entered life first, also to leave it first. Nevertheless, I take such pleasure in the memory of our friendship that I believe I have lived a blessed life because I lived with Scipio. With him I shared concern for both public and private affairs; with him I shared both home and military service; and between us there was that in which the entire power of friendship consists: complete agreement in wishes, interests, and opinions. And so I am not as pleased by that reputation for wisdom which Fannius mentioned just now—especially since it is false—as I am by my hope that the memory of our friendship will last forever. This matters all the more to me because from all the ages scarcely three or four pairs of friends are named; and among that company, I seem able to hope that the friendship of Scipio and Laelius will be known to posterity.

SECTION 16FANNIUS. That certainly must be so, Laelius. But since you have mentioned friendship and we have time to spare, you would do me a great favor—and, I hope, Scaevola as well—if, just as you usually do with other subjects when you are asked about them, you would now discuss friendship: what you think about it, what you believe its nature to be, and what principles you would offer.SCAEVOLA. It would indeed please me, and when I was just about to make this same request of you, Fannius anticipated me. Therefore you would do both of us a very great favor.

SECTION 17LAELIUS. I would certainly not be reluctant, if I had confidence in my own ability. For the subject is an excellent one, and, as Fannius said, we have time to spare. But who am I, and what ability do I possess? It is the custom of learned men—and especially of the Greeks—to have a subject assigned to them about which they must argue, no matter how suddenly it is proposed. That is a considerable task and requires no small amount of practice. Therefore, as for the points that can be argued about friendship, I think you should seek them from those who profess expertise in such matters. I can only urge you to place friendship above all other human concerns; for nothing is so well suited to nature or so appropriate to circumstances, whether favorable or adverse.

SECTION 18But this is my first belief: friendship can exist only among good men. I do not cut the definition to the quick, as those do who discuss these matters with greater precision—perhaps correctly, but with too little regard for practical usefulness. For they deny that anyone is a good man unless he is wise. Let that be so. But by wisdom they mean a kind that no mortal has yet attained. We, however, ought to consider what is found in ordinary practice and everyday life, not what is merely imagined or wished for. I will never say that Gaius Fabricius, Manius Curius, and Tiberius Coruncanius, whom our ancestors judged to be wise, were wise according to the standard of those philosophers. So let them keep for themselves the name of wisdom, a term both pretentious and obscure, and let them grant that those men were good. But they will not even do that; they will deny that this description can be granted to anyone except the wise man.

SECTION 19Let us proceed, then, with plain common sense, as they say. Those who conduct themselves and live in such a way that their loyalty, integrity, fairness, and generosity are approved; who are free from all greed, lust, and recklessness; and who possess great steadfastness, as did the men I named just now—these men, since they have been regarded as good, should also, I think, be called good, because, as far as human beings can, they follow nature, the best guide to living well.

For this is how the matter seems clear to me: we were born in such a way that there is a certain bond among all human beings, but the bond is stronger the closer each person is to us. Thus fellow citizens are more important to us than foreigners, and relatives than strangers, for nature itself has created friendship with them, though that friendship is not sufficiently firm. Friendship is superior to kinship in this respect: goodwill can be removed from kinship, but not from friendship. For when goodwill is removed, the name of friendship is removed, while the name of kinship remains.

SECTION 20The great power of friendship can be understood most clearly from this fact: out of the boundless fellowship of the human race, which nature herself has created, the matter has been so contracted and narrowed that every bond of affection is joined between two people or among only a few.

Friendship is nothing other than complete agreement, accompanied by goodwill and affection, on all things divine and human; and with the possible exception of wisdom, I hardly know whether anything better than friendship has been given to humanity by the immortal gods. Some people prefer riches, others good health, others power, others public office, and many even prefer pleasures. This last belongs to beasts, while the things mentioned before it are fleeting and uncertain, dependent not so much on our own judgment as on the caprice of fortune. Those who place the highest good in virtue are certainly right to do so, but this very virtue both creates and preserves friendship, and without virtue friendship cannot possibly exist.

SECTION 21Let us interpret virtue according to the ordinary practice of our lives and our everyday way of speaking, and not measure it, as certain learned men do, by grandiose language. Let us count as good men those who are commonly regarded as such—the Pauli, Catos, Galli, Scipios, and Phili. Ordinary life is content with them; let us leave aside those perfect men who are found nowhere at all.

SECTION 22Friendship between men of this kind, then, offers advantages so great that I can scarcely describe them. To begin with, how can a life be truly alive, as Ennius says, if it does not find rest in the mutual goodwill of a friend? What is sweeter than having someone with whom you dare to speak about everything as freely as you speak with yourself? What great enjoyment would there be in prosperity if you had no one who rejoiced in it as much as you yourself? And adversity would be hard to bear without someone who took it even more heavily than you did. In short, the other things people seek are each useful for generally only one particular purpose: riches, so that you may use them; influence, so that you may be courted; public offices, so that you may be praised; pleasures, so that you may enjoy yourself; health, so that you may be free from pain and perform the functions of the body. Friendship embraces a great many purposes. Wherever you turn, it is at hand. It is excluded from no place; it is never untimely and never troublesome. And so, as the saying goes, we do not use water or fire on more occasions than we use friendship. I am not now speaking of ordinary or moderate friendship, though even that brings pleasure and benefit, but of true and perfect friendship, such as belonged to those few whose friendships are famous. Friendship makes prosperity more splendid, and by sharing and dividing adversity, makes it lighter.

SECTION 23Although friendship embraces advantages of the greatest number and importance, this unquestionably surpasses them all: it shines the light of good hope into the future and does not allow our spirits to weaken or collapse. Indeed, whoever looks upon a friend looks, as it were, upon a reflection of himself. Therefore, friends who are absent are present; those in need have abundance; the weak are strong; and, what is harder to say, the dead are alive. So great are the honor, remembrance, and longing of their friends that attend them. Because of this, the death of the former seems blessed, while the life of the latter is worthy of praise. But if you remove from the natural world the bond of goodwill, no household and no city will be able to stand; not even the cultivation of the fields will continue. If it is not sufficiently understood from this how great the power of friendship and harmony is, it can be grasped from dissensions and conflicts. For what household is so stable, or what state so secure, that it cannot be utterly overthrown by hatred and division?

From this it can be judged how much good there is in friendship.

