

History of the Peloponnesian War

THUCYDIDES

Plain English Translation

MOUSEIA



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Translated by Michael Berardi

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THIS EDITION

Mouseia's complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from all eight books, 917 chapters and 3,587 sections of the Greek.

TRANSLATOR

Michael Berardi

THE WORK

Written c. 431–400 BCE · History

SOURCE

Original text from the Perseus Digital Library.

GAPS AND UNCERTAINTIES

Words Stuart Jones brackets as probable interpolations are kept in square brackets in every edition. The History breaks off unfinished in the winter of 411 BCE (8.109), as it does in every manuscript.

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Edition dated 25 October 2026

Contents



Book 1 1

Book 2 102

Book 3 182

Book 4 265

Book 5 361

Book 6 434

Book 7 512

Book 8 581

Book 1



CHAPTER 1

1 Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, describing how they fought each other. He began as soon as the war broke out. He expected it to be a major war, more worth recording than any earlier one. His evidence was that both sides entered it at the height of their strength, fully equipped in every way. He also saw the rest of the Greek world taking sides. Some joined one side or the other at once, while others were planning to do so.

2 This was the greatest upheaval that the Greeks had ever experienced. It also affected some of the non-Greeks, and indeed, one might say, most of the human world.

3 So much time has passed that it was impossible to establish clearly what happened before this war, or in still earlier times. But I have investigated as far back as possible and found evidence that I consider reliable. On that basis, I believe those times saw nothing on a large scale, either in warfare or in other activities.

CHAPTER 2

1 The country now called Hellas clearly did not have a settled population in the distant past. People used to migrate. Each group readily left its own land whenever a larger force put pressure on it.

2 There was no trade, and people could not travel safely to visit one another, either by land or by sea. Each group worked its own land just enough to live on. They had no spare money and planted no permanent crops. Without walls to protect them, they never knew when someone might invade and take everything away. They believed they could find the food they needed for each day anywhere. So they found it easy to leave their homes. As a result, they had neither large, powerful cities nor other substantial resources.

3 The best land was especially subject to repeated changes of population. This included what is now called Thessaly, Boeotia, most of the Peloponnese except Arcadia, and the most fertile parts of the rest of the country.

4 Good land allowed some people to become more powerful. This caused civil strife that destroyed them. At the same time, they were more exposed to attacks from people of other groups.

5 Attica, at any rate, had been free of civil strife for a very long time because of its poor soil. The same population therefore always lived there.

6 The following is strong evidence for the argument that migration kept the rest of Hellas from growing as much as Attica. When war or civil strife drove people out of other parts of Hellas, the most powerful among them took refuge with the Athenians because their territory was secure. They became citizens and, from early times, immediately added still further to the city's population. Eventually Attica could not support them all, and the Athenians sent out colonies to Ionia.

CHAPTER 3

1 Another strong indication, in my view, of the weakness of early times is this: Hellas does not appear to have done anything together before the Trojan War.

2 I also think that the whole country did not yet have this name. Before Hellen, the son of Deucalion, the name probably did not even exist at all. Instead, the different peoples gave their own names to their territories. The Pelasgians did so over the widest area. But Hellen and his sons became powerful in Phthiotis. Other cities called them in for help, and through contact with them individual peoples increasingly came to be called Greeks. Even so, only after a long time [could] that name become established for everyone.

3 Homer provides the strongest evidence. Although he lived long after the Trojan War, he nowhere uses the name Greeks for the whole force. He applies it only to the men who came with Achilles from Phthiotis, who were in fact the first Greeks. In his poems he calls the whole force Danaans, Argives, and Achaeans. Nor does he use the term non-Greeks. In my view, this is because the Greeks themselves had not yet been set apart under a single name to form the contrasting group.

4 Those who came to be called Greeks, then, first took the name city by city, among people who understood one another's language, and later all together. Before the Trojan War they did nothing as a united body, because they were weak and had little contact with one another. Even that joint expedition took place only when they were already making greater use of the sea.

CHAPTER 4

1 Minos is the earliest person known to us by report to have acquired a fleet. He controlled most of what is now the Greek sea. He ruled the Cyclades and was the first to establish colonies on most of those islands. He drove out the Carians

and installed his own sons as governors. He also probably did as much as he could to clear pirates from the sea, so that his revenues would reach him more readily.

CHAPTER 5

1 In early times, as the Greeks began to sail across to one another more often, they turned to piracy. So did the non-Greeks who lived on the mainland coast or occupied islands. Their leaders were men of considerable power, who sought profit for themselves and food for those with less power. They attacked unwalled towns made up of scattered villages and plundered them. This supplied most of their living. The activity was not yet considered shameful. In fact, it brought them some honor.

2 Some mainland peoples still show this today: among them, success at piracy is a source of pride. The early poets provide evidence too. Everywhere, in the same way, they have people ask arriving sailors whether they are pirates. This assumes that those being questioned did not look down on the activity, and that those wanting to know were not reproaching them.

3 People also raided one another on land. Even today, much of Hellas still lives in the old way. This is true of the Ozolian Locrians, the Aetolians, the Acarnanians, and the neighboring mainland. These mainland peoples have kept the habit of carrying weapons from the old days of raiding.

CHAPTER 6

1 All of Hellas once carried weapons. Their homes were unprotected, and travel between communities was unsafe. They made carrying arms in daily life a regular practice, just as non-Greeks do.

2 The parts of Hellas that still live this way are evidence that everyone once shared these habits.

3 The Athenians were among the first to stop carrying weapons and to adopt an easier, more luxurious way of life. Indeed, until quite recently the older men among their wealthy citizens still wore linen tunics and tied up their hair in a knot held with golden cicada ornaments. This was part of their taste for luxury. Their kinship with the Athenians meant that older Ionian men also continued to wear this style of dress for a long time.

4 The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, were the first to wear simple clothes in the present style. In other parts of life too, their wealthier citizens came closer than anyone else to living in the same way as ordinary people.

5 They were also the first to exercise naked, taking off their clothes in public and rubbing themselves with oil for their exercises. In earlier times, even at the Olympic games, athletes competed wearing cloths around their genitals. This practice stopped only a few years ago. Even now some non-Greek peoples, especially in Asia, hold boxing and wrestling contests with prizes, and they compete wearing these cloths.

6 Many other examples could also show that the Greeks in early times lived in ways similar to those of non-Greeks today.

CHAPTER 7

1 The more recently founded cities were built when seafaring was already safer and people had more money to spare. They were built with walls right on the shore. Their people also occupied the isthmuses, both for trade and to strengthen their position against their neighbors. But the older cities, on islands as well as on the mainland, were built farther from the sea because piracy had continued for so long. The raiders plundered one another, as well as people who were not seafarers but lived near the coast. These older cities remain inland to this day.

CHAPTER 8

1 The islanders were just as active as pirates. They were Carians and Phoenicians, who had settled most of the islands. Here is some evidence. During this war the Athenians purified Delos and removed all the graves of the dead on the island. More than half of the dead proved to be Carians. They were identified by the weapons buried with them and by the burial method, which the Carians still use today.

2 Once Minos had established his fleet, people could sail to one another more safely. He drove the criminals out of the islands at the same time as he settled most of them.

3 The people living along the coast now began to acquire more wealth and to live in greater security. Some also built walls around their communities as they grew richer than before. The desire for profit led weaker people to accept subjection to the stronger. Meanwhile, those with greater power used their spare wealth to bring smaller cities under their control.

4 This way of life was already more fully developed when, at a later date, they made their expedition against Troy.

CHAPTER 9

1 I think Agamemnon assembled the expedition because he was more powerful than the other rulers of his time. It was not so much because he led Helen's suitors, bound by the oaths they had sworn to Tyndareus.

2 The Peloponnesians who have received the most reliable accounts from earlier generations also say the following. Pelops first gained power through the great wealth that he brought from Asia to people who were poor. Although he was an immigrant, he succeeded in giving his name to the country. Later, his descendants gained still more power. Eurystheus was killed in Attica by the descendants of Heracles. Atreus was his mother's brother. When Eurystheus went on campaign, he entrusted Mycenae and his kingdom to Atreus because

of their family connection. Atreus happened to be in exile from his father because of the death of Chrysippus. When Eurystheus did not return, Atreus took over the kingship of Mycenae and all the other lands that Eurystheus had ruled. The Mycenaeans themselves wanted this, both because they feared the descendants of Heracles and because Atreus seemed powerful and had won the favor of the people. In this way the descendants of Pelops became more powerful than the descendants of Perseus.

3 In my view, Agamemnon inherited this power. He also had greater naval strength than the others. So he organized and carried out the expedition by bringing people together through fear more than through goodwill.

4 He clearly arrived with more ships of his own than anyone else, and also supplied ships to the Arcadians. Homer makes this clear, if his evidence is thought sufficient. In his account of how the scepter was handed down, he also says that Agamemnon / "ruled over many islands and all of Argos." / As a mainland ruler, he could not have controlled islands beyond those close to the coast—and there would not have been many of those—unless he also had a fleet of some size. This expedition should also help us judge what earlier times were like.

CHAPTER 10

1 Mycenae was small, and some other towns of that time may now seem insignificant. But that would not be reliable evidence for doubting that the expedition was as large as the poets and the accepted tradition say it was.

2 Suppose the city of the Lacedaemonians were abandoned, leaving only its temples and the foundations of its buildings. I think that, after a long time, later generations would find it very hard to believe that its power had matched its reputation. Yet the Lacedaemonians occupy two-fifths of the Peloponnese. They lead the whole of it and many allies outside it. Still, their city would look less powerful than it is. It is not built as one continuous city and has no expen-

sive temples or buildings. Instead, it consists of separate villages, in the old Greek way. If the same thing happened to Athens, people would judge from the city's visible remains that its power had been twice as great as it actually is.

3 So it is not reasonable to disbelieve the account, or to pay more attention to how cities look than to their power. We should consider that expedition the largest of any before it, but smaller than those of our own time. This also follows from Homer's poetry, if we should place any trust in it here. As a poet, he would naturally have made it more impressive by exaggeration. Even so, his account still shows it to have been smaller.

4 He describes a fleet of 1,200 ships. The Boeotian ships carried 120 men each, and those of Philoctetes 50. I think he means these to be the largest and smallest, since he gives no other sizes in his list of ships. In his account of Philoctetes' ships, he makes clear that the men did their own rowing and were all fighters: he describes all the rowers as archers. There were probably not many passengers apart from the kings and the highest-ranking men. This is especially likely because they were going to cross the open sea with their military equipment. Their ships did not have enclosed decks, either, but were fitted out in the old style, more like pirate ships.

5 If we take an average between the largest and smallest ships, the number of men who went does not seem great for an expedition sent jointly by the whole of Hellas.

CHAPTER 11

1 The main cause was not a shortage of people but a shortage of money. Because they could not provide enough food, they took a smaller army: only as many men as they hoped could live off the land while fighting there. After landing, they won a battle. This is clear, since otherwise they could not have built the wall around their camp. Yet even then they seem not to have used their full force. Shortage of food made them turn to farming in the Chersonese and to

raiding. Their forces were scattered, and this made it easier for the Trojans to hold out against them for the ten years. The Trojans were a match for the forces left there at any given time.

2 But suppose they had come with plenty of food and had stayed together, fighting the war continuously without raiding or farming. They would easily have won in battle and taken the city. After all, even when they were not all together, the part of their force present at any time could hold its own. If they had stayed there and laid siege to Troy, they would have taken it in less time and with less effort.

3 So lack of money made earlier events small in scale. Even this expedition, the most famous event of earlier times, proves on examination to have been less impressive than its reputation and the account that the poets have made current today.

CHAPTER 12

1 Even after the Trojan War, migration and resettlement continued in Hellas. These prevented it from settling down and growing stronger.

2 The Greeks' return from Troy took a long time and caused many changes. Civil strife broke out in most cities, and the people driven out by it founded new cities.

3 In the sixtieth year after the capture of Troy, the Thessalians drove the ancestors of the present Boeotians out of Arne. They settled in the land now called Boeotia, which had previously been called the land of Cadmus. A section of their people had already been living there before this, and some of those had joined the expedition to Troy. In the eightieth year, the Dorians and the descendants of Heracles took possession of the Peloponnese.

4 Only after a long time did Hellas achieve lasting stability, free from further forced migrations, and begin sending out colonies. The Athenians established settlements for the Ionians and most of the island peoples. The Peloponnesians

settled most of Italy and Sicily, as well as some places in the rest of Hellas. All these settlements were founded after the Trojan War.

CHAPTER 13

1 As Hellas became more powerful and acquired even more wealth than before, tyrannies were established in most cities as their revenues increased. Previously, kingships had been hereditary, with fixed privileges. Hellas also began fitting out fleets, and its people took a stronger interest in the sea.

2 The Corinthians are said to have been the first to handle naval matters in a way very close to present practice. Corinth was also reportedly the first place in Hellas where triremes were built.

3 The Corinthian shipbuilder Ameinocles also appears to have built four ships for the Samians. It was about 300 years before the end of this war that Ameinocles came to Samos.

4 The earliest sea battle we know of was fought between the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans. This too was about 260 years before the same date.

5 Because their city stood on the Isthmus, the Corinthians had always had a trading center. In early times the Greeks usually traveled by land rather than by sea. Those inside the Peloponnese and those outside it passed through Corinthian territory to reach one another. This made the Corinthians wealthy and powerful. The early poets make this clear too, since they called the place rich. When the Greeks began sailing more, the Corinthians acquired ships and suppressed piracy. They offered a trading center for both land and sea traffic, and the revenues made their city powerful.

6 Later, the Ionians also acquired a large fleet, when first Cyrus and then his son Cambyses ruled the Persians. While fighting Cyrus, they controlled the sea along their own coast for a time. During the reign of Cambyses, Polycrates, the

tyrant of Samos, used his naval strength to bring other islands under his rule. He also captured Rhenea and dedicated it to Apollo of Delos. The Phocaeans, while founding Massalia, defeated the Carthaginians in sea battles.

CHAPTER 14

1 These were the most powerful fleets. Yet even these, though they existed many generations after the Trojan War, seem to have used only a few triremes. Like the fleets of that earlier time, they were still equipped with fifty-oared ships and other long warships.

2 Shortly before the Persian Wars and the death of Darius, who ruled the Persians after Cambyses, the tyrants in Sicily and the Corcyraeans acquired large numbers of triremes. These were the last significant fleets established in Hellas before Xerxes' expedition.

3 The Aeginetans and the Athenians, and any other naval powers, possessed only a few ships, most of them fifty-oared vessels. It was only late in this period that Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to build the ships with which they fought their sea battles. They were then at war with the Aeginetans, and a non-Greek invasion was also expected. Even these ships did not yet have decks running their full length.

CHAPTER 15

1 Such were the Greek fleets, both in early times and later. Still, those who concentrated on them gained considerable power through the income they brought and through rule over others. They sailed against the islands and conquered them. Those whose own land was insufficient were especially active in this.

2 No land war arose that led to any substantial increase in power. All the wars that did take place were against each city's own neighbors. The Greeks did not go on distant campaigns, far from home, to conquer others. They had not

joined the largest cities as subjects, nor did they themselves undertake joint campaigns as equals. Instead, neighboring peoples fought separate wars against one another.

3 It was above all in the war fought long ago between the Chalcidians and the Eretrians that the rest of the Greek world also split into alliances with one side or the other.

CHAPTER 16

1 Different obstacles to growth arose in different places. The Ionians had made great progress when Cyrus and the Persian kingdom attacked them. After overthrowing Croesus and conquering everything between the Halys River and the sea, the Persians subjected the cities on the mainland. Later Darius, using the Phoenician fleet to gain the upper hand, subjected the islands too.

CHAPTER 17

1 The tyrants in the Greek cities looked after only their own interests: their personal safety and the growth of their own households. They governed their cities as cautiously as possible. They accomplished nothing significant, except perhaps some action against their immediate neighbors. It was the tyrants in Sicily who developed the greatest power. In these ways Hellas was held back on every side for a long time. It achieved nothing outstanding as a whole, and its individual cities lacked the confidence to act.

CHAPTER 18

1 Eventually the Lacedaemonians overthrew the tyrants of Athens and most of the last remaining tyrants elsewhere in Hellas, much of which had already been under tyrants for a long time. The exception was Sicily. After the settlement of the Dorians who now inhabit it, Lacedaemon suffered civil strife for longer than any other community we know of. Nevertheless, it established good gov-

ernment very early and was always free of tyrants. By the end of this war, the Lacedaemonians had been living under the same constitution for a little over 400 years. The resulting strength allowed them to arrange affairs in the other cities too. Not many years after the tyrants were overthrown in Hellas, the battle at Marathon took place between the Medes and the Athenians.

2 In the tenth year after that battle, the non-Greek invader returned with his great expedition to enslave Hellas. With this enormous danger hanging over them, the Greeks who joined the fight accepted the leadership of the Lacedaemonians, who were the most powerful. As the Medes advanced, the Athenians decided to abandon their city. They packed up their belongings, boarded their ships, and became a naval people. Together the Greeks drove back the non-Greek invader. Not long afterward, both the Greeks who had rebelled against the king and those who had fought in the war divided between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians. These two powers had clearly emerged as the greatest. The Lacedaemonians were strong on land, and the Athenians at sea.

3 Their military alliance lasted only a short time. Then the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians fell out and, with their allies, fought one another. Whenever any of the other Greeks had a dispute, they now joined one or the other of these two sides. Throughout the period from the Persian Wars to this war, there were times when the two powers made treaties and times when they fought, either against one another or against their own rebellious allies. They built up their military resources and gained experience, training in conditions of real danger.

CHAPTER 19

1 The Lacedaemonians led their allies without making them pay tribute. They took care only to ensure that the allies had oligarchic governments favorable to themselves. The Athenians, on the other hand, gradually took over the ships of

the allied cities, except those of Chios and Lesbos, and required them all to pay money. They entered this war with greater resources of their own than they had ever had at their peak with the alliance intact.

CHAPTER 20

1 These are my findings about early times, though it is hard to put trust in every piece of evidence as it comes. People accept accounts of the past from one another without testing them, even when the events concern their own country.

2 Most Athenians, for example, believe that Hipparchus was tyrant when Harmodius and Aristogiton killed him. They do not know that Hippias, the oldest of Pisistratus' sons, was the ruler, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brothers. On that very day, just as they were about to act, Harmodius and Aristogiton suspected that one of their fellow conspirators had informed Hippias. They left him alone because they thought he had been warned. But they wanted to do something before they were arrested, even at the risk of their lives. They came across Hipparchus near the place called the Leocorium, where he was arranging the Panathenaic procession, and killed him.

3 The other Greeks also hold many mistaken beliefs, even about things that still exist today and have not faded from memory with time. For example, they think that each Lacedaemonian king has two votes rather than one, and that the Lacedaemonians have a company from Pitana, which in fact never existed at all. Most people make so little effort to find the truth. They prefer to accept the first account available.

CHAPTER 21

1 Still, on the evidence I have presented, someone would be closest to the truth by accepting the account I have given. They should not put greater trust in the poets, who celebrate these events by exaggerating them. Nor should they trust

the prose writers, who arranged their accounts to attract listeners rather than to tell the truth. These stories cannot be checked, and with the passage of time most of them have become implausible tales. Instead, the reader should consider that my findings rest on the clearest available evidence and are sufficiently reliable for events so long ago.

2 People always judge the war they are fighting to be the greatest. Once it is over, they tend to admire the wars of the distant past instead. Even so, anyone who examines the actual events will see that this war was greater than those earlier ones.

CHAPTER 22

1 As for what people said in speeches, either before the war began or when they were already fighting, it was hard to remember the exact words. This was true both for me, when I had heard them myself, and for those who reported speeches to me from elsewhere. I have made each speaker say what I thought the particular situation most called for. At the same time, I have kept as close as possible to the overall meaning of what was actually said.

2 As for the events of the war, I did not think it right to write down what I learned from just anyone, or what I myself supposed had happened. I investigated each event as accurately as possible, both those I witnessed myself and those I learned about from others.

3 Finding the facts took hard work. The people present at each event gave different accounts of the same things, depending on their sympathies for one side or the other, or on their memories.

4 The lack of mythical stories may make this account less enjoyable to hear. But some readers will want a clear view of what happened, and of events that will someday happen again in the same or similar ways because of human nature. It

will be enough if those readers find my work useful. It has been written to remain a resource forever, rather than as a performance to win a moment's hearing.

CHAPTER 23

1 The greatest event in earlier times was the Persian War. Even that was quickly decided by two battles at sea and two on land. This war, however, lasted a long time. During it, Greece suffered disasters unlike any others in an equal period.

2 Never had so many cities been captured and left deserted. Some were destroyed by non-Greeks, others by the Greeks fighting one another. Some even had their populations replaced after capture. Never had so many people been driven into exile or killed, either in the war itself or through civil strife.

3 Events that people had previously heard about, but that actual experience rarely confirmed, no longer seemed unbelievable. Earthquakes struck the largest areas at once and with the greatest force. Eclipses of the sun occurred more often than those recorded from earlier times. Some places suffered severe droughts and the famines they caused. There was also the epidemic, which was among the most destructive disasters and killed part of the population. All these disasters struck at the same time as this war.

4 The Athenians and Peloponnesians began the war by breaking the thirty-year treaty they had made after the capture of Euboea.

5 To explain why they broke it, I have first set out their complaints and disputes. That way, no one will ever need to ask how so great a war broke out among the Greeks.

6 In my view, the real underlying cause, though the one least openly discussed, was the growth of Athenian power. This frightened the Lacedaemonians and forced them into war. The complaints openly made by each side, which led them to break the treaty and go to war, were as follows.

CHAPTER 24

1 Epidamnus is a city on the right as you sail into the Ionian Gulf. Its neighbors are the Taulantian non-Greeks, an Illyrian people.

2 The Corcyraeans settled it. Its founder was Phalius, son of Eratoclides, a Corinthian descended from Heracles. In keeping with the ancient custom, he had been invited from the mother city. Some Corinthians and other Dorians also joined the settlement.

3 Over time, Epidamnus became powerful and heavily populated.

4 But its people fought among themselves for many years. According to the account given, a war with their non-Greek neighbors ruined them and stripped them of much of their power.

5 Finally, just before this war, the people drove out the powerful citizens. These returned with the non-Greeks and raided those still in the city, both by land and by sea.

6 Under this pressure, the Epidamnians in the city sent representatives to Corcyra, their mother city. They begged the Corcyraeans not to let them be destroyed. Instead, they asked them to reconcile the exiles with them and end the war with the non-Greeks.

7 They made these requests while sitting as people seeking protection at the temple of Hera. But the Corcyraeans refused their appeal and sent them away without achieving anything.

CHAPTER 25

1 When the Epidamnians realized that no help would come from Corcyra, they did not know how to deal with their situation. They sent to Delphi and asked the god whether they should hand their city over to the Corinthians as its founders and try to get some help from them. He told them to hand it over and take the Corinthians as their leaders.

2 The Epidamnians went to Corinth and handed over the colony as the oracle directed. They pointed out that their founder had come from Corinth and explained the oracle's answer. They begged the Corinthians not to let them be destroyed but to come to their defense.

3 The Corinthians agreed to help because they thought it right: they considered the colony theirs just as much as the Corcyraeans'. They also acted out of hatred for the Corcyraeans, who treated them with disregard despite being their colonists.

4 At their shared festivals, the Corcyraeans did not give them the customary honors or let a Corinthian begin the sacrifices, as the other colonies did. They looked down on them. At that time their financial resources matched those of the richest Greeks, and their military equipment was more powerful than Corinth's. Sometimes they boasted that their navy was far superior too. They also took pride in the fact that the Phaeacians, who were famous for their ships, had lived on Corcyra before them. This encouraged them to build up their navy still further, and it was a considerable force: they had 120 triremes when they went to war.

CHAPTER 26

1 With all these grievances against Corcyra, the Corinthians gladly sent help to Epidamnus. They invited anyone who wanted to go there as a settler, and sent a garrison made up of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and their own men.

2 They traveled overland to Apollonia, a Corinthian colony. They feared that the Corcyraeans would stop them if they crossed by sea.

3 The Corcyraeans were angry when they learned that the settlers and garrison had reached Epidamnus and that the colony had been handed over to Corinth. They immediately sailed there with twenty-five ships, followed later by another fleet. They made the insulting demand that the Epidamnians take back the exiles and send away the garrison and settlers the Corinthians had sent. The

Epidamnian exiles had come to Corcyra, pointing to their ancestors' graves and their family ties. On the strength of these ties, they had asked the Corcyraeans to restore them.

4 The Epidamnians refused all these demands. The Corcyraeans then attacked them with forty ships, taking the exiles along to restore them. They also brought in the Illyrians to help.

5 They took up positions outside the city and announced that any Epidamnian who wished, and all foreigners, could leave unharmed. Otherwise, they would be treated as enemies. When the inhabitants refused, the Corcyraeans besieged the city, which stands on an isthmus.

CHAPTER 27

1 When messengers from Epidamnus told the Corinthians that the city was under siege, they prepared an expedition. They also announced a new settlement at Epidamnus. Anyone who wished could go there with full and equal rights. Anyone who did not want to sail immediately, but wanted a share in the colony, could stay behind by paying fifty Corinthian drachmas. Many sailed, and many paid the money.

2 They also asked the Megarians to escort them with ships in case the Corcyraeans tried to stop their voyage. The Megarians prepared eight ships to sail with them, and Pale in Cephallenia prepared four. They asked the Epidaurians as well, who provided five. Hermione provided one, Troezen two, Leucas ten, and Ambracia eight. They asked the Thebans and Phliasians for money, and the Eleans for both uncrewed ships and money. The Corinthians themselves prepared thirty ships and 3,000 hoplites.

CHAPTER 28

1 When the Corcyraeans learned about these preparations, they went to Corinth. They brought along representatives from Lacedaemon and Sicyon. They told the Corinthians to withdraw their garrison and settlers from Epidamnus, since Corinth had no claim to it.

2 If the Corinthians disputed this, they were willing to submit the case to cities in the Peloponnese that both sides agreed on. Whichever side was judged to own the colony should control it. They were also willing to leave the decision to the oracle at Delphi.

3 They urged the Corinthians not to make war. Otherwise, they said, Corinth's use of force would compel them to find support by making friends they did not want, different from those they already had.

4 The Corinthians answered that they would consider the proposal if the Corcyraeans withdrew their ships and the non-Greeks from Epidamnus. Until then, it was not reasonable for the Epidamnians to remain under siege while the Corinthians submitted to a legal decision.

5 The Corcyraeans replied that they would do this if the Corinthians also withdrew their men from Epidamnus. They were also ready for both sides to stay where they were and agree to a truce until the case was decided.

CHAPTER 29

1 The Corinthians accepted none of this. When their ships were fully crewed and their allies had arrived, they first sent a herald to declare war on the Corcyraeans. Then they set sail for Epidamnus with seventy-five ships and 2,000 hoplites to fight the Corcyraeans.

2 The commanders of the fleet were Aristeus, son of Pellichus, Callicrates, son of Callias, and Timanor, son of Timanthes. The land forces were commanded by Archetimus, son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas, son of Isarchus.

3 When they reached Actium in the territory of Anactorium, where Apollo's temple stands at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, the Corcyraeans sent a herald out to them in a small boat. He was to tell them not to sail against Corcyra. At the same time the Corcyraeans were crewing their ships. They had reinforced the old ones to make them seaworthy and repaired the others.

4 The herald returned without any peaceful answer from the Corinthians. The Corcyraeans now had eighty ships fully crewed, since forty more were besieging Epidamnus. They sailed out to meet the Corinthians, formed a battle line, and fought them at sea.

5 The Corcyraeans won a decisive victory and destroyed fifteen Corinthian ships. On the same day, their forces besieging Epidamnus secured its surrender. The terms were that the newcomers would be sold as slaves and the Corinthians kept in chains until a further decision was made.

CHAPTER 30

1 After the sea battle, the Corcyraeans set up a victory monument on Leucimme, a headland of Corcyra. They killed all the prisoners they had taken except the Corinthians, whom they kept in chains.

2 Later, when the Corinthians and their allies had returned home after their naval defeat, the Corcyraeans controlled the whole sea in that region. They sailed to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, and devastated its countryside. They also burned Cyllene, the Eleans' port, because the Eleans had provided the Corinthians with ships and money.

3 For most of the time after the sea battle, the Corcyraeans controlled the sea and raided and damaged Corinth's allies. This continued until the Corinthians, as summer came around, sent ships and troops because their allies were suffering. They camped at Actium and around Chimerium in Thesprotia to protect Leucas and the other friendly cities.

4 The Corcyraeans also set up a camp opposite them at Leucimme, with ships and land forces. Neither side sailed out against the other. They stayed facing each other that summer, and both went home when winter had already begun.

CHAPTER 31

1 Throughout the year after the sea battle and the following year, the Corinthians bitterly pursued the war against the Corcyraeans. They built ships and made every effort to prepare a powerful fleet. They recruited rowers from the Peloponnese itself and the rest of Greece, attracting them with pay.

2 The Corcyraeans learned about these preparations and became afraid. They had no treaty with any Greek state and had not joined either the Athenian or the Lacedaemonian alliance. So they decided to approach the Athenians, become their allies, and try to obtain some help from them.

3 When the Corinthians heard this, they too sent representatives to Athens. They wanted to stop the Athenian navy from joining the Corcyraean navy and preventing them from settling the war as they wished.

4 An assembly was held, and the two sides presented their opposing arguments. The Corcyraeans spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 32

1 "Athenians, when people come to their neighbors asking for help, as we do now, without having done them a great service or already being their allies, they should first make their position clear. Above all, they should show that granting the request will benefit those they ask, or at least will not harm them. Next, they should show that their gratitude will last. If they cannot establish any of this, they must not be angry if their request fails.

2 "The Corcyraeans sent us to ask for an alliance because they believed they could also give you firm assurances on these points.

3 "But the same policy of ours turns out both to make our request to you look unreasonable and to work against our own interests in the present situation.

4 "We have never willingly become anyone's allies before, but now we have come to ask others for an alliance. At the same time, this policy has left us isolated in our present war with Corinth. We used to think it sensible not to share the dangers of an alliance with others at someone else's bidding. Now this policy has come to look like poor judgment and weakness.

5 "In the sea battle that has already taken place, we held off the Corinthians on our own. But now they are coming against us with a larger force drawn from the Peloponnese and the rest of Greece. We see that we cannot win with our own forces alone. The danger of coming under their control is also great. So we have to ask for help from you and from anyone else. We deserve understanding if we now dare to act against our previous policy of staying out of others' affairs. We do this not from bad intentions but because our earlier judgment was mistaken.

CHAPTER 33

1 "If you agree, our need will give you a good opportunity in several ways. First, you will be helping people who are being wronged, not people harming others. Next, by accepting us when everything important to us is at risk, you will earn our deepest gratitude, with a record of your help that will never be forgotten. We also have the largest navy apart from yours.

2 "Think about it. What good opportunity could be rarer, or more painful to your enemies? You would have paid a great deal of money and felt deeply grateful to have this force join you. Now it comes of its own accord and offers itself to you without risk or expense. It also brings you a good reputation with the public, gratitude from those you defend, and greater strength for yourselves. Very few people in all history have gained all these things at once. And few who come asking for an alliance offer those they approach as much security and honor as they will receive.

3 "If any of you thinks that the war in which we could be useful to you will never happen, he is mistaken. He does not see that the Lacedaemonians want war because they fear you. Nor does he see that the Corinthians, who have influence with them and are your enemies, are now trying to get control of us before attacking you. They want to prevent us from uniting against them out of our shared hostility. They also want to make sure they achieve one of two things before you can act: either to damage us or to strengthen themselves.

4 "Our task, instead, is to act first, with us offering the alliance and you accepting it. We should plan against them in advance rather than wait to answer their plans.

CHAPTER 34

1 "If they say it is not right for you to accept their colonists, let them understand this: every colony honors its mother city when treated well, but becomes estranged when treated unjustly. Colonists are not sent out to be slaves, but to have equal standing with those who stay behind.

2 "It is clear that they have wronged us. We invited them to have the dispute over Epidamnus judged, but they chose to pursue their complaints through war rather than a fair settlement.

3 "Let their treatment of us, their relatives, be a warning to you too. Do not let them mislead you with deception or give them help when they ask you openly. Whoever has the fewest regrets from doing favors for opponents will remain the safest.

CHAPTER 35

1 "By accepting us you will not break your treaty with the Lacedaemonians either, since we are allies of neither side.

2 "The treaty says that any Greek city belonging to neither alliance is free to join whichever side it prefers.

3 "It would be outrageous if the Corinthians could recruit crews among the parties to the treaty, and also from the rest of Greece, especially from your own subjects, while shutting us out of the alliance offered to us and any help from elsewhere. And then, if you grant our request, they will count it as wrongdoing!

4 "If we fail to persuade you, we will have far greater reason to blame you. You will be rejecting us, although we are in danger and are not your enemies. As for the Corinthians, who are your enemies and are attacking us, you will not just fail to stop them. You will even allow them to draw additional strength from your own empire. This is not right. You should either stop them from hiring men from your territory or send us whatever help you can be persuaded to give. Best of all, you should accept us openly and help us.

5 "As we said at the start, we can point to many benefits. Most important, we have the same enemies. That is the clearest guarantee of trust. These enemies are not weak but strong enough to harm anyone who changes sides. And the alliance being offered is with a naval power, not a land power. Rejecting a naval ally is not the same as rejecting a land ally. Ideally, if you can, you should not let anyone else have ships. If that is impossible, you should have the strongest naval power as your friend.

CHAPTER 36

1 "If someone thinks that these proposals are in your interest but fears that accepting them might break the treaty, he should understand this. His caution, backed by strength, will frighten his opponents more. His confidence, if he rejects us and so remains weak, will leave strong enemies with less to fear. He should also realize that this decision concerns Athens no less than Corcyra. He

is not planning what is best for Athens if, with war coming and almost already here, he looks only at the immediate situation and hesitates to gain a place whose friendship or hostility matters enormously at critical moments.

2 "Corcyra lies conveniently on the sea route to Italy and Sicily. It can stop naval forces from coming from there to help the Peloponnesians, and escort a fleet from here toward those places. It is also extremely useful in other ways.

3 "To put the whole case, including its separate points, as briefly as possible, this should show you why you must not abandon us. The Greeks have three navies worth mentioning: yours, ours, and Corinth's. If you let two of them come together, and the Corinthians get control of us first, you will have to fight the Corcyraeans and Peloponnesians together at sea. But if you accept us, our ships will add to yours, and you will fight them with a larger fleet."

4 That was what the Corcyraeans said. The Corinthians spoke after them as follows.

CHAPTER 37

1 "These Corcyraeans have not just argued that you should accept them. They also say that we are in the wrong and that the war against them is unjustified. We must therefore address both points first, before moving on to the rest of our argument. That way you will have a clearer understanding of our claim on you, and your rejection of their request will rest on reason.

2 "They say that they have never accepted an alliance with anyone because they are sensible and restrained. But they have followed this policy to make wrongdoing easier, not because they are good. They want no ally to share in their wrongdoing and no witness to it. Nor do they want to feel ashamed when calling someone in to help.

3 "Their city's location also makes it self-sufficient. This allows them to judge their own cases when they harm someone, instead of following agreed procedures. They very rarely sail to their neighbors, while other people are constantly

forced to put in at Corcyra.

4 "So their respectable-looking refusal of alliances is a screen. Its purpose is not to avoid sharing in other people's wrongdoing, but to do wrong alone: to use force where they have the upper hand, to take advantage where they can escape detection, and to brazen it out if they incur any blame.

5 "Yet if they were good men, as they claim, their neighbors' lack of power over them would have given them an even clearer opportunity to show their goodness, by giving and accepting fair treatment.

CHAPTER 38

1 "But they behave like this neither toward others nor toward us. Although they are our colonists, they have always kept apart from us, and now they are at war with us. They say they were not sent out to be mistreated.

2 "We too say that we did not settle them there to be insulted by them. We meant to be their leaders and receive the respect we deserve.

3 "Our other colonies, at any rate, honor us, and our colonists are particularly fond of us.

4 "Clearly, if we satisfy most of them, these people alone have no good reason to be dissatisfied. Nor would we be making such an exceptional expedition against them unless we had been exceptionally wronged.

5 "Even if we were in the wrong, it would have been honorable for them to give way to our anger. We, in turn, would have been disgraced if we had used force against such moderation.

6 "Instead, their arrogance and the freedom their wealth gives them have led them to wrong us in many ways. Epidamnus is one example. It belongs to us. When it was in trouble, they claimed no connection with it. But when we came to help it, they seized it and now hold it by force.

CHAPTER 39

1 "They say, of course, that they were willing to have the case judged before fighting. But an offer like that does not deserve serious consideration when it comes from someone who already has the advantage and makes it from a safe position. It must come from someone who puts his actions on as fair a basis as his words before the fighting begins.

2 "They did not offer the respectable appearance of a legal settlement before they besieged the place. They did so only when they thought we would not stand by and let it happen. And they have come here after doing wrong there themselves, now asking you not merely to be their allies but to share in their wrongdoing. They want you to accept them when they are already in conflict with us.

3 "They should have approached you when they were safest, not now that we have been wronged and they are in danger. You had no share in their power then, but now you are to give them a share of your help. You took no part in their offenses, but you are to share equally in the blame we attach to them. They should have shared their strength with you long ago if they wanted to share the consequences too.

CHAPTER 40

1 "We have shown that we come with well-founded complaints, and that these people use force and take more than their share. You must now understand why it would not be right for you to accept them.

2 "The treaty does say that any city not listed in either alliance may join whichever side it wants. But this agreement is not for cities that join in order to harm others. It is for a city that seeks security without depriving another power of its allegiance, and that will not bring war instead of peace on those who accept it, if they act sensibly. That is what could happen to you now if you do not listen to us.

3 "You would not just become their helpers. You would also become our enemies instead of our partners in the treaty. If you join them, we will have to defend ourselves against you as well as against them.

4 "The right thing for you to do is, above all, to stay out of the way of both sides. Failing that, you should instead join us against them. You have a treaty with the Corinthians, but you have never even had a truce with the Corcyraeans. And you should not establish a rule that allows you to accept people who break away from others.

5 "When the Samians rebelled, we did not cast our vote against you. The other Peloponnesians were divided over whether to help them. We openly opposed helping them and said that each power should punish its own allies.

6 "If you accept and help people who have done wrong, at least as many of your own allies will clearly come over to us. You will establish a rule that works against yourselves more than against us.

CHAPTER 41

1 "These, then, are our claims on you, and by the customs of the Greeks they are sufficient. We also offer the following advice and ask you to repay a favor. We are not your enemies, so we are not trying to harm you. Nor are we your friends, so we are not taking advantage of friendship. We say that you should repay us now.

2 "Once, before the Persian War, you lacked warships for your war against the Aeginetans, and you received twenty ships from Corinth. This service, and our service over Samos, when we stopped the Peloponnesians from helping the Samians, allowed you to defeat the Aeginetans and punish the Samians. We did these things at moments when people, as they attack their own enemies, care about nothing else compared with winning.

3 "For they count anyone who helps them as a friend, even if he was their enemy before. They count anyone who stands in their way as an enemy, even if he happens to be a friend. In their desire to win the immediate contest, they even neglect their own interests.

CHAPTER 42

1 "Remember these things. Those too young to remember should learn them from their elders. Then each of you should agree to repay us in the same way. Do not think that what we say is just, but that something else will serve your interests if war comes.

2 "What serves your interests is generally the course that involves the fewest mistakes. The coming war, which the Corcyraeans use to frighten you into doing wrong, is still uncertain. Do not let it push you into making enemies of the Corinthians here and now, rather than at some future date. It would be wiser instead to remove the distrust that already exists because of the Megarians. A recent favor, if given at the right moment,

3 "can settle a greater grievance, even if the favor itself is small.

4 "Do not let their offer of a powerful naval alliance draw you in either. Not wronging your equals is a stronger source of security than being attracted by an obvious immediate gain and taking risks to get more.

CHAPTER 43

1 "We now face the situation covered by the principle we ourselves stated at Lacedaemon: each power should be allowed to punish its own allies. We ask you to apply that same principle to us. You benefited from our vote. Do not use yours to harm us.

2 "Give us an equal return. Recognize that this is precisely the moment when someone who helps us proves most clearly a friend, and someone who opposes us an enemy.

3 "Do not accept these Corcyraeans as allies against our will, or defend them when they are doing wrong.

4 "If you follow this advice, you will do what is right and make the best decision for yourselves."

CHAPTER 44

1 That was the Corinthians' case. The Athenians heard both sides and held two meetings of the assembly. At the first they were at least as receptive to the Corinthians' arguments as to those of the Corcyraeans. At the second they changed their minds. They decided against an alliance with the Corcyraeans that would require them to have the same enemies and friends. If the Corcyraeans then asked them to sail against Corinth, they would break their treaty with the Peloponnesians. Instead, they made a defensive agreement. They would help each other if anyone attacked Corcyra or Athens or their allies.

2 They thought that war with the Peloponnesians would come in any case. They did not want Corcyra, with its large navy, to fall into Corinthian hands. They wanted the two sides to fight each other as hard as possible. Then, if necessary, they could go to war against the Corinthians and the other naval powers when these were weaker.

3 They also thought the island was well placed on the sea route to Italy and Sicily.

CHAPTER 45

1 These were the reasons why the Athenians accepted the Corcyraeans. Not long after the Corinthians left, they sent ten ships to help them.

2 Their generals were Lacedaemonius son of Cimon, Diotimus son of Strombichus, and Proteas son of Epicles.

3 They were ordered not to fight the Corinthians at sea unless the Corinthians sailed against Corcyra and were about to land there or anywhere in its territory. In that case they were to stop them as far as they could. These orders were given to avoid breaking the treaty.

CHAPTER 46

1 The ships reached Corcyra. When the Corinthians had finished their preparations, they sailed against Corcyra with 150 ships. Ten came from Elis, twelve from Megara, ten from Leucas, twenty-seven from Ambracia, and one from Anactorium. The Corinthians themselves supplied ninety.

2 Each city's contingent had its own generals. Xenoclides son of Euthycles was one of the five Corinthian generals.

3 They sailed from Leucas to the mainland opposite Corcyra and anchored at Chimerium in Thesprotian territory.

4 There is a harbor there. Inland above it lies Ephyra, a city in the Elaeatis district of Thesprotia. Near this city the Acherusian lake empties into the sea. The river Acheron flows through Thesprotia into the lake, which takes its name from the river. The river Thyamis also flows here, forming the boundary between Thesprotia and Cestrine. The headland of Chimerium projects between these rivers.

5 The Corinthians anchored at this point on the mainland and made their camp there.

CHAPTER 47

1 When the Corcyraeans learned that the Corinthians were approaching, they crewed 110 ships under Miciades, Aesimides, and Eurybatus. They camped on one of the islands called Sybota. The ten Athenian ships were there too.

2 Their land army was at Cape Leucimme, along with 1,000 hoplites who had come from Zacynthus to help.

3 Many non-Greeks had also come to help the Corinthians on the mainland. The people of that part of the mainland have always been friendly to them.

CHAPTER 48

1 When the Corinthians were ready, they took food for three days and sailed out from Chimerium during the night to fight at sea.

2 At dawn, as they sailed, they saw the Corcyraean ships out at sea and coming toward them.

3 When the two sides saw each other, they formed opposing battle lines. The Athenian ships held the Corcyraean right wing. The Corcyraeans themselves held the rest of the line, with their ships divided into three groups, each led by one of their three generals.

4 That was the Corcyraean formation. On the Corinthian side, the Megarian and Ambraciot ships held the right wing. The other allies were in the center, each city's ships together. The Corinthians themselves held the left wing with their best-sailing ships, opposite the Athenians and the Corcyraean right.

CHAPTER 49

1 When both sides raised their signals, they closed and began fighting. Each side had many hoplites on deck, as well as many archers and javelin throwers. They were still equipped in the old way, which showed their lack of experience.

2 The sea battle was fierce, but showed little skill. It was mostly like a battle on land.

3 Once ships collided, they could not easily pull apart because there were so many ships crowded together. They relied mainly on the hoplites on deck to win. These men stood and fought while the ships remained still. There were no maneuvers to break through the enemy line. They fought at sea more by courage and strength than by skill.

4 There was noise everywhere, and the battle was confused. The Athenian ships came to support the Corcyraeans wherever they were under pressure, frightening their opponents. But they did not start fighting, because their generals were concerned about the orders from Athens.

5 The Corinthian right wing was in the most trouble. The Corcyraeans routed it with twenty ships and chased its scattered ships to the mainland. They sailed up to the Corinthian camp and landed. They burned the empty tents and looted the property there.

6 On this side the Corinthians and their allies were losing, and the Corcyraeans had the upper hand. But on the left, where the Corinthians themselves were stationed, they were winning decisively. The Corcyraean fleet was smaller to begin with, and its twenty ships were away on the chase.

7 When the Athenians saw the Corcyraeans being pressed harder, they began to help openly. At first they still held back from ramming any ship. But when the rout became unmistakable and the Corinthians pressed their attack, everyone joined in. There was no longer any distinction between the fleets. The situation forced the Corinthians and Athenians to attack each other.

CHAPTER 50

1 After routing their opponents, the Corinthians did not tie lines to the hulls of the ships they had sunk and tow them away. Instead, they sailed through the wreckage, concentrating on killing the men rather than taking them alive. They

even killed some of their own friends without recognizing them. They did not know that their right wing had been defeated.

2 Both sides had many ships spread over a wide area of sea. Once they had come together, it was hard to tell which were winning and which were losing. In fact, by the number of ships involved, this was the largest sea battle yet fought between Greeks.

3 After chasing the Corcyraeans to shore, the Corinthians turned to the wrecks and their own dead. They recovered most of them and brought them to Sybota, where the non-Greek land army had come to help them. Sybota is an uninhabited harbor in Thesprotia. After doing this, they gathered again and sailed against the Corcyraeans.

4 The Corcyraeans sailed out to meet them with the ships still left that were fit to sail, along with the Athenian ships. They were afraid the enemy would try to land in their territory.

5 It was already late, and the battle song had been sung for the attack. Suddenly the Corinthians began backing water. They had seen twenty Athenian ships approaching. The Athenians had sent these as reinforcements after the first ten. They feared that the Corcyraeans might be defeated, as in fact they were, and that their own ten ships would be too few to defend them.

CHAPTER 51

1 The Corinthians saw these ships before their opponents did. Suspecting that more ships were coming from Athens than they could see, they withdrew.

2 The Corcyraeans could not see the newcomers, because the ships were approaching from a direction less visible to them. They wondered why the Corinthians were backing water, until some men spotted the ships and said, “There are ships coming toward us.” Then the Corcyraeans also withdrew. It was already getting dark, and the Corinthians turned away and broke off the action.

3 That was how the two sides separated. The sea battle ended at nightfall.

4 The Corcyraeans were camped at Leucimme. Not long after being sighted, the twenty ships from Athens sailed through the bodies and wreckage and reached the camp. Their commanders were Glaucon son of Leagrus and Andocides son of Leogoras.

5 Since it was night, the Corcyraeans were afraid these were enemy ships. Then they recognized them, and the ships anchored.

CHAPTER 52

1 The next day, the thirty Athenian ships and all the Corcyraean ships still fit to sail put out to sea. They sailed toward the harbor at Sybota, where the Corinthians lay at anchor, to find out whether they would fight.

2 The Corinthians put out from shore and formed a line in open water, but stayed still. They had no intention of starting a sea battle themselves. They could see that fresh ships had arrived from Athens, and they faced many difficulties. They had to guard the prisoners they were holding on their ships, and there was no way to repair their ships in this uninhabited place.

3 Instead, they were considering how to make the voyage home. They feared that the Athenians might think the treaty had been broken because they had fought each other, and might refuse to let them sail away.

CHAPTER 53

1 They therefore decided to put some men in a small boat and send them to the Athenians without a herald's staff, to test their intentions. The men they sent said this:

2 "Athenians, you are doing wrong by starting a war and breaking the treaty. We are punishing our own enemies, and you are standing in our way with weapons raised against us. If you intend to stop us from sailing against Corcyra or any-

where else we want to go, and are breaking the treaty, take us here first and treat us as enemies."

3 That was what they said. All the Corcyraeans in the camp who heard them immediately shouted that they should be seized and killed. But the Athenians gave this reply:

4 "Peloponnesians, we are neither starting a war nor breaking the treaty. We have come to help these Corcyraeans, who are our allies. If you want to sail somewhere else, we will not stop you. But if you sail against Corcyra or any part of its territory, we will not stand by if we can prevent it."

CHAPTER 54

1 After the Athenians gave this answer, the Corinthians prepared to sail home. They also set up a victory monument at Sybota on the mainland. The Corcyraeans recovered the wrecks and bodies that had drifted toward them. The current and a wind that rose during the night had scattered them in every direction. They too set up a victory monument, on the island of Sybota, claiming they had won.

2 Each side claimed victory on the following grounds. The Corinthians had held the advantage in the sea battle until night, recovering most of the wrecks and bodies. They held at least 1,000 prisoners and had sunk about seventy ships. That was why they set up their monument. The Corcyraeans had destroyed about thirty ships. After the Athenians arrived, they had recovered the wrecks and bodies that had come toward their side. Also, on the previous day the Corinthians had backed water and withdrawn from them when they saw the Athenian ships. And after the Athenians arrived, the Corinthians had not sailed out from Sybota to meet them. These were their reasons for setting up a monument.

CHAPTER 55

1 So both sides claimed to have won. Sailing home, the Corinthians captured Anactorium by a trick. It lies at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf and was jointly held by them and the Corcyraeans. They settled Corinthians there and left for home. Of their Corcyraean prisoners, they sold the 800 who were slaves. They kept the other 250 in chains under guard, but treated them very well. They hoped these men would bring Corcyra over to their side when they returned. Most of them were among the most influential men in the city.

2 This was how Corcyra came through its war with the Corinthians, and the Athenian ships left the island. This became the Corinthians' first ground for war against the Athenians: they had fought at sea alongside the Corcyraeans against Corinth while the treaty was still in force.

CHAPTER 56

1 Immediately afterward, the following events also produced disputes that brought the Athenians and Peloponnesians toward war.

2 The Corinthians were working out how to take revenge on the Athenians. Suspecting their hostility, the Athenians gave orders to the Potidaeans, who lived on the isthmus of Pallene. They were Corinthian colonists but allies of Athens who paid tribute. They were to pull down their wall facing Pallene and give hostages. They were also to send away the magistrates whom Corinth sent each year, and not accept them again. The Athenians feared that Perdiccas and the Corinthians might persuade them to revolt, and that they might bring the other allies in the Thracian region into the revolt too.

CHAPTER 57

1 The Athenians began taking these precautions over Potidaea immediately after the sea battle at Corcyra.

2 The Corinthians were now openly hostile. Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, had also become an enemy, although he had previously been an ally and friend.

3 He had become an enemy because the Athenians had allied themselves with his brother Philip and with Derdas, who were acting together against him.

4 Alarmed by this, he sent envoys to Lacedaemon and worked to bring about a war between Athens and the Peloponnesians. He also tried to win over the Corinthians to bring about Potidaea's revolt.

5 He approached the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans in the Thracian region too, urging them to join the revolt. He thought that if these neighboring territories were his allies, it would be easier to wage war with their help.

6 The Athenians learned of this and wanted to prevent the cities from revolting. They happened to be sending thirty ships and 1,000 hoplites against his country, commanded by Archestratus son of Lycomedes and ten other generals. They instructed the fleet's commanders to take hostages from the Potidaeans and tear down their wall. They were also to watch the neighboring cities to stop them from revolting.

CHAPTER 58

1 The Potidaeans had sent envoys to Athens to try to persuade the Athenians not to change their arrangements. They had also gone with the Corinthians to Lacedaemon and [worked] to arrange support if they needed it. Their long negotiations at Athens brought them no satisfactory result. The ships heading for Macedonia were also coming against them. But the Lacedaemonian authorities promised that if Athens attacked Potidaea, they would invade Attica. It was then that the Potidaeans revolted, after swearing a joint oath with the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans.

2 Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon and demolish their coastal cities and move inland to Olynthus, making that one city strong. He gave those who left their homes land to farm in his own territory of Mygdonia, around Lake Bolbe, for as long as the war against Athens lasted. They demolished their cities, moved inland, and prepared for war.

CHAPTER 59

1 The thirty Athenian ships reached the Thracian region and found that Potidaea and the other places had revolted.

2 The generals thought their present force could not fight both Perdiccas and the places that had joined the revolt. They turned toward Macedonia, their original destination. They established themselves there and fought alongside Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded from the interior with an army.

CHAPTER 60

1 Meanwhile, with Potidaea in revolt and the Athenian ships off Macedonia, the Corinthians feared for the city and regarded its danger as their own. They sent volunteers from Corinth and men from the rest of the Peloponnese whom they recruited with offers of pay. In all, there were 1,600 hoplites and 400 lightly armed troops.

2 Their general was Aristeus son of Adeimantus. Most of the soldiers from Corinth had volunteered largely because of their friendship with him. He had always been close to the Potidaeans.

3 They reached the Thracian region on the fortieth day after Potidaea revolted.

CHAPTER 61

1 The news that the cities had revolted reached Athens immediately. When the Athenians also learned that Aristeus and his men were on their way, they sent 2,000 of their own hoplites and forty ships against the rebels. Callias son of Calliades was one of the five generals in command.

2 They went first to Macedonia. There they found that the first 1,000 men had just captured Therme and were besieging Pydna.

3 They too took up positions and joined the siege of Pydna. But then they made a settlement and an alliance with Perdiccas under the pressure of necessity. Potidaea and Aristeus' arrival there demanded urgent attention, so they left Macedonia.

4 They reached Beroea and then Strepsa. They first tried to take the place but failed. Then they marched overland toward Potidaea with 3,000 of their own hoplites, many allied troops in addition, and 600 Macedonian cavalry under Philip and Pausanias. At the same time, seventy ships sailed along the coast beside them.

5 They advanced by short stages and reached Gigonus on the third day, where they made camp.

CHAPTER 62

1 The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians under Aristeus were waiting for the Athenians. They camped on the isthmus on the side toward Olynthus and had set up a market outside the city.

2 The allies had chosen Aristeus as general of all the infantry, and Perdiccas as commander of the cavalry. Perdiccas had immediately deserted the Athenians again and was fighting alongside the Potidaeans. He had left Iolaus to govern in his place.

3 Aristeus planned to keep his own army on the isthmus and wait for the Athenians if they attacked. The Chalcidians, the allies from beyond the isthmus, and the 200 cavalry sent by Perdiccas were to remain in Olynthus. When the Athenians advanced against him, these forces were to attack them from behind, trapping the enemy between the two armies.

4 But Callias, the Athenian general, and his fellow commanders sent the Macedonian cavalry and a few of the allies toward Olynthus to stop the forces there from coming to help. They themselves broke camp and advanced on Potidaea.

5 When they reached the isthmus and saw the enemy preparing for battle, they formed their own line opposite them. Soon afterward the armies met.

6 The wing led by Aristeus, including the picked men from Corinth and elsewhere who were around him, routed the troops facing them and chased them a long way. But the rest of the Potidaean and Peloponnesian army was defeated by the Athenians and fled inside the city walls.

CHAPTER 63

1 Returning from the chase, Aristeus saw that the rest of the army had been defeated. He did not know which direction to risk taking, toward Olynthus or into Potidaea. Finally, he decided to gather his men into the tightest possible group and force his way at a run into Potidaea. He passed along the harbor breakwater through the sea, under attack and with difficulty. He lost a few men but saved most of them.

2 The troops at Olynthus who were to help Potidaea moved forward a short distance when the battle began and the signals were raised. Olynthus is about sixty stades away and in clear view. The Macedonian cavalry formed up opposite them to stop them. But the Athenians quickly won the battle, and the signals were lowered. The troops returned inside the walls, and the Macedonians returned to the Athenians. Neither side's cavalry took part in the battle.

3 After the battle, the Athenians set up a victory monument and returned the dead to the Potidaeans under a truce. A little under 300 Potidaeans and their allies had died. The Athenians themselves lost 150 men and their general Callias.

CHAPTER 64

1 The Athenians immediately built a siege wall facing the city's [wall] on the isthmus side and guarded it. But the side toward Pallene was not enclosed. They thought they did not have enough men both to guard the isthmus and to cross over to Pallene and build a wall there. They feared that the Potidaeans and their allies might attack them if they split their forces.

2 When the Athenians at home learned that the Pallene side was not enclosed, they later sent 1,600 of their own hoplites under the general Phormio son of Asopius. He reached Pallene and set out from Aphytis, bringing his army toward Potidaea by short advances and destroying the countryside as he went. No one came out to fight him. He then enclosed the city's [wall] on the Pallene side with a siege wall.

3 Potidaea was now under full siege on both sides, with ships also stationed off it to maintain a blockade by sea.

CHAPTER 65

1 With Potidaea walled in, Aristeus saw no hope of saving it unless help came from the Peloponnese or something else unexpected happened. He advised everyone except 500 men to wait for a favorable wind and sail out, so that the food would last longer. He was willing to be one of those who stayed. But he could not persuade them. Wanting to make the necessary preparations and put their affairs outside the city in the best possible position, he sailed out without being detected by the Athenian guard.

2 He stayed among the Chalcidians and joined them in their other military operations. He also ambushed the Sermylians near their city and killed many of them. He negotiated with the Peloponnese to find some way of getting help.

3 After Potidaea had been walled in, Phormio took his 1,600 men and devastated Chalcidice and Bottice. He also captured some small towns.

CHAPTER 66

1 These were the grievances that had already arisen between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. The Corinthians complained that Athens was besieging Potidaea, their colony, with Corinthians and other Peloponnesians inside it. The Athenians complained that the Peloponnesians had caused one of their tribute-paying allied cities to revolt, and had come and openly fought against them alongside the Potidaeans. Even so, war had not yet broken out. The truce was still in place, since the Corinthians had acted on their own.

CHAPTER 67

1 With Potidaea under siege, the Corinthians did not remain inactive. Their own men were inside, and they feared for the city too. They immediately called on the allies to come to Lacedaemon. They went there themselves and loudly accused the Athenians of breaking the treaty and wronging the Peloponnese.

2 The Aeginetans did not openly send envoys, because they were afraid of the Athenians. In secret, however, they were among the strongest supporters of the Corinthians in pressing for war. They said they were not being allowed the independence guaranteed by the treaty.

3 The Lacedaemonians invited any other allies, and anyone else who said the Athenians had wronged them, to attend as well. They held their own regular assembly and told the visitors to speak.

4 Others came forward and made their separate complaints. The Megarians reported many other points of dispute, but complained above all that they were being shut out of the harbors in the Athenian empire and the market in Attica, contrary to the treaty.

5 The Corinthians came forward last. They had let the others first stir up the Lacedaemonians, and then spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 68

1 "Lacedaemonians, the trust you have in your own political system and in your dealings with one another makes you less ready to believe what we tell you about other people. This gives you self-control, but it also leaves you less informed about affairs outside your country.

2 "We often warned you about the harm the Athenians were going to do us. But each time, instead of learning about the things we explained, you suspected that the speakers were speaking because of their own private disagreements. That is why you called these allies together only now, when we are already suffering, instead of before the harm was done. Among them, we have as much right as anyone to speak. We have the strongest complaints: the Athenians are mistreating us, and you are neglecting us.

3 "If they were harming Hellas somewhere out of sight, you would need an explanation, since you would not know about it. But as things are, why make a long speech? You can see that they have enslaved some Greeks and are plotting against others, especially our allies. You can also see that they have long been making preparations in case they ever go to war.

4 "Otherwise they would not have taken Corcyra under their protection and kept it against our will, or be besieging Potidaea. Potidaea is a particularly useful base for operations in the Thracian region, while Corcyra would have provided the Peloponnesians with a very large fleet.

CHAPTER 69

1 "You are responsible for this. First you allowed them to strengthen their city after the Persian Wars, and later to build the Long Walls. Right up to the present, you have kept depriving people of freedom—not just those they have enslaved, but now your own allies too. The real responsibility for enslaving people lies not with the one who enslaves them, but with the one who could stop it and looks on instead. This is especially true if he claims credit for freeing Hellas.

2 "Only now have we finally come together, and even now we have no clear purpose. We should no longer be asking whether we are being wronged, but how we are to defend ourselves. Those who are taking action have already made their plans. They are attacking people who have not made up their minds, not merely threatening to attack later.

3 "We know how the Athenians operate and that they advance against their neighbors little by little. As long as they think your lack of awareness keeps them from being noticed, they act less boldly. Once they know that you see what is happening but do nothing, they will press forward with all their strength.

4 "You remain inactive, Lacedaemonians. Alone among the Greeks, you defend yourselves against an enemy by delay rather than force. Alone among them, you put an end to your enemies' growing power not when it begins, but when it has doubled.

5 "Yet people used to say you could be relied on. Your reputation, it turns out, was better than your performance. We know for ourselves that the Persian came from the ends of the earth and reached the Peloponnese before you had sent out a force strong enough to meet him. Now you look on while the Athenians act, although they are close by, not far away like him. Instead of attacking them yourselves, you prefer to wait until they attack and then defend yourselves. You choose to leave things to chance in a fight against opponents who have become much stronger. You know that the non-Greek invader failed mainly through

his own mistakes. You also know that, against the Athenians themselves, we have often survived because of their mistakes rather than your help. Indeed, some people have already been destroyed by the hopes you held out: their trust in you left them unprepared.

6 "None of you should think that we say this more out of hostility than as a complaint. A complaint is directed at friends who make mistakes. An accusation is directed at enemies who have done wrong.

CHAPTER 70

1 "At the same time, we think we have as much right as anyone to criticize our neighbors, especially when such important disagreements are involved. You seem to us not to understand these matters. You have never worked out what sort of people the Athenians are, whom you will have to fight, or how much they differ from you in every way.

2 "They introduce changes. They are quick to think up plans and to carry out their decisions in practice. You preserve what you have, think of nothing new, and fail to do even what is necessary.

3 "Again, they take bold action beyond their strength, run risks beyond what their judgment recommends, and stay hopeful in danger. You achieve less than your strength allows, distrust even what your judgment tells you is secure, and think you will never escape from danger.

4 "They are active, while you delay. They are always away from home, while you stay at home more than anyone. They think that going abroad can bring them gains. You think that by going out to attack you might damage even what you already have.

5 "When they defeat their enemies, they push their advantage as far as possible. When they are defeated, they give way as little as possible.

6 "In serving their city, they treat their bodies as if they belonged to someone else. But when they use their judgment to do something for it, they treat that as entirely their own.

7 "If they think of a plan but do not carry it through, they believe they have lost something of their own. If they attack and gain something, they think their achievement is small compared with what they will gain next. If an attempt happens to fail, they make up for the loss by putting their hopes in something else. They alone can expect to possess what they plan almost as soon as they hope for it, because they put their decisions into action so quickly.

8 "They work at all this throughout their lives, with effort and danger. They enjoy what they have very little, because they are always acquiring more. They regard doing what needs to be done as their only holiday. They consider a quiet life without activity just as much a misfortune as hard work with no rest.

9 "So if someone summed them up by saying that they were born never to be at rest themselves or to let anyone else be at rest, he would be right.

CHAPTER 71

1 "Yet with a city like this opposing you, Lacedaemonians, you keep delaying. You do not think that peace lasts longest for people who use their strength fairly but make it clear that they will not accept unfair treatment. Instead, you think fair dealing consists in not harming others and not being harmed yourselves while defending yourselves.

2 "You would hardly achieve that even if the neighboring city were like your own. As things are, as we have just explained, your methods are out of date compared with theirs.

3 "As in any skill, the latest developments are bound to win out. A city at peace is best served by keeping its customs unchanged. But people who have to face many different challenges also need many new methods. That is why the

Athenians' greater experience has led them to update their methods much more than you have.

4 "So let this be the end of your slowness. Now help the others and the Potidaeans, as you promised. Invade Attica quickly. Do not abandon friends and relatives to their worst enemies, or drive the rest of us, in despair, to seek some other alliance.

5 "If we did that, we would be doing nothing wrong in the eyes of the gods who guard our oaths, or of people who understand the situation. The ones who break a treaty are not those who turn to others because they have been abandoned. They are those who fail to help the people to whom they have sworn an oath.

6 "But if you are willing to act energetically, we will stay. It would be wrong before the gods for us to change sides, and we could not find other allies with whom we have such close ties.

7 "Think carefully about this. Try to ensure that the Peloponnese you lead is no smaller than the one your fathers handed on to you."

CHAPTER 72

1 That was what the Corinthians said. An Athenian delegation happened already to be in Lacedaemon on other business. When its members learned of these speeches, they decided that they should go before the Lacedaemonians. They would not defend themselves against any of the charges the cities were making. Instead, they would make it clear that the whole issue called for more careful thought, not a quick decision. They also wanted to show how powerful their city was. They would remind the older men of things they knew and explain to the younger men things they had not experienced. They thought this speech would be more likely to turn the Lacedaemonians toward peace than toward war.

2 So they approached the Lacedaemonians and said that they too would like to address their assembled citizens, if there was no objection. The Lacedaemonians invited them to come forward. The Athenians did so and spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 73

1 "Our delegation did not come here to argue against your allies. We came on the business our city sent us to discuss. But when we learned how loudly we were being denounced, we came forward. We are not here to answer the cities' charges. You are not judges before whom either we or they should plead a case. We want to prevent you from following your allies too readily into a bad decision on important matters. At the same time, in response to the whole case that has been made against us, we want to show that there are good reasons why we hold what we have acquired, and that our city deserves to be taken seriously.

2 "Why should we speak of the distant past? Reports handed down by others, rather than our listeners' own experience, would be the evidence for what we said. But we must speak about the Persian Wars and the events you yourselves know about, even if you find it tiresome that we keep bringing them up. When we acted then, we took risks to secure a benefit. You shared in the actual benefit. So do not deprive us of all the credit for it in words, if that is of any use to us.

3 "We will speak not so much to ask for lenient treatment as to give evidence and make clear what sort of city you will have to fight if you make a bad decision.

4 "We say that at Marathon we alone faced the non-Greek invader in the first line of danger. When he came again later, we were not strong enough to defend ourselves on land. So our whole population boarded the ships, and we joined in the sea battle at Salamis. That prevented him from sailing against the cities of the Peloponnese one by one and destroying them. They could not have helped one another against so many ships.

5 "He himself provided the strongest evidence of this. After his defeat at sea, he quickly withdrew with most of his army, because he considered his power no longer what it had been.

CHAPTER 74

1 "This was what happened. It showed clearly that the Greeks' fate depended on their ships. We contributed the three things that helped most: the largest number of ships, the most intelligent general, and the most tireless commitment. Of the four hundred ships, we provided a little less than two-thirds. Our commander was Themistocles. He was chiefly responsible for the decision to fight in the strait, which clearly saved the situation. For this you yourselves honored him more highly than any other foreigner who has ever visited you.

2 "We also showed by far the boldest commitment. No one was helping us on land, and the other peoples along the invader's route as far as our own territory were already enslaved. Even so, after leaving our city and sacrificing our property, we decided not to abandon the common cause of the allies who remained. Nor would we scatter and become useless to them. Instead, we boarded our ships and faced the danger. We did not give way to anger because you had failed to come to our defense earlier.

3 "So we say that we helped you at least as much as you helped us. You came to help from cities that were still inhabited, aiming to keep enjoying them in the future. You acted when you began to fear mainly for yourselves, not for us. At any rate, when we were still unharmed, you did not come. We, on the other hand, set out from a city that no longer existed and risked ourselves for a city we had little hope of saving. We did our share in saving you as well as ourselves.

4 "If we had earlier joined the Persian out of fear for our land, as others did, or if we had later considered ourselves ruined and not dared to board our ships, there would have been no point in your fighting at sea. You did not have enough ships. Instead, he would have achieved what he wanted without opposition.

CHAPTER 75

1 "Lacedaemonians, in view of our commitment then and the intelligence of our judgment, do we not deserve rather less resentment from the Greeks for the empire we hold?

2 "We did not obtain this empire by force. You were unwilling to stay and deal with what remained of the non-Greek enemy. The allies themselves came to us and asked us to become their leaders.

3 "At first, the situation itself forced us to expand our empire to its present extent. Fear was the strongest reason, followed by honor, and later by profit as well.

4 "By then, we were hated by most of our subjects. Some had already revolted and been brought back under our control. You were no longer as friendly to us as before, but had become suspicious and hostile. In these circumstances, giving up our empire and exposing ourselves to danger no longer seemed safe. Those who revolted would have gone over to you.

5 "No one can be blamed for looking after their interests when the greatest dangers are involved.

CHAPTER 76

1 "You yourselves, Lacedaemonians, have arranged affairs in the cities of the Peloponnese to your own advantage, and you lead them. If you had stayed on then and continued as leaders, and had become hated, as we did, we know very well that you would have become just as burdensome to the allies. You would have been forced either to rule firmly or to put yourselves in danger.

2 "So there is nothing surprising or contrary to human nature in what we have done. We accepted an empire when it was offered and did not give it up, overcome as we were by three very powerful motives: honor, fear, and profit. Nor were we the first to act in this way. The weaker have always been held down by

the stronger. We also believed we deserved our position, and you thought so too, until now. Now, calculating your own interests, you appeal to justice. But no one who has had the chance to gain something by force has ever put that argument first and turned away from gaining more.

3 "People deserve praise if, following human nature in ruling others, they act more justly than their power would require them to.

4 "We think that if others took over our position, they would show most clearly whether we exercise any restraint. Yet our fairness has brought us more criticism than praise, and that is unreasonable.

CHAPTER 77

1 "We accept disadvantages in lawsuits arising from agreements with our allies, and we have the cases tried in our own courts under laws that apply equally to both sides. Yet people think we are too fond of lawsuits.

2 "None of them asks why this criticism is not made of those who rule elsewhere and treat their subjects with less restraint than we do. The reason is that people who are free to use force have no need to go to court.

3 "Our subjects, however, are used to dealing with us as equals. If they suffer any loss beyond what they think they should, whether through a legal decision, through the power our empire gives us, or in any other way, they are not grateful that they have not lost more. Instead, they take the loss harder than they would if we had ignored the law from the start and openly taken advantage of them. In that case, even they would not have argued that the weaker should not give way to the stronger.

4 "People apparently become angrier when they are treated unjustly than when force is used against them. In the first case, they think an equal is taking advantage of them. In the second, they think someone stronger is compelling them.

5 “At any rate, they endured worse treatment than this under the Persian. Yet they consider our rule harsh. That is understandable: subjects always find the current ruler burdensome.

6 “If you overthrew us and took over our empire, you would probably soon lose the goodwill you have gained because people fear us. That would be so if you followed the same policies now that you showed during your short time as leaders against the Persian. Your own customs are incompatible with those of others. Moreover, when any one of you goes abroad, he follows neither those customs nor the ones the rest of Hellas observes.

CHAPTER 78

1 “So take time to consider your decision: the issues are not small. Do not let other people’s opinions and complaints persuade you to take on suffering of your own. Before you enter a war, recognize how much of it cannot be predicted.

2 “As a war goes on, most of its course usually comes to depend on chance. Neither of us controls that, and we must take the risk without knowing which way things will go.

3 “When people go to war, they start with action, although that should come later. Only when they are already suffering do they turn to discussion.

4 “We have not yet made that mistake ourselves, nor do we see you making it. So we tell you, while both sides are still free to choose a sensible course: do not break the treaty or violate your oaths. Settle the disputes through arbitration, as the agreement requires. Otherwise, we call on the gods who guard our oaths as witnesses, and we will try to defend ourselves against you when you start the war, meeting you on whatever course you choose.”

CHAPTER 79

1 That was what the Athenians said. After the Lacedaemonians had heard both their allies' complaints against the Athenians and the Athenians' reply, they asked everyone else to leave. They then discussed the situation among themselves.

2 Most of them reached the same conclusion: the Athenians were already doing wrong, and war should begin quickly. But their king Archidamus came forward. He was regarded as both intelligent and sensible, and he spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 80

1 "Lacedaemonians, I have already experienced many wars myself, and I see that the same is true of those of you who are my age. So none of us should want war out of inexperience, as many people might, or because he thinks it is something good and safe.

2 "If you work it out sensibly, you will find that the war you are now considering would be far from a small one.

3 "When we fight Peloponnesians or our immediate neighbors, our military strength is much like theirs, and we can quickly reach each place we need to attack. But these people have land far away. Besides that, they are highly experienced at sea and exceptionally well supplied with everything else: private and public wealth, ships, horses, weapons, and a population larger than in any other single place in Hellas. They also have many allies who pay tribute. How can we lightly take up war against people like this? What can we rely on that would justify rushing into it unprepared?

4 "Our ships? But we are weaker at sea. If we are to train and build a fleet to match theirs, that will take time. Our money, then? We are even further behind in that. We have no public funds, and we are not ready to contribute from our private resources.

CHAPTER 81

1 "Someone might feel confident because we have better and more numerous troops, and so can invade and destroy their land.

2 "But they have plenty of other land under their control, and they will bring in what they need by sea.

3 "If instead we try to make their allies revolt, we will also need ships to help them, since most of them live on islands.

4 "So how will we fight this war? Unless we either defeat them at sea or take away the revenues that support their fleet, we will suffer more harm than they do.

5 "By then it will no longer be honorable even to make peace, especially if we are seen as the ones who started the quarrel.

6 "Let us not be encouraged by the hope that the war will end quickly if we destroy their land. I am more afraid that we may even leave it to our children. The Athenians are too proud, in all likelihood, to let concern for their land make them submit, or to panic at war as people with no experience might.

CHAPTER 82

1 "I am certainly not telling you to let them harm our allies without taking notice, or to overlook their plots. But do not take up arms yet. Send envoys to make our complaints, without making it too clear either that we will go to war or that we will let them do as they please. Meanwhile, get our own resources ready. Bring in more allies, both Greeks and non-Greeks, wherever we can gain additional strength in ships or money. No one can blame people threatened by the Athenians, as we are, for securing their survival with the help of non-Greeks as well as Greeks. At the same time, let us develop our own resources.

2 "If they pay any attention to our envoys, that will be best. If not, after two or three years we can attack them, if we think it right, with our defenses better prepared.

3 "Perhaps, when they see our preparations and hear words that suggest a purpose to match, they will be more likely to give way. Their land will still be undamaged, and they will be deciding about good things they still possess, not things already destroyed.

4 "Think of their land simply as a hostage in your hands, all the more valuable the better it has been developed. We should spare it as long as possible, rather than drive them to desperation and make them harder to bring under control.

5 "If we let our allies' complaints hurry us into destroying it before we are ready, be careful that we do not bring greater disgrace and difficulty on the Peloponnese.

6 "Complaints between cities or between individuals can be settled. But if all of us take up a war for the sake of particular interests, with no way to know how it will develop, it will not be easy to end it honorably.

CHAPTER 83

1 "No one should think it cowardly for many cities not to attack one city immediately.

2 "They have at least as many allies as we do, and those allies contribute money. War depends less on weapons than on the money that makes weapons useful, especially when a land power fights a sea power.

3 "So let us first secure that money, and not let our allies' speeches excite us before we do. We are the ones who will bear most of the responsibility for the outcome, whether good or bad. We should also be the ones to take time to consider it in advance.

CHAPTER 84

1 "Do not be ashamed of the slowness and delay for which they criticize us most. If you rush, you may take longer to finish, because you will have started unprepared. Besides, we have always lived in a free city with an outstanding reputation.

2 "This quality may in fact be sensible self-control. Because of it, we alone do not become arrogant in success, and we give way less than others in misfortune. If people praise us to push us into dangers against our own judgment, we do not let the pleasure turn our heads. If someone tries to provoke us with accusations, our irritation is no more likely to persuade us.

3 "Our discipline makes us both good soldiers and good decision-makers. We are good soldiers because a sense of shame is closely linked to self-control, and courage to the fear of disgrace. We make good decisions because our education does not make us clever enough to look down on the laws. Its strictness makes us too self-controlled to disobey them. Nor do we have the useless cleverness that criticizes the enemy's preparations in fine speeches but fails to act against them as effectively in practice. Instead, we think our neighbors' plans are much like our own, and that the accidents of chance cannot be worked out by reasoning.

4 "We always prepare in practice on the assumption that our opponents are planning well. We should base our hopes not on their making mistakes, but on our own taking reliable precautions. We should not think that one person differs greatly from another. The strongest is the one trained under the hardest conditions.

CHAPTER 85

1 "So let us not abandon these habits, which our fathers handed down to us and which we ourselves have always kept with good results. Do not let us hurry into a decision in a small part of one day about so many lives, so much money, so

many cities, and our reputation. Let us take our time. Our strength gives us more freedom than others to do so.

2 "Send envoys to the Athenians about Potidaea and about the wrongs our allies say they are suffering, especially since the Athenians are ready to submit to arbitration. It is not lawful to attack someone who offers arbitration as though his guilt had already been established. At the same time, prepare for war. By doing this you will make the best decision, and the one most frightening to your opponents."

3 That was what Archidamus said. Sthenelaidas, who was one of the ephors at that time, came forward last and spoke [to the Lacedaemonians] as follows.

CHAPTER 86

1 "I do not understand the Athenians' long speeches. They have praised themselves at length, but nowhere have they denied that they are wronging our allies and the Peloponnese. Yet if they behaved well against the Persians then, but badly toward us now, they deserve twice the punishment. They have turned from good behavior to bad.

2 "We are the same now as we were then. If we are sensible, we will not stand by while our allies are wronged, or delay helping them. Their suffering is not being delayed.

3 "Others have plenty of money, ships, and horses. We have good allies, and we must not hand them over to the Athenians. Nor should we settle the matter through lawsuits and speeches, when the harm done to them is not just words. We must help them quickly and with all our strength.

4 "No one should tell us that we ought to deliberate when we are being wronged. It is those who intend to do wrong who ought to deliberate at length.

5 "So vote for war, Lacedaemonians, as Sparta deserves. Do not let the Athenians grow stronger. Let us not betray our allies, but with the gods' help attack those who are doing wrong."

CHAPTER 87

1 After speaking in this way, he himself put the question to the Lacedaemonian assembly, since he was an ephor.

2 They decide by shouting, not by ballot. He said he could not tell which side had shouted louder. In fact, he wanted them to show their opinions openly and so become more committed to war. He said, "Lacedaemonians, any of you who think the treaty has been broken and the Athenians are in the wrong should stand up and move to that place." He pointed out a place to them. "Those who do not should move to the other side." They stood up and separated.

3 Those who thought the treaty had been broken were far more numerous.

4 They called in the allies and said that in their own judgment the Athenians were in the wrong. But they also wanted to call together all the allies and put the matter to a vote. Then they could deliberate together and go to war if they decided to do so.

5 After achieving this, the allies left for home. The Athenian ambassadors left later, after dealing with the business they had come for.

6 This decision by the assembly, that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year of the Thirty Years' Treaty, which had been concluded after the events in Euboea.

CHAPTER 88

1 The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken and that they must go to war. Their main reason was not that the allies' speeches had persuaded them. It was their fear that the Athenians would grow still more powerful,

since they saw that most of Hellas was already under Athenian control.

CHAPTER 89

1 The Athenians had reached the position in which their power grew in the following way.

2 The Persians withdrew from Europe after the Greeks defeated them on land and at sea. Those who escaped in their ships to Mycale were destroyed there. Leotychidas, the Lacedaemonian king who commanded the Greeks at Mycale, returned home with the allies from the Peloponnese. The Athenians stayed behind with the allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, who had already rebelled against the king. They besieged Sestos, which the Persians held. They remained through the winter and took it after the non-Greeks abandoned it. After this they sailed out of the Hellespont, each contingent returning to its own city.

3 Once the non-Greeks had left their territory, the Athenian people immediately began bringing back their children, wives, and remaining belongings from the places where they had taken them for safety. They prepared to rebuild the city and its walls. Only small stretches of the surrounding wall were still standing. Most houses had collapsed, and only a few remained. These were the houses in which the leading Persians themselves had stayed.

CHAPTER 90

1 When the Lacedaemonians learned what was being planned, they sent ambassadors. They themselves would have preferred to see neither Athens nor any other city protected by a wall. But their main reason was pressure from their allies. These feared the unprecedented size of the Athenian fleet and the daring the Athenians had shown in the Persian War.

2 They asked the Athenians not to build walls. Instead, they should join the Lacedaemonians in tearing down the surrounding walls of any cities outside the Peloponnese that still had them. They did not tell the Athenians their real

aim or their suspicions. They said that if the non-Greek enemy invaded again, he would have no fortified base from which to attack, as he had recently attacked from Thebes. The Peloponnese, they said, would provide everyone with an adequate refuge and base of operations.

3 On Themistocles' advice, the Athenians answered the Lacedaemonians' proposals by saying they would send ambassadors to discuss them, and immediately sent them away. Themistocles told them to send him to Lacedaemon as quickly as possible. They should choose other ambassadors to go with him, but not send them immediately. Instead, they should hold them back until they had raised the wall to the minimum height needed to fight from it. Everyone in the city was to work on the wall [the men themselves, the women, and the children]. They were to spare no private or public building that could supply useful material for the work, but tear them all down.

4 After giving these instructions, and indicating that he himself would take care of everything else at Lacedaemon, he left.

5 When he reached Lacedaemon, he did not approach the authorities. Instead, he put things off and made excuses. Whenever an official asked why he was not coming before the government, he said he was waiting for the other ambassadors. Some business had delayed them, but he expected them soon and was surprised that they had not yet arrived.

CHAPTER 91

1 His listeners believed Themistocles because of their friendship with him. But other people arrived and reported clearly that the wall was being built and was already gaining height. The Lacedaemonians could see no way to disbelieve them.

2 Themistocles realized this and told them not to let reports mislead them. Instead, they should send reliable men of their own to inspect the work and report truthfully.

3 So they sent men. Themistocles secretly sent the Athenians instructions about them. They were to detain these men as discreetly as possible and not release them until he and his fellow ambassadors had returned. By now those ambassadors had joined him: Abronichus son of Lysicles and Aristides son of Lysimachus. They reported that the wall was high enough. He was afraid that once the Lacedaemonians heard the truth, they would not let them leave.

4 The Athenians detained the ambassadors as instructed. Themistocles now came before the Lacedaemonians and said openly that their city had already been walled well enough to protect its inhabitants. If the Lacedaemonians or their allies wanted to send ambassadors to them, they must from now on approach people who could judge both their own interests and the common interest.

5 He said that when the Athenians thought it better to abandon their city and board their ships, they had made that decision and dared to act without consulting the Lacedaemonians. And whenever they had deliberated with them, their judgment had proved second to no one's.

6 So now, too, they thought it better for their city to have a wall. This would be more useful both to their own citizens individually and to the allies as a whole.

7 Without comparable military resources, it was impossible to contribute to joint decisions on anything like equal terms. Either all the allies must be without walls, he said, or the Lacedaemonians must accept that Athens' action was right.

CHAPTER 92

1 The Lacedaemonians heard this without showing any anger toward the Athenians. Their embassy had supposedly come not to forbid the wall, but to offer advice for the common good. At that time, too, they felt particularly

friendly toward the Athenians because of their determination against the Persians. Still, they were secretly annoyed that their wishes had been frustrated. The ambassadors on both sides returned home without any formal complaint.

CHAPTER 93

1 This was how the Athenians walled their city in a short time.

2 Even now, the construction clearly shows that it was done in a hurry. The foundations contain stones of all kinds, in some places not even fitted together, but laid just as each was brought in. Many gravestones and worked stones were built into the wall. The city's circuit had been extended in every direction. For this reason they hurried to collect everything without distinction.

3 Themistocles also persuaded them to finish the building work at Piraeus. It had been started earlier, during his year in office as archon of Athens. He thought the site was a good one, with three natural harbors. He also thought that becoming seafarers gave the Athenians a great advantage in building up

4 their power. He was the first to dare to say that they must concentrate on the sea. In doing so, he immediately began laying the foundations of their empire.

5 On his advice they built the wall around Piraeus to the thickness still visible today. Two carts bringing stones could pass each other on it. Inside there was neither rubble nor clay, but large stones fitted together and cut square. On the outside, they were fastened to each other with iron and lead. The wall was completed to only about half the height he had intended.

6 He wanted its height and thickness to discourage enemy attacks. He thought a few men, even those least fit for service, would be enough to guard it. The rest could board the ships.

7 He put his greatest trust in the ships. In my view, he saw that the king's army could advance more easily by sea than by land. He thought Piraeus more useful than the upper city. He often advised the Athenians that if they were ever over-

powered on land, they should go down to Piraeus and use their ships to resist all their enemies.

8 In this way the Athenians built their walls and made their other preparations immediately after the Persians withdrew.

CHAPTER 94

1 Pausanias son of Cleombrotus was sent out from Lacedaemon as general of the Greeks, with twenty ships from the Peloponnese. The Athenians sailed with him with thirty ships, along with a large force of the other allies.

2 They campaigned against Cyprus and subdued most of it. Later they went against Byzantium, which the Persians held, and took it by siege while Pausanias was in command.