SECTION 24We are told that a certain learned man of Acragas proclaimed in Greek verse that, among the things that exist and move in nature and throughout the entire universe, friendship draws them together and discord scatters them. All mortals both understand this and prove it by their actions. And so, whenever a friend has performed some service by facing dangers or sharing them, who does not extol it with the highest praise? What shouts recently filled the entire theater at the new play by my guest-friend and friend Marcus Pacuvius, when, because the king did not know which man was Orestes, Pylades declared that he was Orestes so that he might be killed in Orestes’ place, while Orestes, as he truly was Orestes, persisted in declaring that he was Orestes! The audience stood and applauded at a fictional event. What do we suppose they would have done at a real one? Nature herself easily revealed her power, since people judged that something was rightly done by another even though they could not have done it themselves.

Up to this point, I think I have been able to say what I believe about friendship. If there are further questions—and I believe there are many—then, if you wish, ask them of those who discuss such subjects.

SECTION 25FANNIUS. No, we would rather ask you. Although I have often asked those men too, and have certainly listened to them willingly, your discourse has a different sort of thread.

SCAEVOLA. You would say that all the more, Fannius, if you had recently been present in Scipio’s gardens when the republic was discussed. What an advocate of justice he was then against Philus’ carefully reasoned speech!

FANNIUS. It was certainly easy for the most just of men to defend justice.

SCAEVOLA. What about friendship? Is it not easy for a man who has won the highest glory by preserving it with the greatest loyalty, steadfastness, and justice to defend that as well?

SECTION 26LAELIUS. This really is using force. For what difference does it make how you compel me? You certainly are compelling me. To resist the wishes of my sons-in-law, especially in a good cause, is not only difficult but also unfair.

Therefore, when I have very often thought about friendship, the question that has usually seemed most important to consider is whether friendship is desired because of weakness and need, so that by giving and receiving services each person might obtain from another what he could not accomplish by himself, and repay it in turn; or whether this exchange is indeed a characteristic of friendship, but friendship has another cause, more fundamental, more noble, and arising more directly from nature herself. For love, from which friendship takes its name, is the principal force in joining people together in goodwill. Benefits are often obtained even from those who are courted and treated with deference through a pretense of friendship to suit the needs of the moment; but in friendship nothing is false, nothing is pretended, and whatever exists in it is genuine and voluntary.

SECTION 27For that reason, friendship seems to me to have arisen from nature rather than need, from an inclination of the heart accompanied by a certain feeling of love, rather than from a calculation of how much practical benefit it would provide. The nature of this can be observed even in certain animals. For a time, they love the offspring born from them, and are loved by them in return, in such a way that their feelings are readily apparent. This is much more evident in human beings: first, from the affection that exists between children and parents, which cannot be broken except by a detestable crime; and then, when a similar feeling of love arises because we have found someone whose character and nature harmonize with our own, since we seem to perceive in that person something like a light of integrity and virtue.

SECTION 28Nothing is more lovable than virtue, and nothing does more to attract us to love, since it is because of virtue and integrity that we feel a kind of love even for people we have never seen. Who can mention the memory of Gaius Fabricius or Manius Curius without some affectionate goodwill, though he has never seen them? And who does not hate Tarquinius Superbus, Spurius Cassius, and Spurius Maelius? We fought for supremacy in Italy against two commanders, Pyrrhus and Hannibal. Because of Pyrrhus’ integrity, our feelings toward him are not entirely hostile; because of Hannibal’s cruelty, this state will always hate him.

SECTION 29But if integrity has such great power that we love it even in people we have never seen and, what is still more remarkable, even in an enemy, what wonder is it if people’s hearts are moved when they seem to perceive virtue and goodness in those with whom they can be personally connected? Love is, however, strengthened by receiving a kindness, by recognizing another’s devotion, and by the addition of familiarity. When these things are added to that first impulse of the heart and of love, there blazes up an astonishing intensity of goodwill.

If anyone thinks this goodwill arises from weakness, so that each person may have someone through whom he can obtain what he desires, he leaves friendship with a thoroughly low and, so to speak, ignoble origin by claiming that it was born from poverty and need. If that were so, then the more deficient a person thought himself to be, the better suited he would be for friendship. But the exact opposite is true.

SECTION 30For the more confidence a person has in himself, and the more thoroughly he is fortified by virtue and wisdom, so that he needs no one and judges that all his resources lie within himself, the more he excels in seeking and cultivating friendships. What, then? Did Africanus need me? Not at all, by Hercules! Nor did I need him. But I loved him from a certain admiration for his virtue, and he in turn loved me perhaps because of some favorable opinion he held of my character. Familiarity increased our goodwill. But although many great advantages followed from our friendship, the causes of our affection did not arise from the expectation of those advantages.

SECTION 31For just as we are kind and generous not in order to demand repayment—for we do not lend out a kindness at interest, but are naturally inclined toward generosity—so we believe friendship should be sought not because we are led by hope of reward, but because its entire reward is contained in the love itself.

SECTION 32Such people differ widely from those who, in the manner of cattle, relate everything to pleasure; and no wonder. Those who have cast down all their thoughts upon something so low and contemptible cannot look up to anything lofty, magnificent, or divine. Let us therefore exclude them from this discussion, and let us ourselves understand that the feeling of affection and the loving bond of goodwill are produced by nature when integrity reveals itself. Those who are drawn to integrity attach themselves to it and move nearer, so that they may enjoy the company and character of the person they have begun to love; so that they may be matched and equal in love; so that they may be more inclined to render services than to demand repayment; and so that an honorable rivalry in doing good may exist between them. In this way the greatest benefits will be gained from friendship, and its origin in nature rather than weakness will be more dignified and genuine. For if practical advantage bound friendships together, a change in that advantage would dissolve them. But because nature cannot be changed, true friendships are therefore everlasting.

You now see the origin of friendship, unless by chance you have something to say about it.

FANNIUS. No, please continue, Laelius! I answer on behalf of Scaevola here, since he is younger, as is my right.

SECTION 33SCAEVOLA. You are quite right. So let us listen.

LAELIUS. Then listen, my excellent friends, to the things that Scipio and I very often discussed about friendship. He used to say that nothing was more difficult than for a friendship to endure until the final day of life. For it often happened either that the same course was no longer advantageous to both friends, or that they did not hold the same political opinions. He also said that people’s characters often changed, sometimes because of adversity, sometimes because of the increasing burdens of age. He drew an illustration of these changes from the corresponding experience of early life: the most intense affections among boys were often put aside together with the toga praetexta.