CHAPTER 95

1 By now his violent behavior was angering the other Greeks, especially the Ionians and those who had recently been freed from the king. They kept approaching the Athenians, asking them to become their leaders because of their shared ancestry. They also asked them not to let Pausanias use force against them wherever he tried to do so.

2 The Athenians accepted these appeals. They were determined not to stand by and allow this, and to arrange other matters as seemed best to them.

3 Meanwhile, the Lacedaemonians recalled Pausanias to investigate the reports they were hearing. Greeks arriving at Lacedaemon accused him of many abuses. His conduct seemed more like an imitation of a tyranny than a general's command.

4 His recall coincided with the allies' move to the Athenian side because of their hatred of him. Only the soldiers from the Peloponnese did not change sides.

5 When he reached Lacedaemon, he was held accountable for wrongs done to particular individuals, but was acquitted of the most serious charges. One of the main accusations against him was collaboration with the Persians, and this seemed very clearly established.

6 They did not send him out as commander again. Instead they sent Dorcis and some others with a small force. But the allies would no longer grant them the leadership.

7 When these men realized this, they went home. The Lacedaemonians sent no others out afterward. They were afraid that men who went abroad would become corrupted, as they had seen happen with Pausanias. They also wanted to be free of the Persian War. They thought the Athenians capable of leading it, and at that time they were on friendly terms with them.

CHAPTER 96

1 In this way the Athenians took over the leadership with the consent of the allies, who hated Pausanias. They decided which cities must provide money for the war against the non-Greeks and which must provide ships. The declared aim was to repay the harm they had suffered by laying waste the king's territory.

2 It was then that the Athenians first established the office of Treasurers of the Greeks. These received the tribute, as the monetary contribution was called. The first tribute assessed was 460 talents. Their treasury was on Delos, and their meetings were held in the sanctuary there.

CHAPTER 97

1 At first the Athenians led allies who governed themselves and made their decisions in joint meetings. Between the Persian War and this present war, the Athenians carried out the following military and political actions. These involved fighting the non-Greeks, their own allies when they rebelled, and whichever Peloponnesians they came up against on each occasion.

2 I have written about these events and made this departure from my main account for the following reason. All earlier writers had left this period out. They wrote either about Greek affairs before the Persian Wars or about the Persian Wars themselves. Hellanicus did touch on these events in his history of Attica, but only briefly and without accurate dates. At the same time, this account shows how the Athenian empire was established.

CHAPTER 98

1 First, under the command of Cimon son of Miltiades, they besieged and captured Eion on the Strymon, which the Persians held, and enslaved its people.

2 Next they enslaved the people of Scyros, the island in the Aegean inhabited by Dolopians, and settled it themselves.

3 They also fought a war against the Carystians, in which the other Euboeans took no part. Eventually the two sides reached an agreement.

4 After this they fought the Naxians, who had revolted, and forced them to surrender by siege. This was the first allied city to be reduced to subjection in violation of the established arrangement. Later the same happened to the other cities, as circumstances brought it about in each case.

CHAPTER 99

1 There were various reasons for the revolts. The main ones were failures to provide the required tribute and ships, and, in some cases, failure to serve on campaign. The Athenians were strict in collecting what was due. By forcing people to bear hardships they were neither used to nor willing to endure, they made themselves hated.

2 In other ways, too, Athenian leadership was no longer as welcome as before. They no longer campaigned on equal terms with their allies, and they found it easy to bring rebels into submission.

3 The allies themselves were responsible for this. Because of their reluctance to go on campaign, most of them arranged to pay the money needed to cover the cost instead of supplying ships. This let them stay at home. The Athenians' fleet grew with the money the allies contributed. But when the allies revolted, they found themselves without preparations or experience for war.

CHAPTER 100

1 After this the Athenians and their allies fought the Persians both on land and at sea at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia. Under the command of Cimon son of Miltiades, the Athenians won both battles on the same day. They captured or destroyed about two hundred Phoenician triremes in all.

2 Some time later the Thasians revolted from them. They had quarreled over the trading posts and the mine that the Thasians controlled on the opposite coast of Thrace. The Athenians sailed against Thasos, won a naval battle, and landed on the island.

3 At about the same time they sent ten thousand settlers of their own and from the allies to the Strymon. They intended to settle the place then called Nine Ways, now Amphipolis. They took Nine Ways from the Edonians who held it. But when they advanced into the interior of Thrace, they were destroyed at Drabescus in Edonian territory by the combined Thracian forces. The Thracians regarded the settlement of this place [Nine Ways] as a threat.

CHAPTER 101

1 Defeated in battle and under siege, the Thasians appealed to the Lacedaemonians. They asked them to help by invading Attica.

2 The Lacedaemonians promised to do so without the Athenians' knowledge and were preparing to act. But an earthquake prevented them. At this time their Helots revolted and withdrew to Ithome, along with the Thuriatae and

Aethaeans among the perioeci. Most of the Helots were descendants of the old Messenians who had been enslaved long before. For this reason all the rebels were called Messenians.

3 So the Lacedaemonians were now at war with the people in Ithome. In the third year of the siege, the Thasians made terms with the Athenians. They tore down their wall, handed over their ships, and agreed on the money they must pay immediately and the tribute they would pay in the future. They also gave up the mainland territory and the mine.

CHAPTER 102

1 As their war against the people in Ithome dragged on, the Lacedaemonians called on their allies, including the Athenians, for help. The Athenians came in considerable numbers under Cimon's command.

2 The main reason for calling on them was their reputation for skill in attacking fortifications. The long siege seemed to show that the Lacedaemonians lacked this skill. Otherwise they would have taken the place by force.

3 This expedition caused the first open disagreement between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians. When the place could not be taken by force, the Lacedaemonians grew afraid of the Athenians' daring and readiness for political change. They also regarded them as people of a different stock. They feared that if the Athenians stayed, the people in Ithome might persuade them to join in some revolutionary action. So they sent them away, alone among the allies. They did not reveal their suspicions, but said they no longer needed their help.

4 The Athenians realized that they were being sent away not for the more favorable reason stated, but because some suspicion had arisen. They were outraged and thought they did not deserve such treatment from the Lacedaemonians. As soon as they returned, they abandoned the alliance they had made with them

against the Persians. They allied themselves instead with the Argives, the Lacedaemonians' enemies. Both peoples also entered into the same sworn alliance with the Thessalians.

CHAPTER 103

1 In the tenth year, the people in Ithome could no longer hold out and made terms with the Lacedaemonians. They were to leave the Peloponnese under a safe-conduct agreement and never set foot in it again. If anyone was caught there, he would become the slave of whoever captured him.

2 The Lacedaemonians had also previously received an oracle from Delphi telling them to release anyone who had sought Zeus of Ithome's protection.

3 The rebels left with their children and wives. The Athenians took them in, by now out of hostility toward the Lacedaemonians, and settled them at Naupactus. They had recently captured it from the Ozolian Locrians who held it.

4 The Megarians also left the Lacedaemonians and joined the Athenian alliance. The Corinthians were pressing them in a war over their territorial boundaries. The Athenians took control of Megara and Pegae. They built the Long Walls for the Megarians from the city to Nisaea and garrisoned them themselves. This was one of the chief causes of the Corinthians' intense hatred of the Athenians, which began at this time.

CHAPTER 104

1 Inaros son of Psammetichus was a Libyan and king of the Libyans bordering Egypt. Operating from Marea, the city inland from Pharos, he brought most of Egypt into revolt against King Artaxerxes. He became its ruler himself and called in the Athenians.

2 They happened to be campaigning against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and their allies'. They left Cyprus and came to Egypt. Sailing from the sea up the Nile, they gained control of the river and two of the three parts of Memphis. They fought against the third part, called the White Wall. Inside it were the Persians and Medes who had taken refuge there, and the Egyptians who had not joined the revolt.

CHAPTER 105

1 Athenians who had landed from their ships at Halieis fought a battle against Corinthians and Epidaurians. The Corinthians won. Later the Athenians fought a naval battle off Cecryphalea against Peloponnesian ships, and the Athenians won.

2 After this, war broke out between the Athenians and the Aeginetans. A large naval battle took place off Aegina, with allies supporting both sides. The Athenians won and captured seventy enemy ships. They landed on the island and laid siege to the city under the command of Leocrates son of Stroebus.

3 The Peloponnesians wanted to help the Aeginetans. First they brought three hundred Corinthian and Epidaurian hoplites across to Aegina as reinforcements. The Corinthians and their allies then occupied the heights of Geraneia and came down into Megarian territory. They thought the Athenians would be unable to help the Megarians, since so much of their army was away in Aegina and Egypt. If they did come to help, they would have to withdraw from Aegina.

4 But the Athenians did not move their army from Aegina. Instead, the oldest and youngest of the men still in the city went to Megara under Myronides' command.

5 They fought an evenly balanced battle against the Corinthians and then separated. Each side thought it had done no worse than the other in the fighting.

6 Still, the Athenians had had rather the better of it, and after the Corinthians left they put up a victory monument. The older men back in Corinth accused the Corinthians of cowardice. They made preparations and returned about twelve days later to put up a victory monument of their own, also claiming to have won. The Athenians rushed out from Megara, killed the men putting up the monument, and defeated the rest in battle.

CHAPTER 106

1 The defeated Corinthians retreated. A substantial number of them were hard pressed, missed the road, and went into a private landowner's property. A large ditch happened to surround it, and there was no way out.

2 When the Athenians realized this, they blocked the front with hoplites and placed light-armed soldiers all around. They stoned to death everyone who had gone inside. This was a major disaster for the Corinthians. The main body of their army returned home.

CHAPTER 107

1 Around this time the Athenians also began building the Long Walls down to the sea, one to Phalerum and the other to Piraeus.

2 The Phocians invaded the territory of the Dorians, the Lacedaemonians' ancestral homeland, comprising Boeum, Cytinium, and Erineum. They captured one of these towns. The Lacedaemonians went to help the Dorians with fifteen hundred hoplites of their own and ten thousand from their allies. Nicomedes son of Cleombrotus commanded them on behalf of King Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, who was still young. They forced the Phocians to agree to return the town, and then set off back home.

3 The Athenians had sailed around with their ships and were ready to stop them if they tried to cross the Crisaean Gulf by sea. Nor did they think it safe to march through Geraneia, since the Athenians held Megara and Pegae. Geraneia

was difficult to cross and was always guarded by the Athenians. They also learned that the Athenians were now planning to block this route as well.

4 They decided to stay in Boeotia and consider the safest way to get through. Another factor was that some Athenians were secretly inviting them in. These men hoped to put an end to the democracy and to the building of the Long Walls.

5 The Athenians marched out against them with their full citizen force, together with a thousand Argives and contingents from their other allies. There were fourteen thousand in all.

6 They attacked because they thought the Lacedaemonians could find no way through, and partly because they suspected a plot to overthrow the democracy.

7 Thessalian cavalry also came to help the Athenians under their alliance. During the fighting, they went over to the Lacedaemonians.

CHAPTER 108

1 A battle took place at Tanagra in Boeotia. The Lacedaemonians and their allies won, and many men were killed on both sides.

2 The Lacedaemonians went into Megarian territory, cut down the trees, and returned home through Geraneia and the Isthmus. On the sixty-second day after the battle, the Athenians campaigned against the Boeotians under Myronides' command.

3 They defeated the Boeotians in battle at Oenophyta and gained control of Boeotia and Phocis. They tore down the wall of Tanagra and took a hundred of the richest men among the Opuntian Locrians as hostages. They also completed their own Long Walls.

4 After this the Aeginetans also came to terms with the Athenians. They tore down their walls, handed over their ships, and agreed to pay tribute from then on.

5 The Athenians sailed around the Peloponnese under the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus. They burned the Lacedaemonians' dockyard, captured Chalcis, a Corinthian town, and landed in Sicyonian territory, where they defeated the Sicyonians in battle.

CHAPTER 109

1 The Athenians and their allies stayed on in Egypt. The fighting there took many different forms.

2 At first the Athenians controlled Egypt. The king sent Megabazus, a Persian, to Lacedaemon with money. He was to persuade the Peloponnesians to invade Attica and so draw the Athenians away from Egypt.

3 But he made no progress, and the money was being spent to no purpose. Megabazus returned to Asia with what remained of it. The king then sent Megabyzus son of Zopyrus, a Persian, with a large army.

4 He arrived overland, defeated the Egyptians and their allies in battle, and drove the Greeks out of Memphis. Finally he confined them on the island of Prosopitis and besieged them there for a year and six months. Then he drained the channel by diverting the water elsewhere. This left their ships on dry ground and turned most of the island into mainland. He crossed over on foot and captured the island.

CHAPTER 110

1 That was how the Greek expedition ended in disaster after six years of fighting. Of the large force, only a few survived by making their way through Libya to Cyrene. Most died.

2 Egypt came back under the king's rule, except for Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes. They could not capture him because the marshland was so extensive. Besides, the people of the marshes are the most warlike of the Egyptians.

3 Inaros, the king of the Libyans who had organized the whole Egyptian undertaking, was betrayed, captured, and impaled.

4 Fifty triremes from Athens and the rest of the alliance were sailing to Egypt as a relief force. They put in at the Mendesian branch of the Nile, knowing nothing of what had happened. Infantry attacked them from land and a Phoenician fleet from the sea. Most of the ships were destroyed, but a smaller number escaped back home.

5 That was the end of the great expedition to Egypt by the Athenians and their allies.

CHAPTER 111

1 Orestes, the son of Echecratidas, king of the Thessalians, had been exiled from Thessaly. He persuaded the Athenians to restore him. Taking their Boeotian and Phocian allies with them, the Athenians marched against Pharsalus in Thessaly. They controlled the countryside, but only within a short distance of their main body of troops, since the Thessalian cavalry kept them from going farther. They did not take the city, and none of their other aims in making the expedition came any closer to success. They went back with Orestes, having achieved nothing.

2 Not long afterward, a thousand Athenians boarded the ships at Pegae, which was in their possession. Under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus, they sailed along the coast to Sicyon. They landed and defeated in battle the Sicyonians who came out against them.

3 They immediately took Achaeans on board and sailed across to Acarnania. They attacked Oeniadae and besieged it, but did not capture it. They then returned home.

CHAPTER 112

1 After an interval of three years, the Peloponnesians and Athenians made a five-year truce.

2 The Athenians stopped fighting the Greeks. Instead, under Cimon's command, they launched an expedition against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and their allies.

3 Sixty of these ships sailed to Egypt at the request of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes. The others besieged Citium.

4 Cimon died, and food ran short, so they withdrew from Citium. Sailing off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought the Phoenicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians on land and at sea at the same time. They won both battles and returned home, together with the ships that had come back from Egypt.

5 After this the Lacedaemonians undertook the campaign called the Sacred War. They took control of the sanctuary at Delphi and handed it over to the Delphians. Later, after the Lacedaemonians had left, the Athenians in turn marched there, took control of it, and handed it over to the Phocians.

CHAPTER 113

1 Some time later, Boeotian exiles were holding Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and certain other places in Boeotia. The Athenians marched against these hostile positions under Tolmides son of Tolmaeus. Their force consisted of a thousand of their own hoplites and contingents from the various allies. They captured Chaeronea, enslaved its people, left a garrison, and began their return march.

2 On their way back, at Coronea, they were attacked by the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus, along with Locrians, Euboean exiles, and others who shared their views. These forces won the battle, killing some of the Athenians and taking the others alive.

3 The Athenians left all of Boeotia after making a truce that provided for the return of their men.

4 The Boeotian exiles returned home, and they and all the other Boeotians became independent again.

CHAPTER 114

1 Not long afterward, Euboea revolted against the Athenians. Pericles had already crossed there with an Athenian army when he received news that Megara had revolted, that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica, and that the Megarians had killed the Athenian garrison, except for those who escaped to Nisaea. The Megarians had brought in Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians to help them revolt. Pericles quickly brought the army back from Euboea.

2 After this, the Peloponnesians invaded Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria and laid waste the land. They were led by Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians. They went no farther, but returned home.

3 The Athenians crossed back to Euboea under Pericles and subdued the whole island. They settled terms with the rest of it, but expelled the Hestiaeans and took their land for themselves.

CHAPTER 115

1 Not long after returning from Euboea, they made a thirty-year truce with the Lacedaemonians and their allies. They gave up Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea, the places they held that belonged to the Peloponnesians.

2 In the sixth year, war broke out between the Samians and Milesians over Priene. The Milesians were getting the worse of the war, so they went to Athens and made strong complaints against the Samians. Some private individuals from Samos itself supported them, since they wanted to change its government.

3 The Athenians therefore sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a democracy. They took fifty Samian boys and an equal number of men as hostages, and placed them on Lemnos. Then they left a garrison behind and sailed away.

4 Some of the Samians, however, had not stayed, but had fled to the mainland. They made an agreement with the most powerful men in the city and an alliance with Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes, who then governed Sardis. After gathering about seven hundred mercenaries, they crossed to Samos at night.

5 First they rose against the people and gained control of most of them. Then they secretly removed their hostages from Lemnos and revolted. They handed over the Athenian garrison and the officials stationed among them to Pissuthnes, and immediately began preparing an expedition against Miletus. The Byzantines joined them in revolting.

CHAPTER 116

1 When the Athenians heard, they sailed against Samos with sixty ships. Sixteen were not available for the battle: some had gone toward Caria to watch for the Phoenician fleet, and others to Chios and Lesbos to call for help. With the remaining forty-four ships, commanded by Pericles and nine other generals, the Athenians fought off the island of Tragia against seventy Samian ships. Twenty of the Samian ships were troop transports, and the whole fleet was sailing back from Miletus. The Athenians won.

2 Later, forty ships from Athens and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos came to reinforce them. They landed, defeated the Samians on land, and besieged the city with three walls, while also blockading it from the sea.

3 Pericles took sixty of the blockading ships and hurried toward Caunus and Caria, because news had come that Phoenician ships were sailing against them. Stesagoras and others had also left Samos with five ships to join the Phoenician fleet.

CHAPTER 117

1 Meanwhile, the Samians suddenly sailed out and attacked the unprotected camp. They destroyed the ships on guard and defeated those that put out to meet them. For about fourteen days they controlled the sea around their island and brought in and sent out whatever they wanted.

2 When Pericles returned, they were blockaded by the fleet again. Later, more reinforcements arrived from Athens: forty ships under Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio, and twenty under Tlepolemus and Anticles. Another thirty came from Chios and Lesbos.

3 The Samians fought one short sea battle. Unable to hold out, they were forced to surrender by the siege in its ninth month. They agreed to pull down their wall, give hostages, hand over their ships, and repay the money spent on the war in scheduled installments. The Byzantines also agreed to be subjects as they had been before.

CHAPTER 118

1 It was not many years after these events that the troubles involving Corcyra and Potidaea, and the other disputes that led to this war, took place, as I have already described.

2 All these actions by the Greeks against one another and against the non-Greeks took place in roughly fifty years, between Xerxes' withdrawal and the beginning of this war. During that time, the Athenians tightened their control over their empire and greatly increased their own power. The Lacedaemonians knew this was happening, but did little to stop it and remained inactive most of the time. They had never been quick to go to war unless forced to, and they were also held back to some extent by wars of their own. At last Athenian power was plainly growing, and the Athenians began interfering with their alliance. Then

the Lacedaemonians felt they could no longer tolerate it. They decided they must act with all their energy and, if possible, destroy Athenian strength by starting this war.

3 The Lacedaemonians themselves had decided that the truce had been broken and that the Athenians were in the wrong. They sent to Delphi to ask the god whether it would be better for them to go to war. His answer, it is said, was that they would win if they fought with all their strength. He also said that he would help them, whether they called on him or not.

CHAPTER 119

1 They summoned the allies again, intending to put to a vote the question of going to war. Envoys arrived from the allied states, and a meeting was held. The other speakers said what they wished; most accused the Athenians and called for war. The Corinthians had already approached each city separately to ask it to vote for war. They feared Potidaea would be destroyed before help came. They were present at this meeting too, and came forward last to speak as follows.

CHAPTER 120

1 "Fellow allies, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians of failing to vote for war themselves. They have done so and have now brought us together for that purpose. Leaders must deal with their own interests on the same terms as everyone else, but look ahead to protect our common interests, just as in other matters everyone gives them special honors.

2 "Those of us who have already had dealings with the Athenians need no lessons in guarding against them. But those who live farther inland, away from trade routes, should understand this: unless they defend the people on the coast, they will have more difficulty getting their crops down to the sea and obtaining in return the goods the sea supplies to the mainland. They must not misjudge

what is being said now as though it did not concern them. They should expect that, if they abandon the coast, the danger may one day reach them too. This discussion concerns their interests no less than ours.

3 "That is why they must not hesitate to exchange peace for war. Sensible men stay at peace when no one wrongs them. Brave men go to war when wronged and make peace again when a good opportunity comes. They must not get carried away by success in war, or put up with injustice because they enjoy a peaceful life.

4 "A man who hesitates because he enjoys his comforts could very soon lose the very pleasures that make him hesitate, if he does nothing. And a man who takes success in war too far has not considered how unreliable the confidence is that carries him away.

5 "Many badly planned actions have succeeded because the enemy's judgment was even worse. Still more plans that seemed well thought out have ended in shameful failure. No one carries out a plan with quite the confidence he felt when thinking it through. We form our opinions in safety, but fear makes us fall short when we act.

CHAPTER 121

1 "We are now starting a war because we have been wronged and have substantial grounds for complaint. Once we have defended ourselves against the Athenians, we will end it at the right time.

2 "We have many reasons to expect victory. First, we have the advantage in numbers and military experience. Second, we all obey the orders we receive in the same way.

3 "Their strength lies in their fleet, but we will equip one ourselves from the resources each of us already has and from the funds at Delphi and Olympia. By taking out a loan, we can offer higher pay and draw away the foreign sailors in

their crews. Athenian power depends more on hired men than on their own people. Ours is less exposed to that danger, since its strength lies more in men than in money.

4 "A single victory at sea will probably defeat them completely. If they hold out, we too will have more time to practice naval warfare. Once we have brought our skill up to their level, our courage will surely give us the advantage. They cannot learn the quality we possess by nature, but we can overcome their advantage in expertise through practice.

5 "We will contribute money to meet these needs. It would be shameful if their allies never tired of paying to maintain their own slavery, while we refused to spend money to punish our enemies and secure our own survival at the same time. We must also keep them from taking that money from us and using it to do us harm.

CHAPTER 122

1 "We also have other ways to fight this war. We can encourage their allies to revolt, which would above all deprive them of the revenues that support their power. We can establish a fortified position in their country, and do other things no one can foresee now. War very rarely follows a fixed plan. It usually develops its own methods to meet whatever happens. A man who handles it calmly stands more securely. Losing his temper does nothing to make him less likely to fail.

2 "Remember, too, that if each of us were merely disputing a boundary with an equally strong neighbor, we could bear it. But the Athenians are a match for all of us together, and much stronger than any single city. Unless we resist them with one purpose, as a united body, as separate peoples, and as individual cities, our divisions will let them conquer us without trouble. And everyone must understand, however terrible it may sound, that defeat brings nothing less than outright slavery.

3 "Even to consider this as a possibility is disgraceful for the Peloponnese, as is the idea that so many cities should suffer at the hands of one. People would think we deserved our suffering, or that we put up with it through cowardice. We would look worse than our fathers, who freed Greece. We cannot even secure that freedom for ourselves. We let a city establish itself as a tyrant, yet think it right to overthrow individual rulers within a single city.

4 "We cannot see how such conduct escapes one of three very great failings: poor judgment, weakness, or neglect. Surely you have not avoided these only to turn to contempt for your enemy, which has harmed so many people. It has brought so many down that it has acquired the opposite name: stupidity.

CHAPTER 123

1 "Why spend more time blaming past actions than is useful for the present? We must work hard for the future by dealing with our current troubles. It is your inherited tradition to win distinction through hard work. Do not change your habits just because you may now have a little more wealth and freedom of action. It is not right to lose through plenty what you gained in poverty. Instead, go to war confidently. There are many grounds for confidence. The god has advised it and has himself promised to help. All the rest of Greece will join the struggle too, some out of fear and others for their own benefit.

2 "You will not be the first to break the truce. Even the god considers it broken, since he tells you to go to war. Rather, you will be defending a truce that has been violated. It is not those who defend themselves who break a truce, but those who attack first.

CHAPTER 124

1 "So you have good grounds for war on every side, and we all join in giving you this advice. Shared interests are the strongest basis for trust, for cities as well as individuals. Do not delay in helping the Potidaeans, who are Dorians under

siege by Ionians, although the situation used to be the reverse. Do not delay in winning back freedom for the others. We cannot keep waiting while some are already being harmed and others face the same fate before long, if people learn that we met but did not dare to defend ourselves.

2 "Fellow allies, recognize that necessity has brought you to this point, and that this advice is the best. Vote for war. Do not fear the immediate danger; look instead to the longer-lasting peace that will come from it. War makes peace more secure. Refusing to fight because you want a quiet life does not give you the same safety.

3 "Recognize that the city which has established itself as a tyrant in Greece threatens all of us alike. It already rules some and intends to rule the others. Let us attack it and force it to submit. Then we can live in safety from now on and free the Greeks who are now enslaved." That was what the Corinthians said.

CHAPTER 125

1 After hearing everyone's opinion, the Lacedaemonians called on all the allies present to vote in turn, large and small cities alike. The majority voted for war.

2 They had made their decision, but they were not prepared and could not act immediately. They agreed that each state should provide what was needed, without delay. Still, it took them not quite a year to make the necessary preparations before they invaded Attica and openly began the war.

CHAPTER 126

1 During this time they sent envoys to Athens to present complaints. If the Athenians refused any of their demands, they wanted the strongest possible justification for going to war.

2 First, the Lacedaemonians sent envoys ordering the Athenians to drive out those under the goddess's curse. The curse had arisen in the following way.

3 Long ago there was an Athenian named Cylon, an Olympic victor from a noble family and a man of influence. He had married the daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian who was tyrant of Megara at the time.

4 When Cylon consulted the god at Delphi, the answer told him to seize the Athenian Acropolis during the greatest festival of Zeus.

5 He obtained a force from Theagenes and persuaded his friends to join him. When the Olympic festival in the Peloponnese came around, he seized the Acropolis, intending to become tyrant. He thought this was the greatest festival of Zeus and that it had a particular connection with him because he had won at Olympia.

6 He did not consider further whether the greatest festival meant one in Attica or somewhere else, and the oracle had not made this clear. The Athenians too have a festival called the Diasia, their greatest festival of Zeus the Kindly, held outside the city. The whole population makes sacrifices there, with many offerings that are not animals but pure offerings of the local kind. Cylon thought he understood correctly and went ahead with his attempt.

7 When the Athenians heard, they all came in from the countryside to resist him and his followers. They surrounded them and began a siege.

8 As time passed, the Athenians grew tired of the siege, and most went away. They left the nine archons in charge of the guard, with full authority to settle the whole matter as they thought best. At that time the nine archons handled most public business.

9 Cylon's followers, who were under siege, were in a bad condition because they lacked food and water.

10 Cylon and his brother escaped. The others were in great distress, and some were even dying of hunger. They sat down as suppliants at the altar on the Acropolis.

11 The Athenians assigned to guard them saw that they were dying in the sanctuary. They persuaded them to leave on a promise to do them no harm, then led them away and killed them. They even killed some who sat down at the altars of the Revered Goddesses on the way. From then on, both the killers and their descendants were called men under a curse and offenders against the goddess.

12 The Athenians expelled these cursed men. Later, Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian also expelled them, with the help of an Athenian faction. They drove out the living, dug up the bones of the dead, and threw them out too. The exiles eventually returned, however, and their descendants are still in the city.

CHAPTER 127

1 This was the curse the Lacedaemonians demanded that the Athenians remove. They claimed that their first concern was to obtain justice for the gods. But they knew that Pericles son of Xanthippus was connected with the curse through his mother. They thought that if he were expelled, they could get what they wanted from the Athenians more easily.

2 They did not really expect him to be expelled. Rather, they expected to discredit him in the eyes of the city, by making it seem that the war would be partly due to the curse upon him.

3 He was the most powerful man of his time and directed public policy. He opposed the Lacedaemonians in everything, would not let the Athenians give way, and urged them toward war.

CHAPTER 128

1 The Athenians in turn demanded that the Lacedaemonians drive out those responsible for the curse from Taenarum. The Lacedaemonians had once made some Helots who had taken refuge in Poseidon's sanctuary [at Taenarum] leave

it, then led them away and killed them. They themselves believe that this was why the great earthquake struck Sparta.

2 The Athenians also demanded that they remove the curse connected with the goddess of the Bronze House. It had arisen as follows.

3 When Pausanias the Lacedaemonian was first recalled by the Spartans from his command in the Hellespont, they put him on trial and acquitted him of wrongdoing. He was not sent out again officially. But he took a trireme from Hermione on his own initiative and returned to the Hellespont without the Lacedaemonians' approval. His stated purpose was to fight in the Greek war. His real purpose was to negotiate with the king, as he had tried to do on the first occasion, because he wanted to rule Greece.

4 He first did the king a favor, and began the whole undertaking, in the following way.

5 On his earlier visit, after leaving Cyprus, he had captured Byzantium. The Medes held it, and some of the king's relatives and other connections were captured there. Pausanias secretly sent these prisoners back to the king without the other allies' knowledge. His official account was that they had escaped from him.

6 He did this with the help of Gongylus of Eretria, to whom he had entrusted both Byzantium and the prisoners. He also sent Gongylus to carry a letter to the king. Its contents, as later discovered, were these:

7 "Pausanias, the commander of Sparta, sends these men back to you, wishing to do you a favor. He captured them in war. I propose, if you agree, to marry your daughter and bring Sparta and the rest of Greece under your control. I believe I can accomplish this if I make my plans together with you. If any of this pleases you, send a trusted man to the coast. Through him we will conduct our discussions from now on."

CHAPTER 129

1 That was the letter's message. Xerxes was pleased with it and sent Artabazus son of Pharnaces to the coast. He ordered him to take over the province of Dascylitis, replacing its previous governor, Megabates. He also entrusted him with a reply to Pausanias, telling him to send it on to Byzantium as quickly as possible and show Pausanias the seal. If Pausanias gave him any instructions about the king's affairs, he was to carry them out as effectively and faithfully as possible.

2 Artabazus arrived, carried out the other instructions he had been given, and sent on the letter.

3 The reply said: "King Xerxes says this to Pausanias. The favor you have done me by bringing the men safely across the sea from Byzantium will be recorded forever in our royal house. I am also pleased with your proposals. Let neither night nor day stop you or make you give up carrying out any of your promises to me. Do not be held back by the expense in gold or silver, or by the size of an army you may need anywhere. I have sent you Artabazus, a good man. Work confidently with him on my affairs and yours, in whatever way will give both of us the finest and best results."

CHAPTER 130

1 Pausanias received this letter. The Greeks already held him in high regard because of his command at Plataea. Now his pride grew much greater, and he could no longer live in the usual way. He went out from Byzantium wearing Median clothes. Medes and Egyptians served as his bodyguards when he traveled through Thrace. He had his meals served in the Persian style. He could not keep his intentions to himself. Small actions gave advance signs of the much larger things he planned to do later.

2 He made himself hard to approach. He treated everyone alike with such a harsh temper that no one could come near him. This was one of the main reasons why the allies switched to the Athenians.

CHAPTER 131

1 When the Lacedaemonians learned of this, they recalled him the first time for these very reasons. Later, he sailed out a second time in the ship from Hermione, without their orders, and was clearly behaving in the same way. The Athenians besieged him in Byzantium and forced him out. But he did not return to Sparta. He settled at Colonae in the Troad, and reports reached the Lacedaemonians that he was making deals with the non-Greeks and staying there for no good purpose. At that point they delayed no longer. The ephors sent a herald with an official dispatch. They told him not to fall behind the herald on the journey back. Otherwise, the Spartans declared war on him.

2 He wanted to avoid suspicion as much as possible, and he trusted that money would clear him of the accusation. So he returned to Sparta for the second time. At first the ephors put him in prison. They have the authority to do this even to the king. Later he arranged his release and offered to stand trial before anyone who wished to prove the charges against him.

CHAPTER 132

1 The Spartans had no clear evidence. Neither his enemies nor the community as a whole had anything they could firmly rely on to punish a man of royal birth who was then holding office. He was acting as regent for his cousin Pleistarchus, the son of Leonidas, who was king but still young.

2 But his disregard for the law and his imitation of the non-Greeks gave them many reasons to suspect that he did not want to be on an equal footing with those around him. They examined the rest of his conduct to see whether he had departed anywhere from established customs. They also looked at the time

when he had claimed the right to have this couplet inscribed in his own name on the tripod at Delphi. The Greeks had dedicated it as the first offering from the spoils taken from the Medes: / After destroying the army of the Medes as leader of the Greeks, / Pausanias dedicated this memorial to Phoebus.

3 At the time, the Lacedaemonians immediately chiseled this couplet off the tripod. They replaced it with the names of all the cities that had helped defeat the non-Greeks and had set up the offering. Even then, Pausanias' action was thought wrong. Now that he had reached his present position, it seemed much more clearly to have been an action in keeping with his current intentions.

4 They also learned that he was making some sort of deal with the Helots, and this was true. He promised them freedom and citizenship if they joined him in a revolt and helped him carry out his whole plan.

5 Even so, they would not trust even some of the Helots who informed against him enough to take any drastic action. They followed their usual practice in dealing with their own people: they did not rush to make an irreversible decision about a Spartan without evidence that could not be disputed. At last, as the story goes, an informer came forward. He was a man from Argilus who was about to carry Pausanias' latest letters to Artabazus for the King. He had once been Pausanias' boy lover and was deeply trusted by him. He became afraid when it occurred to him that none of the messengers sent before him had ever returned. He made a copy of the seal so that Pausanias would not notice anything if his suspicion proved wrong or if Pausanias asked to change something in the letter. Then he opened the letters. In them he found what he had suspected: an added order that he too should be killed.

CHAPTER 133

1 When he showed them the letters, the ephors were more convinced. But they still wanted to hear Pausanias say something with their own ears. By arrangement, the man went to Taenarum to seek sanctuary. He set up a hut with two compartments divided by a partition and hid some of the ephors inside.

Pausanias came to him and asked why he had sought sanctuary. The ephors heard everything clearly. The man accused Pausanias over what he had written about him and explained the other details one by one. He said that he had never exposed Pausanias to danger while carrying out his business with the King, yet he had been chosen to die just like most of the messengers. Pausanias admitted these very things. He urged the man not to be angry about what had happened, gave him a pledge that he would be safe if he left the sanctuary, and asked him to set off as quickly as possible and not hold up their plans.

CHAPTER 134

1 After hearing the facts for themselves, the ephors left for the time being. Now that they knew for certain, they set about arresting him in the city. The story is that they were about to arrest him in the street when he saw the face of one of the ephors coming toward him and understood why he was coming. Another ephor, out of goodwill, gave him a discreet nod as a warning. Pausanias ran to the sanctuary of Athena of the Bronze House and reached it first. The sacred enclosure was nearby. He went into a small building belonging to the sanctuary, so that he would not have to suffer out in the open, and stayed there quietly.

2 At first his pursuers were too late to catch him. Afterward they took the roof off the building. They watched the doors until they had him shut inside, then walled them up. They kept watch outside and starved him out.

3 When they realized that he was about to die where he was, inside the building, they brought him out of the sanctuary while he was still breathing. He died as soon as they had brought him out.

4 They were going to throw him into the Caeadas pit [where they threw criminals]. Then they decided to bury him somewhere nearby. Later the god at Delphi told the Lacedaemonians through an oracle to move his grave to the place where he had died. He now lies in the ground in front of the sacred enclosure, as inscribed pillars show. The god also told them that their action had

brought religious pollution on them, and that they must give two bodies in place of one to Athena of the Bronze House. They made two bronze statues of men and dedicated them in place of Pausanias.

CHAPTER 135

1 Since the god himself had judged the act to have caused religious pollution, the Athenians demanded in return that the Lacedaemonians remove it.

2 The Lacedaemonians sent envoys to the Athenians and accused Themistocles as well of involvement in Pausanias' dealings with the Medes. They based this on what they found in the evidence against Pausanias, and demanded that Themistocles receive the same punishment.

3 The Athenians agreed. Themistocles happened to have been ostracized and was living at Argos, though he also visited other parts of the Peloponnese. The Lacedaemonians were ready to join in the pursuit. The Athenians sent men with them under orders to arrest him wherever they found him.

CHAPTER 136

1 Themistocles learned of this in advance and fled from the Peloponnese to Corcyra. He had done favors for its people. But the Corcyraeans said that they were afraid to keep him, since this would make enemies of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians. They took him across to the mainland opposite.

2 The men assigned to pursue him followed reports of where he was going. With no way out of his difficulties, he was forced to take shelter with Admetus, the king of the Molossians, who was not friendly toward him.

3 Admetus happened to be away from home. Themistocles appealed to his wife for protection. She instructed him to take their child and sit down at the hearth.

4 Admetus returned not long afterward. Themistocles told him who he was. He asked Admetus not to punish him now that he was a fugitive, even if he had once opposed a request Admetus had made to the Athenians. He was now in a much weaker position and would suffer at Admetus' hands. It was honorable to take revenge on equals when both sides stood on equal terms. Besides, he had only opposed Admetus over some request, not over saving his life. But if Admetus handed him over, he would be taking away his chance to stay alive. He explained who was pursuing him and on what charge.

CHAPTER 137

1 After hearing him, Admetus raised him from the hearth along with his own son, whom Themistocles had been holding as he sat there. This was the strongest form of appeal for protection. Not long afterward, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians arrived. They argued at length, but Admetus would not hand him over. Themistocles wanted to go to the King, so Admetus sent him overland to the other sea, to Pydna, which belonged to Alexander.

2 There he found a merchant ship about to leave for Ionia and went aboard. A storm drove it toward the Athenian force besieging Naxos. No one on the ship knew who he was. In fear, he told the shipowner his identity and why he was in flight. He said that unless the man saved him, he would say that the shipowner had taken money to bring him on board. The safe course was to let no one leave the ship until they could sail again. If the man obeyed, Themistocles would remember to repay him properly. The shipowner did as he asked. He kept the ship anchored offshore beyond the Athenian camp for a day and a night, and afterward reached Ephesus.

3 Themistocles rewarded him with a gift of money. Later he received money from his friends in Athens and the funds he had left for safekeeping in Argos. He traveled inland with one of the Persians from the coast and sent a letter to King Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, who had recently become king.

4 The letter said: "I, Themistocles, have come to you. I did more harm to your house than any other Greek while I was forced to defend myself against your father's invasion. But I did it much greater good when I was safe and he was again in danger during his retreat. You owe me a favor." Here he mentioned his advance warning from Salamis about the retreat, and his role in preventing the destruction of the bridges at that time, a role he falsely claimed for himself. "Now I have come with the power to do you great good. The Greeks are pursuing me because of my friendship with you. I want to wait a year and then explain to you in person why I have come."

CHAPTER 138

1 The King, it is said, was impressed by his thinking and told him to do this. During the period of waiting, Themistocles learned as much as he could of the Persian language and the customs of the country.

2 When he came to the King after the year was over, he gained greater influence with him than any Greek had ever had. This was partly because of his existing reputation and the hope he held out that he would bring the Greeks under the King's rule. Above all, it was because experience showed the King how intelligent he was.

3 Themistocles gave the clearest possible proof of the power of natural ability. In this respect he deserved more admiration than anyone else. His understanding was his own. He had not developed it through either earlier education or later study. With very little time to think, he was the best judge of what needed to be done at once. He was also the best at predicting what would happen far into the future. He could explain the matters he was handling, and even in unfamiliar matters he could still form an adequate judgment. No one was better at seeing in advance whether things would turn out well or badly, while the outcome was still hidden. In short, through natural ability and with little preparation, he was better than anyone at finding the right response on the spot.

4 He fell ill and died. Some also say that he deliberately poisoned himself because he thought it impossible to fulfill his promises to the King.

5 There is a memorial to him in the marketplace of Magnesia in Asia. He governed that district. The King had given him Magnesia for his bread, which brought him fifty talents a year; Lampsacus for his wine, since it was considered the richest wine-producing place of that time; and Myus for food to go with his bread.

6 His relatives say that, at his request, they brought his bones home and buried them in Attica without the Athenians' knowledge. It was not lawful to bury him there, since he was an exile on a charge of treason. This was how the lives of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian and Themistocles the Athenian ended. They had been the most distinguished Greeks of their time.

CHAPTER 139

1 Such were the demands that the Lacedaemonians made on their first embassy, and the counterdemands they received, about expelling those under a religious curse. On later visits to Athens they demanded that the Athenians withdraw from Potidaea and let Aegina govern itself. Above all, they stated very clearly that there would be no war if the Athenians repealed the decree about the Megarians. This decree barred the Megarians from using the harbors in the Athenian empire and the marketplace in Attica.

2 The Athenians refused the other demands and would not repeal the decree. They accused the Megarians of farming sacred land and land whose boundaries had not been settled, and of sheltering runaway slaves.

3 Finally the last envoys from Lacedaemon arrived: Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander. They said nothing of their usual earlier demands, but only this: "The Lacedaemonians want peace. There can be peace if you let the Greeks

govern themselves." The Athenians held an assembly and invited proposals for debate among themselves. They decided to consider all the issues together and give a single reply.

4 Many speakers came forward and spoke on both sides. Some argued for war. Others said that the decree should not stand in the way of peace and should be repealed. Then Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, came forward. He was the leading Athenian at that time, the most capable in both speech and action. He gave the following advice.

CHAPTER 140

1 "Athenians, I hold to the same view as always: we must not give in to the Peloponnesians. I know that people do not act in a war with the same enthusiasm they felt when they were persuaded to undertake it. Their views change with events. Even now, though, I can see that I must give much the same advice as before. Those of you who accept it should support our common decisions even if something goes wrong. Otherwise, you should not claim a share in the wisdom of our decisions when we succeed. Events can take a course as unpredictable as people's intentions. That is why we usually blame chance for anything that happens against our expectations.

2 "The Lacedaemonians were clearly plotting against us before, and they are doing so now more than ever. Our agreement says that each side must offer and accept arbitration of its disputes with the other, and that each should keep what it has. Yet they have never asked for arbitration, and they refuse it when we offer it. They want to settle their complaints through war rather than discussion. They now come to us giving orders, not simply making accusations.

3 "They tell us to withdraw from Potidaea, let Aegina govern itself, and repeal the decree about the Megarians. These latest envoys also demand that we let the Greeks govern themselves.

4 "None of you should think that we would be going to war over a small matter if we refused to repeal the Megarian decree. They put this at the front of their demands, saying that there would be no war if it were repealed. Do not leave yourselves with any reason to blame yourselves later for having gone to war over a trivial matter.

5 "This small matter contains the whole test and proof of your determination. If you give way to them on it, they will immediately order you to do something more important, because they will think you obeyed this order out of fear. But if you firmly refuse, you will make it clear that they must deal with you more as equals.

CHAPTER 141

1 "Make up your minds right now. Either obey before you suffer any harm, or go to war, which I think is the better course. If we do go to war, we must not give way over either a major or a minor demand, or hold on to our possessions in fear. When an equal orders a neighbor to meet a claim before arbitration, the largest claim and the smallest both amount to the same enslavement.

2 "Now listen to the details of the war and the resources on each side. You will see that we will be no weaker than they are.

3 "The Peloponnesians work their own farms. They have no money, either as individuals or as a community. They also have no experience of long wars or wars overseas. Their poverty means that they only make short attacks on one another.

4 "People in that position cannot often send out either fleets with full crews or land armies. They would have to be away from their own property and pay their own expenses at the same time. Besides, they would be cut off from the sea.

5 "Wars are sustained by financial reserves more than by taxes imposed under pressure. People who work their own farms are more ready to fight with their bodies than with their money. They trust that they may survive the dangers, but they cannot be sure that they will not spend all their money before the end. This is especially true if, as is likely, the war lasts longer than they expect.

6 "The Peloponnesians and their allies can stand up to all the Greeks in a single battle. But they cannot fight a war against a power organized differently from their own. They have no single council that can put a decision into effect quickly. All have an equal vote, but they come from different peoples, and each presses its own interests. The usual result is that nothing gets finished.

7 "Some want above all to take revenge on an enemy. Others want to keep damage to their own property to a minimum. They meet only at long intervals, then spend only a small part of their time considering common business. Most of it goes on their own concerns. Each thinks that his own neglect will do no harm, and that someone else will take care to look ahead on his behalf. Because everyone separately thinks the same thing, they fail to notice that their common interests are being ruined as a whole.

CHAPTER 142

1 "Most importantly, their lack of money will hold them back. They will be slow to find it and will keep delaying. But opportunities in war do not wait.

2 "Nor do we need to fear either their building a fortified position against us or their navy.

3 "It is difficult even in peacetime to build a city that can match another. It is much harder in enemy territory, especially when we would have fortified positions against them that were no less strong.

4 "If they build a fort, raids and people deserting to them might damage part of our land. But it will not be enough to stop us from sailing to their country and building fortified positions against them, or defending ourselves with our ships,

where our strength lies.

5 "Our experience at sea has given us more knowledge of warfare on land than their experience on land has given them of warfare at sea.

6 "And they will not find it easy to acquire skill at sea.

7 "Even you, who have practiced it ever since the Persian Wars, have not yet fully mastered it. How could men who farm rather than sail achieve anything worthwhile? On top of that, we will not even let them practice, since we will always be stationed against them with many ships.

8 "If only a few ships were stationed against them, they might risk an attack, letting their greater numbers give them confidence despite their lack of skill. But a large fleet will keep them shut in and inactive. Without practice, they will become less skilled and, for that very reason, more hesitant.

9 "Seamanship is a skill like any other. It cannot be practiced as a sideline whenever there is a spare moment. In fact, it leaves no room for any other sideline.

CHAPTER 143

1 "Suppose they even used the money at Olympia or Delphi and tried to lure away the foreigners in our crews with higher pay. This would be dangerous if we and our resident foreigners could not go aboard ourselves and match them. But we can do that. Most importantly, our citizens supply more and better helmsmen and other skilled crew members than all the rest of Hellas.

2 "No foreign sailor would accept the risk of exile from his own country and fight on their side with poorer chances of success, just for a few days of high pay.

3 "That, or something close to it, is how I see the Peloponnesians' position. Our own position is free of the weaknesses I have criticized in theirs. We also have other great advantages that they are far from matching.

4 "If they march into our country, we will sail against theirs. Destroying part of the Peloponnese will not have the same effect as destroying all of Attica. They cannot get other land to replace it without fighting. But we have plenty of land, both on islands and on the mainland.

5 "Control of the sea is a great advantage. Think about it: if we were islanders, who would be harder to conquer? Even now, we must think as nearly as possible as if we were. We should give up our land and houses, but keep watch over the sea and the city. We must not get angry over our property and fight a land battle with the Peloponnesians, who far outnumber us. Even if we win, we will have to fight just as many again. If we lose, we will also lose our control over the allies, the source of our strength. They will not stay quiet if we can no longer send armies against them. We should grieve over the loss of people, not houses and land. Property does not acquire people; people acquire property. If I thought I could persuade you, I would tell you to go out and destroy it yourselves. That would show the Peloponnesians that you will not obey them for the sake of this property.

CHAPTER 144

1 "I have many other reasons to expect that we will win, provided you are willing not to expand our empire while we are at war, or take on additional dangers of our own choosing. I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of our enemies' plans.

2 "But these matters will be explained in another speech, as events unfold. For now, let us send the envoys away with this reply. We will let the Megarians use our marketplace and harbors if the Lacedaemonians also stop expelling us and our allies as foreigners. Neither practice is forbidden by the treaty. We will let the cities govern themselves if they were self-governing when we made the treaty. We will do so when the Lacedaemonians also allow their own cities to govern themselves, not in a way that suits themselves [the Lacedaemonians],

but as each city wishes. We are willing to submit to arbitration under the agreement. We will not start a war, but we will defend ourselves against those who do. This reply is both fair and fitting for our city.

3 "We must realize that war is necessary. The more willingly we accept it, the less fiercely our enemies will press us. We must also realize that the greatest dangers bring the greatest honors, both to a city and to an individual.

4 "Our fathers stood up to the Medes. They did not start with resources as great as ours. They even abandoned what they had. They drove back the non-Greeks more through judgment than through luck, and more through courage than through strength. They brought our resources to their present level. We must not fall short of them. We must resist our enemies in every way and try to pass on what we have to those who come after us without any loss."

CHAPTER 145

1 This was what Pericles said. The Athenians thought that his advice was best for them and voted as he urged. They answered the Lacedaemonians in line with his proposal, both on each point as he had explained it and on the overall issue. They would do nothing under orders, but they were ready to settle the complaints by arbitration under the treaty, on fair and equal terms. The envoys went home, and no further embassies were sent after that.

CHAPTER 146

1 These were the accusations and disputes on both sides before the war. They began with the events at Epidamnus and Corcyra. Even while these disputes continued, the two sides still mixed with one another and visited each other without heralds to arrange it, though not without suspicion. What was happening was breaking down the treaty and giving grounds for war.

Book 2



CHAPTER 1

1 The war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and the allies on each side now begins at this point. They no longer had dealings with each other without a herald, and once they had entered the war, they fought continuously. The events are recorded in the order in which they happened, by summer and winter.

CHAPTER 2

1 The thirty-year truce made after the capture of Euboea had lasted fourteen years. In the fifteenth year, Chrysis had been priestess at Argos for forty-eight years, Aenesias was ephor at Sparta, and Pythodorus still had two months to serve as archon at Athens. In the sixth month after the battle at Potidaea, just as spring began, a little more than three hundred armed Thebans entered Plataea in Boeotia, an ally of Athens, at about the time of the first sleep. Their commanders were the Boeotarchs Pythangelus son of Phyleides and Diemporus son of Onetorides.

2 Some Plataeans—Nauclides and his associates—had invited them in and opened the gates. To increase their own power, they wanted to kill their political opponents among the citizens and bring the city over to Thebes.

3 They arranged this through Eurymachus son of Leontiades, a man of very great influence at Thebes. The Thebans saw that war was coming. They wanted to take control of Plataea, which had always been hostile to them, while it was still peacetime and before war had openly begun. This also made it easier for them to enter unnoticed, since no guard had been posted.

4 They took up a position with their weapons in the marketplace. They did not follow the advice of the men who had brought them in, who wanted them to act at once and attack their enemies' houses. Instead, they decided to make friendly announcements and try to bring the city to an agreement and friendship. The herald announced that anyone who wanted to join the alliance of all the Boeotians on their traditional terms should take his place beside them with his weapons. They thought this would easily bring the city over to their side.

CHAPTER 3

1 When the Plataeans realized that the Thebans were inside and had suddenly taken control of their city, they were terrified. They thought that far more men had come in, since they could not see in the dark. They moved toward an agreement, accepted the terms, and remained quiet, especially since the Thebans were taking no hostile action against anyone.

2 But while these arrangements were being made, they somehow realized that the Thebans were not numerous. They thought they could easily defeat them if they attacked. Most of the Plataeans did not want to break away from Athens.

3 So they decided to try. They gathered in one another's houses by breaking through the shared walls, to avoid being seen going along the streets. They put wagons in the streets without their draft animals, to serve as barricades. They made all the other preparations that seemed useful in the circumstances.

4 When they were as ready as they could be, they waited for the last darkness just before dawn and came out of the houses to attack. They did not want to face the Thebans in daylight, when the invaders would be more confident and on equal terms with them. In the dark, the Thebans would be more frightened and at a disadvantage against the Plataeans' knowledge of the city. They attacked at once and quickly began fighting at close quarters.

CHAPTER 4

1 When the Thebans realized they had been tricked, they closed ranks and fought off the attacks wherever they came.

2 They beat them back two or three times. Then the Plataeans attacked with a great uproar, while the women and household slaves on the houses shouted and screamed and threw stones and roof tiles. Heavy rain had also fallen during the night. The Thebans panicked, turned, and fled through the city. In the darkness and mud, most of them did not know which routes would take them to safety. It was the end of the month, too. Their pursuers knew the city and how to prevent them from escaping. As a result, most of them were killed.

3 One of the Plataeans closed the gates they had entered through, the only ones that were open. He used the spike at the butt of a javelin as a pin to secure the bar. They could no longer escape that way either.

4 As they were pursued through the city, some climbed onto the wall and jumped down outside; most of these died. A few escaped through an unguarded gate without being noticed, after a woman gave them an ax and they cut through the bar. But they were soon discovered, so not many got out. Others were scattered around the city and killed.

5 The largest group, which had kept together better than the rest, rushed into a large building adjoining the wall. Its doors happened to be open. They thought these were city gates and that there was a way straight through to the outside.

6 Seeing them trapped, the Plataeans debated whether to set the building on fire and burn them where they were, or deal with them in some other way.

7 In the end, these men and all the other Thebans still alive and wandering through the city agreed to hand themselves and their weapons over to the Plataeans, to do with them whatever they wanted.

8 That was what had happened to the men inside Plataea.

CHAPTER 5

1 The rest of the Theban army was supposed to arrive in full strength while it was still night, in case anything went wrong for the men who had entered. When news of what had happened reached them on the road, they hurried to help.

2 Plataea is seventy stades from Thebes. The rain that fell during the night slowed their journey. The river Asopus was running high and was difficult to cross.

3 They marched through the rain and crossed the river with difficulty. They arrived too late: some of their men had already been killed and the others were being held alive.

4 When the Thebans learned what had happened, they planned an attack on the Plataeans outside the city. People and property were still in the countryside, since this unexpected disaster had happened in peacetime. If they captured anyone, they wanted to have hostages to exchange for the men inside, in case any had been taken alive. That was their plan.

5 While they were still discussing it, the Plataeans suspected that something like this would happen. Afraid for the people outside, they sent a herald to the Thebans. He said they had acted against divine law by trying to seize the city during a truce, and warned them not to harm anyone or anything outside.

Otherwise, the Plataeans said, they too would kill the Theban prisoners they held alive. But if the Thebans withdrew from their territory, they would return the men.

6 That is the Thebans' account. They also say the Plataeans swore to this. The Plataeans deny promising to return the men immediately. They say they would do so only if an agreement was reached after negotiations. They also deny having sworn an oath.

7 In any case, the Thebans withdrew from the territory without doing any damage. As soon as the Plataeans had hurriedly brought in what was in the countryside, they immediately killed the prisoners. There were a hundred and eighty captives. One of them was Eurymachus, with whom the traitors had made their arrangements.

CHAPTER 6

1 After doing this, they sent a messenger to Athens and returned the dead to the Thebans under a truce. They arranged matters inside the city as they thought best for the situation.

2 The Athenians were told at once what had happened at Plataea. They immediately arrested all the Boeotians in Attica and sent a herald to Plataea. His instructions were to tell the Plataeans to take no further action against their Theban prisoners until the Athenians themselves had considered what to do about them.

3 They had not been told that the men were dead. The first messenger had left as the Thebans were entering, and the second just after their defeat and capture. The Athenians knew nothing of what happened afterward. They sent their instructions in this state of ignorance, and when the herald arrived, he found that the men had been killed.

4 After this, the Athenians sent a force to Plataea, brought in grain, and left a garrison. They evacuated the people least useful for defense, along with the women and children.

CHAPTER 7

1 After the incident at Plataea, the truce had clearly been broken. The Athenians prepared for war, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies did the same. Both sides planned to send embassies to the King and to non-Greeks elsewhere, wherever they hoped to get help. They also brought into their alliances cities outside their own control.

2 The Lacedaemonians ordered their supporters in Italy and Sicily to build ships in proportion to the size of their cities. These would supplement the ships already available in Greece, bringing the total to five hundred. They also ordered them to have a fixed sum of money ready. Until these preparations were complete, they were otherwise to remain quiet and admit the Athenians if they came with a single ship.

3 The Athenians reviewed their existing alliance and sent embassies especially to the regions around the Peloponnese: Corcyra, Cephallenia, the Acarnanians, and Zacynthus. They saw that, if these were firmly friendly to them, they could attack the Peloponnese from all sides and defeat it.

CHAPTER 8

1 Neither side had small plans. Both eagerly committed themselves to the war, which was natural: people always take up a new effort with greater energy at the start. There were many young men in both the Peloponnese and Athens, and their lack of experience made them willing to take part in the war. All the rest of Hellas was on edge as the leading cities came into conflict.

2 Many prophecies circulated, and interpreters chanted many oracles, both among those about to fight and in the other cities.

3 Shortly before this, Delos had also been shaken by an earthquake. It had never been shaken before within Greek memory. People said and believed that this was a sign of what was to come. They searched out every other event of the same kind that happened to have occurred.

4 Most people's sympathies were much more strongly with the Lacedaemonians, especially since they had announced that they were freeing Hellas. Every individual and city was eager to give them whatever help they could, in words and in action. Everyone felt the effort was being held back wherever he himself was not taking part.

5 That was how angry most people were with the Athenians. Some wanted to be free of their rule; others feared coming under it.

CHAPTER 9

1 These were their preparations and attitudes as they set out. Each side entered the war with the following cities as allies.

2 The Lacedaemonians' allies were all the Peloponnesians on their side of the Isthmus except the Argives and Achaeans, who were friendly to both sides. Of the Achaeans, only the people of Pellene fought alongside them at first; later all the Achaeans did. Outside the Peloponnese, their allies were the Megarians, Boeotians, Locrians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians.

3 Of these, the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, people of Pellene, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians provided naval forces. The Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians provided cavalry. The other cities provided infantry. This was the Lacedaemonian alliance.

4 The Athenians' allies were the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, Messenians at Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyraeans, and the Zacynthians. They also had the tribute-paying cities in the following regions: coastal Caria,

the Dorians neighboring the Carians, Ionia, the Hellespont, the regions along the Thracian coast, the islands eastward of the Peloponnese and Crete, and all the Cyclades except Melos and Thera.

5 Of these, the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyraeans provided naval forces. The others provided infantry and money.

6 These were the alliances and preparations of the two sides for the war.

CHAPTER 10

1 Immediately after the events at Plataea, the Lacedaemonians sent instructions around the Peloponnese and to their allies outside it. The cities were to prepare their troops and the supplies needed for a campaign abroad, since they intended to invade Attica.

2 As each city was ready, two-thirds of its forces assembled at the Isthmus at the appointed time.

3 When the whole army had gathered, Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians and commander of this expedition, called together the generals of all the cities, along with their most important officials and most notable men. He gave them the following advice.

CHAPTER 11

1 "Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers fought many campaigns, both within the Peloponnese and outside it. The older men among us also have experience of war. Even so, we have never marched out with a greater force than this. We are now advancing against a very powerful city, and our own army is larger and better than ever.

2 "So we must show ourselves to be no worse than our fathers, and live up to our own reputation. All Hellas has been stirred by this expedition and is watching closely. Because of its hatred of the Athenians, it wishes us success in what we

plan to do.

3 "Some may think that we are advancing in such numbers that there is little risk of the enemy meeting us in battle. But that must not make us march with any less care in our preparations. Every commander and soldier from every city must always expect that he himself will face some danger.

4 "War is unpredictable. Most attacks begin with little warning, and in a burst of anger. Often a smaller force, because it was afraid, has defended itself more successfully against larger numbers whose contempt for their opponents had left them unprepared.

5 "When campaigning in enemy territory, we must always be confident in our thinking but make our practical preparations as carefully as if we were afraid. That way we will have the most courage when attacking the enemy and the best protection when attacked.

6 "The city we are advancing against is certainly not unable to defend itself. It is very well prepared in every way. So we must fully expect its people to come out and fight. They may not have set themselves to do so now, while we are still absent, but they will when they see us on their land, plundering it and destroying their possessions.

7 "Everyone gets angry at the immediate sight of unusual suffering before his own eyes. The less people use their judgment, the more they let anger drive them into action.

8 "The Athenians are likely to do this even more than others. They think they deserve to rule other people and to invade and destroy their neighbors' land, rather than watch their own being destroyed.

9 "So remember that we are campaigning against a city of such power. Depending on the outcome, we will bring the greatest credit or disgrace to our ancestors and ourselves. Follow wherever you are led. Above everything, main-

tain discipline and vigilance, and respond quickly to orders. Nothing is better or safer than for a large army to be seen acting under a single discipline."

CHAPTER 12

1 After this speech, Archidamus dismissed the meeting. Before doing anything else, he sent Melesippus son of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens. He wanted to see whether the Athenians might now make some concession, seeing that his army was already on its way.

2 But the Athenians did not admit him to the city or to their public authorities. Pericles had previously carried a motion that they should receive no herald or embassy once the Lacedaemonians had marched out. So they sent him away without hearing him and ordered him to be outside their borders that same day. In future, if the Lacedaemonians wanted to send an embassy, they must first withdraw to their own territory. They sent escorts with Melesippus to prevent him from meeting anyone.

3 When he reached the border and was about to part from his escorts, he said just this before going on: "This day will mark the beginning of great troubles for the Greeks."

4 When he returned to the camp and Archidamus learned that the Athenians would still make no concessions, the king broke camp and advanced with his army into their territory.

5 The Boeotians provided their share of troops and their cavalry to campaign with the Peloponnesians. With the men who remained, they went to Plataea and laid waste its land.

CHAPTER 13

1 While the Peloponnesians were still gathering at the Isthmus and marching, before they invaded Attica, Pericles son of Xanthippus was one of the ten Athenian generals. Once he knew the invasion would happen, he became concerned because Archidamus was a personal friend with whom he exchanged hospitality. Archidamus might spare his farms from destruction as a private favor, or the Lacedaemonians might order this to discredit him. They had already demanded the expulsion of those under religious curses with him in mind. So he told the Athenians in the assembly beforehand that Archidamus was indeed his friend, but that this friendship must do the city no harm. If the enemy did not destroy his farms and houses as they did those of others, he would make them public property. There must be no suspicion of him on this account.

2 His advice about the current situation was the same as before. They should prepare for war and bring in their property from the countryside. They should not march out to fight, but come inside and defend the city. They should fit out the fleet, which was their strength, and keep a firm hold on their allies. He said their power depended on the money coming in from the allies. Success in war depended mainly on sound judgment and a reserve of money.

3 He told them to be confident. Apart from its other income, the city received an average of six hundred talents a year in tribute from the allies. There were still six thousand talents of coined silver on the Acropolis at that time. At its highest, the reserve had reached nine thousand seven hundred talents, but money had been spent from it on the gateways of the Acropolis, the other buildings, and Potidaea.

4 This did not include uncoined gold and silver in private and public offerings, all the sacred equipment used in processions and contests, the spoils taken from the Persians, and other such items. Their value [was] at least five hundred talents.

5 He added the considerable sums in the other sanctuaries, which they could use. If they were completely cut off from all other resources, they could even use the gold covering the goddess herself. He pointed out that the statue carried forty talents by weight of refined gold, all of which could be removed. But if they used it to save themselves, he said, they must replace it afterward with at least as much.

6 That was how he encouraged them about their money. As for hoplites, he said there were thirteen thousand, apart from those in the forts and the sixteen thousand on the battlements.

7 That was the number initially assigned to guard duty whenever the enemy invaded. They came from the oldest and youngest age groups and from the resident foreigners who served as hoplites. The Phaleric wall ran for thirty-five stades to the city's outer wall. The guarded section of that outer wall was forty-three stades long. Part of it was unguarded: the section between the Long Wall and the Phaleric wall. The Long Walls to Piraeus were forty stades long, and only the outer one was guarded. The entire circuit of Piraeus, including Munychia, was sixty stades, and half of this was guarded.

8 He stated that they had twelve hundred cavalry, including mounted archers, sixteen hundred archers, and three hundred seaworthy triremes.

9 These were the resources the Athenians had, with no fewer than the stated amount in each category, when the first Peloponnesian invasion was about to happen and they were entering the war. Pericles also made his other usual arguments to show that they would win the war.

CHAPTER 14

1 The Athenians listened and accepted his advice. They brought their children, wives, and household belongings in from the countryside. They even took down the woodwork of their houses and brought it in. They sent their livestock and draft animals across to Euboea and the nearby islands.

2 This move was painful for them, because most had always been used to living in the countryside.

CHAPTER 15

1 From very early times, this had been more characteristic of the Athenians than of other peoples. In the time of Cecrops and the first kings, right down to Theseus, the people of Attica lived in separate towns, each with its own civic hall and officials. Unless some danger arose, they did not meet with the king to deliberate. Each town governed itself and held its own councils. Some even went to war with the kings, as the Eleusinians under Eumolpus once did against Erechtheus.

2 When Theseus became king, he combined intelligence with power. Among his other reforms of the country, he abolished the council houses and governments of the other towns. He established one council house and civic hall in the present city and united everyone under it. Each person continued to occupy his own property as before, but Theseus required them all to use this one city as their political center. With everyone now contributing to it, the city grew great, and Theseus handed it down to those who came after him. From that time to the present, the Athenians have celebrated the Synoecia, a publicly funded festival for the goddess.

3 Before this, the city consisted of what is now the Acropolis and the ground below it, mainly on the southern side.

4 Here is evidence for this. There are sanctuaries of other gods, too, on the Acropolis itself, and the sanctuaries outside it are mostly situated toward this part of the city. These include the sanctuary of Olympian Zeus, the Pythian sanctuary, the sanctuary of Earth, and that of Dionysus in the Marshes. The older Dionysia are celebrated for this god [on the twelfth day] of the month Anthesterion, as is still the custom among the Ionians descended from the Athenians. Other ancient sanctuaries also stand in this area.

5 The fountain now called Enneacrunus, because the tyrants fitted it out in its present form, was formerly called Callirrhoe, when its springs lay open. Because it was nearby, the people of that time used it for their most important needs. From this ancient practice comes the custom, still kept today, of using its water before weddings and for other religious ceremonies.

6 Because the earliest settlement was in this area, the Athenians still call the Acropolis the City to this day.

CHAPTER 16

1 The Athenians had therefore long lived in independent settlements across the countryside. Even after they were united into one city, most people, in both earlier and later generations down to this war, continued by habit to be born and live in the country. Moving away with their entire households was not easy for them, especially since they had only recently restored their homes and property after the Persian Wars.

2 They were upset and found it hard to leave their houses and the sanctuaries that had always belonged to their families since the old form of government. They faced a change in their way of life. Each person felt that he was leaving nothing less than his own city.

CHAPTER 17

1 When they reached the city, a few had homes there, and some found shelter with friends or relatives. But most settled in the unoccupied parts of the city and in all the sanctuaries and shrines of heroes, except the Acropolis, the Eleusinium, and any other place securely closed off. They even occupied the so-called Pelargic ground below the Acropolis. A curse forbade anyone to live there, and the last words of an oracle from Delphi also prohibited it, saying, "The Pelargic ground is better left unused." Yet the pressure of their immediate need made them settle there anyway.

2 In my view, the oracle came true in the opposite way from what people expected. The city did not suffer disasters because the occupation was unlawful. Instead, the war forced people to occupy the ground. Without naming the war, the oracle foresaw that the place would only be settled in bad circumstances.

3 Many also made themselves homes in the towers of the walls and wherever each could find room. The city could not hold them all when they gathered there. Later, they divided up and occupied the space along the Long Walls and much of Piraeus.

4 At the same time, they began their preparations for war. They gathered their allies and fitted out a hundred ships for an attack on the Peloponnese.

5 That was the stage their preparations had reached.

CHAPTER 18

1 The Peloponnesian army advanced and first reached Oenoe in Attica, at the point where they intended to invade. They camped there and prepared to attack its wall with siege engines and by other means.

2 Oenoe stood on the border between Attica and Boeotia. It had been fortified, and the Athenians used it as a stronghold whenever war broke out. The Peloponnesians therefore prepared their attacks, and also spent time there in other ways.

3 This brought considerable blame on Archidamus. Even while the war was being organized, people thought he was weak and friendly toward the Athenians, since he did not urge war enthusiastically. Once the army was assembling, the delay at the Isthmus and the slow pace of the rest of the march brought him under suspicion. Above all, they objected to the delay at Oenoe.

4 During this time the Athenians were bringing their belongings into the city. The Peloponnesians thought that, if they had advanced quickly, they could have caught everything still outside, but for his hesitation.

5 That was how angry the army was with Archidamus while they remained in camp. But he held back because, it is said, he expected the Athenians to make some concession while their land was still undamaged. He thought they would hesitate to stand by and see it devastated.

CHAPTER 19

1 However, they attacked Oenoe and tried every method, but could not capture it. The Athenians sent no message through a herald either. So the Peloponnesians finally set out from Oenoe and invaded Attica. This was about eighty days after the events at Plataea [involving the Thebans who had entered it], in summer, when the grain was ripe. Their commander was Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians.

2 They camped and first devastated Eleusis and the Thriasian plain. They also put some Athenian cavalry to flight near the place called the Rheiti. Then they advanced through Cropia, keeping Mount Aegaleos on their right, until they reached Acharnae, the largest of the districts in Attica called demes. They settled there, established a camp, and stayed a long time devastating the land.

CHAPTER 20

1 The following is said to have been Archidamus's reason for remaining near Acharnae with his troops drawn up for battle, rather than going down into the plain during this invasion.

2 The Athenians had large numbers of young men in their prime and were better prepared for war than ever before. He hoped that they might come out to fight rather than stand by and see their land devastated.

3 Since they had not come to meet him at Eleusis or in the Thriasian plain, he camped near Acharnae to test whether they would come out.

4 For one thing, the place seemed suitable for a camp. For another, the Acharnians formed a large part of the citizen body: they supplied three thousand hoplites. He thought they would not stand by and see their property destroyed, but would push everyone into battle. Even if the Athenians did not come out during this invasion, he would be able to devastate the plain and advance right up to the city with less fear in the future. Once the Acharnians had lost their own property, they would not be as eager to risk themselves for other people's land. Opinion would be divided.

5 These were Archidamus's calculations as he remained near Acharnae.

CHAPTER 21

1 As long as the army was near Eleusis and in the Thriasian plain, the Athenians still had some hope that it would come no closer. They remembered Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians. Fourteen years before this war he had invaded Attica with a Peloponnesian army, reaching Eleusis and Thria, but then withdrew without advancing any farther. This was why he was exiled from Sparta: he was thought to have been bribed [to withdraw].

2 But when they saw the army near Acharnae, sixty stades from the city, they could no longer bear it. Naturally, it seemed terrible to see their land being devastated before their eyes. The younger men had never seen this happen, and the older men had seen it only during the Persian Wars. People generally, and especially the young, wanted to go out rather than stand by and watch.

3 They gathered in groups and argued fiercely. Some urged going out, while others opposed it. Reciters of oracles chanted all kinds of predictions, and people listened according to their own inclinations. The Acharnians believed they made up a very substantial part of the Athenian population. Since it was their land that was being devastated, they pressed hardest for an advance. The city

was agitated in every way. People were angry with Pericles and forgot all his earlier advice. They called him a coward for being a general who would not lead them out, and blamed him for everything they were suffering.

CHAPTER 22

1 Pericles saw that they were angry at the immediate situation and were not thinking in their own best interests. He was also sure he was right not to go out. He therefore called neither an assembly nor any other meeting, to prevent them from coming together and making a mistake through anger rather than judgment. He guarded the city and kept it as quiet as he could.

2 He did, however, keep sending out cavalry to stop advance parties from the enemy army from raiding and damaging the farms near the city. A brief cavalry fight took place at Phrygia between one unit of Athenian cavalry, with Thessalians alongside them, and the Boeotian cavalry. The Athenians and Thessalians held their own until hoplites came to help the Boeotians. They were then routed, and a few Thessalians and Athenians were killed. They recovered the bodies that same day without a truce.

3 The next day the Peloponnesians set up a victory trophy. The Thessalians had come to help the Athenians under their old alliance. The contingents were Larisaeans, Pharsalians, [Parasians], Crannonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheraeans. Their commanders from Larisa were Polymedes and Aristonous, one from each political faction, and from Pharsalus, Menon. The other cities also had their own commanders.

CHAPTER 23

1 When the Athenians did not come out to fight them, the Peloponnesians moved away from Acharnae and devastated some other demes between Mount Parnes and Mount Brilessus.

2 While the enemy was still in their territory, the Athenians sent the hundred ships they had been preparing on a voyage around the Peloponnese. On board were a thousand hoplites and four hundred archers. The generals were Carcinus son of Xenotimus, Proteas son of Epicles, and Socrates son of Antigenes.

3 They set out with this force and sailed around the coast. Meanwhile, the Peloponnesians stayed in Attica as long as their supplies lasted, then withdrew through Boeotia, not by the route they had taken in. As they passed Oropus, they devastated the land called Graice, which was occupied by the Oropians, subjects of Athens. When they reached the Peloponnese, they broke up and returned to their own cities.

CHAPTER 24

1 After their withdrawal, the Athenians established guard posts on land and at sea, intending to maintain them throughout the war. They also decided to set aside a special reserve of a thousand talents from the money on the Acropolis. This was not to be spent; they were to finance the war from their other funds. They made it punishable by death to propose or put to a vote any use of this money, unless an enemy fleet attacked the city and they needed it for their defense.

2 Along with this money, they reserved the hundred best triremes each year and appointed trierarchs for them. None of these ships was to be used for any other purpose, but only with the money against that same danger, if the need arose.

CHAPTER 25

1 The Athenians sailing around the Peloponnese in the hundred ships were joined by Corcyraeans who had come to help with fifty ships, and by some of the other allies in that region. They damaged various places as they sailed along.

They also landed at Methone in Laconia and attacked its wall, which was weak and had no defenders on it.

2 Brasidas son of Tellis, a Spartan, happened to be in that area with a garrison. When he learned what was happening, he went to help the people in the town with a hundred hoplites. The Athenian army was scattered across the countryside and facing the wall. He ran through it and got into Methone, losing only a few of his men as he broke through. He saved the city, and for this bold action he became the first man in this war to receive public praise at Sparta.

3 The Athenians sailed on and put in at Pheia in Elis. They devastated the land for two days and defeated in battle three hundred picked men from Hollow Elis and men from the neighboring district of Elis who had come to help.

4 A strong wind came down and caught them in a storm at a place without a harbor. Most boarded the ships and sailed around the headland called Ichthys to the harbor at Pheia. Meanwhile, the Messenians and some others who had been unable to board went overland and captured Pheia.

5 Later, the ships came around, picked them up, and put out to sea, abandoning Pheia. By then the main army of the Eleans had arrived to help. The Athenians sailed along to other places and devastated them.

CHAPTER 26

1 At about this same time the Athenians sent out thirty ships to operate along the coast of Locris and also to guard Euboea. Their general was Cleopompus son of Clinias.

2 He made landings and devastated parts of the coast. He also captured Thronium and took hostages from its people, and at Alope he defeated in battle the Locrians who came to help.

CHAPTER 27

1 That same summer the Athenians also expelled the Aeginetans from Aegina, including their children and wives. They accused them of being among those most responsible for the war against Athens. Since Aegina lay close to the Peloponnese, they also thought it safer to hold it by sending settlers of their own. Not long afterward they sent the settlers there.

2 The Lacedaemonians gave the expelled Aeginetans Thyrea as a place to live and farm. They did this both because of their hostility toward the Athenians and because the Aeginetans had helped them at the time of the earthquake and the Helot uprising. The territory of Thyrea lies on the border between Argive territory and Laconia and extends down to the sea. Some of the Aeginetans settled there; others scattered across the rest of Hellas.

CHAPTER 28

1 In the same summer, at the new moon—which seems to be the only time this can happen—the sun was eclipsed after noon and then became full again. It had turned into a crescent, and some stars had appeared.

CHAPTER 29

1 Also that summer, the Athenians appointed Nymphodorus son of Pythes, a man from Abdera, as their official local representative and sent for him. They had previously considered him an enemy. His sister was married to Sitalces, and he had great influence with him. The Athenians wanted Sitalces son of Teres, king of the Thracians, to become their ally.

2 This Teres, Sitalces' father, was the first to establish the great Odrysian kingdom over much of the rest of Thrace. A large part of the Thracian population is independent, however.

3 This Teres has no connection with Tereus, who married Procne, daughter of Pandion, from Athens. Nor did they come from the same part of Thrace. He [Tereus] lived at Daulia, in the land now called Phocis, which was then inhabited by Thracians. It was in this land that the women carried out their deed against Itys. Many poets, too, call the nightingale the Daulian bird when they mention it. It is also reasonable to think that Pandion arranged his daughter's marriage over this distance for their mutual benefit, rather than sending her on a journey of many days to the Odrysians. Teres, whose name is not even the same, was the first king to establish power over the Odrysians.

4 It was his son Sitalces whom the Athenians were making their ally. They wanted his help in conquering the places on the Thracian coast and Perdiccas.

5 Nymphodorus came to Athens, arranged the alliance with Sitalces, and had his son Sadocus made an Athenian citizen. He also promised to bring the war on the Thracian coast to an end. He would persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians a Thracian army of cavalry and light infantry carrying small shields.

6 He also reconciled Perdiccas with the Athenians and persuaded them to return Therme to him. Perdiccas immediately joined the Athenians and Phormio in a campaign against the Chalcidians.

7 In this way both Sitalces son of Teres, king of the Thracians, and Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, became allies of the Athenians.

CHAPTER 30

1 The Athenians in the hundred ships were still operating around the Peloponnese. They captured Sollium, a small Corinthian town, and handed over both the land and the town to the Palaereans alone among the Acarnanians, for them to occupy. They also stormed Astacus, where Euarchus ruled as tyrant, drove him out, and brought the place into their alliance.

2 They sailed to the island of Cephallenia and brought it over to their side without a fight. Cephallenia lies opposite Acarnania and Leucas and has four communities: the Palians, Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronnaeans. Not long afterward the ships returned to Athens.

CHAPTER 31

1 Toward the autumn of that summer, the Athenians invaded Megarian territory with their entire available force, both citizens and resident foreigners. Pericles son of Xanthippus was in command. The Athenians in the hundred ships that had sailed around the Peloponnese happened to be at Aegina on their way home. When they learned that the entire army from the city was in Megarian territory, they sailed over and joined it.

2 This was the largest Athenian army ever assembled in one place. The city was still at full strength and had not yet suffered from the plague. There were at least ten thousand Athenian citizen hoplites, not counting the three thousand at Potidaea. At least three thousand hoplites who were resident foreigners also joined the invasion, besides a considerable force of other, lightly armed troops. They devastated most of the territory and then withdrew.

3 Later in the war the Athenians invaded Megarian territory every year, sometimes with cavalry and sometimes with their whole army, until they captured Nisaea.

CHAPTER 32

1 At the end of this summer the Athenians also fortified Atalanta as a stronghold. This previously uninhabited island lies off the coast of the Opuntian Locrians. The fortification was intended to stop raiders sailing from Opus and the rest of Locris to damage Euboea. These were the events of this summer after the Peloponnesians withdrew from Attica.

CHAPTER 33

1 During the following winter, Euarchus the Acarnanian wanted to return to Astacus. He persuaded the Corinthians to sail there with forty ships and fifteen hundred hoplites to restore him. He also hired some mercenaries himself. The commanders of the force were Euphamidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis.

2 They sailed over and restored him. They also wanted to gain control of some other places along the coast of Acarnania and made an attempt. When they failed, they sailed for home.

3 On the way they put in at Cephallenia and landed in the territory of the Cranians. The Cranians tricked them with a kind of agreement, then attacked them when they were not expecting it, killing some of their men. They put out to sea in considerable difficulty and went home.

CHAPTER 34

1 In the same winter, following their ancestral custom, the Athenians held a public funeral for the first men to die in this war. They did it in the following way.

2 They put up a tent and lay out the bones of the dead two days before the funeral. Anyone who wishes brings an offering for his own relative.

3 At the funeral procession, wagons carry cypress coffins, one for each tribe. Each coffin contains the bones of the men who belonged to that tribe. They also carry one empty bier, covered with a cloth, for the missing whose bodies could not be recovered.

4 Anyone who wishes, whether a citizen or a foreigner, joins the procession. The women related to the dead are also present at the tomb, mourning.

5 They place the dead in the public burial ground, which is in the most beautiful suburb of the city. They always bury the war dead there, except those who died at Marathon. They judged those men's courage to be outstanding and gave

them a tomb on the battlefield itself.

6 After they have covered the dead with earth, a man chosen by the city gives a speech praising them as they deserve. He must be considered a man of sound judgment and hold a distinguished position. After this, the people leave.

7 This is how they hold the burial, and throughout the war they followed this custom whenever the occasion arose.

8 For these first dead, Pericles son of Xanthippus was chosen to speak. When the time came, he stepped forward from the tomb onto a high platform built so that as many people in the crowd as possible could hear him. He spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 35

1 "Most of those who have spoken here before have praised the man who added this speech to the funeral custom. They thought it fitting to give such a speech at the burial of men killed in war. My own view is that men who proved their courage through actions could have been sufficiently honored through actions too. You can see such honors in the public arrangements around this tomb today. The courage of many men should not depend for its credibility on whether one man speaks well or badly.

2 "It is hard to speak with the right balance when it is difficult even to establish the audience's belief that one is telling the truth. A listener who knows the facts and is sympathetic may think the account falls short of what he wants and knows to be true. Someone without that experience may think some things are exaggerated, out of envy, if he hears of an achievement beyond his own abilities. People will tolerate praise of others only so far as each thinks he could do something like what he hears described. Anything beyond their own abilities makes them envious, and then they disbelieve it too.

3 "But since earlier generations decided that this was the right practice, I too must follow the custom and try, as far as possible, to meet each of your wishes and expectations.

CHAPTER 36

1 "I will begin with our ancestors. It is right and appropriate to honor them by remembering them on an occasion like this. The same people have always lived in this land, generation after generation, and through their courage they have handed it down free to the present day.

2 "They deserve praise, and our fathers deserve even more. Besides what they inherited, they acquired the empire we now hold, at the cost of much effort, and passed it on to us who live today.

3 "Most of its expansion has been our own work—the work of the generation still living, most of us now in our mature years. We have also equipped the city with everything it needs to be fully self-sufficient in both war and peace.

4 "I will leave aside the military actions by which these possessions were acquired, and the occasions when we or our fathers eagerly fought off an attack by an enemy, whether non-Greek or Greek. I do not want to speak at length about things you know. Instead, I will first explain the practices that brought us to this position, and the political system and ways of life that made our power great. Then I will go on to praise these men. I think these subjects are appropriate to the occasion and that the whole gathering, citizens and foreigners alike, will benefit from hearing about them.

CHAPTER 37

1 "Our political system does not copy our neighbors' laws. We are a model for some others rather than imitators of anyone else. It is called a democracy because government is conducted for the many, not the few. In private disputes, everyone has equality under the law. When people are chosen for public

responsibilities, what counts is their personal ability and the reputation they have earned in a particular field, not the group they belong to. Nor does poverty stand in the way: anyone who can do something useful for the city is not barred because his social position is obscure.

2 "We act freely in public life, and in daily life we do not keep a suspicious watch on one another. We do not get angry with a neighbor for doing what he enjoys. Nor do we give him looks of disapproval which do no actual harm but are still unpleasant to see.

3 "We do not make life difficult for one another in private. In public affairs, however, respect above all keeps us from breaking the law. We obey those who hold office at any given time and the laws, especially those laid down to protect people who suffer injustice, and those unwritten rules whose violation brings shame that everyone acknowledges.

CHAPTER 38

1 "We have also provided our minds with plenty of breaks from work. We hold games and sacrifices throughout the year, as our custom requires, and have attractive homes and furnishings. The pleasure these give us each day drives away distress.

2 "The size of our city brings us goods of every kind from every land. As a result, we are as used to enjoying other peoples' products as we are the good things our own country produces.

CHAPTER 39

1 "We also differ from our opponents in the following ways in our approach to war. We keep our city open to everyone. We never expel foreigners to prevent anyone from learning or seeing things, even when an enemy might benefit from seeing something we have not kept secret. We rely less on preparations and

deception than on our own courage when it comes to action. In education, too, our opponents train painfully from their earliest youth in pursuit of courage. We live in a relaxed way, yet face dangers as great as theirs with no less readiness.

2 "Here is the evidence. The Lacedaemonians do not invade our territory on their own, but with all their allies. Yet when we invade our neighbors' territory ourselves, we usually defeat without difficulty, on foreign soil, the people fighting to defend their own homes.

3 "No enemy has yet faced our whole force together. We have to attend to our navy at the same time as we send our own men on many different land operations. But if our enemies meet some part of our force and defeat some of us, they boast of having driven us all back. If they are beaten, they claim that our entire force defeated them.

4 "Yet if we are willing to face danger with an easy way of life rather than constant hard training, and with courage that comes more from our habits than from legal compulsion, we gain an advantage. We do not wear ourselves out in advance over sufferings still to come. And when we face them, we prove no less brave than those who are always working hard. In these respects our city deserves admiration, and in others as well.

CHAPTER 40

1 "We appreciate beauty without spending too much, and we value thought without becoming soft. We use wealth as a resource for action rather than a reason to boast. Admitting that you are poor is no disgrace here. It is more shameful not to work to escape poverty.