SECTION 34But even if those friendships continued into young adulthood, they were nevertheless sometimes broken apart by rivalry over a prospective marriage or over some other advantage that both friends could not obtain. And even if some people had advanced further in friendship, their friendships were often shaken if they became rivals for public office. For he said that no plague was more destructive to friendships than greed for money among most people and competition for office and glory among the very best, and that from this the bitterest enmities had often arisen between the closest friends.

SECTION 35He also said that serious and generally justified divisions arose when something morally wrong was demanded of friends—for example, that they become agents of another’s lust or accomplices in an injustice. Those who refused, although they acted honorably in doing so, were nevertheless accused of abandoning the obligations of friendship by the people whose wishes they would not obey. But those who dared to demand anything at all from a friend were, by that very demand, declaring that they themselves would do anything for the sake of a friend. Their long-standing resentment tended not only to destroy close relationships but also to produce everlasting hatred. So many of these dangers, he said, hung over friendships like so many decrees of fate that to escape them all seemed to him a matter not only of wisdom but also of good fortune.

SECTION 36Therefore, let us first consider, if you please, how far affection ought to go in friendship. If Coriolanus had friends, were they obliged to bear arms with Coriolanus against their country? Were the friends of Vecellinus obliged to help him when he sought royal power, or those of Maelius to help him?

SECTION 37We saw Tiberius Gracchus, when he was throwing the republic into turmoil, abandoned by Quintus Tubero and his other friends of the same age. But Gaius Blossius of Cumae, a family friend of yours, Scaevola, came to me to plead his case, since I was serving on the council of the consuls Laenas and Rupilius. He offered this as his excuse and asked me to forgive him: that he had valued Tiberius Gracchus so highly that he thought he was bound to do whatever Gracchus wished. Then I said, “Even if he had wanted you to carry torches to the Capitol?” “He would never have wanted that,” he replied, “but if he had, I would have obeyed.” You see what an abominable statement that was. And, by Hercules, he acted accordingly—or even went beyond what he had said. For he did not merely obey the reckless designs of Tiberius Gracchus; he took the lead in them. He presented himself not as a companion in Gracchus’s madness, but as its leader. And so, in consequence of this insanity, terrified by the special court of inquiry, he fled to Asia, joined the enemies of Rome, and paid the republic a severe and just penalty.There is therefore no excuse for wrongdoing if you have done wrong for a friend’s sake. For since a belief in someone’s virtue is what brings friendship into being, friendship can hardly survive if you abandon virtue.

SECTION 38Now, if we were to establish as a rule that it is right either to grant our friends whatever they want or to obtain from them whatever we want, the principle would indeed be faultless if we possessed perfect wisdom. But we are speaking of the friends before our eyes, whom we actually see or about whom tradition has informed us—the kind familiar from ordinary life. We must take our examples from this group, and especially from those who come closest to wisdom.

SECTION 39We know that Papus Aemilius was an intimate friend of Gaius Luscinus—this is what we have learned from our fathers—and that they were consuls together twice and colleagues in the censorship. Tradition also tells us that Manius Curius and Tiberius Coruncanius were extremely close both to them and to each other. We cannot even suspect, therefore, that any one of these men ever pressed a friend to do anything contrary to good faith, contrary to his oath, or contrary to the republic. Indeed, in the case of such men, what is the point of saying that, if one of them had made such a demand, he would not have obtained it? They were men of the highest integrity, and it is equally wicked either to do such a thing when asked or to ask it of someone else. Tiberius Gracchus, however, was followed by Gaius Carbo and Gaius Cato, and also by his brother Gaius—though at that time less ardently than the others, while now he is the fiercest of them all.

SECTION 40Let this law therefore be established in friendship: we must neither ask for dishonorable things nor do them when asked. For it is a shameful and wholly unacceptable excuse in wrongdoing generally, and especially when someone admits that he acted against the republic for a friend’s sake. Fannius and Scaevola, we have been placed in such a position that we must look far ahead and anticipate the future dangers of the republic. The customs of our ancestors have already strayed somewhat from their proper course and path.

SECTION 41Tiberius Gracchus attempted to seize royal power—or rather, he actually reigned for a few months. Had the Roman people ever heard or seen anything like it? I cannot say without tears what his friends and relatives, following his example even after his death, did to Publius Scipio. As for Carbo, we endured him as best we could because the punishment of Tiberius Gracchus was still so recent. But I do not care to predict what I expect from the tribunate of Gaius Gracchus. The movement then creeps onward, and once it has begun, it slides easily downhill toward destruction. You see how much corruption has already been caused by the ballot—first by the Gabinian law, and then two years later by the Cassian law. I already seem to see the people separated from the Senate and the most important affairs conducted at the will of the multitude. For more people will learn how these things are done than how they may be resisted.

SECTION 42What is the point of all this? It is that no one attempts such a thing without associates. Honorable men must therefore be instructed that, if through ignorance or some accident they fall into friendships of this kind, they must not think themselves so tightly bound that they cannot withdraw from friends who are committing some grave offense against the republic. As for the wicked, a punishment must be fixed for them—and certainly no lighter a punishment for those who follow another than for those who themselves become leaders in treason. Who in Greece was more famous than Themistocles, or more powerful? After he had served as commander in the Persian War and freed Greece from slavery, he was driven into exile because of envy. Yet he failed to endure the injustice of his ungrateful country, as he ought to have done. He did the same thing that Coriolanus had done among us twenty years earlier. Neither man found anyone willing to help him against his country, and so each took his own life.

SECTION 43Therefore, such an alliance among wicked men must not merely be denied the shelter of friendship as an excuse; rather, it must be punished with every penalty, so that no one may think he is permitted to follow a friend who is making war on his country. And indeed, judging from the way things have begun to go, I am not sure that this may not happen someday. For my part, I am no less concerned about what the republic will be like after my death than about what it is like today.

SECTION 44Let this, then, be established as the first law of friendship: we must ask honorable things of our friends and do honorable things for their sake. We should not even wait until we are asked; eagerness should always be present, hesitation absent. We must dare to give true advice freely. In friendship, the authority of friends who give good counsel should carry the greatest weight. That authority should be employed in offering advice not only openly but even sharply, if circumstances require it, and when it is exercised, it should be obeyed.

SECTION 45For I believe that certain men whom I hear were considered wise in Greece adopted some astonishing views—though there is nothing those people will not pursue through clever argument. Some of them held that excessively close friendships should be avoided, so that one person would not have to be anxious on behalf of many; that each person already has more than enough concerns of his own; that it is troublesome to become too deeply involved in those of others; and that the most convenient course is to keep the reins of friendship as loose as possible, so that you may tighten or slacken them whenever you wish. For, they said, the chief requirement for a happy life is freedom from anxiety, which the mind cannot enjoy if one person is, as it were, in labor on behalf of many.

SECTION 46Others, I am told, speak far more inhumanly—a position I touched on briefly a little earlier. They say that friendships should be sought for protection and assistance, not from goodwill or affection. Accordingly, the less firmness and strength a person possesses, the more eagerly he seeks friendships. That is why, they claim, weak women seek the protection of friendships more than men, the poor more than the rich, and the unfortunate more than those who are considered prosperous.

SECTION 47What splendid wisdom! Those who remove friendship from life seem to remove the sun from the world, for the immortal gods have given us nothing better or more delightful than friendship. What, after all, is this freedom from anxiety? It is attractive in appearance, certainly, but in reality it must be rejected in many situations. For it is unreasonable to refuse to undertake any honorable action or enterprise, or to abandon it once undertaken, merely to avoid anxiety. If we flee from concern, we must also flee from virtue, for virtue must necessarily feel some concern when it despises and hates what is opposed to it: goodness hates wickedness, self-control hates lust, and courage hates cowardice. And so you may see that the just are most deeply pained by injustice, the brave by cowardice, and the honorable by disgraceful conduct. It is therefore characteristic of a properly ordered mind both to rejoice in good things and to grieve at their opposites.

SECTION 48Therefore, if mental pain can befall a wise person—and it certainly can, unless we suppose that all humanity has been rooted out of his mind—what reason is there to remove friendship entirely from life merely to avoid undergoing certain troubles because of it? If emotional responsiveness is taken away, what difference is there—not merely between a human being and an animal, but between a human being and a tree trunk, a stone, or anything else of that kind? Nor should we listen to those who want virtue to be something hard and almost made of iron. In many matters, and especially in friendship, virtue is tender and responsive: it expands, so to speak, at a friend’s good fortune and contracts at his misfortunes. Therefore, the anguish that must often be endured for a friend is not powerful enough to justify removing friendship from life, any more than the cares and troubles brought by the virtues justify rejecting virtue.Moreover, as I said above, friendship is formed when some evidence of virtue shines forth and a similar mind attaches and unites itself to it. When that happens, affection necessarily arises.

SECTION 49For what could be more absurd than to take pleasure in many empty things—such as public office, fame, buildings, clothing, and bodily adornment—yet take little pleasure in a living being endowed with virtue, someone capable of loving and, so to speak, loving in return? Nothing is more delightful than the repayment of goodwill, nothing more delightful than a mutual exchange of devotion and services.

SECTION 50What if we also add—and we may rightly do so—that nothing attracts and draws anything else to itself as strongly as similarity draws people into friendship? It will surely be admitted as true that good people love other good people and take them into their lives as though united by kinship and nature. For nothing is more eager or more insistent than nature in seeking what resembles itself. Therefore, Fannius and Scaevola, this point, I think, may be regarded as settled: among good people there exists an almost necessary goodwill toward one another, and this is the source of friendship established by nature. Yet that same goodness also extends to the multitude. For virtue is not inhuman, selfish, or arrogant; it is accustomed to protect entire peoples and to serve their interests in the best possible way, something it certainly would not do if it recoiled from affection for ordinary people.

SECTION 51Moreover, those who invent friendships for the sake of advantage seem to me to remove the most lovable bond of friendship. For it is not so much the advantage gained through a friend that gives pleasure as the friend’s love itself; and what comes from a friend becomes delightful when it proceeds from devotion. So far is it from being true that friendships are cultivated because of need that those who, because of their resources, wealth, and especially virtue—in which the greatest protection lies—have the least need of another person are the most generous and beneficent. Indeed, I am not sure it is even desirable for friends never to lack anything at all. For when would my devotion have had an opportunity to show its strength if Scipio had never needed my advice or assistance, either at home or in military service? Friendship, therefore, did not follow advantage; advantage followed friendship.

SECTION 52We must not, therefore, listen to people softened by excessive luxury if they ever discuss friendship, which they understand neither from experience nor from reason. For, in the name of the good faith of gods and men, who would want to possess an overflowing abundance of every resource and live amid a profusion of everything, on condition that he neither love anyone nor be loved by anyone himself? This, of course, is the life of tyrants—a life in which there can be no good faith, no affection, and no secure confidence in lasting goodwill. Everything is always suspicious and anxious; there is no place for friendship.

SECTION 53For who can love a man whom he fears, or a man by whom he believes himself feared? Tyrants are nevertheless courted, but only with pretense and only for a time. If they happen to fall, as they generally do, it then becomes clear how destitute of friends they were. This is what Tarquin is said to have declared in exile: that only then did he understand which of his friends had been loyal and which disloyal, when he was no longer able to repay either group.

SECTION 54Still, considering his arrogance and brutality, I am amazed that he could have had any friend at all. And just as the character of the man I have mentioned made it impossible for him to acquire true friends, so the wealth of many extremely powerful men excludes faithful friendships. For fortune is not only blind herself; she generally makes blind those whom she embraces as well. Thus they are commonly carried away by disdain and insolence, and nothing can become more unbearable than a fortunate fool. Indeed, one may observe that people who were formerly agreeable in character are changed by command, power, and prosperity: they scorn their old friendships and indulge their new ones.

SECTION 55What could be more foolish than for people who possess the greatest resources, means, and wealth to acquire everything else that money can buy—horses, servants, splendid clothing, precious vessels—but not acquire friends, the best and most beautiful furnishing of life, so to speak? For when they acquire those other things, they do not know for whom they are acquiring them or for whose sake they are laboring; each of those things belongs to whoever proves strongest, but each person’s possession of his friendships remains stable and secure. Even if those things that are, as it were, gifts of fortune remain, a life uncultivated and deserted by friends still cannot be pleasant. But enough of this.

SECTION 56We must now determine what the boundaries of friendship are, and, so to speak, the limits of affection. I see three opinions offered about them, none of which I approve: first, that we should feel toward a friend exactly as we feel toward ourselves; second, that our goodwill toward our friends should correspond precisely and equally to their goodwill toward us; and third, that a person should be valued by his friends as highly as he values himself.

SECTION 57I agree completely with none of these three opinions. The first is not true—that a person should feel toward a friend just as he feels toward himself. How many things we do for our friends that we would never do for ourselves! We make requests of an unworthy person, resort to entreaties, attack someone more bitterly and pursue him more vehemently. Actions that would not be entirely honorable in our own affairs become thoroughly honorable when done for our friends. And there are many situations in which good men sacrifice much of their own advantage, and allow it to be sacrificed, so that their friends rather than they themselves may enjoy it.