2 "The same people can look after both their own affairs and public business. Even those occupied with their trades have a sound understanding of politics. We alone regard someone who takes no part in these matters not as someone who minds his own business, but as useless. We ourselves either make decisions

or think the issues through properly. We do not think discussion gets in the way of action. The real obstacle is going ahead with what must be done without first learning about it through discussion.

3 "We are also different in this: the same people show the greatest daring and carefully calculate what they are going to attempt. For other people, ignorance brings boldness, while thought brings hesitation. Those who understand most clearly both what is frightening and what is pleasant, but do not let that knowledge turn them away from danger, can rightly be judged the strongest in spirit.

4 "We also differ from most people in doing good. We make friends by helping others, not by being helped. The person who has done a favor is the more reliable friend. He keeps showing goodwill to the person he helped, so that the debt of gratitude stays alive. The person who owes the favor is less eager. He knows that when he returns the kindness, he will be paying a debt, not freely doing a favor.

5 "We alone help others without fear, relying less on calculations of advantage than on the confidence that comes with being free.

CHAPTER 41

1 "To sum up, I say that our whole city is an education for Hellas. I also think that each individual among us can personally meet the widest range of demands with the greatest adaptability and grace.

2 "This is not just boasting for the occasion, but a statement of fact. The city's power itself proves it, power we have gained through these ways of living.

3 "Of all cities today, ours alone proves greater in experience than its reputation suggests. It alone gives an enemy who attacks it no reason to resent the kind of people he suffers at the hands of. Nor does it give a subject any reason to complain that his rulers are unworthy of their power.

4 "We have displayed our power with great proofs, certainly not without evidence. People now and in the future will admire us. We need no Homer to sing our praises, or anyone else whose verses will please people for the moment, only for the truth to damage the impression they give of what we have done. Instead, our daring has forced every sea and land to open to us. Everywhere we have established lasting reminders of the harm and the good we have done.

5 "It was for a city like this that these men fought and died with courage, convinced that it must not be taken from them. Everyone who survives should be willing to bear hardship for it.

CHAPTER 42

1 "That is why I have spoken at length about the city. I wanted to show that our struggle does not have the same stakes as the struggle of people who enjoy none of these advantages to the same extent. At the same time, I wanted to give clear evidence for my praise of the men I am speaking about now.

2 "Most of that praise has already been given. The qualities for which I praised the city were made its own by the courage of these men and others like them. For few Greeks would words of praise seem as well matched by their deeds as they do for these men. I think that the end these men have now met reveals a man's worth: it may be the first evidence of it, or its final confirmation.

3 "Even when men have fallen short in other ways, it is right to put their courage in fighting for their country first. They have wiped out the bad with the good. They have done more to help the community than they did to harm it through their private conduct.

4 "None of these men became a coward because he valued the continued enjoyment of his wealth more highly. None put off facing danger because he was poor and hoped he might yet escape poverty and become rich. They thought punishing their enemies more desirable than either prospect, and considered this the finest danger they could face. They chose to face it and punish their

enemies, letting those other things go. They left the uncertain outcome to hope. But in acting against the danger already before their eyes, they thought it right to trust themselves. They preferred to resist and suffer rather than give in and survive. They escaped a shameful reputation, but endured the reality with their bodies. In the brief moment that decided their fate, they passed away at the height of their glory rather than their fear.

CHAPTER 43

1 "These men, then, proved themselves worthy of their city. Those who remain should pray to face the enemy more safely, but should be determined to show no less courage. Do not judge its benefits just by listening to an account of them. Someone could speak at length about the advantages of resisting the enemy, but you know them just as well yourselves. Instead, look at the city's power in practice every day and come to love it. Whenever it seems great to you, remember that men won it by daring, by knowing what needed to be done, and by having a sense of shame in their actions. Even when they failed in an attempt, they did not think that this justified depriving the city of their courage. They gave it the finest contribution they could.

2 "They gave their bodies to the community, and each received praise that does not grow old and the most distinguished tomb. That tomb is not so much where they lie as where their fame lives on, always remembered whenever an occasion for speech or action arises.

3 "For outstanding men, the whole earth is a tomb. An inscription on a monument at home is not the only sign of their memory. Even in foreign countries an unwritten memory lives in each person's mind, a memory of their spirit more than of their actions.

4 "Make these men your example. Recognize that happiness depends on freedom, and freedom on courage, and do not hold back from the dangers of war.

5 “It is not those who live in misery, with no hope of anything good, who have the better reason to risk their lives. It is those who may still suffer a change for the worse while they live, and who have the most to lose if they meet with a setback.

6 “For a man with self-respect, the humiliation that comes from acting like a coward is more painful than a death that comes without being felt, while he is strong and shares in the community’s hopes.

CHAPTER 44

1 “That is why I will offer comfort, rather than pity, to the parents of these men who are here today. They know that they have grown up amid all kinds of changes in fortune. The fortunate are those whose lot is the most honorable death, as these men’s is now, or the most honorable grief, as yours is. They are those whose allotted lives end at the same point as their happiness.

2 “I know it is hard to persuade you of this. Other people’s happiness will often remind you of the happiness you once took pride in yourselves. Grief does not come from missing good things you have never experienced. It comes from losing something you have grown used to.

3 “But those who are still of an age to have children must take strength from the hope of having others. For some of you, children born later will help you forget those who are gone. The city will benefit in two ways: its population will not be depleted, and it will be safer. People cannot take part in decisions on equal and fair terms unless they too have children to expose to the same risks as others.

4 “Those of you who are past that age should count the greater part of your lives, when you were happy, as a gain. Remember that the time left will be short, and find relief in these men’s good name. The desire for honor alone does not grow old. When age makes a person no longer useful, it is not making money that gives the greatest pleasure, as some say, but being honored.

CHAPTER 45

1 "For those of you here who are sons or brothers of these men, I see a great challenge ahead. Everyone tends to praise the dead. Even if you showed exceptional courage, you would scarcely be judged only a little below them, let alone their equals. People envy the living because they are rivals. Someone who no longer stands in their way is honored with goodwill that has no rival to challenge it.

2 "If I must also say something about the qualities of women, for those of you who will now be widows, I can put it all into a short piece of advice. Your great credit will be not to fall below the nature you were born with. And the woman who is least talked about among men, whether for praise or blame, has the greatest credit.

CHAPTER 46

1 "I too have now said, as the law requires, what I thought appropriate. In practice, the men we are burying have already received part of their honors. For the rest, the city will bring up their children at public expense from now until adulthood. In this way it offers these men and those who survive a useful reward for struggles like these. Where the greatest rewards are offered for courage, the best men are also found as citizens.

2 "Now, after each of you has mourned the person close to you, go home."

CHAPTER 47

1 This was the funeral held during that winter. When winter had passed, the first year of this war came to an end.

2 As soon as summer began, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica with two-thirds of their forces, as they had the first time. Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, was in command. They set up camp and devastated the land.

3 They had been in Attica only a few days when the disease first began among the Athenians. It was said to have struck in many places before, around Lemnos and elsewhere. But there was no record of a plague this great, or of such a loss of human life, anywhere.

4 At first the doctors could not help, because they were treating it without understanding it. In fact, they died more than anyone else, since they had the most contact with the sick. No other human skill was any use either. All the prayers people offered at sanctuaries, their consultations of oracles, and other such efforts were useless. In the end they gave these up, overwhelmed by the disaster.

CHAPTER 48

1 It is said to have started in Ethiopia beyond Egypt, then spread down into Egypt and Libya and into much of the King's territory.

2 It struck the Athenians' city suddenly, first affecting people in Piraeus. They even said that the Peloponnesians had put poison in the wells, since there were no fountains there yet. Later it reached the upper city too, and then many more people began to die.

3 Doctors and people without medical training can each give their own opinion about it: what was likely to have caused it, and what causes they think could have been powerful enough to bring about such a great change. I will describe what it was like. I will set out the signs that someone could look for, so that, if it ever strikes again, they would have some advance knowledge and be most likely to recognize it. I had the disease myself and saw other people suffering from it.

CHAPTER 49

1 Everyone agreed that this particular year was exceptionally free from other illnesses. If anyone already had an illness, it developed into this one.

2 Others were perfectly healthy when, without any apparent cause, they were suddenly struck first by intense heat in the head and redness and inflammation of the eyes. Inside the mouth, the throat and tongue immediately became blood-red, and the breath that came out was abnormal and foul-smelling.

3 Sneezing and hoarseness followed. Before long the pain spread down into the chest, with a severe cough. When it settled in the stomach, it upset it and brought on discharges of bile of every kind named by doctors, all accompanied by great distress.

4 Most people also had dry heaves, which caused violent spasms. For some the spasms eased afterward, but for others only much later.

5 From the outside, the body was neither very hot to the touch nor pale. It was reddish and bruised-looking, covered with an eruption of small blisters and sores. But inside, people burned so fiercely that they could not bear even the lightest clothing or linen coverings. They could bear nothing except being naked, and wanted most of all to throw themselves into cold water. Many who had no one to look after them actually did this, jumping into wells, driven by an unending thirst. Drinking more or less made no difference.

6 They were continually tormented by restlessness and inability to sleep. While the disease was at its height, the body did not waste away, but held out against the suffering surprisingly well. Most died on the ninth or seventh day from the internal burning, while they still had some strength. If they survived this, the disease spread down to the bowels, causing severe ulceration and, at the same time, uncontrollable diarrhea. Most of these died later from the weakness the diarrhea caused.

7 The disease began by settling in the head and then spread from the top through the whole body. Even if someone survived its worst effects, it left its mark by attacking the extremities.

8 It struck the genitals and the ends of the hands and feet. Many survived after losing these parts, and some lost their eyes as well. Others, immediately on recovering, lost all memory. They did not recognize themselves or the people close to them.

CHAPTER 50

1 The disease was beyond description. In other respects too, it attacked each person with a severity greater than human nature could bear. But this showed most clearly that it was unlike any familiar disease: although many bodies lay unburied, the birds and four-legged animals that feed on human bodies either did not approach them or died after tasting them.

2 There was evidence for this. Such birds visibly disappeared. They were not seen around the bodies or anywhere else. Dogs gave a clearer opportunity to observe what happened, because they lived with people.

CHAPTER 51

1 That, then, was the general character of the disease. I have left out many other unusual features, since individual cases differed from one another. At that time none of the usual illnesses caused any additional trouble. If one did occur, it ended in this disease.

2 Some died from lack of care, others despite receiving every attention. No single treatment could be identified that was sure to help when given. What helped one person harmed another.

3 No constitution, strong or weak, proved able to resist it. It swept away everyone, even those looked after with every kind of diet and care.

4 The worst features of the whole disaster were the despair people felt when they realized they were ill, and the way they caught the infection from one another while providing care and died like sheep. As soon as their minds turned to

hopelessness, they gave up much more readily and made no effort to resist. Infection through caring for others caused the greatest loss of life.

5 If people were afraid and unwilling to visit one another, the sick died alone. Many households were emptied because there was no one to provide care. If people did visit, they died themselves. This happened especially to people who cared about living up to a standard of decency. They felt ashamed not to visit their friends and went in without sparing themselves. In the end even family members grew too exhausted to mourn the dead, overwhelmed by the scale of the disaster.

6 Yet those who had recovered showed more pity for the dying and the suffering. They knew what it was like, and they themselves now felt safe. The disease did not attack the same person twice, at least not fatally. Others called them fortunate. In their immediate joy they themselves even had an unfounded hope that in the future they would never die of any other disease either.

CHAPTER 52

1 The move from the countryside into the city added to their existing suffering. It bore no less heavily on those who had come in.

2 There were no houses available, and people lived in huts that were stifling in that season of the year. Death came amid complete disorder. As people died, their bodies lay piled on one another. Half-dead people rolled about in the streets and around every fountain, desperate for water.

3 The sanctuaries where they had put up shelters were full of bodies, because people died there. The disaster was too much for them. Not knowing what would become of them, people stopped caring about sacred things or about what was right.

4 All their previous burial customs were thrown into confusion. People buried the dead however they could. Many turned to shameless ways of disposing of bodies, because so many of their own people had already died that they lacked

the necessary supplies. Some reached another person's funeral pyre before those who had built it, put their own dead on it, and lit it. Others threw the body they were carrying onto a pyre where another body was already burning, and went away.

CHAPTER 53

1 The disease also began a greater breakdown of law in other areas of city life. People more readily dared to do openly for pleasure what they had previously kept hidden. They saw how quickly fortunes changed: prosperous people suddenly died, while people who had owned nothing before immediately took over their possessions.

2 So they thought they should enjoy things quickly and for pleasure. They considered their lives and their property equally temporary.

3 No one was willing to put effort into what was thought honorable. They believed it was uncertain whether they would die before reaching their goal. Whatever gave immediate pleasure, and any means of making money to pay for it, came to be considered both honorable and useful.

4 Neither fear of the gods nor human law held them back. They thought worship and the lack of it made no difference, since they saw everyone dying alike. No one expected to live long enough to be brought to trial for his offenses and pay the penalty. They thought a much heavier sentence had already been passed on them and was hanging over them. Before it fell, it seemed reasonable to enjoy something of life.

CHAPTER 54

1 The Athenians were weighed down by this disaster. People were dying inside the city while their land was being devastated outside it.

2 In their distress, as was natural, they also remembered this verse, which older people said had been sung long before: / "A Dorian war will come, and plague along with it."

3 People argued that the ancient verse had said "famine," not "plague." But at the time the view that it had said "plague" prevailed, as was natural. People shaped their memories to fit what they were suffering. If another Dorian war comes after this one and happens to bring a famine, I think they will probably sing it that way instead.

4 Those who knew of it also remembered the oracle given to the Lacedaemonians. When they asked the god whether they should go to war, he answered that if they fought with all their strength, they would win. He also said that he himself would help them.

5 They thought that what was happening matched the oracle. The disease began as soon as the Peloponnesians invaded. It did not enter the Peloponnese to any extent worth mentioning. It spread above all through Athens, and then through the most heavily populated of the other places. That was what happened with the disease.

CHAPTER 55

1 After devastating the plain, the Peloponnesians moved into the region called Paralus, as far as Laurium, where the Athenians have their silver mines. First they devastated the part facing the Peloponnese, then the part facing Euboea and Andros.

2 Pericles was still a general. As during the earlier invasion, he held to the view that the Athenians should not go out to fight.

CHAPTER 56

1 While the enemy were still in the plain, before they reached the coast, he was preparing an expedition of a hundred ships against the Peloponnese. When everything was ready, he put to sea.

2 He took four thousand Athenian hoplites aboard the ships, and three hundred cavalry in horse transports. These had been made for the first time then by converting old ships. Men from Chios and Lesbos also joined the expedition with fifty ships.

3 When this Athenian force sailed, they left the Peloponnesians still in the coastal part of Attica.

4 They reached Epidaurus in the Peloponnese and devastated most of its territory. They attacked the city and had hopes of taking it, but did not succeed.

5 Sailing from Epidaurus, they devastated the territories of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione. All these places are on the coast of the Peloponnese.

6 They sailed on from there to Prasiae, a small coastal town in Laconia. They devastated its territory and captured and sacked the town itself. After doing this they returned home. By the time they got back, the Peloponnesians had already withdrawn and were no longer in Attica.

CHAPTER 57

1 Throughout the time when the Peloponnesians were in Athenian territory and the Athenians were campaigning aboard their ships, the disease killed Athenians both in the expeditionary force and in the city. It was even said that the Peloponnesians left the country sooner because they were afraid of the disease. Deserters had told them it was in the city, and they could also see the dead being buried.

2 Yet in this invasion they stayed longer than ever and devastated the whole country. They were in Attica for about forty days.

CHAPTER 58

1 During the same summer, Hagnon son of Nicias and Cleopompus son of Clinias, who were generals along with Pericles, took the force he had used. They immediately campaigned against the Chalcidians in the Thracian region and against Potidaea, which was still under siege. On arriving, they brought siege engines against Potidaea and tried every way of capturing it.

2 They did not succeed in taking the city, and their other achievements did not match the scale of their preparations either. The disease broke out there and now bore very heavily on the Athenians, destroying their army. Even the Athenian soldiers already there, who had previously been healthy, caught it from the army that came with Hagnon. Phormio and his sixteen hundred men were no longer in the Chalcidian region.

3 Hagnon therefore returned to Athens with the ships. Out of four thousand hoplites, he had lost a thousand and fifty to the disease in about forty days. The soldiers who had been there before stayed in place and continued the siege of Potidaea.

CHAPTER 59

1 After the second Peloponnesian invasion, the Athenians began to change their minds. Their land had been devastated for a second time, and both the disease and the war were weighing on them at once.

2 They blamed Pericles for persuading them to go to war and held him responsible for the disasters they had suffered. They were eager to reach an agreement with the Lacedaemonians and sent envoys to them, but achieved nothing. With no idea which way to turn, they kept pressing Pericles.

3 He saw that they were angry at their present troubles and were behaving exactly as he had expected. He called a meeting—he was still a general—because he wanted to restore their confidence. He wanted to draw their minds away from

anger and make them calmer and less afraid. He came forward and spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 60

1 "I expected you to turn your anger against me. I understand the reasons for it. That is why I called this assembly: to remind you of certain things and to challenge you if you are wrong either to be angry with me or to give in to your troubles.

2 "I believe that a city doing well as a whole benefits its individual citizens more than a city where each citizen is doing well but the whole community is failing.

3 "A man whose own affairs are going well is still destroyed along with his country if it falls. But a man who is doing badly has a much better chance of coming through safely if his country is successful.

4 "A city can cope with the misfortunes of individuals, but no individual can cope with the city's misfortunes. So surely everyone must defend it, instead of doing what you are doing now. Your troubles at home have overwhelmed you. You are giving up on the safety of the community, and you blame both me, for advising you to go to war, and yourselves, for agreeing to it.

5 "Yet the man you are angry with believes he is as capable as anyone of recognizing what needs to be done and explaining it. I also love my city and cannot be bought.

6 "A man who understands something but cannot explain it clearly is no better off than if he had never thought of it. A man with both abilities, but no loyalty to his city, will not give advice that serves its interests. And even if he is loyal as well, but lets money win him over, he will sell all these qualities for that one thing.

7 "So if you let me persuade you to go to war because you thought I had these qualities even to a moderate degree more than other men, you cannot reasonably blame me now for having done you wrong.

CHAPTER 61

1 "Of course, it is very foolish to go to war if you have a choice and everything else is going well. But if you have to choose between giving in and immediately submitting to your neighbors, or taking a risk and coming out on top, the man who avoids the risk deserves more blame than the man who faces it.

2 "I am the same man, and I have not changed my position. You are the ones changing. You agreed when you had suffered no harm, but regret it now that you are suffering. My advice looks wrong because your own resolve is weak. Each of you already feels the pain, while the benefits are not yet clear to anyone. A great change has struck you, and struck you suddenly. It has left you too dispirited to stick to your decision.

3 "What is sudden, unexpected, and far beyond anything we could calculate breaks our spirit. That is what has happened to you, above all with the disease, on top of your other troubles.

4 "Still, you live in a great city and have been brought up with habits that match its greatness. You must be willing to face the worst misfortunes and not destroy its standing. People think it equally right to blame someone who is too weak to live up to his established reputation and to hate someone who is bold enough to reach for a reputation he does not deserve. You must put aside the pain of your personal losses and work for the safety of the community.

CHAPTER 62

1 "You worry that the war will mean a great deal of hardship without bringing us victory. The arguments I have often given before, showing that this fear is mistaken, should be enough. But I will also explain something about the scale of

your imperial power that I do not think you have ever considered, and that I have not mentioned in my earlier speeches. I would not bring it up even now, since the claim sounds rather boastful, if I did not see you more frightened than you have reason to be.

2 "You think you rule only your allies. But I say that of the two parts of the world open to human use, land and sea, you are complete masters of one. This holds both for the sea you now use and for any further area you want to reach. With your present naval resources, no one can stop you sailing there—not the King or any other nation that exists today.

3 "So this power cannot be compared with the use you get from your houses and land, whose loss you regard as so great. Instead of taking their loss so hard, you should make little of them. Beside this power, they are only a little garden, an ornament of wealth. Understand that if we hold on to our freedom and keep it safe, it will easily restore these things. But those who submit to others usually find even their previous possessions reduced. Do not fall short of your fathers in either respect. They worked hard to acquire these things, rather than receiving them from others, and kept them safe before handing them on to you. It is more shameful to have something taken away than to fail in an attempt to gain it. Face your enemies not just with confidence, but with a sense that you are better than they are.

4 "Even a coward can become boastful if he is ignorant and has had good luck. But a man looks down on his opponents when his judgment also gives him confidence that he is better than they are. That is our position.

5 "When the chances on each side are equal, an intelligent understanding that we are superior makes our courage more secure. It relies less on hope, which has its strength when there is no other way out, and more on a judgment based on the resources we have. That gives us a more reliable view of what lies ahead.

CHAPTER 63

1 "You should also defend the honor the city gains from ruling others, which all of you take pride in. You must not avoid the hard work—or else you must stop pursuing the honors too. Nor should you think the struggle concerns just one thing, slavery instead of freedom. It also concerns the loss of your empire and the danger from the hatred you have earned while ruling it.

2 "You can no longer give up that empire, even if someone, frightened by the present situation, wants to play the good citizen by staying out of affairs. By now you hold it like a tyranny. Taking it may seem wrong, but letting it go is dangerous.

3 "People like that would very quickly destroy a city if they persuaded others, or even if they settled somewhere independently on their own. Staying out of affairs is not safe unless active people provide protection. It is not suited to a ruling city, but to a subject city that wants to remain safely enslaved.

CHAPTER 64

1 "Do not let citizens like these lead you astray. And do not be angry with me: you yourselves joined me in deciding on war. Our enemies invaded and did what we could expect once you refused to submit. On top of what we expected, this disease has come upon us. It is the one thing that has happened entirely beyond our expectations. I know that it has made you hate me somewhat more. That is unfair, unless you also intend to give me the credit when something unexpectedly goes well for you.

2 "We must accept what the gods send as unavoidable and face what our enemies do with courage. This has always been the city's practice. Do not let it end with you.

3 "Understand that our city has the greatest name in all the world because it does not give in to misfortunes. It has spent more lives and effort on war than any other, and has acquired the greatest power known up to now. The memory of

that power will remain forever with future generations, even if we should now give way at some point—for everything naturally declines. They will remember that we Greeks ruled over more Greeks than anyone else, that we held out in the greatest wars against them all together and against individual states, and that we lived in a city greater and better supplied with everything than any other.

4 "Someone who stays out of affairs may criticize these achievements. Someone who wants to achieve something himself will try to match them. And anyone who does not possess them will be jealous.

5 "Everyone who has claimed the right to rule others has faced hatred and resentment in their own time. But a man makes the right choice if he accepts that resentment for the greatest goals. Hatred does not last long. The honor gained now, and the fame it brings in the future, leave a memory that lasts forever.

6 "Look ahead to future honor and to avoiding disgrace now. Win both through determined action at once. Do not send heralds to the Lacedaemonians or let them see that your present hardships are weighing you down. Those who let misfortunes distress their judgment least and resist them most firmly in action are the strongest, whether they are cities or individuals."

CHAPTER 65

1 With arguments like these, Pericles tried to ease the Athenians' anger against him and turn their thoughts away from their present troubles.

2 In public policy his words persuaded them. They stopped sending envoys to the Lacedaemonians and put more energy into the war. But in their private lives they grieved over their sufferings. Ordinary people had started with less and had lost even that. The wealthy had lost fine country properties, with buildings and costly furnishings. And worst of all, they had war instead of peace.

3 They did not, however, stop being angry with him as a body until they had imposed a fine on him.

4 Not long afterward, as crowds tend to do, they elected him general again and put all their affairs in his hands. By then each man's grief over his private troubles was less intense, and they thought Pericles the most valuable man for meeting the needs of the whole city.

5 For as long as he led the city in peacetime, he guided it with moderation and kept it safe. It was at its greatest under him. And when war broke out, he evidently understood its strength in that situation too.

6 He lived for two years and six months after the war began. After his death, his foresight about the war became still clearer.

7 He had said that they would win if they held back, looked after their navy, did not try to extend their empire during the war, and did not put the city at risk. They did the exact opposite in all these respects. In other matters, apparently unconnected with the war, personal ambition and private gain led them to pursue policies that harmed both themselves and their allies. When these policies succeeded, it was mainly individuals who gained honor and profit. When they failed, they damaged the city's war effort.

8 The reason was that Pericles had power through his standing and intelligence and was clearly beyond being bribed. He could control the people while respecting their freedom. Instead of letting them lead him, he led them. Because he had not gained power by improper means, he did not have to say things to please them. His standing allowed him to speak against them even when this made them angry.

9 Whenever he saw them overconfident and arrogant at the wrong moment, his words brought them down to a state of fear. When they were frightened without reason, he restored their confidence. In name it was a democracy, but in practice it was government by its leading man.

10 His successors were more evenly matched with one another, and each wanted to take first place. So they began handing over the conduct of affairs to the people to please them.

11 This led to many mistakes, as might be expected in a great city with an empire, including the expedition to Sicily. That was not so much a mistake in judging the people they were attacking. The problem was that those who sent the expedition did not go on to make decisions that would help the men abroad. Instead, their personal attacks on one another in the struggle to lead the people weakened the army's efforts. At the same time, their disputes first brought disorder to affairs in the city itself.

12 Even after the disaster in Sicily, where they lost their other military resources and most of their navy, and with civil strife already under way at home, they still held out for three years. They faced their original enemies together with the forces from Sicily, as well as most of their allies, who had now revolted. Later Cyrus, the King's son, also joined the other side and supplied the Peloponnesians with money for their navy. The Athenians did not give in until their private disputes brought them into conflict with one another and caused their downfall.

13 Pericles' assessment at the time allowed such a margin of strength that the city could have won the war against the Peloponnesians alone very easily.

CHAPTER 66

1 That same summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies sent an expedition of a hundred ships against the island of Zacynthus, which lies opposite Elis. Its inhabitants were colonists from the Achaeans of the Peloponnese and were allies of the Athenians.

2 On board were a thousand Lacedaemonian hoplites and Cnemus, a Spartan, as admiral. They landed and laid waste to most of the country. When the inhabitants refused to come to terms, they sailed home.

CHAPTER 67

1 As the same summer ended, Aristeus the Corinthian, the Lacedaemonian envoys Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Pratodamus, Timagoras of Tegea, and Pollis, an Argive traveling in a private capacity, were on their way to the King in Asia. They hoped to persuade him to supply money and join the war on their side. First they went to Thrace to visit Sitalces, son of Teres. They wanted, if possible, to persuade him to leave his alliance with Athens and attack Potidaea, where an Athenian army was conducting a siege. They also wanted his help to continue their intended journey across the Hellespont to Pharnaces, son of Pharnabazus, who was to send them on to the King.

2 Two Athenian envoys happened to be with Sitalces: Learchus, son of Callimachus, and Ameiniades, son of Philemon. They persuaded Sitalces' son Sadocus, who had been made an Athenian citizen, to hand the men over to them. They argued that the men must not be allowed to cross over to the King and do what they could to harm his adopted city.

3 Sadocus agreed. As the men were traveling through Thrace to the ship that was to take them across the Hellespont, he had them arrested before they could board. He sent men along with Learchus and Ameiniades and ordered them to hand the prisoners over to those two envoys. The envoys took charge of them and brought them to Athens.

4 When they arrived, the Athenians feared that Aristeus might escape and do them still more harm. He had already clearly been responsible for everything that had happened at Potidaea and in the Thracian region. So that very day they killed all the prisoners without a trial, although they wanted to speak in their own defense, and threw them into a ravine. They claimed the right to retaliate in the same way the Lacedaemonians had acted first. The Lacedaemonians had killed the Athenian and allied merchants they captured sailing in cargo ships around the Peloponnese and had thrown them into

ravines. In fact, at the beginning of the war the Lacedaemonians treated everyone they caught at sea as an enemy and killed them, whether they were fighting alongside the Athenians or were on neither side.

CHAPTER 68

1 At about the same time, as the summer ended, the Ambraciots mobilized many non-Greeks and marched with them against Amphilochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia.

2 Their hostility toward the Argives first began in the following way.

3 Amphilochus, son of Amphiaraus, founded Amphilochian Argos and settled the rest of Amphilochia on the Ambracian Gulf after the Trojan War. He had returned home but was dissatisfied with the situation in Argos. He called the new city Argos after his own homeland.

4 This was the largest city in Amphilochia, and its inhabitants were the most powerful.

5 Many generations later, the Argives were hard pressed by misfortunes. They invited the Ambraciots, whose territory bordered Amphilochia, to live with them. It was from living with the Ambraciots that they first learned the Greek language they now speak. The other Amphilochians are non-Greeks.

6 In time, however, the Ambraciots drove the Argives out and held the city themselves.

7 After this happened, the Amphilochians placed themselves under the protection of the Acarnanians. Both peoples called in the Athenians, who sent them the general Phormio and thirty ships. When Phormio arrived, they took Argos by force and enslaved the Ambraciots. Amphilochians and Acarnanians then settled there together.

8 It was after this that the Athenians and Acarnanians first became allies.

9 The Ambraciots' hostility toward the Argives began with the enslavement of their own people. Later, during the present war, they mounted this expedition with their own forces, the Chaonians, and some other neighboring non-Greek peoples. They reached Argos and controlled the countryside. But when their assault failed to take the city, they went home, and each people dispersed to its own territory. These were the events of the summer.

CHAPTER 69

1 The following winter the Athenians sent twenty ships around the Peloponnese under the general Phormio. Based at Naupactus, he kept watch to stop anyone sailing into or out of Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf. They sent six other ships to Caria and Lycia under the general Melesander. These were to collect money in those regions and stop Peloponnesian pirates based there from disrupting the passage of cargo ships from Phaselis, Phoenicia, and the mainland in that area.

2 Melesander took a force of Athenians from the ships, together with allies, inland into Lycia. He was defeated in battle and killed, and lost part of his army.

CHAPTER 70

1 That same winter the Potidaeans could no longer hold out under siege. The Peloponnesian invasions of Attica had still not made the Athenians withdraw, and their food had run out. Desperate need for food had already driven them to many other extremes, and some had even eaten one another. They now approached the Athenian generals commanding the siege to discuss terms of surrender: Xenophon, son of Euripides, Hestiodorus, son of Aristoclides, and Phanomachus, son of Callimachus.

2 The generals accepted their offer of talks. They could see how their army was suffering in a place exposed to winter weather, and the city had already spent two thousand talents on the siege.

3 They agreed on these terms: the Potidaeans, their children and wives, and the hired soldiers were to leave with one cloak each, except for the women, who could take two. They could also take a fixed amount of money for their journey.

4 They left under the protection of the agreement and went to Chalcidice or wherever each could find a place. The Athenians blamed the generals for making the agreement without consulting them. They thought they could have gained control of the city on whatever terms they wanted. Later they sent settlers from among their own people to live in Potidaea. These were the events of the winter, and the second year of this war, whose history Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

CHAPTER 71

1 The following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies did not invade Attica. Instead, they marched against Plataea under Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. He stationed his army and was about to lay waste to the land when the Plataeans immediately sent envoys to him. They spoke as follows:

2 "Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, by marching against Plataean land you are acting unjustly and in a way unworthy of yourselves and your fathers. Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, a Lacedaemonian, freed Hellas from the Medes together with the Greeks who were willing to share the dangers of the battle fought here in our country. He then offered sacrifices in the Plataean marketplace to Zeus the Liberator and called all the allies together. He restored the Plataeans' land and city to them, to live there independently. No one was ever to march against them unjustly or to enslave them. If anyone did, the allies present were to defend them as far as they could.

3 "Your fathers gave us these guarantees because of the courage and commitment we showed in those dangers. But you are doing the opposite. You have come with the Thebans, our bitterest enemies, to enslave us.

4 "We call as witnesses the gods who witnessed those oaths, the gods of your ancestors, and the gods of our own country. We tell you not to harm the land of Plataea or break the oaths, but to let us live independently, as Pausanias declared was our right."

CHAPTER 72

1 When the Plataeans had finished speaking, Archidamus answered: "What you say is just, Plataeans, if your actions match your words. As Pausanias granted you, live independently yourselves, and help free the others who shared those dangers and joined you in swearing the oaths, but are now subject to the Athenians. This great force has been assembled and this war begun to free them and the others. The best way for you to keep your oaths is to join in that effort. Otherwise, do what we have already invited you to do before: live peacefully, enjoying your own possessions, and take neither side. Receive both sides as friends, but neither for purposes of war. That will be enough for us."

2 That was what Archidamus said. After hearing him, the Plataean envoys went into the city and reported his words to the people. They then answered that they could not do as he asked without the Athenians' consent, since their children and wives were in Athens. They were also afraid for the whole city. Once the Lacedaemonians had left, the Athenians might come and refuse to allow this arrangement. Or the Thebans might again try to seize their city, claiming that the oath's requirement to admit both sides gave them the right.

3 To reassure them on these points, he said: "Then hand over your city and houses to us Lacedaemonians. Show us the boundaries of your land and count your trees and anything else that can be counted. You yourselves can move wherever you like for as long as the war lasts. Once it is over, we will return whatever we have received. Until then we will hold it in trust, farm the land, and pay you enough of its produce to meet your needs."

CHAPTER 73

1 After hearing this, they went back into the city. They consulted the people and said that they wanted first to put his proposal to the Athenians. If they could persuade them, they would do as he asked. They requested a truce in the meantime and asked him not to lay waste to their land. He granted a truce for as many days as the return journey could reasonably take, and did not damage the land.

2 The [Plataean] envoys went to the Athenians and consulted with them. They then returned and gave the people in the city the following report:

3 "Plataeans, the Athenians say that at no time since we became allies have they abandoned you when you were being wronged. They will not stand by now either, but will help you as far as they can. They appeal to the oaths our fathers swore and urge you not to make any change in the alliance."

CHAPTER 74

1 After the envoys delivered this report, the Plataeans decided not to betray the Athenians. They would endure seeing their land laid waste, if necessary, and whatever else might happen to them. No one was to go outside again. Instead, they would answer from the wall that they could not do what the Lacedaemonians asked.

2 When they gave this answer, King Archidamus first called on the local gods and heroes to witness his actions. He spoke as follows: "Gods and heroes who protect the land of Plataea, be our witnesses. It was not unjustly that we came here in the first place: these people had already abandoned our sworn agreement. In this land our fathers prayed to you and defeated the Medes, and you made it a friendly place for the Greeks to fight their battle. Nor will we be acting unjustly in anything we do now. We have made many reasonable offers, but without success. Give your approval: let those who first did wrong be punished for it, and let those who lawfully punish them obtain their revenge."

CHAPTER 75

1 After calling on the gods in this way, he set the army to work on the attack. First they surrounded the Plataeans with a barrier of stakes made from the trees they had cut down. This was to stop anyone from coming out. Then they began building a mound against the city. With such a large army at work, they expected to capture it very quickly.

2 They cut timber from Cithaeron and built it up on both sides of the mound. They laid it in a crisscross pattern to serve as retaining walls, so that the mound would not spread too far outward. They brought up wood, stones, earth, and anything else that would help them build it up.

3 They kept building for seventy days and nights without a break. They worked in shifts, so that some carried materials while others slept and ate. The Lacedaemonian officers assigned to the contingents from the different cities helped supervise and forced the men to work.

4 When the Plataeans saw the mound rising, they put together a wooden framework. They set it on top of their own wall at the point where the mound was approaching. Inside this framework they built with bricks taken from nearby houses that they pulled down.

5 The timber held the structure together, so that it would not become weak as it grew taller. They covered the front with hides and leather. This protected both the workers and the timber from burning arrows and kept them safe.

6 The wall rose to a great height, but the mound grew just as quickly to match it. Then the Plataeans thought of another plan. They opened a gap in their wall where the mound touched it and began carrying the earth inside.

CHAPTER 76

1 When the Peloponnesians realized this, they packed clay into reed mats and threw these into the gap. This material would not fall apart and be carried away as the earth had been.

2 Blocked in this way, the Plataeans stopped that work. Instead they dug a tunnel out from the city. They calculated where the mound was and tunneled beneath it, then began drawing its earth back into the city. For a long time the men outside did not notice. As a result, they made less progress as they piled on more material. The base of the mound was being removed, and it kept sinking into the space left underneath.

3 Still, they feared that even this would not allow so few men to hold out against so many. So they devised another measure. They stopped work on the high structure facing the mound. Starting from the lower wall on either side of it, they built a crescent-shaped wall inside the city, curving inward. If the high wall was captured, this new one would hold out. The enemy would have to build another mound against it. As they advanced inside, they would have twice as much work and be more exposed to attack from both sides.

4 While building the mound, the Peloponnesians also brought siege engines against the city. One was moved up along the mound against the high structure. It shook a large part of it and frightened the Plataeans. Other engines attacked other parts of the wall. The Plataeans threw ropes with loops around these and pulled them off course. They also hung large beams from long iron chains attached at each end. These were supported by two poles that leaned out and extended over the wall. They raised each beam crosswise. Whenever an engine was about to strike anywhere, they let the beam drop, allowing the chains to go slack instead of holding it back. The force of the falling beam broke off the projecting head of the ram.

CHAPTER 77

1 After this, the Peloponnesians found that their engines were doing no good and that the mound was being met with a new defensive wall. They decided that the means of attack they had available would not let them take the city. So they prepared to surround it with a siege wall.

2 First, though, they decided to try fire. The city was not large, and they hoped that a wind might let them burn it down. They were thinking of every possible way to bring it under their control without the expense of a siege.

3 They carried bundles of brushwood up the mound. First they threw them into the space between the mound and the wall. With so many hands at work, this was soon full. Then, from their high position, they piled more brushwood as far into the rest of the city as they could reach. They threw in fire with sulfur and pitch and set the wood alight.

4 The flames were greater than any human-made fire anyone had seen up to that time. There had, of course, been fires in mountain forests where the wind rubbed the wood against itself, making it catch fire naturally and send up flames.

5 This fire was huge. It very nearly killed the Plataeans, who had escaped all the other dangers. A large area inside the city could not be approached. If a wind had risen and driven the fire toward the city, as the enemy hoped, they would not have escaped.

6 As it was, another event is also reported: heavy rain [from the sky] fell, with thunder, putting out the flames and so ending the danger.

CHAPTER 78

1 When this attempt also failed, the Peloponnesians kept part of the army there and sent most of it away. They built a siege wall all around the city, dividing the ground among the different cities' contingents. There was a ditch on both the

inside and the outside. They used the earth from these to make bricks.

2 The whole work was finished about the time when Arcturus rises. They left guards for half the wall—the Boeotians guarded the other half—and withdrew their army. The men dispersed to their own cities.

3 The Plataeans had already sent their children, women, oldest men, and the rest of those who could not help to Athens. Four hundred Plataeans remained to face the siege, along with eighty Athenians and a hundred and ten women to prepare food.

4 That was their total number when the siege began. There was no one else inside the walls, either slave or free. These were the arrangements for the siege of Plataea.

CHAPTER 79

1 In the same summer, at the time of the expedition against Plataea, the Athenians marched against the Chalcidians in Thrace and the Bottiaeans. They sent two thousand of their own hoplites and two hundred cavalry, when the grain was ripe. Xenophon son of Euripides was in command, with two other generals.

2 They arrived outside Spartolus in Bottiaea and destroyed the grain. It also looked as though the city would come over to them, since some people inside were working for this. But those who opposed them sent a message to Olynthus, and hoplites and other troops came to defend the city. This force came out of Spartolus, and the Athenians fought it just outside the city.

3 The Athenians defeated the Chalcidian hoplites and some mercenaries who were with them. These troops withdrew into Spartolus. But the Chalcidian cavalry and light-armed troops defeated the Athenian cavalry and light-armed troops.

4 The Chalcidians had a small number of troops armed with light shields from the region called Crusis. Just after the battle, more troops of this kind came from Olynthus to help.

5 The light-armed troops from Spartolus saw them arrive. Encouraged by these reinforcements and by the fact that they had not been defeated earlier, they attacked the Athenians again. The Chalcidian cavalry and the newly arrived troops joined them. The Athenians fell back toward the two companies they had left with the baggage carriers.

6 Whenever the Athenians advanced, the enemy gave way. But when the Athenians withdrew, they pressed after them and threw javelins at them. The Chalcidian cavalry also rode up and attacked wherever they saw a chance. They did a great deal to frighten the Athenians, and put them to flight. They pursued them for a long distance.

7 The Athenians took refuge in Potidaea. Later they recovered their dead under a truce and returned to Athens with what was left of their army. They had lost four hundred and thirty men and all their generals. The Chalcidians and Bottiaeans set up a trophy, collected their own dead, and dispersed to their cities.

CHAPTER 80

1 In the same summer, not long after these events, the Ambraciots and Chaonians wanted to conquer all Acarnania and make it break away from Athens. They persuaded the Lacedaemonians to get a fleet ready from their allies and send a thousand hoplites to Acarnania. They argued that, if the Lacedaemonians joined them in an attack by land and sea at once, the Acarnanians on the coast would be unable to come to help. They could then easily take Acarnania and gain control of Zacynthus and Cephallenia too. The Athenians would no longer find it as easy to sail around the Peloponnese. There was even hope of taking Naupactus.

2 The Lacedaemonians agreed. They immediately sent Cnemus, who was still admiral, and the hoplites in a few ships. They sent orders to the fleet to get ready and sail to Leucas as quickly as possible.

3 The Corinthians were particularly eager to help the Ambraciots, who were their colonists. The fleet from Corinth, Sicyon, and the nearby places was still being prepared. The ships from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia had arrived earlier and were waiting at Leucas.

4 Cnemus and the thousand hoplites with him crossed over without being noticed by Phormio. Phormio commanded the twenty Athenian ships that were keeping watch around Naupactus. As soon as they had crossed, Cnemus and his men began preparing the land expedition.

5 The Greeks with him were Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians he had brought himself. Among the non-Greeks were a thousand Chaonians, who had no king. Their leaders were Photius and Nicanor, members of the ruling family who held office for the year. The Thesprotians, who also had no king, took part in the expedition alongside the Chaonians.

6 Sabylinthus led the Molossians and Atintanians. He was acting as guardian for their king, Tharyps, who was still a child. Oroedus led the Parauaeans as their king. A thousand Orestae, whose king was Antiochus, served with the Parauaeans under Oroedus, with Antiochus's permission.

7 Perdiccas also sent a thousand Macedonians without the Athenians' knowledge. These arrived later.

8 Cnemus marched with this army without waiting for the fleet from Corinth. As they passed through the Argive territory, they destroyed Limnaea, an unwalled village. They then reached Stratus, the largest city in Acarnania. They thought that, if they took this city first, the rest would easily come over to them.

CHAPTER 81

1 The Acarnanians learned that a large army had invaded by land and that enemy ships would also be arriving by sea. They did not combine their forces to help, but each community guarded its own territory. They sent to Phormio to ask for help. He said he could not leave Naupactus undefended when a fleet was about to sail from Corinth.

2 The Peloponnesians and their allies divided themselves into three groups and advanced toward the city of Stratus. They meant to camp nearby. If they could not persuade the city to submit, they would try an attack on its wall.

3 The Chaonians and the other non-Greeks advanced in the center. On their right were the Leucadians, Anactorians, and the troops with them. On their left were Cnemus, the Peloponnesians, and the Ambraciots. The groups were far apart, and at times could not even see one another.

4 The Greeks advanced in formation and took precautions until they had made camp in a suitable place. But the Chaonians were confident in themselves. The mainland peoples of that region also considered them the best fighters. They did not wait to occupy a camp. Instead they rushed forward with the other non-Greeks, thinking they could take the city at the first attack and have the achievement all to themselves.

5 The people of Stratus noticed them while they were still approaching. They thought that, if they defeated them while they were on their own, the Greeks would be less ready to advance against the city. So they placed men in ambush around the city in advance. When the enemy came close, they charged out to meet them from the city and attacked from the ambushes as well.

6 The Chaonians panicked, and many were killed. When the other non-Greeks saw them giving way, they did not stand their ground any longer, but fled.

7 Neither of the Greek divisions knew about the battle. The non-Greeks had gone far ahead, and the Greeks thought they were hurrying to occupy a campsite.

8 When the fleeing non-Greeks came rushing toward them, the Greeks took them in. They brought their divisions together and stayed where they were for the day. The people of Stratus did not fight them at close quarters, since the other Acarnanians had not yet come to help. But they fired slingstones from a distance and put them in a difficult position: it was impossible to move without armor. The Acarnanians are considered exceptionally good at using slings.

CHAPTER 82

1 When night fell, Cnemus quickly withdrew his army to the river Anapus, eighty stades from Stratus. The next day he recovered his dead under a truce. The people of Oeniadae came to join him as friends, and he withdrew to their territory before the Acarnanian reinforcements arrived. From there the different contingents went home. The people of Stratus set up a trophy for the battle against the non-Greeks.

CHAPTER 83

1 The fleet from Corinth and the other allies in the Crisaean Gulf was supposed to join Cnemus. Its job was to prevent the Acarnanians on the coast from going inland to help. But it never arrived. Instead, at about the same time as the battle at Stratus, it was forced to fight a sea battle against Phormio and the twenty Athenian ships stationed at Naupactus.

2 Phormio was watching for them as they sailed out of the gulf. He wanted to attack them in open water.

3 The Corinthians and their allies had sailed with preparations suited more to a land campaign in Acarnania than to fighting a sea battle. They did not think the Athenians would dare fight their forty-seven ships with just twenty of their own. But as they traveled along the shore, they saw the Athenians sailing on a parallel course. Then, as they crossed from Patrae in Achaea toward the oppo-

site mainland, on their way to Acarnania, they saw the Athenians coming toward them from Chalcis and the river Evenus. They had not escaped notice by setting out at night. So they were forced to fight in the middle of the strait.

4 Each of the cities that had provided ships had its own commanders. The Corinthian commanders were Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas.

5 The Peloponnesians arranged their ships in the largest circle they could form without leaving a passage for the enemy to sail through. The bows faced outward and the sterns inward. Inside they placed the small craft that had sailed with them, along with their five best-sailing ships. These could come out over a short distance and be on the spot if the enemy attacked anywhere.

CHAPTER 84

1 The Athenians sailed around them in a circle, in single file. They kept passing close by and made it look as though they were about to ram. In this way they squeezed the enemy into a smaller space. But Phormio had ordered them not to attack until he gave the signal.

2 He expected that the enemy would not keep their formation as an army on land could. Instead, their ships would collide with one another, and the small craft would add to the confusion. If the wind blew out of the gulf, they would not stay steady for a moment. He was sailing around them waiting for this wind, which usually rose toward dawn. Since his ships sailed better, he also thought he could choose when to attack, and that this would be the best moment.

3 The wind came down, and the ships were already crowded into a small space. The wind and the small craft together threw them into confusion. Ships collided, and their crews pushed them apart with poles. The men shouted warnings and insults at one another. In all the noise they could not hear either the orders or the men setting the rowing rhythm. The inexperienced rowers could not lift their oars in the swell, making the ships harder for the helmsmen to control. At just this moment Phormio gave the signal. The Athenians attacked and first

sank one of the commanders' ships. Then they destroyed other ships wherever they went. They brought the enemy to such confusion that no one tried to resist. Instead they fled to Patrae and Dyme in Achaea.

4 The Athenians pursued them, captured twelve ships, and picked up most of the men from them. They sailed away to Molycreum, set up a trophy on Rhium, and dedicated a ship to Poseidon. Then they returned to Naupactus.

5 The Peloponnesians immediately sailed along the coast with their remaining ships from Dyme and Patrae to Cyllene, the port of the Eleans. After the battle at Stratus, Cnemus also came to Cyllene from Leucas with the ships from there, which were supposed to have joined this fleet.

CHAPTER 85

1 The Lacedaemonians also sent Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron to the fleet as advisers to Cnemus. They ordered him to prepare for another sea battle with better results, and not to let so few ships keep him off the sea.

2 The result seemed completely unexpected to them, especially since this was their first experience of a sea battle. They did not think their fleet was so far inferior. They thought there must have been some cowardice. They did not weigh the Athenians' long experience against their own short training. So they sent the advisers in anger.

3 When the advisers arrived, they joined Cnemus in sending orders to the cities for more ships. They also fitted out the ships already there for a sea battle.

4 Phormio also sent messengers to Athens. They were to report the enemy's preparations and describe the sea battle the Athenians had won. He asked for as many ships as possible to be sent to him quickly, since he expected another sea battle on any day.

5 The Athenians sent him twenty ships, but gave their commander an additional order to go to Crete first. Nicias, a Cretan from Gortyn who acted as Athens' local representative, had persuaded them to sail against Cydonia. He said he would bring this hostile city over to them. In fact, he was bringing in the Athenians as a favor to the Polichnitans, who were neighbors of the Cydonians.

6 The commander took the ships and went to Crete. Together with the Polichnitans, he laid waste the Cydonians' land. Winds and conditions that prevented sailing kept him there for a considerable time.

CHAPTER 86

1 While the Athenians were held up around Crete, the Peloponnesians at Cyllene finished preparing for a sea battle. They sailed along the coast to Panormus in Achaea. A Peloponnesian land army had come there to support them.

2 Phormio also sailed along to Molycrian Rhium. He anchored outside it with the same twenty ships with which he had fought the battle.

3 This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians. The other Rhium, in the Peloponnese, is directly opposite it. About seven stades of sea separate them. This is the entrance to the Crisaean Gulf.

4 So, when the Peloponnesians saw the Athenians, they too anchored at Rhium, on the Achaean side, with seventy-seven ships. This was not far from Panormus, where their infantry were stationed.

5 For six or seven days the two fleets lay at anchor opposite one another, practicing and preparing for battle. The Peloponnesians intended not to sail beyond the two points of Rhium into open water, because they feared a repeat of their earlier disaster. The Athenians intended not to sail into the narrows, because they thought a battle in a confined space would favor the enemy.

6 Then Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders wanted to fight quickly, before any reinforcements came from Athens. They first called the soldiers together. Seeing that most of them were frightened by the previous defeat and unwilling to fight, they encouraged them with this speech.

CHAPTER 87

1 "Men of the Peloponnese, if any of you are afraid of the coming sea battle because of the last one, that battle gives you no sound grounds for fear.

2 "As you know, we were inadequately prepared. We were sailing on a military expedition rather than to fight a sea battle. Chance also brought a good many things against us. And perhaps our inexperience contributed to our failure, since it was our first sea battle.

3 "So our defeat was not caused by cowardice on our part. Our determination was not beaten by superior force, and it still has grounds to challenge the result. It should not be weakened by the outcome of that misfortune. We must recognize that people can meet with bad luck, but that the same men should always show courage in their decisions. If they have courage, they have no good reason to act like cowards in any situation and use inexperience as their excuse.

4 "Your lack of experience is not as great as your advantage in boldness. You are most afraid of the enemy's skill. If they have courage, they will also remember how to put what they have learned into practice in danger. Without courage, no skill has strength in the face of danger. Fear drives out memory, and skill without the will to fight is no help at all.

5 "So set your greater boldness against their greater experience. Against the fear caused by your defeat, set the fact that you were unprepared then.

6 "You also have the advantage in numbers of ships. And you will fight close to your own land, with hoplites present. Usually the larger and better-prepared force wins.

7 "So we can find no reason at all why we should expect to fail. The very mistakes we made before will now give us lessons to learn from.

8 "Be confident, then, helmsmen and sailors alike. Each of you must do his own part and follow orders. Do not leave whatever position you are assigned.

9 "We will prepare the attack at least as well as the previous commanders. We will give no one an excuse to act like a coward. If anyone chooses to do so anyway, he will receive the punishment he deserves. Those who fight well will be honored with the rewards their courage deserves."

CHAPTER 88

1 This was how the commanders encouraged the Peloponnesians. Phormio, too, was worried about his men's anxiety. He noticed that they were gathering in small groups and showing fear at the number of enemy ships. He wanted to call them together, encourage them, and give them advice for the situation they faced.

2 He had always told them before, and prepared them to believe, that no fleet attacking them could be so large that they must not stand up to it. The men had long accepted this belief among themselves: as Athenians, they would not retreat before any mass of Peloponnesian ships.

3 But now he saw that the sight before them was discouraging them. He wanted to remind them to be confident. So he called the Athenians together and spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 89

1 "Soldiers, I see that the enemy's numbers have frightened you. That is why I have called you together. I do not think you should be afraid of things that are not dangerous.

2 "First, they have been defeated already. They do not even think they are our equals. That is why they have assembled so many ships instead of meeting us with an equal force. Second, their greatest source of confidence as they approach is their belief that courage is naturally theirs. But their confidence comes only from the fact that their experience in fighting on land usually brings them success. They think it will do the same for them at sea.

3 "But if they have the advantage on land, then by the same reasoning we should have it here. They are no braver than we are. Each side is bolder in the field where it has more experience.

4 "The Lacedaemonians who command them are bringing most of them unwillingly into danger, for the sake of their own reputation. Otherwise, after such a heavy defeat, they would never have tried another sea battle.

5 "So do not be afraid of their boldness. You give them much greater and better-founded reasons to fear you. You have defeated them already. They also believe that you would not stand against them unless you expected to achieve something far out of the ordinary.

6 "When opponents attack with greater numbers, as these men do, they rely more on their strength than on their judgment. But when men with much smaller forces dare to resist, without being forced to do so, they have very firm confidence in their own plans. The enemy understands this. Our unexpected behavior frightens them more than any reasonable estimate of our force would.

7 "Many armies have already fallen to smaller forces through inexperience, and some through lack of courage. We suffer from neither of these weaknesses now.

8 "I will not willingly fight in the gulf or sail into it. I see that a confined space is no help to a few well-handled ships with experienced crews against many ships with inexperienced crews. You cannot approach properly for a ramming attack unless you can see the enemy from a long way off. Nor can you pull back at the right moment if you are hard pressed. There is no room to break through the enemy line or turn back to attack again. These are the maneuvers of ships that

handle better. Instead, the sea battle would have to become a battle like one fought on land. In that kind of fighting, the side with more ships has the advantage.

9 "I will take care of these matters as far as I can. You must stay in good order at your ships and respond quickly to commands, especially since the attack will be made from close by. During the fighting, put the greatest value on order and silence. These help in most military operations, and especially in a sea battle. Fight off this enemy in a way worthy of what you have already done.

10 "Much is at stake in this battle for you. You can either end the Peloponnesians' hopes of success at sea, or bring closer the day when the Athenians must fear for their control of the sea.

11 "I remind you again that you have defeated most of these men already. Once men have been beaten, they are not ready to face the same dangers with the same determination."

CHAPTER 90

1 Phormio also encouraged his men in this way. The Athenians would not sail into the gulf and its narrow waters, so the Peloponnesians wanted to draw them inside against their will. At dawn they put out to sea and sailed along their own coast into the gulf. Their ships were arranged four abreast, with the right wing leading, just as they had been at anchor.

2 On that wing they placed their twenty fastest ships. Phormio might think they were sailing against Naupactus and sail along the coast himself to defend it. If he did, these ships were to prevent the Athenians from escaping their attack by sailing past the outside of their wing. Instead, they would surround them.

3 Phormio did just what they expected. When he saw them setting out, he was afraid for Naupactus, which was undefended. Reluctantly, he hurried his men aboard and sailed along the coast. The Messenian infantry moved along the shore at the same time to help him.

4 The Peloponnesians saw the Athenian ships sailing in single file, already inside the gulf and close to land. This was exactly what they wanted. At a single signal they suddenly turned their ships and advanced in a line abreast against the Athenians, each ship moving as fast as it could. They hoped to cut off all the Athenian ships.

5 Eleven of the leading Athenian ships slipped past the Peloponnesian wing as it turned and escaped into open water. But the Peloponnesians caught the others as they tried to get away. They drove them against the shore and wrecked them. They killed all the Athenians aboard who did not swim to safety.

6 They attached towlines to some of the empty ships and began pulling them away. They had already captured one with its crew aboard. But the Messenians came to help. They waded into the sea with their weapons, boarded some of the ships already being towed away, and fought from their decks to recover them.

CHAPTER 91

1 In this part of the battle, then, the Peloponnesians were winning and wrecking the Athenian ships. Meanwhile, their twenty ships from the right wing chased the eleven Athenian ships that had escaped the turn into open water. All but one of these reached Naupactus ahead of their pursuers. They stopped opposite the sanctuary of Apollo, with their bows facing out, and prepared to defend themselves if the enemy sailed in toward them on the shore.

2 The Peloponnesians came up later, singing their battle song as they sailed, as though they had won. One Leucadian ship, far ahead of the rest, was chasing the one Athenian ship left behind.

3 A merchant ship happened to be anchored offshore. The Athenian ship reached it first, sailed around it, and rammed the pursuing Leucadian ship in the middle of its side, sinking it.

4 This unexpected event, so different from what they had counted on, frightened the Peloponnesians. Their success had also led them to pursue without keeping formation. Some ships lowered their oars into the water and stopped, wanting to wait for the larger group. This was a bad move with the enemy so close and able to counterattack. Others ran aground in the shallows because they did not know the waters.

CHAPTER 92

1 The Athenians took courage when they saw this. At a single command they shouted and charged. Because of their earlier mistakes and their present disorder, the Peloponnesians held out only briefly. Then they turned and fled to Panormus, where they had set out from.

2 The Athenians pursued them and captured the six ships nearest to them. They also recovered their own ships, which the Peloponnesians had wrecked near the shore at the start and attached towlines to. They killed some of the men and took others alive.

3 Timocrates the Lacedaemonian was aboard the Leucadian ship that sank near the merchant ship. As his ship was being destroyed, he killed himself. His body washed into the harbor of Naupactus.

4 The Athenians returned and set up a victory monument at the place they had sailed from to win the battle. They recovered the bodies and wreckage near their own shore. They returned the enemy's dead under a truce.

5 The Peloponnesians also set up a victory monument. They claimed victory for the rout in which they had wrecked the ships near the shore. The ship they had captured they dedicated at Achaean Rhium, beside their monument.

6 After this, they were afraid of the reinforcements coming from Athens. As night fell, all except the Leucadians sailed into the Crisaean Gulf and on to Corinth.

7 Not long after the ships had withdrawn, the Athenians arrived at Naupactus from Crete with the twenty ships that should have joined Phormio before the sea battle. And the summer ended.

CHAPTER 93

1 At the start of winter, before the fleet that had withdrawn to Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf broke up, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders wanted to try an attack on Piraeus, the Athenians' harbor. The Megarians had suggested it. The harbor had no guards and its entrances were not closed off. This was understandable, given the Athenians' great superiority at sea.

2 The plan was for each sailor to take his oar, rowing cushion, and oar strap, and walk from Corinth to the sea on the side facing Athens. They would hurry to Megara and launch forty ships that happened to be in its dockyard at Nisaea. Then they would sail straight for Piraeus.

3 There was no fleet stationed there to keep watch. Nor did anyone expect the enemy ever to make such a sudden attack by sea. They thought the enemy would not dare to attack even openly and with time to prepare. And if the enemy did plan an attack, they were sure they would find out beforehand.

4 Once they had agreed on the plan, they set out immediately. They arrived at night and launched the ships from Nisaea. But they no longer sailed against Piraeus as they had intended. They had become afraid of the danger, and a wind is also said to have held them back. Instead, they sailed against the headland of Salamis that faces Megara. On it stood a fort, with three ships on guard to stop any shipping entering or leaving Megara. They attacked the fort and towed away the empty triremes. They also raided the rest of Salamis, catching its people by surprise.

CHAPTER 94

1 Fire signals warning of an enemy attack were sent to Athens. The panic was as great as any during the war. People in the city thought the enemy had already sailed into Piraeus. Those in Piraeus thought Salamis had been captured and that the enemy was about to sail into their harbor. This could easily have happened if the enemy had decided not to hold back. No wind would have prevented it.

2 At daybreak the Athenians went with their whole force to help Piraeus. They launched ships and boarded them in a great hurry and confusion. With the ships they sailed to Salamis, while with the infantry they set up guards for Piraeus.

3 When the Peloponnesians learned that help was coming, they quickly sailed back to Nisaea. They had overrun most of Salamis and taken prisoners and plunder, along with the three ships from the fort of Budorum. Another reason for their alarm was the state of their ships. These had not been launched for a long time and leaked badly. After reaching Megara, they returned to Corinth on foot.

4 The Athenians no longer found them at Salamis and sailed back themselves. After this they took greater care to guard Piraeus, closing off the entrances to the harbors and taking other precautions.

CHAPTER 95

1 At about the same time, as this winter began, Sitalces son of Teres, the Odrysian king of the Thracians, marched against Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and against the Chalcidians in Thrace. Two promises were involved: he wanted to make Perdiccas keep one and to keep the other himself.

2 At the start of the war Perdiccas had been under pressure. He had promised Sitalces certain things if Sitalces would reconcile him with the Athenians and not restore his brother Philip, who was his enemy, to the throne. But Perdiccas

had not kept his promises. Sitalces himself, when he made his alliance with the Athenians, had agreed to end the war with the Chalcidians in Thrace.

3 He made the expedition for both these reasons. He took Philip's son Amyntas with him, intending to make him king of the Macedonians. He also took the Athenian ambassadors who happened to be there on this business, and Hagnon as commander. The Athenians, too, were supposed to bring ships and as large an army as possible against the Chalcidians.

CHAPTER 96

1 Starting from the Odrysian country, he first called up the Thracians under his rule on this side of Mount Haemus and Rhodope, as far as the sea [to the Euxine Sea and the Hellespont]. Next he called up the Getae beyond Haemus and the people of all the other inhabited districts on this side of the Ister River, toward the Euxine Sea. The Getae and the people of this region border on the Scythians and are equipped in the same way. They are all mounted archers.

2 He also invited many of the independent Thracian mountain people who carry swords and are called Dii. Most of them live on Rhodope. He persuaded some with pay, while others joined him voluntarily.

3 He also called up the Agrianes, the Laeaeans, and all the other Paeonian peoples under his rule. These were at the edge of his kingdom. His rule extended as far as the Laeaean Paeonians and the Strymon River, which flows from Mount Scombrus through the Agrianes and Laeaeans. [Here] his kingdom bordered on the Paeonians who were independent.

4 On the side facing the Triballians, who were also independent, the Treres and Tilataei marked the border. They live north of Mount Scombrus and extend west as far as the Oscius River. This flows from the same mountain as the Nestus and the Hebrus. The mountain is large and uninhabited, and adjoins Rhodope.

CHAPTER 97

1 Along the coast, the Odrysian kingdom extended from the city of Abdera into the Euxine Sea as far as the Ister River. By the shortest sea route, with the wind always behind it, a merchant ship takes four days and as many nights to sail along this coast. By the shortest land route, a man traveling light completes the journey from Abdera to the Ister in eleven days.

2 That was its extent along the sea. Inland, the journey from Byzantium to the Laeaeans and the Strymon took a man traveling light thirteen days. In that direction the kingdom reached its greatest distance inland from the sea.

3 The tribute from all the non-Greek territory and the Greek cities reached its highest total under Seuthes, who became king after Sitalces and raised it to its greatest amount. It was worth about four hundred talents of silver and was paid in gold and silver. Gifts of gold and silver worth at least as much were also brought in. This was apart from patterned and plain cloth and other goods. The gifts went not only to the king but also to the powerful men around him and the Odrysian nobles.

4 They had established a custom opposite to that of the Persian kingdom: to receive rather than give. The other Thracians also followed this custom. It was more shameful to refuse a request for a gift than to ask for one and not receive it. But the Odrysians used their power to carry the practice further. Nothing could be done without giving gifts. As a result, the kingdom became very powerful.

5 Of all the kingdoms in Europe between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine Sea, it was the greatest in revenue and general wealth. But in fighting strength and the size of its army, it ranked second, far behind the Scythian kingdom.

6 No kingdom in Europe can equal that one. In fact, not even in Asia is there any single people that could stand up to the Scythians if they all acted together. But in sound judgment generally, and in understanding the practical needs of life, the Scythians do not measure up to other peoples.

CHAPTER 98

1 Sitalces, then, ruled a country of this size and was preparing his army. When he was ready, he set out for Macedonia, first through his own kingdom and then through Cercine, an uninhabited mountain on the border between the Sinti and the Paeonians. He crossed it by the road he himself had made earlier by cutting through the forest, when he campaigned against the Paeonians.

2 As they crossed the mountain from the Odrysian country, they had the Paeonians on their right and the Sinti and Maedi on their left. After crossing it, they reached Doberus in Paeonia.

3 On his march he lost no troops except through sickness. Instead, it grew. Many of the independent Thracians joined him without being invited, hoping for plunder. The whole force is said to have reached at least a hundred and fifty thousand.

4 Most of this force was infantry, while about a third was cavalry. The Odrysians themselves supplied the largest part of the cavalry, followed by the Getae. The best fighters among the infantry were the sword-carrying independent people who had come down from Rhodope. The rest followed as a mixed crowd, most frightening because of its size.

CHAPTER 99

1 They gathered at Doberus and prepared to come down from the high ground into lower Macedonia, which Perdiccas ruled.

2 The Macedonians also include the Lyncestians, Elimiotae, and other peoples living higher up. They are allies and subjects of the Macedonians in the lowlands but have their own kings.

3 Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors were the first to acquire and rule what is now coastal Macedonia. They were originally Temenids from Argos. They drove the Pierians out of Pieria by force. The Pierians later settled

at Phagres and other places below Mount Pangaeum, across the Strymon. Even now, the coastal land below Pangaeum is called the Pierian Gulf. They also drove the Bottiaeans out of the country called Bottia. The Bottiaeans now live next to the Chalcidians.

4 They also acquired a narrow strip of Paeonia along the Axius River, running down from the interior as far as Pella and the sea. Across the Axius, they drove out the Edonians and now occupy the land called Mygdonia as far as the Strymon.

5 They also drove the Eordi out of what is now called Eordia. Most of them were destroyed, but a small number have settled around Physca. They drove the Almopes out of Almopia as well.

6 These Macedonians also conquered the other peoples whose lands they still hold: Anthemus, Crestonia, Bisaltia, and a large part of the land of the Macedonians themselves. The whole region is called Macedonia. Perdiccas son of Alexander was its king when Sitalces invaded.

CHAPTER 100

1 These Macedonians could not resist the great army coming against them. They took refuge in the strong positions and fortified places in their country.

2 There were not many of these. Later, when Archelaus son of Perdiccas became king, he built the forts that now exist in the country. He cut straight roads and made other improvements too. For war he provided horses, weapons, and other resources on a greater scale than all eight kings before him put together.

3 The Thracian army advanced from Doberus, first into the territory that had formerly belonged to Philip. It took Idomene by force. Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other places came over by agreement because of their friendship with Philip's son Amyntas, who was present. The Thracians besieged Europus but could not capture it.

4 Then the army advanced into the rest of Macedonia, to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. It did not go farther in, beyond these places into Bottiaea and Pieria. Instead, it devastated Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus.

5 The Macedonians did not even consider defending themselves with infantry. But they sent for more cavalry from their allies in the highlands. Small numbers of them then attacked the much larger Thracian army wherever they thought best. Wherever they charged, no one stood against these skilled, armored horsemen. But they were surrounded by superior numbers and put themselves in danger among a crowd many times their size. In the end they stopped fighting. They did not think they were strong enough to risk attacking a larger force.

CHAPTER 101

1 Sitalces negotiated with Perdiccas about the matters that had brought him to war. The Athenians had not come with their ships, because they had doubted that he would come. Instead, they had sent gifts and ambassadors to him. So he sent part of his army against the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, forced them to stay behind their walls, and devastated their land.

2 While he remained in this region, the Thessalians and Magnetes to the south, the other subjects of the Thessalians, and the Greeks as far as Thermopylae were afraid that the army might march against them too. They began preparing to defend themselves.

3 The Thracians who held the plains north of the Strymon were also afraid: the Panaeans, Odomanti, Droi, and Dersaeans. They are all independent.

4 The expedition also caused anxious talk among the Greeks who were enemies of Athens. They feared that the Athenians might use their alliance to bring the Thracians against them too.

5 Sitalces continued to occupy and devastate Chalcidice, Bottice, and Macedonia at the same time. But he was achieving none of the aims of his invasion. His army was short of food and suffering from the winter weather. Seuthes son of

Sparadocus, his nephew and the most powerful man after him, persuaded him to leave quickly. Perdiccas had secretly won Seuthes over by promising him his sister in marriage, with money as her dowry.

6 Sitalces took his advice. After staying thirty days in all, eight of them among the Chalcidians, he quickly withdrew his army home. Later Perdiccas gave his sister Stratonice to Seuthes, as he had promised. This was how Sitalces' expedition turned out.

CHAPTER 102

1 During the same winter, after the Peloponnesian fleet had broken up, the Athenians at Naupactus made an expedition under Phormio. They sailed along the coast to Astacus and landed. With four hundred Athenian hoplites from the ships and four hundred Messenians, they marched into the interior of Acarnania. They expelled men thought unreliable from Stratus, Coronta, and other places. After restoring Cynes son of Theolytus to Coronta, they returned to their ships.

2 They did not think it possible to campaign in winter against Oeniadae, the only Acarnanians who had always been their enemies. The Achelous River flows from Mount Pindus through Dolopia, the lands of the Agraeans and Amphilochians, and the Acarnanian plain. In its upper course it passes the city of Stratus, and it enters the sea near Oeniadae. It floods the area around their city, and the water makes a winter campaign impossible.

3 Most of the Echinades islands also lie opposite Oeniadae, very close to the mouths of the Achelous. The river is large and continually deposits silt. Some of the islands have already become part of the mainland, and all of them can be expected to do so before very long.

4 The river is big, carries a great deal of water, and is muddy. The islands are close together and become linked to one another by silt [because they keep it from spreading out]. They lie in staggered positions, not in a straight row, and leave

no straight channels for the water to reach the open sea.

5 The islands are uninhabited and small. It is also said that Apollo told Alcmaeon son of Amphiaraus to settle in this land, when he was wandering after killing his mother. Apollo warned him that he would not be free of the things that terrified him until he found and settled in a land that the sun had not yet seen, and that was not yet land, when he killed his mother. All other land was polluted for him.

6 The story says that Alcmaeon was at a loss, but eventually thought of this land deposited by the Achelous. He had been wandering for a long time since killing his mother. It seemed to him that enough land could have built up during that time to give him a place to live. He settled around Oeniadae, became its ruler, and left the country named after his son Acarnan. This is the account of Alcmaeon that has come down to us.

CHAPTER 103

1 The Athenians and Phormio left Acarnania and returned to Naupactus. At the beginning of spring they sailed back to Athens, bringing the free men among their prisoners from the sea battles and the ships they had captured. The prisoners were exchanged man for man.

2 This winter ended, and the third year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

Book 3



CHAPTER 1

1 The next summer, when the grain was ripening, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica. Their commander was Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians.

2 They set up camp and devastated the land. As usual, the Athenian cavalry attacked wherever an opportunity arose. They kept most of the enemy's lightly armed troops from moving ahead of the hoplites and damaging the land near the city.

3 They stayed as long as their food lasted, then withdrew and dispersed to their own cities.

CHAPTER 2

1 Immediately after the Peloponnesian invasion, Lesbos revolted from Athens, except for Methymna. The Lesbians had wanted to revolt even before the war, but the Lacedaemonians had refused to accept them. Now, too, they were forced to revolt earlier than they had intended.

2 They were waiting for work on building barriers at their harbors, building walls, and constructing ships to be completed. They were also waiting for things that had to arrive from the Black Sea, including archers and grain, and for the other supplies they had sent for.

3 But the Tenedians, who were their enemies, and the Methymnaeans informed the Athenians of their plans. So did some individual Mytilenaeans, who were supporters of Athens in the city's civil strife and served as Athens' official local representatives. They reported that the Mytilenaeans were forcibly uniting Lesbos under Mytilene. With the Lacedaemonians and their relatives the Boeotians, they were rushing all their preparations for a revolt. Unless someone acted at once to stop them, the Athenians would lose Lesbos.

CHAPTER 3

1 The Athenians were worn down by the plague and by the war, which had only recently begun and was now at its height. They thought it would be a major undertaking to start another war against Lesbos, which had a fleet and its strength still intact. At first they did not accept the accusations, largely because they did not want them to be true. But they sent envoys and still could not persuade the Mytilenaeans to abandon their plan to unite the island or their military preparations. They became alarmed and decided to act before the Mytilenaeans could do so.

2 They suddenly sent out forty ships that happened to be ready for a voyage around the Peloponnese. Cleippides son of Deinias was in command, with two other generals.

3 They had been told that a festival of Apollo Maloeis was held outside the city, and that all the Mytilenaeans took part. If they hurried, there was a chance of taking them by surprise. If the attempt succeeded, that would settle the matter. If not, they were to order the Mytilenaeans to hand over their ships and tear down their walls, and to wage war if they refused.

4 The ships sailed off. Meanwhile, the Athenians seized ten Mytilenaean triremes that happened to be with them as reinforcements under the alliance, and imprisoned their crews.

5 But a man crossed from Athens to Euboea and went overland to Geraestus. There he found a merchant ship about to sail and took passage on it. On the third day after leaving Athens, he reached Mytilene and reported that the fleet was coming.

6 The Mytilenaeans therefore did not go out to the sanctuary of Maloeis. They also blocked the unfinished parts of their walls and harbors and kept guard.

CHAPTER 4

1 The Athenians arrived by sea not long afterward and saw the situation. The generals delivered their orders. When the Mytilenaeans refused to comply, hostilities began.

2 The Mytilenaeans were unprepared and had been forced into war without warning. They sent their ships a short way out of the harbor as if to fight a naval battle. But the Athenian ships drove them back, and they then opened talks with the generals. They wanted, if possible, to get the fleet to leave for the time being by reaching some reasonable agreement.

3 The Athenian generals accepted the offer of talks. They too were afraid that their force was not strong enough to fight all Lesbos.

4 They agreed to a truce. The Mytilenaeans then sent envoys to Athens, including one of their accusers, who was now regretting his actions. They hoped to persuade the Athenians to withdraw the ships on the grounds that the Mytilenaeans were not planning a revolt.

5 Meanwhile, they also sent envoys to Lacedaemon in a trireme. They slipped past the Athenian fleet, which was anchored at Malea, north of the city. They did not trust their approach to the Athenians to succeed.

6 The envoys bound for Lacedaemon made a difficult crossing of the open sea. Once there, they worked to secure some help for their people.

CHAPTER 5

1 When the envoys returned from Athens without achieving anything, the Mytilenaeans and the rest of Lesbos, except Methymna, went to war. The Methymnaeans had come to help the Athenians, as had the people of Imbros and Lemnos and a few of their other allies.

2 The Mytilenaeans marched out with their full force against the Athenian camp, and a battle followed. Although the Mytilenaeans did no worse than their opponents, they neither camped on the battlefield nor trusted their own strength, but withdrew. After that they stayed quiet. They wanted to wait for help from the Peloponnese and further preparations before risking another battle. Meleas, a Laconian, and Hermaeondas, a Theban, also arrived. They had been sent out before the revolt but had not managed to get there before the Athenian fleet. They slipped into the harbor in a trireme after the battle. They urged the Mytilenaeans to send another trireme and envoys back with them, and the Mytilenaeans did so.

CHAPTER 6

1 The Mytilenaeans' inactivity gave the Athenians much more confidence. They called in allies, who came much faster when they saw that the Lesbians were offering no strong resistance. The Athenians sailed around to the south side of the city and fortified two camps, one on either side of the city. They stationed ships off both harbors to blockade them.

2 They prevented the Mytilenaeans from using the sea. But the Mytilenaeans and the other Lesbians, who had now come to their aid, controlled the rest of the land. The Athenians held only a small area around their camps. Malea served

mainly as a station for their ships and a market. This was how the war around Mytilene was being fought.

CHAPTER 7

1 At the same time that summer, the Athenians also sent thirty ships around the Peloponnese, with Asopius son of Phormio as general. The Acarnanians had asked them to send either a son or another relative of Phormio to command them.

2 As the ships sailed past Laconia, they devastated the settlements along the coast.

3 Asopius then sent most of the ships home, but took twelve himself to Naupactus. Later, he called out the entire Acarnanian force and marched against Oeniadae. He sailed his ships up the Achelous, while the land army devastated the countryside.

4 When the people of Oeniadae refused to come over to his side, he dismissed the land army. He himself sailed to Leucas and landed at Nericus. During his retreat, he and part of his force were killed by local people who had come to the defense and by a small number of garrison troops.

5 The Athenians later sailed back and recovered their dead from the Leucadians under a truce.

CHAPTER 8

1 The Mytilenaean envoys sent out in the first ship went to Olympia. The Lacedaemonians had told them to come there so that the other allies could also hear them and discuss the matter. This was the Olympic festival at which Dorieus of Rhodes won his second victory.

2 When they were given a hearing after the festival, they spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 9

1 "We know the usual attitude among Greeks, Lacedaemonians and allies. When people revolt during a war and abandon their previous alliance, those who take them in are pleased to gain their help. But they also think less of them because they see them as traitors to their former friends.

2 "This judgment is fair if those who revolt and those they break away from have the same aims and goodwill toward one another, are evenly matched in military resources and strength, and have no reasonable grounds for breaking apart. But that was not the situation between us and the Athenians.

3 "And no one should think less of us because we are leaving them in a time of danger after being treated with honor by them in peacetime.

CHAPTER 10

1 "We will begin by talking about justice and honest conduct, especially since we are asking for an alliance. We know that neither friendship between individuals nor cooperation between cities can be lasting or achieve anything unless each side believes in the other's good character and they are alike in other respects too. Differences in outlook lead to differences in action.

2 "Our alliance with the Athenians first began when you withdrew from the Persian war, while they stayed on to complete the work that remained.

3 "But we did not ally ourselves with the Athenians to help them enslave the Greeks. We allied ourselves with the Greeks to free them from the Persians.

4 "As long as the Athenians led us as equals, we followed willingly. But when we saw them relaxing their hostility toward the Persians and moving toward the enslavement of their allies, we no longer felt safe.

5 "With so many separate votes, the allies were divided and could not defend themselves one by one. They were enslaved, except for us and the Chians. We continued to campaign alongside the Athenians, supposedly self-governing and

free in name.

6 "But we no longer trusted the Athenians as leaders. We judged them by what had already happened. It was not likely that they would conquer the people who had joined the treaty along with us, yet leave the rest untouched if they ever had the power to do the same to them.

CHAPTER 11

1 "If we had all still been self-governing, we could have trusted them more not to change the arrangement. But with most of the allies under their control, they would naturally find it harder to deal with us as equals. They were already giving way to the desire for greater power, while we alone still stood on equal terms. This was especially true as their own strength kept growing and we became more isolated.

2 "Only fear on both sides, evenly balanced, makes an alliance secure. Anyone who wants to break the agreement is held back by the knowledge that he would have no advantage if he attacked.

3 "We were left self-governing for one reason only. They thought they could gain control more easily through a respectable explanation and careful planning than by force, and keeping us independent helped them build their empire in this way.

4 "For one thing, they used us as evidence. They argued that people with an equal vote would not join their campaigns against their will unless the people being attacked had done something wrong. At the same time, they first took the strongest allies along against the weaker ones. By leaving the strongest until last, after the rest had been taken away, they expected to find them weaker.

5 "If they had started with us, when all the allies still had their own strength and a side to rally to, they would not have brought them under control so easily.

6 "Our fleet also caused them some fear. It might one day unite with yours or someone else's and pose a danger to them.

7 "We also survived by cultivating both their people as a whole and whoever happened to be leading them.

8 "But judging from the examples of their treatment of the others, we did not think we could have gone on doing this for long if this war had not broken out.

CHAPTER 12

1 "What sort of friendship was this? How could we trust our freedom when neither side meant what it said in welcoming the other? They treated us well during the war because they feared us. We did the same to them during peacetime. Goodwill is what usually gives people the strongest grounds for trusting one another. In our case, fear provided that security. We remained allies more because of fear than friendship. Whichever side first felt safe enough to act boldly was going to be the first to break the agreement.

2 "So anyone who thinks we are wrong to have revolted before they harmed us is not seeing things clearly. They were delaying their attack on us, and we did not wait in turn until we knew for certain whether it would happen.

3 "If we had been equally able to plot against them and to delay in our turn, why should we, as their equals, have been at their mercy? But since they have always had the choice of when to attack, we too must have the right to defend ourselves in advance.

CHAPTER 13

1 "Those are our grounds and reasons for revolting, Lacedaemonians and allies. They are clear enough for anyone listening to see that our action was reasonable. They were also enough to frighten us and make us look for some way to stay safe. We had wanted to act long ago, when we sent envoys to you about a

revolt while peace still lasted. But your refusal to accept us prevented it. Now, when the Boeotians invited us, we responded at once. We thought we would be making a break on two fronts. In our relations with the Greeks, we would stop helping the Athenians harm them and instead help to free them. In our relations with the Athenians, we would act first instead of waiting to be destroyed by them later.

2 "But our revolt has come sooner than planned, before we were ready. That makes it all the more necessary for you to accept us as allies and send help quickly. Then you will show that you defend those you should defend, while harming your enemies at the same time.

3 "The opportunity is better than ever before. The Athenians have been worn down by the plague and by spending their money. Some of their ships are off your coast, and the others are stationed against us.

4 "So they are unlikely to have ships to spare if you invade a second time this summer, with a fleet and an army together. Either they will fail to resist your fleet as it approaches, or they will withdraw from both places.

5 "No one should think that he will be risking his own safety for someone else's land. Anyone who thinks Lesbos is far away will find that the benefit it brings him is close to home. The war will not be fought in Attica, as some people think, but in the territory from which Attica gets its strength.

6 "It is the allies who supply its revenue. That revenue will be even greater if they conquer us. No one else will revolt, our resources will be added to theirs, and we will suffer worse treatment than those who were enslaved before us.

7 "But if you give us your full support, you will gain a city with a large fleet, which is what you need most. You will defeat the Athenians more easily by taking their allies away from them, since everyone will feel more confident about joining you. You will also escape the accusation made against you that you do not help those who revolt. If you show yourselves to be liberators, you will have a firmer hold on victory in the war.

CHAPTER 14

1 "So respect the hopes the Greeks have placed in you, and respect Olympian Zeus, in whose sanctuary we stand as people seeking his protection. Become our allies and defend the Mytilenaeans. Do not abandon us. We are risking our own lives, but if we succeed, everyone will share the benefit. If we fail because you have refused to listen, the harm will be shared even more widely.

2 "Prove yourselves to be the men the Greeks expect you to be, and the men we, in our fear, need you to be."

CHAPTER 15

1 That was what the Mytilenaeans said. After hearing them, the Lacedaemonians and their allies accepted their arguments and made the Lesbians their allies. They planned an invasion of Attica and told the allies present to send two-thirds of their forces to the Isthmus as quickly as possible. The Lacedaemonians themselves arrived first. They began preparing equipment at the Isthmus to haul ships across from Corinth to the sea facing Athens, so that they could attack by land and sea together.

2 They set to work eagerly. But the other allies assembled slowly. They were busy gathering their crops and had little enthusiasm for going on campaign.

CHAPTER 16

1 The Athenians realized that these preparations were being made because the enemy thought they were weak. They wanted to show that this judgment was wrong. They could easily resist the attack from the Peloponnese without moving the fleet at Lesbos. So they manned a hundred ships, with the citizens themselves boarding, except for the cavalry and those in the highest property class, along with the resident foreigners. They put out to sea toward the Isthmus, displayed their strength, and landed wherever they chose in the Peloponnese.

2 The Lacedaemonians saw how badly events had contradicted their expectations and concluded that what the Lesbians had told them was untrue. They thought they had no way forward. Their allies had not arrived, and at the same time reports came that the thirty Athenian ships sailing around the Peloponnese were devastating the territory of their perioeci. They went home.

3 Later they prepared a fleet to send to Lesbos. They ordered the cities to supply a total of forty ships and appointed Alcidas admiral to command the expedition.

4 The Athenians also withdrew their hundred ships when they saw that the Lacedaemonians had withdrawn.

CHAPTER 17

1 [At the time these ships were at sea, the Athenians had one of their largest and finest fleets in active service at once. At the start of the war they had had about as many ships, or even more.

2 A hundred ships guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis, and another hundred were around the Peloponnese. This did not include the ships at Potidaea and in other places. In all, two hundred and fifty ships were in service at the same time during a single summer.

3 This, together with Potidaea, did the most to use up their money.

4 The hoplites keeping watch on Potidaea were paid two drachmas each a day: each man received one for himself and one for his servant. The original force numbered three thousand, and at least that many stayed throughout the siege. Another sixteen hundred came with Phormio and left before it ended. The crews of all the ships received the same pay. This was how the money was used up in the early part of the war, and this was the largest number of ships they ever manned at once.]

CHAPTER 18

1 At the same time as the Lacedaemonians were at the Isthmus, the Mytilenaeans and their supporting troops marched overland against Methymna, expecting it to be betrayed to them. They attacked the city, but when things did not turn out as they had expected, they left for Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus. They made their control of these cities more secure and strengthened their walls, then quickly went home.

2 After they withdrew, the Methymnaeans in turn marched against Antissa. But the Antissaeans and their supporting troops came out against them and defeated them. Many Methymnaeans were killed, and the rest retreated quickly.