SECTION 58The second opinion defines friendship in terms of equal services and equal goodwill. But this is to reduce friendship to an excessively narrow and meager accounting, so that the balance of what is received and what is given must be equal. True friendship seems to me richer and more abundant than that, and it does not keep a strict watch to avoid giving back more than it has received. There is no need to fear that something will spill out, or run onto the ground, or that more than the proper amount will be poured into friendship.

SECTION 59The third limit is the worst of all: that a person should be valued by his friends as highly as he values himself. For some people often have too low an opinion of themselves, or too little hope of improving their fortunes. A friend, therefore, should not treat such a person as that person treats himself, but should instead strive to raise his friend’s dejected spirit and lead him to greater hope and better thoughts. We must therefore establish another limit for true friendship, after I first tell you what saying Scipio used to condemn above all. He maintained that no statement more hostile to friendship could ever have been devised than the saying that one should love as if one might someday come to hate. He could not bring himself to believe that Bias, as was commonly thought, had said this, since Bias was regarded as one of the Seven Sages. It was, he said, the opinion of some corrupt or ambitious man, or of someone who made everything serve his own power. For how can anyone be a friend to a person whom he thinks he may become an enemy? Indeed, he will inevitably wish and hope that his friend makes mistakes as often as possible, so as to provide him with more handles, as it were, for criticism; and, conversely, he will inevitably be distressed, grieved, and envious at his friends’ right actions and successes.

SECTION 60Therefore this maxim, whoever its author may be, is effective only in destroying friendship. What should have been advised instead was that we use such care in forming friendships that we never begin to love someone whom we might someday be able to hate. Indeed, even if we had been less fortunate in our choice, Scipio thought we should endure it rather than contemplate a time of hostility.

SECTION 61I therefore believe that the proper limits are these: when friends have morally sound characters, there should be between them, without any exception, complete sharing of all matters, plans, and desires. Even if it should happen by some misfortune that we must support wishes of our friends that are not entirely just, in cases where their life or reputation is at stake, we may deviate from the straight path, provided that utter disgrace does not follow; for there is a limit to the pardon that can be granted for friendship’s sake. Reputation, however, must not be neglected, nor should we suppose that the goodwill of our fellow citizens is an insignificant weapon in conducting public affairs. To obtain that goodwill by flattery and servile agreement is shameful; but virtue, which is followed by affection, must by no means be rejected.

SECTION 62But—since I often return to Scipio, whose whole conversation was about friendship—he used to complain that people were more careful in every other matter. Each person could say how many goats and sheep he owned, but could not say how many friends he had. They took care in acquiring the former, but were negligent in choosing friends and had, as it were, no particular signs and marks by which they might judge those who were fit for friendship. We must therefore choose people who are firm, steady, and constant, but there is a great shortage of that kind. And it is certainly difficult to judge a person without putting him to the test, yet the testing must take place within the friendship itself. Thus friendship outruns judgment and takes away the opportunity for testing.

SECTION 63A prudent person, therefore, should restrain the impulse of affection just as he would restrain a runner’s pace, so that we may enter into friendship only after our friends’ characters have been tested to some degree, just as we use horses only after they have been tried. Some people are often revealed by a small sum of money to be utterly unreliable; others, whom a small sum could not influence, are exposed when a large sum is involved. But even if some people are found who consider it sordid to prefer money to friendship, where shall we find those who do not place honors, public offices, military commands, positions of power, and wealth ahead of friendship, so that, when these things are offered on one side and the claims of friendship on the other, they do not much prefer the former? For human nature is too weak to despise power; and even if people attain it by neglecting friendship, they think that neglect will be obscured because friendship could not have been neglected without some weighty reason.

SECTION 64And so true friendships are hardest to find among those who are engaged in the pursuit of office and in public life. For where can you find a man who puts his friend’s advancement ahead of his own? And, to leave that aside, how burdensome and difficult most people find it to share in another’s misfortunes, which few can readily be found willing to enter. Although Ennius rightly says, “A sure friend is discerned in unsure circumstances,” these two situations expose most people as fickle and weak: they either despise their friends in prosperity or desert them in adversity. Therefore, anyone who in both situations has shown himself serious, constant, and steadfast in friendship must be regarded as belonging to an exceedingly rare, almost divine class of human beings.

SECTION 65The foundation of the stability and constancy we seek in friendship is loyalty, for nothing disloyal is stable. We should also choose someone who is straightforward, sociable, and congenial—that is, someone who is moved by the same things as we are. All these qualities contribute to loyalty. A complicated and devious nature cannot be loyal, and a person who is not moved by the same things and is not congenial by nature can be neither loyal nor steadfast. We must add that he should neither take pleasure in making accusations nor believe accusations that are brought to him; all of this belongs to the constancy I have now been discussing for some time. Thus the claim I made at the beginning proves true: friendship can exist only among good people.

For it is the mark of a good man, whom we may also call a wise man, to observe these two rules in friendship. First, there must be nothing false or pretended; for it is more honorable even to hate openly than to conceal one’s true opinion behind one’s expression. Second, he must not only reject accusations brought by others, but must not himself be suspicious, always imagining that his friend has committed some offense against him.

SECTION 66To this must be added a certain pleasantness in conversation and manner, by no means an insignificant seasoning of friendship. Gloominess and severity in every matter do indeed possess a certain dignity, but friendship ought to be more relaxed, more unrestrained, and more agreeable, and more inclined toward every kind of courtesy and affability.

SECTION 67At this point, however, a rather difficult question arises: whether new friends who are worthy of friendship should ever be preferred to old ones, just as we are accustomed to prefer young horses to old ones. The doubt is unworthy of a human being. There should be no weariness of friendships, as there is of other things. The oldest friendships, like wines that improve with age, ought to be the sweetest. And the saying is true that many bushels of salt must be eaten together before the duties of friendship are fulfilled.

SECTION 68New friendships, however, if they offer hope—if the prospect of fruit appears in them, as it does in plants that will not disappoint us—should certainly not be rejected. Yet old friendship must be preserved in its proper place, for age and familiarity have very great power. Indeed, in the case of the very horse I mentioned just now, if nothing prevents it, everyone would rather use the one he is accustomed to than an untrained and unfamiliar one. And familiarity has power not only in the case of an animal, but even in the case of inanimate things, since we delight in the very places, even mountainous and wooded ones, where we have lived for a long time.

SECTION 69But the most important thing in friendship is for the superior to make himself equal to the inferior. For there are often certain forms of preeminence, such as Scipio possessed within our circle, so to speak. He never placed himself above Philus, or Rupilius, or Mummius, or any of his friends of lower rank. He treated his brother Q. Maximus, a thoroughly distinguished man but by no means his equal, as his superior because Maximus was older; and he wanted all his friends to be able to become more distinguished through his help.

SECTION 70Everyone should act in this way and imitate this example: if they have attained some superiority in virtue, ability, or fortune, they should share it with their own people and make it available to those closest to them. If they were born to parents of humble station, or have relatives weaker in either spirit or fortune, they should increase their resources and bring them honor and dignity. So in stories, those who have spent some time in servitude because they did not know their ancestry and family, when they are recognized and discovered to be the children of gods or kings, nevertheless retain their affection for the shepherds whom for many years they regarded as their fathers. This should certainly be done far more for one’s true and acknowledged parents. For the greatest benefit from ability, virtue, and every kind of excellence is gained when it is bestowed on each of those closest to us.

SECTION 71Just as those who are superior in a close bond of friendship and association ought to make themselves equal to their inferiors, so the inferiors ought not to resent being surpassed by their friends in ability, fortune, or rank. Most of them are always complaining about something or even making reproaches, especially if they think they can say that they have done something dutifully and affectionately, with some effort of their own. People who reproach others for their services are certainly an offensive class of human beings: the person on whom a service has been bestowed ought to remember it, but the person who bestowed it ought not to mention it.

SECTION 72Therefore, just as those who are superior ought to lower themselves in friendship, so those who are inferior ought in a certain sense to raise themselves up. For some people make friendships burdensome by imagining that they are being looked down on—something that generally happens only to those who also think themselves worthy of contempt. They must be relieved of this belief not only by words but also by actions.

SECTION 73Each person should be given, first, as much as you yourself are able to accomplish, and then as much as the person you love and assist is able to bear. For no matter how distinguished you may be, you cannot bring all your friends to the highest public offices. Scipio, for example, was able to make Publius Rupilius consul, but he could not do the same for Rupilius’s brother Lucius. And even if you could confer any honor at all upon another person, you would still have to consider what he was capable of bearing.

SECTION 74In general, friendships should be judged only after both character and age have matured and become settled. If some men in their youth were devoted to hunting or ball games, they should not therefore regard as intimate friends those whom they loved at that time because they shared the same enthusiasm. On that principle, nurses and tutors would have the strongest claim upon our affection by right of long acquaintance. They certainly should not be neglected, but they must be valued in a different way; otherwise, stable friendships cannot endure. For unlike characters are accompanied by unlike interests, and the difference between them breaks friendships apart. Nor is there any other reason why good people cannot be friends with the wicked, or the wicked with the good, except that the distance between them in character and interests is as great as it can possibly be.

SECTION 75It can also rightly be laid down as a rule in friendship that an excessive affection, as very often happens, must not obstruct a friend’s great advantages. To return to the stories, Neoptolemus could not have captured Troy if he had chosen to listen to Lycomedes, in whose household he had been raised, when Lycomedes tried with many tears to prevent his departure. And important circumstances often arise that require us to leave our friends. Anyone who tries to prevent this because he cannot easily bear the separation is weak and soft by nature and, for that very reason, not sufficiently fair in friendship.

SECTION 76In every situation, moreover, you must consider both what you ask of a friend and what you allow a friend to obtain from you.

There is also a certain misfortune, sometimes unavoidable, in bringing friendships to an end—for our discussion is now descending from the friendships of the wise to ordinary friendships. Friends’ faults often burst out, sometimes against their friends themselves and sometimes against strangers, though the resulting disgrace still reflects upon their friends. Such friendships, therefore, must be dissolved by a gradual relaxation of contact and, as I heard Cato say, should be unstitched rather than torn apart—unless some utterly intolerable wrong has flared up, making it neither right nor honorable, nor even possible, to avoid an immediate estrangement and separation.

SECTION 77But if, as often happens, some change has occurred either in character or in interests, or if a disagreement over political allegiance has intervened—I am speaking now, as I said a little earlier, not of the friendships of the wise but of ordinary friendships—we must take care that it does not appear that not only has the friendship been laid aside, but hostility has also been assumed. For nothing is more shameful than waging war against someone with whom you have lived on intimate terms. Scipio, as you know, withdrew from his friendship with Quintus Pompeius on my account; and because of the political disagreement between them, he became estranged from our colleague Metellus. In both cases he acted with dignity and moderation, and without bitter resentment.

SECTION 78For this reason, our first effort should be to prevent any breach between friends; but if something of that kind does occur, we should make it appear that the friendship died out rather than that it was violently crushed. We must certainly take care that friendships do not turn into bitter hostilities, which give rise to quarrels, abuse, and insults. Yet if these are tolerable, they must be endured, and this honor must be paid to the former friendship: the person who commits the wrong, not the person who suffers it, should be the one at fault.

In general, there is one safeguard and one precaution against all these faults and troubles: people should not begin to love too quickly, and they should not love those who are unworthy.

SECTION 79Those worthy of friendship are people who possess within themselves the reason why they should be loved. They are a rare class! Indeed, everything excellent is rare, and nothing is more difficult than finding something that is perfect in every respect within its kind. But most people recognize nothing good in human affairs unless it is profitable, and, like livestock, they particularly value those friends from whom they hope to obtain the greatest return.

SECTION 80Thus they are deprived of that most beautiful and most natural friendship, sought for its own sake and because of itself; nor do they themselves provide their own example of the nature and magnitude of friendship’s power. For every person loves himself, not in order to demand from himself some payment for his affection, but because each person is dear to himself in and of himself. Unless this same feeling is transferred to friendship, a true friend will never be found; for a true friend is, as it were, another self.

SECTION 81If this is apparent among animals—birds, fish, land animals, tame and wild—first, in their loving themselves, since that feeling is born equally in every living creature, and then in their seeking and pursuing other living creatures of their own kind to which they may attach themselves, doing so with longing and with something resembling human love, how much more does this occur by nature in a human being, who both loves himself and seeks another person whose mind he may so blend with his own as to make almost one person out of two!