3 The Athenians learned of these events, and that the Mytilenaeans controlled the countryside while their own troops were unable to stop them. As autumn was beginning, they sent the general Paches son of Epicurus with a thousand Athenian hoplites.

4 The hoplites rowed the ships themselves on the voyage. After arriving, they surrounded Mytilene with a single wall. At some of the strongest positions they built forts into it.

5 Mytilene was now firmly blockaded on both sides, by land and sea, and winter was beginning.

CHAPTER 19

1 The Athenians needed more money for the siege. They themselves paid a special tax, imposed then for the first time, of two hundred talents. They also sent twelve ships to collect money from the allies, with Lysicles and four other generals in command.

2 Lysicles sailed around collecting money in various places. He then went inland in Caria, starting from Myus and crossing the plain of the Maeander as far as the hill of Sandius. The Carians and the people of Anaea attacked him there,

killing him and many of his troops.

CHAPTER 20

1 During the same winter, the Plataeans were still under siege by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians. Their grain was running out and they were in serious trouble. They had no hope of help from Athens, and no other way to save themselves was apparent. They and the Athenians trapped in the siege with them initially planned for everyone to break out and climb over the enemy's walls, forcing their way through if they could. The seer Theaenetus son of Tolmides and Eupompidas son of Daimachus, who was also their general, had proposed the attempt.

2 Then about half lost their nerve, thinking the danger too great. But about two hundred and twenty men volunteered to go ahead with the escape. This was how they did it.

3 They made ladders as high as the enemy's wall. They calculated its height from the courses of bricks at a place where the side facing them happened not to be plastered. Many men counted the courses at the same time. Some were likely to make mistakes, but most would get the count right, especially since they counted repeatedly and were not far away. They could easily see the part of the wall they wanted to measure.

4 This was how they worked out the length of the ladders, estimating the height from the thickness of a brick.

CHAPTER 21

1 The Peloponnesian wall was built as follows. It had two circuits: one facing Plataea and the other facing any force coming from Athens to attack from outside. The two circuits were about sixteen feet apart.

2 In the space between them [the sixteen feet], separate living quarters had been built for the guards. These joined together, so that the structure looked like one thick wall with battlements on both sides.

3 At every tenth battlement there were large towers as wide as the wall. Each tower extended to both the inner and the outer face. There was no way past a tower along its side; the men had to go through its middle.

4 On nights of stormy, rainy weather, the guards left the battlements and kept watch from the towers. These were close together and had roofs overhead. This was the wall that kept the Plataeans under siege.

CHAPTER 22

1 When their preparations were complete, the Plataeans waited for a moonless night with a storm of wind and rain, and set out. The men who had proposed the attempt led the way. First they crossed the ditch surrounding them. Then they approached the enemy's wall without the guards noticing. It was too dark for the guards to see them in advance, and the wind drowned out the noise of their approach.

2 They also walked well apart so that their weapons would not strike one another and give them away. They were lightly equipped and wore a shoe only on the left foot, to give them a secure footing in the mud.

3 They approached the battlements between two towers, knowing that no guards were there. The ladder carriers went first and set their ladders against the wall. Next, twelve lightly equipped men climbed up with short swords and breastplates. Their leader was Ammeas son of Coroebus, who climbed up first. The men behind him followed, six toward each tower. Other lightly equipped men with short spears came after them. Men behind carried their shields so that they could climb more easily, and would hand them over when they came close to the enemy.

4 When more men had reached the top, the guards in the towers noticed them. One of the Plataeans had knocked a tile off the battlements as he took hold of them, and it fell with a crash.

5 Shouts went up at once, and the troops in the camp rushed toward the wall. In the darkness and the storm, they did not know what the danger was. At the same time, the Plataeans who had stayed in the city came out and attacked the Peloponnesian wall on the opposite side from where their men were climbing over. They wanted to keep the enemy's attention away from the escape party as much as possible.

6 The guards remained at their posts in confusion. No one dared to leave his own station to help, and they could not work out what was happening.

7 The three hundred men assigned to go to the rescue wherever they were needed moved outside the wall toward the shouting. Fire signals were raised to warn Thebes of an enemy attack.

8 But the Plataeans in the city also raised many fire signals from their wall. They had prepared them earlier for this very purpose. They wanted to confuse the meaning of the enemy's signals, so that the Thebans would mistake what was happening for something else and not come to help before the escaping men had got away and reached safety.

CHAPTER 23

1 Meanwhile, the Plataeans were getting over the wall. The first of them had climbed up, killed the guards in both towers, and taken control of them. They stationed themselves in the passages through the towers and guarded them to stop anyone from bringing help that way. They also set ladders against the towers from the wall and brought up more men. From the towers, some threw missiles at the defenders coming to help, keeping them back both above and below. Meanwhile, most of the Plataeans set up many ladders, knocked down the battlements, and crossed the wall between the towers.

2 As each man got across, he took his place on the edge of the ditch. From there they shot arrows and threw javelins at anyone coming along the wall to help the defenders and obstruct the crossing.

3 When everyone else had crossed, the men in the towers came down last, with difficulty, and made their way to the ditch. At that moment the three hundred came toward them carrying torches.

4 Standing in the darkness on the edge of the ditch, the Plataeans could see these men more clearly. They shot arrows and threw javelins at their unprotected parts. The Plataeans themselves remained hidden, and the torchlight made them harder to see. As a result, even the last of them managed to cross the ditch in time, though with difficulty and a great deal of effort.

5 Ice had formed in the ditch, but it was not firm enough to walk on. It was more slushy, as ice is in an east [or north] wind. Snow falling during the night with this wind had greatly increased the water in the ditch. They crossed it with their heads barely above water. In fact, it was largely the severity of the storm that made their escape possible.

CHAPTER 24

1 Leaving the ditch, the Plataeans moved together along the road to Thebes, keeping the shrine of the hero Androcrates on their right. They thought their enemies would be least likely to suspect them of taking this road, which led toward the enemy. At the same time, they could see the Peloponnesians pursuing them with torches along the road toward Cithaeron and Dryoscephalae, which led to Athens.

2 The Plataeans followed the road toward Thebes for six or seven stades. Then they turned back and took the road toward the mountain, leading to Erythrae and Hysiae. Once they reached the mountains, they escaped to Athens. There

were two hundred and twelve of them, out of a larger number who had started. Some had turned back to the city before climbing the wall, and one man, an archer, was captured at the outer ditch.

3 The Peloponnesians stopped their efforts to intercept them and returned to their positions. The Plataeans in the city knew nothing of what had happened. The men who had turned back told them that no one had survived. So at daybreak they sent out a herald and tried to arrange a truce to recover the dead. Once they learned the truth, they stopped. This was how these Plataeans got over the wall and escaped safely.

CHAPTER 25

1 At the end of the same winter, Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian, was sent from Lacedaemon to Mytilene in a trireme. He sailed to Pyrrha, then went on foot along a ravine where it was possible to get over the siege wall. He slipped into Mytilene unnoticed. He told the officials that an invasion of Attica would take place at the same time as the arrival of the forty ships that were to help them. He had been sent ahead to make these arrangements and also to take charge of other matters.

2 This encouraged the Mytilenaeans and made them less inclined to reach an agreement with the Athenians. This winter ended, and with it the fourth year of this war, whose history Thucydides wrote.

CHAPTER 26

1 The following summer, the Peloponnesians sent off the forty-two ships for Mytilene. They put Alcidas, their admiral, in command. Then they and their allies invaded Attica. They wanted to create trouble for the Athenians on two fronts and so make them less able to act against the ships sailing to Mytilene.

2 Cleomenes led this invasion on behalf of King Pausanias, the son of Pleistoanax, who was still too young. Cleomenes was the brother of Pausanias' father.

3 They destroyed the parts of Attica that had been devastated before, including anything that had grown back, and whatever the earlier invasions had left untouched. Apart from the second invasion, this was the most damaging one for the Athenians.

4 They kept waiting for news from Lesbos of something their fleet had achieved, believing it had already made the crossing. Meanwhile, they went through most of the country, destroying its crops. But none of their expectations was fulfilled, and their food ran out. They withdrew and dispersed to their own cities.

CHAPTER 27

1 Meanwhile, the ships from the Peloponnese were delayed and had still not reached the Mytilenaeans. The Mytilenaeans' food had run out. They were forced to come to terms with the Athenians for the following reasons.

2 Salaethus himself no longer expected the ships to arrive. He equipped the people, who had previously been lightly armed, with heavy weapons, intending to march out against the Athenians.

3 Once they had these weapons, they stopped obeying the authorities. They gathered in groups and demanded that the powerful men bring out the food supplies for everyone to see and share them among all. Otherwise, they said, they would make their own agreement with the Athenians and hand over the city.

CHAPTER 28

1 The men in power realized that they could not stop this and would be in danger if they were left out of the agreement. So they made terms on behalf of everyone with Paches and his army. The Athenians could decide whatever they wanted about the Mytilenaeans, and the Mytilenaeans would admit the army into the city. But the Mytilenaeans could send representatives to Athens to plead their case. Until these returned, Paches was not to imprison, enslave, or kill any Mytilenaean.

2 These were the terms they agreed on. But the Mytilenaeans who had been most involved in dealings with the Lacedaemonians were terrified. When the army entered, they could not bear it and took refuge at the altars despite the agreement. Paches persuaded them to leave by promising not to harm them. He placed them on Tenedos until the Athenians reached a decision.

3 He also sent triremes to Antissa and brought it under his control. He settled the other military arrangements as he thought best.

CHAPTER 29

1 The Peloponnesians in the forty ships should have arrived quickly. Instead, they spent a long time sailing around the Peloponnese itself and made slow progress on the rest of the voyage. The Athenians in the city knew nothing of them until they reached Delos. From there they went on to Icarus and Myconus, where they first learned that Mytilene had fallen.

2 To find out for certain, they sailed to Embatum in the territory of Erythrae. When they reached Embatum, Mytilene had been captured about seven days earlier. Once they had confirmed the news, they discussed what to do in these circumstances. Teutiaplus, a man from Elis, spoke to them as follows.

CHAPTER 30

1 "Alcidas, and all of us Peloponnesians here who command the force, I think we should sail to Mytilene as we are, before anyone learns of our presence.

2 "As is likely with men who have only just captured a city, we will probably find much left unguarded. This will be especially true on the sea side. They cannot expect an enemy to attack them there, and that is where our own strength chiefly lies. Their land troops have probably also scattered among the houses and become less careful now that they have won.

3 "So if we attack suddenly at night, I hope we can gain control with the help of people inside, if anyone still remains there who supports us.

4 "Let us not back away from the danger. We should recognize that this kind of lapse is exactly what creates an opening in war. A general who guards against it in his own forces, and attacks when he spots it in the enemy's, will have the greatest success."

CHAPTER 31

1 This was what he said, but he did not persuade Alcidas. Some of the Ionian exiles and the Lesbians sailing with them offered another suggestion. If he was afraid to take this risk, he should capture one of the cities in Ionia, or Cyme in Aeolis. They could use that city as a base and make Ionia revolt. There was hope of doing so, they said, since no one resented their arrival. They would then take away Athens' greatest source of income. At the same time, if the Athenians kept a fleet stationed against them, it would cost the Athenians money. They also thought they could persuade Pissuthnes to join them in the war.

2 Alcidas would not accept these suggestions either. Since he had arrived too late for Mytilene, his chief concern was to get back to the Peloponnese as quickly as possible.

CHAPTER 32

1 He sailed from Embatum and followed the coast. At Myonnesus, in the territory of Teos, he put in and slaughtered most of the prisoners he had taken during the voyage.

2 When he anchored at Ephesus, representatives of the Samians living at Anaea came to him. They said he was going about the liberation of Greece the wrong way if he killed men who neither offered resistance nor were his enemies, but were allies of Athens under compulsion. Unless he stopped, he would bring few enemies over to his side and make enemies of many more friends.

3 He was persuaded and released all the Chians he still held, along with some of the others. When people saw his ships, they had not fled. Instead, they had approached them, thinking they were Athenian. They had not the slightest expectation that Peloponnesian ships could ever reach Ionia while Athens controlled the sea.

CHAPTER 33

1 Alcidas sailed from Ephesus in a hurry to escape. The Salaminia and the Paralus had spotted him while he was still anchored near Clarus. These ships happened to be sailing from Athens. Afraid of being chased, he sailed across the open sea. He did not intend to stop anywhere but the Peloponnese unless he had to.

2 News reached Paches and the Athenians from the territory of Erythrae, and reports also came in from every direction. Since Ionia had no fortifications, people were very afraid that the Peloponnesians would attack and plunder the cities as they sailed past, even if they had no intention of staying. The Paralus and the Salaminia also reported what they themselves had seen of Alcidas at Clarus.

3 Paches made every effort to catch them. He pursued them as far as the island of Patmos, but turned back when it became clear that he could no longer overtake them. Although he had failed to meet them at sea, he thought it an advantage

that they had not been trapped anywhere and forced to set up a camp. That would have forced his men to keep watch over them and blockade them by sea.

CHAPTER 34

1 On his way back along the coast, he also put in at Notium, which belonged to the Colophonians. Colophonians had settled there after Itamanes and his non-Greek troops captured the upper city. They had been brought in during the Colophonians' own civil strife. The city had fallen at about the time of the Peloponnesians' second invasion of Attica.

2 The refugees who settled at Notium then fell into civil strife again. One side brought in Arcadian and non-Greek mercenaries from Pissuthnes and kept them in a fortified enclosure. Colophonians from the upper city who had sided with the Persians joined this group and shared control of the government. The other side escaped from them and went into exile. These men called in Paches.

3 Paches invited Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians in the enclosure, to a conference. He promised to return him safe and unharmed to the fortification if they reached no satisfactory agreement. Hippias came out to meet him. Paches kept him under guard, though not in chains, and suddenly attacked the fortification. He captured it while its defenders were expecting nothing and killed the Arcadians and all the non-Greeks inside. Later he took Hippias back inside, as he had promised. Once Hippias was inside, Paches seized him and had him shot dead with arrows.

4 Paches handed Notium over to the Colophonians, except those who had sided with the Persians. Later the Athenians sent men to establish a settlement there under Athenian laws. They gathered together all the Colophonians they could find in any of the cities and settled them at Notium.

CHAPTER 35

1 When Paches reached Mytilene, he secured the surrender of Pyrrha and Eresus. He also found Salaethus the Lacedaemonian hiding in the city and sent him to Athens. With him he sent the Mytilenaeans he had placed on Tenedos, and anyone else he considered responsible for the revolt.

2 He also sent most of the army home. He stayed with the rest and settled affairs in Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos as he thought best.

CHAPTER 36

1 When these men and Salaethus arrived, the Athenians immediately put Salaethus to death. He had offered, among other things, to get the Peloponnesians to withdraw from Plataea, which was still under siege.

2 They discussed what to do with the other men. In their anger, they decided to kill not just those present but every adult male Mytilenaean, and to enslave the women and children. What they held against the Mytilenaeans, apart from the revolt itself, was that they had revolted without being subjects like the other allies. The fact that Peloponnesian ships had dared to risk a voyage to Ionia to help them also did much to fuel the Athenians' anger. It suggested that the revolt had been planned well in advance.

3 So they sent a trireme to Paches to report their decision, ordering him to kill the Mytilenaeans quickly.

4 The very next day, they began to change their minds. On reflection, they thought it a savage and extreme decision to destroy an entire city rather than just those responsible.

5 When the Mytilenaean representatives in Athens and their Athenian supporters realized this, they got the officials to reopen the debate. They persuaded them more easily because the officials could clearly see that most citizens wanted someone to give them another chance to consider the matter.

6 An assembly was held at once, and various speakers put forward their views. Cleon, the son of Cleaenetus, came forward and spoke again as follows. His proposal to kill the Mytilenaeans had won in the earlier debate. In other matters too he was the most aggressive of the citizens, and at that time he had far more influence over the people than anyone else.

CHAPTER 37

1 "I have often before realized that a democracy is incapable of ruling others. Nothing has shown me this more clearly than your present change of mind about the Mytilenaeans.

2 "You live your daily lives without fear or plots against one another, and you take the same attitude toward your allies. If their arguments persuade you to make a mistake, or you give way out of pity, you do not think about how this weakness endangers you without earning their gratitude. You fail to see that your empire is a tyranny over people who plot against you and submit unwillingly. They do not obey because of the favors you do them at your own expense. They obey because you hold the advantage through strength, not through their goodwill.

3 "The worst thing of all will be if none of our decisions stands firm. We must understand that a city with inferior laws that remain fixed is stronger than one with good laws that have no force. Lack of learning combined with self-control is more useful than cleverness without discipline. As a rule, ordinary people govern their cities better than the more intelligent.

4 "The intelligent want to appear wiser than the laws and to outdo every argument put before the public. They act as though there were no more important matters in which to show their judgment. This behavior usually brings their cities to disaster. Ordinary people distrust their own intelligence. They accept that they know less than the laws and are less able to fault the argument of a good speaker. They judge impartially rather than competing, and so they usually get things right.

5 "We speakers should act in the same way. We must not let cleverness and competition in intelligence carry us away into giving you, the people, advice that goes against our own judgment.

CHAPTER 38

1 "My own opinion has not changed. I am surprised at those who have reopened the debate on the Mytilenaeans and caused a delay, which chiefly benefits the wrongdoers. The victim pursues the offender with less anger as time passes. Retaliation is most effective as punishment when it comes as close as possible to the injury and answers it in equal measure. I also wonder who will speak against me and undertake to show that the Mytilenaeans' wrongdoing benefits us, while our misfortunes harm our allies.

2 "Clearly, such a man must either trust his speaking skills and compete to overturn what seems certain, as though we had not understood it, or be tempted by profit and try to mislead you with an argument he has worked up to sound respectable.

3 "In contests like these, the city gives the prizes to others but bears the risks itself.

4 "You are to blame because you run these contests badly. You habitually treat speeches as a spectacle and learn about actions only from what you hear. You judge whether future actions are possible from the skill of those who speak for them. As for things that have already happened, you trust clever verbal criticism more than the evidence of your own eyes.

5 "You are exceptionally good at being deceived by a new argument, but unwilling to follow one that has been tested. You are slaves to whatever is unusual and look down on what is familiar.

6 "Each of you would most like to be able to make such speeches himself. Failing that, you compete with those who do, trying not to appear slow in catching their meaning. You rush to applaud a sharp remark before it is fully spoken.

You eagerly anticipate what will be said, but are slow to foresee its consequences.

7 "You are looking, one might say, for a world different from the one we live in, yet you do not adequately understand even our present situation. In short, you let the pleasure of listening get the better of you. You sit there more like spectators at a display by teachers of clever argument than people considering their city's affairs.

CHAPTER 39

1 "To turn you away from these habits, I declare that the Mytilenaeans have wronged you more than any other single city has.

2 "I can forgive people who revolt because they cannot bear your rule, or because the enemy forces them to do so. But these people had an island protected by walls. They needed to fear our enemies only at sea, and even there their own force of triremes gave them some protection. They governed themselves and were among those we treated with the greatest honor. What they did was not so much a revolt as a conspiracy and an uprising against us. A revolt, after all, is something people do when they are being oppressed. They joined our worst enemies and tried to destroy us. This is worse than if they had built up their own strength and fought us on their own.

3 "The disasters of their neighbors who had already revolted and been brought under our control taught them nothing. Nor did their present prosperity make them hesitate to run into danger. They grew bold about the future. Their hopes went beyond their strength, though they still fell short of their desires. They started a war, choosing to put force before justice. They attacked us when they thought they would have the advantage, not because we were wronging them.

4 "When cities suddenly gain great and unexpected prosperity, they usually become arrogant. Success that comes in a way people can reasonably expect is generally safer than unexpected good fortune. People find it easier, so to speak, to drive away hardship than to preserve prosperity.

5 "We should never have given the Mytilenaeans any more honor than the others. Then they would not have become so arrogant. Human nature tends to look down on those who show consideration and to respect those who refuse to give way.

6 "Even now, let them be punished as their wrongdoing deserves. Do not put the blame on the few and let the people go free. They all attacked you alike. The people could have turned to us and now been back in their city. Instead, they thought that taking their chances with the few was the safer course, and joined them in the revolt.

7 "Consider your allies too. If you impose the same penalties on those whom the enemy forces to revolt and those who revolt willingly, who do you think will not revolt at the slightest excuse? Success will mean freedom, while failure will bring no irreparable harm.

8 "But we will have to risk our money and our lives against each city. If we succeed, we will take over a ruined city and lose its future income, which is what gives us our strength. If we fail, we will have more enemies in addition to our present ones. We will spend the time we should be using to resist our existing enemies at war with our own allies.

CHAPTER 40

1 "So we must not offer them any hope, whether made credible by an argument or purchased with money, that they will be forgiven for making a human mistake. They did not harm us unwillingly. They plotted against us knowingly. It is the unintentional act that deserves forgiveness.

2 "My position is the same as at the start: I insist that you must not change your earlier decision. Do not make a mistake through the three things most harmful to an empire: pity, pleasure in speeches, and leniency.

3 "Pity should rightly be given in return to people like ourselves, not to those who will not pity us in return and are bound to remain our enemies. Speakers who delight us with their speeches will have other, less important occasions to compete. They should not compete on an issue where the city will pay heavily for a brief pleasure, while they are rewarded for speaking well. And leniency is better given to people who will remain well disposed toward us in the future than to those who will stay just as hostile as before.

4 "To sum it up in one statement: if you follow my advice, you will treat the Mytilenaeans justly and serve your own interests at the same time. If you decide otherwise, you will not win their gratitude; instead, you will pass judgment against yourselves. If they were right to revolt, you must be wrong to rule them. But if you insist on ruling even when you have no right to do so, you must also punish them as your interests demand, regardless of what is fair. Otherwise, give up the empire and show how good you are without taking any risks.

5 "Decide to repay them with the same punishment they would have given you. You have escaped their plot; do not show yourselves less sensitive to injury than those who plotted it. Think what they would probably have done if they had defeated you, especially since they were the first to do wrong.

6 "Those who harm someone without any justification are particularly eager to pursue and completely destroy him. They suspect the danger of letting an enemy survive. Someone who has suffered an unprovoked injury is more dangerous if he escapes than an enemy who has fought on equal terms.

7 "So do not betray yourselves. Put yourselves as nearly as possible back into the state of mind you had when you were suffering. Remember how you would have valued defeating them above everything else, and now pay them back. Do

not soften because of the immediate situation or forget the terrible danger that once hung over you.

8 "Punish these men as they deserve, and set a clear example for your other allies: anyone who revolts will be punished with death. If they understand this, you will be less likely to neglect your enemies while fighting your own allies."

CHAPTER 41

1 That was what Cleon said. After him, Diodotus son of Eucrates came forward. He had been the strongest opponent of killing the Mytilenaeans at the earlier assembly too. Now he spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 42

1 "I do not blame those who have proposed that we reconsider the Mytilenaeans' case. Nor do I approve of those who criticize us for discussing the most important matters more than once. I think the two greatest obstacles to good judgment are haste and anger. Haste usually goes with foolishness, and anger with ignorance and a narrow outlook.

2 "Anyone who insists that discussion cannot teach us about action either lacks understanding or has a private interest at stake. He lacks understanding if he thinks we can explain the future, which is still hidden, by any other means. He has a private interest if he wants to persuade us to do something shameful. He thinks he cannot make a good argument for a bad cause, but that a skillful attack on people's character will intimidate both his opponents and his audience.

3 "Those who also accuse a speaker of putting on a display for money are especially dangerous. If they only accused him of ignorance, a man who failed to persuade you would leave with a reputation for being stupid rather than dishonest. But when dishonesty is the charge, he falls under suspicion if he persuades you. If he fails, he is considered dishonest as well as stupid.

4 "The city gains nothing from this. Fear deprives it of advisers. Indeed, it would do best if citizens of that kind could not speak. Then its citizens would be least likely to be persuaded to make mistakes.

5 "A good citizen should not frighten his opponents. He should show that his argument is better in a fair contest. A sensible city should not give extra honors to the man who most often offers good advice, but neither should it reduce the honors he already has. And it should not punish a man whose proposal fails, or even treat him with disrespect.

6 "In that way, a successful speaker would be least likely to say something against his own judgment simply to please you and win still greater honors. And an unsuccessful speaker would not try to win over the crowd himself by pleasing it in the same way.

CHAPTER 43

1 "We do the opposite. What is more, if we suspect someone of giving the best advice but doing it for profit, our resentment at his uncertain prospect of gain makes us deprive the city of a clear benefit.

2 "We have reached the point where good advice, honestly given, is just as suspect as bad advice. So a man who wants to persuade you to do something terrible must deceive the people to win them over, while a man offering better advice must also lie to gain their trust.

3 "Because of its excessive cleverness, ours is the only city that cannot be helped openly without being deceived. Anyone who openly offers it something good is suspected in return of secretly expecting some larger gain.

4 "Even in these conditions, when the greatest interests are at stake, you must allow us to speak with a little more foresight than you who take a short-term view. This is especially true because we are held responsible for our advice, while you are not held responsible for listening to it.

5 "If the man who persuaded you and those who followed him suffered equally, you would judge more sensibly. As things are, when you make a mistake, you sometimes give way to whatever anger comes over you and punish the one man's judgment that persuaded you. You do not punish your own judgments, though there were many of them and they shared in the mistake.

CHAPTER 44

1 "I have not come forward either to speak against the accusations about the Mytilenaeans or to accuse them myself. If we are sensible, our dispute is not about their wrongdoing but about making a good decision ourselves.

2 "Even if I show that they have done a great wrong, I will not therefore recommend killing them, unless that serves our interests. And even if I show that they deserve some forgiveness, I will not recommend it if it does not seem good for the city.

3 "I think we are discussing the future more than the present. Cleon insists above all that making death the penalty will benefit us in the future by reducing revolts. I too am arguing about what will be best for the future, but I reach the opposite conclusion.

4 "I ask you not to reject the practical value of my argument because his looks more respectable. His argument appeals more to justice, and so it might attract you in your present anger against the Mytilenaeans. But we are not in a lawsuit against them, where arguments about justice would be needed. We are deciding what to do about them so that they will be useful to us.

CHAPTER 45

1 "In cities, the death penalty is set for many offenses, not just ones as serious as this, but lesser ones too. Still, people take the risk, encouraged by hope. No one has ever set out on a dangerous plot after deciding that he would not succeed.

2 “And what city has ever attempted a revolt when it thought its resources were inadequate, either its own resources or those supplied by an alliance with others?

3 “Everyone naturally makes mistakes, both as individuals and as communities. No law will prevent this. People have already tried the whole range of punishments, making them harsher in the hope that criminals would do them less harm. Probably even the greatest crimes had lighter penalties in the past. But as people continued to break the law, most penalties eventually became death. Yet people still break the law despite that.

4 “So either we must find something more frightening than death, or this threat does nothing to hold people back. Poverty makes people desperate and so gives them courage. Having the means to do as you please encourages greed through arrogance and self-confidence. Other circumstances in life drive people into danger through their passions, as each person is gripped by some overpowering impulse that cannot be cured.

5 “Hope and desire are at work in every venture. Desire leads, and hope follows. Desire works out the plot, and hope suggests that fortune will make it easy. They do the most damage. Though they cannot be seen, they are stronger than the dangers that can.

6 “Chance also contributes just as much to encouraging people. Sometimes it comes to their aid unexpectedly and tempts them to take risks even with inadequate resources. This is no less true of cities. They are playing for the greatest stakes, freedom or power over others. And when everyone acts together, each person unreasonably overestimates his own strength.

7 “In short, it is impossible to hold human nature back by the force of law or by any other threat once it is determined to do something. Anyone who thinks otherwise is very naive.

CHAPTER 46

1 "We must not make a worse decision because we trust the death penalty as a sure safeguard. Nor must we leave rebels without hope that they can change their minds and end their offense as quickly as possible.

2 "Consider this. As things stand, a city that has revolted might realize it cannot win and come to terms while it can still repay our costs and pay tribute in the future. But under the other policy, what city do you think would fail to prepare more carefully than now and hold out under siege to the very end? The outcome would be the same whether it surrendered early or late.

3 "And how would it not harm us to sit there spending money because no agreement was possible? Even if we captured the city, we would take over a ruined place and lose its revenue from then on. Yet that revenue is what gives us strength against our enemies.

4 "So we must not harm ourselves by acting as overly strict judges of those who do wrong. Instead, we should see how moderate punishments can let us use the cities in the future while they are still financially strong. We should expect to protect ourselves not through frightening laws, but through careful attention to what we do.

5 "At present we do the opposite. If we overcome a free people who are ruled by force and have understandably revolted to gain independence, we think we must punish them harshly.

6 "But we should not punish free people harshly after they revolt. We should watch them carefully before they revolt and take steps beforehand so that they do not even think of it. Once we have defeated them, we should hold as few people responsible as possible.

CHAPTER 47

1 "Consider also how great a mistake you would make in this other respect if you followed Cleon.

2 "At present, the people in every city are friendly to you. Either they do not join the few powerful men in revolt, or, if forced to do so, they are immediately hostile to the men who caused it. So when you go to war against a city that has turned against you, you have its ordinary people as allies.

3 "But suppose you destroy the people of Mytilene. They took no part in the revolt, and once they got control of weapons, they freely handed over the city. First, you will be doing wrong by killing people who have helped you. Then you will give the powerful exactly what they most want. When they bring their cities into revolt, they will immediately have the people as allies. For you will have shown in advance that the same punishment applies equally to the guilty and the innocent.

4 "Even if they have done wrong, we must act as if we have not noticed. Otherwise the only group that is still our ally may become our enemy.

5 "I think it is much better for keeping our empire to accept being wronged than to kill, however justly, people we ought not to kill. Cleon says this punishment is both just and useful. But in this case those two things cannot be achieved together.

CHAPTER 48

1 "Recognize that this is the better course. Do not give extra weight to pity or to leniency. I do not allow you to be led by those either. Instead, accept my proposal on its own merits. Take your time deciding the cases of the Mytilenaeans whom Paches sent here as offenders, and let the rest stay in their city.

2 "This will be good for the future and frightening to our enemies right now. A man who plans well against his opponents is stronger than one who attacks them foolishly with force."

CHAPTER 49

1 That was what Diodotus said. These proposals were the ones most directly opposed to each other. After hearing them, the Athenians remained divided in their opinions, and the show of hands was nearly even. But Diodotus' proposal won.

2 They immediately sent off another trireme at full speed. They did not want the first ship to arrive ahead of it and leave them to find the city destroyed. The first ship had a lead of about a day and a night.

3 The Mytilenaean envoys supplied the ship with wine and barley meal and promised great rewards if it arrived in time. The crew pushed on so hard that they ate while rowing, taking barley meal mixed with wine and oil. They took turns sleeping while the others rowed.

4 Luckily, no wind blew against them. The first ship was moving slowly toward its horrifying task, while the second was hurrying in this way. The first arrived only just ahead: Paches had read the decree and was about to carry out the decision. The second ship then came into harbor behind it and prevented the massacre. That was how close Mytilene came to destruction.

CHAPTER 50

1 On Cleon's proposal, the Athenians killed the other men whom Paches had sent away as the people most responsible for the revolt. There were a little over a thousand. They also pulled down the Mytilenaeans' walls and took over their ships.

2 Later, they did not impose tribute on the people of Lesbos. Instead, they divided the land, apart from the territory of Methymna, into three thousand plots. They set aside three hundred as sacred to the gods. To the others they sent settlers chosen by lot from their own citizens. The people of Lesbos agreed to pay these settlers two minas in silver each year for every plot, and farmed the land themselves.

3 The Athenians also took over all the small towns on the mainland that the Mytilenaeans had controlled. From then on, these were subject to Athens. That was what happened in Lesbos.

CHAPTER 51

1 During the same summer, after the capture of Lesbos, the Athenians made an expedition against the island of Minoa, which lies off Megara. Their general was Nicias son of Niceratus. The Megarians had built a tower on the island and used it as a fort.

2 Nicias wanted the Athenians to keep watch from there, at closer range, rather than from Budorum and Salamis. He wanted to stop the Peloponnesians from secretly sailing out of there with triremes, as they had done before, or sending out raiders. At the same time, he wanted to stop anything from being shipped in to the Megarians.

3 First, he used siege engines from the sea to capture two towers projecting from Nisaea. This cleared the entrance to the channel between the island and the mainland. He then built a wall to cut off the approach from the mainland. Reinforcements had been able to reach the island that way over a bridge across marshy shallows, since the island was only a short distance from the mainland.

4 They finished this work in a few days. Nicias then also left a wall and a garrison on the island and withdrew with his army.

CHAPTER 52

1 At about the same time that summer, the Plataeans had no food left and could no longer hold out under siege. They came to terms with the Peloponnesians in the following way.

2 The Peloponnesians were attacking their wall, and the Plataeans could not defend themselves. The Lacedaemonian commander recognized their weakness, but did not want to capture the city by force. He had received instructions from Lacedaemon about this. If a treaty was ever made with Athens, and the two sides agreed to return the places each had taken in war, Plataea should not have to be returned, because its people had joined them voluntarily. So he sent a herald to ask whether they were willing to hand over the city voluntarily to the Lacedaemonians and accept them as judges. They would punish the guilty, but no one unjustly.

3 That was the herald's message. The Plataeans were by now utterly weak, so they handed over their city. The Peloponnesians fed them for several days, until the five judges from Lacedaemon arrived.

4 When the judges arrived, they presented no accusation. They simply called the Plataeans before them and asked whether they had done the Lacedaemonians and their allies any good [at all] during the present war.

5 The Plataeans asked to speak at greater length. They chose two of their own people to represent them: Astymachus son of Asopolaus, and Lacon son of Aeimnestus, who acted as the Lacedaemonians' representative in Plataea. These men came forward and spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 53

1 "Lacedaemonians, we handed over our city because we trusted you. We did not expect to face a trial like this, but one conducted more properly. We would not have agreed to place ourselves, as we now have, before any judges [other than you]. We thought you would be the fairest.

2 "Now we fear that we were wrong on both counts. We have good reason to suspect that this case puts our lives at risk and that you will not turn out to be impartial. We base this on the fact that no accusation has been made beforehand for us to answer—we had to ask for permission to speak ourselves. And your question is so brief that an honest answer works against us, while a false one can be exposed.

3 "We have no way out on any side. This forces us to take the risk of saying something, and we think that is safer. For people in our position, even an argument left unsaid could become a cause for self-blame: if we had made it, it might have saved us.

4 "Besides our other difficulties, we also find it hard to persuade you. If we did not know each other, we might benefit by offering evidence about things you knew nothing about. But now everything we say will be addressed to people who know it all already. We are not afraid that you will decide our good deeds were inferior to yours and make that a charge against us. We fear that, to please others, you are bringing us to a trial whose outcome is already decided.

CHAPTER 54

1 "Still, we will set out the just grounds we have in our disputes with the Thebans and in our dealings with you and the other Greeks. We will remind you of the good we have done and try to persuade you.

2 "Your brief question was whether we have done the Lacedaemonians and their allies any good in this war. Our answer is this. If you are asking us as enemies, you have not been wronged by receiving no benefit from us. If you regard us as friends, it is those who attacked us who are more at fault.

3 "But in peacetime and against the Persian we have served you well. We were not the first to break the peace now. And back then we were the only Boeotians who joined in attacking the Persian to free Hellas.

4 "Although we live inland, we fought at sea at Artemisium. We stood beside you and Pausanias in the battle fought in our own land. And whenever any other danger faced the Greeks in that period, we took part in everything, doing more than our strength allowed.

5 "We also helped you in particular, Lacedaemonians. When Sparta faced its greatest danger after the earthquake, when the Helots revolted and went to Ithome, we sent a third of our own people to help. You should not forget these things.

CHAPTER 55

1 "That is how we thought it right to act in the great events of the past. Later we became enemies. But you were responsible. When the Thebans put pressure on us and we asked you for an alliance, you turned us away. You told us to turn to the Athenians, since they were near us and you lived far away.

2 "Even so, during the war you have suffered no exceptional harm from us, nor were you threatened with any.

3 "If we refused to leave the Athenians when you told us to, we did no wrong. They had come to help us against the Thebans when you held back. After that, betraying them would not have been right. This was especially true because they had helped us, we ourselves had approached them for an alliance in our need, and we had received a share in their citizenship. It was reasonable for us to respond willingly to their calls for service.

4 "As for the actions that each of you directs your allies to take, if anything wrong is done, the followers are not responsible. Those who lead them into doing wrong are.

CHAPTER 56

1 "The Thebans have wronged us in many other ways. You yourselves know about the latest offense, which has brought us to our present suffering.

2 "They tried to seize our city during a truce and, what is more, during a sacred festival. We were right to punish them under the rule accepted by everyone: it is lawful before the gods to defend yourself against an attacking enemy. It would not be reasonable for us to suffer now on their account.

3 "If you decide what is just by your own immediate advantage and their hostility toward us, you will show that you are not honest judges of what is right, but are looking after your interests instead.

4 "Yet if they seem useful to you now, we and the other Greeks were much more useful then, when you faced greater danger. Now you are the ones who threaten others with attack. But at that time, when the non-Greek invader was bringing slavery to everyone, these men were on his side.

5 "It is only fair to weigh our willingness to help then against our offense now, if indeed we have done anything wrong. You will find that the earlier service was greater and the present offense smaller. Our service also came at a time when few Greeks were willing to set their courage against Xerxes' forces. The men most praised were not those who dealt with the invasion by doing what served their own safety, but those who willingly took risks to do what was best.

6 "We were among those men and received the highest honors. Now we fear we will be destroyed for the same conduct: choosing the Athenians because it was right, rather than you because it was profitable.

7 "Yet you should show that you judge the same conduct by the same standards. You should recognize that your true interest lies in ensuring that good allies can always rely on gratitude for their service, even when some immediate advantage offers itself to you.

CHAPTER 57

1 "Consider also that most Greeks now see you as an example of courage and good conduct. But suppose you pass an unreasonable judgment on us. This trial will not take place unnoticed: you are highly respected, and we too have no bad reputation. Be careful: people may refuse to accept a disgraceful sentence on good men from you, who are considered still better. Nor will they accept trophies taken from us, who have served Hellas well, being dedicated at the shared sanctuaries.

2 "People will think it terrible that the Lacedaemonians destroyed Plataea. Your fathers had our city's name inscribed on the tripod at Delphi because of its courage. But you, to please the Thebans, would wipe it and every household in it out of the Greek world altogether.

3 "This is the depth of misfortune we have reached. We would have been destroyed if the Persians had won. Now, before you who were once our closest friends, we are losing to the Thebans. We have faced two terrible struggles: before, the prospect of starving to death unless we surrendered the city, and now, a trial with death as the penalty.

4 "We Plataeans, who did more for the Greeks than our strength allowed, have been pushed aside by everyone. We are alone, with no one to defend us. None of our allies from that time helps us. And you, Lacedaemonians, are our only hope, but we fear that we cannot rely on you.

CHAPTER 58

1 "Still, we ask you to be moved by the gods who once watched over our alliance, and by our service to the Greeks. Change your minds if the Thebans have persuaded you of anything. Ask them to grant you this favor in return: not to kill people whom it would be wrong for you to kill. Receive a reasonable favor instead of a shameful one. Do not give pleasure to others and receive disgrace yourselves in return.

2 "It takes little time to destroy our bodies, but removing the bad name that comes from it is hard work. For you will not be justly punishing enemies, but people who wish you well and fought you only because they had to.

3 "So by sparing our lives, you would give a judgment that respects the gods. Remember that you received us when we surrendered willingly, holding out our hands. Greek custom forbids killing such people. Remember also that we have always helped you.

4 "Look at the tombs of your fathers. They were killed by the Persians and buried in our land. Every year we honored them at public expense with clothing and the other customary offerings. We brought them the first share of every crop our land produced in its season. We did this as friends from a friendly land, and as allies honoring men who had once fought beside us. If you judge wrongly, you will do the opposite.

5 "Think about it. When Pausanias buried them, he believed he was laying them in friendly ground, among people like us. But if you kill us and make Plataean territory Theban, what else will you be doing? You will leave your fathers and relatives in enemy ground, among their killers, deprived of the honors they receive now. Besides, you will enslave the land where the Greeks won their freedom. You will leave empty the sanctuaries of the gods to whom they prayed before defeating the Persians. And you will take away the traditional sacrifices from the people who established and founded the sanctuaries.

CHAPTER 59

1 "Lacedaemonians, this would not fit your reputation. You must not break the customs shared by the Greeks or wrong your ancestors. You must not destroy us, who have helped you, because of someone else's hostility, when we have done you no wrong. Spare us instead. Let a reasonable pity soften your decision. Think not just of the terrible things we will suffer, but of the kind of people who will suffer them. Remember how unpredictable disaster is, and how it can fall on anyone, even someone who does not deserve it.

2 "We ask you to accept these arguments, as we have a right to do and as our need forces us to do. We call on the gods whose altars we share and who belong to all the Greeks. We remind you of the oaths your fathers swore and ask you not to forget them. We appeal to you as suppliants at your ancestors' tombs. We call on the dead not to let us fall under Theban rule or let us, their closest friends, be handed over to our bitterest enemies. We remind you of that day when we joined them in achieving their greatest deeds. Yet today we risk suffering the worst possible fate.

3 "For people in our position, ending a speech is both necessary and extremely painful. The danger that our lives will end comes close behind it. As we finish, we say this: we did not surrender our city to the Thebans. Rather than do that, we would have chosen to die by starvation, the most degrading death. We trusted you and came to you. If we fail to convince you, it is only fair to put us back in our former position and let us choose for ourselves whatever danger we must face.

4 "We also urgently ask you, Lacedaemonians, not to hand us over to the Thebans, our bitterest enemies. We are Plataeans, who showed the greatest commitment to the Greeks. We are your suppliants, in your hands and under your pledge of protection. Save us. Do not destroy us while you are freeing the rest of the Greeks."

CHAPTER 60

1 That was what the Plataeans said. The Thebans feared that their speech might make the Lacedaemonians give way on some point. They came forward and said that they too wanted to speak. Contrary to what they had expected, the Plataeans had been allowed to say much more than an answer to the question required. Given permission, they spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 61

1 "We would not have asked to speak if these men had simply given a short answer to the question. Instead, they turned against us and made accusations. They also offered a long defense of themselves on matters outside the issue, matters they had not even been accused of, and praised deeds that no one had criticized. Now we must answer some of their claims and expose the others as false. Then neither our supposed wickedness nor their reputation will help them. You can hear the truth about both sides and judge.

2 "Our first disagreement with them began as follows. We founded Plataea later than the rest of Boeotia, along with other places that we took over after driving out their mixed populations. But these men refused to accept our leadership, as had originally been arranged. They broke with the ancestral customs observed by the other Boeotians. When we tried to compel them to comply, they went over to the Athenians. Together with them, they did us a great deal of harm, for which they suffered in return.

CHAPTER 62

1 "When the non-Greek invader came against Hellas, they say they were the only Boeotians who did not side with the Persians. This is their greatest source of pride and their main reproach against us.

2 "We say they did not side with the Persians because the Athenians did not either. Later, however, when the Athenians attacked the Greeks in the same way, these men were once again alone among the Boeotians, this time in siding with Athens.

3 "Still, consider the conditions under which each of us acted. Our city at that time was not governed either by an oligarchy with equal rights under law or by a democracy. Power was in the hands of a small group of men. This kind of personal rule is most opposed to law and sensible government, and comes closest to tyranny.

4 "These men hoped to gain even more personal power if the Persian cause won. They held the people down by force and brought the invader in. The whole city did this when it had no control over its own affairs. It is not fair to blame it for wrongs done when it was not acting under its laws.

5 "Instead, examine what happened after the Persian had left and the city had recovered its laws. Later the Athenians attacked the rest of Hellas and tried to bring our territory under their control. Through civil strife they already held most of it. Did we not fight and defeat them at Coronea and free Boeotia? Are we not now eagerly helping to free the others, supplying cavalry and more equipment than any of the other allies?

CHAPTER 63

1 "That is our answer to the charge of siding with the Persians. Now we will try to show that you have done the Greeks much greater harm and deserve every punishment.

2 "You became allies and citizens of Athens, you say, to get protection against us. Then you should have called on them only against us, not joined them in attacking others. If the Athenians tried to draw you into anything against your will, you had a way out. Your alliance with these Lacedaemonians, the one made against the Persian that you yourselves keep bringing up, was already in place. It was enough to keep us away from you and, most importantly, to let you make your decisions without fear. Yet you freely chose the Athenian side instead, without being forced any longer.

3 "You say it would have been shameful to betray those who had helped you. But it was far more shameful and unjust to betray all the Greeks, to whom you had sworn an oath, than the Athenians alone. The Athenians were enslaving Hellas; the others were freeing it.

4 "And the help you gave the Athenians in return was neither an equal repayment nor free from shame. You called them in, you say, because you were being wronged. But you became their partners in wronging others. It is more shameful to fail to repay a favor with a similar favor than to fail to repay one that was fairly earned when repayment would mean doing wrong.

CHAPTER 64

1 "You have also made it clear that even then, when you alone refused to side with the Persians, you did not do so for the Greeks' sake. You did it because the Athenians did not side with them either. You wanted to follow the Athenians' wishes and oppose ours.

2 "Now you claim a reward for good deeds you did because of others. That is not reasonable. You chose the Athenians, so fight alongside them. Do not bring up the sworn agreement made back then and claim that it should save you now.

3 "You abandoned that agreement. You broke it by helping to enslave the Aeginetans and some of the others who had sworn it, instead of preventing their enslavement. You did this willingly, under the same laws that you have kept to this day. No one forced you, as we were forced. You also refused our last offer before the siege wall was built around you: to remain neutral and give neither side help.

4 "So who deserves the hatred of all the Greeks more than you? You made a display of courage to bring harm on them. You have now shown that the good deeds you claim to have done once have nothing to do with you today. What your nature always wanted has been revealed for what it really was. You joined the Athenians as they followed a course of injustice.

5 "That is what we have to say about our unwilling support for the Persians and your willing support for Athens.

CHAPTER 65

1 "Now for the latest wrong you say you suffered. You say that we broke the law by coming against your city during a truce and a sacred month. We do not think that even here we were more at fault than you.

2 "If we had come on our own initiative, fought against your city, and ravaged your land as enemies, we would have been in the wrong. But your leading men in wealth and birth freely invited us in. They wanted to end your alliance with outsiders and restore the ancestral arrangements shared by all the Boeotians. What wrong did we do? Those who bring others in are more responsible for breaking the law than those who follow them.

3 "In our judgment, though, neither they nor we broke it. They were citizens just as you were, and they were taking greater risks. They opened their own walls and brought us into their own city as friends, not enemies. They wanted the worse men among you to stop gaining the upper hand and the better men to have what they deserved. They were trying to make your policies more sensible. They were not trying to take the city away from its citizens, but to bring it closer to its relatives. They were not making you anyone's enemies, but putting you at peace with everyone alike.

CHAPTER 66

1 "Here is proof that we were not acting as enemies. We harmed no one. We publicly invited anyone who wanted to live under the ancestral arrangements shared by all Boeotians to join us.

2 "You gladly came over, made an agreement, and at first kept quiet. Later you realized how few we were. Even if you thought we had acted somewhat unfairly by coming in without the consent of your people, you did not respond in the same way. You could have avoided violence and tried to persuade us to leave. Instead, you broke the agreement and attacked us. We do not feel the same bitterness about those you killed in the fighting, since they suffered under a kind

of accepted rule. But others held out their hands in surrender, and you took them alive. Later you promised us not to kill them, yet you put them to death unlawfully. How can you deny the horror of what you did?

3 "You committed three wrongs in a short time. You broke the agreement. You later killed the men. And you went back on your promise to us not to kill them if we did no harm to your property in the countryside. Yet you say we broke the law and claim that you yourselves should not be punished in return. No—not if these judges decide rightly. You will be punished for all these things.

CHAPTER 67

1 "Lacedaemonians, we have gone through all this for your sake as well as ours. We want you to know that your verdict against them will be just, and that our revenge will be all the more consistent with divine law.

2 "Do not let accounts of their past good deeds, if they ever did any, soften you. Such deeds should help people who are being wronged. But for people who do something shameful, they should bring a double penalty, since their wrongdoing is out of keeping with their past. Do not let these men benefit from crying and appeals to pity, as they call on your fathers' tombs and point to their own isolation.

3 "We can point in reply to our young men, whom they killed, and who suffered far worse. Some of their fathers died at Coronea while bringing Boeotia over to your side. Others have been left behind in old age, with empty homes. Their appeal to you to punish these men is far more just.

4 "People who suffer something they do not deserve have a better claim to pity. But when people suffer justly, as these men do, the opposite is true: their suffering should give satisfaction.

5 "They have only themselves to blame for their present isolation. They willingly pushed away their better allies. They broke the law without first being harmed by us. Hatred, not justice, determined their decision. Even now, the punish-

ment they pay will not match what they did. They will suffer within the law. They have not held out their hands in surrender after a battle, as they claim. They handed themselves over for judgment under an agreement.

6 "So, Lacedaemonians, defend the law shared by the Greeks, which these men have broken. We have suffered unlawfully. Give us a fair return for our eager service to you. Do not let their arguments push us aside in your judgment. Set an example for the Greeks. Make the contest one of actions, not speeches. When actions are good, a short account is enough. When they are wrong, speeches dressed up in fine language become a cover for them.

7 "But if those in command, as you are now, make judgments that apply to everyone by focusing on the main facts, people will be less likely to look for fine words to defend unjust deeds."

CHAPTER 68

1 That was what the Thebans said. The Lacedaemonian judges thought it right to ask whether they had received any help from the Plataeans during the war. Their stated position had been that, in the earlier period, the Plataeans should remain neutral under the old agreement made by Pausanias after the Persian invasion. Later, before building the siege wall around them, they had offered them terms for remaining neutral on that basis. The Plataeans had refused. The judges therefore considered that, despite their own just intentions, the Plataeans were now outside the agreement and had harmed them. They brought the men forward one by one and again asked the same question: had they done any good for the Lacedaemonians and their allies during the war? Whenever a man said no, they led him away and killed him. They made no exceptions.

2 They killed at least two hundred of the Plataeans themselves and twenty-five Athenians who had shared the siege. They enslaved the women.

3 For a year or so, [the Thebans] let the city be occupied by Megarians who had been driven out by civil strife and by any surviving Plataeans who supported them. Later they demolished the whole city down to its foundations. Near the sanctuary of Hera they built a lodging house two hundred feet along each side, with rooms all around it on both the ground and upper floors. They used the Plataeans' roofs and doorways for it. From the other materials inside the walls, the bronze and iron objects, they made couches and dedicated them to Hera. They also built her a stone temple a hundred feet long. They made the land public property and leased it out for ten years. The Thebans farmed it.

4 The Lacedaemonians' harsh treatment of the Plataeans was almost entirely for the Thebans' sake. They thought the Thebans would be useful in the war that was then just getting under way.

5 That was how the story of Plataea ended, in the ninety-third year after the Plataeans became allies of Athens.

CHAPTER 69

1 The forty Peloponnesian ships that had gone to help Lesbos had fled across the open sea, as described earlier. They had been pursued by the Athenians and then caught in a storm near Crete. From there they had made their way to the Peloponnese in scattered groups. At Cyllene they found thirteen triremes from Leucas and Ambracia, and Brasidas son of Tellis, who had arrived as an adviser to Alcidas.

2 Having failed at Lesbos, the Lacedaemonians wanted to increase their fleet and sail to Corcyra, where civil strife was going on. Only twelve Athenian ships were present near Naupactus. They wanted to act before a larger fleet could come from Athens to help. Brasidas and Alcidas made preparations for this.

CHAPTER 70

1 The Corcyraeans had been in civil strife since the return of the men taken prisoner in the sea battles near Epidamnus. The Corinthians had released them. The public explanation was that the men who represented Corcyra there had guaranteed eight hundred talents for their release. In reality, the prisoners had been persuaded to bring Corcyra over to Corinth. These men went from citizen to citizen, working to make the city break away from Athens.

2 An Athenian ship and a Corinthian ship arrived, each carrying envoys. After hearing them, the Corcyraeans voted to remain allies of Athens under their existing agreement, but to be friends of the Peloponnesians as they had been before.

3 There was a man named Peithias who voluntarily served as the Athenians' local representative and led the people's party. The returned prisoners brought him to trial, accusing him of enslaving Corcyra to Athens.

4 He was acquitted. He then brought charges against the five richest men among them, saying that they were cutting vine stakes from the sacred land of Zeus and Alcinous. The penalty was a stater for each stake.

5 They were found guilty. Because the fine was so large, they sat as suppliants at the sanctuaries, asking to arrange payment in installments. But Peithias, who was also a member of the council, persuaded it to enforce the law.

6 The law thus blocked their request. They also learned that Peithias intended, while he was still on the council, to persuade the people to recognize the same friends and enemies as Athens. They conspired, took daggers, and suddenly burst into the council chamber. They killed Peithias and about sixty others, both council members and private citizens. A few of Peithias's supporters escaped to the Athenian trireme, which was still there.

CHAPTER 71

1 After doing this, they called the Corcyraeans together. They said that what they had done was best and gave them the best chance of avoiding enslavement by Athens. From now on, neither side should be admitted except peacefully in a single ship. Any larger force should be treated as hostile. After speaking, they forced the people to approve their proposal.

2 They also immediately sent envoys to Athens. These were to explain why their actions had been for the best, and to persuade those who had taken refuge there not to do anything against them. Their aim was to prevent a counterattack.

CHAPTER 72

1 When the envoys arrived, the Athenians arrested them as agents of a political overthrow. They also arrested the refugees whom the envoys had won over, and held them all on Aegina.

2 Meanwhile, a Corinthian trireme and Lacedaemonian envoys arrived at Corcyra. The men in power attacked the people's party and defeated them in battle.

3 At nightfall, the people's party fled to the citadel and the higher parts of the city. They gathered there and took up their position. They also held the Hyllaic harbor. The other side occupied the marketplace, where most of them lived, and the harbor beside it that faced the mainland.

CHAPTER 73

1 The next day there was a little skirmishing. Both sides sent messengers around the countryside, calling on the slaves to join them and promising freedom. Most of the household slaves came to help the people's party. The other side was joined by eight hundred hired soldiers from the mainland.

CHAPTER 74

1 After a day's interval, there was another battle. The people's party won, with the advantage of stronger positions and greater numbers. The women boldly helped them, throwing roof tiles from the houses. They endured the uproar in a way that went against their nature.

2 The other side was routed in the late afternoon. The oligarchs feared that the people would rush straight on, capture the dockyard, and kill them. To block the advance, they set fire to the houses and apartment buildings around the marketplace. They spared neither their own property nor anyone else's. Much of the merchants' stock was also burned. The whole city was in danger of destruction if a wind came up and carried the flames toward it.

3 Both sides stopped fighting and rested, keeping watch through the night. Now that the people's party had won, the Corinthian ship slipped out to sea. Most of the hired soldiers secretly crossed back to the mainland.

CHAPTER 75

1 The following day, Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, an Athenian general, arrived from Naupactus to help. He brought twelve ships and five hundred Messenian hoplites. He worked to arrange a settlement and persuaded the two sides to agree on these terms. The ten men most responsible would stand trial, though they had already left. The rest would remain in the city, making peace with one another and an agreement with Athens to recognize the same enemies and friends.

2 After arranging this, Nicostratus was about to sail away. But the leaders of the people's party persuaded him to leave five of his own ships with them. This would make their opponents less likely to cause trouble. They themselves would crew the same number of their own ships and send them with him.

3 He agreed, and they began enrolling their enemies for service on the ships. These men feared they would be sent to Athens, so they took refuge in the sanctuary of the Dioscuri.

4 Nicostratus tried to get them to leave and reassured them. But he could not persuade them. The people's party took up arms, using this as their excuse. They said the men's distrust and refusal to sail showed that they were plotting something bad. They took the men's weapons from their houses. They would also have killed some of the men they came across if Nicostratus had not stopped them.

5 Seeing what was happening, the others took refuge as suppliants in the sanctuary of Hera. There were at least four hundred of them. The people's party feared they might attempt an uprising. They persuaded them to leave the sanctuary and moved them to the island in front of it. They sent provisions over to them there.

CHAPTER 76

1 This was the state of the civil strife when the Peloponnesian ships arrived from Cyllene, on the fourth or fifth day after the men had been moved to the island. The ships had been lying ready at Cyllene since their voyage from Ionia. There were fifty-three of them. Alcidas commanded them, as before, and Brasidas sailed with him as his adviser. They anchored at Sybota, a harbor on the mainland, and at dawn sailed against Corcyra.

CHAPTER 77

1 The Corcyraeans were in great confusion. They were frightened both by events in the city and by the approaching fleet. They began preparing sixty ships, sending each one out against the enemy as soon as it was crewed. The Athenians urged them to let the Athenian ships sail out first, and then to follow with all their own ships together.

2 Their ships reached the enemy in scattered groups. Two immediately deserted to the other side. On some of the others, the men on board were fighting one another. Nothing they did was orderly.

3 The Peloponnesians saw the confusion. They assigned twenty ships to face the Corcyraeans and the rest to face the twelve Athenian ships. Two of the Athenian ships were the Salaminia and the Paralus.

CHAPTER 78

1 On their side of the battle, the Corcyraeans were in trouble. They attacked badly and only a few ships at a time. The Athenians feared the enemy's numbers and the risk of being surrounded. They did not attack the whole force assigned to face them, or strike its center. Instead, they attacked one wing and sank a ship. After this, the enemy formed a circle. The Athenians sailed around it, trying to throw them into confusion.

2 The Peloponnesians facing the Corcyraeans realized what was happening. They feared a repeat of what had happened at Naupactus and came to help. With their ships now united, they advanced against the Athenians together.

3 The Athenians now began backing water to withdraw. At the same time, they wanted as many of the Corcyraean ships as possible to get safely away ahead of them. They withdrew slowly themselves, keeping the enemy's attack directed at them.

4 That was how the sea battle went. It ended at sunset.

CHAPTER 79

1 The Corcyraeans feared that the enemy, confident after their victory, would sail against the city, take off the men on the island, or make some other move against them. They brought the men back from the island to the sanctuary of Hera and guarded the city.

2 But although the Peloponnesians had won the sea battle, they did not dare sail against the city. They had captured thirteen Corcyraean ships. With these, they sailed back to the mainland, to the place they had set out from.

3 The next day they still did not sail against the city, even though its people were in great confusion and fear. Brasidas is said to have urged Alcidas to attack, but he had no equal vote in the decision. Instead, they landed at the headland of Leucimme and ravaged the countryside.

CHAPTER 80

1 Meanwhile, the Corcyraean people's party was terrified that the fleet would attack. They began talks with the suppliants and the others about how to save the city. They persuaded some of them to go aboard the ships. In spite of everything, they crewed thirty ships and waited for the attack.

2 The Peloponnesians ravaged the land until midday and then sailed away. Toward nightfall, fire signals told them that sixty Athenian ships were approaching from Leucas. The Athenians had sent these ships when they learned of the civil strife and heard that the fleet under Alcidas was about to sail against Corcyra. They sent Eurymedon son of Thucles as general.

CHAPTER 81

1 The Peloponnesians immediately set off for home that night, traveling quickly along the coast. They hauled their ships across the isthmus of Leucas so they would not be seen sailing around it, and continued on their way.

2 The Corcyraeans learned that the Athenian ships were approaching and the enemy ships had left. They brought into the city the Messenians who had previously been outside it. They ordered the ships they had manned to sail around to the Hyllaic harbor. While the ships were making this trip, they killed any of their enemies they caught. They also brought off the ships the men they had

persuaded to board them, and killed them. Then they went to Hera's sanctuary and persuaded about fifty of the men seeking protection there to stand trial. They sentenced every one of them to death.

3 Most of those seeking protection had not agreed to stand trial. When they saw what was happening, they began killing one another right there in the sanctuary. Some hanged themselves from the trees, and others ended their lives however they could.

4 For seven days, while Eurymedon remained there after arriving with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans murdered their fellow citizens whom they considered enemies. They charged their victims with trying to overthrow the democracy. But some were killed because of personal hatred, and others by people who had borrowed money from them and owed it back.

5 People were killed in every possible way. As usually happens in such circumstances, every kind of horror took place, and worse besides. Fathers killed their sons. People were dragged away from sanctuaries and killed beside them. Some were even walled up in the sanctuary of Dionysus and died there.

CHAPTER 82

1 The civil strife reached this level of cruelty. It seemed all the worse because it was among the first outbreaks. Later, practically the whole Greek world was shaken by it. In each city there were divisions: the leaders of the people wanted to bring in the Athenians, and the oligarchs wanted to bring in the Lacedaemonians. In peacetime they would have had neither an excuse to call them in nor the willingness to do so. But now the two powers were at war. Each side could get an alliance that would harm its opponents and, by the same means, strengthen itself. So anyone wanting a political upheaval could easily arrange outside intervention.

2 Civil strife brought many terrible sufferings on the cities. Such things happen and will always happen as long as human nature stays the same. They may be more violent or milder, and take different forms, depending on the changes in circumstances that arise in each case. In peace and prosperity, cities and individuals show better judgment because they are not forced into desperate situations against their will. But war takes away the ease of meeting daily needs. It teaches people by force and brings most people's tempers into line with their immediate circumstances.

3 So civil strife spread through the cities. Wherever it came later, people heard what had happened elsewhere and took their ideas much further. They devised more elaborate attacks and more extreme forms of revenge.

4 People changed the usual meanings of words describing actions to suit their own judgments. Reckless daring was called courage in support of one's friends. Cautious delay was called cowardice with a respectable cover. Self-control was a disguise for a lack of manliness. Understanding every side of a question meant being unable to act on anything. A wild rush into action was counted as a manly quality. Planning with safeguards was considered a reasonable excuse for backing out.

5 The person who was always angry was trusted; anyone who disagreed with him was suspect. Someone who carried out a successful plot was clever, and someone who detected one was even more capable. But anyone who planned ahead so that neither would be needed was breaking up the party and was terrified of its opponents. In short, people praised anyone who struck first against someone about to do harm, and anyone who encouraged a person who had not intended harm to do it.

6 Even family ties became weaker than party ties, because party members were readier to take risks without making excuses. These groups were not formed to secure benefits within the established laws, but to gain more for themselves by breaking them. Their trust in one another was reinforced less by religious obligations than by their shared involvement in lawbreaking.

7 When people had the upper hand, they responded to reasonable proposals from their opponents by guarding against their actions, not by showing generosity. Taking revenge mattered more than avoiding an injury in the first place. If the two sides ever swore oaths of reconciliation, they did so to meet an immediate difficulty. The oaths held only while neither side could get strength from elsewhere. When an opportunity arose, whichever side first regained confidence and saw the other off guard preferred to take revenge by exploiting its trust rather than by an open attack. It reckoned that this was safer, and that winning by deception also earned it a prize for cleverness. Most people would rather be called clever criminals than good but simple-minded people. They are ashamed of the second description and proud of the first.

8 The cause of all this was the pursuit of power out of greed and ambition. These motives also produced the violent passions that emerged when people entered a struggle to win. In the cities, the leaders on each side adopted attractive slogans. One side favored political equality for the people, the other a moderate rule by the best men. They claimed to serve the public interest, but made it the prize they competed for. They used every means to get the better of each other, dared to commit the most terrible acts, and went on to take still greater revenge. They did not set limits according to justice or the city's good, but according to whatever would please each side at the time. Whether they gained power by an unjust vote of condemnation or by force, they were ready to satisfy their immediate desire to win. Neither side respected religious duty. Those who managed to carry out a hateful act under cover of a respectable argument won a better reputation. Citizens who stayed in the middle were destroyed by both sides, either because they would not join the struggle or because others resented their surviving.

CHAPTER 83

1 In this way civil strife brought every kind of bad conduct into the Greek world. Simple honesty, which is so closely connected with a noble character, was laughed out of existence. Instead, people became deeply committed to opposing one another with suspicion.

2 There was nothing to settle their differences: no dependable promise, no oath that inspired fear. Everyone had concluded firmly that there was no hope of lasting security. They looked ahead to avoid being harmed rather than finding themselves able to trust anyone.

3 People with less intelligence usually came out on top. They feared their own limitations and their opponents' cleverness. Afraid of losing in debate, or of being caught first in a plot devised by their opponents' versatile minds, they moved boldly into action.

4 The others looked down on them. They thought they would see danger coming, and that they had no need to secure by action what they could achieve by intelligence. As a result, they were more often caught off guard and killed.

CHAPTER 84

1 [In Corcyra, then, most of these crimes were committed first. There were acts of revenge of the kind people might commit after being ruled with more arrogance than moderation by those who had given them reason to retaliate. Others wanted to escape their long-standing poverty. Driven above all by passion and the desire to own their neighbors' property, they made unjust decisions. Still others attacked not for gain but chiefly as equals fighting equals. Carried to extremes by uncontrolled anger, they struck cruelly and without mercy.

2 At this crisis, life in the city was thrown into confusion. Human nature, already used to doing wrong despite the laws, now overpowered them. It gladly showed that it could not control its anger, that it was stronger than justice, and that it

hated anyone who stood above it. People would not have put revenge ahead of religious duty, or profit ahead of avoiding wrongdoing, if envy had not possessed such destructive power.

3 When taking revenge on others, people choose to destroy in advance the common rules that apply to such situations. These rules give everyone hope of surviving if they suffer a setback themselves. Yet people do not preserve them for a time when they themselves might fall into danger and need one of them.]

CHAPTER 85

1 These were the first outbursts of anger that the Corcyraeans in the city directed against one another. Eurymedon and the Athenians sailed away with their ships.

2 Later, the Corcyraean exiles—about five hundred of them had survived—captured the forts on the mainland. They controlled their own city's territory on the opposite coast. Using it as their base, they raided the people on the island and did great damage. A severe famine developed in the city.

3 They also sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon and Corinth to arrange their return. Nothing came of this. After some time, they got ships and hired troops together and crossed to the island. They numbered about six hundred altogether.

4 They burned their ships so they could have no hope of doing anything except winning control of the country. Then they went up Mount Istone and built a fort there. They inflicted damage on the people in the city and controlled the countryside.

CHAPTER 86

1 At the end of the same summer, the Athenians sent twenty ships to Sicily. Their generals were Laches son of Melanopus and Charoeades son of Euphiletus.

2 The Syracusans and Leontini had gone to war with one another. Apart from Camarina, the other Dorian cities were allied with Syracuse. These were the cities that had also joined the Lacedaemonian alliance when the war first began, although they had not actually taken part in the fighting. The Chalcidian cities and Camarina were allied with Leontini. In Italy, Locri supported Syracuse, while Rhegium supported Leontini because of their shared ancestry.

3 The allies of Leontini sent representatives to Athens. Appealing to their old alliance and to the fact that they were Ionians, they persuaded the Athenians to send them ships. The Syracusans were cutting them off from both land and sea.

4 The Athenians sent the ships, giving their ancestral connection as the reason. Their real aims were to stop grain being shipped from there to the Peloponnese and to make an initial test of whether they could bring Sicily under their control.

5 They established themselves at Rhegium in Italy and fought the war alongside their allies. The summer ended.

CHAPTER 87

1 During the following winter, the disease struck the Athenians a second time. It had never disappeared completely, but there had still been some relief from it.

2 This later outbreak lasted no less than a year; the first had lasted two years. Nothing did more than this disease to crush the Athenians and damage their strength.

3 No fewer than four thousand four hundred hoplites on the military rolls died, along with three hundred cavalrymen. The number of deaths among the rest of the population could not be established.

4 There were also many earthquakes at that time, in Athens, Euboea, and Boeotia, especially at Orchomenus in Boeotia.

CHAPTER 88

1 During the same winter, the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians made an expedition with thirty ships against the islands called the Islands of Aeolus. Lack of water made an expedition against them impossible in summer.

2 The islands belong to the Liparaeans, who are colonists from Cnidus. They live on one of the islands, a small one called Lipara. From there they go out to farm the others: Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera.

3 The local people believe that Hephaestus works at his forge on Hiera, because the island can be seen giving off a great deal of fire at night and smoke by day. These islands lie opposite the territory of the Sicels and the Messenians. Their people were allies of Syracuse.

4 The Athenians ravaged the land. When the inhabitants still refused to come over to their side, they sailed back to Rhegium. The winter ended, and the fifth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

CHAPTER 89

1 The next summer, the Peloponnesians and their allies came as far as the Isthmus, intending to invade Attica. They were led by Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. But many earthquakes occurred, so they turned back, and the invasion did not take place.

2 Around this time, while the earthquakes continued, the sea at Orobiae in Euboea withdrew from what was then the shore. It rose into a wave and rushed over part of the city. It flooded some of the land permanently and receded from the rest. What was once land is now sea. It killed everyone who could not run to higher ground in time.

3 A similar flood occurred around Atalanta, the island off the coast of the Opuntian Locrians. It swept away part of the Athenian fort and smashed one of the two ships that had been hauled up on shore.

4 At Peparethus, too, the water drew back, but there was no flood. An earthquake knocked down part of the wall, the town hall, and a few other buildings.

5 My own explanation of these events is this: at the point where the earthquake was strongest, it drove the sea back. The sea then suddenly rushed in again, making the flood more violent. I do not think such a thing could happen without an earthquake.

CHAPTER 90

1 During the same summer, warfare also continued in Sicily as opportunities arose for the various parties. The Sicilian Greeks campaigned against one another, and the Athenians campaigned with their own allies. I will describe the most important actions carried out by the allies together with the Athenians, or by their enemies against them.

2 Charoeades, the Athenian general, had already been killed in battle by the Syracusans. Laches now had sole command of the fleet. With the allies, he made an expedition against Mylae, which belonged to the Messenians. Two Messenian tribes happened to be garrisoning Mylae. They had also set an ambush for the men landing from the ships.

3 The Athenians and their allies routed the men in the ambush and killed many of them. They then attacked the fort and forced its defenders to agree to surrender the acropolis and join an expedition against Messene.

4 After this, when the Athenians and their allies advanced, the Messenians themselves also came over to their side. They gave hostages and the other guarantees.

CHAPTER 91

1 In the same summer, the Athenians sent thirty ships around the Peloponnese, commanded by Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes and Procles son of Theodorus. They sent sixty ships and two thousand hoplites to Melos, commanded by Nicias son of Niceratus.

2 They wanted to bring the Melians under their control. Although they were islanders, the Melians refused to submit or join the Athenian alliance.

3 The Melians did not come over to their side even when their land was ravaged. So the Athenians left Melos and sailed to Oropus in Graea. They landed around nightfall, and the hoplites immediately left the ships and marched overland to Tanagra in Boeotia.

4 At an agreed signal, the entire Athenian force from the city marched overland to meet them at the same place. Its generals were Hipponicus son of Callias and Eurymedon son of Thucles.

5 They camped that day in Tanagra's territory, ravaged it, and stayed overnight. The next day they defeated in battle the Tanagraeans who came out against them and some Thebans who had come to help. They captured arms, set up a victory monument, and withdrew, some to the city and the others to the ships.

6 Nicias sailed along the coast with the sixty ships, ravaged the coastal districts of Locris, and returned home.

CHAPTER 92

1 Around this time the Lacedaemonians were establishing their colony of Heraclea in Trachinia. Their reasons were as follows.

2 The Malians as a whole are divided into three groups: the Paralians, the Irians, and the Trachinians. The Trachinians were being devastated in war by their neighbors the Oetaeans. At first they intended to put themselves under Athenian protection. But they feared that the Athenians would not be reliable, so they sent to Lacedaemon instead, choosing Tisamenus as their ambassador.

3 The Dorians, whose country was the original homeland of the Lacedaemonians, joined this embassy with the same request. They too were being devastated by the Oetaeans.

4 After hearing them, the Lacedaemonians decided to send out the colony. They wanted to help the Trachinians and Dorians. They also thought the city would be well placed for the war against Athens. A fleet could be equipped there to attack Euboea, with only a short crossing to make. It would also be useful for the route to Thrace. Altogether, they were eager to settle the place.

5 First they consulted the god at Delphi. When he told them to proceed, they sent out settlers from among their own people and the perioeci. They invited any other Greeks who wanted to join them, except Ionians, Achaeans, and a few other peoples. Three Lacedaemonians led the expedition as its founders: Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon.

6 After arriving, they built and walled a new city, now called Heraclea. It is about forty stades from Thermopylae and twenty from the sea. They also prepared dockyards and built a barrier on the side toward Thermopylae, right at the narrow pass, so they could easily defend the dockyards.

CHAPTER 93

1 When this city was being settled, the Athenians were afraid at first. They thought it was being established chiefly to threaten Euboea, because the crossing to Cenaeum in Euboea is short. But the result was contrary to their expectations: no danger came from it.

2 There were reasons for this. The Thessalians, who were powerful in that region, and the people on whose land the city was being founded were afraid of having such strong neighbors. They attacked the new settlers and fought them constantly until they wore them down. The settlers had been very numerous at first: people went there confidently because the Lacedaemonians were founding it, thinking the city would be secure. But the Lacedaemonian governors who came out were at least as responsible for ruining its affairs and reducing its population. Their harsh and sometimes unjust government frightened most people away. This made it easier for the neighboring peoples to overcome them.

CHAPTER 94

1 During the same summer, around the time when the Athenians were being held up at Melos, the Athenians in the thirty ships sailing around the Peloponnese first ambushed and killed some garrison troops at Ellomenus in Leucadian territory. Later they came against Leucas with a larger force. They had all the Acarnanians, who joined with their full force except for the Oeniadae, as well as Zacynthians, Cephallenians, and fifteen Corcyraean ships.

2 The Leucadians remained inactive, overwhelmed by the enemy's numbers. Their land was being ravaged both outside the isthmus and inside it, where the city of Leucas and Apollo's sanctuary stand. The Acarnanians urged Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to cut them off with a wall. They thought they could easily capture the city by siege and get rid of a city that was always hostile to them.

3 At this point, however, the Messenians persuaded Demosthenes that, with so large an army assembled, he had a good opportunity to attack the Aetolians. They were enemies of Naupactus. If he defeated them, he could easily bring the rest of the mainland in that region over to the Athenians too.

4 They explained that the Aetolians were a large and warlike people, but lived in unwalled villages set far apart and used light equipment. So it would not be difficult to conquer them before they could join forces to help one another.

5 They advised him to attack the Apodotians first, then the Ophioneans, and after them the Eurytanians. These are the largest section of the Aetolians. Their speech is especially hard to understand, and they are said to eat raw meat. Once these peoples had been taken, they said, the rest would easily come over too.

CHAPTER 95

1 Demosthenes agreed, partly to oblige the Messenians. Above all, he thought that with the mainland allies and the Aetolians he could march overland against Boeotia without the main Athenian force. He would go through the territory of the Ozolian Locrians to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Mount Parnassus on his right, until he came down into Phocis. He thought the Phocians would willingly join the expedition because of their long-standing friendship with Athens, or at least could be forced to join. Boeotia directly borders Phocis. So he sailed from Leucas with the whole army, against the wishes of the Acarnanians, and put in at Sollium.

2 He shared his plan with the Acarnanians. They would not accept it, because he had failed to wall off Leucas. So he marched against the Aetolians with the rest of the army: Cephallenians, Messenians, Zacynthians, and the three hundred Athenian marines from his own ships. The fifteen Corcyraean ships had left.

3 His base was Oeneon in Locris. These Ozolian Locrians were allies, and their entire force was supposed to meet the Athenians inland. As neighbors of the Aetolians who used the same equipment, they were expected to be a great help on the expedition. They knew both the Aetolian way of fighting and the countryside.

CHAPTER 96

1 He camped with his army at the sanctuary of Nemean Zeus. This is where the poet Hesiod is said to have been killed by the local people, after an oracle had told him that this would happen to him at Nemea. At dawn Demosthenes set

out and marched into Aetolia.

2 He took Potidania on the first day, Crocyleum on the second, and Teichium on the third. He stayed there and sent the loot to Eupalium in Locris. His plan was to conquer the other places, return to Naupactus, and later campaign against the Ophioneans if they refused to surrender.

3 The Aetolians had known about these preparations even when the attack was first being planned. Once the army invaded, they all came to help in great strength. Even the most distant Ophioneans, the Bomians and Callians, whose territory extends toward the Malian Gulf, came to join them.

CHAPTER 97

1 The Messenians gave Demosthenes much the same advice as when they first tried to convince him how easy it would be to conquer the Aetolians. They urged him to attack the villages as quickly as possible. He should not wait until all the Aetolians had assembled to face him, but should always try to capture whichever village lay immediately ahead.

2 He accepted their advice and felt confident in his good fortune, because nothing had gone against him. He did not wait for the Locrians who were supposed to come to his support, although his greatest shortage was of lightly armed javelin throwers. Instead he advanced on Aegitium and captured it by direct assault. The inhabitants had withdrawn and taken up positions on the hills above the town. The town itself stood on high ground, about eighty stades from the sea.

3 The Aetolians had already come to the aid of Aegitium. They attacked the Athenians and their allies, running down from the hills from different directions and throwing javelins. Whenever the Athenian army advanced, they fell back. When it withdrew, they pressed after it. This kind of fighting went on for a long time, with pursuits and retreats, and the Athenians had the worse of both.

CHAPTER 98

1 As long as the archers had arrows and were able to use them, the rest held their ground. The Aetolians were lightly armed and drew back under the arrows. But the archers' commander was killed, and they scattered. The Athenians themselves were exhausted after being kept so long at the same hard fighting, while the Aetolians kept pressing them and throwing javelins. Then they broke and fled. They ran into ravines they could not escape from and into unfamiliar ground, and were killed. Their guide on the roads, Chromon the Messenian, also happened to have been killed.

2 The Aetolians were lightly armed and fast on their feet. They pursued closely, throwing javelins, and killed many men on the spot as they fled. But most of the fugitives lost their way and rushed into woods with no way out. The Aetolians brought fire and burned the woods around them.

3 The Athenian army suffered every kind of disaster in its flight and destruction. The survivors only just managed to escape to the sea and Oeneon in Locris, the place they had originally set out from.

4 Many of the allies died, along with about one hundred and twenty Athenian hoplites. For a group of that size and age, these were the finest men the city of Athens lost in this war. Procles, the other general, was also killed.

5 They recovered their dead from the Aetolians under a truce and returned to Naupactus. Later they sailed back to Athens. But Demosthenes stayed behind around Naupactus and the neighboring districts. After what had happened, he was afraid of the Athenians.

CHAPTER 99

1 At about the same time, the Athenians operating around Sicily sailed to the territory of the Locrians. During one landing they defeated the Locrians who came to resist them. They also captured a small fort on the river Halex.

CHAPTER 100

1 During the same summer, the Aetolians had already sent ambassadors to Corinth and Lacedaemon: Tolophon the Ophionean, Boriades the Eurytanian, and Teisander the Apodotian. They persuaded them to send an army against Naupactus because the people there had brought the Athenians against them.

2 Around the fall, the Lacedaemonians sent out three thousand allied hoplites. Five hundred of these came from Heraclea in Trachis, a city that had just been founded. Eurylochus, a Spartan, commanded the army. Two other Spartans, Macarius and Menedaius, accompanied him.

CHAPTER 101

1 When the army had assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent heralds to negotiate with the Ozolian Locrians. His route to Naupactus lay through their country. He also wanted to make them break away from the Athenians.

2 Among the Locrians, the Amphissians gave him the most help. They were afraid because the Phocians were hostile to them. They were the first to give hostages themselves. They also persuaded the others, who feared the approaching army, to do the same. First came their neighbors, the Myonians, whose territory offered the hardest route into Locris. Then came the Ipnians, Messapians, Tritaeans, Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and Oeantheans. All these also joined the expedition. The Olpaeans gave hostages but did not join it. The Hyaeans did not give hostages until the army captured one of their villages, called Polis.

CHAPTER 102

1 When all his preparations were complete, Eurylochus left the hostages at Cytinium in Doris and advanced with his army through Locrian territory toward Naupactus. On the way he captured their towns of Oeneon and Eupalium, which had refused to join him.

2 Once they reached the territory of Naupactus, the Aetolians had already joined them to help. They ravaged the land and captured the unwalled suburb. They also advanced against Molycreum and captured it. It was a Corinthian colony but subject to Athens.

3 Demosthenes the Athenian was still in the area of Naupactus after the events in Aetolia. He learned of the army's approach in advance and feared for the city. He went to the Acarnanians and persuaded them to help Naupactus. This was difficult because of his withdrawal from Leucas.

4 They sent a thousand hoplites with him on the ships. These got into the town and saved it. There had been a serious fear that the defenders would not hold out: the wall covered a large area, and there were few men to defend it.

5 Eurylochus and his troops learned that the reinforcements had entered and that they could not take the city by force. They withdrew, but not to the Peloponnese. Instead they went to Aeolis, the region now called Calydon and Pleuron, to the places nearby, and to Proschium in Aetolia.

6 The reason was that the Ambraciots had come to them and persuaded them to join an attack on Amphilochian Argos, the rest of Amphilochia, and Acarnania as well. They said that if they gained control of these places, the whole mainland would become an ally of the Lacedaemonians.

7 Eurylochus agreed. He dismissed the Aetolians and kept his army in those districts, waiting until the Ambraciots marched against Argos and needed his help. The summer came to an end.

CHAPTER 103

1 During the following winter, the Athenians in Sicily advanced against Inessa, a Sicel town whose citadel the Syracusans held. With them were their Greek allies and those Sicels who had been forced under Syracusan rule and had been allied with them, but had revolted [from the Syracusans] and were fighting alongside the Athenians. They attacked the town, but could not take it and withdrew.

2 During the withdrawal, the allies were retreating behind the Athenians. The Syracusans came out of the fort and attacked them. Their assault put part of the army to flight and killed a considerable number.

3 After this, Laches and the Athenians made some landings from their ships in Locrian territory. Near the river Caicinus they defeated about three hundred Locrians who came to resist them under Proxenus son of Capaton. They took their weapons and withdrew.

CHAPTER 104

1 During the same winter, the Athenians also purified Delos in obedience to an oracle. Pisistratus the tyrant had purified it before, but not the whole island, only the part visible from the sanctuary. This time the entire island was purified in the following way.

2 They removed every burial place on Delos. They also announced that from then on no one was to die or give birth on the island. Instead, people were to be taken across to Rhenea. Rhenea is so close to Delos that Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, once tied it to Delos with a chain when he dedicated it to Delian Apollo. This was at a time when his fleet was powerful, he ruled other islands, and he had captured Rhenea. After the purification, the Athenians held the Delian festival for the first time as a festival to take place every four years.

3 Long ago, too, there used to be a large gathering on Delos of Ionians and the islanders living nearby. They came to watch the festival with their wives and children, as the Ionians now do at the Ephesian festival. Athletic and musical contests were held there, and the cities brought choirs.

4 Homer gives the clearest evidence that this was how things were, in these verses from a prelude in honor of Apollo: / "But when you took the greatest pleasure in Delos, Phoebus, / there the Ionians in their long robes gather / with their children and wives in your street. / There they please you with boxing, dancing, and song, / remembering you whenever they hold a contest."

5 He also shows that there was a musical contest and that people came to compete, in these verses from the same prelude. After praising the women's choir on Delos, he ended his praise with these lines, in which he also mentioned himself: / "Come now, may Apollo and Artemis be kind to us, / and farewell to all of you. In the days to come, / remember me whenever someone from among the people on earth, / another traveler who has been through hardships, comes here and asks: / 'Girls, who is the sweetest singer of all the men / who visit here, and whose singing gives you the most pleasure?' / All of you must be sure to answer without being prompted: / 'A blind man, who lives on rocky Chios.'"

6 This is Homer's evidence that even long ago there was a large gathering and festival on Delos. Later, the islanders and the Athenians continued to send choirs with sacrificial offerings. But the contests and most of the other activities fell away, probably because of misfortunes. This lasted until the Athenians held the contest at this time, adding horse races, which had not been held before.

CHAPTER 105

1 During the same winter, the Ambraciots marched against Amphilochian Argos with three thousand hoplites. This was the campaign they had promised Eurylochus, persuading him to keep his army there. They invaded the territory of Argos and occupied Olpae, a strong fort on a hill beside the sea. The Acarnanians had once built it and used it as a common court of justice. It is about twenty-five stades from the city of Argos, which is on the coast.

2 Some of the Acarnanians went to help defend Argos. Others camped at the place in Amphilochia called Crenae. They kept watch to stop the Peloponnesians under Eurylochus from slipping through to join the Ambraciots.

3 They also sent for Demosthenes, who had commanded the Athenians in Aetolia, to lead them. And they sent for the twenty Athenian ships that happened to be off the Peloponnese. These were commanded by Aristoteles son of Timocrates and Hierophon son of Antimnestus.

4 The Ambraciots at Olpae also sent a messenger to their city, calling on the whole population to come to their aid. They feared that Eurylochus and his men might not be able to get through the Acarnanians. They would then either have to fight on their own or find it unsafe to retreat if they wanted to.

CHAPTER 106

1 When the Peloponnesians with Eurylochus learned that the Ambraciots had reached Olpae, they left Proschium and hurried to help them. They crossed the Achelous and advanced through Acarnania. The country was empty because its people had gone to defend Argos. They kept the city of Stratus and its garrison on their right, and the rest of Acarnania on their left.

2 After passing through the territory of Stratus, they went through Phytia, then along the outer edge of Medeon's territory, and then through Limnaea. They entered the country of the Agraeans. This was no longer Acarnania, but a country friendly to them.

3 They reached Mount Thyamus, which belongs to the Agraeans, crossed it, and descended into the territory of Argos after nightfall. They passed unnoticed between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian guard at Crenae, and joined the Ambraciots at Olpae.

CHAPTER 107

1 Their forces were now united. At daybreak they took up a position at the place called Metropolis and made camp. Not long afterward the Athenians arrived in the Ambracian Gulf with their twenty ships to help the Argives. Demosthenes also arrived with two hundred Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian archers.

2 The ships blockaded the hill at Olpae from the sea. The Acarnanians had already gathered at Argos, along with a few Amphilochians. Most of the Amphilochians were being held back by force by the Ambraciots. They pre-

pared to fight the enemy and chose Demosthenes to command the whole allied force together with their own generals.

3 Demosthenes brought them close to Olpae and camped there. A large ravine separated the armies. They remained inactive for five days. On the sixth, both sides formed up for battle. The Peloponnesian army was larger and its line extended beyond the other. Demosthenes feared being surrounded. He put about four hundred hoplites and lightly armed troops in ambush in a sunken road overgrown with bushes. They were to rise up just as the armies met and attack from behind the part of the enemy line that extended beyond his own.

4 When both sides were ready, they came to close combat. Demosthenes held the right wing with the Messenians and a few Athenians. The Acarnanians, each contingent in its assigned position, held the rest of the line, along with the Amphilochian javelin throwers who were present. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were mixed together in their line, except for the Mantineans. These kept together toward the left, but not at the very end of the wing. Eurylochus and his own men held the extreme left, opposite the Messenians and Demosthenes.

CHAPTER 108

1 Once the armies were fighting at close quarters, the Peloponnesians extended their wing around the enemy's right and began to surround it. Then the Acarnanians in ambush came up behind them, attacked, and put them to flight. They did not even stand to defend themselves. Their panic also sent most of the army into flight. When the rest saw Eurylochus' force, the strongest part of their army, being destroyed, they became much more afraid. The Messenians, who were stationed there with Demosthenes, did most of the fighting.

2 But the Ambraciots and those on the right wing defeated the troops facing them and chased them toward Argos. The Ambraciots are, in fact, the most warlike people in that region.

3 On their way back they saw that most of their army had been defeated. The other Acarnanians were pressing them, and they struggled to get safely back to Olpae. Many were killed as they ran into their opponents in confusion and with no order at all. The Mantineans were the exception. They kept their formation better than anyone else in the army as they withdrew. The battle ended late in the day.

CHAPTER 109

1 The next day Menedaius took command, since Eurylochus and Macarius were dead. After such a heavy defeat he did not know how they could hold out if they stayed, besieged on land and blockaded at sea by the Athenian ships, or how they could escape safely if they withdrew. He approached Demosthenes and the Acarnanian generals to discuss a truce and a withdrawal, as well as permission to recover the dead.

2 They returned the dead, set up a victory monument themselves, and recovered their own dead, about three hundred. They did not openly agree to a truce allowing everyone to withdraw. But Demosthenes and his fellow commanders, the Acarnanian generals, secretly agreed that the Mantineans, Menedaius, the other Peloponnesian commanders, and their most important men could leave quickly. He wanted to leave the Ambraciots and the mass of hired soldiers [the foreign troops] without support. Above all, he wanted to discredit the Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesians among the Greeks of that region, by showing that they had betrayed their allies and put their own interests first.

3 The defeated army recovered its dead and hurried to bury them as best it could. Those who had permission to leave secretly planned their departure.

CHAPTER 110

1 Demosthenes and the Acarnanians now received news that the Ambraciots from the city were marching through Amphilochian country with their whole force. They were coming to help in response to the first message from Olpae. They wanted to join the troops there and knew nothing of what had happened.

2 Demosthenes immediately sent part of his army ahead to set ambushes on the roads and occupy strong positions before the enemy arrived. At the same time he prepared to take the rest of the army against them.

CHAPTER 111

1 Meanwhile, the Mantineans and the others covered by the truce went out, supposedly to gather vegetables and firewood. They slipped away in small groups, collecting the things they claimed to have come out for as they went. Once they were well away from Olpae, they quickened their retreat.

2 The Ambraciots and the others who happened to have gone out together as a group realized that they were leaving. They too set off, running to catch up with them.

3 At first the Acarnanians thought that all of them were leaving without a truce. They pursued the Peloponnesians as well. Some of their own generals tried to stop them, saying that a truce had been made with these men. Someone even threw javelins at these generals, thinking that they were betraying their own side. But afterward they let the Mantineans and Peloponnesians go and killed the Ambraciots.

4 There was much argument and confusion over whether a man was an Ambraciot or a Peloponnesian. They killed about two hundred of them. The rest escaped to the neighboring country of the Agraeans. Their king, Salynthius, was friendly to them and took them in.

CHAPTER 112

1 The Ambraciots coming from the city reached Idomene. Idomene consists of two high hills. After night fell, the troops Demosthenes had sent ahead from his camp occupied the larger hill before the enemy could, without being noticed. The Ambraciots had already gone up the smaller hill. The advance troops camped on the larger one for the night.

2 After dinner, Demosthenes and the rest of the army began their march as soon as evening came. He led half the force along the route into the country, while the other half went through the Amphilochian mountains.

3 At dawn he fell on the Ambraciots while they were still in their sleeping places. They had no warning of what had happened. In fact, they were much more inclined to think the approaching troops were their own men.

4 Demosthenes had deliberately put the Messenians in front and told them to speak to the sentries. They spoke the Doric dialect and so reassured the guards. It was also still night, and they could not be seen clearly.

5 When he attacked their army, his men put it to flight. They killed most of them on the spot. The rest fled into the mountains.

6 But the roads had already been occupied. The Amphilochians knew their own country and were lightly armed, facing hoplites. The fugitives did not know the area and had no idea which way to turn. They fell into ravines and the ambushes set for them, and were killed.

7 They tried every possible way of escaping. Some even turned toward the sea, which was not far away. They saw the Athenian ships sailing past just as the battle was taking place and swam toward them. In their immediate terror, they thought it better, if they had to die, to be killed by the men on the ships than by the Amphilochians, who were non-Greeks and their bitterest enemies.

8 After this disaster, only a few of the many Ambraciots got safely back to their city. The Acarnanians stripped the dead, set up victory monuments, and returned to Argos.

CHAPTER 113

1 The next day a herald came to them from the Ambraciots who had fled from Olpae to the Agraeans. He wanted permission to recover the dead killed after the first battle, when they had left without a truce along with the Mantineans and those protected by the agreement.

2 The herald saw the weapons of the Ambraciots who had come from the city and was amazed at how many there were. He knew nothing of the disaster and thought they belonged to the men who had been with his own force.

3 Someone asked him why he was surprised and how many of their men had died. The questioner, in turn, assumed the herald had come from the troops at Idomene. He answered, "About two hundred." The questioner replied, "These weapons don't look like they belong to that many men,

4 "but to more than a thousand." The herald said, "Then they aren't from the men who fought with us." The other answered, "They are if you fought at Idomene yesterday." "But we didn't fight anyone yesterday. It was the day before, during the retreat." "Well, yesterday we fought these men, who had come to help from the city of Ambracia."

5 When the herald heard this and realized that the reinforcements from the city had been destroyed, he cried out in grief. Stunned by the scale of the disaster, he left at once without completing his task and no longer asked for the dead.

6 This was the greatest disaster to strike a single Greek city in a comparable number of days during this war. I have not recorded the number killed, because the reported loss seems unbelievable in relation to the size of the city. But I know that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had wanted to follow the advice of

the Athenians and Demosthenes and take Ambracia, they could have captured it at the first assault. Instead, they feared that the Athenians, if they held it, would be more troublesome neighbors to them.

CHAPTER 114

1 After this, they assigned a third of the spoils to the Athenians and divided the rest among their cities. The Athenians' share was captured while being carried by sea. The three hundred full sets of armor now dedicated in the sanctuaries of Attica had been set aside for Demosthenes, and he sailed home with them. His success also made him less afraid to return after the disaster in Aetolia.

2 The Athenians in the twenty ships also left for Naupactus. After the Athenians and Demosthenes had gone, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians made a truce allowing the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had taken refuge with Salynthius and the Agraeans to withdraw from Oeniadae. They had moved there from Salynthius' territory.

3 The Acarnanians and Amphilochians also made a peace treaty and an alliance with the Ambraciots for the next hundred years, on these terms. The Ambraciots were not to campaign with the Acarnanians against the Peloponnesians, nor were the Acarnanians to campaign with the Ambraciots against the Athenians. They were to help defend each other's country. The Ambraciots were to return every place and hostage belonging to the Amphilochians that they held. They were not to send help to Anactorium, which was hostile to the Acarnanians.

4 With this agreement they ended the war. Afterward, the Corinthians sent about three hundred of their own hoplites to garrison Ambracia, with Xenoclides son of Euthycles as commander. They reached it with difficulty after traveling overland. That was how events at Ambracia turned out.

CHAPTER 115

1 During the same winter, the Athenians in Sicily landed from their ships in the territory of Himera. They acted together with the Sicels who had invaded the outer parts of that territory from the uplands. They also sailed to the islands of Aeolus.

2 When they returned to Rhegium, they found Pythodorus son of Isolochus, an Athenian general, who had arrived to take over command of Laches' ships.

3 The allies in Sicily had sailed to Athens and persuaded the Athenians to send more ships to help them. The Syracusans controlled their land. At sea, however, a small number of ships was keeping the Syracusans shut out. They were gathering a fleet and preparing to act, determined not to let this continue.

4 The Athenians were fitting out forty ships to send them. They thought this would bring the war there to an end more quickly. They also wanted to give their navy practice.

5 They therefore sent one of the generals, Pythodorus, with a few ships. They intended to send Sophocles son of Sostratides and Eurymedon son of Thucles with the larger part of the fleet.

6 Pythodorus had already taken over Laches' command of the ships. Toward the end of the winter, he sailed against the Locrian fort that Laches had captured earlier. The Locrians defeated him in battle, and he withdrew.

CHAPTER 116

1 Around this very spring, a stream of fire poured out of Etna, as it had before. It destroyed some land belonging to the people of Catana, who live below Mount Etna, the highest mountain in Sicily.

2 This flow is said to have occurred in the fiftieth year after the previous one. In all, the stream of fire is said to have flowed three times since Greeks began to settle in Sicily.

3 These events took place during this winter. The sixth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

Book 4



CHAPTER 1

1 In the following summer, around the time when the grain was coming into ear, ten Syracusan ships and the same number of Locrian ships sailed to Messene in Sicily and took control of it. The people there had invited them in, and Messene broke away from the Athenians.

2 The Syracusans acted mainly because they saw that the place offered a way into Sicily. They feared that the Athenians might one day use it as a base to attack them with a larger force. The Locrians acted out of hostility toward the people of Rhegium. They wanted to attack them from both sides and defeat them.

3 At the same time, the Locrians had invaded the territory of Rhegium with their whole army to stop its people from helping the Messenians. Exiles from Rhegium who were living among the Locrians also helped bring about the invasion. Rhegium had been divided by civil strife for a long time and was currently unable to defend itself against the Locrians. This made them all the more ready to attack.

4 After laying waste to the land, the Locrian land forces withdrew. But the ships stayed to guard Messene. Other ships were being fitted out and were to make their base there too and carry on the war from there.

CHAPTER 2

1 Around the same time in the spring, before the grain was fully grown, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica. Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, led them. They established themselves there and laid waste to the land.

2 The Athenians sent the forty ships to Sicily, as they had been preparing to do, along with the two remaining generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles. Pythodorus, the third general, had already gone ahead to Sicily.

3 They also told these generals to look after the Corcyraeans in the city as they sailed past. Exiles in the mountain were raiding them. Sixty Peloponnesian ships had sailed there to support the men in the mountain. There was a severe famine in the city, and the Peloponnesians thought they could easily take control.

4 Demosthenes had held no public office since his return from Acarnania. At his own request, they gave him permission to use these ships around the Peloponnese if he wished.

CHAPTER 3

1 As they sailed along the coast of Laconia, they learned that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra. Eurymedon and Sophocles wanted to hurry there. But Demosthenes urged them to put in at Pylos first, do what was needed, and then continue their voyage. They objected, but a storm happened to come up and drove the ships into Pylos.

2 Demosthenes immediately called for the place to be fortified. This was why he had sailed with them. He pointed out that there was plenty of timber and stone. The place was naturally strong, and both it and a large stretch of the surrounding country were uninhabited. Pylos is about four hundred stades from Sparta, in what was once Messenian territory. The Lacedaemonians call it Coryphasium.

3 They replied that the Peloponnese had plenty of deserted headlands, if he wanted to occupy them and make the city spend money. But he thought this place had special advantages over others. It had a harbor, and the Messenians had originally belonged there and spoke the same language as the Lacedaemonians. Using it as a base, they could do the Lacedaemonians a great deal of harm. They would also be reliable guards for the place.

CHAPTER 4

1 He could not persuade either the generals or the soldiers, even after he later discussed the plan with the commanders of the infantry divisions. So he did nothing while the weather kept them from sailing. Eventually the soldiers themselves, with nothing to do, felt the urge to gather around the site and fortify it.

2 They began work without having any tools for cutting stone. Instead, they picked up stones and carried them over, fitting each one into place however it would go. Where they needed mortar, they had no containers, so they carried it on their backs. They bent forward to keep it in place as much as possible and clasped their hands behind them to stop it from falling off.

3 They hurried in every possible way to finish the most vulnerable points before the Lacedaemonians could arrive to oppose them. Most of the site was naturally strong and needed no wall.

CHAPTER 5

1 The Lacedaemonians happened to be celebrating a festival. When they heard the news, they took little notice. They thought that once they came out against the Athenians, these would either leave rather than face them or be easily taken by force. They were also held back to some extent because their army was still in Attica.

2 In six days the Athenians fortified the landward side of the site and the other points that most needed it. They left Demosthenes there with five ships to guard it. With the greater part of the fleet, they hurried on toward Corcyra and Sicily.

CHAPTER 6

1 When the Peloponnesians in Attica learned that Pylos had been occupied, they hurried home. The Lacedaemonians and King Agis thought that the situation at Pylos directly concerned them. Also, they had invaded early, while the grain was still green, and most of the army was short of food. A storm more severe than was usual for the season also came up and caused the troops hardship.

2 Several causes thus combined to make them withdraw sooner and to make this invasion the shortest of all. They stayed in Attica for fifteen days.

CHAPTER 7

1 Around the same time, the Athenian general Simonides gathered a few Athenians from the garrisons and a large force of local allies. With help from traitors inside, he took Eion in Thrace, a colony of Mende that was hostile to Athens. But the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans immediately came to its aid. He was driven out and lost many of his soldiers.

CHAPTER 8

1 After the Peloponnesians had withdrawn from Attica, the Spartans themselves and the nearest perioeci immediately marched to help at Pylos. The other Lacedaemonians were slower to advance, since they had only just returned from another campaign.

2 They also sent word throughout the Peloponnese for help to come to Pylos as quickly as possible. They sent for their sixty ships at Corcyra too. These were hauled across the isthmus of Leucas and reached Pylos without being noticed

by the Athenian ships at Zacynthus. The land army was already there.

3 While the Peloponnesians were still sailing toward him, Demosthenes managed to send out two ships ahead of them. These were to tell Eurymedon and the Athenians aboard the ships at Zacynthus to come, because the position was in danger.

4 The ships sailed off quickly with Demosthenes' message. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians prepared to attack the fort by land and sea. They expected to take it easily, since it had been built in a hurry and had only a few defenders inside.

5 They also expected the Athenian ships from Zacynthus to come to its aid. If they had not taken the fort before then, they planned to block the harbor entrances too, so that the Athenians could not anchor inside it.

6 The island called Sphacteria stretches along the harbor and lies close to it. This makes the harbor sheltered and its entrances narrow. At the entrance beside Pylos and the Athenian fort, two ships can pass abreast. At the entrance toward the rest of the mainland, eight or nine can pass. The whole island was wooded and had no paths because it was uninhabited. It was about fifteen stades long.

7 They intended to close the entrances with ships packed closely together, their bows facing outward. They feared that the Athenians might use the island as a base against them, so they sent hoplites across to it and stationed others along the mainland.

8 In this way, they thought, both the island and the mainland would be hostile territory for the Athenians, with no place for them to land. The seaward coast of Pylos itself, outside the harbor entrance, had no harbors, so the Athenians would have no base there from which to help their own men. The Lacedaemonians themselves would probably take the position by siege without risking a sea battle or any other danger. There was no grain inside, and it had been occupied with very little preparation.

9 Once they had decided on this plan, they drew lots among all the companies and sent the selected hoplites across to the island. Other men had already crossed earlier in rotation. The last group, who were also the men cut off there, numbered four hundred and twenty, with their attendant Helots. Their commander was Epitadas son of Molobrus.

CHAPTER 9

1 Demosthenes saw that the Lacedaemonians were about to attack with their ships and land army together, and made his own preparations. He hauled the remaining triremes from those left with him up beneath the fort and put a stockade around them. He armed their sailors with poor shields, mostly made of wicker. There was no way to get weapons in an uninhabited place. Even these shields came from a Messenian pirate ship with thirty oars and a small boat that happened to arrive. Among these Messenians were also about forty hoplites, whom he used along with the others.

2 He stationed most of the men, both armed and unarmed, at the best-fortified and strongest points of the site on the landward side. He told them to defend it against the land army if it attacked. He himself selected sixty hoplites from the whole force and a few archers, and went outside the wall toward the sea. This was where he most expected the enemy to try to land. The ground was rough and rocky and faced the open sea. But the wall was weakest there, so he thought they would be eager to force their way in at that point.

3 The Athenians had not expected ever to be defeated at sea, and for that reason had not built a strong wall there. If the enemy forced a landing, the position would be open to capture.

4 So he went down to the water's edge at this point and stationed his hoplites there to keep the enemy out if he could. He encouraged them with these words.

CHAPTER 10

1 "Men who have joined me in facing this danger, in a crisis like this none of you should try to look clever by calculating every danger surrounding us. Instead, face the enemy confidently, without too much thought. That is how you may win. When things reach a crisis like ours, there is very little room for calculation. What is needed is to take the risk as quickly as possible.

2 "I can also see that most of the advantages are on our side, if we are willing to stand our ground. We must not let their numbers terrify us into throwing away the stronger position we already hold.

3 "I count the difficulty of approaching the place as one of our advantages. It helps us if we stay. But if we retreat, the ground will be easy to cross despite its difficulties, because no one will be stopping the enemy. And the enemy will be more dangerous to us because, once ashore, they will find it hard to retreat, even if we press them back. They are easiest to fight off while still aboard their ships. Once they have landed, they are on equal terms with us.

4 "We should not be too afraid of their numbers either. However many there are, only a few will fight at a time, since it is hard to bring ships in to shore. This is not a larger army fighting on land under the same conditions as we are. They are attacking from ships, and many things at sea have to go right for them at the right moment.

5 "So I think their difficulties make up for our small numbers. You are Athenians, and your experience of landing troops against an enemy has taught you this: if a defender stands firm and does not retreat in fear of the waves and the frightening sight of ships sailing in, he can never be forced back. I ask you now to stand firm yourselves. Fight them off at the very edge of the surf, and save both ourselves and this position."

CHAPTER 11

1 After this encouragement from Demosthenes, the Athenians felt more confident. They went farther down and took up their positions at the very edge of the sea.

2 The Lacedaemonians advanced and attacked the fort with their land army and, at the same time, with their forty-three ships. Their fleet commander, the Spartan Thrasymelidas son of Cratesicles, sailed with them. He attacked at the very point Demosthenes had expected.

3 The Athenians defended themselves on both sides, against attacks from land and sea. The enemy divided their ships into small groups because there was no room for more to approach. They attacked in turns, resting between attacks. They made every effort and shouted encouragement to each other, hoping somehow to drive the defenders back and take the fort.

4 Brasidas stood out more than anyone. He was commanding a trireme. He saw that, because of the difficult ground, the ship commanders and helmsmen were hesitating even where a landing seemed possible. They were taking care not to wreck their ships. He shouted that they should not spare a few pieces of wood and let the enemy keep a fort they had built in their country. He urged them to smash their own ships if necessary to force a landing. He called on the allies not to hesitate to give their ships to the Lacedaemonians in this crisis, in return for the great benefits they had received. They should run the ships ashore, get off them by any means, and overcome both the men and their position.

CHAPTER 12

1 He urged the others on in this way and made his own helmsman run the ship ashore. Then he moved onto the gangway. As he tried to land, the Athenians drove him back. He received many wounds and fainted. He fell into the ship's

outrigger, and his shield slipped into the sea. It washed ashore, and the Athenians picked it up. Later they used it for the victory trophy they set up to mark this attack.

2 The others tried hard, but they could not land. The ground was difficult, and the Athenians stood firm without giving way at all.

3 Their fortunes had been reversed so completely that Athenians were defending a position on land—Laconian land at that—against an attack by sea. Lacedaemonians were landing from ships to attack Athenians on their own soil, which had become enemy territory. At that time, the prevailing view was that the Lacedaemonians were above all a land power with the best infantry, while the Athenians were a sea power with by far the strongest navy.

CHAPTER 13

1 After attacking throughout that day and part of the next, they stopped. On the third day they sent some of their ships along the coast to Asine to get timber for siege engines. They hoped to take the wall facing the harbor with these engines. It was high, but that was the easiest place to land.

2 Meanwhile the Athenian ships arrived from Zacynthus, forty in all. Some of the guard ships from Naupactus and four Chian ships had joined them to help.

3 They saw both the mainland and the island crowded with hoplites, and the enemy ships staying inside the harbor instead of sailing out. They did not know where to anchor. So for the moment they sailed to the nearby uninhabited island of Prote and spent the night there. The next day they prepared for a sea battle and put out. If the enemy were willing to sail out against them, they would fight in open water. Otherwise they would sail into the harbor themselves.

4 The enemy neither put out to meet them nor carried out their plan to block the entrances. Instead, they stayed on shore, manning their ships and preparing to fight inside the harbor if anyone sailed in. It was a large harbor.

CHAPTER 14

1 Once the Athenians saw this, they rushed at them through both entrances. Most of the ships were already afloat and facing them with their bows. The Athenians attacked these and put them to flight. In a short pursuit they damaged many and captured five, one of them with its crew. They rammed the other ships, which had taken refuge by the shore. Some were struck while still being manned, before they could put out. The Athenians also tied towlines to some empty ships and began pulling them away after their crews had fled.

2 The Lacedaemonians saw this and were deeply distressed by the disaster, especially because their men were being cut off on the island. They rushed to help, waded into the sea with their weapons, seized the ships, and pulled against the Athenians. Each man felt that things would be held up unless he personally took part in the action.

3 There was great confusion, and in the struggle over the ships each side's usual way of fighting was reversed. In their eagerness and alarm, the Lacedaemonians were practically fighting a sea battle from the land. The Athenians had the upper hand and wanted to make the most of their present good fortune. They were fighting a land battle from their ships.

4 After much hard fighting and many wounds on both sides, they separated. The Lacedaemonians saved the empty ships, apart from those captured at the start.

5 Both sides returned to their camps. The Athenians set up a victory trophy, gave back the enemy dead, and took possession of the wrecks. They immediately began sailing around the island and keeping watch over it, since the men there were now cut off. The Peloponnesians on the mainland, now reinforced from all their communities, stayed in position at Pylos.

CHAPTER 15

1 When the news of what had happened at Pylos reached Sparta, the Lacedaemonians treated it as a great disaster. They decided that the authorities should go down to the camp, see things for themselves, and immediately decide what to do.

2 They saw that they could not help the men on the island. They did not want to risk the men either dying of hunger or being overwhelmed and captured by a larger force. So they decided to arrange a truce over Pylos with the Athenian generals, if these were willing, and send envoys to Athens to negotiate a settlement. They would try to get their men back as quickly as possible.

CHAPTER 16

1 The generals accepted the proposal, and a truce was made on these terms. The Lacedaemonians were to bring to Pylos and hand over to the Athenians the ships they had fought with and all the warships in Laconia. They were not to attack the fort by land or sea. The Athenians were to allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send fixed rations of kneaded barley meal to the men on the island: two Attic choenices for each man, along with two cotylae of wine and some meat. Each servant was to receive half these amounts. These supplies were to be brought in under Athenian supervision, and no boat was to slip in secretly. The Athenians were to keep watch over the island just as closely as before, but without landing on it. They were not to attack the Peloponnesian army by land or sea.

2 If either side broke any part of these terms, however small, the truce would end at once. It was to last until the Lacedaemonian envoys returned from Athens. The Athenians were to send them there in a trireme and bring them back again. On their return, the truce would end, and the Athenians were to give back the ships in the same condition as when they received them.

3 The truce was made on these terms. The ships, about sixty in all, were handed over, and the envoys were sent off. When they reached Athens, they spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 17

1 "Athenians, the Lacedaemonians sent us to negotiate about the men on the island. We want to persuade you to accept a settlement that benefits you and, at the same time, preserves as much dignity for us in our misfortune as the present situation allows.

2 "Our speech is longer than usual, but this is not a departure from our custom. At home we use few words when few are enough. But we use more when the occasion calls for us to explain something important and use words to achieve what is needed.

3 "Do not receive our words with hostility, or feel that we are teaching you because you lack understanding. Think of them instead as a reminder to people who already know how to make a good decision.

4 "You can put your present good fortune to good use. You can keep what you have gained and add honor and a good reputation. You need not make the mistake of people who are unused to good fortune. Because their present success has come as a surprise, they keep reaching out in the hope of getting more.

5 "People who have experienced the most changes of fortune, both good and bad, have the best reason to distrust success. Given our experience, this should apply especially to your city and to us.

CHAPTER 18

1 "Look at our present misfortunes and recognize the truth of this. We have the highest standing among the Greeks, yet we have come to you. Before, we thought we had more power to grant others what we are now here to ask you

for.

2 "This did not happen because we lacked power, or because we gained more power and became arrogant. We had our usual resources but made a mistake in judgment. Anyone is equally liable to do the same.

3 "So you should not assume that fortune will always be on your side because your city is strong now and has gained these additional advantages.

4 "Sensible people put their gains somewhere safe against an uncertain future. Those same people would also handle misfortunes more intelligently. They recognize that war does not stay within whatever limits someone chooses for his own part in it. Instead, events go where chance takes them. Such people make the fewest mistakes because they do not become overconfident and get carried away when the war goes well. They are most likely to end it while their luck is good.

5 "Athenians, this is a good time for you to do that with us. Otherwise, if you reject our advice and later suffer a setback—and there are many ways that could happen—people may think that even your present successes were due to luck. Yet you have the chance to leave behind an enduring reputation for strength and good judgment without taking a risk.

CHAPTER 19

1 "The Lacedaemonians invite you to make a treaty and end the war. We offer peace, an alliance, and close friendship and ties between us in other ways too. In return, we ask for the men on the island. We think it better for both sides not to take a gamble on their fate: they might force their way out if some chance of rescue arose, or they might instead be forced into submission by the siege and captured.

2 "We believe that bitter hostilities can be ended most securely in this way. It is not by retaliating, gaining the upper hand in most of the fighting, and then forcing an unequal settlement on the enemy and binding him to it by oaths.

Rather, when you have the power to do that, you should choose fairness, outdo him in generosity, and agree to more moderate terms than he expected.

3 "The enemy then feels that he owes you generosity in return, rather than retaliation for being forced to submit. His sense of shame makes him readier to keep the agreement he has made.

4 "People are more likely to act this way toward their bitterest enemies than toward those with whom they have only ordinary disagreements. It is human nature to give way gladly in return to those who freely yield, but to risk everything against overbearing demands, even against one's own better judgment.

CHAPTER 20

1 "If there was ever a good time for both of us to reach a settlement, it is now. We should act before something beyond repair happens to us in the meantime. That would force us to add a lasting personal hatred of you to our hostility as a state, while you would lose the benefits we now offer.

2 "Let us come to terms while the outcome is still undecided. You can gain a good reputation and our friendship. We can settle our misfortune on reasonable terms before anything disgraceful happens. Let us choose peace instead of war for ourselves and give the other Greeks relief from their suffering. They will give you the greater credit for this. They are caught up in a war, and it is unclear which side started it. But if it ends—and you now have the greater power to bring this about—they will give you their thanks.

3 "If you decide to do this, you can become firm friends with the Lacedaemonians. They themselves have made the offer, and you will have done them a favor rather than forced them to submit.

4 "Consider how many benefits this is likely to bring. If you and we agree, you know that the rest of the Greeks, being weaker, will show us the greatest respect."

CHAPTER 21

1 That was what the Lacedaemonians said. They thought the Athenians had previously wanted a treaty but that Lacedaemonian opposition had prevented it. Now that peace was being offered, they expected the Athenians to accept it gladly and give back the men.

2 But the Athenians believed that, with the men on the island in their power, they could already make a treaty with the Lacedaemonians whenever they wished. They wanted more.

3 Cleon son of Cleaenetus encouraged them most. At that time he was a popular leader with more influence over the people than anyone else. He persuaded them to give this answer: the men on the island must first surrender their weapons and themselves and be brought to Athens. Once they were there, the Lacedaemonians must give back Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea. They had not gained these places in war. They had received them under the previous agreement, when the Athenians had given them up because of their misfortunes and their greater need for a treaty at that time. After returning them, the Lacedaemonians could recover their men and make a treaty for whatever period both sides thought suitable.

CHAPTER 22

1 They did not argue against this answer. Instead, they asked the Athenians to choose representatives to meet with them. These would discuss each point, listening as well as speaking, and quietly reach agreement wherever they could persuade one another.

2 At this Cleon attacked them fiercely. He said he had already known that they had no fair proposal in mind. Now it was clear: they would say nothing to the people, but wanted to meet with a small group of men. If they had anything reasonable in mind, he told them to say it to everyone.

3 The Lacedaemonians saw that they could not speak before the people about any concessions their misfortune might make them willing to offer. If they offered these and failed to reach agreement, their allies might turn against them. They also saw that the Athenians would not accept the settlement they proposed on reasonable terms. So they left Athens without achieving anything.

CHAPTER 23

1 As soon as they returned, the truce at Pylos ended. The Lacedaemonians demanded their ships back, as agreed. But the Athenians refused to return them. They complained of an attack on their fort in breach of the truce and of other incidents that seemed unimportant. They insisted that the agreement said that any breach at all would end the truce. The Lacedaemonians disputed this and called the withholding of the ships an injustice. They went away and resumed the war.

2 Both sides fought hard around Pylos. During the day, the Athenians constantly sailed two ships around the island in opposite directions. At night their whole fleet lay around it, except on the seaward side when the wind was blowing. Twenty ships also arrived from Athens to help with the blockade, bringing the total to seventy. The Peloponnesians kept their camp on the mainland and attacked the wall. They watched for any chance to rescue their men.

CHAPTER 24

1 Meanwhile in Sicily, the Syracusans and their allies brought up the rest of the fleet they were preparing to join the ships guarding Messene.

2 They conducted the war from Messene. The Locrians urged them on more than anyone, because of their hatred of the people of Rhegium. The Locrians had also invaded their territory with their full force.

3 They wanted to try a sea battle. They saw that the Athenians had few ships there, and they had heard that the larger fleet that was supposed to come was blockading the island.

4 If they won control at sea, they hoped to take Rhegium easily by attacking it with troops and ships. Their position would then be strong. Rhegium, on the tip of Italy, lies close to Messene in Sicily. With both places in their hands, the Athenians would have no base for their ships and could not control the strait.

5 The strait is the stretch of sea between Rhegium and Messene, where Sicily is closest to the mainland. This is the place called Charybdis, through which Odysseus is said to have sailed. It is narrow, and the water pours into it from two great seas, the Tyrrhenian and the Sicilian, creating strong currents. It was therefore quite reasonably considered dangerous.

CHAPTER 25

1 Here in the strait, late in the day, the Syracusans and their allies were forced into a sea battle over a ship making the crossing. They put out with a little more than thirty ships against sixteen Athenian ships and eight from Rhegium.

2 The Athenians defeated them, and they quickly sailed away, each as best it could, to their respective camps at Messene and Rhegium. They lost one ship. Nightfall ended the action.

3 After this the Locrians left the territory of Rhegium. The ships of the Syracusans and their allies gathered at Peloris, in the territory of Messene, and anchored there. Their land army was there too.

4 The Athenians and the men of Rhegium sailed up, saw the ships without their crews, and attacked. But a grappling hook caught one of their own ships, and they lost it. Its crew swam away.

5 After this the Syracusans boarded their ships and moved along the coast toward Messene using a towline. The Athenians attacked again, but the Syracusans turned their bows out to sea and rammed first. The Athenians lost another ship.

6 The Syracusans thus reached the harbor at Messene without getting the worse of either the coastal passage or the sea battle that took place during it.

7 The Athenians then heard that Archias and his supporters were betraying Camarina to the Syracusans, and sailed there. Meanwhile the people of Messene attacked neighboring Naxos, a Chalcidian city, with their whole force by land and their fleet at the same time.

8 On the first day they forced the Naxians inside their walls and laid waste to their territory. On the next day they sailed around to the Acesines River and devastated the land there, while their land army advanced toward the city.

9 Meanwhile large numbers of Sicels were coming down over the heights to help against the men of Messene. When the Naxians saw them, they took courage. They encouraged one another by saying that the people of Leontini and their other Greek allies were coming to their aid. They suddenly rushed out of the city and attacked the men of Messene. They routed them and killed over a thousand. The rest had difficulty getting home, for the non-Greeks also attacked them on the roads and killed most of them.

10 The ships put in at Messene and later separated, each returning home. The people of Leontini and their allies, together with the Athenians, immediately attacked Messene, taking advantage of its weakened state. The Athenians attacked the harbor with their ships, while the land army attacked the city.

11 The men of Messene came out with some Locrians under Demoteles, who had been left as a garrison after the disaster. Their sudden attack routed most of the army from Leontini and killed many men. When the Athenians saw this, they

landed from their ships to help. They fell on the men of Messene while these were in confusion and chased them back into the city. They set up a victory marker and withdrew to Rhegium.

12 After this the Greeks in Sicily continued their land campaigns against one another without the Athenians.

CHAPTER 26

1 At Pylos the Athenians were still blockading the Lacedaemonians on the island. The Peloponnesian army on the mainland stayed in its position.

2 The blockade was hard work for the Athenians because they lacked food and water. There was only one spring, in the stronghold of Pylos itself, and it was small. Most of the men dug through the pebbles along the shore and drank the sort of water one would expect to find there.

3 They were also crowded into a small camp. There was no anchorage for the ships, so they took turns bringing their crews ashore for food, while the others lay at anchor offshore.

4 The unexpected length of the blockade was especially discouraging. They had thought they would force the men to surrender within a few days, since they were on a deserted island and had only brackish water to drink.

5 The reason was that the Lacedaemonians had announced that anyone willing should take ground grain, wine, cheese, or any other food useful during a siege to the island. They offered high payments and promised freedom to any Helot who got supplies through.

6 Others took the risk of bringing supplies, but the Helots did so most of all. They sailed from whatever point in the Peloponnese they could and reached the seaward side of the island while it was still night.

7 They especially watched for a wind that would carry them in. It was easier to evade the triremes on guard when a wind blew from the open sea, since the ships could not maintain their stations around the island. The supply boats could make their landing without concern for damage: their value had been guaranteed in money, so the men simply ran them aground. The hoplites kept watch at the island's landing places. Those who risked coming in calm weather were caught.

8 Swimmers also came through the harbor underwater. They towed skins on a thin cord, carrying poppy seed mixed with honey and crushed flaxseed. At first they escaped notice, but later guards were posted against them.

9 Each side tried every device it could: one to get food in, the other to prevent any supplies getting through unnoticed.

CHAPTER 27

1 When the people at Athens learned that their army was suffering and food was reaching the men on the island, they were at a loss. They feared that winter would come before the blockade ended. They saw that bringing supplies around the Peloponnese would become impossible. The place was deserted, and even in summer they could not send enough supplies around to it. Nor could they maintain the naval blockade, since there were no harbors there. Either they would have to abandon their guard and let the men survive, or the men would wait for stormy weather and sail away in the boats that brought them food.

2 Above all, they were afraid of the Lacedaemonians. They thought these must have some strong grounds for confidence, since they no longer sent heralds to negotiate with them. They regretted not accepting the peace agreement.

3 Cleon realized that they blamed him for blocking the agreement. He said that the men bringing the reports were not telling the truth. The men who had arrived suggested that, if the Athenians did not believe them, they should send

observers. The Athenians chose Cleon himself, along with Theagenes, for this job.

4 Cleon realized that he would have to give the same report as the men he had accused, or else contradict them and be exposed as a liar. He also saw that the Athenians were now more inclined to send out an expedition. So he urged them not to send observers or waste time and miss their chance. If they thought the reports were true, they should sail against the men on the island.

5 He pointed at Nicias son of Niceratus, who was a general. Cleon was his enemy and was criticizing him. He said that, if the generals were real men, it would be easy to sail there with a force and capture the men on the island. He himself would do it, if he were in command.

CHAPTER 28

1 Some Athenians shouted at Cleon to ask why he did not sail there now, if he thought it so easy. Nicias heard them and saw that Cleon was attacking him. He told Cleon to take whatever force he wanted and make the attempt, as far as the generals were concerned.

2 At first Cleon thought Nicias was only making a verbal offer, and he was ready to accept. But when he realized that Nicias really meant to hand over the command, he backed away. He said that Nicias, not he, was the general. He was frightened now: he had not thought Nicias would dare to give way to him.

3 Nicias repeated his offer and gave up his command at Pylos, calling the Athenians as witnesses. As crowds tend to do, the more Cleon tried to avoid the voyage and take back his words, the more they urged Nicias to hand over the command and shouted at Cleon to sail.

4 So, unable to find any escape from what he had said, Cleon agreed to sail. He came forward and said he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians. He would sail without taking anyone from the city itself. Instead he would take the Lemnians and Imbrians who were there, the peltasts who had come to help from Aenus

and elsewhere, and four hundred archers. With these men added to the troops at Pylos, he said, within twenty days he would either bring the Lacedaemonians back alive or kill them on the spot.

5 The Athenians laughed a little at his reckless talk. Still, the more sensible among them were pleased. They reckoned that one of two good things would happen. Either they would be rid of Cleon, which they expected more, or their judgment would prove wrong and he would capture the Lacedaemonians for them.

CHAPTER 29

1 Cleon settled everything in the assembly, and the Athenians voted to send him out. He chose Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, to join him in command, and quickly set sail.

2 He chose Demosthenes because he had heard that he was planning a landing on the island. The soldiers were suffering from the lack of resources at their position. They felt more like the besieged than the besiegers and were eager to risk a battle. The fact that the island had burned also gave Demosthenes more confidence.

3 Previously, most of the island had been wooded, with no paths because it had always been uninhabited. This worried him, and he thought it gave the enemy an advantage. Even if he landed a large army, they could attack from cover and hurt it. The woods would keep the enemy's mistakes and preparations from being as clear to his men. But every mistake his own army made would be visible. The enemy could therefore make surprise attacks wherever they wanted, since the choice of when to attack would be theirs.

4 If he forced his way into the thick woods to meet them, he thought their smaller force, familiar with the ground, would be stronger than his larger force, which did not know it. His own army, large as it was, might be destroyed with-

out its men knowing what was happening. They would not be able to see where they needed to help one another.

CHAPTER 30

1 These thoughts weighed on him especially because of his disaster in Aetolia, which had been partly caused by the woods.

2 But because space was so short, the soldiers had been forced to put in at the edges of the island to prepare their midday meal, posting guards for protection. Someone accidentally set fire to a small patch of the woods. Then a wind came up, and before they realized it, most of the woods had burned down.

3 Demosthenes could now see the Lacedaemonians more clearly and saw that there were more of them than he had thought. Previously he had suspected that the food was being brought in for a smaller number. He also saw that the island was easier to land on. So he began preparing the attack, believing that the Athenians now had a more worthwhile target and should make a greater effort. He sent for troops from the nearby allies and made his other preparations.

4 Cleon sent a messenger ahead to tell Demosthenes he was coming, and arrived at Pylos with the troops he had requested. Once together, they first sent a herald to the camp on the mainland. They invited the commanders there, if they wished, to avoid a battle by ordering the men on the island to surrender themselves and their weapons to the Athenians. The men would be held under reasonable guard until a broader settlement was reached.

CHAPTER 31

1 The Lacedaemonians rejected this offer, and the Athenians waited one day. The next night they put all their hoplites aboard a few ships and sailed out. Shortly before dawn they landed on both sides of the island, from the open sea and from the harbor. There were about eight hundred hoplites, and they ran toward the first guard post on the island.

2 The enemy had been stationed as follows. About thirty hoplites were at this first post. Most of the men, with their commander Epitadas, held the center of the island, where the ground was most level and the water was. A small detachment guarded the far end facing Pylos. This had steep cliffs above the sea and was very difficult to attack by land. There was also an old defensive wall there, made of loosely fitted stones. They thought it would be useful if they were forced to retreat. These were their positions.

CHAPTER 32

1 The Athenians immediately killed the guards at the first post they rushed, some still in their beds and others picking up their weapons. The landing had gone unnoticed, since the guards thought the ships were sailing to their usual stations for the night blockade.

2 At dawn the rest of the army began landing too. All the men from a little over seventy ships came ashore except the lowest bank of rowers, each with whatever equipment he had. There were also eight hundred archers and at least as many peltasts. The Messenians who had come to help landed too, along with all the other men holding positions around Pylos, except the guards on the wall.

3 On Demosthenes' orders they spread out in groups of two hundred or more, and sometimes fewer, taking the highest ground. This was meant to leave the enemy surrounded and as helpless as possible. They would not know which way to turn and face an attack, but would be caught between large forces. If they advanced against the men in front, those behind would shoot at them. If they turned against those on one side, the troops on either side of them would attack.

4 Whichever way they moved, the enemy would always be behind them. These lightly armed men were the hardest to deal with. They could fight at long range with arrows, javelins, stones, and slings, and it was impossible to come to grips with them. Even when they ran away they kept the advantage, and when their

opponents retreated they pressed after them. This was the plan Demosthenes had in mind when he first proposed the landing, and these were the arrangements he made in the battle.

CHAPTER 33

1 Epitadas and the main body of troops on the island saw that the first guard post had been destroyed and an army was advancing against them. They formed up and advanced against the Athenian hoplites, wanting to fight at close quarters. The hoplites were directly in front of them, while the light troops were on their flanks and behind them.

2 But they could not reach the hoplites or use their own fighting experience. The light troops kept them back with missiles from both sides, while the hoplites stayed still instead of advancing to meet them. Wherever the light troops pressed them hardest, they charged and drove them away. But the light troops turned back and continued fighting. Their equipment was light, so they could easily get a head start when they ran away. The ground was difficult and rough because it had previously been uninhabited, and the Lacedaemonians could not pursue them there in heavy armor.

CHAPTER 34

1 For a short time they skirmished like this. Then the Lacedaemonians could no longer rush out quickly against attacks. The light troops noticed that their defense was now slower. The sight of their own force, many times larger than the enemy's, had given them most of their confidence. They were also getting used to their opponents and no longer found them so frightening. They had not immediately suffered the losses they had expected when they first landed, intimidated by the thought that they were going to face Lacedaemonians. Now they looked down on them, raised a shout, and rushed at them together. They hurled stones, arrows, and javelins, each using whatever he had at hand.

2 The shouting and the rush together threw the men into confusion: they were not used to this kind of fighting. Great clouds of dust rose from the recently burned woods. With arrows and stones flying from so many men through the dust, they could not see what was in front of them.

3 The fighting now became very difficult for the Lacedaemonians. Their felt headgear did not stop the arrows, and their spears had been broken by the blows they took. They had no way to use their skills. They could not see ahead, and the enemy's louder shouting kept them from hearing their own orders. Danger surrounded them, and they had no hope of finding a way to defend themselves and survive.

CHAPTER 35

1 At last, with many men now wounded because they were constantly moving about in the same area, they closed ranks and moved to the defensive position at the far end of the island. It was not far away, and their own guards were there.

2 As soon as they gave way, the light troops pressed after them with even louder shouts, full of confidence. Any Lacedaemonians caught during the retreat were killed. But most escaped to the defensive position. With the guards already there, they formed a line along every part where an attack was possible, ready to defend it.

3 The Athenians followed. The strength of the position prevented them from going around and surrounding the enemy, so they advanced from the front and tried to drive them back.

4 For a long time, through most of the day, both sides held on, worn out by the fighting, thirst, and sun. The Athenians tried to drive the enemy from the high ground; the Lacedaemonians tried not to give way. The Lacedaemonians found it easier to defend themselves than before, since they were not being surrounded on their flanks.

CHAPTER 36

1 When the fighting seemed to have no end, the Messenian general came to Cleon and Demosthenes and said they were struggling for nothing. If they would give him some of the archers and light troops, he would take them around behind the enemy by whatever route he could find. He thought he could force a way in.

2 He was given the men he had asked for and started from a concealed position so that the enemy would not see him. He climbed along the cliffs of the island wherever he could find a way through. The Lacedaemonians had trusted the strength of the ground here and left it unguarded. With great difficulty he worked his way around unnoticed, then suddenly appeared on the heights behind them. The surprise stunned the Lacedaemonians, while the Athenians were greatly encouraged at seeing what they had hoped for.

3 The Lacedaemonians were now being attacked from both sides. To compare a small event with a great one, they were in the same situation as the men at Thermopylae. Those men had been destroyed when the Persians went around them by the path. Here too, caught between two attacks, the Lacedaemonians could hold out no longer. They were few fighting many, and their bodies were weak from lack of food. They began falling back, and the Athenians now controlled the approaches.

CHAPTER 37

1 Cleon and Demosthenes realized [that] if the Lacedaemonians gave way even a little further, their own army would kill them. They stopped the battle and held their men back. They wanted to bring the Lacedaemonians to Athens alive, if hearing an offer might soften their resolve and persuade them to surrender their weapons, giving in to the terror of their present position.

2 They had a herald announce that, if they wished, they could surrender themselves and their weapons to the Athenians, who would decide what to do with them.

CHAPTER 38

1 When they heard this, most lowered their shields and waved their hands to show that they accepted the offer. The fighting stopped. Cleon and Demosthenes then met for talks with Styphon son of Pharax, who represented the enemy. Of their previous commanders, Epitadas, the first in command, was dead. Hippagretes, appointed next after him, was lying among the dead, still alive but taken for dead. Styphon himself had been appointed third in command under the law, to take over if anything happened to the other two.

2 Styphon and the men with him said they wanted to send a herald to the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to ask what they should do.

3 The Athenians would not let any of them go. Instead, they themselves called for heralds from the mainland. After questions had passed back and forth two or three times, the last man to cross from the Lacedaemonians on the mainland gave this message: "The Lacedaemonians tell you to decide for yourselves about your own situation, without doing anything dishonorable." After discussing it among themselves, the men surrendered their weapons and themselves.

4 The Athenians kept them under guard that day and the following night. The next day the Athenians set up a victory marker on the island and made their other preparations to sail. They divided the prisoners among the trireme captains to guard. The Lacedaemonians sent a herald and brought their dead back across.

5 These were the numbers killed and taken alive on the island. In all, four hundred and twenty hoplites had crossed over. Of these, two hundred and ninety-two were brought back alive; the rest were killed. About one hundred and

twenty of the survivors were Spartans. Not many Athenians were killed, since the battle was not fought at close quarters.

CHAPTER 39

1 The men on the island were under siege for seventy-two days in all, from the sea battle to the battle on the island.

2 For about twenty of those days, while the envoys were away negotiating the truce, they received regular supplies of food. For the rest of the time they lived on what people secretly brought in by sea. Some grain and other food were still found on the island when it was taken. Their commander Epitadas had given each man less than the available supplies allowed.

3 The Athenians and Peloponnesians then withdrew their armies from Pylos and returned home. Cleon's promise, crazy as it had seemed, came true. He brought the men back within twenty days, just as he had undertaken to do.

CHAPTER 40

1 Of all the events of the war, this was the one that most surprised the Greeks. They had thought that neither hunger nor any other pressure would make the Lacedaemonians surrender their weapons. Instead, they expected them to keep their weapons and die fighting as best they could.

2 They could hardly believe that the men who surrendered were of the same quality as those who died. Later, one of the Athenian allies spitefully asked a prisoner from the island whether the men on their side who had died were the brave ones. He answered that a spindle—meaning an arrow—would be worth a great deal if it could tell brave men from the rest. He meant that stones and arrows killed whoever happened to be hit.

CHAPTER 41

1 When the men had been brought to Athens, the Athenians decided to keep them in chains until an agreement was reached. If the Peloponnesians invaded their territory before then, they would bring the prisoners out and kill them.

2 They stationed a garrison at Pylos. The Messenians from Naupactus sent the most suitable of their own men there, treating it as their homeland, since Pylos is in what was once Messenian territory. These men raided Laconia and did very great damage, helped by speaking the same language as the inhabitants.

3 The Lacedaemonians had no previous experience of raids and this kind of warfare. Helots were deserting, and they feared that unrest in their territory might spread further. They found the situation hard to bear. Although they did not want the Athenians to see this, they sent envoys to them and tried to recover Pylos and the prisoners.

4 But the Athenians wanted greater gains. The envoys came repeatedly, and the Athenians sent them away without achieving anything. These were the events at Pylos.

CHAPTER 42

1 Immediately afterward, in the same summer, the Athenians attacked Corinthian territory with eighty ships, two thousand of their own hoplites, and two hundred cavalry carried in horse transports. Their allies from Miletus, Andros, and Carystus went with them. Nicias son of Niceratus commanded, with two other generals.

2 They sailed in and reached the beach between Chersonesus and Rheitus at dawn. Above this spot stands the Solygean hill. Long ago the Dorians established themselves on it and fought the Corinthians in the city, who were Aeolians. A village called Solygea now stands on the hill. From the beach where the ships landed, this village is twelve stades away, the city of Corinth sixty, and the Isthmus twenty.

3 The Corinthians had received advance information from Argos that the Athenian force was coming. They had gone to the Isthmus well beforehand, all except those who lived outside the Isthmus. Five hundred of their men were also away on garrison duty in Ambracia and Leucas. All the others kept watch to see where the Athenians would land.

4 The Athenians sailed in during the night without being noticed. When signals were raised to inform the Corinthians, they left half their men at Cenchreae in case the Athenians went toward Crommyon. The others hurried to meet the attack.

CHAPTER 43

1 Battus, one of their generals—two were present at the battle—took a company to guard the village of Solygea, which had no walls. Lycophron engaged the enemy with the remaining troops.

2 The Corinthians first attacked the Athenian right wing, which had just landed in front of Chersonesus, and then the rest of the army as well. The fighting was fierce and entirely hand to hand.

3 The Athenian right wing, including the Carystians, who were stationed at the outer end of the line, met the Corinthians and drove them back with difficulty. The Corinthians retreated to a dry-stone wall, since the whole area sloped upward. From their higher position they threw stones, then sang the battle song and advanced again. The Athenians met them, and the fighting was again hand to hand.

4 A Corinthian company came to help its own left wing. It routed the Athenian right and chased it down to the sea. But the Athenians and Carystians turned back from the ships and advanced again.

5 The rest of both armies kept fighting without a break. The fighting was especially fierce on the Corinthian right, where Lycophron faced the Athenian left and held it off. They expected the Athenians to try to reach the village of

Solygea.

CHAPTER 44

1 For a long time they held their ground, neither side giving way. But the Athenians received valuable help from their cavalry, while the other side had no cavalry. Eventually the Corinthians were routed. They withdrew to the hill, grounded their weapons, and stayed there without coming down again.

2 Most of the Corinthian losses in this retreat were on the right wing, where their general Lycophron also died. The rest of the army was not pursued far and did not flee in haste. Once forced back, it withdrew to the higher ground and took up a position there.

3 When the Corinthians no longer came forward to fight, the Athenians stripped the enemy dead and collected their own. They immediately set up a victory monument.

4 The half of the Corinthian force stationed at Cenchreae, guarding against an Athenian voyage to Crommyon, could not see the battle because Mount Oneum blocked their view. But when they saw the dust and [when] they realized what was happening, they immediately came to help. The older Corinthians in the city also came to help when they learned what had happened.

5 The Athenians saw all these men approaching and thought they were reinforcements coming from the neighboring Peloponnesian communities. They hurried back to their ships with the captured equipment and their own dead, except for two whom they could not find and left behind.

6 They boarded their ships and crossed to the nearby islands. From there they sent a herald and recovered the bodies they had left behind under a truce. Two hundred and twelve Corinthians died in the battle, and a little fewer than fifty Athenians.

CHAPTER 45

1 The Athenians left the islands and sailed that same day to Crommyon in Corinthian territory. It is a hundred and twenty stades from the city. They anchored, destroyed the crops and property in the area, and camped for the night.

2 The next day they first sailed along the coast to Epidaurian territory and made a landing there. Then they reached Methana, between Epidaurus and Troezen. They cut off the peninsula by building a wall across its isthmus, [where Methone stands,] and established a fort. From then on they used it to raid the territories of Troezen, Halieis, and Epidaurus. Once they had finished fortifying the place, they sailed home with their fleet.

CHAPTER 46

1 At about the same time, while these events were taking place, Eurymedon and Sophocles left Pylos with the Athenian fleet bound for Sicily. They reached Corcyra and joined the people in the city in an attack on the Corcyraeans established on Mount Istone. These were the men who had crossed over after the earlier civil strife, taken control of the countryside, and done great damage.

2 The attackers stormed and captured their fort. The defenders fled together to some higher ground and agreed to surrender their mercenaries. They themselves would hand over their weapons and leave the Athenian people to decide their fate.

3 The generals took them across to the island of Ptychia to be kept under guard until they could be sent to Athens. The agreement protected them, but stipulated that if anyone was caught trying to escape, the agreement would be canceled for all of them.

4 The leaders of the Corcyraean people feared that the Athenians might not put the men to death when they arrived. So they devised the following plan.

5 They secretly sent friends to persuade a few of the men on the island to escape. These friends had been instructed to speak as though they meant well. They were to say that the prisoners' best course was to escape as quickly as possible, and that they would prepare a boat for them. For, they claimed, the Athenian generals were about to hand the prisoners over to the Corcyraean people.

CHAPTER 47

1 The men were persuaded. A boat was arranged, and they were caught sailing away. The agreement was canceled, and all the prisoners were handed over to the Corcyraeans.

2 The Athenian generals did a great deal to help bring this about. They made it clear that, since they themselves were sailing to Sicily, they did not want other men to take the prisoners to Athens and win the credit for bringing them. This made the excuse for canceling the agreement secure and gave those who had planned the scheme greater confidence to carry it out.

3 The Corcyraeans took charge of the prisoners and shut them in a large building. Later they brought them out twenty at a time, tied to one another, and led them between two lines of hoplites drawn up on either side. Whenever one of these men recognized a personal enemy, he struck and stabbed him. Men carrying whips walked alongside and made those moving too slowly quicken their pace.

CHAPTER 48

1 They brought out and killed about sixty men in this way without those inside the building realizing it. The prisoners thought the men were being taken away to be moved somewhere else. But when they understood and someone told them what was happening, they called on the Athenians and asked them to kill

them themselves, if that was what they wanted. They refused to leave the building any longer and said they would do all they could to stop anyone from entering.

2 The Corcyraeans had no intention of forcing their way through the doors either. They climbed onto the building's roof, broke it open, and threw down tiles and shot arrows at the men below.

3 The prisoners defended themselves as best they could, while most also began killing themselves. They pushed the arrows shot at them into their throats. They hanged themselves with cords from some beds that happened to be in the building, or with strips torn from their clothes. Night fell during the ordeal. Through most of it, they died in every possible way, killing themselves or being hit by the men above.

4 When day came, the Corcyraeans piled the bodies in layers on wagons and took them outside the city. They sold into slavery all the women who had been captured in the fort.

5 This was how the Corcyraeans from the mountain were killed by the people. The civil strife had been widespread, and this brought it to an end, at least for the duration of this war. No significant part of the other side was left.

6 The Athenians sailed on to Sicily, their original destination, and fought alongside their allies there.

CHAPTER 49

1 At the end of the summer, the Athenians at Naupactus and the Acarnanians made a joint expedition against Anactorium, a Corinthian city at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf. They captured it through betrayal. After expelling [the Corinthians], the Acarnanians themselves occupied the place, bringing settlers from all their communities. The summer ended.

CHAPTER 50

1 In the following winter, Aristides son of Archippus, one of the commanders of the Athenian ships sent to collect money from the allies, arrested a Persian named Artaphernes at Eion on the Strymon. He was traveling from the king to Lacedaemon.

2 When he was brought to Athens, the Athenians translated his letters from the Assyrian script and read them. Among many other things, their main message to the Lacedaemonians was that the king did not understand what they wanted. Many envoys had come, but none said the same thing. If they wanted to make a clear proposal, they should send men to him with the Persian.

3 Later the Athenians sent Artaphernes to Ephesus in a trireme, along with envoys of their own. There the envoys learned that King Artaxerxes son of Xerxes had recently died—his death occurred about this time—and returned home.

CHAPTER 51

1 In the same winter, the Chians tore down their new wall at the Athenians' orders. The Athenians suspected that they were planning a revolt. The Chians did, however, obtain pledges from the Athenians and the strongest assurance they could that no change in their status would be planned. The winter ended, and the seventh year of this war, which Thucydides wrote about, came to an end.

CHAPTER 52

1 At the very beginning of the following summer there was a partial eclipse of the sun around the new moon. There was also an earthquake early in the same month.

2 The exiles from Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, most of them operating from the mainland, hired mercenaries from the Peloponnese and gathered others locally. They captured Rhoeteum, but gave it back unharmed after receiving two thousand Phocaean staters.

3 After this they attacked Antandrus and captured the city through betrayal. Their plan was to free the other cities known as the Actaean cities, which the Mytilenaeans had formerly controlled but the Athenians now held, and above all Antandrus. They would strengthen Antandrus and use it as a base. Ships could easily be built there, since timber was available locally and Mount Ida stood close by; other equipment was also readily available. From there they could easily attack nearby Lesbos and take control of the Aeolian towns on the mainland. They were preparing to carry out these plans.

CHAPTER 53

1 In the same summer the Athenians attacked Cythera with sixty ships, two thousand hoplites, a few cavalry, and allied troops from Miletus and some other places. Their generals were Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, and Autocles son of Tolmaeus.

2 Cythera is an island off Laconia, opposite Malea. Its people are Lacedaemonians of the perioeci class. Every year an official called the Cytherodices went over from Sparta. The Lacedaemonians also regularly sent a garrison of hoplites and took great care of the island.

3 It was a stopping place for their merchant ships coming from Egypt and Libya. It also reduced the damage pirates could do to Laconia from the sea, the only direction from which the country was open to their attacks. The whole of it faces the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

CHAPTER 54

1 When the Athenian force arrived, ten ships and two thousand Milesian hoplites captured the coastal town called Scandea. The rest of the army landed on the side of the island facing Malea and advanced toward the Cytherians' city [on the coast]. They immediately found the whole Cytherian force drawn up there.

2 In the battle that followed, the Cytherians stood their ground for a short time. Then they were routed and fled to the upper city. Later they agreed with Nicias and his fellow commanders to let the Athenians decide their fate, provided they were not put to death.

3 Nicias had already held discussions with some of the Cytherians. Because of this, the terms of the agreement were settled more quickly and more favorably for them, both for the moment and for the future. Otherwise the Athenians would have removed the Cytherians from their homes, since they were Lacedaemonians and their island lay so close to Laconia.

4 After the agreement, the Athenians took over Scandea, the town by the harbor, and established a garrison on Cythera. Then they sailed to Asine, Helos, and most of the places along the coast. For about seven days they made landings, camped wherever the opportunity arose, and destroyed crops and property in the countryside.

CHAPTER 55

1 The Lacedaemonians saw that the Athenians held Cythera and expected them to make similar landings in their territory. They nowhere opposed them with their whole force. Instead they sent garrisons around the country, assigning as many hoplites as each place needed. In other respects, too, they were very much on their guard. They feared that there might be some disturbance of their polit-

ical order. The disaster on the island had been unexpected and severe. Pylos and Cythera were occupied, and on every side they faced warfare that moved quickly and gave no warning.

2 As a result, they departed from their usual practice and raised a force of four hundred cavalry, as well as archers. They became more reluctant than ever to take military action. Their existing way of preparing for war did not fit the naval struggle they now faced, especially against the Athenians. To the Athenians, not attempting something always meant falling short of what they thought they could achieve.

3 At the same time, so many unexpected blows of fortune had fallen on them so quickly that they were deeply shaken. They feared that they might suffer another disaster like the one on the island.

4 This made them less willing to risk battle. They thought that any move they made would go wrong. They had not been used to failure before, and this had now made them lose confidence in their own judgment.

CHAPTER 56

1 So, when the Athenians were destroying property along their coast, the Lacedaemonians mostly stayed still. Whenever a landing took place near a garrison, its men thought they were outnumbered and were in this state of mind. Only one garrison, near Cotyrta and Aphroditia, offered resistance. It rushed at the scattered mass of lightly armed troops and put them to flight. But when the hoplites stood against it, it withdrew again. A few of its men were killed and some weapons captured. The Athenians set up a victory monument and sailed back to Cythera.

2 From there they sailed around to Epidaurus Limera. After destroying property in part of its territory, they reached Thyrea. This lies in the region called Cynuria, on the border between Argive and Laconian territory. The Lacedaemonians controlled it and had given it to the Aeginetans to live in after

their expulsion. This was partly in return for the help the Aeginetans had given them at the time of the earthquake and the Helot revolt. It was also because, even while subject to Athens, the Aeginetans had always supported the Lacedaemonian point of view.

CHAPTER 57

1 While the Athenians were still approaching by sea, the Aeginetans abandoned the wall they were building on the coast. They withdrew to the upper city where they lived, about ten stades from the sea.

2 One of the Lacedaemonian garrisons stationed around the country had been helping them build the wall. Despite the Aeginetans' pleas, these men refused to go inside the city walls with them. They thought it dangerous to shut themselves in. Instead they withdrew to the higher ground and stayed still, thinking they were not strong enough to fight.

3 Meanwhile the Athenians landed, immediately advanced with their whole army, and captured Thyrea. They burned the city and looted everything in it. They returned to Athens with all the Aeginetans who had not been killed in the fighting and with Tantalus son of Patrocles, the Lacedaemonian commander stationed among them. He had been wounded and captured alive.

4 They also brought a few men from Cythera whom they thought it safer to remove. The Athenians decided to place these men on the islands. The other Cytherians were to stay in their own country and pay four talents in tribute. They decided to kill all the captured Aeginetans because of their long-standing hostility, and to put Tantalus in chains with the other Lacedaemonians captured on the island.

CHAPTER 58

1 In the same summer in Sicily, the people of Camarina and Gela first made a truce with one another. Then the other Sicilian Greeks also met at Gela, with envoys from every city, and began talks to see whether they could reach a settlement. Many views were expressed on both sides. Each side argued and pressed its claims wherever it thought it was being treated unfairly. Hermocrates son of Hermon, a Syracusan, spoke to the gathering as follows. He did more than anyone else to persuade them.

CHAPTER 59

1 "Fellow Sicilian Greeks, I do not speak as a citizen of one of the smallest cities, or of one suffering the most from the war. I want to set out publicly what I believe is the best policy for Sicily as a whole.

2 "Why should anyone give a long speech listing all the hardships of war to people who already know them? It is not ignorance of these hardships that drives anyone to war. Nor does fear stop anyone who thinks he will gain something. Some people think the gains will outweigh the dangers. Others are willing to face those dangers rather than accept an immediate loss.

3 "But if either side chooses the wrong moment to act in this way, advice to make peace can be useful.

4 "It could be extremely valuable to us too, if we listened to it now. Each of us began the war thinking we would improve our own position. Now we are trying to settle our differences through argument. And if we cannot manage to go home on equal terms, we will go to war again.

CHAPTER 60

1 "But we must understand that, if we are sensible, this meeting will not just deal with our separate interests. It will decide whether we can still save the whole of Sicily from what I judge to be an Athenian plot against it. We should regard the

Athenians as a much stronger reason to settle these disputes than anything I can say. They have the greatest power among the Greeks and are here with a few ships, watching for our mistakes. Under the legitimate name of an alliance, they make their natural hostility look respectable and turn it to their own advantage.

2 "We choose war and call them in, although they are men who attack even those who do not call them. We harm ourselves at our own expense and at the same time help extend their empire. Once they see us worn out, they will naturally come here with a larger fleet and try to bring this whole country under their rule.

CHAPTER 61

1 "If we are sensible, each of us should bring allies into our own country and take on risks to gain what we do not have, rather than to damage what we already possess. We should recognize that civil strife does more than anything else to destroy our cities and Sicily. All of us who live here are under threat together, yet we are divided city by city.

2 "Once we recognize this, individuals must settle their differences with individuals, and cities with cities. We must try to save the whole of Sicily together. No one should imagine that only the Dorians among us are enemies of the Athenians, while the Chalcidian population is safe because of its Ionian kinship with them.

3 "They are not attacking us out of hostility to one of the two ethnic groups into which we are divided. They want the good things in Sicily that we all possess together.

4 "They have shown this now in responding to the appeal of the Chalcidian people. Those people had never helped them as allies. Yet the Athenians eagerly offered them more support than their obligations under the treaty required.

5 "It is quite understandable that the Athenians should pursue these gains and plan ahead. I do not blame those who want to rule, but those who are too ready to submit. Human nature has always been to rule those who give way and to defend against those who attack.

6 "But we are at fault if we know this and still fail to take the right precautions. Each of us should have come here having decided that our first priority is to deal properly, all together, with our common danger.

7 "The quickest way to get rid of it would be to reach an agreement with one another. The Athenians are not operating from their own country, but from the country of those who invited them. In this way we end our differences without trouble, through peace rather than by meeting war with war. Those who were invited here came under a respectable pretext to do wrong. They can leave without achieving anything, with a sound reason for going.

CHAPTER 62

1 "If we make the right decision, then, this is the great advantage we gain in dealing with the Athenians.

2 "But everyone agrees that peace is best. Why shouldn't we make peace among ourselves too? Suppose one of us is doing well and another badly. Don't you think peace, rather than war, would end the trouble for the one and help preserve the good fortune of the other? Peace also makes honors and public distinction less risky. It has many other benefits that someone could discuss at length, just as people discuss warfare. Think about these things. Don't dismiss what I say. Instead, each of you should use it to look ahead to your own safety.

3 "And if anyone feels sure he will achieve something through justice or force, he should not be bitterly disappointed if things turn out otherwise. He should remember how many people before him have sought to punish those who

wronged them, while others hoped to use their power to gain more. The first group not only failed to get revenge but did not even survive. The second, instead of gaining more, ended up losing what they already had.

4 "Revenge does not succeed just because the person seeking it has been wronged. Nor is strength reliable just because it gives someone confidence. The uncertainty of the future has the greatest influence on events. Nothing is more likely to upset our plans, yet it also proves very useful. When both sides are equally afraid, we act more carefully toward one another.

CHAPTER 63

1 "So let us now take both dangers seriously: our fear of an unknown future that cannot be predicted, and the Athenians, whose presence already threatens us. Let us accept that these obstacles are reason enough for our plans to fall short of what each of us thought he would achieve. Let us send the enemy now facing us out of our country. Above all, let us make a lasting settlement among ourselves. If we cannot do that, let us make a truce for as long as possible and put off our private disputes until later.

2 "In short, we must realize this. If you listen to me, each of us will have a free city. We will control our own affairs and repay those who help or harm us on equal terms, according to our ability. If you reject my advice and submit to others, there will be no question of getting revenge on anyone. Even if we are very lucky, we will be forced to become friends with our worst enemies and fall out with people we should not oppose.

CHAPTER 64

1 "As I said at the start, I represent the greatest city here, and I am more likely to attack someone else than to have to defend myself. Even so, I think I should look ahead and make concessions. I should not hurt my opponents so much

that I suffer even greater harm myself. Nor should I be so foolishly set on winning that I think I control fortune, which I do not rule, as fully as I control my own judgment. Instead, I should give way as far as is reasonable.

2 "I ask the rest of you to do the same as I do. Make these concessions to one another, rather than have your enemies force them on you.

3 "There is nothing shameful in relatives giving way to relatives, whether a Dorian gives way to Dorians or a Chalcidian to his own people. In any case, we are neighbors who share a single country surrounded by the sea, and we all have the same name: Sicilians. We will fight, I suppose, when circumstances lead us to. But we will also settle our differences again on our own, by discussing them together.

4 "If we are sensible, we will always unite to fight off invaders from outside our people. When any one of us is harmed, we are all in danger. In the future we will never bring in outsiders as allies or as mediators.

5 "By doing this, we will not deny Sicily either of two benefits now: freedom from the Athenians and freedom from war among ourselves. In the future we will live in it on our own as a free country, less exposed to plots by others."

CHAPTER 65

1 The Sicilians accepted what Hermocrates had said. They agreed among themselves to end the war, with each side keeping what it held. Camarina was to have Morgantina in return for paying Syracuse a fixed sum of money.

2 The allies of the Athenians called in the Athenian officials and told them they would make a settlement, and that the truce would include them too. The officials approved. The agreement was made, and afterward the Athenian ships sailed away from Sicily.

3 When the generals returned, the Athenians at home sentenced two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles, to exile. They fined the third, Eurymedon. The charge was that they could have conquered Sicily but had taken bribes to withdraw.

4 Their success at the time made the Athenians think nothing should stand in their way. They thought they could achieve both easy and more difficult goals equally well, whether their preparations were extensive or inadequate. The reason was that most of their successes had exceeded reasonable expectations, making their hopes grow stronger.

CHAPTER 66

1 During the same summer, the Megarians in the city were under pressure from two sides. The Athenians were waging war against them and regularly invaded their land twice a year with their whole army. Their own exiles at Pegae were also causing serious trouble through raids. These men had been driven out by the people during civil strife. The Megarians began discussing among themselves whether they should take the exiles back, rather than let the city be ruined from both sides.

2 The friends of the exiles heard about this talk. They too began arguing, more openly than before, that this proposal should be followed.

3 The leaders of the people realized that these hardships would make it impossible for the people to keep supporting them. In fear, they began talks with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates son of Ariphron and Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes. They wanted to hand over the city. They thought this would be less dangerous for them than the return of the men they had expelled. First they agreed that the Athenians should capture the Long Walls. These ran for about eight stades from the city to Nisaea, its harbor. This would stop the Peloponnesians from coming to help from Nisaea, where they alone provided

the garrison to keep Megara securely under their control. Then the leaders would try to hand over the upper city as well. Once the walls were taken, the city would be more likely to come over.

CHAPTER 67

1 Once both sides had settled the arrangements and made their practical preparations, the Athenians sailed after dark to Minoa, the Megarians' island. They had six hundred hoplites commanded by Hippocrates. These men took up a position in a pit from which clay had been dug to make bricks for the walls. It was not far from the walls.

2 The lightly armed Plataeans and other patrol troops with Demosthenes, the other general, hid in ambush at the sanctuary of Enyalius, which was even closer. No one knew about their presence that night except the men who needed to know.

3 Just before dawn, the Megarians who were betraying the city put the following plan into action. For a long time they had arranged for the gates to be opened as part of this routine. With the commander's permission, they would take a small boat with oars on both sides down through the ditch on a cart at night, launch it, and sail out as raiders. Before daylight they would bring it back on the cart and take it through the gates into the walls. Their purpose was to keep their patrols hidden from the Athenians on Minoa, since no boat would be visible in the harbor.

4 Now the cart was already at the gates. When these were opened as usual for the boat, the Athenians saw it and ran from their hiding places. This was the agreed signal. They wanted to get there before the gates were closed again, while the cart was still in the gateway and prevented them from being shut. At the same time, the Megarians working with them killed the guards at the gates.

5 The Plataeans and patrol troops with Demosthenes were the first to run in, at the spot where the victory monument now stands. The Peloponnesians nearest to them had noticed what was happening. Fighting just inside the gates, the Plataeans defeated those who came to help and secured the gates for the Athenian hoplites advancing behind them.

CHAPTER 68

1 After this, each group of Athenians that came inside moved onto the wall.

2 At first a few of the Peloponnesian guards stood their ground and fought back. Some were killed. Most of them, however, fled. They were frightened by the enemy's sudden night attack and by the Megarian traitors fighting against them. They thought all the Megarians had betrayed them.

3 As it happened, the Athenian herald had also announced, on his own initiative, that any Megarian who wanted to could come and take his place under arms with the Athenians. When the guards heard this, they did not wait any longer. Convinced that the whole population was attacking them, they took refuge in Nisaea.

4 At dawn the walls had already been captured, and the Megarians inside the city were in confusion. The men who had negotiated with the Athenians, together with a large number of others who knew about the plan, said they should open the gates and go out to fight.

5 They had agreed that the Athenians would rush in as soon as the gates were opened. They themselves would be easy to recognize, because they would cover themselves with oil, so that they would not be harmed. Opening the gates was now safer for them. The four thousand Athenian hoplites and six hundred cavalry from Eleusis had also arrived as agreed, after marching through the night.

6 They had already oiled themselves and were near the gates when someone who knew about the plot revealed it to the other side. These men gathered in a body and came up. They said there must be no attack outside the walls. They had

never dared to do that before, even when they were stronger. Nor should they put the city in obvious danger. If anyone refused to listen, the fighting would take place right there. They gave no sign that they knew about the plot. They simply insisted that their advice was best, and stayed on guard at the gates. As a result, the plotters could not carry out their plan.

CHAPTER 69

1 The Athenian generals realized that something had gone wrong and that they could not take the city by force. They immediately began building a wall around Nisaea. They thought that, if they captured it before any reinforcements arrived,

2 Megara too would surrender sooner. Iron tools, stonemasons, and the other things they needed arrived quickly from Athens. They started from the wall they held and built a cross-wall on the side facing Megara. From there the army divided up the work of digging a ditch and building walls down to the sea on either side of Nisaea. They used stones and bricks from the suburb. They cut down trees and brushwood to make palisades wherever these were needed. The houses in the suburb themselves served as defenses once battlements had been added.

3 They worked for the whole of that day. By late afternoon the next day the wall was almost complete. Those inside Nisaea were frightened. They had no supply of food, since they had been getting it each day from the upper city. They did not think the Peloponnesians would come to help quickly, and they regarded the Megarians as enemies. So they agreed with the Athenians to hand over their weapons and be released, each man paying a fixed sum. The Athenians could do whatever they wanted with the Lacedaemonians—the commander and any others who were there.

4 They accepted these terms and came out. The Athenians broke the connection between the Long Walls and the city of Megara, took possession of Nisaea, and made their other preparations.

CHAPTER 70

1 At this time Brasidas son of Tellis, a Lacedaemonian, happened to be near Sicyon and Corinth preparing an expedition to the Thracian coast. When he learned that the walls had been taken, he feared for the Peloponnesians in Nisaea and worried that Megara might be captured. He sent word to the Boeotians, telling them to meet him quickly with an army at Tripodiscus. This was a village in Megarian territory below Mount Geraneia. He himself went there with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian hoplites, four hundred from Phlius, six hundred from Sicyon, and as many of his own troops as had already assembled. He thought he would reach Nisaea before it was taken.

2 He arrived at Tripodiscus at night and learned that Nisaea had fallen. Before his presence became known, he chose three hundred men from the army and approached the city of Megara. The Athenians, who were near the sea, did not notice him. His stated purpose was to make an attempt on Nisaea, and he meant to do so in practice as well if he could. But his main aim was to enter Megara and secure it. He asked the Megarians to let his men in, saying he hoped to recover Nisaea.

CHAPTER 71

1 The two factions at Megara were afraid. One feared that Brasidas would bring back the exiles and expel them. The other feared that the people, alarmed at that very prospect, would attack them. The city might then be destroyed by fighting within it, with the Athenians waiting close by. So they did not admit him. Both sides thought they should stay quiet and wait to see what happened.

2 Both expected a battle between the Athenians and the army that had come to help. They thought it would be safer to join the side they favored once it had won. When Brasidas failed to persuade them, he returned to the rest of his army.

CHAPTER 72

1 The Boeotians arrived at dawn. Even before Brasidas sent his message, they had decided to help Megara, since the danger concerned them too. Their whole army was already at Plataea. When the messenger arrived, they were all the more determined. They sent two thousand two hundred hoplites and six hundred cavalry, and went home with the rest.

2 The whole force had now assembled, with no fewer than six thousand hoplites. The Athenian hoplites were drawn up near Nisaea and the sea, but their lightly armed troops were scattered across the plain. The Boeotian cavalry fell on these troops unexpectedly and drove them toward the sea. Until then, no reinforcements had come to the Megarians from anywhere.

3 The Athenian cavalry rode out to meet them and joined the fight. A long cavalry battle followed, in which each side claims it did no worse than the other.

4 The Athenians killed the Boeotian cavalry commander and a few others who rode right up to Nisaea, and stripped their bodies. They kept control of these bodies, returned them under a truce, and set up a victory monument. But neither side had gained a clear advantage in the battle as a whole when they separated. The Boeotians went back to their own army and the Athenians to Nisaea.

CHAPTER 73

1 After this, Brasidas and his army moved closer to the sea and the city of Megara. They took up a suitable position, formed their battle line, and waited. They expected the Athenians to attack them and knew that the Megarians were waiting to see which side won.

2 They thought this served them well in both respects. They would not attack first or willingly start a dangerous battle. But since they had openly shown their readiness to defend themselves, they could fairly count the result as a victory

without a fight. At the same time, this would work in their favor with the Megarians too.

3 If they had not been seen coming to help, the outcome would not even have been uncertain. They would clearly have lost the city at once, just as if they had been defeated. As things stood, the Athenians might choose not to fight, and they would then achieve what they had come for without a battle. This was what happened.

4 The Athenians came out and formed their line beside the Long Walls. They too waited, since the other side was not attacking. Their generals calculated that the risks were not equal. They had already achieved most of their aims. If they started a battle against a larger army, victory would give them Megara, but defeat would mean losses among the best of their hoplite force. For their opponents, by contrast, each contingent represented only part of their total forces and even of the army present. It was reasonable for them to be willing to take the risk. Both sides waited for a time, and neither made a move. Then the Athenians withdrew first to Nisaea, and afterward the Peloponnesians went back to where they had started. The Megarian friends of the exiles now felt more confident, treating Brasidas as the winner since the Athenians were no longer willing to fight. They opened the gates to Brasidas himself and the commanders from the various cities. After admitting them, they began discussions. By now the men who had negotiated with the Athenians were terrified.

CHAPTER 74

1 Later, after the allies had dispersed to their own cities, Brasidas himself returned to Corinth. He continued preparing the expedition to the Thracian coast that he had originally set out to make.

2 The Athenians also went home. Of the Megarians inside the city, those who had been most involved in the dealings with Athens knew they had been discovered and immediately slipped away. The others discussed matters with the

friends of the exiles and brought back the men from Pegae. They required them to swear binding oaths that they would not take revenge for the past, but would make the best decisions for the city.

3 But once the returning exiles held office, they held a review of the men under arms. They separated the companies and picked out about a hundred men from among their enemies and those thought to have been most involved in the dealings with Athens. They forced the people to vote openly on these men. Once they had been condemned, they killed them and made the city's government a very narrow oligarchy.

4 This change of government, brought about through civil strife by a very small group, lasted an exceptionally long time.

CHAPTER 75

1 During the same summer the Mytilenaeans were about to fortify Antandrus, as they had planned. The Athenian generals commanding the ships that collected money, Demodocus and Aristides, were near the Hellespont. Their third colleague, Lamachus, had sailed into the Black Sea with ten ships. When the first two learned about the preparations at Antandrus, they were alarmed. They feared it might become another Anaea, the base opposite Samos. Samian exiles had settled there and helped the Peloponnesians with their navy by sending them helmsmen. They also caused trouble among the Samians in the city and took in those who left it. So the generals gathered an army from the allies and sailed to Antandrus. They defeated the troops who came out to fight them and recaptured the place.

2 Not long afterward Lamachus, who had sailed into the Black Sea, lost his ships after anchoring in the river Cales in the territory of Heraclea. Rain fell upstream, and the resulting flood swept down without warning. He and his army traveled on foot through the territory of the Bithynian Thracians, who live on the Asian side of the sea. They reached Chalcedon, a Megarian colony at the entrance to the Black Sea.

CHAPTER 76

1 During the same summer, immediately after withdrawing from Megarian territory, the Athenian general Demosthenes arrived at Naupactus with forty ships.

2 Some men in the Boeotian cities were working with him and Hippocrates on a plan for Boeotia. They wanted to change the existing system and introduce democracy, as at Athens. Mainly at the suggestion of Ptoeodorus, an exile from Thebes, they made the following arrangements.

3 Some men were going to betray Siphae, a coastal town in the territory of Thespiae on the Crisaean Gulf. Others from Orchomenus were offering to hand over Chaeronea, which was under the authority of Orchomenus. Orchomenus had formerly been called Minyan and was now called Boeotian. The Orchomenian exiles were particularly active in the scheme and were hiring men from the Peloponnese. Chaeronea lies at the edge of Boeotia, next to the district of Phanotis in Phocis. Some Phocians were involved as well.

4 The Athenians were to seize Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo in the territory of Tanagra facing Euboea. All these actions were to take place at the same time on a fixed day. This would prevent the Boeotians from gathering their whole force to defend Delium. Instead, each would have to deal with unrest at home.

5 They hoped that if the attempt succeeded and Delium was fortified, it would be easy to bring affairs in Boeotia around to their advantage. Even if there was no immediate change in the Boeotian governments, things would not stay as they were. These places would be occupied, the land would be raided, and each group would have a refuge close by. In time, the Athenians would come to help the rebels, while their opponents would be unable to unite their forces.

CHAPTER 77

1 These were the preparations for the plot. Hippocrates intended to march into Boeotia with a force from Athens when the time came. He sent Demosthenes ahead with the forty ships to Naupactus. Demosthenes was to gather an army

of Acarnanians and the other allies from that area and sail to Siphae, which was to be handed over. They had fixed a day on which these actions were to take place together.

2 When Demosthenes arrived, he found that all the other Acarnanians had forced Oeniadae to join the Athenian alliance. He himself called up the entire allied force in the area. First he campaigned against Salynthius and the Agraeans and won them over. Then he made the rest of his preparations, ready to reach Siphae when the time came.

CHAPTER 78

1 At about the same time that summer, Brasidas was marching toward the Thracian coast with seventeen hundred hoplites. He reached Heraclea in Trachis and sent a messenger ahead to his friends at Pharsalus, asking them to guide him and his army through. Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus, who represented the interests of the Chalcidians, came to Melitaea in Achaea. Only then did he continue his march.

2 Other Thessalians also guided him, including Niconidas from Larisa, a friend of Perdiccas. It was not easy to pass through Thessaly without a guide in any circumstances, and certainly not with an armed force. Throughout Greece, passing through a neighbor's territory without permission was regarded with suspicion. Besides, the mass of the Thessalian people had always been friendly to the Athenians.

3 If Thessaly had been governed under equal laws rather than by powerful families, he would never have got through. Even as things were, some men who opposed his guides met him at the river Enipeus during his march and tried to stop him. They said he was acting wrongly by passing through without the consent of the whole community.

4 His guides said they would not take him through against the Thessalians' wishes. He had arrived unexpectedly, and they were escorting him as his friends. Brasidas himself also said that he was passing through as a friend of Thessaly and its people. He was taking his army against the Athenians, who were his enemies, not against the Thessalians. He knew of no hostility between the Thessalians and Lacedaemonians that should prevent either from using the other's land. He would not go on now against their wishes—indeed, he could not—but he thought he should not be stopped.

5 After hearing this, the men went away. At his guides' urging, Brasidas pressed on at speed without delay, before a larger force could gather to stop him. On the very day he left Melitaea he reached Pharsalus and camped by the river Apidanus. From there he went to Phacium and then into Perrhaebia.

6 At this point his Thessalian guides went home. The Perrhaebians, who were subjects of the Thessalians, took him to Dium in Perdiccas' kingdom. This small Macedonian town lies below Olympus, on the side facing Thessaly.

CHAPTER 79

1 In this way Brasidas hurried through Thessaly before anyone could prepare to stop him. He reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice.

2 Perdiccas and those in the Thracian region who had rebelled against Athens had brought the army out of the Peloponnese. They were alarmed by the Athenians' success. The Chalcidians thought the Athenians would attack them first. Their neighboring cities that had not rebelled also secretly helped bring the army there. Perdiccas was not openly at war with Athens. But he too was afraid because of his old disputes with the Athenians. Above all, he wanted to bring Arrhabaeus, king of the Lyncestians, under his control.