SECTION 82But most people perversely, not to say shamelessly, want to have a friend of a kind that they themselves are incapable of being, and they demand from their friends the very things that they do not give them. It is fair, however, first to be a good person oneself, and then to seek another person like oneself. Among such people, that stability of friendship which we have now been discussing for so long can be secured. When people are joined by mutual affection, they will first rule the desires that enslave everyone else; then they will delight in fairness and justice and will undertake everything for one another. Neither will ever ask anything of the other unless it is honorable and right, and they will not only respect and love each other, but also feel reverence for each other. For anyone who removes reverence from friendship removes its greatest adornment.

SECTION 83Therefore, those who think that friendship gives free license to every lust and wrongdoing are making a ruinous error. Friendship was given by nature as an assistant to virtues, not as a companion to faults, so that, since virtue could not reach the highest goals in isolation, it might reach them when joined and allied with another. If such a partnership exists, has existed, or will exist between any people, their companionship must be regarded as the best and happiest possible journey toward nature’s highest good.

SECTION 84This, I say, is the partnership that contains everything people think desirable—honor, glory, peace of mind, and pleasure—so that when these things are present, life is happy, and without them it cannot be happy.

Since this is the best and greatest thing, if we wish to attain it, we must devote ourselves to virtue, without which we can obtain neither friendship nor anything else worth desiring. But those who neglect virtue and still think they have friends finally realize their mistake when some serious misfortune forces them to put those friends to the test.

SECTION 85For this reason—for it must be said repeatedly—you should love someone after you have judged him, not judge him after you have loved him. But although we are punished for carelessness in many matters, we are most careless of all in choosing and cherishing our friends. We form our plans backward and try to undo what has already been done, although an old proverb forbids this. For after we have become mutually entangled, either through long association or even through obligations, we suddenly break off our friendships in midcourse when some offense arises.

SECTION 86All the more blameworthy, therefore, is such great carelessness in a matter of the greatest necessity. Friendship is the one thing in human affairs whose usefulness everyone unanimously acknowledges. Virtue itself, to be sure, is despised by many and is said to be a kind of self-promotion and display. Many people scorn riches and, content with little, take pleasure in modest food and a simple way of life. As for public honors, the desire for which inflames some people, how many despise them so completely that they consider nothing emptier or more trivial! Likewise, there are very many who regard as worthless the other things that seem wonderful to some. But on friendship everyone, without exception, holds the same opinion: those who have devoted themselves to public life; those who delight in knowledge and learning; those who attend to their private affairs while remaining out of public life; and, finally, those who have surrendered themselves entirely to pleasure. They all believe that life is no life without friendship, provided that they wish to live with some degree of dignity.

SECTION 87For friendship somehow winds its way through everyone’s life and permits no way of spending our years to be entirely without it.

Indeed, even if someone were so harsh and savage by nature that he avoided and hated all contact with other people—the sort of person we are told some Timon was at Athens—even he could not endure without seeking someone in whose presence he could spew out the venom of his bitterness. This would be judged most clearly if something like the following could happen: suppose some god removed us from this crowded human world and placed us somewhere in solitude, supplying us there with an abundance and plenty of everything nature desires, but taking away every possibility of ever seeing another human being. Who would be so hardhearted that he could endure such a life, and from whom would solitude not take away the enjoyment of every pleasure?

SECTION 88What Archytas of Tarentum used to say, then, is true, as I believe. I heard our elders repeat it after hearing it from other elders: “If someone had ascended into the sky and beheld the structure of the universe and the beauty of the stars, his wonder at them would give him no pleasure, though it would have been most delightful if he had had someone to whom he could describe it.” Thus nature loves nothing solitary and always leans upon something as a kind of support, and that support is sweetest in one’s closest friend.

But although nature makes clear by so many signs what she wants, seeks, and desires, somehow we grow deaf and do not hear her warnings. The practice of friendship is varied and complex, and many causes of suspicion and offense arise. It is the part of a wise person sometimes to avoid them, sometimes to lessen them, and sometimes to endure them. One kind of offense must be faced if both usefulness and good faith are to be preserved in friendship: friends must often be advised and reproved, and these things must be received in a friendly spirit when they are done out of goodwill.

SECTION 89But somehow what my friend says in The Woman of Andros is true:

“Compliance makes friends; truth breeds hatred.”

Truth is troublesome if hatred, the poison of friendship, springs from it; but compliance is far more troublesome, because by indulging a friend’s faults it allows him to be carried headlong toward ruin. The greatest blame, however, lies with the person who both scorns the truth and is driven into deception by compliance.

In this whole matter, therefore, care and diligence must be used: first, so that advice is free from harshness, and then so that reproof is free from insult. In compliance, since I gladly use Terence’s word, let there be courtesy, but let flattery, the assistant of faults, be kept far away. Flattery is unworthy not only of a friend but even of a free person; for one lives in one way with a tyrant and in another with a friend.

SECTION 90But if a person’s ears are closed to the truth so that he cannot bear to hear the truth from a friend, there is no hope for his well-being. That saying of Cato’s, like many of his sayings, is perceptive: “Bitter enemies render some people better service than friends who seem pleasant; the former often tell the truth, the latter never do.” And it is absurd that those who are being advised do not feel the distress they ought to feel, but do feel the distress from which they ought to be free. They are not troubled that they have done wrong, but they resent being reproved, whereas they ought, on the contrary, to grieve over their offense and rejoice at their correction.

SECTION 91Just as it is characteristic of true friendship both to give advice and to receive it—to give it frankly, but not harshly, and to receive it patiently, not resentfully—so we must hold that no plague in friendship is greater than flattery, fawning, and servile agreement. For although this vice of shallow and deceitful people, who say everything to please and nothing for the sake of truth, can be described by many names, it must always be condemned.

SECTION 92Pretense is wrong in all things, because it removes our ability to judge the truth and corrupts that judgment, but it is especially incompatible with friendship, for it destroys truth, without which the very name of friendship has no meaning. The power of friendship lies in this: that a single mind is formed, so to speak, from several. But how can that happen if there is not even in each individual a single mind, always the same, but instead one that is shifting, changeable, and many-sided?

SECTION 93For what can be as pliable and wayward as the mind of a man who adjusts himself not only to another’s feelings and wishes, but even to his expression and nod? “Someone says no; I say no. He says yes; I say yes. In short, I have ordered myself to agree with everything,” as the same Terence says, though he says it in the character of Gnatho. To employ such a kind of friend is a mark of utter shallowness.

SECTION 94Yet there are many men like Gnatho who are superior in position, wealth, and reputation; their flattery is especially troublesome when authority is added to insincerity.

SECTION 95With careful attention, however, a flattering friend can be distinguished and recognized apart from a true one, just as everything artificial and counterfeit can be distinguished from what is genuine and true. A public assembly, though composed of the most inexperienced people, is nevertheless usually able to judge the difference between a demagogue—that is, a flattering and shallow citizen—and a steadfast, truthful, and serious one.

SECTION 96With what flatteries Gaius Papirius was recently pouring into the ears of the assembly when he proposed his law allowing tribunes of the plebs to be reelected! We spoke against it—but I will say nothing about myself; I would rather speak about Scipio. Immortal gods, what dignity he possessed, what majesty in his speech! You could easily have called him the leader of the Roman people, not one of their followers. But you were there, and the speech is in everyone’s hands. And so a popular law was rejected by the votes of the people.

And, to return to myself, you remember how popular Gaius Licinius Crassus’s law concerning the priesthoods appeared when Quintus Maximus, Scipio’s brother, and Lucius Mancinus were consuls. The right of the priestly colleges to choose their own members was being transferred to the people as a privilege. He was also the first to introduce the practice of turning toward the Forum when addressing the people. Nevertheless, while I spoke in defense of it, reverence for the immortal gods easily prevailed over his appealing speech. This occurred while I was praetor, five years before I was made consul. Thus that cause was defended more by its own merits than by the highest personal authority.

SECTION 97But if truth has power even on the stage—that is, in a public assembly, where there is so much room for fiction and mere outlines of reality—provided only that the truth is uncovered and brought to light, what must happen in friendship, which is judged entirely by truth? Unless, as the saying goes, you see your friend’s heart laid open and show him your own, you can have nothing trustworthy, nothing certain—not even the assurance that you love or are loved, since you do not know how sincerely either is being done. Yet although such flattery is destructive, it can harm no one except the person who accepts it and takes pleasure in it. And so the man who opens his ears widest to flatterers is the man who flatters himself and takes the greatest pleasure in himself.

SECTION 98Virtue certainly loves itself, for it knows itself perfectly and understands how lovable it is. But I am not now speaking about virtue; I am speaking about the belief that one possesses virtue. Far more people wish to appear endowed with virtue than actually possess it. Such people delight in flattery. When fabricated words adapted to their wishes are offered to them, they consider that empty speech testimony to their own praises. This, then, is no friendship at all, when one man does not want to hear the truth and the other is ready to lie. Nor would the flattery of parasites in comedies seem amusing to us if there were no swaggering soldiers.

“Does Thais really give me great thanks?”

It would have been enough to answer, “Great thanks.”

“Enormous thanks,” he says.

The flatterer always magnifies whatever the person whose wishes he is serving wants to be considered great.

SECTION 99Therefore, although this flattering insincerity has influence with those who themselves attract and invite it, even more serious and steadfast people must be warned to take care not to be caught by clever flattery.

Everyone except a complete fool can recognize an open flatterer. Careful attention is needed to keep the clever and concealed flatterer from insinuating himself into one’s favor. He is not at all easy to recognize, since he often flatters even by disagreeing: pretending to argue, he fawns, and in the end he throws up his hands and allows himself to be defeated, so that the man who has been made a fool of may appear to have shown greater insight. But what is more shameful than being made a fool of? All the greater care must therefore be taken to prevent that from happening:

“How splendidly today, beyond all the foolish old men of comedy, you have manipulated and mocked me!”

SECTION 100For even in plays, the very most foolish character is the shortsighted and credulous old man.

But somehow my discussion has drifted from the friendships of perfect men—that is, of wise men, though I mean the kind of wisdom that seems attainable by a human being—to shallow friendships. Let us therefore return to those first principles and finally bring the discussion itself to a conclusion.

Virtue, I say, Gaius Fannius and you, Quintus Mucius, both forms and preserves friendships. In virtue there is harmony in all things, stability, and constancy. When virtue has risen to prominence and revealed its own light, and has seen and recognized the same light in another, it draws near to that other virtue and in turn receives what is in the other. From this either love or friendship bursts into flame, for both words are derived from “loving.” To love is nothing other than to cherish the very person whom you love, with no need to be satisfied and no advantage sought. Yet advantage itself blossoms from friendship, even if you have not particularly pursued it.

SECTION 101With this kind of affection, when we were young, we loved those older men Lucius Paulus, Marcus Cato, Gaius Gallus, Publius Nasica, and Tiberius Gracchus, the father-in-law of our Scipio. This affection shines even more brightly among people of the same age, as it did between Scipio and me, Lucius Furius, Publius Rupilius, and Spurius Mummius. In turn, we old men find comfort in the affection of the young, as I do in yours and in that of Quintus Tubero. Indeed, I also take pleasure in my close friendship with the very young Publius Rutilius and Aulus Verginius. And since the course of our life and nature has been arranged so that one generation follows another, it is especially desirable to be able to reach the finish line, as the saying goes, together with the same companions of your own age with whom you were released from the starting gates.

SECTION 102But because human affairs are fragile and fleeting, we must always seek out people whom we may love and by whom we may be loved; for if affection and goodwill are removed, all pleasure is removed from life. As for me, although Scipio was suddenly taken away, he nevertheless lives for me and always will live. For I loved that man’s virtue, and that has not been extinguished. It remains before the eyes not only of me, who always had it close at hand, but it will also be bright and distinguished for later generations. No one will ever undertake great things in spirit or aspiration without thinking that he should set Scipio’s memory and image before himself.

SECTION 103Of all the things that either fortune or nature has given me, I have nothing that I can compare with my friendship with Scipio. In it I found agreement about public affairs; in it, counsel concerning private matters; and in that same friendship, repose filled with delight. I never offended him even in the smallest matter, so far as I was aware, and I myself never heard anything from him that I did not wish to hear. We shared one home, the same way of life, and a common table; and we shared not only military service, but also journeys abroad and stays in the country.

SECTION 104Why should I speak of our constant eagerness to discover and learn something, pursuits in which, away from the public eye, we spent all our leisure time? If the recollection and memory of these things had died together with him, I could not possibly endure my longing for so closely attached and loving a man. But those memories have not been extinguished; instead, they are nourished and strengthened by my thought and remembrance. And even if I had been entirely deprived of them, my age itself nevertheless brings me great comfort, for I cannot now remain in this state of longing much longer. Everything brief ought to be bearable, even if it is great.

This is what I had to say about friendship. I urge you, however, to assign virtue such a high place—for without it friendship cannot exist—that, with virtue alone excepted, you consider nothing more excellent than friendship.