3 The Lacedaemonians' difficulties at the time made it easier for them to bring an army out of the Peloponnese.

CHAPTER 80

1 The Athenians were pressing hard on the Peloponnese, especially on Lacedaemonian territory. The Lacedaemonians thought their best hope of drawing them away was to send an army against their allies and cause trouble in return. This was especially promising because the allies were ready to support the army and were calling for their help in rebelling.

2 They also wanted an excuse to send some of the Helots away. They feared that, with Pylos occupied, the Helots might take advantage of the present situation to revolt.

3 Fear of the Helots' defiance and their numbers had also led them to do the following. Most Lacedaemonian policies had always been mainly concerned with guarding against the Helots. They announced that any Helots who thought they had served them best in the wars should present themselves for selection, with the promise of freedom. This was a test. They believed that those whose pride led them to claim that they deserved to be freed before anyone else would also be the most likely to attack them.

4 They selected about two thousand. These men put on wreaths and went around the sanctuaries as freed men. Not long afterward, the Lacedaemonians made them disappear. No one knew how each of them was killed.

5 So on this occasion they gladly sent seven hundred Helot hoplites with Brasidas. He recruited the rest of his men in the Peloponnese with an offer of pay and led them out.

CHAPTER 81

1 Brasidas himself was very eager to go, and the Lacedaemonians sent him. The Chalcidians were also keen to have him. In Sparta he was thought to be energetic in everything he did. Once he went abroad, he proved extremely valuable to the Lacedaemonians.

2 For the immediate future, his fair and reasonable treatment of the cities brought most of them over in revolt. He captured some places through betrayal. This gave the Lacedaemonians places to exchange for the recovery of their own when they wanted a settlement, as they later did. It also gave the Peloponnese relief from the war. Later, in the war that followed the events in Sicily, the courage and good judgment Brasidas showed at this time did more than anything else to make Athens' allies eager to turn to the Lacedaemonians. Some had experienced these qualities themselves; others believed what they had heard about them.

3 He was the first to go abroad, and he was thought to be a good man in every way. He left behind a firm expectation that the others were like him too.

CHAPTER 82

1 At this time, then, when the Athenians heard of his arrival in the Thracian region, they declared Perdiccas an enemy. They thought he was responsible for Brasidas' passage. They also increased their watch over their allies in that region.

CHAPTER 83

1 Perdiccas immediately took Brasidas and his army, together with his own forces, on a campaign against his neighbor Arrhabaeus, son of Bromerus and king of the Lyncestian Macedonians. He had a dispute with him and wanted to conquer him.

2 But when Perdiccas and Brasidas reached the entrance to Lyncus with the army, Brasidas said he wanted to approach Arrhabaeus first and talk to him before going to war. He hoped to make him an ally of the Lacedaemonians if he could.

3 Arrhabaeus had also made some approaches through heralds. He was ready to submit the dispute to Brasidas as a neutral judge. The Chalcidian envoys who were there also urged Brasidas not to remove Perdiccas' troubles for him. They wanted Perdiccas to be more eager to help with their own affairs as well.

4 Besides, Perdiccas' representatives at Lacedaemon had said something to the effect that he would make many of the places around him their allies. For this reason, Brasidas thought it right to deal with Arrhabaeus in the common interest rather than in Perdiccas' alone.

5 Perdiccas said he had not brought Brasidas to judge his disputes, but to destroy whichever enemies he pointed out. Brasidas would be treating him unfairly if he met with Arrhabaeus while Perdiccas was supporting half the army.

6 Despite Perdiccas' opposition and the disagreement between them, Brasidas met Arrhabaeus. What Arrhabaeus said persuaded him, and he took the army away before it invaded the country. After this, Perdiccas paid for a third of the army's supplies instead of half, because he thought he had been treated unfairly.

CHAPTER 84

1 Still in the same summer, Brasidas immediately marched against Acanthus, a colony of Andros. He had Chalcidian troops with him. It was shortly before the grape harvest.

2 The people of Acanthus were divided over whether to admit him. Those working with the Chalcidians to bring him in were opposed by the people. But their crops were still outside the walls, and the majority feared for them. Brasidas persuaded them to let him in alone and hear him before deciding. They admitted him, and he addressed the people as follows. For a Lacedaemonian, he was not a bad speaker.

CHAPTER 85

1 "People of Acanthus, the Lacedaemonians have sent me and this army to carry out the reason we gave at the start of the war. We said we would fight the Athenians to free Hellas.

2 "Do not blame us if we have been slow to arrive. We were mistaken about the war back home. We hoped to defeat the Athenians quickly on our own, without exposing you to danger. Now that we have had the chance, we have come here and will try to defeat them with your help too.

3 "But I am surprised that you have shut your gates against me, and that my arrival may not be welcome to you.

4 "We Lacedaemonians thought we were coming to people who were already our allies in spirit, even before we actually arrived, and who would welcome us. That is why we took this great risk, traveling for many days through foreign country and putting all our energy into it.

5 "It would be a terrible thing if you have something else in mind, or if you intend to oppose your own freedom and that of the other Greeks.

6 "It is not just that you yourselves are resisting. People in the other places I approach will be less likely to join me. They will be troubled that you, the first people I came to, did not accept me, although your city is important and you are thought to be sensible. I will have no convincing explanation to offer. People will think either that the freedom I offer is unjust, or that I have arrived too weak and powerless to protect you against the Athenians if they attack.

7 "Yet when [I] brought this army I now command to help Nisaea, the Athenians refused to fight us, although they had more men. So they are not likely to send an army by sea against you as large as the one they had at Nisaea.

CHAPTER 86

1 "I have come not to harm the Greeks but to free them. I have bound the Lacedaemonian authorities by the most solemn oaths that any allies I bring over will govern themselves. At the same time, we do not mean to force or trick you into becoming our allies. Just the opposite: we mean to be your allies against the Athenians who have enslaved you.

2 "So, since I give you the strongest assurances, I ask you not to suspect me or think me powerless to protect you. I ask you to join us with confidence.

3 "If anyone is holding back because of some private fear that I might hand the city over to a particular group, he should feel more confident than anyone.

4 "I have not come to take sides in civil strife. Nor would I think I was bringing genuine freedom if I set aside your traditional arrangements and enslaved the majority to the few, or the minority to the whole people.

5 "That would be harder to bear than foreign rule. We Lacedaemonians would receive no thanks for our efforts. Instead of honor and a good reputation, we would get blame. We would plainly be earning the very accusations on which we base our war against the Athenians. And we would be hated more for them than someone who had made no claim to good conduct.

6 "For people with a reputation to maintain, taking advantage through deception that looks respectable is more shameful than doing so by open force. The use of force rests on a claim to the strength that chance has given; deception rests on a deliberately dishonest scheme.

CHAPTER 87

1 "That is how carefully we look after our most important interests. Apart from the oaths, you could have no stronger assurance than this: compare our actions with our words, and you must conclude that it is also in our interest to act as I have said.

2 "But suppose that, despite these assurances, you say you cannot join us. Suppose you claim to be friendly and ask to be left alone without suffering harm. You may say that freedom seems dangerous to you, that it is right to offer it only to those who can accept it, and that no one should be forced to take it against their will. In that case, I will call the local gods and heroes to witness that I have come to help you but cannot persuade you. Then I will try to force you by laying waste your land.

3 "I will not think that I am then acting unjustly. I will think I also have reasonable grounds because of two needs. First, if you do not join us, the Lacedaemonians must not be harmed by the money you send the Athenians, despite your goodwill toward us. Second, you must not stop the Greeks from escaping slavery.

4 "Otherwise we would have no reasonable grounds for doing this. We Lacedaemonians have no right to free people against their will except for some common good.

5 "Nor are we seeking an empire. Instead, we are working to end the empire of others. We would wrong the greater number if, while offering everyone self-government, we let you stand in the way.

6 "Think carefully about this. Try to be the first to begin the Greeks' freedom and win a reputation that lasts forever. At the same time, keep your own property safe and give your whole city the finest possible name."

CHAPTER 88

1 That was what Brasidas said. After much discussion on both sides, the Acanthians voted in secret. Brasidas' persuasive speech and fear for their crops led the majority to decide to rebel against the Athenians. They made him pledge himself to the oaths the Lacedaemonian authorities had sworn before sending him out: any allies he brought over would govern themselves. Only then did they admit the army.

2 Not long afterward, Stagirus, another colony of Andros, joined the revolt. These were the events of that summer.

CHAPTER 89

1 At the very beginning of the following winter, the plans to hand places in Boeotia over to the Athenian generals Hippocrates and Demosthenes were going ahead. Demosthenes was to arrive at Siphae with the ships, and Hippocrates at Delium. But there was a mistake over the days on which the two were to campaign. Demosthenes sailed to Siphae too early, with Acarnanians and many of the allies from that region on board his ships. He achieved nothing because Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanoteus, had revealed the plot. He had told the Lacedaemonians, and they had told the Boeotians.

2 All the Boeotians came to help, since Hippocrates had not yet entered their country to cause trouble. They occupied Siphae and Chaeronea before the Athenians could reach them. When the conspirators realized the mistake, they made no move in the cities.

CHAPTER 90

1 Hippocrates called out the whole Athenian population: citizens, resident foreigners, and any other foreigners who were there. He reached Delium later, after the Boeotians had already withdrawn from Siphae. He encamped his army and fortified Delium [the sanctuary of Apollo] in the following way.

2 They dug a ditch in a circle around the sanctuary and the temple. They piled the excavated earth into a wall, driving stakes in alongside it. They cut down the vines around the sanctuary and threw them in, along with stones and bricks from nearby houses they pulled down. They used every possible means to raise the defenses. They also put up wooden towers wherever these were useful and there was no sanctuary building already standing. The colonnade that had once been there had fallen down.

3 Counting from their departure from home, they started work on the third day. They worked that day, the fourth day, and until lunchtime on the fifth.

4 Then, when most of the work was finished, the army moved ahead about ten stades from Delium on its way home. Most of the light troops went straight on, but the hoplites halted and rested with their weapons grounded. Hippocrates stayed behind to organize the guards and finish whatever work on the outer defenses still needed doing.

CHAPTER 91

1 During these days the Boeotians were gathering at Tanagra. Once the troops from all the cities were there, they learned that the Athenians were moving homeward. The other Boeotarchs did not agree to fight, since the Athenians were no longer in Boeotia. There are eleven Boeotarchs in all. The Athenians had in fact halted near the borders of the territory of Oropus. But Pagondas, son of Aeoladas, wanted to fight and thought it better to take the risk. He was a Boeotarch for Thebes along with Arianthides, son of Lysimachides, and it was his turn to command. He called the men over company by company, so that they would not all leave their weapons at once. He urged the Boeotians to advance against the Athenians and fight, speaking as follows.

CHAPTER 92

1 "Men of Boeotia, none of us commanders should even have considered it wrong to fight the Athenians if we happened to catch them outside Boeotia. They have come from the neighboring country and built a fort inside Boeotia, and they intend to destroy our country. They are surely our enemies wherever we catch them, and in the place they came from to attack us.

2 "If anyone thought it safer not to fight, let him change his mind now. Someone whose own country is being attacked cannot take the same cautious approach as someone whose possessions are safe and who chooses to attack another country because he wants more.

3 "It is your tradition to resist an invading foreign army, whether it is in your own country or in your neighbors' territory. This is all the more necessary with the Athenians, who are also our immediate neighbors.

4 "For everyone, freedom from neighboring cities depends on equal strength. And these people try to enslave not only those nearby but also those far away. How can we fail to fight them with every effort? We have examples in the Euboeans across the water and most of the rest of Hellas: we can see how they stand in relation to Athens. We must recognize this difference. Other peoples fight their neighbors over the boundaries of their land. But if we are defeated, one boundary will be fixed for our entire country, and we will have no say about it.

5 "They will force their way in and hold what is ours. That is how much more dangerous they are to live beside than other people. Those who attack their neighbors with the confidence of superior strength, as the Athenians do now, generally feel less fear about invading someone who stays quiet and defends himself only on his own land. They are less ready to try to dominate someone who goes beyond his borders to meet them and, when the opportunity comes, starts the war himself.

6 "We have had experience of this with these very people. When they occupied our country during our civil strife, we defeated them at Coronea. That victory has given Boeotia great security right up to the present.

7 "We must remember this. The older men must match their earlier achievements. The younger men, whose fathers proved brave on that occasion, must try not to disgrace their families' courage. We must trust that the god will be on our side: they have fortified his sanctuary against sacred law and are occupying it. We must also trust the favorable signs we see in the sacrifices we have offered. Let us advance against these men and show them this: when they attack people who will not resist, they may gain what they want. But they will not get away without a fight from men whose pride is always to keep their own country free in battle and not to enslave the country of others unjustly."

CHAPTER 93

1 With this encouragement, Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to advance against the Athenians. He quickly got the army moving, since it was already late in the day. When he came close to the Athenian army, he halted in a position where a hill between them kept the two armies from seeing each other. He then arranged his forces and prepared for battle.

2 When Hippocrates, who was at Delium, received word that the Boeotians were advancing, he sent orders to the army to form up. He joined it himself not long afterward. He left about three hundred cavalry at Delium, both to guard it if anyone attacked and to watch for a chance to attack the Boeotians during the battle.

3 The Boeotians stationed troops to oppose these cavalry. When their arrangements were complete, they appeared over the hill and halted with their weapons grounded, in the formation they intended to fight in. They had about seven thousand hoplites, over ten thousand light troops, a thousand cavalry, and five hundred peltasts.

4 The Thebans and those who shared their district held the right wing. In the center were the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, and the others who lived around the lake. The Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians held the left wing. Cavalry and light troops were stationed on each wing. The Thebans formed up twenty-five shields deep. The others used whatever depth suited each contingent.

5 These were the Boeotians' forces and their arrangement.

CHAPTER 94

1 The Athenian hoplites formed up eight deep across the whole army. Their numbers matched those of the enemy hoplites, and they had cavalry on each wing. They had no properly equipped force of light troops there. The city had never organized one. The light troops who had joined the invasion were many

times more numerous than the enemy's. Many men had followed without weapons, since there had been a general mobilization of citizens and foreigners who were present. But they had been the first to start for home, so only a few were there for the battle.

2 When they had taken their positions and were about to engage, Hippocrates, the general, went along the Athenian lines encouraging the men. He spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 95

1 "Athenians, my words of encouragement will be brief. But for brave men they are just as effective as a longer speech. They are more a reminder than an order.

2 "None of you should think that we are taking this great risk in a foreign country for no good reason. We will be fighting on their land to defend our own. If we win, the Peloponnesians will never invade your country without the cavalry of these men. In a single battle you can win this country and make your own more securely free.

3 "So advance against them in a way worthy of our city, which each of you is proud to call his home, the foremost city among the Greeks. Be worthy too of your fathers, who defeated these men in battle with Myronides at Oenophyta and once held Boeotia."

CHAPTER 96

1 Hippocrates was still giving this encouragement. He had gone only halfway along the army and had no time to reach the rest. Pagondas had also spoken a few quick words of encouragement to his men on the spot. The Boeotians sang their battle hymn and advanced down the hill. The Athenians advanced to meet them and charged into contact at a run.

2 The outermost troops of both armies did not come to blows. Both had the same problem: streams blocked their way. The rest were locked in fierce fighting, pushing shield against shield.

3 The Athenians were defeating the Boeotian left wing and the troops as far as the center. They pressed hard on the troops there, especially the Thespians. The men stationed alongside the Thespians had withdrawn, leaving them surrounded in a small space. Those Thespians who died were cut down while resisting hand to hand. Some Athenians also became confused as they encircled the enemy, failed to recognize one another, and killed each other.

4 The Boeotians on this side were defeated and fled toward the part of their army that was still fighting. But their right wing, where the Thebans were, was beating the Athenians. They pushed them back, slowly at first, and followed them up.

5 Because their left wing was in trouble, Pagondas had sent two cavalry units out of sight around the hill. When they suddenly appeared, the victorious Athenian wing panicked, thinking that another army was coming against it.

6 Both wings now gave way. This alarm, together with the Thebans' pursuit and their breaking through the Athenian line, put the whole Athenian army to flight.

7 Some fled toward Delium and the sea, others toward Oropus, and others toward Mount Parnes. The rest went wherever each thought he had some hope of safety.

8 The Boeotians pursued and killed them. The cavalry did the most killing, both the Boeotians' own and the Locrians who had arrived to help just as the rout began. But night fell during the pursuit, making it easier for most of the fleeing men to escape.

9 The next day, those at Oropus and those at Delium went home by sea. They left a garrison at Delium, which they still held despite the defeat.

CHAPTER 97

1 The Boeotians set up a victory trophy, recovered their own dead, and stripped the enemy dead. They left a guard and withdrew to Tanagra, where they planned an attack on Delium.

2 An Athenian herald on his way to arrange the recovery of the dead met a Boeotian herald. The Boeotian turned him back, saying he would achieve nothing until the Boeotian himself had returned. Then he went before the Athenians and delivered the Boeotians' message. They said the Athenians had acted wrongly by breaking the established customs of the Greeks.

3 It was the rule for everyone invading another people's country to leave its sanctuaries untouched. But the Athenians had fortified Delium and were living in it. Everything people did on ordinary, unconsecrated ground was going on there. They were even drawing water for their own use that the Boeotians were forbidden to touch except to wash their hands for sacrifices.

4 So, on behalf of the god and themselves, the Boeotians called on the divine powers who shared the altar, and on Apollo, and ordered the Athenians to leave the sanctuary and take away what belonged to them.

CHAPTER 98

1 After the herald had said this, the Athenians sent a herald of their own to the Boeotians. They said they had done no wrong to the sanctuary and would not deliberately damage it in the future. They had not entered it for that purpose in the first place. They wanted to use it as a base from which to defend themselves against those who were wronging them.

2 The custom among the Greeks, they said, was that whoever controlled a piece of land, large or small, also took possession of its sanctuaries. They cared for these with whatever observances they could manage in addition to the customary ones.

3 The Boeotians themselves, like most other peoples who had driven someone out by force and occupied their land, had first taken over sanctuaries belonging to others. They now owned them as their own.

4 If the Athenians themselves had been able to conquer more of Boeotian territory, they would have kept it. As things stood, they would not willingly leave the part they occupied, because they regarded it as their own.

5 They had drawn the water out of necessity. They had not brought this necessity on themselves through reckless aggression. The Boeotians had invaded their land first, and in defending themselves they were forced to use it.

6 It was only reasonable to expect even the god to forgive anything done under the pressure of war or some terrible danger. Altars were, after all, a refuge for people who had done wrong unintentionally. The charge of breaking sacred law applied to those who did evil without being forced to, not to those whom misfortune drove to take such risks.

7 The Boeotians were acting far more irreverently by demanding the sanctuaries in exchange for returning the dead than the Athenians were by refusing to use sacred places to recover what was due to them.

8 They asked the Boeotians to give them a clear answer about recovering their dead under a truce, as ancestral custom allowed. This was not a request made on condition that they leave Boeotian land. They were no longer on land belonging to the Boeotians, but on land they had won by force of arms.

CHAPTER 99

1 The Boeotians replied that if the Athenians were in Boeotia, they should leave Boeotian land and take away what was theirs. If they were on their own land, they could decide for themselves what to do. Their reasoning was that the territory of Oropus belonged to Athens as a dependency. The dead were lying there because the battle had taken place on the border, but the Athenians could not recover them by force against the Boeotians' will. On the other hand, the

Boeotians did not intend to grant a truce for land supposedly belonging to the Athenians. They thought it more respectable to answer, "Leave our land and recover what you are asking for." The Athenian herald heard this and left without achieving anything.

CHAPTER 100

1 The Boeotians immediately sent for javelin throwers and slingers from the Malian Gulf. Two thousand Corinthian hoplites had also come to help them after the battle, along with the Peloponnesian garrison troops who had left Nisaea and some Megarians. With these forces they marched against Delium and attacked the fort. They tried other methods as well, but brought up the following machine, which captured it.

2 They sawed a large beam in half, hollowed it out along its whole length, and fitted the halves back together closely to make a tube. At its far end they hung a cauldron on chains. An iron nozzle ran down from the beam and pointed into the cauldron. A considerable length of the rest of the wood was also covered in iron.

3 They brought it up from a distance on wagons toward the part of the wall built mostly of vine branches and timber. When it was close, they fitted large bellows into the end of the beam nearest them and pumped them.

4 The air passed through the airtight tube into the cauldron, which held burning charcoal, sulfur, and pitch. It produced a great flame and set fire to the wall. No one could stay on it any longer. The defenders abandoned it and fled, and this was how the fort was captured.

5 Some of the garrison were killed, and two hundred were taken prisoner. Most of the rest boarded the ships and were carried home.

CHAPTER 101

1 Delium was captured on the seventeenth day after the battle. Not long afterward the Athenian herald came back again about the dead, unaware of what had happened. The Boeotians returned them and no longer gave the same answer.

2 Slightly fewer than five hundred Boeotians died in the battle. The Athenian dead numbered slightly fewer than a thousand, including the general Hippocrates. Large numbers of light troops and baggage carriers also died.

3 A little after this battle, Demosthenes also made a landing in Sicyonian territory. When he had sailed to Siphae earlier, the plan to have it betrayed to him had failed. He still had his army aboard the ships: Acarnanians, Agraeans, and four hundred Athenian hoplites.

4 Before all the ships had arrived, the Sicyonians came to meet the attack. They routed those who had landed and chased them back to the ships, killing some and capturing others alive. They set up a victory monument and returned the dead under a truce.

5 Around the same time as the events at Delium, Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, also died. He had marched against the Triballians and been defeated in battle. His nephew Seuthes, son of Sparadocus, became king of the Odrysians and of the rest of the Thracian territory Sitalces had ruled.

CHAPTER 102

1 That same winter, Brasidas took his allies in Thrace and marched against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the Strymon River.

2 Aristagoras of Miletus had earlier tried to settle the site where the city now stands while fleeing from King Darius. But the Edonians drove him out. Thirty-two years later the Athenians tried as well. They sent ten thousand set-

tlers, including their own citizens and anyone else who wished to go. The Thracians destroyed them at Drabescus.

3 In the twenty-ninth year after that, the Athenians came again. They sent Hagnon, son of Nicias, to found the colony. They drove out the Edonians and settled this site, which had previously been called Nine Roads.

4 They used Eion as their base. They held this trading port on the coast at the river's mouth, twenty-five stades from the present city. Hagnon named the city Amphipolis because the Strymon flowed around it on both sides [because it enclosed it]. He blocked off the space with a long wall running from one part of the river to the other, and founded the city on a site clearly visible from both the sea and the mainland.

CHAPTER 103

1 Brasidas set out against Amphipolis with his army from Arnae in Chalcidice. Around evening he reached Aulon and Bormiscus, where Lake Bolbe drains into the sea. After the men had eaten, he continued through the night.

2 The weather was stormy, with a little snow. This made him all the more eager to press on. He wanted to reach Amphipolis without anyone knowing, except those who were betraying it to him.

3 Some Argilians lived in the city—the Argilians were colonists from Andros—and they and others were helping with the plan. Some were acting at Perdiccas' urging, others at that of the Chalcidians.

4 The Argilians were especially active. They lived nearby, had always been distrusted by the Athenians, and had long been plotting against the place. When the opportunity came with Brasidas' arrival, they had already been negotiating for some time with their fellow citizens living in Amphipolis about handing over the city. That night they admitted Brasidas into their own city and broke with Athens. Before dawn they brought his army to the bridge over the river.

5 The city is some distance from the crossing. At that time its walls did not extend down to the bridge as they do now, and only a small guard was posted there. Brasidas easily overpowered it. Betrayal helped him, as did the bad weather and the unexpected attack. He crossed the bridge and immediately took control of the property of the Amphipolitans living outside the walls, throughout the whole district.

CHAPTER 104

1 The crossing took the people in the city by surprise. Many of those outside were being captured, while others were escaping inside the wall. The Amphipolitans were thrown into great confusion, especially since they also distrusted one another.

2 It is said that Brasidas would probably have taken the city if he had chosen to advance on it immediately instead of allowing his army to turn to plundering.

3 Instead, after overrunning the land outside, he made camp and waited. Events inside were not turning out as he had expected.

4 The opponents of the traitors were strong enough in numbers to prevent the gates from being opened immediately. Together with Eucles, the general who had come from Athens to guard the city, they sent to the other general in Thrace, Thucydides, son of Olorus, who wrote this history. He was near Thasos, an island colonized by the Parians, about half a day's sail from Amphipolis. They asked him to come to their aid.

5 When he heard this, he immediately sailed with the seven ships that happened to be available. His first aim was to reach Amphipolis before it surrendered. Failing that, he wanted to secure Eion before the enemy could take it.

CHAPTER 105

1 Meanwhile, Brasidas feared the arrival of help by sea from Thasos. He also learned that Thucydides owned the rights to work the gold mines in that part of Thrace, and because of this was one of the most influential men on the mainland. He hurried to secure the city before Thucydides could arrive, if possible. Otherwise the majority of the Amphipolitans might refuse to come over to him. They might hope that Thucydides would gather an allied force by sea and another from Thrace and keep them safe.

2 He therefore offered moderate terms. He proclaimed that any Amphipolitan or Athenian in the city who wished could stay, keeping his property and enjoying equal civic rights. Anyone unwilling to stay could leave within five days, taking his belongings.

CHAPTER 106

1 When the majority heard this, they began to change their minds. This was all the more so because only a small part of the citizen population was Athenian. Most were of mixed origins, and many of those captured outside had relatives inside. Given their fears, they thought the offer fair. The Athenians would be glad to leave. They thought they faced greater danger than the others and did not expect help to arrive soon. The rest would not lose their city and would keep equal rights, while unexpectedly escaping danger.

2 Those working with Brasidas now argued openly for his terms. They could see that the majority had changed sides and would no longer listen to the Athenian general present. So an agreement was made, and they admitted Brasidas on the terms he had proclaimed.

3 That was how they surrendered the city. Thucydides and his ships sailed into Eion late that same day.

4 Brasidas had only just taken Amphipolis, and Eion escaped capture by only a night's margin. If the ships had not come to its aid quickly, it would have been taken at dawn.

CHAPTER 107

1 After this, Thucydides organized affairs at Eion so that it would be secure both against an immediate attack by Brasidas and in the future. He also admitted those who chose to move down from Amphipolis under the agreement.

2 Brasidas suddenly sailed down the river against Eion with many boats. He hoped to seize the point projecting from the wall and so control the entrance to the harbor. He also tried an attack by land at the same time. Both attacks were driven back, and he turned to putting affairs at Amphipolis in order.

3 The Edonian city of Myrcinus came over to him after Pittacus, the Edonian king, was killed by the sons of Goaxis and by his own wife, Brauro. Not long afterward Galepsus and Oesyme joined him too. These were colonies of the Thasians. Perdiccas also arrived immediately after the capture of Amphipolis and helped organize these developments.

CHAPTER 108

1 The capture of Amphipolis greatly alarmed the Athenians. The city was valuable to them for its shipments of shipbuilding timber and its financial income. There was also the problem of access to their allies. With Thessalian guides, the Lacedaemonians could travel as far as the Strymon, but without control of the bridge they could not get farther. Upstream the river formed a large lake stretching a long way, while the approaches toward Eion were guarded by triremes. Now, however, passage had become easy, [they thought]. They also feared that their allies might revolt.

2 Brasidas behaved moderately in other ways too, and everywhere he spoke he declared that he had been sent to free Hellas.

3 The cities subject to Athens heard about the capture of Amphipolis, the terms Brasidas offered, and his mild behavior. This strongly encouraged them to revolt. They secretly sent heralds to him, asking him to come to them. Each wanted to be the first to break away.

4 They thought they could do so safely. They badly underestimated the power Athens later proved to have. Their judgments rested more on uncertain wishes than on sound foresight. People generally hand over what they want to unthinking hope, and dismiss what they dislike with reasoning that accepts no challenge.

5 The Athenians had also recently suffered their defeat in Boeotia. Brasidas made attractive but untrue claims that the Athenians had refused to fight him at Nisaea when he had only his own army with him. This encouraged the cities, and they believed no force would come against them.

6 Most importantly, they were ready to take any risk because of the immediate pleasure of revolt and because this would be their first chance to try it while the Lacedaemonians were eager to help. The Athenians realized this and sent out garrisons to the cities, as far as they could at short notice and in winter. Brasidas sent to Lacedaemon to press for additional troops. He himself began preparing to build triremes on the Strymon.

7 The Lacedaemonians did not meet his request. This was partly because their leading men were jealous of him, and partly because they preferred to recover their men from the island and end the war.

CHAPTER 109

1 That same winter, the Megarians captured and completely demolished their Long Walls, which the Athenians had held. After taking Amphipolis, Brasidas marched with his allies against the region called Acte.

2 Acte projects out beyond the King's canal. Its high mountain, Athos, ends at the Aegean Sea.

3 Its cities include Sane, a colony of Andros beside the canal itself, facing the sea toward Euboea. The others are Thyssus, Cleonae, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium.

4 These are inhabited by a mixture of non-Greek peoples who speak two languages. There is also a small Chalcidian population. Most are Pelasgians, descended from the Tyrrhenians who once lived in Lemnos and Athens. There are also Bisaltians, Crestonians, and Edonians. They live in small towns.

5 Most of them went over to Brasidas, but Sane and Dium resisted. He stayed with his army and laid waste to their territory.

CHAPTER 110

1 When they would not give in, he immediately marched against Torone in Chalcidice, which the Athenians held. A few men were inviting him there and were ready to hand over the city. He arrived with his army while it was still night, near dawn, and took up a position by the shrine of the Dioscuri, about three stades from the city.

2 The rest of the people of Torone and the Athenian garrison did not know he was there. But those working with him knew he was coming. A few had secretly gone out and were watching for his approach. Once they realized he had arrived, they brought seven lightly armed men with daggers inside to join them. Of the twenty men originally assigned, only these seven had not been too afraid to enter. Their leader was Lysistratus of Olynthus. They slipped through the wall facing the open sea without being noticed. Since the city stood on a hillside, they climbed up, killed the guards at the highest watchpost, and broke through the small gate facing Canastraeum.

CHAPTER 111

1 Brasidas advanced a little and waited with the main army. He sent a hundred peltasts ahead. They were to run in first when a gate was opened and the agreed signal was raised.

2 As time passed, the peltasts became puzzled and gradually moved close to the city. Inside, the Toronaeans working on the plan and the men who had entered made their preparations. The small gate had been broken through, and the gates by the marketplace were being opened after their bar was cut. First they led some men around and brought them in through the small gate. They wanted to cause sudden panic among the unsuspecting people in the city by attacking from behind and from both sides. Then they raised the agreed fire signal and admitted the rest of the peltasts through the gates by the marketplace.

CHAPTER 112

1 Brasidas saw the signal, got his army moving, and ran forward. The men all shouted together, terrifying the people inside the city.

2 Some immediately rushed in through the gates. Others climbed over square beams that happened to be leaning against a collapsed section of wall under repair. The beams were there for hauling up stones.

3 Brasidas and the main body immediately turned toward the upper, higher parts of the city. He wanted to take it completely and hold it securely. The remaining troops spread out everywhere.

CHAPTER 113

1 As Torone was being taken, most of its people had no idea what was happening and were thrown into confusion. But those involved in the plot, and those who approved of it, immediately joined the men who had entered.

2 About fifty Athenian hoplites happened to be sleeping in the marketplace. When they realized what was happening, a few were killed in close fighting. The rest escaped safely to the fort at Lecythus, some going on foot and others taking refuge aboard the two ships on guard duty. The Athenians had occupied this fort themselves. It was a headland projecting from the city into the sea, cut off at a narrow isthmus.

3 The Toronaeans who supported them also fled to join them there.

CHAPTER 114

1 When daylight came and the city was securely in his hands, Brasidas made a proclamation to the Toronaeans who had fled with the Athenians. Any who wished could come back to their property and live as citizens without fear. He sent a herald to the Athenians, telling them to leave Lecythus under a truce and take their belongings, because the place belonged to the Chalcidians.

2 They refused to leave but asked for a one-day truce to recover their dead. He granted two days. During this time he strengthened the neighboring houses, and the Athenians strengthened their own positions.

3 He called a meeting of the Toronaeans and spoke much as he had at Acanthus. He said they should not think worse of the men who had worked with him to capture the city, or regard them as traitors. They had not acted to enslave the city or because they had been bribed. They had acted for its good and its freedom. Nor should those who had taken no part think they would be treated less well. He had not come to harm either the city or any individual.

4 That was why he had made his proclamation to those who had fled to the Athenians. He thought no worse of them for their friendship with Athens. Once they had experience of his side [the Lacedaemonians], he believed they would be no less friendly to them, but much more so, because they acted with much greater fairness. For now, lack of experience made them afraid.

5 He told everyone to prepare to be dependable allies. From now on they would be held responsible for any wrongdoing. But as for the past, it was not his side that had been wronged. Rather, the Toronaeans themselves had suffered at the hands of others more powerful than they were. If they had opposed him, they could be forgiven.

CHAPTER 115

1 After saying this and reassuring them, Brasidas began attacking Lecythus once the truce had expired. The Athenians defended themselves from a poor wall and from houses fitted with battlements.

2 They held off the attack for one day. The next day the enemy planned to bring up a machine from which they intended to throw fire onto the wooden defenses. The army was already approaching. At the spot where the Athenians thought the machine was most likely to be brought up, and where their position was most open to attack, they built a wooden tower on top of a house. They carried up many jars and large storage pots of water, along with large stones. Many men also climbed onto it.

3 The house suddenly collapsed under the excessive weight, making a tremendous noise. The Athenians nearby who saw what had happened were more upset than frightened. But those farther away, especially the most distant, thought the position had already been captured there. They rushed to escape to the sea and the ships.

CHAPTER 116

1 Brasidas noticed them abandoning the battlements and saw what was happening. He immediately brought his army forward, captured the fort, and killed everyone he found inside.

2 This was how the Athenians abandoned the place. They crossed to Pallene in boats and warships. There was a sanctuary of Athena in Lecythus, and before the attack Brasidas had happened to promise thirty minas of silver to the first man to get onto the wall. He now thought that something beyond human action had caused its capture. He therefore paid the thirty minas into the goddess's sanctuary. He demolished and cleared Lecythus and set the whole area aside as sacred land.

3 For the rest of the winter he put the places he held in order and made plans against the others. With the end of winter, the eighth year of the war came to an end.

CHAPTER 117

1 At the very beginning of spring in the following summer season, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians made a one-year truce. The Athenians thought Brasidas would then be unable to get any more of their subjects to revolt before they could prepare without interference. At the same time, if things went well for them, they might reach a more general agreement. The Lacedaemonians believed these were the things the Athenians feared, as indeed they did. They thought that once the Athenians had experienced a break from suffering and hardship, they would be more eager for a settlement. They would return the prisoners and agree to a longer peace.

2 The Lacedaemonians put a higher value on recovering their men while Brasidas was still successful. If he made further progress and brought the two sides' strength into balance, they were likely to lose the men. They would then have to risk an evenly matched struggle with the Athenians to win.

3 The truce between them and their allies was therefore made on the following terms.

CHAPTER 118

1 "Concerning the sanctuary and oracle of Pythian Apollo, we agree that anyone who wishes may use them without deception or fear, according to ancestral laws.

2 "The Lacedaemonians and the allies present agree to this. They say they will send heralds to the Boeotians and Phocians and do all they can to persuade them as well.

3 "Concerning the god's property, we must take care to discover those who have wronged him. Both you and we, and any others who wish to join us, must act correctly and justly according to ancestral laws. All must follow ancestral laws.

4 "The Lacedaemonians and the other allies have agreed to these provisions on those subjects. If the Athenians make a truce, the Lacedaemonians and the other allies also agree to the following. Each side is to remain in its own territory, keeping what we now hold. Those at Coryphasium must stay within Buphras and Tomeus. Those in Cythera must not enter our allied territory. Neither we nor they may enter the other's territory. Those at Nisaea and Minoa must not cross the road from the gates beside the shrine of Nisus to the temple of Poseidon, and from that temple straight to the bridge leading to Minoa. The Megarians and their allies must not cross this road either. The Athenians are to keep the island they captured. Neither side may cross over to the other side's territory. The positions in Troezen are to remain as they now are, in accordance with the agreement made with the Athenians.

5 "The Lacedaemonians and their allies may use the sea along their own coasts and those of their allies. They may not sail in warships, but may use other oared vessels with a carrying capacity of up to five hundred talents.

6 "Heralds and embassies, with as many attendants as they think appropriate, are to have safe passage to and from the Peloponnese and Athens, by land and sea, to discuss ending the war and settling disputes.

7 "During this period, neither you nor we may receive deserters, whether free people or slaves.

8 "You must submit to legal proceedings brought by us, and we to proceedings brought by you, according to ancestral practice. Disputed matters must be settled through legal judgment without war.

9 "The Lacedaemonians and their allies agree to these terms. If you think anything could be better or fairer, come to Lacedaemon and explain it. Neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies will reject any fair proposals you make.

10 "Those who come must have full authority, just as you require of us. The truce will last one year."

11 "The people approved this resolution. The tribe Acamantis held the presidency, Phaenippus was secretary, and Niciades was chairman. Laches proposed: With good fortune for the Athenians, a truce is to be made on the terms the Lacedaemonians and their allies accept and have agreed to in the assembly.

12 "The truce is to last one year, beginning today, the fourteenth day of the month Elaphebolion.

13 "During this period, embassies and heralds are to travel between the two sides and hold discussions about how the war can be ended.

14 "The generals and presiding officials are to call an assembly, and the Athenians are to give first consideration to peace ... in response to any embassy that comes to discuss ending the war. The embassies now present must immediately swear before the people that they will keep to the truce for the year."

CHAPTER 119

1 "The Lacedaemonians and their allies agreed to these terms [and swore to keep them] with the Athenians and their allies on the twelfth day of the month Gerastius at Lacedaemon.

2 "The following men made the agreement and concluded the truce: for the Lacedaemonians, Taurus son of Echetimidas, Athenaeus son of Periclidas, and Philocharidas son of Eryxilaidas; for the Corinthians, Aeneas son of Ocytus and Euphamidas son of Aristonymus; for the Sicyonians, Damotimus son of Naucrates and Onasimus son of Megacles; for the Megarians, Nicasus son of Cecalus and Menecrates son of Amphidorus; for the Epidaurians, Amphias son of Eupaidas; and for the Athenians, the generals Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Autocles son of Tolmaeus."

3 This was how the truce came about. Throughout it, the two sides kept meeting to discuss a more lasting peace treaty.

CHAPTER 120

1 During these same days, Scione, a city in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians and joined Brasidas. The Scionaeans say that they came from Pellene in the Peloponnese. Their first settlers were sailing home from Troy when the storm that struck the Achaeans drove them to this place, and they settled there.

2 After their revolt, Brasidas sailed across to Scione at night. A friendly trireme sailed ahead, while he followed some distance behind in a small, fast boat. His plan was that, if he met a vessel larger than his small boat, the trireme would protect him. If an enemy trireme appeared, he thought it would turn against his warship rather than the smaller boat. Meanwhile he would escape safely.

3 After crossing over, he called the Scionaeans together and repeated what he had said at Acanthus and Torone. He also said that they deserved the highest praise. The Athenians held Potidaea and had cut off Pallene at the isthmus, so the Scionaeans were effectively islanders. Even so, they had moved toward freedom of their own accord. They had not timidly waited to be forced to act for what was clearly their own good. This showed that they would also face other very great dangers bravely. If things went as he hoped, he would regard them as the Lacedaemonians' most genuinely faithful friends and honor them in other ways as well.

CHAPTER 121

1 His words lifted the Scionaeans' spirits and gave them all confidence, including those who had previously opposed what was happening. They resolved to support the war enthusiastically. Besides giving Brasidas a warm welcome in other ways, they publicly crowned him with a gold crown as the man who was freeing Hellas. As individuals, they came up to him and tied ribbons around him as if he were a victorious athlete.

2 For the moment, he left a small garrison with them and crossed back. Not long afterward he brought a larger force across. He wanted to attack Mende and Potidaea with the Scionaeans' help. He expected the Athenians to come to the rescue, as they would to an island, and wanted to act first. He was also negotiating with people in these cities who were planning to betray them to him.

CHAPTER 122

1 He was about to make his attempt on these cities when the men announcing the truce arrived to see him in a trireme. They were Aristonymus for the Athenians and Athenaeus for the Lacedaemonians.

2 The army crossed back to Torone, and the envoys told Brasidas about the agreement. All the Lacedaemonians' allies in the Thracian region accepted what had been done.

3 Aristonymus approved the arrangements in other respects. But when he calculated the dates and realized that the Scionaeans had revolted after the truce, he said they would not be covered by it. Brasidas argued at length that they had revolted earlier, and he refused to give up the city.

4 When Aristonymus reported the situation to Athens, the Athenians were immediately ready to march against Scione. The Lacedaemonians sent envoys to say that this would break the truce. Trusting Brasidas' account, they claimed the city and were willing to submit the dispute over it to arbitration.

5 The Athenians did not want to risk arbitration. They wanted to attack as quickly as possible. They were angry that even people who were effectively on islands now thought they could revolt from Athens, trusting in the Lacedaemonians' land power, which could not help them.

6 The facts about the revolt actually supported the Athenians' claim more strongly: the Scionaeans had revolted two days after the truce. The Athenians immediately passed a decree, on Cleon's proposal, to capture the Scionaeans and put them to death. They left other matters alone and prepared for this operation.

CHAPTER 123

1 Meanwhile Mende, a city in Pallene and a colony of the Eretrians, revolted from them. Brasidas accepted its people too. He did not think he was doing wrong, even though they had clearly joined him during the truce. He himself accused the Athenians of breaking the treaty in certain respects.

2 This made the Mendaeans more confident about acting. They saw that Brasidas was willing to receive them, and his conduct toward Scione showed them that he would not abandon them. At the same time, the small group organizing the revolt, now that the moment for action had come, refused to back down. Afraid that they themselves would be exposed, they forced the majority to act against its wishes.

3 As soon as the Athenians heard the news, they became much angrier still and prepared to attack both cities.

4 Expecting their fleet to arrive, Brasidas moved the children and women of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans to safety at Olynthus in Chalcidice. He sent the cities five hundred Peloponnesian hoplites and three hundred Chalcidian peltasts, with Polydamidas in command of them all. They made their defensive preparations together, expecting the Athenians to arrive shortly.

CHAPTER 124

1 Meanwhile Brasidas and Perdiccas marched together against Arrhabaeus into Lyncus for a second time. Perdiccas brought the Macedonian force under his control and hoplites from the Greeks living there. Brasidas brought his remaining Peloponnesians, Chalcidians, Acanthians, and troops from each of the other allies according to its strength. Altogether there were about three thousand Greek hoplites. The Macedonian and Chalcidian cavalry accompanying them totaled nearly a thousand. There was also a large body of other non-Greek troops.

2 They invaded Arrhabaeus' territory and found the Lyncestians camped opposite them. They too settled into camp facing the enemy.

3 The infantry on each side held a hill, with a plain between them. First the cavalry of both sides rode down onto the plain and fought. Then the Lyncestian hoplites came down from their hill first, joining their cavalry and preparing to fight. Brasidas and Perdiccas led their own troops forward to meet them. They fought and routed the Lyncestians, killing many of them. The rest escaped to the higher ground and stayed there without further action.

4 After this, they set up a trophy and waited for two or three days. They were expecting the Illyrians whom Perdiccas had hired and who were due to arrive. Then Perdiccas wanted to advance against Arrhabaeus' villages rather than stay where they were. But Brasidas was worried about Mende. He feared that the Athenians might sail there before he did and harm it. With the Illyrians still absent as well, he was unwilling to advance and preferred to retreat.

CHAPTER 125

1 While they were arguing about this, news came that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdiccas and joined Arrhabaeus. Both commanders now thought they should retreat, because they feared the Illyrians, who were warlike people. But because of their disagreement they had settled nothing about when to start. Night fell,

and the Macedonians and the mass of non-Greek troops suddenly panicked. Large armies often take fright like this for no clear reason. They imagined that the approaching enemy was many times stronger than it really was and was about to arrive. They suddenly took flight and headed home. Perdiccas did not notice at first. When he realized what was happening, they forced him to leave before seeing Brasidas. Their camps were a long way apart.

2 At dawn Brasidas saw that the Macedonians had already left and that the Illyrians and Arrhabaeus were about to attack. He drew his hoplites together in a square, put the mass of lightly armed troops in the center, and prepared to retreat.

3 He assigned the youngest men to rush out wherever the enemy attacked them. He himself planned to follow at the rear with three hundred picked men. As he withdrew, he would turn to face and fight off the first of the enemy to press the attack.

4 Before the enemy came close, he quickly gave his soldiers this encouragement:

CHAPTER 126

1 "Peloponnesians, if I did not suspect that you were frightened because we have been left alone and the approaching enemy are non-Greeks in great numbers, I would not be giving you an explanation as well as encouragement. As it is, I will briefly remind you of a few things and offer some advice. I will try to convince you of the most important points about our friends' departure and the enemy's numbers.

2 "You should be good soldiers because of your own courage, not because allies happen to be with you. Nor should you fear any number of other men. You do not come from states where the many rule the few. Instead, the few rule the many, and they gained their power by nothing other than victory in battle.

3 "You are afraid of these non-Greeks now because you do not know them. But you must learn that they will not be formidable opponents. You can judge from the fighting you have already done against some of them alongside the Macedonians. I judge this too, and know it from what others have told me.

4 "When an enemy's strength is more apparent than real, learning the truth about it gives those defending themselves greater confidence. But against an enemy with some solid advantage, a man would act more boldly if he did not know about it beforehand.

5 "These men are frightening to anyone unfamiliar with them while their attack is still to come. Their numbers look terrifying, the volume of their shouting is unbearable, and their pointless waving of weapons has a threatening effect. But when they close with men who stand their ground against all this, they are not the same. They have no fixed formation that would make them ashamed to leave their position when pressed. Retreating and attacking bring them equal credit, so their courage is never put to the test. When each man fights as he chooses, he can very easily find a respectable excuse for saving himself. They think that frightening you without taking risks is more reliable than fighting you hand to hand. Otherwise they would have chosen to fight instead.

6 "You can clearly see that all the terror they cause in advance amounts to little in practice. It is what you see and hear that makes it overwhelming. Stand your ground against their attack, and then, when the time is right, pull back again in good order and in formation. You will reach safety sooner, and you will know in the future that, against men who withstand their first attack, mobs like these boast about their courage with threats from a distance, without getting on with it. But if anyone gives way to them, they are quick to show how brave they are by chasing him, when they can do so safely."

CHAPTER 127

1 After giving this advice, Brasidas began to withdraw his army. When the non-Greeks saw it, they pressed forward with loud shouting and uproar. They thought he was running away and that they would catch and destroy him.

2 But wherever they attacked, the men assigned to rush out met them, while Brasidas himself stood against them with his picked troops. Contrary to the enemy's expectations, the Greeks held off the first charge. After that, they faced and fought the enemy whenever it advanced and withdrew whenever it stopped. Most of the non-Greeks then stopped attacking Brasidas' Greeks in the open ground. They left a small force to follow and harass them. The rest ran after the fleeing Macedonians, killing any they met. They also hurried ahead to occupy the narrow entrance into Arrhabaeus' territory between two hills. They knew Brasidas had no other route for retreat. As he approached this difficult stretch of road, they began to surround him, intending to cut him off.

CHAPTER 128

1 Brasidas realized this and ordered the three hundred men with him to run toward whichever of the hills he thought would be easier to capture. Each man was to run as fast as he could, without keeping formation. They were to try to drive off the non-Greeks already on it before the larger force surrounding them could reach that point too.

2 They attacked and defeated the men on the hill. The main body of the Greek army could now make its way toward it more easily. The non-Greeks were frightened by the rout of their men from the high ground there. They stopped following the Greeks any farther, thinking that they were already at the border and had escaped.

3 Once Brasidas had secured the high ground, he marched more safely. That same day he reached Arnissa, the first place in Perdiccas' kingdom.

4 His soldiers were angry that the Macedonians had retreated ahead of them. Along the road they came across Macedonian ox teams and equipment that had been left behind, as was likely in a frightened retreat at night. They unyoked and slaughtered the oxen and took the equipment for themselves.

5 From this point Perdiccas first began to regard Brasidas as an enemy. From then on he felt an unusual hatred for the Peloponnesians, considering his relations with the Athenians. He put aside his urgent interests and worked to make peace with the Athenians as quickly as possible and get rid of the Peloponnesians.

CHAPTER 129

1 When Brasidas returned from Macedonia to Torone, he found that the Athenians already held Mende. He stayed where he was, thinking it was now impossible to cross to Pallene and bring help. Instead, he kept Torone under guard.

2 For about the same time as the events in Lyncus, the Athenians had sailed against Mende and Scione, as they had been preparing to do. They had fifty ships, ten of them from Chios, a thousand of their own hoplites, six hundred archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and other peltasts from the local allies. Their generals were Nicias son of Niceratus and Nicostratus son of Diitrephes.

3 They sailed from Potidaea, put in near the temple of Poseidon, and advanced against the Mendaeans. The Mendaeans, three hundred Scionaeans who had come to help them, and the Peloponnesian mercenaries—seven hundred hoplites altogether—with their commander Polydamidas, happened to be camped outside the city on a strong hill.

4 Nicias took a hundred and twenty lightly armed Methonaeans, sixty picked Athenian hoplites, and all the archers, and tried to go up a path on the hill. But the defenders wounded him, and he could not force his way through.

Nicostratus brought all the rest of the army by a longer route against another part of the hill. It was difficult to attack, and his force fell into serious confusion. The whole Athenian army came close to defeat.

5 The Mendaeans and their allies did not give way that day, so the Athenians withdrew and camped. When night fell, the Mendaeans went back into the city.

CHAPTER 130

1 The next day the Athenians sailed around to the side facing Scione and captured the suburb. They spent the whole day ravaging the land, and no one came out against them. There was also some civil strife in the city. The following night the three hundred Scionaeans went home.

2 On the next day Nicias advanced with half the army toward the Scionaean border, ravaging the land as he went. Nicostratus took the rest and settled in front of the city by the upper gates, where the road leads toward Potidaea.

3 The Mendaeans and the hired troops happened to be stationed inside the wall at this point. Polydamidas drew them up for battle and urged the Mendaeans to march out.

4 One of the men from the people's party, speaking in opposition as a member of the rival faction, told him that he would not go out and did not want to fight. At this refusal, Polydamidas grabbed him with his hand and manhandled him. The people immediately picked up their weapons in fury and advanced against the Peloponnesians and those who had worked with them against the people's interests.

5 They attacked and routed them. Their opponents were caught by the sudden fighting and also frightened when the gates were opened to the Athenians. They thought the attack had been arranged with the Athenians beforehand.

6 Those who were not killed at once fled to the acropolis, which they had already been holding. The Athenians rushed into Mende. Nicias had now returned and was also outside the city. Since the city had not been opened to them under an agreement, the whole army looted it as if they had taken it by force. The generals could barely stop them from killing the inhabitants as well.

7 After this they told the Mendaeans to govern themselves as they had before. They were to hold their own trials of anyone they thought responsible for the revolt. The Athenians shut off the men in the acropolis with a wall on either side running down to the sea, and posted a guard. Once they had secured Mende, they moved against Scione.

CHAPTER 131

1 The Scionaeans and the Peloponnesians came out to meet them and took up a position on a strong hill in front of the city. Unless the Athenians captured it, they could not surround the city with a wall.

2 The Athenians attacked the hill in full force and drove off its defenders in battle. They made camp, set up a trophy, and prepared to build the wall around the city.

3 Not long afterward, when they were already at work, the hired troops besieged in the acropolis at Mende forced their way past the guard beside the sea and arrived by night. Most of them slipped past the army outside Scione and got into the city.

CHAPTER 132

1 While the Athenians were building the wall around Scione, Perdiccas sent a herald to their generals and made an agreement with Athens. His hostility toward Brasidas over the retreat from Lyncus was the reason. He had started the negotiations immediately after that retreat.

2 At this time Ischagoras the Lacedaemonian was about to lead an army overland to Brasidas. Now that Perdiccas had made his agreement, Nicias told him to give the Athenians some clear proof that he would keep it. Perdiccas himself also no longer wanted Peloponnesians coming into his country. He therefore enlisted his friends in Thessaly, where he always dealt with the leading men, and blocked the army and its preparations. They did not even attempt to pass through Thessaly.

3 Ischagoras, Ameinias, and Aristeus themselves did, however, reach Brasidas. The Lacedaemonians had sent them to inspect the situation. They also brought some of their own men of military age out of Sparta, contrary to the law, to put them in command of the cities rather than leave these to just anyone. Brasidas appointed Clearidas son of Cleonymus at Amphipolis and Pasitelidas son of Hegesander at Torone.

CHAPTER 133

1 During the same summer the Thebans demolished the wall of Thespiae, accusing its people of supporting Athens. They had always wanted to do this. It had become easier now because the best of the Thespians had been killed in the battle against the Athenians.

2 That same summer the temple of Hera at Argos burned down. Chrysis, the priestess, had put a burning lamp near the garlands and then fallen asleep. Everything caught fire and burned down without her noticing.

3 Afraid of the Argives, Chrysis fled immediately that night to Phlius. Following the established law, they appointed another priestess, named Phaeinis. When Chrysis fled, she had served through eight years of this war and half the ninth.

4 By the end of the summer, the wall around Scione was completely finished. The Athenians left a force to guard it and withdrew with the rest of the army.

CHAPTER 134

1 During the following winter the Athenians and Lacedaemonians remained inactive because of the truce. But the Mantineans and Tegeans, with the allies of each, fought at Laodocium in Oresthis. The outcome was disputed. Each side routed the wing facing it, and both set up trophies and sent captured armor to Delphi.

2 There were, however, heavy losses on both sides, and the battle was very evenly matched. Nightfall ended the fighting. The Tegeans camped on the battlefield and immediately set up a trophy. The Mantineans withdrew to Bucolion and later set up a rival trophy.

CHAPTER 135

1 Toward the end of the same winter, when spring was already close, Brasidas also made an attempt on Potidaea. He approached at night and put a ladder against the wall, remaining undetected up to that point. The ladder went up in the gap after the bell had been carried past, before the man passing it on returned. But the defenders noticed at once, before his men could climb up. He quickly led his army away again without waiting for daylight.

2 The winter ended, and the ninth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

Book 5



CHAPTER 1

1 By the Pythian Games in the following summer, the one-year truce had ended. During the truce the Athenians expelled the Delians from Delos. They thought an old offense made the Delians too impure to perform sacred duties. They also thought their purification of the island was incomplete without this step. As I explained earlier, they had believed they were acting correctly when they removed the graves of the dead. Pharnaces gave the Delians Adramyttium in Asia to live in, and they settled there as each chose.

CHAPTER 2

1 After the truce, Cleon persuaded the Athenians to send him to the towns in the Thracian region. He sailed with 1,200 Athenian hoplites and 300 cavalry, a larger number of allied troops, and thirty ships.

2 He first put in at Scione, which was still under siege. He took additional hoplites from the forces guarding it and sailed to Cophus, a harbor in Torone's territory not far from the city.

3 There he learned from deserters that Brasidas was not in Torone and that the men inside could not put up an effective fight. He advanced on the city with his land army and sent ten ships around to sail into the harbor.

4 He first reached the outer wall. Brasidas had built this addition to the city's defenses to enclose the suburb. By taking down part of the old wall, he had made the whole place a single city.

CHAPTER 3

1 Pasitelidas, the Lacedaemonian commander, and the garrison there came to defend the outer wall and resisted the Athenian attack. They were being forced back, while the ships sent around to the harbor were sailing in. Pasitelidas feared that the ships would capture the undefended city first and that he would be trapped if the outer wall fell. He abandoned it and ran back to the city.

2 The Athenians from the ships reached Torone first and captured it. Their land army followed close behind the defenders and rushed in with a shout through the gap in the old wall. They killed some of the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans in the immediate hand-to-hand fighting. They captured the others alive, including the commander Pasitelidas.

3 Brasidas was coming to help Torone. On the way he learned that it had fallen and turned back. He had been about forty stades away when he failed to arrive in time.

4 Cleon and the Athenians set up two victory monuments, one by the harbor and the other near the outer wall. They enslaved the Toronaean women and children. They sent the men, the Peloponnesians, and any other Chalcidians who were there to Athens, about seven hundred prisoners in all. The Peloponnesians among them were later released under the peace treaty. The Olynthians recovered the rest through an exchange of one prisoner for another.

5 At about the same time, the Boeotians captured Panactum, an Athenian fort on the border, through treachery.

6 Cleon posted a garrison in Torone, put to sea, and sailed around Athos toward Amphipolis.

CHAPTER 4

1 At about the same time, the Athenians sent Phaeax son of Erasistratus as one of three ambassadors to Italy and Sicily. He sailed with two ships.

2 After the agreement and the Athenian withdrawal from Sicily, the Leontines had enrolled many new citizens. The people were planning to redistribute the land.

3 When the powerful men learned this, they called in the Syracusans and drove the people out. The expelled people scattered wherever each could go. The powerful men reached an agreement with the Syracusans, left their city empty, and settled in Syracuse with citizenship rights.

4 Later, some of them were dissatisfied and left Syracuse again. They occupied a part of the city of Leontini called Phocaeae, as well as Bricinniae, a stronghold in Leontine territory. Most of the people expelled earlier joined them. They established themselves there and fought from behind the walls.

5 When the Athenians heard about this, they sent Phaeax. They hoped to save the people of Leontini by persuading their allies there, and if possible the other Sicilian Greeks, to join in attacking the Syracusans, on the grounds that Syracuse was building up its power.

6 On his arrival Phaeax persuaded the Camarinaeans and Acragantines. But his efforts met resistance at Gela, and he went no farther to the other cities, realizing that he would not persuade them. He returned through the country of the Sicels to Catana. On the way he also visited Bricinniae and encouraged its people. Then he sailed away.

CHAPTER 5

1 On his voyage to Sicily and on his return, he also negotiated with some cities in Italy about friendship with Athens. He encountered some Locrian settlers who had been driven out of Messene. After the agreement among the Sicilian Greeks, civil strife had broken out in Messene. One side had called in the Locrians, who sent these men as settlers. Messene was under Locrian control for a time.

2 Phaeax did not harm these men when he met them on their voyage home. The Locrians had already reached an understanding with him about an agreement with Athens.

3 They alone among the allies had not made a truce with Athens when the Sicilian Greeks settled their differences. They would not have done so even now, if they had not been tied down by a war with the Hipponians and Medmaeans, their neighbors and colonists. Phaeax arrived back in Athens some time later.

CHAPTER 6

1 After sailing around from Torone toward Amphipolis, Cleon made Eion his base. He attacked Stagirus, a colony of Andros, but failed to capture it. He did, however, take Galepsus, a colony of Thasos, by force.

2 He sent ambassadors to Perdiccas, asking him to bring an army as required by their alliance. He sent others to Thrace, to Polles, king of the Odomantians, to hire and bring back as many Thracians as possible. He himself stayed at Eion and waited.

3 When Brasidas learned this, he took up a position against him at Cerdylium. This place belongs to the Argilians and stands on high ground across the river, not far from Amphipolis. Everything could be seen from there, so Cleon could

not move out with his army without Brasidas noticing. Brasidas expected him to do just that: dismiss the numbers on their side and march up to Amphipolis with the army he already had.

4 Meanwhile, Brasidas was also gathering 1,500 Thracian mercenaries and calling up all the Edonian peltasts and cavalry. He had a thousand Myrcinian and Chalcidian peltasts as well as those in Amphipolis.

5 The hoplites assembled numbered about two thousand in all. There were also three hundred Greek cavalry. Brasidas held his position at Cerdylium with about 1,500 of these troops. The others were stationed in Amphipolis with Clearidas.

CHAPTER 7

1 For a time Cleon stayed where he was. Then he was forced to do what Brasidas expected.

2 The soldiers were annoyed at sitting idle. They contrasted the enemy's experience and daring with their own commander's ignorance and timidity. They also recalled how unwillingly they had followed him from home. Cleon heard their complaints. He did not want them to become resentful because he kept them in the same place, so he took them out and led them forward.

3 He used the same approach as at Pylos, where success had made him believe he had some understanding of war. He did not expect anyone to come out and fight him. He said he was going up mainly to inspect the place. He was waiting for his larger force, not to give himself a safe advantage if forced to fight, but to surround the city and capture it by force.

4 He arrived and stationed his army on a strong hill in front of Amphipolis. He himself examined the lake formed by the Strymon and the layout of the city on the side facing Thrace.

5 He thought he could leave whenever he wanted without a fight. No one could be seen on the wall, and no one came out through the gates, which were all closed. He even thought he had made a mistake by not bringing siege engines up with him: he could have taken the city because it was undefended.

CHAPTER 8

1 As soon as Brasidas saw the Athenians moving, he too came down from Cerdylium and entered Amphipolis.

2 He did not march out and form a battle line against the Athenians. He was worried about his own forces and thought they were inferior, not in numbers, which were roughly equal, but in quality. The Athenian contingent on the expedition was a select force, and the men from Lemnos and Imbros were their best troops. Instead, he prepared to use a trick to attack them.

3 He thought that showing the enemy his troops' numbers and makeshift equipment would not improve his chances of victory. He would do better if they had not seen his men beforehand and had no real basis for looking down on them.

4 So he chose 150 hoplites for himself and put the rest under Clearidas. He planned to attack suddenly before the Athenians left. He did not think he would get another chance to catch them on their own in the same way if their reinforcements arrived. He called all the soldiers together to encourage them and explain his plan, and spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 9

1 "Men of the Peloponnese, a brief reminder is enough about the country we come from: its courage has always kept it free. And you are Dorians about to fight Ionians, whom you have usually beaten.

2 “But I will explain how I intend to make the attack. Otherwise, attacking with a few men rather than risking everyone at once might look inadequate and make some of you lose courage.

3 “I think the enemy came up to this position because they looked down on us and did not expect anyone to come out and fight them. Now they have turned their attention to looking around, without keeping formation, and are being careless.

4 “A commander is most likely to succeed if he spots mistakes like these in the enemy and adapts his attack to his own strength. He must not insist on coming out into the open and fighting in battle formation. Instead, he must do what works best in the situation.

5 “The tricks that deserve the greatest respect are those that do the most to deceive the enemy and bring the greatest benefit to one’s own side.

6 “They are still unprepared but confident. From what I can see, they are thinking more of slipping away than of staying. So while their minds are relaxed, before they gather their thoughts more firmly, I will take my men and, if I can get there first, charge at the center of their army.

7 “Then, Clearidas, when you see that I am already attacking and, as is likely, frightening them, suddenly open the gates. Lead out the men with you, the Amphipolitans and the other allies. Charge out and hurry to join the fight as quickly as you can.

8 “That is the best way to frighten them. A force coming up later is more alarming to the enemy than the one already there fighting them.

9 “Show your courage, as a Spartan should. And you, men of the allied forces, follow bravely. Remember the three things that make a good soldier: eagerness, a sense of shame, and obedience to commanders. If you fight well today, you will be free and will be called allies of the Lacedaemonians. Otherwise, you will

be slaves of the Athenians, in a slavery harsher than before. That is the best you can expect if you escape being sold as slaves or killed. You will also have prevented the rest of the Greeks from being set free.

10 "Do not lose courage when you see how much is at stake in this fight. For my part, I will show that I can not only encourage others but also go into action myself."

CHAPTER 10

1 After speaking, Brasidas prepared to go out himself. He stationed the other troops with Clearidas at the gates called the Thracian Gates, so that they could come out as ordered.

2 Brasidas had been seen coming down from Cerdylium. He could also be seen from outside the city as he made a sacrifice near Athena's sanctuary and carried out these preparations. Cleon had moved farther forward to inspect the place. A report reached him that the enemy's whole army was visible in the city and that many horses' and men's feet could be seen beneath the gates, as though they were about to come out.

3 When he heard this, he went over to look. After seeing it for himself, he did not want to fight a decisive battle before his reinforcements arrived, and thought he could get away in time. He immediately ordered the signal for retreat. He told the departing troops to move toward Eion by the left wing, the only possible way.

4 But he thought this was taking too long. He turned the right wing around himself and led the army away, exposing its unshielded side to the enemy.

5 Brasidas saw his opportunity as the Athenian army began to move. He said to his own men and the others, "These men will not stand up to us. You can tell from the movement of their spears and heads. Troops who move like that do not usually stand their ground against an attack. Open the gates I ordered, someone, and let us charge out as fast as we can, with confidence."

6 He went out through the gates toward the stockade and the first gates of the long wall that stood there then. He ran straight down the road, where a victory monument now stands as you approach the strongest part of the position. He attacked the Athenians in the center of their army and put them to flight. They were already frightened by their own disorder and shocked by his daring.

7 At the same time Clearidas led his army out through the Thracian Gates, as ordered, and charged. The unexpected, sudden attack from both directions threw the Athenians into confusion.

8 Their left wing, on the side toward Eion, had already moved ahead. It immediately broke away and fled. As it was retreating, Brasidas advanced against the right wing and was wounded. The Athenians did not notice him fall. The men near him picked him up and carried him away.

9 The Athenian right wing held its ground more firmly. Cleon had never intended to stand and fight. He fled at once, but a Myrcinian peltast caught and killed him. The hoplites rallied on the hill there and resisted Clearidas, even after he attacked them two or three times. They did not give way until the Myrcinian and Chalcidian cavalry and the peltasts surrounded them, threw javelins at them, and put them to flight.

10 The whole Athenian army was now in flight. Some were killed in the immediate hand-to-hand fighting, others by the Chalcidian cavalry and the peltasts. The survivors made their way back to Eion with difficulty, taking many different routes over the mountains.

11 The men who had picked Brasidas up from the battlefield brought him safely into the city while he was still breathing. He learned that his side was winning, but died soon afterward.

12 The rest of the army returned from the pursuit with Clearidas, stripped the dead, and set up a victory monument.

CHAPTER 11

1 After this, all the allies followed Brasidas' funeral procession under arms. They buried him at public expense inside the city, in front of what is now the marketplace. Since then, the Amphipolitans have enclosed his tomb and offered sacrifices to him as a hero. They have honored him with games and annual sacrifices and have credited him with founding the colony. They pulled down the buildings associated with Hagnon and removed anything that might survive as a reminder of his founding of the city. They considered Brasidas their savior. Also, because they feared the Athenians, they wanted for the present to maintain the goodwill of their Lacedaemonian allies. Since the Athenians were now their enemies, they thought honoring Hagnon would no longer be as useful or as welcome to them.

2 They returned the dead to the Athenians. About six hundred Athenians died, but only seven on the other side. This was because the fighting had come about not so much between armies in battle formation as through this sudden encounter and the fear it caused before the fight began.

3 After recovering their dead, the Athenians sailed home. Clearidas and his men settled affairs around Amphipolis.

CHAPTER 12

1 At about the same time, as summer was ending, the Lacedaemonians Rhamphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas were leading nine hundred hoplites as reinforcements to the Thracian region. They reached Heraclea in Trachis and put right whatever they thought was wrong there.

2 While they were staying there, this battle took place, and the summer ended.

CHAPTER 13

1 At the start of the following winter, Rhamphias and his men marched as far as Pierium in Thessaly. The Thessalians stopped them from going farther. Brasidas, to whom they were taking the army, was also dead, so they turned back for home. They thought there was no longer any opportunity to act. The Athenians had left after their defeat, and they themselves were not strong enough to carry out any of the plans Brasidas had had in mind.

2 Their main reason for leaving was that, when they had set out, they knew the Lacedaemonians were becoming more inclined toward peace.

CHAPTER 14

1 Immediately after the battle at Amphipolis and Rhamphias' withdrawal from Thessaly, neither side took any further military action. Both were now more inclined toward peace. The Athenians had suffered a blow at Delium and then, soon afterward, another at Amphipolis. They could no longer rely on their hopes of success through their own strength. These hopes had previously made them refuse a truce, because they thought their current good fortune would give them the upper hand.

2 They also feared that their setbacks would encourage their allies to rebel on a larger scale. They regretted not making peace after the events at Pylos, when they had had a good opportunity.

3 For the Lacedaemonians, in turn, the war had not gone as expected. They had thought they could destroy Athenian power in a few years by ravaging Athenian land. Instead, they had suffered the disaster on the island, unlike anything Sparta had experienced before. Their land was being raided from Pylos and Cythera, and the Helots were deserting. They also lived in constant fear that the Helots still in the country might count on help from outside and rebel against the existing government, as they had done before.

4 Their thirty-year truce with the Argives was also about to expire. The Argives would not make another unless the land of Cynuria was returned to them. Fighting both the Argives and the Athenians at once seemed impossible. They also suspected that some cities in the Peloponnese would break away and join the Argives, as in fact happened.

CHAPTER 15

1 After considering these points, both sides thought they should reach an agreement. The Lacedaemonians were at least as eager as the Athenians, because they wanted to recover the men captured on the island. The Spartans among these prisoners were leading citizens and relatives of men at home.

2 They had begun negotiations immediately after the capture. But the Athenians, who were doing well, were not yet at all willing to end the war on equal terms. Immediately after the Athenians' defeat at Delium, the Lacedaemonians realized they would now be more receptive and made the one-year truce. During it they were to meet and discuss a longer agreement.

CHAPTER 16

1 Now the Athenians had also been defeated at Amphipolis, and Cleon and Brasidas were dead. These two had been the strongest opponents of peace on their respective sides. Brasidas opposed it because war brought him success and honor. Cleon thought that in peacetime his wrongdoing would be easier to see and his accusations against others less believable. So the men most eager for leadership in each city now worked much harder for peace. They were Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, and Nicias son of Niceratus, who had enjoyed more success as a general than anyone else at the time. Nicias wanted to preserve his good fortune while he was still free from misfortune and held in respect. He wanted an immediate end to the hardships for himself and his fellow citizens. He also wanted to leave a name for the future as a man who had gone through life without causing his city any set-

back. He thought this could be achieved by avoiding danger and leaving as little as possible to chance. Peace would provide that safety. Pleistoanax, for his part, was being attacked by his enemies over his return from exile. Whenever the Lacedaemonians suffered a setback, these enemies kept reminding them of him. They claimed that these things happened because his return had broken religious law.

2 They accused him and his brother Aristocles of persuading the priestess at Delphi to give the same response repeatedly to the Lacedaemonian sacred envoys who came there. She told them to bring the offspring of Zeus's demigod son back from a foreign land to their own. Otherwise they would have to plow with a silver plowshare.

3 In time, they said, she had persuaded the Lacedaemonians to bring him back in the nineteenth year of his exile. He had fled to Lycaeum because his earlier withdrawal from Attica had been suspected of being bought by bribes. For fear of the Lacedaemonians, he had been living there with half his house inside Zeus's sanctuary. They brought him back with the same dances and sacrifices they had used when they first founded Lacedaemon and installed their kings.

CHAPTER 17

1 He resented these accusations and worked hard for an agreement. He thought that if there was peace, with no setbacks and with the Lacedaemonians recovering their men, his enemies would have nothing to criticize him for. But while war continued, leading men were bound to be blamed for disasters.

2 They held talks throughout this winter. As spring approached, the Lacedaemonians also made a show of preparing for war. They sent announcements around the cities that they intended to build a fort in enemy territory, to make the Athenians more willing to listen. At their meetings both sides put forward many claims. Eventually they agreed to make peace by returning what each had captured in the war, except that the Athenians would keep Nisaea. When the Athenians demanded Plataea in return, the Thebans said they held it

not by force but by agreement: its people had submitted voluntarily, and the place had not been betrayed to them. The Athenians made the same argument about Nisaea. The Lacedaemonians then summoned their allies. All except the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians voted to end the war. Those four were dissatisfied with the arrangements. The Lacedaemonians made the agreement and swore to observe the following terms with the Athenians, who swore the same to them.

CHAPTER 18

1 "The Athenians, the Lacedaemonians, and their allies made a peace treaty on the following terms, and swore to it city by city.

2 "At the sanctuaries shared by all, anyone who wishes may offer sacrifices, visit, consult the oracles, and attend festivals according to ancestral custom. They may travel safely by land and sea. Apollo's sanctuary and temple at Delphi, and the Delphians themselves, shall have their own laws, manage their own finances, and exercise their own jurisdiction over themselves and their land, according to ancestral custom.

3 "The treaty shall last fifty years between the Athenians and their allies and the Lacedaemonians and their allies. There shall be no deceit or acts of harm, either on land or at sea.

4 "The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not take up arms to harm the Athenians and their allies, nor shall the Athenians and their allies do so against the Lacedaemonians and their allies. Neither side shall do this through any trick or scheme. If they have a dispute, they shall settle it by legal judgment and oaths, under terms they agree on.

5 "The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall return Amphipolis to the Athenians. In all the cities the Lacedaemonians have handed over to the Athenians, the inhabitants may leave for wherever they wish, taking their belongings with them. The cities shall have their own laws and pay the tribute

assessed in the time of Aristides. Once the treaty has been made, the Athenians and their allies shall not take up arms to harm these cities, as long as they pay the tribute. These cities are Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. They shall be allies of neither the Lacedaemonians nor the Athenians. But if the Athenians persuade them, they may become allies of Athens of their own free will.

6 "The Mecybernaeans, Sanaeans, and Singaeans shall live in their own cities on the same terms as the Olynthians and Acanthians.

7 "The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall return Panactum to the Athenians. The Athenians shall return to the Lacedaemonians Coryphasium, Cythera, Methana, Pteleum, and Atalanta, and all the Lacedaemonian men held in the public prison at Athens or in a public prison anywhere else under Athenian rule. They shall release the Peloponnesians besieged in Scione, the other allies of the Lacedaemonians who are in Scione, all those Brasidas sent in, and any allies of the Lacedaemonians held in the public prison at Athens or in a public prison anywhere else under Athenian rule. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall likewise return any Athenians and Athenian allies they hold.

8 "The Athenians may decide as they wish about the people of Scione, Torone, and Sermyle, and about any other cities they hold.

9 "The Athenians shall swear an oath to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, dealing with each city separately. On each side, seventeen men from each city shall swear the most binding oath used in their country. The oath shall be: 'I will keep these agreements and this treaty fairly and without deceit.' The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall swear the same oath to the Athenians.

10 "Both sides shall renew the oath every year. They shall set up stone tablets at Olympia, Pytho, the Isthmus, on the Acropolis at Athens, and in the Amyclaeum at Lacedaemon.

11 "If either side has forgotten anything, on any matter, they may discuss it fairly and make whatever changes both sides, the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, agree to. Such changes will not break either side's oath.

CHAPTER 19

1 "The treaty takes effect at Lacedaemon in the term of the ephor Pleistolas, on the fourth day from the end of the month Artemisius. At Athens it takes effect in the term of the archon Alcaeus, on the sixth day from the end of the month Elaphebolion. The following men swore the oaths and made the treaty.

2 "On the Lacedaemonian side: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcinadas, Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus. On the Athenian side: Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes."

CHAPTER 20

1 This treaty was made as winter ended and spring began, immediately after the City Dionysia. Exactly ten years had passed since the first invasion of Attica and the start of this war, with a difference of only a few days.

2 Anyone checking the dates should look at the actual periods of time. They should not put more trust in counting the names of officials in different places, or of people whose offices are used to date past events. That is not an exact method. An event might occur at the start of someone's term, in the middle, or at any other point in it.

3 But if they count by summers and winters, as this account does, with each season representing half a year, they will find that this first war lasted ten summers and the same number of winters.

CHAPTER 21

1 The Lacedaemonians had drawn the lot requiring them to return what they held first. They immediately released the prisoners of war in their custody. They also sent Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas as envoys to the Thracian region. They ordered Clearidas to hand Amphipolis over to the Athenians, and the others to accept the treaty on the terms laid down for each of them.

2 But the others refused, because they thought the terms did not suit them. Clearidas did not hand over the city either. He wanted to please the Chalcidians, and said he could not hand it over against their will.

3 He hurried to Lacedaemon himself with envoys from the region. He wanted to defend himself if Ischagoras and his colleagues accused him of disobedience, and also to find out whether the agreement could still be changed. He found that the Lacedaemonians were committed to it. They sent him back with orders to hand over the place if at all possible, or otherwise to withdraw all the Peloponnesians in it. He set off back at once.

CHAPTER 22

1 The allies themselves happened to be at Lacedaemon. The Lacedaemonians told those who had not accepted the treaty to do so. But they repeated the objection on which they had first rejected it. They said they would not accept a treaty unless its terms were fairer than these.

2 When the allies would not listen, the Lacedaemonians sent them away and began making an alliance with the Athenians themselves. They thought this was the best way to keep the Argives from troubling them and to keep the rest of the Peloponnese quiet. The Argives had refused to renew their treaty when Ampelidas and Lichas came, because they thought the Lacedaemonians were no threat without the Athenians. The other Peloponnesians, too, would turn to the Athenians if they had the chance.

3 Athenian envoys were there, so discussions took place and an agreement was reached. The oaths were sworn, and the alliance had the following terms.

CHAPTER 23

1 "The Lacedaemonians and Athenians will be allies for fifty years on these terms. If any enemy invades Lacedaemonian territory and harms the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians must help them as strongly as they can, using whatever means are within their power. If the enemy ravages the land and then leaves, that city must be an enemy of both the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, and both must attack it. The two cities must make peace with it together. They must carry out these terms fairly, willingly, and without deception.

2 "If any enemy invades Athenian territory and harms the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians must help them as strongly as they can, using whatever means are within their power. If the enemy ravages the land and then leaves, that city must be an enemy of both the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, and both must attack it. The two cities must make peace with it together.

3 "They must carry out these terms fairly, willingly, and without deception. If the slave population rises in revolt, the Athenians must help the Lacedaemonians with all the strength they can provide.

4 "The same men on each side who swore to the other treaty will swear to these terms. The oath must be renewed every year. The Lacedaemonians must go to Athens for the Dionysia, and the Athenians to Lacedaemon for the Hyacinthia.

5 "Each side must set up a stone pillar: one at Lacedaemon beside Apollo's temple at Amyclae, and the other at Athens on the Acropolis beside Athena's temple.

6 "If the Lacedaemonians and Athenians decide to add anything to this alliance or remove anything from it, whatever they agree on will not violate either side's oath.

CHAPTER 24

1 "The following Lacedaemonians swore the oath: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus. The Athenians were Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes."

2 This alliance was made not long after the peace treaty. The Athenians returned the men captured on the island to the Lacedaemonians, and the summer of the eleventh year began. The account so far has covered these ten years, during which the first war continued without a break.

CHAPTER 25

1 The treaty and alliance between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians came after the ten-year war, when Pleistolas was ephor at Lacedaemon and Alcaeus was archon at Athens. Those who accepted them were now at peace. But the Corinthians and some of the cities in the Peloponnese tried to overturn the settlement. Trouble immediately began again between the allies and Lacedaemon.

2 At the same time, as time passed, the Athenians also grew suspicious of the Lacedaemonians. On some points they were not doing what the agreement required.

3 For six years and ten months the two sides did not invade each other's territory. But during this uncertain truce they did each other as much harm as possible elsewhere. Then they were forced to break the treaty made after the ten years and return to open war.

CHAPTER 26

1 The same Thucydides of Athens also wrote the account of these events in the order they happened, by summers and winters. It continues until the Lacedaemonians and their allies ended the Athenians' rule and took possession of the Long Walls and Piraeus. By that point the war had lasted twenty-seven years in all.

2 Anyone who refuses to count the intervening settlement as part of the war will be judging incorrectly. Look at the events as they have been set out, and it will be clear that this period cannot reasonably be called a peace. Neither side returned or received everything agreed on. Besides this, both sides committed violations during the war at Mantinea and Epidaurus and in other matters. The allies in the Thracian region were just as hostile as before, and the Boeotians had a truce lasting ten days at a time.

3 So if someone calculates the actual time, adding the first ten-year war, the uneasy truce that followed, and the later war that grew out of it, they will find this total of years, with a difference of only a few days. Of all the predictions people insisted on making from oracles, this alone came true exactly.

4 I remember that throughout the war, from its beginning to its end, many people kept saying that it was bound to last three times nine years.

5 I lived through the whole war. I was old enough to understand events, and paid close attention so that I could get accurate knowledge of them. After my command at Amphipolis, I spent twenty years in exile from my own country. This let me follow affairs on both sides. Because of my exile, I could follow the Peloponnesian side at least as closely as the Athenian side. I could learn more about events without distraction.

6 I will therefore describe the disputes after the ten years, the breakdown of the treaty, and how the war was fought afterward.

CHAPTER 27

1 For after the fifty-year treaty and the later alliance were made, the envoys from the Peloponnese who had been invited to discuss them left Lacedaemon.

2 The others went home, but the Corinthians went to Argos. They first spoke to some of the Argive officials. They said the Lacedaemonians had made a treaty and alliance with the Athenians, previously their bitterest enemies, not for the Peloponnese's benefit but to enslave it. The Argives must therefore consider how to save the Peloponnese. They should vote to let any Greek city that wished join an alliance with them, provided it was independent and settled disputes on equal and fair terms. The alliance would require each side to defend the other's territory. The Argives should appoint a small group of men with full authority to conduct the talks, rather than put them before the people. This would keep the identity of anyone who failed to persuade the majority from becoming known. They said that many would join out of hatred for the Lacedaemonians.

3 After setting out these proposals, the Corinthians went home.

CHAPTER 28

1 The Argive men who had heard them brought their proposals before the officials and the people. The Argives approved them and elected twelve men. Any Greeks who wished could make an alliance through these men, except for the Athenians and Lacedaemonians. No treaty could be made with either of those without the approval of the Argive people.

2 The Argives were all the more ready to accept these proposals because they saw that war with the Lacedaemonians was coming: their treaty with them was about to expire. They also hoped to become leaders of the Peloponnese. At this time Lacedaemon's reputation was at its lowest, and its misfortunes had

brought it into contempt. The Argives, by contrast, were doing very well in every way. They had not taken part in the Athenian war. Instead, they had been at peace with both sides and had profited from it.

3 So the Argives began admitting any Greeks who wanted to join the alliance on these terms.

CHAPTER 29

1 The Mantineans and their allies were the first to join, because they feared the Lacedaemonians. While the war with Athens was still going on, the Mantineans had brought part of Arcadia under their rule. They thought the Lacedaemonians would not let them keep ruling it now that their hands were free. So they gladly turned to the Argives. They saw Argos as a large city, always at odds with the Lacedaemonians, and a democracy like themselves.

2 When the Mantineans broke away, the rest of the Peloponnese began talking about doing the same. They thought the Mantineans must know something more than they did to have changed sides. They were also angry with the Lacedaemonians for several reasons. One was the clause in the treaty with Athens stating that the two cities, Lacedaemon and Athens, could agree on any additions or removals without breaking their oaths.

3 This clause caused particular alarm in the Peloponnese. It made people suspect that the Lacedaemonians wanted to join with the Athenians to enslave them. They thought the right to change the treaty should have been written as applying to all the allies.

4 As a result, most of them were afraid and eager to make separate alliances with the Argives themselves.

CHAPTER 30

1 The Lacedaemonians learned of this talk in the Peloponnese, and that the Corinthians had started it and were themselves about to make a treaty with Argos. They sent envoys to Corinth, hoping to stop this before it happened. They blamed the Corinthians for proposing the whole scheme. They said that if the Corinthians broke away and allied with the Argives, they would violate their oaths. They were already in the wrong by refusing to accept the treaty with Athens. The rule was that whatever the majority of the allies voted for was binding, unless a god or hero stood in the way.

2 The Corinthians had with them the allies who had likewise refused to accept the treaty; they had invited them earlier. They answered the Lacedaemonians without openly stating their grievances: the failure to get Sollium and Anactorium back for them from the Athenians, and any other losses they thought they had suffered. Instead, they gave as their reason that they would not betray the people in the Thracian region. They had sworn oaths to them separately when they first revolted along with the Potidaeans, and others later.

3 So, they said, refusing to join the treaty with Athens did not break their oaths to the allies. They had sworn pledges to those people in the gods' names, and betraying them would break those oaths. The rule said, "Unless a god or hero stands in the way." In their view, this was a divine obstacle.

4 That was their answer about the earlier oaths. As for the alliance with Argos, they said they would consult their friends and do whatever was right.

5 The Lacedaemonian envoys went home. Argive envoys also happened to be at Corinth. They urged the Corinthians to join the alliance without delay. The Corinthians told them to come to the next meeting to be held in their city.

CHAPTER 31

1 An embassy from Elis also arrived immediately. It first made an alliance with the Corinthians. Then the envoys went on to Argos and became allies of the Argives, as already mentioned. The Eleans were at odds with the Lacedaemonians over Lepreum.

2 The Lepreans had once been at war with some Arcadians. They had invited the Eleans to ally with them in exchange for half their land. When the Eleans ended the war, they left the Lepreans themselves in possession of the land but required them to pay one talent to Olympian Zeus.

3 The Lepreans made these payments until the Athenian war. Then they stopped, using the war as an excuse. The Eleans tried to force them to pay, and they turned to the Lacedaemonians. The dispute was referred to the Lacedaemonians for judgment. But the Eleans suspected they would not receive fair treatment, so they withdrew from the arbitration and ravaged the Lepreans' land.

4 The Lacedaemonians went ahead and ruled that the Lepreans were independent and that the Eleans were in the wrong. Because the Eleans had not abided by the arbitration, they sent a garrison of hoplites into Lepreum.

5 The Eleans thought the Lacedaemonians had taken in a city that had broken away from them. They pointed to the agreement stating that each party should emerge from the Athenian war holding what it had held when it entered it. Believing they had been treated unfairly, they broke away and turned to the Argives. They too made the alliance, as already mentioned.

6 Immediately after them, the Corinthians and the Chalcidians in the Thracian region also became allies of the Argives. The Boeotians and Megarians spoke in the same terms but took no action. The Lacedaemonians left them alone. Since they themselves were governed by oligarchies, they thought the Argive democracy suited them less well than the Lacedaemonian system of government.

CHAPTER 32

1 At about the same time that summer, the Athenians captured Scione after a siege. They killed the men of military age, enslaved the women and children, and gave the land to the Plataeans to farm. They also brought the Delians back to Delos. They did this with their defeats in battle in mind, and because the god at Delphi had given an oracle.

2 The Phocians and Locrians also began a war.

3 The Corinthians and Argives, now allies, went to Tegea to make it break away from the Lacedaemonians. They saw that it was an important part of the Peloponnese. They thought that if it joined them, they would have the whole Peloponnese on their side.

4 But the Tegeans said they would do nothing against the Lacedaemonians. The Corinthians, who had worked eagerly up to this point, gave up their struggle. They began to fear that none of the others would now join them.

5 Even so, they went to the Boeotians and asked them to become allies of themselves and the Argives and to act together in other matters. The Athenians and Boeotians had made a truce lasting ten days at a time, not long after [this] fifty-year treaty. The Corinthians asked the Boeotians to accompany them to Athens and arrange the same truce for them too, [like the one the Boeotians had]. If the Athenians refused, the Boeotians should cancel their truce and make no further treaty without the Corinthians.

6 In answer to these requests, the Boeotians told the Corinthians to wait over the alliance with Argos. They went to Athens with them, but did not obtain the ten-day truce. Instead, the Athenians replied that the Corinthians were already covered by the treaty, if they were allies of the Lacedaemonians.

7 The Boeotians did not cancel their ten-day truce, despite the Corinthians' demands and their complaint that the Boeotians had agreed to do so. The Corinthians had a suspension of hostilities with the Athenians, but no treaty.

CHAPTER 33

1 That same summer the Lacedaemonians marched out with their whole army under their king, Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, against the Parrhasians in Arcadia, who were subject to the Mantineans. A faction involved in civil strife had invited them in. They also intended, if possible, to destroy the fort at Cypsela, which the Mantineans had built and garrisoned themselves. It stood in Parrhasian territory on the border with Sciritis in Laconia.

2 The Lacedaemonians ravaged the Parrhasians' land. The Mantineans left their own city in the care of Argive guards and went to defend their allied territory themselves. But they could not save either the fort at Cypsela or the cities among the Parrhasians, and withdrew.

3 The Lacedaemonians made the Parrhasians independent, demolished the fort, and went home.

CHAPTER 34

1 That same summer the soldiers who had gone out with Brasidas returned from Thrace. Clearidas brought them back after the treaty. The Lacedaemonians voted that the Helots who had fought with Brasidas should be free and could live wherever they wished. Not long afterward they settled them at Lepreum alongside the other newly freed men. Lepreum lay on the border between Laconia and Elis, and the Lacedaemonians were now at odds with the Eleans.

2 As for their own men who had been captured on the island and had surrendered their weapons, the Lacedaemonians were afraid. The men still had their full citizen rights, and the Lacedaemonians feared they might expect to lose their standing because of their misfortune and start a revolt. So they took away their rights, even though some already held office. This loss of rights meant they could neither hold office nor make a legally valid purchase or sale. Later, after some time, their rights were restored.

CHAPTER 35

1 That same summer the Dians captured Thyssus on the Acte peninsula of Athos. It was an ally of the Athenians.

2 Throughout this summer the Athenians and Peloponnesians had dealings with each other. But the Athenians and Lacedaemonians had distrusted each other ever since the treaty, because they had not returned the places they held to one another.

3 The Lacedaemonians had drawn the lot requiring them to make the first return, but they had not returned Amphipolis or the other places. Nor had they made the allies in the Thracian region, the Boeotians, or the Corinthians accept the treaty. They kept saying that if these people refused, they would join the Athenians in forcing them. They had also set deadlines, though not in writing, after which those who did not join the treaty were to be enemies of both sides.

4 The Athenians saw that none of this was actually happening and suspected that the Lacedaemonians had no intention of acting fairly. So they refused the Lacedaemonians' demand to return Pylos. They even regretted having returned the prisoners from the island. They kept the other places they held, waiting for the Lacedaemonians to carry out their promises to them as well.

5 The Lacedaemonians said they had done what they could. They had returned the Athenian prisoners in their custody, withdrawn the soldiers from the Thracian region, and done whatever else was within their control. They said they did not control Amphipolis and so could not hand it over. But they would try to bring the Boeotians and Corinthians into the treaty, recover Panactum, and bring back all the Athenians held prisoner in Boeotia.

6 They still insisted that Pylos should be returned to them. If not, at least the Messenians and Helots should be withdrawn, just as they themselves had withdrawn their troops from the Thracian region. The Athenians could garrison the place themselves if they wished.

7 After many lengthy discussions during this summer, they persuaded the Athenians to withdraw the Messenians, the other Helots, and all who had deserted from Laconia from Pylos. The Athenians settled them at Cranii in Cephallenia.

8 So this summer was peaceful, with visits between the two sides.

CHAPTER 36

1 In the following winter, new ephors were already in office, replacing those under whom the treaty had been made, and some of them opposed it. Envoys came from the allies. Athenians, Boeotians, and Corinthians were present, and there was much discussion between them, but no agreement. As they were leaving for home, Cleobulus and Xenares held private talks with the Boeotians and Corinthians. These were the ephors most eager to break up the treaty. They urged them to agree with this policy as fully as possible. The Boeotians should try to become allies of the Argives first, and then bring the Argives, along with themselves, into an alliance with the Lacedaemonians. This would be the best way for the Boeotians to avoid being forced into the treaty with Athens. The Lacedaemonians would choose to gain the Argives as friends and allies even if that meant making enemies of the Athenians and breaking the treaty. They knew that the Lacedaemonians had always wanted a friendly relationship with Argos on favorable terms. The Lacedaemonians thought this would make a war outside the Peloponnese easier.

2 But they asked the Boeotians to arrange to hand Panactum over to the Lacedaemonians. They hoped to get Pylos back in exchange for it if they could, and so be in a better position to go to war with the Athenians.

CHAPTER 37

1 The Boeotians and Corinthians went home, each carrying these instructions from Xenares, Cleobulus, and their other friends among the Lacedaemonians to report to their public authorities.

2 Two Argive men who belonged to the highest governing body waited to meet them along their route as they left. They met and discussed whether the Boeotians might become allies of Argos, like the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans. The Argives said that if this succeeded, they thought it would then be easy to act together in making war or peace, with the Lacedaemonians if they wished, or with anyone else they needed to.

3 The Boeotian envoys liked what they heard. By chance, the Argives were asking for exactly what their friends at Lacedaemon had instructed them to do. When the Argive men saw that the proposal was welcome, they said they would send envoys to Boeotia, and left.

4 When the Boeotians arrived home, they reported to the Boeotarchs both the proposals from Lacedaemon and those from the Argives they had met. The Boeotarchs approved and were much more eager to act because the approaches from the two sides matched. Their Lacedaemonian friends were asking for the same things that the Argives were trying to achieve.

5 Not long afterward, Argive envoys arrived to make the proposals already discussed. The Boeotarchs approved their proposals and sent them away, promising to send envoys to Argos to discuss the alliance.

CHAPTER 38

1 Meanwhile, the Boeotian governors, the Corinthians, the Megarians, and the envoys from Thrace first decided to exchange oaths. They would help any of the others who needed it in whatever situation arose. They would neither make

war nor reach an agreement with anyone without everyone's approval. After that, the Boeotians and Megarians would make a treaty with the Argives, since the two states acted together.

2 Before the oaths were taken, the Boeotian governors put these proposals before the four Boeotian councils, which hold all the authority. They recommended exchanging oaths with any cities willing to join them in a sworn agreement for their mutual benefit.

3 The members of the Boeotian councils rejected the proposal. They feared that exchanging oaths with the Corinthians, who had broken away from the Lacedaemonians, would mean acting against the Lacedaemonians. The Boeotian governors had not told them about the messages from Lacedaemon. The ephors Cleobulus and Xenares and their friends were urging them to become allies of the Argives and Corinthians first, and then join the Lacedaemonians. The governors thought that, even without being told this, the council would vote for whatever they had already decided to recommend.

4 When the plan met this resistance, the Corinthians and the envoys from Thrace left without achieving anything. The Boeotian governors had intended, if they won approval for these proposals, to try next to arrange the alliance with the Argives. Now they did not even put the question of Argos before the councils. Nor did they send the envoys they had promised to Argos. The whole business suffered from neglect and delay.

CHAPTER 39

1 During this same winter, the Olynthians made a sudden attack on Mecyberna and captured it, although it had an Athenian garrison.

2 After this, the Lacedaemonians hoped that if the Athenians recovered Panactum from the Boeotians, they themselves could recover Pylos. The Athenians and Lacedaemonians were constantly discussing the places and pris-

oners each held that belonged to the other. So the Lacedaemonians sent envoys to the Boeotians. They asked them to hand over Panactum and the Athenian prisoners, so that they could recover Pylos in exchange.

3 The Boeotians said they would not hand them over unless the Lacedaemonians made a separate alliance with them, as they had with the Athenians. The Lacedaemonians knew this would wrong the Athenians. They had agreed not to make a treaty or go to war with anyone without each other's consent. But they wanted to take over Panactum so they could recover Pylos in exchange. Also, those who were working to wreck the treaty strongly supported the arrangement with the Boeotians. So they made the alliance as winter was ending and spring approaching. The demolition of Panactum began immediately. And the eleventh year of this war, came to an end.

CHAPTER 40

1 As soon as spring came, at the start of the next summer, the Argives grew afraid. The Boeotian envoys who were supposed to come had not arrived. They also learned that Panactum was being demolished and that the Boeotians had made a separate alliance with the Lacedaemonians. They feared they would be left alone and the whole alliance would go over to the Lacedaemonians.

2 They thought the Lacedaemonians had persuaded the Boeotians to demolish Panactum and join the treaty with the Athenians. They also thought the Athenians knew about this. That would mean they could no longer make an alliance even with Athens. Previously they had hoped that the disagreements would at least let them become allies of the Athenians, if their own treaty with the Lacedaemonians did not last.

3 These problems left the Argives at a loss. They feared they might have to fight the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans, the Boeotians and Athenians, all at once. Previously they had rejected a treaty with the Lacedaemonians, confidently expecting to lead the Peloponnese themselves. Now they sent Eustrophus and Aeson to Lacedaemon as quickly as possible. They thought these men were the

envoys most welcome there. In their present situation, they thought it best to make a treaty with the Lacedaemonians on whatever terms they could get, and stay out of trouble.

CHAPTER 41

1 Their envoys arrived and discussed with the Lacedaemonians the terms on which they could make a treaty.

2 At first the Argives asked to submit their dispute over Cynurian territory to arbitration by some city or individual. This border territory had always been disputed. It includes Thyrea and the town of Anthene, and the Lacedaemonians occupy it. The Lacedaemonians would not let them bring up the question. They said they were ready for a treaty if the Argives wanted one on the old terms. Even so, the Argive envoys persuaded them to agree to the following conditions. For the present, they would make a treaty for fifty years. But either side could challenge the other to fight over this territory, provided neither Lacedaemon nor Argos was suffering from disease or war. This would be like the earlier occasion when each side had claimed victory. Pursuit would not be allowed beyond the borders toward Argos or Lacedaemon.

3 At first the Lacedaemonians thought this was foolish. But they were determined to have Argos as a friend, so they accepted the proposed terms and put them in writing. Before anything was finalized, however, the Lacedaemonians told the envoys to go back to Argos and show the agreement to the people. If they approved, the envoys were to return at the Hyacinthia festival to take the oaths. So they went back.

CHAPTER 42

1 While the Argives were carrying on these negotiations, the Lacedaemonian envoys Andromenes, Phaedimus, and Antimenidas were supposed to collect Panactum and the prisoners from the Boeotians and return them to the

Athenians. They found that the Boeotians themselves had demolished Panactum. The Boeotians' stated reason was that, after an old dispute over it, they and the Athenians had sworn that neither side would settle the place, but that they would use the land together. Andromenes and his fellow envoys took over the Athenian prisoners of war held by the Boeotians, brought them to Athens, and handed them back. They also told the Athenians about the demolition of Panactum. They thought this too amounted to returning it, since no enemy of the Athenians would live there anymore.

2 The Athenians reacted angrily to this news. They felt the Lacedaemonians had wronged them by demolishing Panactum, which should have been handed over intact. They also learned of the separate alliance with the Boeotians. Previously, the Lacedaemonians had said they would join the Athenians in forcing those who rejected the treaty to accept it. The Athenians reviewed all the other terms of the agreement that the Lacedaemonians had failed to carry out, and felt they had been deceived. They gave the envoys a harsh reply and sent them away.

CHAPTER 43

1 With the Lacedaemonians and Athenians now at odds in this way, those in Athens who wanted to end the treaty immediately pressed their case.

2 Among them was Alcibiades son of Clinias. At that time he was still young by the standards of other cities, but his family's standing brought him respect. He thought an agreement with the Argives was the better course. But personal pride and rivalry also drove his opposition. The Lacedaemonians had arranged the treaty through Nicias and Laches, passing him over because of his youth. They had also failed to honor his family's old role as their representatives in Athens. His grandfather had given up that role, but Alcibiades had intended to renew it by looking after their men captured on the island.

3 He thought he was being slighted in every way. From the start he had opposed the treaty, saying the Lacedaemonians could not be trusted. He claimed they were making peace so they could first make a treaty with the Argives, remove

them as a threat, and then attack the Athenians alone once more. Now that the disagreement had arisen, he immediately sent a private message to Argos. He urged the Argives to come as quickly as possible, together with the Mantineans and Eleans, to propose an alliance. The time was right, he said, and he would give them all the help he could.

CHAPTER 44

1 The Argives heard this message and learned that the Boeotian alliance had not been arranged with Athenian involvement. Instead, the Athenians were now in a serious dispute with the Lacedaemonians. So they paid little attention to their envoys, who happened to be away in Lacedaemon negotiating the treaty. They turned their thoughts more toward the Athenians. Athens, they reasoned, had been friendly to them for a long time and was a democracy like their own. It also had great naval power and would fight alongside them if they went to war.

2 So they immediately sent envoys to the Athenians to discuss the alliance. The Eleans and Mantineans sent envoys with them.

3 Lacedaemonian envoys also arrived in a hurry: Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius, who were thought to be well liked by the Athenians. The Lacedaemonians feared the Athenians might make an alliance with the Argives out of anger. The envoys also came to demand Pylos in exchange for Panactum and to defend their alliance with the Boeotians. They said they had not made it to harm the Athenians.

CHAPTER 45

1 They spoke about these matters in the council and said they had come with full authority to settle all the disagreements. This alarmed Alcibiades. He feared that if they said the same things before the people, they might win them over and the alliance with the Argives would be rejected.

2 Alcibiades devised this trick against them. He persuaded the Lacedaemonians not to admit before the people that they had come with full authority. He gave them his assurance that, if they did this, he would get Pylos returned to them and settle the other disputes. He himself would persuade the Athenians, he said, just as he was now opposing them.

3 His aim was to draw them away from Nicias. He also wanted to attack them before the people as men who had no honest intentions and never told the same story twice. Then he could make the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans allies. And that is what happened.

4 When the envoys appeared before the people and were questioned, they denied having come with full authority, contrary to what they had said in the council. The Athenians lost patience. Alcibiades attacked the Lacedaemonians far more loudly than before, and the Athenians listened to him. They were ready to bring the Argives and their companions forward immediately and make them allies. But an earthquake occurred before anything was ratified, and this assembly was adjourned.

CHAPTER 46

1 At the assembly the next day, Nicias still argued that they should choose friendship with the Lacedaemonians instead. The Lacedaemonian envoys had themselves been deceived into denying that they had come with full authority, and he too had been misled about this. Even so, he urged the Athenians to put the Argive negotiations on hold and send another embassy to find out the Lacedaemonians' intentions. He said that delaying the war would preserve the Athenians' good position and leave the Lacedaemonians in a poor one. Things were going well for the Athenians, so their best course was to keep that success safe as long as possible. The Lacedaemonians, by contrast, were doing badly and stood to gain by taking a risk as soon as possible.

2 He persuaded them to send envoys, including himself. They were to tell the Lacedaemonians that, if they meant to act fairly, they must return Panactum intact, return Amphipolis, and end their alliance with the Boeotians unless the Boeotians joined the treaty. For they had agreed not to make an agreement with anyone without each other's consent.

3 The Athenians also instructed the envoys to say that, if they themselves had wanted to act unfairly, they would already have made the Argives allies. The Argives were there for that very purpose. They gave Nicias and his fellow envoys instructions about all their other complaints too, and sent them away.

4 The envoys arrived and delivered the other messages. Finally they said that, unless the Lacedaemonians ended their alliance with the Boeotians if those refused to join the treaty, the Athenians too would make the Argives and their companions allies. The Lacedaemonians refused to end their Boeotian alliance. The ephor Xenares and his supporters, together with everyone else who shared their views, prevailed on this point. But at Nicias's request they renewed the oaths. He feared he might leave without achieving anything at all and then be attacked politically, as indeed he was, since he was regarded as responsible for the treaty with the Lacedaemonians.

5 When Nicias returned and the Athenians heard that nothing had been achieved in Lacedaemon, they immediately became angry. They felt they were being wronged. The Argives and their allies happened to be there, and Alcibiades brought them forward. The Athenians made the following treaty and alliance with them.

CHAPTER 47

1 "The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans have made a treaty with one another for a hundred years, on behalf of themselves and the allies each rules. They will act honestly and cause no harm to one another, either on land or at sea.

2 "The Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies must not take up arms to harm the Athenians or the allies the Athenians rule. Nor may the Athenians and the allies they rule do so against the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies, by any trick or scheme whatever.

3 "The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans will be allies for a hundred years on the following terms. If enemies invade Athenian territory, the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans will send help to Athens as the Athenians request, with the strongest force they can provide. If the invaders leave after damaging the land, their city will be an enemy of the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, and all these cities will attack it. None of the cities may end the war with that city unless they all agree.

4 "The Athenians will likewise send help to Argos, Mantinea, and Elis if enemies invade the territory of the Argives, Mantineans, or Eleans. They will respond as these cities request, with the strongest force they can provide. If the invaders leave after damaging the land, their city will be an enemy of the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, and all these cities will attack it. None of the cities may end the war with that city unless all [the cities] agree.

5 "They must not allow armed forces on their way to war to pass through their own territory or that of the allies each rules, or to pass by sea, unless all the cities—the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans—have voted to allow passage.

6 "The city sending help will provide its troops with food for up to thirty days after they arrive at the city that called for help, and will do the same on their return journey. If the city that called them wishes to use the army for longer, it will provide a food allowance: three Aeginetan obols each day for every hoplite, light-armed soldier, and archer, and one Aeginetan drachma for every cavalryman.

7 "The city that called in the army will command it when the war is in its own territory. If all the cities decide to undertake a joint campaign somewhere, all will share equally in the command.

8 "The Athenians will swear to the treaty on behalf of themselves and their allies. The Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and their allies will swear city by city. Each will take the most binding oath used in its own country, over fully grown sacrificial animals. The oath will be as follows: 'I will keep to the alliance on the agreed terms, fairly, without harm or dishonesty, and I will not break it by any trick or scheme whatever.'

9 "At Athens, the council and the officials serving in the city will take the oath, and the presiding councilors will administer it. At Argos, the council, the Eighty, and the artynae will swear, and the Eighty will administer the oath. At Mantinea, the chief magistrates, the council, and the other officials will swear, and the sacred officials and military commanders will administer the oath. At Elis, the chief magistrates, those holding the highest offices, and the Six Hundred will swear, and the chief magistrates and guardians of the laws will administer the oath.

10 "The Athenians will renew the oaths by traveling to Elis, Mantinea, and Argos thirty days before the Olympic festival. The Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans will travel to Athens ten days before the Great Panathenaea.

11 "The Athenians will have the terms of the treaty, oaths, and alliance inscribed on a stone slab on the Acropolis. The Argives will do the same in the temple of Apollo in the marketplace, and the Mantineans in the temple of Zeus in their marketplace. They will also jointly set up a bronze slab at Olympia at the coming Olympic festival.

12 "If these cities think it would be better to add anything to the agreed terms, whatever all the cities decide after discussing it together will be binding."

CHAPTER 48

1 That was how the treaty and alliance were made. Neither side, however, renounced the treaty and alliance between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians on this account.

2 Although the Corinthians were allies of the Argives, they did not join this agreement. Nor had they sworn to an earlier alliance between the Eleans, Argives, and Mantineans, which required them to make war and peace with the same parties. They said their original defensive alliance was enough for them. Under it they were to help one another, but not join in attacking anyone.

3 In this way the Corinthians withdrew from their allies and turned their thoughts back toward the Lacedaemonians.

CHAPTER 49

1 The Olympic games took place that summer. Androsthenes of Arcadia won his first victory in the combined wrestling and boxing contest. The Eleans barred the Lacedaemonians from the sanctuary, so they could neither sacrifice nor compete. They had not paid the fine the Eleans had imposed on them under Olympic law. The Eleans charged that they had attacked the fort of Phyrcus in Elean territory and sent their hoplites into Lepreum during the Olympic truce. The fine was two thousand minas, at two minas for each hoplite, as the law prescribed.

2 The Lacedaemonians sent envoys to protest that the judgment against them was unfair. They said the truce had not yet been announced at Lacedaemon when they sent in the hoplites.

3 The Eleans replied that the truce was already in force among themselves, since they announce it to themselves first. They had been keeping quiet and expecting no attack because of the truce, and the Lacedaemonians had taken advantage of this to wrong them without warning.

4 The Lacedaemonians replied that the Eleans should not have gone on to announce the truce at Lacedaemon if they already thought the Lacedaemonians had broken it. By doing so, they had shown they did not think that. The Lacedaemonians also said they had not attacked the Eleans anywhere after that announcement.

5 The Eleans stood by their position. They would not be persuaded that the Lacedaemonians had done nothing wrong. But if they were willing to return Lepreum, the Eleans would cancel their own share of the fine and pay the god's share themselves on the Lacedaemonians' behalf.

CHAPTER 50

1 When the Lacedaemonians would not agree, the Eleans made another proposal. They need not return Lepreum if they did not want to. But since they were eager to use the sanctuary, they should go up to the altar of Olympian Zeus and swear before the Greeks that they would pay the fine later.

2 They would not agree to this either. So the Lacedaemonians remained barred from the sanctuary [from sacrifices and contests] and sacrificed at home. All the other Greeks except the Lepreans attended the festival.

3 Even so, the Eleans feared the Lacedaemonians might force their way in to sacrifice. They kept their younger men on guard under arms. The Argives and Mantineans also came to help them, a thousand of each, along with Athenian cavalry, who stayed at Harpina during the festival.

4 The crowd at the festival was very afraid the Lacedaemonians would come in arms. Their fear grew especially strong after the rod-bearing officials beat Lichas son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedaemonian, at the games. His team of horses had won, but because he was not allowed to compete, it was announced as belonging to the Boeotian state. He had gone onto the course and put a victory

ribbon on the driver to show that the chariot was his. This made everyone much more afraid, and they expected some trouble. The Lacedaemonians, however, kept quiet, and that was how the festival passed for them.

5 After the Olympic games, the Argives and their allies went to Corinth to ask the Corinthians to come over to their side. Lacedaemonian envoys also happened to be there. There was much discussion, but in the end nothing was achieved. An earthquake occurred, and the different parties broke up and went home. And the summer ended.

CHAPTER 51

1 During the following winter, the people of Heraclea in Trachis fought a battle against the Aenianians, Dolopians, Malians, and some of the Thessalians.

2 These peoples lived near the city and were hostile to it, since the fortified settlement had been built on their land, not anyone else's. From the moment the city was founded they had opposed it, doing as much damage as they could. Now they defeated the Heracleans in battle. Xenares son of Cnidis, the Lacedaemonian who governed them, was killed, and other Heracleans also died. And the winter ended, and the twelfth year of this war, came to an end.

CHAPTER 52

1 At the very beginning of the next summer, the Boeotians took over Heraclea, which had been in a badly weakened state since the battle. They expelled the Lacedaemonian Agesippidas on the grounds that he was governing it badly. They took over the place because they feared the Athenians might capture it while the Lacedaemonians were distracted by the troubles in the Peloponnese. The Lacedaemonians, however, were angry with them.

2 During the same summer, Alcibiades son of Clinias, serving as an Athenian general, came to the Peloponnese with a small force of Athenian hoplites and archers. The Argives and their allies cooperated with him. He added some of

the local allies to his army and traveled through the Peloponnese, helping to organize the alliance in other ways as well. He persuaded the people of Patrae to extend their walls down to the sea. He also intended to build another fort himself at Rhium in Achaea. But the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and others whom the fort would have harmed came to oppose him and prevented it.

CHAPTER 53

1 During the same summer, war broke out between the Epidaurians and Argives. The stated reason concerned the sacrifice owed to Apollo Pythaeus. The Epidaurians had not sent the offering they were required to provide for grazing, and the Argives had the chief authority over the sanctuary. But even without this complaint, Alcibiades and the Argives thought it would be useful to gain control of Epidaurus if they could. It would help keep Corinth quiet, and Athenian reinforcements would have a shorter route from Aegina than by sailing around Scyllaeum. So the Argives prepared to invade Epidaurian territory on their own, to collect the offering.

CHAPTER 54

1 At about the same time, the Lacedaemonians also marched out with their full forces to Leuctra, on their own frontier toward Mount Lycaeum. King Agis son of Archidamus commanded them. No one knew where they were campaigning, not even the cities that had sent troops.

2 But the sacrifices they offered before crossing the border did not give favorable signs. They went home and sent instructions around to their allies to prepare for a campaign after the coming month. That month was Carneus, a sacred month for the Dorians.

3 After they withdrew, the Argives marched out on the fourth day from the end of the month before Carneus. They kept counting it as that same day throughout the campaign. They invaded Epidaurian territory and damaged the land.

4 The Epidaurians called on their allies. Some used the sacred month as an excuse not to come. Others reached the borders of Epidaurian territory but took no action.

CHAPTER 55

1 While the Argives were in Epidaurian territory, envoys from the cities met at Mantinea at the Athenians' invitation. During the discussions, Euphamidas the Corinthian said their words did not match their actions. They were sitting there talking about peace, while the Epidaurians and their allies were lined up under arms against the Argives. Representatives of both sides should first go and get the armies disbanded. Then they could discuss peace again.

2 They accepted his advice, went off, and got the Argives to withdraw from Epidaurian territory. Later they met again in the same place, but even then could not reach agreement. So the Argives invaded Epidaurian territory again and damaged the land.

3 The Lacedaemonians also marched out to Caryae. When the sacrifices before crossing the border were unfavorable there too, they withdrew.

4 After destroying the crops on about a third of Epidaurian territory, the Argives went home. A thousand Athenian hoplites also came to help them, under the general Alcibiades. He had heard that the Lacedaemonians had marched out. Now that the Athenians were no longer needed, he left. That was how the summer passed.

CHAPTER 56

1 During the following winter, without the Athenians finding out, the Lacedaemonians sent three hundred garrison troops by sea to Epidaurus, with Agesippidas as their commander.

2 The Argives came to the Athenians and complained. The treaty said that each party must not let enemies pass through its territory, yet the Athenians had allowed them to sail past by sea. Unless the Athenians in turn brought the Messenians and Helots to Pylos to act against the Lacedaemonians, the Argives said they would be wronged.

3 At Alcibiades' urging, the Athenians added an inscription to the slab recording their treaty with Lacedaemon, stating that the Lacedaemonians had not kept their oaths. They also brought the Helots from Cranii to Pylos to make raids. In other respects they took no action.

4 During this winter, the Argives and Epidaurians remained at war, but fought no planned battle. There were ambushes and raids, in which men on either side were killed as chance decided.

5 As winter was ending and spring approaching, the Argives came against Epidaurus with ladders. They intended to take it by force, believing the war had left it without defenders. But they left without achieving anything. And the winter ended, and the thirteenth year of this war, came to an end.

CHAPTER 57

1 In the middle of the following summer, the Lacedaemonians saw that their allies at Epidaurus were in trouble. Elsewhere in the Peloponnese, some places had broken away and others were unsettled. They thought that unless they moved quickly to stop this, it would spread further. So they marched against Argos with their entire force of Lacedaemonians and Helots. Their king, Agis son of Archidamus, led them.

2 The Tegeans and all the other Arcadians allied with the Lacedaemonians joined the campaign. The allies from the rest of the Peloponnese and from outside it gathered at Phlius. The Boeotians sent 5,000 hoplites, the same number of light-armed troops, 500 cavalry, and an equal number of infantry who fought

alongside the cavalry. The Corinthians sent 2,000 hoplites. The other allies sent their separate contingents. The Phliasians turned out with their whole army, since the allied force was in their territory.

CHAPTER 58

1 The Argives had learned about the Lacedaemonian preparations from the start. When the Lacedaemonians began moving toward Phlius to join the others, the Argives also marched out. The Mantineans came to help them, bringing their own allies, along with 3,000 Elean hoplites.

2 As they advanced, they met the Lacedaemonians at Methydrium in Arcadia. Each side occupied a hill. The Argives prepared to fight the Lacedaemonians while they were on their own. But Agis got his army up during the night and slipped away unnoticed toward Phlius to join the other allies.

3 When the Argives discovered this, they set out at dawn. First they went to Argos. Then they moved to the road through Nemea, where they expected the Lacedaemonians and their allies to come down.

4 Agis did not take the road they expected. He gave orders to the Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians and took another, difficult route down into the Argive plain. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians took a different, steep road. The Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians had orders to come down by the Nemea road, where the Argives were stationed. If the Argives moved into the plain to defend it against Agis, these troops were to follow them and use their cavalry against them.

5 After arranging his forces in this way, Agis entered the plain and began ravaging Saminthus and other places.

CHAPTER 59

1 When the Argives learned this, they set out from Nemea to defend their land. It was already daylight. They ran into the Phliasian and Corinthian force and killed a few of the Phliasians. The Corinthians killed a slightly larger number of Argives.

2 The Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians advanced toward Nemea as ordered, but no longer found the Argives there. The Argives had come down and, seeing their own land being ravaged, were drawing up for battle. The Lacedaemonians also prepared to face them.

3 The Argives were trapped in the middle. In the plain, the Lacedaemonians and their companions cut them off from the city. The Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellenians were on the higher ground, and the Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Megarians were on the Nemea side. The Argives had no cavalry with them. The Athenians were the only allies who had not yet arrived.

4 Most of the Argives and their allies did not think their situation was so dangerous. Instead, they thought the battle would be fought on favorable terms. They believed they had trapped the Lacedaemonians in Argive territory, close to Argos.

5 But two Argives approached Agis just as the armies were about to meet. They were Thrasyllus, one of the five generals, and Alciphron, who represented Lacedaemonian interests in Argos. They asked him not to fight. The Argives, they said, were ready to submit any Lacedaemonian complaints against them to a fair and equal settlement by arbitration, with each side accepting the same obligations. They would also make a treaty and remain at peace in the future.

CHAPTER 60

1 These Argives spoke on their own initiative, without instructions from the people. Agis accepted their proposal on his own as well. He did not hold a general consultation, but discussed the matter with just one of the officials accom-

panying the army. He agreed to a truce of four months, during which the Argives were to carry out what they had promised. He immediately led the army away, without telling any of the other allies.

2 The Lacedaemonians and their allies followed his lead, as the law required. But among themselves they strongly criticized Agis. They thought they had had a good chance to fight, with the enemy shut in on every side by cavalry and infantry. Instead, they were leaving without having done anything worthy of their preparations.

3 This was in fact the finest Greek army that had come together up to that time. Its strength was most apparent while it was still assembled at Nemea. It included the entire Lacedaemonian army, along with Arcadians, Boeotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megarians. All these were picked men from their respective states. They seemed capable of taking on not only the Argive alliance but even another force added to it.

4 So the army withdrew, criticizing Agis in this way, and broke up as each contingent went home.

5 The Argives themselves were even angrier with the men who had made the truce without consulting the people. They too believed they would never have a better opportunity against the Lacedaemonians, yet had let them escape. They would have fought near their own city, supported by many strong allies.

6 On their return they began stoning Thrasyllus at the Charadrus. This is where they hear cases arising from a campaign before entering the city. He escaped death by taking refuge at the altar. They did, however, confiscate his property.

CHAPTER 61

1 After this, 1,000 Athenian hoplites and 300 cavalry arrived to help, under the command of Laches and Nicostratus. The Argives were still reluctant to break their truce with the Lacedaemonians. They told the Athenians to leave and

would not bring them before the people, although they wanted to speak. The Mantineans and Eleans, who were still there, finally forced the Argives to let them speak by pressing their request.

2 With Alcibiades present as an ambassador, the Athenians told the Argives and their allies that it had been wrong even to make the truce without the other allies. Now they should resume the war, since the Athenians had arrived at the right moment.

3 Their arguments persuaded the allies. All of them except the Argives immediately marched against Orchomenus in Arcadia. Even though the Argives had been persuaded, they stayed behind at first. Later they too joined the others.

4 They all took up positions around Orchomenus, besieged it, and made assaults. They wanted to bring it over to their side in any case, and there were also hostages from Arcadia being held there by the Lacedaemonians.

5 The Orchomenians were frightened by the weakness of their wall and the size of the army. With no one coming to help them, they feared they would be destroyed before help arrived. They agreed to become allies, give hostages of their own to the Mantineans, and hand over the hostages the Lacedaemonians had placed there.

CHAPTER 62

1 Now that they controlled Orchomenus, the allies discussed which of the remaining places they should attack first. The Eleans urged them to go against Lepreum, but the Mantineans urged Tegea. The Argives and Athenians supported the Mantineans.

2 The Eleans were angry that the vote had gone against an attack on Lepreum, and went home. The other allies stayed in Mantinean territory and prepared to march against Tegea. Some people inside Tegea itself were also working to hand the city over to them.

CHAPTER 63

1 After withdrawing from Argos with the four-month truce agreed, the Lacedaemonians sharply criticized Agis for not having brought Argos under their control. They believed the opportunity had been better than any they had ever had before. It was not easy, they said, to assemble so many allies of such quality.

2 When news came that Orchomenus too had fallen, they grew much angrier. In their anger they immediately began considering measures quite unlike their usual practice: demolishing Agis's house and fining him 100,000 drachmas.

3 He begged them not to do either. He would lead a campaign and clear himself of the charges by some military success. Otherwise, they could then do whatever they wanted to him.

4 They held back from imposing the fine and demolishing his house. But for the time being they passed a law of a kind they had never had before. They selected ten Spartans to act as his advisers, without whose consent he was not authorized to lead an army out of the city.

CHAPTER 64

1 Meanwhile, a message reached them from their supporters at Tegea. Unless the Lacedaemonians came quickly, Tegea would break away to the Argives and their allies. It was already on the point of doing so.

2 The Lacedaemonians then rushed to help with their entire force of citizens and Helots, moving faster than ever before.

3 They marched to Orestheum in Maenalia. They instructed their Arcadian allies to assemble and follow right behind them to Tegea. The whole Lacedaemonian force went as far as Orestheum. From there they sent a sixth of their own men

back home, including the oldest and youngest, to guard things there. They reached Tegea with the rest of the army. Their Arcadian allies arrived not much later.

4 They also sent to Corinth and to the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians, telling them to come to Mantinea as quickly as possible to help. But these allies had little notice. It was also hard for them to cross enemy territory unless they waited for one another and moved as a single force, since that territory lay across their route. Still, they hurried.

5 The Lacedaemonians took with them the Arcadian allies who had arrived and invaded Mantinean territory. They camped near the sanctuary of Heracles and ravaged the land.

CHAPTER 65

1 When the Argives and their allies saw them, they occupied a strong position that was hard to approach and drew up for battle.

2 The Lacedaemonians immediately advanced against them. They had come within range of stones and javelins when one of the older men saw that they were moving against a strong position and called out to Agis that he was trying to cure one mistake with another. He meant that Agis was trying to make up for his much-criticized retreat from Argos with this badly timed eagerness to attack.

3 Whether because of this shout, or because something else or the same idea suddenly occurred to him, Agis quickly led his army back before the two sides met.

4 He reached the border of Tegean territory and began diverting the water into Mantinean territory. The Mantineans and Tegeans fight over this water, because it usually damages whichever territory it flows into. He wanted to bring [the Argives and their allies] down from the hill to stop the diversion once they heard of it, and fight the battle on level ground.

5 He stayed there that day, working to divert the water. At first the Argives and their allies were stunned by the enemy's sudden retreat from so close by, and did not know what to make of it. Then the retreating army disappeared from view, while they themselves stayed still and did not follow. They began blaming their own generals again. Previously they had had the Lacedaemonians trapped near Argos, but had let them go. Now they were running away and no one was pursuing them. The enemy was escaping undisturbed, while they themselves were being betrayed.

6 The generals were alarmed at first. Later they led the men down from the hill, advanced onto the plain, and camped there, intending to march against the enemy.

CHAPTER 66

1 The next day the Argives and their allies formed up, ready to fight if they met the enemy. Meanwhile, the Lacedaemonians left the water and returned toward their former camp near the sanctuary of Heracles. They suddenly saw the enemy close by, already fully drawn up for battle and out beyond the hill.

2 The Lacedaemonians were more startled at that moment than they could ever remember being. They had very little time to prepare. They immediately hurried into their usual formation, with King Agis giving each order as the law prescribed.

3 When a king leads the army, everything is under his command. He tells the senior commanders what needs to be done. They tell the company commanders, who tell the platoon commanders. These in turn tell the squad commanders, and they tell their squads.

4 Any orders they want to issue pass down the same chain and travel quickly. Almost the whole Lacedaemonian army, with few exceptions, consists of officers commanding other officers. Many men therefore share responsibility for carrying out each action.

CHAPTER 67

1 On this occasion the Sciritae took their position on the left wing. They alone among the Lacedaemonians always have this post as their own separate unit. Beside them were Brasidas's soldiers from Thrace, with the men newly given citizen status alongside them. Next the Lacedaemonians themselves formed up, company after company. Beside them were the Heraeans from Arcadia, then the Maenalians. On the right wing were the Tegeans, with a few Lacedaemonians at the very end. Their cavalry were on both wings.

2 That was the Lacedaemonian formation. On the other side the Mantineans held the right wing, because the battle was taking place in their territory. Beside them were their Arcadian allies. Next came the 1,000 picked Argives, whom the city had for a long time provided with military training at public expense. Beside these were the other Argives, followed by their allies from Cleonae and Orneae. Finally the Athenians held the far end of the left wing, with their own cavalry beside them.

CHAPTER 68

1 These were the formations and preparations on each side. The Lacedaemonian army appeared to be the larger one.

2 I could not give exact numbers for the separate contingents on either side or for their totals. The number of Lacedaemonians was unknown because their political system is secretive. The figures given by the other side were unreliable because people tend to boast about their own numbers. Still, the following calculation allows an estimate of the Lacedaemonian force present on this occasion.

3 Seven companies fought, not counting the 600 Sciritae. Each company contained four platoons, and each platoon four squads. Each squad had four men fighting in its front rank. They did not all form up to the same depth: each

company commander chose his own. Overall, though, they were eight deep. The front rank along the whole line, excluding the Sciritae, numbered 448 men.

CHAPTER 69

1 As the armies were about to meet, the generals of each contingent encouraged their men in the following terms. The Mantineans were told that they would be fighting for their homeland, and also that rule or slavery was at stake. They must not lose their rule without a fight or experience slavery again. The Argives were told not to accept being deprived forever of their old leadership and the equal standing they had once enjoyed in the Peloponnese. They should also punish their enemies and neighbors for their many wrongs. The Athenians were told that it would be an honor to fall behind no one while fighting alongside so many strong allies. If they defeated the Lacedaemonians in the Peloponnese, they would make their empire more secure and larger, and no one else would ever invade their land.

2 This was the encouragement given to the Argives and their allies. The Lacedaemonians, both individually and with their familiar military music, reminded one another to be brave. They knew that long practice in action did more to keep men safe than a well-delivered speech of encouragement given at short notice.

CHAPTER 70

1 After this the armies moved to meet. The Argives and their allies advanced hard and angrily. The Lacedaemonians moved slowly to the sound of many flute players stationed throughout their ranks. This was not for religious reasons. It was to let them move forward evenly, keeping time, so that their formation would not break up, as large armies often do when they advance.

CHAPTER 71

1 While they were still approaching, King Agis decided to make the following move. All armies tend to do the same thing: as they advance to meet the enemy, they drift toward their own right wing. Each army's right then extends beyond the enemy's left. Fear makes each man bring his unprotected side as close as possible to the shield of the man stationed on his right. They think that closing up tightly gives the best protection. This starts with the man at the end of the front rank on the right wing. He keeps trying to move his own unprotected side out beyond the enemy's reach. The others follow for the same reason: fear.

2 On this occasion the Mantinean wing extended far beyond the Sciritae. The Lacedaemonians and Tegeans extended still further beyond the Athenians, because their army was larger.

3 Agis feared that his left wing would be surrounded and thought the Mantineans extended too far beyond it. He signaled the Sciritae and Brasidas's men to move outward away from the rest of the line until they were level with the Mantineans. He ordered two companies from the right wing, commanded by the senior officers Hipponoidas and Aristocles, to move across into the resulting gap and fill it. He thought his right wing would still have men to spare and that his line facing the Mantineans would be more secure.

CHAPTER 72

1 But he gave the order during the advance itself, at short notice. As a result, Aristocles and Hipponoidas refused to move across. They were later exiled from Sparta on this charge, having been judged cowardly. The enemy reached them before the move could be completed. When the companies failed to move across to the Sciritae, Agis ordered the Sciritae to rejoin the main line. But by then they too were unable to close the gap.

2 The Lacedaemonians had been thoroughly outmaneuvered in every respect. Yet their courage proved just as effective in securing victory.

3 When the armies came to close combat, the Mantinean right wing routed the Sciritae and Brasidas's men. The Mantineans, their allies, and the 1,000 picked Argives charged into the gap that had not been closed. They killed Lacedaemonians, surrounded and routed them, and drove them back to the wagons. They also killed some of the older men assigned to guard them.

4 Here the Lacedaemonians were being beaten. But the rest of their army routed the enemy. The center was especially effective: King Agis stood there, surrounded by the 300 men called the Horsemen. They attacked the older Argives and the units known as the five companies, along with the Cleonaeans, Orneatae, and Athenians stationed beside them. Most did not even wait to fight at close quarters. They gave way as soon as the Lacedaemonians advanced. Some were even trampled because they could not escape being overtaken.

CHAPTER 73

1 Once the Argive and allied army had given way here, its line began breaking apart on both sides. At the same time the Lacedaemonian and Tegean right wing, which extended beyond the Athenians, began wheeling around them. The Athenians faced danger from both directions: on one side they were being surrounded, while on the other their side had already been defeated. They would have suffered more than any other part of the army if their cavalry had not been there to help them.

2 Then Agis realized that his left wing, facing the Mantineans and the 1,000 Argives, was in trouble. He ordered the whole army to move toward the part that was being beaten.

3 When this happened, the army moved across and turned away from the Athenians. The Athenians then escaped undisturbed, along with the defeated Argives who were with them. The Mantineans, their allies, and the picked Argives no longer thought of pressing the enemy. They saw that their own side had been beaten and that the Lacedaemonians were advancing against them, and they turned and fled.

4 More of the Mantineans were killed, but most of the picked Argives escaped. The flight and retreat were not hard-pressed or prolonged. The Lacedaemonians stand their ground and fight long, determined battles until they rout the enemy. Once they have done that, they pursue only briefly and not very far.

CHAPTER 74

1 That was how the battle went, or as close to that as possible. It was the largest battle between Greeks for a very long time, and armies from the most important cities took part.

2 The Lacedaemonians laid out the arms taken from the enemy dead and immediately set up a trophy. They stripped the bodies, collected their own dead, and took them to Tegea, where they were buried. They returned the enemy's dead under a truce.

3 The Argives, Orneatae, and Cleonaeans lost 700 men. The Mantineans lost 200, and the Athenians, including the Aeginetans, lost 200 and both their generals. The Lacedaemonian allies did not suffer any significant losses. It was hard to find out the true number of Lacedaemonian dead, but it was reported to be about 300.

CHAPTER 75

1 Just before the battle, the other king, Pleistoanax, also marched out to help, bringing the older and younger men. He reached Tegea, but returned when he heard of the victory.

2 The Lacedaemonians sent messengers to turn back their allies from Corinth and from beyond the Isthmus. They themselves went home and dismissed their allies. It happened to be the time of their Carnea festival, and they celebrated it.

3 By this single action they cleared themselves of the charges the Greeks were then making against them: cowardice because of their disaster on the island, and poor judgment and slowness in other matters. People now saw that bad luck had made them appear weak, but that their determination was still the same.

4 It also happened that, on the day before this battle, the Epidaurians invaded Argive territory with their entire force, thinking it had been left undefended. They killed many of the Argive guards who had remained behind and came out against them.

5 After the battle, 3,000 Elean hoplites came to help the Mantineans, along with 1,000 Athenians in addition to the earlier force. All these allies immediately marched against Epidaurus while the Lacedaemonians were celebrating the Carnea. They divided up the work and began building a wall around the city.

6 The others stopped work, but the Athenians immediately finished fortifying the headland called the Heraeum, as they had been assigned to do. They all contributed men to a garrison left in this fort, then returned to their separate cities. And the summer ended.

CHAPTER 76

1 Right at the beginning of the following winter, after celebrating the Carnea, the Lacedaemonians marched out. They reached Tegea and sent proposals for a settlement ahead to Argos.

2 They already had supporters there who wanted to overthrow the democracy at Argos. Since the battle, these men had been much more able to persuade the people to accept an agreement. They wanted first to make peace with the Lacedaemonians, then later an alliance, and only then attack the democracy.

3 Lichas son of Arcesilaus, who represented Argive interests in Lacedaemon, arrived at Argos from the Lacedaemonians with two proposals: one setting out terms if the Argives wanted war, the other if they wanted peace. There was

much argument, since Alcibiades also happened to be there. The men working for the Lacedaemonians now dared to act openly as well. They persuaded the Argives to accept the proposal for a settlement. It was as follows.

CHAPTER 77

1 "The assembly of the Lacedaemonians has decided to make an agreement with the Argives on these terms. The Argives must return the boys to the Orchomenians, the men to the Maenalians, and the men at Mantinea to the Lacedaemonians. They must withdraw from Epidaurus and tear down the wall.

2 "If the Athenians do not withdraw from Epidaurus, they will be enemies of the Argives, the Lacedaemonians, and the allies of both.

3 "If the Lacedaemonians hold any boys, they must return them to their respective cities, without exception.

4 "As for the offering to the god, if the Argives wish, they may leave it to the Epidaurians to swear an oath. Otherwise they must swear themselves.

5 "All the cities in the Peloponnese, large and small, must govern themselves according to their ancestral customs.

6 "If anyone from outside the Peloponnese attacks Peloponnesian territory, they must consult together and defend it in whatever way the Peloponnesians consider fairest.

7 "The Lacedaemonians' allies outside the Peloponnese will have the same standing as the Lacedaemonians. The Argives' allies will have the same standing as the Argives and keep their own territory.

8 "These terms must be shown to the allies, and an agreement made if they approve. If the allies have a proposal, it must be sent home."

CHAPTER 78

1 The Argives first accepted this proposal, and the Lacedaemonian army left Tegea and went home. After this, the two sides were once again in contact. Before long, the same men arranged for the Argives to abandon their alliance with the Mantineans, Athenians, and Eleans and make a treaty and alliance with the Lacedaemonians. These were its terms.

CHAPTER 79

1 "The Lacedaemonians and Argives have agreed to a treaty and alliance for fifty years. Each side must submit disputes to judgment on equal and reciprocal terms, according to ancestral custom. The other cities in the Peloponnese may share in the treaty and alliance. They will govern themselves as independent cities, keep their own territory, and submit disputes to judgment on equal and reciprocal terms, according to ancestral custom.

2 "The Lacedaemonians' allies outside the Peloponnese will have the same standing as the Lacedaemonians. The Argives' allies will have the same standing as the Argives and keep their own territory.

3 "If a joint military expedition is needed anywhere, the Lacedaemonians and Argives must discuss how to carry it out in the way they judge fairest to the allies.

4 "If any cities, inside or outside the Peloponnese, have a dispute about borders or anything else, it must be settled by arbitration. If one allied city has a dispute with another, they must refer it to a city that both consider impartial. Private citizens must have their cases judged according to ancestral custom."

CHAPTER 80

1 This was the treaty and alliance that they made. They also settled any matters arising from territory or other property that either side had taken from the other in war or otherwise. They now acted together and voted not to admit any

herald or delegation from Athens unless the Athenians left the Peloponnese and abandoned their forts. They also agreed not to make peace or war with anyone except jointly.

2 They pursued their other plans with energy. Both sent envoys to the places along the Thracian coast and to Perdiccas, and persuaded Perdiccas to join their agreement by oath. He did not break with the Athenians immediately, but he intended to do so, partly because he saw that the Argives had done so. His own family originally came from Argos. They also renewed their old oaths with the Chalcidians and swore additional ones.

3 The Argives also sent envoys to the Athenians, telling them to abandon the fort at Epidaurus. The Athenians saw that their men were outnumbered by the other troops sharing the garrison, and sent Demosthenes to bring their men out. When he arrived, he used an athletic competition outside the fort as a pretext. Once the rest of the garrison had gone out, he shut the gates against them. Later the Athenians themselves renewed the treaty with the Epidaurians and handed the fort back to them.

CHAPTER 81

1 After the Argives left the alliance, the Mantineans at first held out. But they could not manage without the Argives. They too came to terms with the Lacedaemonians and gave up their rule over the cities.

2 The Lacedaemonians and Argives went on a joint expedition with a thousand men each. The Lacedaemonians first went to Sicyon on their own and put power there more firmly into the hands of a small group. After that, both forces together overthrew the democracy at Argos, and an oligarchy friendly to the Lacedaemonians was set up. This happened as spring approached and winter ended. The fourteenth year of the war came to an end.

CHAPTER 82

1 In the following summer, the people of Dium on Mount Athos broke away from the Athenians and joined the Chalcidians. The Lacedaemonians also reorganized affairs in Achaea, where things had previously been unfavorable to them.

2 Meanwhile, the ordinary people at Argos gradually organized themselves and regained their confidence. They waited for the Lacedaemonians' festival of the Gymnopaediae and attacked the oligarchs. Fighting broke out in the city. The people won, killed some of the oligarchs, and drove the others out.

3 The Lacedaemonians had long failed to come when their friends asked them for help. They now postponed the Gymnopaediae and set out to support them. But at Tegea they learned that the oligarchs had lost. Despite the pleas of those who had escaped, they refused to go any farther. They went home and celebrated the Gymnopaediae.

4 Later, envoys came from those in the city [messengers] and from the Argives outside it. The allies were present, and both sides spoke at length. The Lacedaemonians decided that the people inside the city were in the wrong and voted to march against Argos. But there were delays and postponements.

5 In the meantime, the people of Argos were afraid of the Lacedaemonians. They were again seeking an alliance with Athens and thought it would be their best source of help. They began building long walls down to the sea. If they were cut off from their farmland, supplies brought in by sea with Athenian help could then support them.

6 Some of the cities in the Peloponnese also knew about the building of the walls. The whole Argive population worked on them: the men themselves, the women, and the slaves. Carpenters and stonemasons also came to help them from Athens. The summer ended.

CHAPTER 83

1 The following winter, when the Lacedaemonians learned that the walls were being built, they marched against Argos with their allies, except the Corinthians. They also had a scheme being organized in their support inside Argos itself. Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, commanded the army.

2 The scheme inside the city, which they had expected to help them, came to nothing. But they captured and demolished the walls under construction. They also took Hysiae, a place in Argive territory, and killed all the free men they captured there. Then they withdrew, and the troops dispersed to their own cities.

3 After this, the Argives also marched into Phliasian territory. They laid it waste and then went home. They did this because the Phliasians had taken in their exiles; most of them had settled there.

4 During the same winter the Athenians also blockaded Macedonia. They accused Perdiccas of entering into the sworn agreement with the Argives and Lacedaemonians. They also charged that, when they had prepared an army under Nicias son of Niceratus to attack the Chalcidians on the Thracian coast and Amphipolis, he had broken his obligations as an ally. His withdrawal had been the main reason the expedition broke up. So he was now an enemy. This winter ended, and the fifteenth year of the war came to an end.

CHAPTER 84

1 The next summer, Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships and arrested three hundred Argives who were still suspected of favoring the Lacedaemonians. The Athenians placed them on nearby islands under their control. The Athenians also sent an expedition against the island of Melos. Their force consisted of thirty of their own ships, six Chian ships, and two

Lesbian ships; twelve hundred of their own hoplites, three hundred archers, and twenty mounted archers; and about fifteen hundred hoplites from their allies and the islanders.

2 The Melians were colonists from Lacedaemon. They would not submit to the Athenians as the other islanders had. At first they remained neutral and kept out of the fighting. But when the Athenians tried to force them to submit by devastating their land, they entered into open war.

3 The generals, Cleomedes son of Lycomedes and Tisias son of Tisimachus, landed this force and camped in Melian territory. Before doing any damage to the land, they sent envoys to talk first. The Melians did not bring them before the general population. Instead, they told them to state their business before the magistrates and the small governing group.

CHAPTER 85

1 The Athenian envoys spoke as follows. "We are not speaking before the general population. Presumably this is to stop us from misleading the people with an uninterrupted speech, in which they would hear all our persuasive claims at once without being able to challenge them. We understand that this is why you have brought us before this small group. You who are sitting here can make yourselves even safer. Do not give a single speech yourselves either. Take each point separately, and interrupt us immediately whenever we say something you think is unsatisfactory. First, tell us whether this procedure suits you."

CHAPTER 86

1 The Melian representatives answered, "We have no objection to the fairness of explaining our views to each other calmly. But your preparations for war are already here, not something still to come, and they seem inconsistent with that.

We can see that you have come to judge what we say yourselves. The likely outcome is that if we win the argument on justice and therefore refuse to give in, it will bring us war; if we let you persuade us, it will bring slavery."

CHAPTER 87

1 Athenians: "If you have met to make guesses about the future, or for any purpose other than to discuss your city's survival in the light of the present facts that you can see, we should stop. If survival is what you are here for, we should talk."

CHAPTER 88

1 Melians: "In a situation like ours, it is natural and understandable that our words and thoughts should turn in many directions. Still, this meeting is indeed about our survival. If you agree, let the discussion proceed in the way you suggest."

CHAPTER 89

1 Athenians: "We will not make a long, unconvincing speech using impressive claims: that our empire is justified because we defeated the Persians, or that we are now attacking because we have been wronged. Nor should you expect to persuade us by saying that, although you are Lacedaemonian colonists, you did not join their campaigns, or that you have done us no harm. Instead, we should try to get what is possible, on the basis of what each side really thinks. You know as well as we do that, in human negotiations, questions of justice are decided only when the two sides have equal power to compel each other. Those with greater power do what they can, and the weak give way."

CHAPTER 90

1 Melians: "As we see it, it is in your interest not to destroy a protection that benefits everyone. We have to speak of interest, since you have made that, rather than justice, the basis of discussion. Anyone who is in danger should still be able to appeal to what is reasonable and fair. Someone who makes a persuasive case should be allowed some benefit even if the case falls short of strict proof. This concerns you no less than anyone else. If you fall, you would face the harshest punishment and become an example to others."

CHAPTER 91

1 Athenians: "Even if our empire ends, we are not discouraged by the thought of its final outcome. People who rule over others, as the Lacedaemonians do, are not the ones who pose the greatest danger to a defeated power. And our contest is not with the Lacedaemonians. The danger is if the subjects of an empire attack their former rulers themselves and defeat them.

2 Athenians: "Leave us to take that risk. We will explain that we have come to benefit our empire, and that what we are now going to say is intended to save your city. We want to rule you without trouble and to keep you safe in a way that benefits both of us."

CHAPTER 92

1 Melians: "How could it be as useful for us to be enslaved as it is for you to rule?"

CHAPTER 93

1 Athenians: "Because you would submit before suffering the worst, and we would profit by not destroying you."

CHAPTER 94

1 Melians: "Would you not accept us keeping out of the war, as your friends rather than your enemies, but allied to neither side?"

CHAPTER 95

1 Athenians: "No. Your hostility does us less harm than your friendship would. To our subjects, friendship with you would signal our weakness, while your hatred would show our strength."

CHAPTER 96

1 Melians: "Is that how your subjects judge what is reasonable? Do they put people with no connection to you in the same category as those who are mostly your own colonists, some of whom rebelled and were then brought under your control?"

CHAPTER 97

1 Athenians: "They think that neither group lacks arguments to justify its position. But they think that those who stay independent do so because they are strong, and that we do not attack them because we are afraid. So, quite apart from adding to the people we rule, your conquest would make us safer. This is especially true because you are islanders and we control the sea. You are weaker than other peoples, and it is important that you should not hold out against us."

CHAPTER 98

1 Melians: "But do you not see safety in the other course? Here too, we must try to persuade you. You have ruled out arguments about justice and urge us to submit to your interests. So we must explain what benefits us and try to persuade you if it turns out to benefit you as well. All those who are now allied to

neither side will look at this and think that you will one day attack them too. How will you avoid making enemies of them? Will you not simply strengthen your existing enemies and force others to become your enemies against their will, when they had never intended to do so?"

CHAPTER 99

1 Athenians: "We do not think the people on the mainland are the greater danger to us. Their freedom will allow them to put off taking precautions against us for a long time. The danger comes instead from independent islanders like you and from those already made angry by the constraints of our empire. These are the people most likely to act without thinking and bring both themselves and us into obvious danger."

CHAPTER 100

1 Melians: "Then surely, if you take such great risks to keep your empire, and those already enslaved take them to escape it, it would be very dishonorable and cowardly for us, who are still free, not to try everything before becoming slaves."

CHAPTER 101

1 Athenians: "Not if you make a sensible decision. This is not an equal contest in courage, where you must avoid disgrace. Your discussion is about survival instead, and about not standing up to people who are much stronger."

CHAPTER 102

1 Melians: "But we know that war sometimes gives each side a more equal chance than the difference in their numbers would suggest. If we give in, we lose all hope immediately. If we act, there is still hope that we can stand our ground."

CHAPTER 103

1 Athenians: "Hope gives comfort in danger. People who have resources to spare can use it and, even if it hurts them, it does not destroy them. But hope is costly by nature. Those who stake everything they have on it only discover what it is when they have already fallen. Once they recognize it, it leaves them nothing with which to protect themselves against it.

2 Athenians: "You are weak, and a single turn can decide your fate. Do not choose to suffer this. Do not be like most people, who could still save themselves by ordinary human means, but, once they are under pressure and their visible grounds for hope give out, turn to invisible ones: divination, oracles, and all the other things that offer hope and bring ruin."

CHAPTER 104

1 Melians: "We too understand, you may be sure, how hard it is to fight your power, and also luck, unless it treats us equally. Still, we trust that the gods will not give us worse luck, because we are standing up as people who respect them against people who are unjust. As for our lack of strength, we expect our alliance with the Lacedaemonians to make up for it. They are bound to help us, if for no other reason, because we are related and they would be ashamed not to. So our confidence is not altogether unreasonable."

CHAPTER 105

1 Athenians: "We do not think we will lack the gods' favor either. Nothing we claim or do falls outside what people believe about the gods or want for themselves.

2 Athenians: "We believe this about the gods, and know it for certain about people: nature always compels them to rule wherever they have the power. We did not establish this rule, nor were we the first to use it once it existed. We found it

already in place and will leave it to last forever. We use it knowing that you, or anyone else with the same power as us, would do the same.

3 Athenians: "So, as far as the gods are concerned, we reasonably expect not to be at a disadvantage. As for your opinion of the Lacedaemonians, you trust that shame will make them help you. We congratulate you on your innocence, but we do not envy your foolishness.

4 Athenians: "In their dealings with each other and with the customs of their own country, the Lacedaemonians show a great deal of good conduct. Much could be said about how they treat outsiders, but the clearest summary is this: more openly than anyone else we know, they consider what pleases them honorable and what benefits them just. That way of thinking hardly supports your present unreasonable hope of survival."

CHAPTER 106

1 Melians: "But it is precisely their own interest that gives us our greatest confidence. They will not want to betray the Melians, who are their colonists, and so lose the trust of friendly Greeks and help their enemies."

CHAPTER 107

1 Athenians: "Do you not see, then, that pursuing your interests goes with staying safe, whereas doing what is just and honorable involves danger? The Lacedaemonians are generally very unwilling to take that risk."

CHAPTER 108

1 Melians: "But we think they would be more willing to take risks for us, and would consider them safer than risks taken for others. For military operations, we are close to the Peloponnese. And because we are related, they can trust our loyalty more than that of others."

CHAPTER 109

1 Athenians: "People considering whether to join a fight do not find security in the goodwill of those asking for help. They look for a large advantage in actual military strength. The Lacedaemonians consider this even more carefully than others. They distrust their own resources so much that even when they attack their neighbors, they take many allies with them. So they are unlikely to cross to an island while we control the sea."

CHAPTER 110

1 Melians: "But they could also send other people. The Cretan Sea is wide. Across it, those who control the sea have a harder time catching ships than people trying to slip past have in getting through safely.

2 "And if they failed at that, they could turn against your own territory and the rest of your allies, those whom Brasidas did not attack. Then you would have to concern yourselves less with a country that has nothing to do with you than with your own land and allies, who are much closer to you."

CHAPTER 111

1 Athenians: "You too may gain some experience of this, though you already know that the Athenians have never yet abandoned a single siege for fear of trouble elsewhere.

2 Athenians: "We notice that, although you said you would discuss your survival, in all this talk you have said nothing that people could rely on and expect to survive. The things you count on most are hopes for the future. What you actually have is too little to defeat the forces already drawn up against you. You are showing very poor judgment, unless you now ask us to leave and come to some more sensible decision.

3 Athenians: "Surely you will not turn to that sense of shame which so often destroys people when they face dangers that are both disgraceful and obvious. Many people can still see where they are heading. But the thing called disgrace, through the force of its seductive name, draws them on. Overpowered by the word, they willingly fall into disasters from which they cannot recover. Their foolishness then brings them a disgrace worse than anything bad luck could have brought.

4 Athenians: "If you think sensibly, you will avoid that. You will not consider it degrading to give way to the greatest city when its terms are moderate: become its allies, keep your own land, and pay tribute. Given a choice between war and safety, do not stubbornly insist on the worse option. Those who do not give way to their equals, deal properly with their superiors, and treat weaker people moderately are the most likely to succeed.

5 Athenians: "Consider this after we leave too. Keep reminding yourselves that you are deciding about your homeland. You have only one, and whether it does well or badly will depend on this single decision."

CHAPTER 112

1 The Athenians withdrew from the discussion. Left on their own, the Melians reached much the same decision as they had expressed in their replies. They gave this answer.

2 "Athenians, our view has not changed from the beginning. We will not, in a short time, take away the freedom of a city that has now been inhabited for seven hundred years. Instead, we will try to save ourselves. We trust in the good fortune the gods have given the city, which has preserved it until now, and in help from people, including the Lacedaemonians.

3 "We ask to be your friends and the enemies of neither side. Make a treaty on terms that seem suitable to both of us, and leave our land."

CHAPTER 113

1 That was the Melians' answer. As the Athenians were now ending the discussion, they said, "To judge by these decisions, you seem to us the only people who consider the future more certain than what you can see, and who look at things that are not visible as if your wishes had already made them happen. You have staked the most on the Lacedaemonians, luck, and hope. With that much trust in them, you will suffer the greatest fall."

CHAPTER 114

1 The Athenian envoys returned to the army. Since the Melians would not submit at all, the generals immediately began military operations. They divided the work among the contingents from each city and built a wall all the way around the Melians.

2 Later, the Athenians left a force of their own men and allies to keep watch on land and at sea, and withdrew with most of the army. The troops who stayed continued the siege.

CHAPTER 115

1 At about the same time, the Argives invaded Phliasian territory. The Phliasians and the Argive exiles ambushed them, killing about eighty.

2 The Athenians at Pylos also took a large amount of plunder from the Lacedaemonians. In response, the Lacedaemonians went to war with them, though they still did not cancel the treaty. They also proclaimed that anyone on their side who wished could raid the Athenians.

3 The Corinthians went to war with the Athenians over certain disputes of their own. The other Peloponnesians stayed out of the fighting.

4 The Melians also attacked at night and captured the part of the Athenian siege wall facing the marketplace. They killed some men and brought in grain and as many useful supplies as they could. Then they withdrew and made no further move. After that, the Athenians arranged a better watch. The summer ended.

CHAPTER 116

1 The following winter, the Lacedaemonians intended to march into Argive territory. But their sacrifices for crossing the border [the sacred rites at the frontier] did not give favorable signs, and they went home. Because of this planned expedition, the Argives suspected certain people inside their city. They arrested some, but others escaped them.

2 At about the same time, the Melians again captured another part of the Athenian siege wall, where there were few guards on duty.

3 After these events, another army came from Athens, commanded by Philocrates son of Demeas. The siege was now pressed hard, and there was also some betrayal inside the city. The Melians surrendered unconditionally to the Athenians, leaving them to decide their fate.

4 The Athenians killed all the Melian men of military age whom they captured and sold the women and children into slavery. They settled the place themselves, later sending out five hundred colonists.

Book 6



CHAPTER 1

1 That same winter the Athenians wanted to sail to Sicily again. This time they planned a larger force than the one sent with Laches and Eurymedon, hoping to conquer the island if they could. Most of them did not know how big it was or how many people, both Greeks and non-Greeks, lived there. They also did not realize that they were taking on a war not much smaller than their war against the Peloponnesians.

2 Sailing around Sicily in a merchant ship takes not much less than eight days. Yet, large as it is, only about twenty stades of sea separate it from the mainland.

CHAPTER 2

1 This is how the island was settled in early times, and these were all the peoples who lived there. The Cyclopes and Laestrygonians are said to have been the earliest inhabitants of one part of the country. I cannot say what people they belonged to, where they came from, or where they went. We must leave them as the poets have described them and as each person understands them.

2 The Sicani appear to have been the first people to settle there after them. They themselves say they came even earlier, because they were native to the island. But investigation shows that they were Iberians, driven by the Ligurians from the river Sicanus in Iberia. The island, previously called Trinacria, was then named Sicania after them. They still live in the western parts of Sicily today.

3 When Troy fell, some Trojans escaped the Achaeans and reached Sicily by ship. They settled next to the Sicani, and the combined population was called the Elymians. Their cities were Eryx and Egesta. Some Phocians also settled with them. These had been blown off course on their way from Troy, first to Libya and then from there to Sicily.

4 The Sicels crossed to Sicily from Italy, where they had been living, to escape the Opicans. The likely account, which is also the one people give, is that they crossed on rafts, waiting until the wind blew down the strait. But they may have sailed across in some other way. There are still Sicels in Italy today. The country got its name, Italy, from a Sicel king named Italus.

5 They arrived in Sicily as a large army, defeated the Sicani in battle, and pushed them into the southern and western parts of the island. They changed its name from Sicania to Sicily. After their crossing they settled in and held the best land, nearly three hundred years before the Greeks came to Sicily. They still occupy the central and northern parts of the island today.

6 Phoenicians also lived all around Sicily. They occupied coastal headlands and the small offshore islands so they could trade with the Sicels. But when Greeks began arriving by sea in large numbers, the Phoenicians left most of these places. They concentrated their settlements at Motya, Soloeis, and Panormus, near the Elymians. They relied on their alliance with the Elymians, and this part of Sicily also offered the shortest crossing to Carthage. These, then, were the non-Greek peoples who settled Sicily, and this was how they did so.

CHAPTER 3

1 The first Greeks were Chalcidians who sailed from Euboea with Thucles as their founder and established Naxos. They built the altar of Apollo the Founder that now stands outside the city. Sacred delegations sailing from Sicily first offer sacrifices at this altar.

2 The following year Archias, a descendant of Heracles from Corinth, founded Syracuse. He first drove the Sicels out of the island where the inner city now stands, though it is no longer surrounded by water. Later the outer city was also enclosed by a wall and became heavily populated.

3 In the fifth year after Syracuse was founded, Thucles and the Chalcidians set out from Naxos. They drove out the Sicels by force and founded Leontini, and afterward Catana. The Catanaeans themselves chose Euarchus as their founder.

CHAPTER 4

1 About the same time, Lamis arrived in Sicily leading a colony from Megara. He founded a place called Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas. Later he left there and joined the Chalcidians as a fellow citizen at Leontini for a short time. They expelled him, and he founded Thapsus, where he died. The others left Thapsus and founded the city called Hyblaean Megara. Hyblon, a Sicel king, had given them the land and guided them there.

2 After living there for two hundred and forty-five years, they were driven out of their city and territory by Gelon, the tyrant of Syracuse. Before their expulsion, a hundred years after their own settlement, they sent out Pamillus and founded Selinus. Pamillus came from Megara, their mother city, and helped establish the colony.

3 Antiphemus from Rhodes and Entimus from Crete brought settlers and jointly founded Gela in the forty-fifth year after Syracuse was settled. The city was named after the river Gelas. The site where the city now stands, which was the first part to be walled, is called Lindii. They adopted Dorian institutions.

4 About a hundred and eight years after their own settlement, the people of Gela founded Acragas. They named the city after the river Acragas and appointed Aristonous and Pystilus as its founders. They gave it the institutions of Gela.

5 Zancle was first settled by pirates from Cumae, a Chalcidian city in Opicia. Later a large number of people came from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea and shared out the land with them. Its founders were Perieres from Cumae and Crataemenes from Chalcis. Its original name was Zancle, a name given by the Sicels because the site is shaped like a sickle: the Sicels call a sickle a 'zanclon.' Later the inhabitants were driven out by Samians and other Ionians who reached Sicily while escaping from the Persians.

6 Not long afterward Anaxilas, the tyrant of Rhegium, drove out the Samians. He settled a mixed population in the city himself and renamed it Messene after his own original homeland.

CHAPTER 5

1 Himera was settled from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon. Most of the colonists were Chalcidians, but some exiles from Syracuse, called the Myletidae, joined them after being defeated in civil strife. Their language became a mixture of Chalcidian and Dorian, but Chalcidian institutions prevailed.

2 Acrae and Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans: Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmenae nearly twenty years after Acrae.

3 Camarina too was first founded by the Syracusans, about a hundred and thirty-five years after Syracuse was established. Its founders were Dascon and Menecolus. The Syracusans later drove out the people of Camarina in a war following their revolt. Some time afterward Hippocrates, the tyrant of Gela, received the territory of Camarina as ransom for Syracusan prisoners. He settled Camarina again, acting as its founder himself. Gelon emptied it once more, and the people of Gela settled it for the third time.

CHAPTER 6

1 These were the Greek and non-Greek peoples living in Sicily. It was against an island of this size and population that the Athenians were eager to campaign. Their real aim was to rule the whole island, though they also wanted the respectable excuse of helping their relatives and the allies they had gained there.

2 The strongest encouragement came from the Egestaean ambassadors who were in Athens urgently asking for help. The Egestaeans had gone to war with their neighbors at Selinus over some marriage disputes and a piece of disputed land. The Selinuntians brought in the Syracusans as allies and were pressing them hard in the war, on both land and sea. The Egestaeans therefore reminded the Athenians of the alliance made in the time of Laches and the earlier Leontine war. They asked the Athenians to send ships to defend them. Among their many arguments, their main point was this: if the Syracusans went unpunished after expelling the people of Leontini, and went on to destroy Athens' remaining allies and take control of all Sicily's power, there would be a danger later. The Syracusans might send a large force to help the Peloponnesians, as fellow Dorians and as colonists helping the people who had sent them out, and join in destroying Athenian power. It would be sensible, they said, to resist the Syracusans together with the allies who still remained, especially since the Egestaeans would provide enough money for the war.

3 The Athenians heard these arguments repeated at the assemblies by the Egestaeans and their supporters. They voted to send ambassadors to Egesta first. These would investigate whether the money really was available in the public treasury and the temples, as the Egestaeans claimed. They would also find out how the war against the Selinuntians stood.

CHAPTER 7

1 The Athenian ambassadors were sent to Sicily. That same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, except the Corinthians, invaded Argive territory. They devastated a small part of the land and took away some grain, using

teams of animals they had brought along. They settled the Argive exiles at Orneae and left a few men from the rest of the army with them. They also arranged a truce for a set period, under which the people of Orneae and the Argives would not damage one another's territory. Then they withdrew their army and went home.

2 Not long afterward the Athenians arrived with thirty ships and six hundred hoplites. The Argives marched out with their entire army alongside the Athenians and besieged the people in Orneae for one day. At night, when the army camped some distance away, the people in Orneae escaped. The next day, when the Argives found out, they demolished Orneae and withdrew. The Athenians later sailed home too.

3 The Athenians also took cavalry by sea to Methone, on the border of Macedonia. These were their own cavalry and the Macedonian exiles living among them. They ravaged Perdiccas' territory.

4 The Lacedaemonians sent a message to the Chalcidians in Thrace, who had a truce with Athens renewable on ten days' notice. They told them to join Perdiccas in the war, but the Chalcidians refused. The winter ended, and with it the sixteenth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote about.

CHAPTER 8

1 At the start of the next summer, in early spring, the Athenian ambassadors returned from Sicily. Egestaeans came with them, bringing sixty talents of uncoined silver as a month's pay for the sixty ships they intended to request.

2 The Athenians held an assembly and heard the Egestaeans and their own ambassadors. Along with other attractive but untrue statements, they reported that plenty of money was ready in the temples and the public treasury. The Athenians voted to send sixty ships to Sicily, with Alcibiades son of Clinias, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Lamachus son of Xenophanes as generals with full

authority. They were to help the Egestaeans against the Selinuntians and, if the war went well for them, help restore the people of Leontini to their city. They were also to handle other matters in Sicily as they thought best for Athens.

3 On the fifth day after this, another assembly was held. It was to decide how to prepare the ships as quickly as possible and vote the generals anything else they needed for the voyage.

4 Nicias had been elected to the command against his wishes. He thought the city had made a bad decision: on a slight but respectable excuse, it was aiming to take all Sicily, an enormous undertaking. He came forward to try to stop it and gave the Athenians the following advice.

CHAPTER 9

1 "This assembly was called to discuss our preparations and how we should sail to Sicily. But I think we should still consider the basic question: is it better to send the ships at all? We should not make such a major decision after so little thought, or let foreigners persuade us to take on a war that is none of our business.

2 "I do gain honor from a command like this, and I am less afraid for my own life than others are. That said, I think a man who takes some care of his own life and property is just as good a citizen. For his own sake, he would be particularly eager for his city's affairs to go well. Still, I have never spoken against my judgment to gain honors, and I will not do so now. I will say what I think is best.

3 "Given your character, I would achieve little by advising you to preserve what you have and not risk your present possessions for uncertain gains in the future. But I will show you that you are rushing ahead at the wrong time, and that what you are setting out to conquer will not be easy to hold.

CHAPTER 10

1 "My point is that you are leaving many enemies behind you here, yet want to sail over there and bring still more enemies back upon yourselves.

2 "You may think the treaty you have made offers some security. As long as you stay quiet it will remain a treaty in name: that was how men on both sides arranged it. But if you suffer a setback with a substantial force, our enemies will quickly attack us. First, their troubles forced them into the agreement on terms more humiliating for them than for us. Second, we have many disputes over the treaty itself.

3 "Some states have not even accepted this agreement yet, and they are not the weakest. Some are openly at war with us. Others are restrained only by truces renewable on ten days' notice, and only because the Lacedaemonians are still keeping quiet.

4 "If they find our forces divided, as we are now hurrying to divide them, they may very well join the Sicilian Greeks in attacking us. They would have valued an alliance with them above many other things in the past.

5 "So we must consider these matters. We should not choose to put our city at risk while its position is uncertain, or reach for another empire before we secure the one we have. The Chalcidians in Thrace have been in revolt against us for years and are still not subdued. Some others on the mainland give us only doubtful obedience. Yet we hurry to help the Egestaeans on the grounds that they are our allies and are being wronged. Meanwhile we still put off defending ourselves against the people whose long-standing revolt wrongs us directly.

CHAPTER 11

1 "If we defeated these people, we could keep them under control. But even if we beat the Sicilians, they are so far away and so numerous that we could hardly rule them. It is foolish to attack people when victory will not let you hold them, and failure will leave you worse off than before you began.

2 "As things stand, I think the Sicilian Greeks would be even less dangerous to us if the Syracusans came to rule them. Yet this is the very thing the Egestaeans use most to frighten us.

3 "At present, individual states might perhaps come here to please the Lacedaemonians. But under those conditions, one empire would be unlikely to attack another. If they helped the Peloponnesians destroy our empire, their own would probably be destroyed by the same people in the same way.

4 "The Greeks over there would fear us most if we never went, or next best, if we displayed our power and soon left. We all know that people admire what is most distant and what has least exposed its reputation to a test. But if we met with any setback, they would quickly lose their respect for us and join our enemies here in attacking us.

5 "This is just what has now happened to you, Athenians, in your attitude toward the Lacedaemonians and their allies. You were afraid of them at first. But because you did better against them than you expected, you now look down on them and are reaching for Sicily as well.

6 "We should not let our enemies' misfortunes make us overconfident. We should feel confident only when we have defeated their plans. We should also assume that the Lacedaemonians, humiliated as they are, are thinking of nothing else but how, even now, they can trip us up if possible and repair their disgrace. They care more than anyone about a reputation for courage and have worked at it longer than anyone.

7 "So if we are sensible, our struggle is not about the Egestaeans, non-Greeks in Sicily. It is about taking prompt precautions against a city whose oligarchy is plotting against us.

CHAPTER 12

1 "We must also remember that only recently have we had a short respite from a great epidemic and from war, allowing us to recover money and manpower. We should spend these resources here on ourselves, not on these exiles who are asking for help. They benefit from telling convincing lies. They put others at risk while contributing nothing but words themselves. If they succeed, they need not show gratitude in proportion to what we have done; if they fail somewhere, they can destroy their friends along with themselves.

2 "And if someone who is delighted to have been elected to command urges you to sail, think about his motives. He may be looking only to his own interests, especially if he is still too young for command. He wants admiration for his racehorses and, because of his expensive habits, some profit from his command. Do not give him the chance to make himself famous at the city's risk. Consider that such men harm public interests while wasting their own resources. This is a major undertaking, not something for a younger man to plan and carry out in a hurry.

CHAPTER 13

1 "I am alarmed to see these young men sitting here at that same man's call to support him. In response, I appeal to the older men. If one of them is sitting beside you, do not be embarrassed or fear being thought a coward if you do not vote for war. Do not share their unhealthy longing for things far away. Remember that desire brings very few successes, while foresight brings most. Vote against them for the sake of your country, which is taking the greatest risk it has ever faced. Vote to let the Sicilian Greeks keep the boundaries that now separate them from us—boundaries that give us no cause for complaint: the Ionian Gulf for those sailing along the coast, and the Sicilian Sea for those crossing open water. Let them enjoy their own possessions and settle their affairs among themselves.

2 "Tell the Egestaeans separately that, since they began their war against the Selinuntians without the Athenians, they must also end it on their own. In future, let us stop making allies as we usually do: people whom we will defend when things go badly for them, but from whom we will get no help when we need it ourselves.

CHAPTER 14

1 "And you, presiding officer, put this to a vote and open the question to the Athenians again, if you think it your duty to care for the city and want to be a good citizen. If you are afraid of holding another vote, consider this: with so many witnesses, you cannot be charged with breaking the law. Instead, you can cure the city's bad decision. Good leadership means benefiting your country as much as possible, or at least doing it no deliberate harm."

CHAPTER 15

1 That was what Nicias said. Most of the Athenians who came forward urged them to carry out the expedition and not overturn the vote. Some, however, spoke against it.

2 The most eager supporter of the expedition was Alcibiades son of Clinias. He wanted to oppose Nicias, both because they disagreed on politics in general and because Nicias had spoken insultingly about him. Above all, he wanted the command. He hoped to capture both Sicily and Carthage through his leadership, and at the same time to use his success to gain wealth and fame for himself.

3 He enjoyed high standing among the citizens, but his spending on racehorses and other things went beyond what his existing wealth could support. This contributed more than almost anything else to the later downfall of Athens.

4 Most people were frightened by how far he disregarded the law in his personal way of life, and by the ambition he showed in everything he undertook. They became his enemies because they thought he wanted to become a tyrant. Although his public management of the war was excellent, individuals were offended by his private behavior and put affairs in other hands. Before long they brought the city to disaster.

5 At this time, then, he came forward and gave the Athenians the following advice.

CHAPTER 16

1 "Athenians, I am more entitled than others to command, and I believe I deserve it. I have to begin here, since Nicias has attacked me. The things that make people talk about me bring fame to my ancestors and myself, and also benefit our country.

2 "The Greeks had expected our city to be worn out by the war. But the splendid display I made at Olympia led them to think it even more powerful than it really is. I entered seven chariots, more than any private individual had ever entered before. I won first, second, and fourth place, and arranged everything else on a scale worthy of my victory. Custom treats such things as an honor, but people also infer power from what they see done.

3 "Again, when I make a show in our city by sponsoring choruses or in some other way, my fellow citizens naturally envy it. But foreigners see this too as a sign of strength. This supposed foolishness is not useless when a man spends his own money to benefit not just himself but his city as well.

4 "Nor is it unfair for someone who takes pride in himself to refuse to be on an equal footing with others. After all, no one takes an equal share of the misfortunes of someone who is doing badly. Just as people do not greet us when we are unfortunate, they should put up with being looked down on by the successful. Or let them give equal treatment before demanding it in return.

5 "I know that men like this, and everyone who stands out for some distinction, are resented during their own lives. Their equals resent them most, but so do the other people they deal with. Yet they leave later generations claiming kinship with them, sometimes even when none exists. Their country boasts about them, not as outsiders or failures, but as its own people who achieved great things.

6 "That is what I aim for, and why people make a fuss about my private life. But look at my public work: do I handle it worse than anyone else? I brought together the strongest powers in the Peloponnese, without great risk or expense to you, and forced the Lacedaemonians to stake everything on a single day's fighting at Mantinea. Even though they won that battle, they have still not fully regained their confidence.

CHAPTER 17

1 "This was what my youth and my supposedly outrageous foolishness achieved. I dealt with the Peloponnesian powers using arguments suited to them, and my enthusiasm inspired trust and won them over. Do not be afraid of that quality now. While I am still in my prime and have it, and while Nicias has his reputation for good luck, make full use of what each of us can offer.

2 "Do not change your decision to sail to Sicily on the grounds that we would be facing a great power. The cities have large populations, but these are mixed crowds. Their citizenship changes easily, and newcomers are easily admitted.

3 "As a result, no one equips himself with weapons or furnishes the countryside with permanent buildings as he would if it were his own homeland. Instead, each man prepares to get whatever he can from the community, either by persuasive speeches or through civil strife, and to settle in another country if he fails.

4 "A crowd like that is unlikely either to agree when listening to a speech or to work together in action. Each group would quickly come over to us if it heard something it liked, especially if they are in civil strife, as we are told they are.

5 "Nor do they have as many hoplites as they boast. The other Greeks have not turned out to have the numbers each claimed for themselves either. Hellas greatly deceived itself on this point and has barely managed to equip enough men in this war.

6 "From what I hear, then, that is the situation over there, and it will be still more favorable. We will have many non-Greeks who will join our attack on the Syracusans out of hatred for them. And the situation here will not stand in our way if you make the right decisions.

7 "Our fathers won their empire with these very same enemies—the ones we are now told we would leave behind if we sailed—and with Persia as an enemy too. Their strength lay in nothing other than the superiority of their navy.

8 "And the Peloponnesians have never had less hope of success against us than they do now. Even if they are full of confidence, they can invade our land whether we sail or not. But they could not harm us at sea, since we will still have a navy left here that is a match for theirs.

CHAPTER 18

1 "So what reasonable excuse could we give for holding back ourselves, or for refusing to help our allies there? We have sworn an alliance with them, so we must defend them. We should not object that they do not help us in return. We did not take them as allies so that they would come here to help us. We wanted them to keep our enemies there busy and prevent them from coming to attack us here.

2 "We acquired our empire in this way, as everyone else who has ruled others has done: by readily helping whoever called on us, whether Greeks or non-Greeks. If everyone stayed quiet or carefully sorted out which people deserved help, we

would add little to our empire and put what we already have at greater risk. When someone is stronger, you do not just defend yourself when he attacks. You take steps beforehand to stop him from attacking.

3 "We cannot decide for ourselves how far we want our rule to extend. Now that we are in this position, we must plan to attack some people and keep our hold on others. Otherwise, if we do not rule others, we risk being ruled ourselves. You cannot judge the advantages of staying quiet on the same basis as other people unless you also intend to adopt their way of life.

4 "So let us consider that going there will strengthen our position here, and make the voyage. We will discourage the Peloponnesians if they see that we have not been content with the present peace and have even sailed to Sicily. At the same time, if we gain control of the people there, we will probably rule all of Hellas. Or we will at least damage Syracuse, benefiting both ourselves and our allies.

5 "Our ships will make it safe for us either to stay, if things go well, or to leave. Even against all the Sicilians together, we will control the sea.

6 "Do not let Nicias turn you aside with his arguments for doing nothing or his attempt to divide the young from the old. Keep our usual good order. Our fathers brought our power to its present level by having young and old make decisions together. Try to advance the city in the same way now. Remember that neither youth nor old age can achieve anything without the other. Their less developed, average, and highly accurate judgments will be strongest when combined. If the city does nothing, it will wear itself out from within, like anything else, and its knowledge in every field will grow outdated. By constantly taking on challenges, it will gain more experience and become used to defending itself in practice rather than just in words.

7 "In short, I believe that nothing would destroy a city used to activity faster than a change to inactivity. The people who live most securely are those who make the fewest departures from their existing customs and laws, even if those customs and laws are not particularly good."

CHAPTER 19

1 That was what Alcibiades said. The Athenians heard him, and also the Egestaeans and the exiles from Leontini. These came forward to appeal for help, reminding the Athenians of their sworn promises and begging them to honor them. The Athenians were now much more eager to launch the expedition than before.

2 Nicias realized that repeating his arguments would no longer turn them against it. But he thought he might change their minds by demanding preparations on a very large scale. He came forward again and spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 20

1 "Athenians, I see that you are completely determined to go on this expedition. I hope it turns out as we wish. For now, I will tell you what I think.

2 "From what I hear, the cities we are about to attack are large. They are not subject to one another. They have no need for a change of government, such as people would welcome if it took them from forced slavery to an easier condition. They are unlikely to exchange their freedom for our rule. And there are many Greek cities for a single island.

3 "Besides Naxos and Catana, which I expect to join us because of their kinship with Leontini, there are seven others. They are equipped in much the same way as our own forces in every respect. This is especially true of Selinus and Syracuse, the main targets of our voyage.

4 "They have many hoplites, archers, and javelin throwers, as well as many triremes and enough men to crew them. They have money in private hands, and the people of Selinus also have money in their temples. Syracuse also receives offerings of first produce from some non-Greek peoples. Their greatest advantages over us are their large numbers of horses and their use of homegrown grain rather than imports.

CHAPTER 21

1 "Against forces like these, we need more than a fleet and a small army. A large infantry force must sail with us if we intend to achieve anything worthy of our plans and avoid being kept off the land by their numerous cavalry. This is especially important if fear unites the cities and no allies besides the Egestaeans supply us with cavalry to oppose theirs.

2 "It would be disgraceful to be forced to withdraw, or to send for reinforcements later because we had not thought things through at the start. We must leave here with adequate forces. Remember that we are going to sail a long way from home. This will not be like an expedition here, when you went as allies to attack someone among your subjects and could easily get any extra supplies from friendly territory. We will be cut off in a completely foreign country. During the four winter months, even a messenger cannot easily get here from there.

CHAPTER 22

1 "So I think we must take many hoplites, both our own and our allies': those of our subject allies and any men from the Peloponnese we can persuade to come or hire for pay. We also need many archers and slingers to resist their cavalry. Our fleet must be much larger than theirs, so that we can bring in supplies more easily. We must also take grain from here in cargo ships—wheat and roasted barley—and paid grain processors, conscripted in due proportion from the mills. Then, if bad sailing conditions hold us up somewhere, the army will have provisions. Not every city will be able to accommodate such a large force. We must prepare everything else as fully as possible and not depend on others. Above all, we must take as much money from here as we can. As for the funds that the Egestaeans say are ready over there, assume that they are mainly ready in words.

CHAPTER 23

1 "If we set out from here with equipment not just equal to theirs but greater in every respect, apart from their fighting infantry, the hoplites, only then will we just be able to defeat them and keep our own forces safe.

2 "You must think of yourselves as going to establish a city among foreign and hostile peoples. Such settlers must take control of the land immediately, on the very day they arrive. Otherwise, they must understand that if they fail, everything around them will be hostile.

3 "That is what I fear. I know that we must make many sound decisions, and that we will need good luck in even more things. That is difficult for human beings. So I want to sail with as little as possible left to chance, and with preparations that make us as secure as we can reasonably expect.

4 "I believe this is the surest course for the city as a whole and the way to keep those of us on the expedition alive. If anyone disagrees, I hand over the command to him."

CHAPTER 24

1 Nicias said this thinking that the scale of the undertaking would either discourage the Athenians or, if he was forced to go, allow him to sail as safely as possible.

2 But the burden of the preparations did not take away their desire to sail. Instead, they became much more eager. The result was the opposite of what he intended. They thought his advice was good and that the expedition would now be very safe indeed.

3 Everyone alike was seized with a desire to sail. The older men thought that they would either conquer the places they were sailing against or that, at least, so large a force could not come to harm. Those of military age wanted to see and explore distant places, and they were confident that they would come back

alive. The mass of ordinary people and the soldiers expected to earn money immediately and to acquire power that would provide them with paid service forever.

4 The majority's enthusiasm was so great that anyone who disapproved kept quiet. He feared that voting against the expedition would make him seem disloyal to the city.

CHAPTER 25

1 Finally, an Athenian came forward and called on Nicias to stop making excuses or delaying. He should tell everyone there, right away, what preparations he wanted the Athenians to vote for.

2 Reluctantly, Nicias said that he would rather discuss the matter quietly with his fellow commanders. But his present view was that they must sail with at least a hundred triremes. The Athenians themselves should provide as many troop transports as seemed necessary, and further ships should be called in from the allies. There should be at least five thousand hoplites in all, Athenians and allies together, and more if possible. They would prepare and take other forces in proportion: archers from Athens and Crete, slingers, and anything else they thought suitable.

CHAPTER 26

1 On hearing this, the Athenians immediately voted to give the generals full authority over the size of the army and the expedition as a whole. They could act as they thought best [for the Athenians].

2 Preparations then began. They sent messages to the allies and drew up enlistment lists at home. The city had only recently recovered from the plague and the continuous fighting. During the truce, a large new generation had reached military age and money had accumulated. This made it easier to supply everything. So the Athenians continued their preparations.

CHAPTER 27

1 Meanwhile, in a single night, most of the stone figures of Hermes in Athens had their faces hacked away. These are made in the local style, with a square pillar, and stand in large numbers both at the entrances to private houses and in sacred places.

2 No one knew who had done it. The state offered large rewards for information leading to the culprits. The Athenians also voted that anyone who knew of any other offense against religion could report it without fear of punishment, whether a citizen, a foreigner, or a slave.

3 They took the affair very seriously. They saw it as an omen for the expedition and also believed it was part of a conspiracy to bring about revolution and overthrow the democracy.

CHAPTER 28

1 Some resident foreigners and servants then gave information, though not about the figures of Hermes. They reported that young men had previously damaged other statues as a drunken joke, and that the mystery rites were being performed in private houses as an insult to religion. Alcibiades was among those they accused.

2 The men who most resented Alcibiades seized on these reports. He prevented them from securing the leadership of the people for themselves, and they thought that if they drove him out, they would take first place. They exaggerated the affair and loudly claimed that the mockery of the mysteries and the mutilation of the figures of Hermes had been intended to overthrow the democracy. They said that nothing in either affair had been done without him. As evidence, they cited the other lawless features of his way of life, which were at odds with democracy.

CHAPTER 29

1 Alcibiades immediately defended himself against the accusations. The preparations for departure were already complete, and he was ready to stand trial before sailing to determine whether he had done any of these things. If guilty of any of them, he would accept punishment. If acquitted, he would take up his command.

2 He appealed to them not to accept slanders against him in his absence. If he was guilty, they should put him to death now. It would be wiser, he said, not to send him out in command of so large a force with an accusation like this unresolved.

3 But his enemies feared that if he stood trial immediately, the army would support him. They also feared that the people would be lenient and favor him because he had persuaded the Argives and some of the Mantineans to join the expedition. They worked to prevent the trial and hurry him away. They put forward other speakers who said he should sail now, without delaying the departure, and stand trial on a specified date after his return. Their aim was to have him recalled to face trial after stirring up more hostility against him, which they could do more easily while he was away. It was decided that Alcibiades should sail.

CHAPTER 30

1 After this, when summer was already halfway through, the expedition set sail for Sicily. Most of the allies, the grain-carrying cargo ships, the other vessels, and all the other supporting equipment had already been told to assemble at Corcyra. From there they would cross the Ionian Sea together to the Iapygian promontory. The Athenians themselves, with any allies who were present, went down to the Piraeus at dawn on the appointed day and manned the ships for departure.

2 Almost everyone else in the city, citizens and foreigners alike, went down with them. The local people each saw off their own friends, relatives, or sons. They went with both hope and tears: hope for what they would gain, and tears at the thought that they might never see their loved ones again. They thought about how far from home they were sending them.

CHAPTER 31

1 Now, when they were about to part and face danger, the terrors of the expedition struck them more strongly than when they had voted to sail. Still, the sight of the force before them restored their confidence, because of the huge quantities of everything they saw. The foreigners and the rest of the crowd had come to watch what seemed an important and almost unbelievable undertaking. No Greek force sent out by a single city up to that time had been so expensive or so impressive to look at.

2 In numbers of ships and hoplites, the expedition to Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same force that went to Potidaea under Hagnon, had been no smaller. Four thousand Athenian hoplites, three hundred cavalry, and a hundred triremes had sailed on it, along with fifty ships from Lesbos and Chios and many more allies.

3 But those forces had set out on a short voyage with modest equipment. This fleet, by contrast, was fitted out for a long campaign and for action, wherever needed, both at sea and on land. The city and the trireme commanders had spent large sums and taken great trouble over the fleet. The state paid each sailor a drachma a day and provided the ship hulls: sixty fast ships and forty troop transports, with the best crews for them. The trireme commanders added extra pay to the state wages for the upper-tier rowers and the ships' specialist crews. They also provided expensive figureheads and other fittings. Each commander made every possible effort to make his ship stand out for its appearance

and speed. The infantry had been picked from carefully selected enlistment lists, and the men competed keenly with one another over their weapons and personal equipment.

4 As a result, there was competition among the men in every assigned duty. To the other Greeks, the whole undertaking looked more like a display of power and wealth than preparations for a campaign against an enemy.

5 Suppose someone had added up the city's public spending and the private spending of the men on the expedition. On the city's side, there was all it had already spent in advance and the money it sent out with the generals. On the private side, there was what each man had spent on his own equipment, what each trireme commander had spent on his ship, and what they would still have to spend. In addition, everyone would naturally have provided money for a long campaign beyond the pay from the state, and soldiers and traders were taking goods to sell. The total being carried out of the city would have amounted to many talents.

6 The expedition became famous as much for its astonishing boldness and magnificent appearance as for the army's overwhelming size compared with those it was attacking. It was also the largest expedition yet to cross the sea far from home, and none had placed such great hopes in future gains compared with what it already possessed.

CHAPTER 32

1 When the ships were manned and everything they needed for departure was aboard, a trumpet signaled for silence. They said the customary prayers before sailing, not ship by ship but all together, led by a herald. Wine was mixed in bowls throughout the force, and the fighting men aboard and their officers poured offerings from gold and silver cups.

2 The crowd on shore joined in the prayers, both citizens and anyone else present who wished them well. After singing the hymn and completing the drink offerings, they put to sea. At first they sailed out in single file; then they raced as far as Aegina. They hurried on toward Corcyra, where the rest of the allied force was assembling.

3 Reports of the coming attack reached Syracuse from many sources, but for a long time none of them was believed. An assembly was held, and speakers gave arguments of the following kind. Some believed the reports about the Athenian expedition; others argued against them. Hermocrates son of Hermon also came forward. Believing that he had reliable information about the Athenians, he spoke and gave the following advice.

CHAPTER 33

1 "Like some other speakers, I may seem to you to be saying things you cannot believe when I tell you the truth about the coming attack. I know that people who state or report things that seem unbelievable not only fail to persuade their audience but also look foolish. Even so, I will not let fear silence me when the city is in danger. I am convinced that I speak with more definite knowledge than anyone else.

2 "The Athenians have set out against you with a large force of ships and infantry, however surprising you find that. Their stated reasons are their alliance with Egesta and the restoration of the people of Leontini to their home. Their real aim is to take Sicily, especially our city. They think that if they capture it, they will easily control the rest.

3 "So expect them to arrive soon. Consider how to use what you have to defend yourselves as effectively as possible. Do not despise them and let yourselves be caught without defenses. And do not disbelieve the reports and neglect the whole matter.

4 "But anyone who does believe the reports should not be overwhelmed by their boldness or strength. They will not be able to do us more harm than they suffer themselves. And the fact that they are attacking with a large fleet is not entirely to our disadvantage. It will greatly improve our position with the other Sicilians, who will be frightened and more willing to become our allies. If we defeat the Athenians, or drive them away without achieving their aims—I certainly do not fear that they will achieve what they expect—we will have accomplished something outstanding. I, for one, do not think this is beyond our hopes.

5 "Very few large expeditions, whether Greek or non-Greek, have succeeded after sailing far from home. They do not arrive in greater numbers than the inhabitants and their neighbors, since fear unites everyone. And if lack of supplies brings them to disaster in a foreign land, they still leave a great reputation to the people they attacked, even if their own mistakes caused most of their trouble.

6 "That is how these very Athenians grew powerful. The Persians suffered many unexpected reverses, but the Athenians gained the reputation because the attack had been directed against Athens. We too can reasonably hope for something like that.

CHAPTER 34

1 "So let us prepare our defenses here with confidence. We should send to the Sicels, strengthening our ties with some and trying to establish friendship and an alliance with others. We should also send ambassadors to the rest of Sicily to make clear that the danger threatens everyone, and to Italy, to win allies or at least persuade the people there not to receive the Athenians.

2 "I also think it would be best to send to Carthage. The Carthaginians do not regard an Athenian attack on their city as impossible. In fact, they constantly fear it. They may think that if they abandon us, they too will be in trouble, and so be willing to help us secretly, openly, or in some other way. If they choose to

act, they are better able to help than any other power today. They possess enormous amounts of gold and silver, which provide the means for war and everything else.

3 "We should also send to Lacedaemon and Corinth, asking them to send help here quickly and to get the war going again over there.

4 "Now I will tell you what I think is the most useful step, though your habit of staying quiet makes it the proposal you are least likely to accept quickly. If all of us Sicilians were willing—or, failing that, as many as possible joined us—we could launch every ship we have, take two months' provisions, and go to meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory. We would make it clear that before they could fight for Sicily, they would have to fight to cross the Ionian Sea. This would alarm them most and make them think. They would see that we were defending ourselves from a base in friendly territory, since Tarentum receives us, while they had to cross a wide stretch of sea with all their equipment. The length of the voyage would make it hard for them to keep formation. Their force would be easy for us to attack as it came up slowly in small groups.

5 "If instead they lightened their loads and attacked with a more concentrated force of fast ships, we could attack them when they were tired, if they had used their oars. If we decided not to attack, we could retreat to Tarentum. They would have crossed with few supplies, expecting a sea battle, and would be short of provisions along a deserted coast. If they stayed, they could be blockaded. If they tried to sail along the coast, they would leave the rest of their equipment behind. And uncertainty about whether the cities would receive them would discourage them.

6 "So I think this reasoning would make them feel blocked, and they would not even set out from Corcyra. They would either keep debating and sending scouts to find out how many we were and where we were stationed, until the season slipped away into winter, or they would be so alarmed by this unexpected development that they would call off the voyage. This is especially likely

because, as I hear, the most experienced of their generals is leading them unwillingly. He would gladly seize on any excuse if he saw us making a serious show of strength.

7 "I am certain that reports would exaggerate our numbers. People base their decisions on what they hear. They are more afraid of those who attack first, or at least make it clear to their attackers in advance that they will defend themselves. They think that such opponents face them on equal terms of danger.

8 "That is how the Athenians would react now. They are coming against us expecting no resistance. They have good reason to think poorly of us, since we did not help the Lacedaemonians to crush them. But if they saw us showing courage beyond their expectations, the surprise would frighten them more than our actual strength.

9 "So take my advice. Above all, be bold enough to carry out this plan. If not, get everything else ready for war as quickly as possible. Everyone must understand that contempt for an attacker should be shown by courage in action. For now, the most useful course is to regard preparations made out of fear as the safest and act as though danger is at hand. The enemy is coming. I know for certain that they are already at sea and will be here at any moment."

CHAPTER 35

1 That was what Hermocrates said. The people of Syracuse argued fiercely among themselves. Some said the Athenians would never come and that his report was untrue. Others asked what harm the Athenians could do them, even if they came, without suffering still greater harm in return. Others were completely dismissive and made a joke of the whole thing. Only a few believed Hermocrates and feared what was coming.

2 Then Athenagoras came forward to speak. He was a leader of the people and, at that time, the speaker the majority found most convincing. He said this:

CHAPTER 36

1 "Anyone who does not want the Athenians to make such a foolish mistake and come here to fall into our hands is either a coward or no friend of this city. As for those who report these things and frighten you, I am not surprised at their nerve. But I am surprised at their stupidity, if they think their motives are not obvious.

2 "People who have something to fear for themselves want to panic the city. They hope to hide their own fear behind everyone's fear. That is what these reports amount to now. They have not come about by chance. They are put together by the very men who are always stirring up trouble here.

3 "If you want to make a sound decision, do not judge what is likely by looking at their reports. Instead, consider what clever, experienced men would do. That is how I rate the Athenians.

4 "They are hardly likely to leave the Peloponnesians behind, with the war there still not securely settled, and willingly start another war just as big. In fact, I think they are glad that we are not attacking them, with so many cities, and such large ones.

CHAPTER 37

1 "But suppose they do come, as the reports say. I think Sicily is better able than the Peloponnese to fight the war through, because it is better equipped in every way. Our city alone, I think, is far stronger than the force said to be coming against us, even if twice that number comes. I know they will bring no horses with them. They will not get any here either, except perhaps a few from the Egestaeans. Nor can they bring as many hoplites as we have, when they have to come by sea. Even getting the ships themselves here over such a distance, without extra loads, is a major task. Then there are all the other supplies that must be provided for an attack on a city like ours. Those are no small matter.

2 "That is how great I think the difference is. Even if they brought another city as large as Syracuse, settled it beside us, and fought from there, I think they would barely escape complete destruction. Still less could they escape in Sicily with the whole island against them—for it will unite. They would have a camp set up after leaving their ships, with little tents and only essential equipment. Our cavalry would stop them from going far outside it. In short, I do not think they could even control the countryside. That is how much stronger I consider our resources.

CHAPTER 38

1 "But the Athenians understand this, just as I have explained it, and I am sure they are looking after their own interests. Men here are making up stories about things that are not happening and never could happen.

2 "I have known these men, not just now but all along, to want to frighten the mass of you into letting them rule the city. They use speeches like these, or even more harmful ones, or actual deeds. And I really do fear that, with so many attempts, they may succeed someday. We are poor at taking precautions before we suffer, and at taking action against them once we recognize the danger.

3 "That is why our city is rarely at peace. It goes through repeated civil strife and fights as many battles against itself as against its enemies. Sometimes it also suffers tyrannies and the unjust rule of small groups.

4 "If you are willing to follow me, I will try never to let any of this happen in our time. I will persuade the majority of you and punish those who plot such things. I will not punish them only when they are caught in the act—that is hard to do—but also for what they intend, even if they cannot carry it out. We must defend ourselves against an enemy's intentions, not just his actions. Otherwise, unless we take precautions, we will suffer first. As for the few, I will expose them in some cases, watch them in others, and in others teach them better. I think that is the best way to turn them away from wrongdoing.

5 "And now, young men, what is it you actually want? I have often wondered. Do you want to hold office already? The law does not allow it. That law was made because you lack the ability, rather than to deny you office when you have it. Or is it that you do not want to have equal rights with everyone else? How can it be right for people who are equals not to receive equal treatment?

CHAPTER 39

1 "Someone will say that democracy is neither sensible nor fair, and that those with money are also best suited to govern. My answer is, first, that 'the people' means the whole community, while 'oligarchy' means only a part. Second, the rich are best at looking after money, the intelligent at giving advice, and the majority at judging once they have heard the arguments. In a democracy all these groups have equal shares, both separately and together.

2 "An oligarchy gives the majority a share of the dangers. But when it comes to the benefits, it does not just take more than its share. It takes everything and keeps it. This is what the powerful men and the young men among you are eager for. In a large city it is impossible to maintain. Even now, you utterly foolish men, if you do not understand that you are rushing toward disaster, you are the most ignorant Greeks I know. Or, if you do understand and still dare to do it, you are the most unjust.

CHAPTER 40

1 "So either learn better or change your minds, and build up the city's common good for everyone. Recognize that the better men among you can have an equal share in it, or even a larger one [than the mass of the city's people]. But if you want something else, you risk losing everything. And stop bringing us reports like these. We see through you and will not let you have your way.

2 "If the Athenians really are coming, this city will defend itself in a way worthy of it. We have generals to look into these things. And if none of this is true, as I believe, the city will not let your reports frighten it into choosing you as rulers and imposing slavery on itself. It will think for itself and judge your words by the effects they can have. It will not lose its existing freedom simply by listening to you. Instead, it will try to keep that freedom by taking practical precautions and refusing to give in."

CHAPTER 41

1 That was what Athenagoras said. One of the generals stood up and let no one else come forward. He spoke about the present situation himself, as follows:

2 "It is not sensible for speakers to make accusations against each other, or for listeners to accept them. We should pay more attention to the reports we are receiving. We must see how each of us, and the city as a whole, can be properly prepared to defend ourselves against the attackers.

3 "Even if none of this turns out to be needed, there is no harm in equipping the community with horses and weapons

4 "and all the other things that make a military force impressive. We will take responsibility for arranging and inspecting these. Nor is there any harm in sending people to the cities, both to gather information and for any other useful purpose that appears. We have already taken care of some things, and we will report to you whatever we learn." After the general had said this, the Syracusans left the meeting.

CHAPTER 42

1 By now the Athenians and all their allies were at Corcyra. First the generals reviewed the force and organized it in the order they intended to use when anchoring and camping. They divided it into three parts and assigned one to each general by lot. This was to prevent the whole fleet from sailing together

and running short of water, harbors, and supplies wherever they put in. It would also keep the force better organized in other respects and easier to command, with each division assigned to a general.

2 They then sent three ships ahead to Italy and Sicily to find out which cities would receive them. These ships were told to come back and meet them, so that they would know the situation before sailing in.

CHAPTER 43

1 After this the Athenians left Corcyra and crossed toward Sicily with the following force. There were 134 triremes in all, and two Rhodian ships with fifty oars each. Of the triremes, 100 were Athenian: sixty were fast ships, and the rest troop transports. The remaining ships belonged to Chios and the other allies. There were 5,100 hoplites in all. Among these, the Athenians themselves provided 1,500 from the citizen muster roll and 700 from the poorest citizen class serving as marines aboard the ships. The rest of the army consisted of allies, some from the subject cities, together with 500 Argives and 250 Mantineans and mercenaries. There were 480 archers in all, including eighty Cretans, as well as 700 Rhodian slingers and 120 lightly armed Megarian exiles. There was also one horse transport carrying thirty cavalrymen.

CHAPTER 44

1 That was the size of the first force to sail across for the war. Thirty grain-carrying cargo ships brought its supplies. They also carried bakers, stonemasons, carpenters, and all the tools needed for building fortifications. A hundred smaller vessels had been required to sail with these cargo ships. Many other boats and cargo ships followed the army voluntarily for trade. All of them crossed the Ionian Gulf together from Corcyra at this time.

2 The whole force made land at the Iapygian promontory, at Tarentum, or wherever each group could manage. They then sailed along the coast of Italy. The cities would not let them into their markets or towns, but allowed them water and anchorage. Tarentum and Locri refused even these. Eventually they reached Rhegium, at the tip of Italy.

3 There they gathered together. Since they were not allowed inside the city, they set up camp outside it in the sanctuary of Artemis, where the Rhegians also provided them with a market. They pulled their ships ashore and rested. They opened talks with the Rhegians and asked them, as people of Chalcidian descent, to help the people of Leontini, who were also Chalcidian. The Rhegians said they would not join either side. They would do whatever the other Greeks in Italy jointly decided.

4 The Athenians considered how best to deal with the situation in Sicily. At the same time they waited for the ships sent ahead to return from Egesta. They wanted to know whether the money was there, as the envoys had claimed at Athens.

CHAPTER 45

1 Meanwhile the Syracusans were receiving clear reports from many sources, including their scouts, that the ships were at Rhegium. With this confirmed, they threw themselves into preparations and no longer doubted the news. They sent guards to some of the Sicels and envoys to others. They put garrisons into the outlying forts in their territory. In the city they inspected weapons and horses to see whether everything was in order. They made their other arrangements for a war that would come quickly and was almost upon them.

CHAPTER 46

1 The three ships sent ahead to Egesta reached the Athenians at Rhegium. They reported that the rest of the promised money did not exist. Only thirty talents could be found.

2 The generals were immediately discouraged. This was the first setback, along with the Rhegians' refusal to join the expedition. The Rhegians had been the first people they tried to persuade and seemed the most likely to agree. They were related to the people of Leontini and had always been friendly to the Athenians. Nicias had expected the news from Egesta, but the other two generals found it more surprising.

3 The Egestaeans had used the following trick when the first Athenian envoys came to inspect their funds. They took them to the sanctuary of Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them the offerings: bowls, wine jugs, incense burners, and a considerable amount of other equipment. These silver objects gave an impression of wealth far greater than their relatively small value. They also entertained the ships' crews in private homes. They collected the gold and silver drinking cups from Egesta itself and borrowed others from nearby cities, both Phoenician and Greek. Each host brought these out at dinner as though they were his own.

4 Most of the hosts were using the same objects. But because so many appeared everywhere, the Athenians from the triremes were deeply impressed. When they got back to Athens, they spread the word that they had seen great wealth.

5 These men had been fooled themselves and had then persuaded the others. When the news spread that the money did not exist at Egesta, the soldiers blamed them heavily. The generals discussed what to do in the circumstances.

CHAPTER 47

1 Nicias proposed sailing against Selinus with the whole army. That was the main purpose for which they had been sent. If the Egestaeans provided money for the whole force, they could plan accordingly. If not, they should demand supplies for the sixty ships the Egestaeans had actually requested. They should stay until they had reconciled the Selinuntians with the Egestaeans, either by force or by agreement. Then they should sail past the other cities, displaying the power of Athens and showing its readiness to help its friends and allies, and sail home. The only exception would be if some quick, unexpected opportunity let them help the people of Leontini or win over another city. They should not put Athens at risk by using up its own resources.

CHAPTER 48

1 Alcibiades said they should not sail away in disgrace without achieving anything, after coming out with so large a force. Instead, they should send heralds to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse. They should also try to get some of the Sicels to break away from Syracuse and make friends with the others, so that they would have grain and troops. First they should persuade the people of Messene. That city was right on the strait, at the point of entry into Sicily, and would provide an excellent harbor and base for the army. Once they had won the cities over and knew who would fight on their side, they should attack Syracuse and Selinus, unless Selinus reached an agreement with Egesta and Syracuse allowed the people of Leontini to be resettled.

CHAPTER 49

1 Lamachus said they should sail straight to Syracuse and fight beside the city as quickly as possible, while the Syracusans were still unprepared and most frightened.

2 Every army was most frightening at first, he said. If it delayed before appearing, people regained confidence and were more inclined to look down on it when they saw it. But if they struck suddenly, while the Syracusans were still waiting in fear, they would have the best chance of winning and would frighten them in every way. The sight of the army would be frightening, since it would now appear at its greatest strength. So would the thought of what they might suffer, and, most of all, the immediate danger of battle.

3 Many people were also likely to be caught outside in the fields because they did not believe the Athenians would come. While these people were bringing their possessions into the city, the army would have no shortage of resources, if it took up a position outside the city and controlled the area.

4 This would also make the other Sicilian Greeks more likely to refuse an alliance with Syracuse and join the Athenians instead. They would not keep delaying while they watched to see which side would win. He said they should withdraw to Megara and make it their naval base for further attacks. It was deserted and not far from Syracuse by either sea or land.

CHAPTER 50

1 Although Lamachus argued this way, he too supported Alcibiades' proposal in the end. After this Alcibiades sailed to Messene in his own ship and discussed an alliance with its people. He did not persuade them. They answered that they would not admit the Athenians into the city but would provide a market outside. He then sailed back to Rhegium.

2 The generals immediately manned sixty ships drawn from the whole fleet, loaded supplies, and sailed along the coast to Naxos. They left the rest of the army at Rhegium with one of the generals.

3 The Naxians admitted them into their city, and they sailed on to Catana. The people of Catana would not admit them, because there were men there who supported Syracuse.

4 So they went to the river Terias and camped for the night. The next day they sailed toward Syracuse with the main body of their ships in single file. They sent ten ships ahead to sail into the Great Harbor and see whether any warships had been launched. These ships were also to sail close in and announce that the Athenians had come to resettle the people of Leontini in their own land, because of their alliance and shared ancestry. Any people from Leontini who were in Syracuse should therefore come out without fear to the Athenians, their friends and helpers.

5 When they had made the announcement and examined the city, the harbors, and the surrounding countryside from which they would have to conduct the war, they sailed back to Catana.

CHAPTER 51

1 An assembly was held. The people of Catana would not admit the army, but invited the generals to come in and say whatever they wished. While Alcibiades was speaking and the people in the city were focused on the assembly, the soldiers broke through a small gateway that had been poorly walled up, without being noticed. They entered the city and began buying things in the market.

2 When the supporters of Syracuse in Catana saw the army inside, they immediately became frightened and slipped away. There were not many of them. The others voted for an alliance with Athens and told the Athenians to bring the rest of their army from Rhegium.

3 After this the Athenians sailed across to Rhegium, then left for Catana with the whole army. When they arrived, they set up their camp.

CHAPTER 52

1 They received a report from Camarina that its people would join them if they came. They also heard that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. So they first sailed along the coast to Syracuse with their whole force. Finding no fleet being

manned, they sailed on to Camarina. They put in at the beach and sent a herald. But the Camarinaeans would not admit them. They said their sworn agreement was to receive the Athenians when they arrived in a single ship, unless they themselves sent for more.

2 Having achieved nothing, they sailed away. They landed in a part of Syracusan territory and plundered it. The Syracusan cavalry came to its defense and killed some of the light troops who had scattered. The Athenians then returned to Catana.

CHAPTER 53

1 They found that the ship Salaminia had arrived from Athens. It had come to order Alcibiades to sail home and defend himself against the city's charges. It had also come for some of the soldiers with him who had been accused of offenses against religion involving the Mysteries, some of them also in connection with the statues of Hermes.

2 After the army sailed, the Athenians had continued just as vigorously to investigate what had been done concerning the Mysteries and the statues of Hermes. They did not check the informers' credibility. Instead, they accepted every report as grounds for suspicion, arrested thoroughly respectable citizens on the word of dishonest men, and put them in prison. They thought it better to investigate the affair fully and discover the truth than to let any accused man escape investigation, even one considered respectable, just because the informer was dishonest.

3 The people knew from accounts handed down to them that the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had become harsh toward the end. They also knew that it had been overthrown not by themselves and Harmodius, but by the Lacedaemonians. So they were always afraid and treated everything with suspicion.

CHAPTER 54

1 The daring attack by Aristogiton and Harmodius began with an incident involving a love affair. I will describe it in more detail and show that neither other people nor the Athenians themselves give an accurate account of their own tyrants or of what happened.

2 When Pisistratus died in old age while still tyrant, it was not Hipparchus who took power, as most people think, but Hippias, who was the oldest son. Harmodius was a young man of striking beauty. Aristogiton, an Athenian citizen of middle rank, was his lover and had a relationship with him.

3 Hipparchus, the son of Pisistratus, made advances to Harmodius, who rejected him and told Aristogiton. Aristogiton was deeply hurt as a lover and feared that Hipparchus would use his power to take Harmodius by force. He immediately began planning, as far as his position allowed, to overthrow the tyranny.

4 Meanwhile Hipparchus made another attempt and had no more success in persuading Harmodius. He did not want to use force. Instead, he planned to humiliate him in some indirect way, so that this would not appear to be the reason.

5 In his exercise of power more generally, too, he did not oppress the majority, but ruled without provoking resentment. These tyrants made a very great effort to act honorably and intelligently. They took only a twentieth of the Athenians' produce as tax. They made their city beautiful, fought their wars, and offered sacrifices at the sanctuaries.

6 Otherwise the city itself continued to use its existing laws. The only exception was that the tyrants always made sure one of their own people was in office. Several of them held the yearly office of archon at Athens, including Pisistratus, the son of the tyrant Hippias, who had his grandfather's name. While archon, he dedicated the altar of the Twelve Gods in the marketplace and the altar of Apollo in the Pythian sanctuary.

7 Later the Athenian people extended the altar in the marketplace, making it longer and covering up the inscription. But the inscription on the altar in the Pythian sanctuary can still be seen even now, in faint letters. It says: / Pisistratus, son of Hippias, set this up to commemorate his term in office / in the sacred precinct of Pythian Apollo.

CHAPTER 55

1 I am confident that Hippias ruled as the oldest brother. What I have learned by word of mouth is more accurate than most people's information. But anyone can also recognize this from the following fact. Of the legitimate brothers, he alone is known to have had children. This is shown both by the altar and by the stone recording the tyrants' wrongdoing that was set up on the Athenian Acropolis. It lists no child of Thessalus or Hipparchus, but five of Hippias, born to him by Myrrhine, the daughter of Callias son of Hyperochides. It was natural for the oldest brother to marry first.

2 On that same stone he is listed first after his father. This too makes sense, since he was his father's oldest son and ruled as tyrant.

3 Nor do I think Hippias could ever have kept control of the tyranny so easily at that critical moment if Hipparchus had died while in power and Hippias himself had taken over that very day. Instead, his established position had already made him feared by the citizens and given him a firm hold over the mercenaries. This gave him a large margin of safety as he kept control. He did not find himself helpless, as a younger brother would have been who had not previously been regularly involved in governing.

4 Hipparchus, however, became well known because of his unfortunate death. As a result, later generations also came to think that he had been the tyrant.

CHAPTER 56

1 After Harmodius rejected his approach, Hipparchus went ahead with the insult he had planned. They invited Harmodius' unmarried sister to come and carry a basket in a procession. Then they turned her away, saying that they had never invited her in the first place because she was not worthy of it.

2 Harmodius took this badly, and Aristogiton was even more angry on his account. They had already made the other arrangements with those who would join their attack. They were waiting for the Great Panathenaea. This was the only day when the citizens taking part in the procession could assemble with weapons without raising suspicion. Harmodius and Aristogiton were to begin the attack, and the others were immediately to help them fight the bodyguards.

3 For safety, they had allowed only a few people into the plot. They hoped that, if even a few men took action, people who knew nothing of the plan would also want to help win their own freedom on the spot, since they would have their weapons with them.

CHAPTER 57

1 When the festival came, Hippias was outside the city in the place called the Ceramicus. With his bodyguards, he was arranging the order in which each part of the procession should move forward. Meanwhile, Harmodius and Aristogiton were already carrying their daggers and going to make the attack.

2 Then they saw one of their fellow conspirators talking on friendly terms with Hippias. Hippias was easy for anyone to approach. They became frightened and thought that the plot had been reported and that they were about to be arrested.

3 So, if they could, they wanted to get their revenge first on the man who had hurt them and was the reason they were risking everything. They rushed inside the gates just as they were and came across Hipparchus beside the place called

the Leocorium. They immediately attacked him without thinking. Both were as angry as they could be, one because of his love, the other because he had been insulted. They struck Hipparchus and killed him.

4 As the crowd rushed together, Aristogiton escaped the bodyguards for the moment. He was caught later and treated harshly. Harmodius was killed there on the spot.

CHAPTER 58

1 When the news reached Hippias in the Ceramicus, he immediately went, not to the scene of the killing, but to the hoplites taking part in the procession. They were some distance away and had not yet heard what had happened. He kept his face from showing any response to the disaster. Pointing out a place, he ordered them to go there without their weapons.

2 They went off, thinking he wanted to speak to them. He told the mercenaries to take charge of the weapons and immediately picked out the men he suspected, along with anyone found carrying a dagger. The usual weapons for the processions were a shield and a spear.

CHAPTER 59

1 That is how a painful affair of love led Harmodius and Aristogiton to begin their plot, and how their sudden fear led them to act so recklessly.

2 After this, the tyranny became harsher for the Athenians. Hippias was now more afraid. He killed many citizens and at the same time looked abroad for some place where he could find safety if his situation changed.

3 Afterward, for example, although he was an Athenian, he gave his daughter Archedice in marriage to a man from Lampsacus, Aeantides, the son of Hippoclus, its tyrant. He knew that they had great influence with King Darius. Her tomb is in Lampsacus and has this inscription: / Hippias stood above the

men of his time in Hellas; / this earth covers his daughter Archedice. / Her father, husband, and brothers were tyrants, / and her sons too, but she did not let pride lead her mind into wrongdoing.

4 Hippias ruled the Athenians as tyrant for three more years. In the fourth he was removed by the Lacedaemonians and the exiled Alcmaeonids. He left under an agreement guaranteeing his safety and went to Sigeum and to Aeantides at Lampsacus. From there he went to King Darius. Setting out from there, he later joined the Medes in their campaign against Marathon in the twentieth year after his departure, when he was already an old man.

CHAPTER 60

1 The Athenian people had these events in mind and remembered all they had heard about them. So at this time they were harsh and suspicious toward those accused over the mysteries. They thought that everything had been done as part of a conspiracy to establish an oligarchy or a tyranny.

2 Their anger over this had already put many prominent men in prison. There seemed to be no end in sight. Each day they grew more violent and arrested still more people. At that point, one of the prisoners persuaded another, the man thought most guilty, to give information. Whether his account was true or not is uncertain. People have suggested both possibilities, but neither then nor later has anyone been able to say for certain who committed the act.

3 His fellow prisoner persuaded him by saying that, even if he had not done it, he should obtain immunity and save himself, and end the city's current suspicions. He would be more certain of surviving if he confessed with a guarantee of immunity than if he denied the charge and went through a trial.

4 So he gave information about the damage to the herms, accusing both himself and others. The Athenian people were delighted to have what they thought was the truth. Previously they had been deeply alarmed at the thought that they might not discover who was plotting against their democracy. They immedi-

ately released the informer and the other prisoners he had not accused. They tried those he had accused and executed those who were in custody. They sentenced those who had escaped to death and announced a cash reward for anyone who killed them.

5 In this affair it remained uncertain whether the people who suffered had been punished unjustly. But the rest of the city clearly benefited for the time being.

CHAPTER 61

1 Meanwhile, the enemies of Alcibiades kept stirring up accusations against him. These were the same men who had attacked him before he sailed. The Athenians took the matter very seriously. Now that they thought they knew the truth about the herms, they were all the more convinced that the affair of the mysteries, in which he was implicated, had also been arranged by him for the same purpose, as part of the conspiracy against the people.

2 Also, during this period of alarm, a small Lacedaemonian army happened to have advanced as far as the Isthmus on some business with the Boeotians. People believed that it had come by prior agreement at Alcibiades' arrangement, not because of the Boeotians. They thought the city would have been betrayed if they had not acted first and arrested the men named in the information. For one night they even slept under arms in the sanctuary of Theseus in the city.

3 At the same time, Alcibiades' personal friends in Argos were suspected of plotting an attack on the people there. For this reason, the Athenians then handed over the Argive hostages they were holding on the islands to the Argive people to be killed.

4 Suspicion surrounded Alcibiades on every side. Wanting to put him on trial and execute him, they therefore sent the ship Salaminia to Sicily to fetch him and the others who had been accused.

5 The crew had orders to tell him to come with them to defend himself, but not to arrest him. The Athenians wanted to avoid causing alarm among either their own troops in Sicily or the enemy. Above all, they wanted the Mantineans and Argives to stay. They believed that these men had been persuaded by Alcibiades to join their expedition.

6 Alcibiades, with his own ship, and those accused along with him sailed from Sicily with the Salaminia, supposedly bound for Athens. When they reached Thurii, however, they stopped following it. They left the ship and disappeared, afraid to sail back and face trial on malicious accusations.

7 The men from the Salaminia searched for Alcibiades and his companions for a while. When they could find them nowhere, they sailed away. Not long afterward, Alcibiades, now an exile, crossed by boat from the territory of Thurii to the Peloponnese. The Athenians tried him and his companions in their absence and sentenced them to death.

CHAPTER 62

1 After this, the remaining Athenian generals in Sicily divided the army into two parts. Each took command of one by lot, and they sailed with the whole force toward Selinus and Egesta. They wanted to find out whether the Egestaeans would provide the money. They also wanted to investigate the situation at Selinus and learn about its dispute with Egesta.

2 They sailed along the side of Sicily facing the Tyrrhenian Gulf, keeping the island on their left, and put in at Himera. It is the only Greek city in that part of Sicily. When its people refused to admit them, they continued along the coast.

3 On their way along the coast, they captured Hyccara, a small Sicanian town that was hostile to the Egestaeans. It stood beside the sea. They enslaved its people and handed the town over to the Egestaeans, some of whose cavalry had

joined them. Their own infantry then returned through Sicel territory until they reached Catana. The ships sailed around the coast carrying the captives.

4 Nicias sailed straight from Hyccara along the coast toward Egesta. He dealt with the other business there, received thirty talents, and returned to the army. They sold the captives and received 120 talents for them.

5 They also sailed around to their Sicel allies and told them to send troops. With half their own army they marched against the hostile town of Hybla Geleatis, but failed to capture it. And the summer ended.

CHAPTER 63

1 At the very beginning of the following winter, the Athenians began preparing their advance on Syracuse. The Syracusans were also preparing to march against them.

2 The Athenians had not attacked immediately, as the Syracusans had first feared and expected. Each day that passed made them more confident. When they saw the Athenians sailing along the far side of Sicily, a long way from them, and heard that they had attacked Hybla but failed to take it by force, they became still more dismissive. As a crowd tends to do when it feels confident, they demanded that their generals lead them against Catana, since the Athenians were not coming against them.

3 Syracusan cavalry scouts also kept riding up to the Athenian army and insulting them. Among other things, they asked whether the Athenians had come to settle themselves in someone else's country rather than to resettle the Leontinians in their own.

CHAPTER 64

1 The Athenian generals knew about this. They wanted to draw the entire Syracusan force as far from the city as possible. Meanwhile, they would sail along the coast at night and occupy a suitable campsite without interference. They knew they could not do this so easily if they landed from their ships against an enemy who was ready, or if they marched by land and were spotted. The Syracusans' large cavalry force would badly damage their light troops and camp followers, since the Athenians had no cavalry with them. By using this plan, they could instead take up a position where the cavalry could do them little serious harm. Syracusan exiles accompanying them had told them about the place beside the sanctuary of Olympian Zeus, which they did in fact occupy. To achieve their purpose, the generals devised the following trick.

2 They sent a man they trusted, who also seemed no less friendly to the Syracusan generals. He was from Catana. He said he had been sent by men in Catana whose names the generals recognized and whom they knew to be among their supporters still left in the city.

3 He said that the Athenians spent the night in the city away from their weapons. If the Syracusans were willing to bring their whole force against the camp at dawn on a specified day, the men in Catana would shut in the Athenians staying with them and burn their ships. The Syracusans could easily capture the camp by attacking the stockade. Many people in Catana would join in this action, he said, and the men who had sent him were already prepared.

CHAPTER 65

1 The Syracusan generals were already confident about the situation in general. Even without this proposal, they intended to prepare an advance against Catana. So they trusted the man with far too little thought. They immediately agreed on a day when they would arrive and sent him away. Then, since the Selinuntians and some of their other allies had already arrived, they ordered all

the Syracusans to march out in full force. Once their preparations were complete and the agreed date for their arrival was near, they set off toward Catana. They camped beside the river Symaethus in Leontinian territory.

2 When the Athenians learned that they were approaching, they took their entire army, together with all the Sicels and anyone else who had joined them, and put them aboard the warships and transports. They sailed toward Syracuse during the night.

3 At dawn the Athenians landed near the sanctuary of Olympian Zeus to occupy their campsite. At the same time, the Syracusan cavalry reached Catana ahead of the infantry and found that the whole army had sailed away. They turned back and told the infantry. The entire force then turned around and hurried to defend the city.

CHAPTER 66

1 The Syracusans had a long way to go. Meanwhile, the Athenians settled their army without interference in a suitable position. It would let them begin battle whenever they wanted, and gave the Syracusan cavalry the least chance to trouble them either during the fighting or beforehand. On one side small walls, houses, trees, and a marsh blocked access; on the other there were steep drops.

2 They cut down the nearby trees, carried them down to the sea, and built a stockade beside their ships. At Dascon, where the enemy could most easily approach, they quickly put up a defensive barrier of stones gathered as they came to hand and timber. They also broke up the bridge over the Anapus.

3 While they were making these preparations, no one came out of the city to interfere. The Syracusan cavalry arrived first to help defend it, and later the whole infantry force assembled as well. At first they approached close to the Athenian army. But when the Athenians did not come out to meet them, they withdrew, crossed the road to Helorus, and camped.

CHAPTER 67

1 The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle and arranged their forces as follows. The Argives and Mantineans held the right wing, the Athenians the center, and the other allies the rest of the line. Half the army was posted in front, eight men deep. The other half was formed into a square near the sleeping quarters, also eight deep. These men had orders to watch and go to help whichever part of the army was under the greatest pressure. The baggage carriers were placed inside this reserve formation.

2 The Syracusans arranged all their hoplites sixteen men deep. These included the full Syracusan levy and all the allies present. The Selinuntians provided the most help. There were also cavalry from Gela, about two hundred in all, and about twenty cavalry and fifty archers from Camarina. The Syracusans posted their cavalry on the right, no fewer than 1,200 men, with the javelin throwers beside them.

3 As the Athenians were about to attack first, Nicias went along the ranks, addressing each national contingent and the whole force with encouragement like this.

CHAPTER 68

1 "Men, why should we need a long speech of encouragement when we have come here for the same fight? I think the force we have assembled can give us more confidence than a fine speech delivered to a weak army.

2 "We have Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the best of the islanders among us. With allies of such quality and in such numbers, how can any of us fail to have high hopes of victory? This is especially true against men who are defending themselves with a general levy, not a selected force like ours. Besides, they are Sicilians. They look down on us, but they will not stand up to us, because their skill falls short of their daring.

3 "Each of you should also remember this. We are a long way from our own country, and we are not near any friendly land except what you yourselves win by fighting. My reminder to you is the opposite of what I know the enemy are saying to encourage themselves. They say that they will be fighting for their homeland. I say that we are not in our homeland. Here we must win, or we will find it hard to get away, because their many cavalry will be on our heels.

4 "So remember your own quality and attack the enemy eagerly. Consider the desperate difficulty of our present situation more frightening than the enemy themselves."

CHAPTER 69

1 After giving this encouragement, Nicias immediately led the army forward. The Syracusans had not expected to fight just then. Some had even gone off to the city, since it was nearby. They hurried back at a run to help, but arrived late and took their places wherever each man happened to reach the main body. They were certainly not short of enthusiasm or daring, either in this battle or in the others. They matched their opponents in courage as far as their skill could support it. But where their skill fell short, they could not carry out their intentions, however much they wanted to. Still, although they had not thought the Athenians would attack first and were forced to defend themselves in a hurry, they took up their weapons and immediately advanced to meet them.

2 First the stone throwers, slingers, and archers on both sides fought in front of the main armies. They drove one another back in the usual way of light troops. Then the diviners brought forward the customary animals for sacrifice, and the trumpeters gave the hoplites the signal to engage.

3 The armies advanced. The Syracusans were fighting for their homeland, and each man for his own immediate survival and future freedom. On the other side, the Athenians were fighting to make someone else's country their own, and to avoid damaging their own country through defeat. The Argives and the independent allies wanted to help the Athenians win what they had come for,

and to win the battle so they could see their own homeland again. The subject allies were eager to fight mainly because of their immediate survival: without victory, they had no hope of it. As a secondary motive, they also hoped that helping conquer other peoples might make their own obedience less burdensome.

CHAPTER 70

1 Once the battle became hand-to-hand, the two sides held out against each other for a long time. Thunder, lightning, and heavy rain also broke out. For those fighting for the first time, with very little experience of war, this added to their fear. The more experienced men thought the weather was simply normal for the time of year. The enemy facing them, still undefeated, gave them much more reason for alarm.

2 First the Argives drove back the Syracusan left wing. Then the Athenians drove back the troops facing them. The rest of the Syracusan army now began to break apart as well and took to flight.

3 The Athenians did not pursue far. The Syracusan cavalry were numerous and still undefeated, and held them back. Whenever they saw any Athenian hoplites pursuing ahead of the others, they charged them and drove them back. The Athenians followed in a close body as far as it was safe, then returned and set up a victory monument.

4 The Syracusans gathered at the road to Helorus and formed up as well as circumstances allowed. Even in this situation, they sent a detachment of their own men to guard the sanctuary of Olympian Zeus. They were afraid the Athenians might take some of the treasures kept there. The rest withdrew into the city.

CHAPTER 71

1 The Athenians did not approach the sanctuary. They gathered their own dead, laid them on a funeral pyre, and camped there for the night. The next day they returned the Syracusan dead under a truce. About 260 Syracusans and allies had been killed. They collected the bones of their own dead, about fifty Athenians and allies, and sailed away to Catana with the equipment stripped from the enemy.

2 It was winter, and they did not yet think they could conduct the war from that position. First they would have to send to Athens for cavalry and gather more from their local allies, so that they would not be completely outmatched in cavalry. They also needed to collect money locally and receive funds from Athens. They wanted to win over some of the cities, which they hoped would be more ready to submit to them after the battle. They also needed to prepare grain and all their other requirements, ready to attack Syracuse in the spring.

CHAPTER 72

1 With this plan, they sailed away to Naxos and Catana to spend the winter. The Syracusans buried their own dead and held an assembly.

2 Hermocrates son of Hermon came forward to speak to them. He was as intelligent as anyone in other matters, and in war he had gained considerable experience and was known for his courage. He encouraged them and urged them not to give way because of what had happened.

3 Their resolve had not been defeated, he said. Their lack of order had hurt them. Even so, they had not fallen as far short as might have been expected, especially since they had faced the most experienced of the Greeks. It had been, so to speak, a contest between amateurs and skilled workers.

4 Another great disadvantage had been the number of generals and the divided command: they had fifteen generals. The troops' disorderly lack of discipline had also done great harm. But they would probably defeat the enemy, he said, if

they appointed a few experienced generals and used this winter to prepare their hoplites. They should obtain armor and weapons for those who had none, to bring their numbers as high as possible, and also make them practice the other military skills. They already had courage; good order in action would now be added to it. Both would improve. Discipline would be practiced in dangerous situations, and their courage itself would become more confident with the assurance that comes from skill.

5 They should elect only a few generals and give them full authority. They should swear an oath to let these men command according to their own judgment. That way, matters needing secrecy would be better protected, and all the other preparations would be made in an orderly way, without excuses.

CHAPTER 73

1 After hearing him, the Syracusans voted for all his proposals. They elected three generals: Hermocrates himself, Heraclides son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus son of Execestus.

2 They also sent ambassadors to Corinth and Lacedaemon. They wanted allied help to reach them, and they wanted to persuade the Lacedaemonians to wage war against Athens more firmly and openly on their behalf. This would either draw the Athenians away from Sicily or reduce the reinforcements they could send to their army there.

CHAPTER 74

1 The Athenian army at Catana immediately sailed to Messene, expecting the city to be handed over by people inside it. But the plan failed. When Alcibiades left his command after being recalled, he already knew he would go into exile. He knew about the plan and revealed it to the friends of Syracuse in Messene.

They had already killed the men involved. Now they were engaged in civil strife and under arms, and those who wanted to keep the Athenians out had the upper hand.

2 The Athenians stayed about thirteen days. But they were suffering from winter weather, had no supplies, and were making no progress. They left for Naxos, marked out their camp, put a palisade around it, and spent the winter there. They sent a trireme to Athens to ask for money and cavalry, so that these could arrive at the start of spring.

CHAPTER 75

1 During the winter the Syracusans also added a wall to their city. It ran along the whole side facing Epipolae and brought the Temenites inside the defenses. This would prevent the enemy from easily cutting them off with a shorter wall if they suffered a defeat. They also built a fort at Megara and another in the Olympieum. Along the sea they set up stakes in front of every possible landing place.

2 Knowing that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they marched against Catana with their whole available force. They ravaged part of its territory, burned the Athenians' tents and camp, and went home.

3 They heard that the Athenians were sending ambassadors to Camarina, hoping to win it over through the alliance made in the time of Laches. So they too sent ambassadors to oppose them. They suspected that the Camarinaeans had been reluctant to send even the help they had sent for the first battle. They also feared that, after seeing the Athenians' success in the battle, the Camarinaeans would no longer be willing to support them. Instead, the Athenians might persuade them to change sides on the strength of their earlier friendship.

4 Hermocrates and others came to Camarina from Syracuse, and Euphemus came with others from the Athenians. The Camarinaeans held an assembly. Hermocrates wanted to turn them against the Athenians before the Athenians

spoke, and said this:

CHAPTER 76

1 "Camarinaeans, we have not sent this embassy because we feared that the Athenian force now here would frighten and overwhelm you. We are more afraid that the speeches they are about to make will persuade you before you have heard anything from us.

2 "They have come to Sicily with the excuse you have heard, but with the intention we all suspect. I think they want not so much to resettle the Leontini as to drive us out of our homes. It makes no sense for them to destroy cities back there while resettling cities here. Nor does it make sense for them to care about the Leontini as their Chalcidian relatives while keeping the Chalcidians in Euboea enslaved. Those are the very people who founded Leontini.

3 "They are now trying to gain control here by the same method they used there. The Ionians and the allies descended from Athens willingly accepted them as leaders, supposedly to take revenge on the Persian. Then Athens conquered them. It charged some with failing to serve in the army, others with fighting one another, and each of the rest with whatever plausible accusation it could find.

4 "So neither did the Athenians resist the Persian for the freedom of the Greeks, nor did the Greeks resist him for their own freedom. The Athenians wanted to enslave them for themselves rather than for him. The Greeks were only exchanging their master for one who was no less clever, but cleverer at doing harm.

CHAPTER 77

1 "But we have not come here now to expose the Athenian state. It is easy enough to accuse it, and you know all its wrongdoing already. We have come much more to blame ourselves. We have the example of the Greeks over there, who were enslaved because they did not defend themselves. Now the same

tricks are being used against us: resettling their relatives, the Leontini, and helping their allies, the Egestaeans. Yet we are unwilling to unite and show the Athenians more forcefully who lives here. We are not Ionians or people of the Hellespont and the islands. They keep changing masters, whether the Persian or someone else, and remain slaves. We are free Dorians who came from the independent Peloponnese to settle Sicily.

2 "Or are we waiting to be captured city by city? We know that this is the only way we can be conquered. We can see the Athenians following this method. They use speeches to divide some of us. They lead others into war against one another by offering the hope of an alliance. They tell each city something it likes to hear, and so manage to harm it. When a fellow Sicilian community some distance away is destroyed first, do we think the danger will not reach us too? Do we think that its suffering is merely its own separate misfortune, rather than something happening to it before it happens to us?

CHAPTER 78

1 "Perhaps someone thinks that Syracuse is Athens' enemy, but he is not, and feels it is wrong to take risks for my country. He should remember that, in fighting for my country, he will be fighting just as much for his own. He will also fight with greater safety, because I will not have been destroyed beforehand. He will have me as an ally, instead of facing the struggle alone. He should remember too that Athens does not simply want to punish Syracuse for its hostility. It is using us as an excuse to make his own friendship with Athens just as firmly binding.

2 "Perhaps someone envies us, or is even afraid of us. Greater powers provoke both feelings. Because of this, he wants Syracuse to suffer enough to teach us a lesson, but to survive for the sake of his own safety. He is hoping for something beyond human power. No one can control the outcome as fully as he controls his own wishes.

3 "If he miscalculates, he may soon be mourning his own troubles and wishing he could envy our good fortune once again. But that will be impossible if he abandons us and refuses to share the same dangers. These concern realities, not labels. In name, he would be preserving our power; in fact, he would be protecting his own safety.

4 "Camarinaeans, as our neighbors and the next people who will be in danger, you above all should have seen this coming. You should not be such halfhearted allies as you are now. Instead, you should come to us yourselves and urge us not to give in at all. You should make the same appeal to us now, on equal terms, that you would have begged us to accept if the Athenians had attacked Camarina first. But neither you nor the others have yet made any move to do this.

CHAPTER 79

1 "Perhaps fear will make you try to meet your obligations both to us and to the invaders. You will say that you have an alliance with the Athenians. But you did not make it for use against your friends. It was for defense if any enemy attacked you, and to help the Athenians when others wronged them, not when they themselves wronged their neighbors, as they are doing now.

2 "Even the people of Rhegium, who are Chalcidians, are unwilling to help resettle the Leontini, although they too are Chalcidians. They suspect what is really behind this fine claim, and act sensibly despite having no respectable excuse. It would be outrageous if you, with a respectable excuse, chose to help your natural enemies and joined your bitterest enemies in destroying people still more closely related to you by nature.

3 "That is not right. You must help us and not be afraid of their forces. Those forces are no threat if we all stand together. They are a threat if, on the contrary, we split apart, which is just what the Athenians are trying to achieve. Even when they attacked us alone and won a battle, they failed to get what they wanted and quickly withdrew.

CHAPTER 80

1 "So if we are united, there is no reason to lose heart. You should join the alliance more eagerly, especially since help will come from the Peloponnese, whose people are far superior to these men in warfare. No one should think that the following cautious course is fair to us and safe for you: to help neither side, on the grounds that you are allies of both.

2 "It is fair in its claim, but not in its effect. Suppose your refusal to join us means that the victims are defeated and the conquerors prevail. By the very same absence, have you not both failed to help one side survive and failed to stop the other from doing wrong? It would be better to side with people who are being wronged and are also your relatives. You would protect Sicily's common interest, and stop the Athenians, your supposed friends, from doing wrong.

3 "To sum up, we Syracusans say there is no need to explain clearly to you or to the others things you understand just as well yourselves. But we ask for help. And if we fail to persuade you, we put this on record: we Dorians are being attacked by Ionians, our constant enemies, and betrayed by you, who are Dorians yourselves.

4 "If the Athenians conquer us, your decisions will have won their victory, but they will take the credit themselves. Their prize for winning will be none other than the people who gave them the victory. If, on the other hand, we win, you yourselves will pay the penalty for having caused our danger.

5 "So consider this and make your choice now. You can accept slavery at once without taking a risk. Or you can have the chance of winning with us, avoiding the shame of taking these men as masters, and escaping an enmity with us that would not be short-lived."

CHAPTER 81

1 That was what Hermocrates said. After him, Euphemus, the Athenian ambassador, spoke as follows:

CHAPTER 82

1 "We came to renew the alliance that existed before. But since the Syracusan has attacked us, we must also explain why we have good reason to hold our empire.

2 "He himself gave the strongest evidence: the Ionians have always been enemies of the Dorians. This is indeed the case. We are Ionians. The Peloponnesians are Dorians, are more numerous than we are, and live near us. We considered how best to avoid coming under their rule.

3 "After the Persian Wars, we acquired ships and freed ourselves from Lacedaemonian rule and leadership. They had no more right to give orders to us than we had to give orders to them, except that they were stronger at the time. We ourselves became leaders of those who had formerly been under the King, and we still hold that position. We thought that having the power to defend ourselves was the best way to avoid falling under the Peloponnesians. And to be precise, we were not unjust in conquering the Ionians and islanders whom the Syracusans say we have enslaved despite their kinship with us.

4 "They came with the Persian to attack us, their mother city. They did not dare to rebel and sacrifice their property, as we did when we abandoned our city. Instead, they accepted slavery for themselves and wanted to impose the same on us.

CHAPTER 83

1 "For these reasons we rule them, and deserve to. We supplied the Greeks with the largest navy and gave our wholehearted support without making excuses. These people, by willingly doing the same for the Persian, harmed us. At the same time, we seek the strength to stand up to the Peloponnesians.

2 "We do not dress this up by claiming that we rightly rule because we alone defeated the non-Greeks. Nor do we claim that we took risks for these people's freedom rather than for everyone's, including our own. No one can be blamed

for securing their own safety. We are here now for our own security, and we see that the same course serves your interests too.

3 "We will show this from the very things they accuse us of, which make you most fearful and suspicious. We know that people whose fears make them suspicious may enjoy a pleasant speech for the moment. But when it comes to action later, they do what serves their interests.

4 "As we have said, fear makes us hold our empire at home. The same reason has brought us here to put affairs on a secure footing with our friends. We have come not to enslave people, but rather to prevent our own enslavement.

CHAPTER 84

1 "No one should think we have no reason to care about you. He should understand that if you survive and are strong enough to resist Syracuse, we will be less exposed to harm from any force it sends to help the Peloponnesians.

2 "In this respect, you are already of the greatest concern to us. That is also why it makes sense to resettle the Leontini, not as subjects like their relatives in Euboea, but as strong as possible. From their own territory on the Syracusan border, they can then cause Syracuse trouble on our behalf.

3 "At home, we can face our enemies by ourselves. The Chalcidians there are useful to us without armed forces, simply paying us money. He says it makes no sense for us to have enslaved them while freeing the Chalcidians here. But here the Leontini and our other friends are useful to us when they are as independent as possible.

CHAPTER 85

1 "For a tyrant or a city that rules others, nothing is unreasonable if it serves their interests, and no one counts as a relative if they cannot be trusted. In each case they must become an enemy or a friend as the situation requires. What helps us

here is not to harm our friends, but to have friends strong enough to keep our enemies powerless.

2 "You should not distrust us. We also direct each of our allies at home according to how it can be useful. The Chians and Methymnaeans are independent and supply ships. We put stronger pressure on most of the others to make them pay money. Others are our allies on completely free terms, although they are islanders and easy to conquer, because they occupy important positions around the Peloponnese.

3 "So you should expect our policy here too to serve our interests and, as we say, to be shaped by fear of Syracuse. The Syracusans want to rule you. They want to unite you through suspicion of us and then rule Sicily themselves, either by force or by taking advantage of your isolation after we leave without achieving anything. This must happen if you join them. We will no longer find it easy to deal with such great strength united in one body. And once we are gone, they will not be weak when they confront you.

CHAPTER 86

1 "The facts themselves refute anyone who disagrees. When you first called us in, you held out only this threat: if we let you fall under Syracusan rule, we ourselves would be in danger too.

2 "It is not right for you now to distrust the very argument you thought should persuade us. Nor should you suspect us because we have come with a larger force to match their strength. You have much more reason to distrust them.

3 "We cannot even stay here without your support. Even if we acted wickedly and conquered you, we could not keep control. The voyage is long, and we would lack the means to garrison large cities equipped to fight on land. But these men live close to you, not in a camp, but in a city stronger than the force we have brought here. They are always plotting against you. Whenever they get an opportunity against one of you,

4 "they do not let it go. They have already shown this in other cases and in their treatment of the Leontini. Yet now they dare to call on you to attack the people who stop them and have so far kept Sicily from falling under their rule, as though you could not see what was happening.

5 "Our appeal, on the other hand, offers much more real safety. We ask you not to throw away the security that each side gains from the other. Remember that their numbers always leave them ready to march against you, even without allies. But you will not often have the chance to defend yourselves with so much help. If your suspicions make you let this force leave without achieving anything, or even after a defeat, you will later wish you could see even a tiny fraction of it. By then, its arrival will no longer do you any good.

CHAPTER 87

1 "Camarinaeans, do not let their accusations persuade either you or the others. We have told you the whole truth about the things that make you suspicious of us. We will briefly remind you of the main points, and ask you to accept them.

2 "We say that we rule the people at home so that we do not have to obey someone else. We free the people here so that they cannot harm us. We are forced to do many things because we must guard against many things. Both now and before, we have come as allies to those of you here who are being wronged, not uninvited, but because we were called in.

3 "Do not try to turn us from our course by making yourselves judges of what we do or by trying to discipline us. That would be difficult now anyway. Instead, take whatever part of our active policy and our way of doing things serves your own interests, and use it. Remember that these things do not harm everyone equally, and that they benefit far more of the Greeks than they harm.

4 "Everywhere, even in places where we are not present, both the person expecting to be wronged and the person planning harm have to reckon with us. The first can always hope to get help from us. The second knows that, if we come,

he cannot take his risk without fear. So the would-be attacker has to restrain himself, however unwillingly, while his intended victim stays safe without having to do anything.

5 "Do not reject this protection, which is available to anyone who needs it and is now offered to you. Instead, put yourselves on the same footing as the others and join us. Take your turn in plotting against Syracuse on equal terms, rather than always having to guard against it."

CHAPTER 88

1 That was what Euphemus said. The Camarinaeans' feelings were as follows. They were friendly toward the Athenians, except that they thought Athens would enslave Sicily. They were always at odds with Syracuse because they shared a border. But they were just as afraid that their Syracusan neighbors might win even without their help. That was why they had sent them the small cavalry force at first. For the future, they decided that their practical help would favor Syracuse, but they would give as little as they could. For the moment, however, they decided to give both sides the same answer. Since the Athenians had also won the battle, they did not want to seem to have treated them less favorably.

2 Having reached this decision, they answered that, since both their allies happened to be at war with each other, they thought keeping their oaths required them to help neither side for the present. The ambassadors of both sides left.

3 The Syracusans continued their own preparations for war. Meanwhile, the Athenians, encamped at Naxos, negotiated with the Sicels to get as many as possible to join them.

4 Most of the Sicels living nearer the plains had held back, since they were subjects of Syracuse. Among those in the interior, whose settlements had always been independent, all but a few immediately sided with the Athenians. They brought grain down to the army, and some brought money too.

5 The Athenians marched against those who would not join them and forced some to do so. In other cases, the Syracusans sent garrisons and help, and prevented them. During the winter the Athenians moved their ships from Naxos to Catana, rebuilt the camp the Syracusans had burned, and spent the winter there.

6 They sent a trireme to Carthage to discuss friendship and see whether they could get any help. They also sent to Tyrrhenia, where some cities had themselves offered to join the war. They sent instructions around to the Sicels and sent to Egesta too, telling them to provide as many horses as possible. They also prepared bricks, iron, and everything else needed for a wall around Syracuse. They intended to take up the war at the start of spring.

7 The Syracusan ambassadors sent to Corinth and Lacedaemon sailed along the coast of Italy. On the way, they tried to persuade the Greeks there not to stand by and watch what the Athenians were doing, since the same plans threatened them too. When they reached Corinth, they spoke there, asking for help on the grounds of kinship.

8 The Corinthians were the first to vote, immediately and on their own initiative, to give help with all their strength. They also sent ambassadors with the Syracusans to Lacedaemon. Together they were to persuade the Lacedaemonians both to wage war against Athens more openly in their own region and to send some help to Sicily.

9 The ambassadors from Corinth arrived at Lacedaemon, and Alcibiades was there too. At about this time he and his fellow exiles had first crossed on a merchant ship from the territory of Thurii to Cyllene in Elis. Later he came to Lacedaemon under a safe-conduct, at the invitation of the Lacedaemonians themselves. He was afraid of them because of his involvement in the affairs of Mantinea.

10 In the Lacedaemonian assembly, the Corinthians, the Syracusans, and Alcibiades all happened to urge the same course on the Lacedaemonians. The ephors and the other authorities intended to send ambassadors to Syracuse to stop it from reaching an agreement with Athens, but they were not eager to send help. Alcibiades came forward, stirred the Lacedaemonians up, and urged them into action with this speech:

CHAPTER 89

1 "I must first speak about the accusations against me, so that your suspicion of me does not make you less willing to listen to what I say about public affairs.

2 "My ancestors gave up their role as your city's official hosts and representatives because of a grievance. I myself took it up again and worked to serve you, both in other matters and during the disaster at Pylos. Although I remained eager to help, when you made peace with Athens you negotiated through my enemies. You gave them influence and brought dishonor on me.

3 "So you deserved the harm I did you when I turned to the Mantineans and Argives, and through my other actions against you. Anyone who was unreasonably angry with me then, while suffering that harm, should now look at the truth and change his mind. Or if someone thought less of me because I was more closely aligned with the people, he should not think his resentment justified on that account either.

4 "My family has always opposed tyrants. Everything opposed to the ruling power has been called 'the people.' That is how leadership of the people came to us and stayed with us. Besides, since the city was a democracy, we generally had to go along with the established system.

5 "Still, we tried to be more moderate in our political conduct than the prevailing lack of restraint. Others, both in the past and now, led the crowd to worse behavior. They were the very people who drove me out.

6 "We led the whole community. We thought it right to help preserve the form of government under which the city had become greatest and freest, the same form each of us had inherited. Those of us with any sense understood democracy, and I understood it as well as anyone—all the more because I could say so much against it. But there is nothing new to be said about something everyone agrees is foolish. With you stationed nearby as enemies, we did not think it safe to change it.

CHAPTER 90

1 "Those are the facts about the accusations against me. Now listen to the matters you need to decide, and on which I need to advise you if I know anything more than you do.

2 "We sailed to Sicily intending first to conquer the Sicilian Greeks, if we could, and then the Greeks in Italy. After that we would attack the Carthaginian empire and Carthage itself.

3 "If all or most of this succeeded, we then intended to attack the Peloponnese. We would bring all the Greek forces we had gained there and hire large numbers of non-Greeks, including Iberians and others from that region who are now generally recognized as the best fighters among non-Greeks. We would also build many triremes to add to our own, since Italy has plentiful timber. With these ships we would blockade the Peloponnese all around its coast, while our infantry attacked by land. We would take some cities by force and build forts against others. We hoped to defeat the Peloponnese easily in this way and then rule the whole Greek world.

4 "The territories we gained there would provide enough money and grain to make both more plentiful for us, without any need for revenue from here.

CHAPTER 91

1 "So you have heard what we intended to do with the expedition that has now sailed, from the man who knows the facts most exactly. The generals who remain will carry out the same plans if they can. Now learn why things there will not survive unless you help.

2 "The Sicilian Greeks are less experienced, but even now they could still win if they joined together as a single force. But the Syracusans alone cannot resist the Athenian forces now there. Their entire army has already been defeated in battle, and they are also being blockaded by sea.

3 "If this city is taken, all Sicily is in Athenian hands, and Italy will immediately follow. The danger from that direction that I have just described would soon fall on you.

4 "So no one should think that you are deciding only about Sicily. You are also deciding about the Peloponnese, unless you act quickly as follows. Send troops there on ships, men who will row themselves across and immediately serve as hoplites. And send a Spartan commander, which I think is even more useful than the troops. He can organize the forces already there and force the unwilling to join them. This will give your existing friends more confidence, and those who are undecided will feel safer about joining you.

5 "At the same time you must wage war more openly here. This will make the Syracusans resist more firmly, because they see that you are taking an interest in them. It will also make the Athenians less able to send further reinforcements to their own troops.

6 "You must also fortify Decelea in Attica. This is what the Athenians have always feared most. They believe it is the only experience of this war they have not yet faced. The surest way to hurt your enemies is to find out exactly what they fear most and then bring it upon them. It is reasonable to suppose that each side knows its own dangers best and fears them accordingly.

7 "I will pass over many of the advantages you will gain, and the losses you will inflict on your opponents, by establishing this fort. I will sum up the most important. Most of the resources with which their countryside is stocked will come into your hands, some by capture and some of their own accord. They will immediately lose the revenue from the silver mines at Laurium, and everything they now earn from the land and the law courts. Above all, they will lose revenue from their allies, which will come in less regularly. The allies will become careless about paying when they think you are now waging war with all your strength.

CHAPTER 92

1 "Lacedaemonians, it is up to you to carry out any of this quickly and energetically. I am entirely confident that it can be done, and I do not think my judgment will prove wrong.

2 "I do not think any of you should consider me a worse man because I now attack my own city so forcefully alongside its bitterest enemies, although I once seemed devoted to it. Nor should you distrust what I say because of an exile's eagerness.

3 "I am in exile from the wickedness of those who drove me out, not from the chance to help you, if you listen to me. You, who have harmed your enemies, are not greater enemies than those who forced their friends to become enemies.

4 "My love for my city is not for a city where I am wronged, but for one where I lived securely as a citizen. I do not think I am now attacking a country that is still mine. Instead, I am trying to recover the country I no longer have. The true lover of his city is not the man who refuses to attack it after unjustly losing it. It is the man who wants it so much that he tries every possible way to recover it.

5 "So, Lacedaemonians, I ask you to use me without hesitation in any danger or hardship. Remember the argument everyone repeats: if I did you great harm as an enemy, I could also be very useful as a friend. Indeed, I know the Athenians'

affairs, whereas I could only guess at yours. You should now recognize that the matters you are deciding are of the greatest importance. Do not hesitate to send expeditions to Sicily and Attica. By sending a small part of your forces to help there, you can save great interests and bring down both the present and the future power of Athens. After that you can live in safety yourselves and lead all Hellas with its willing support, through goodwill rather than force."

CHAPTER 93

1 That was what Alcibiades said. The Lacedaemonians had already been thinking of marching against Athens themselves, but they were still delaying and watching events. His explanation of each of these points made them much more determined. They thought they had heard from the man who knew the facts most clearly.

2 They now turned their attention to fortifying Decelea and to sending immediate help to the people in Sicily. They appointed Gylippus son of Cleandridas commander for the Syracusans. They told him to consult with them and the Corinthians and arrange for the greatest and quickest possible help to reach the people there with the resources available.

3 He immediately told the Corinthians to send him two ships to Asine. They were to prepare the rest of the ships they intended to send and have them ready to sail when the time came. After making these arrangements, they left Lacedaemon.

4 The Athenian trireme that the generals had sent from Sicily to get money and cavalry also arrived. After hearing its report, the Athenians voted to send the army money for its upkeep and the cavalry. The winter ended, and the seventeenth year of this war, whose history Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

CHAPTER 94

1 At the very beginning of spring in the following summer, the Athenians in Sicily sailed from Catana along the coast toward Megara in Sicily. As I mentioned earlier, the Syracusans had expelled its inhabitants in the time of the tyrant Gelon and now held the land themselves.

2 The Athenians landed and destroyed the crops in the fields. They advanced against a Syracusan fort but failed to take it. Then they moved on by land and sea to the river Terias. They went inland onto the plain, destroyed the crops, and burned the grain. They met a small number of Syracusans and killed some of them. After setting up a victory monument, they returned to their ships.

3 They sailed back to Catana and collected provisions there. Then they marched with their whole army against Centoripa, a Sicel town. They brought it over to their side by agreement and left, burning the grain of the Inessaeans and Hyblaeans as they went.

4 When they reached Catana, they found that 250 cavalrymen had arrived from Athens with their equipment but without horses, since horses were to be obtained locally. Thirty mounted archers and 300 talents of silver had also arrived.

CHAPTER 95

1 That same spring the Lacedaemonians marched against Argos. They reached Cleonae, but an earthquake made them withdraw. After this the Argives invaded the neighboring district of Thyreatis and took a great deal of plunder belonging to the Lacedaemonians. It sold for at least twenty-five talents.

2 Not long afterward, in the same summer, the people of Thespiae attacked those holding office but failed to gain control. The Thebans came to help the authorities. Some of the attackers were captured, and others fled to Athens.

CHAPTER 96

1 That same summer the Syracusans learned that the cavalry had reached the Athenians and that they were now about to advance against them. They thought the Athenians could not easily surround them with a wall, even if they won a battle, unless they took control of Epipolae. This was a steep height directly above the city. They planned to guard its approaches so that the enemy could not climb up by these routes without being noticed. There was no other way for them to get up.

2 The rest of the ground stands high above its surroundings. It slopes down as far as the city, and its entire inner surface is visible. The Syracusans call it Epipolae because it lies above the rest of the area.

3 At daybreak the Syracusans went out with their whole army to the meadow beside the river Anapus. Hermocrates and his fellow generals had just taken office. They held a review of the troops and first picked out 600 selected hoplites under Diomilus, an exile from Andros. These men were to guard Epipolae and, if needed elsewhere, to assemble and arrive quickly.

CHAPTER 97

1 During the night before the day of this review, the Athenians had brought their whole army from Catana without the Syracusans noticing. They put in at the place called Leon, six or seven stades from Epipolae, and landed their infantry. They then anchored their ships at Thapsus. This is a peninsula extending into the open sea from a narrow isthmus, only a short journey from Syracuse by either sea or land.

2 The Athenian naval force built a palisade across the isthmus at Thapsus and stayed there. The infantry immediately ran toward Epipolae. They climbed up by Euryelus before the Syracusans, on learning what was happening, could arrive from the meadow where they were holding their review.

3 The other Syracusans hurried to help as fast as each could, together with Diomilus and his 600 men. From the meadow they had to cover at least twenty-five stades before they could meet the enemy.

4 As a result, the Syracusans attacked in considerable disorder. They were defeated in battle on Epipolae and withdrew into the city. Diomilus was killed, along with about 300 others.

5 After this the Athenians set up a victory monument and returned the Syracusan dead under a truce. The next day they went down toward the city itself. When the Syracusans did not come out against them, they withdrew and built a fort at Labdalum, on the edge of the cliffs of Epipolae facing Megara. It was to serve as a store for their equipment and money whenever they went forward to fight or build walls.

CHAPTER 98

1 Not long afterward, 300 cavalrymen from Egesta reached them, along with about 100 from the Sicels, Naxos, and some other places. There were already 250 Athenians there. They obtained horses for these men, some supplied by the Egestaeans and Catanaeans and others bought. Altogether they assembled 650 cavalrymen.

2 The Athenians left a garrison in Labdalum and advanced to Syce. They established themselves there and quickly built their circular fort. The speed of the building alarmed the Syracusans. They came out intending to fight rather than stand by and let it continue.

3 The two sides were already forming up against each other when the Syracusan generals saw that their army was scattered and difficult to get into formation. They led it back into the city, except for some of the cavalry. These stayed behind and prevented the Athenians from carrying stones or spreading out very far.

4 The hoplites of one Athenian tribe, together with all their cavalry, attacked and routed the Syracusan cavalry. They killed some of them and set up a victory monument for the cavalry battle.

CHAPTER 99

1 The next day some of the Athenians were building the wall north of the circular fort. Others collected stones and timber and kept laying them along the route toward the place called Trogilus. This was the shortest line for their blockade wall from the Great Harbor to the sea on the other side.

2 The Syracusans no longer wanted to risk their whole army in battles against the Athenians, particularly on the advice of their general Hermocrates. They thought it better to build a counterwall across the line where the Athenians intended to take their wall. If they finished first, it would block the Athenians' route. And if the Athenians came to stop the work, the Syracusans could send part of their army against them while getting ahead of them to secure the approaches with stakes. The Athenians would then have to stop work and turn their whole force against them.

3 So they came out and began building from their own city. They ran a wall across the Athenian line below the circular fort, cutting down the olive trees in the sacred precinct and putting up wooden towers.

4 The Athenian ships had not yet sailed around from Thapsus into the Great Harbor. The Syracusans still controlled the coastal area, and the Athenians brought their supplies overland from Thapsus.

CHAPTER 100

1 The Syracusans decided that they had built enough of their counterwall and its palisade. The Athenians had not come to stop them, since they feared that dividing their own forces would make them easier to fight, and they were also hurrying to complete their own blockade wall. The Syracusans left one tribe to

guard the structure and withdrew into the city. The Athenians destroyed the underground channels that brought drinking water into the city. Then they watched for a time at midday when the other Syracusans were in their tents, some had even gone back into the city, and the men at the palisade were keeping a careless watch. They placed 300 selected men of their own and some picked light troops with their weapons in front, with orders to run suddenly at the counterwall. The rest of the army advanced in two divisions. One, under one of the generals, moved toward the city to meet any force coming to help. The other, under the other general, moved toward the palisade beside the small gate.

2 The 300 attacked and took the palisade. Its guards abandoned it and fled into the outer defensive wall around the Temenites. Their pursuers rushed in with them, but once inside they were forced out again by the Syracusans. Some Argives and a few Athenians were killed there.

3 The whole army withdrew, demolished the counterwall, pulled up the palisade, and carried the stakes back to their own lines. They also set up a victory monument.

CHAPTER 101

1 The next day the Athenians extended their wall from the circular fort along the cliff above the marsh. This is the side of Epipolae that faces the Great Harbor. From there, down across the level ground and the marsh to the harbor, lay the shortest route for their blockade wall.

2 Meanwhile the Syracusans also came out and built another line of stakes, starting from the city and running through the middle of the marsh. They dug a ditch alongside it to prevent the Athenians from completing their wall to the sea.

3 Once the Athenians had finished their work by the cliff, they attacked the Syracusan palisade and ditch again. They ordered their ships to sail around from Thapsus into the Great Harbor of Syracuse. They themselves went down from Epipolae onto the level ground before dawn. They laid doors and broad planks across the marsh where its muddy ground was firmest and walked over them. At daybreak they captured the ditch and all but a small section of the palisade. Later they took the remaining section too.

4 A battle followed, and the Athenians won. The Syracusan right wing fled toward the city, and the left wing along the river. The 300 selected Athenian troops hurried at a run toward the bridge, hoping to cut them off from the crossing.

5 The Syracusans were alarmed. Most of their cavalry were also there. They advanced to meet these 300 men, routed them, and charged into the Athenian right wing. Their attack also panicked the tribe at the front of the wing.

6 Lamachus saw this and came to help from the Athenian left wing, bringing a few archers and the Argives with him. He crossed a ditch and was cut off with a few men who had crossed with him. He was killed, along with five or six of his companions. The Syracusans immediately seized their bodies and hurried them to safety on the other side of the river before the Athenians could intervene. They themselves withdrew as the rest of the Athenian army was now coming up.

CHAPTER 102

1 Meanwhile, the Syracusans who had first fled toward the city saw what was happening. Encouraged, they came out from the city again and formed up against the Athenians facing them. They also sent some of their men against the circular fort on Epipolae, thinking they could capture it while it was deserted.

2 They captured and destroyed the Athenians' outer wall, ten plethra long. But Nicias prevented them from taking the circular fort itself. He happened to have been left there because he was ill. He realized that, with so few men, they could not hold out in any other way. So he ordered the attendants to set fire to the siege engines and all the timber lying in front of the wall.

3 This had the intended effect. The Syracusans could no longer approach because of the fire and withdrew again. Athenian reinforcements were already coming back up to the circular fort from below, after driving off the enemy there. At the same time their ships, following their orders, sailed from Thapsus into the Great Harbor.

4 When the Syracusans on the heights saw this, they withdrew quickly, and the entire Syracusan army returned to the city. They thought their present forces could no longer stop the wall from reaching the sea.

CHAPTER 103

1 After this the Athenians set up a victory monument, returned the Syracusan dead under a truce, and recovered Lamachus and the men killed with him. Their entire force, both fleet and infantry, was now there. Starting from Epipolae and the cliffs, they began to cut off the Syracusans with a double wall extending to the sea.

2 Supplies for the army came in from every part of Italy. Many Sicels who had previously stood back now came to join the Athenians as allies. Three ships with fifty oars each also arrived from Tyrrhenia. Everything else was going as they hoped.

3 The Syracusans no longer thought they could win the war, since no help had reached them even from the Peloponnese. They discussed a settlement both among themselves and with Nicias. He now held sole command, since Lamachus was dead.

4 Nothing was agreed. But, as was natural among people in difficulty and under a tighter siege than before, there was much discussion with Nicias and still more within the city. Their current troubles also made them somewhat suspicious of one another. They dismissed the generals under whom these events had happened, thinking they were suffering from either their bad luck or their treachery. They elected Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias in their place.

CHAPTER 104

1 Meanwhile Gylippus the Lacedaemonian and the ships from Corinth had reached the area of Leucas. They wanted to get to Sicily quickly to help. Alarming reports kept reaching them, all repeating the same false claim that Syracuse was already completely walled off. Gylippus gave up all hope for Sicily but wanted to save Italy. He and Pythen the Corinthian therefore crossed the Ionian Sea to Tarentum as quickly as possible with two Laconian and two Corinthian ships. The Corinthians were to sail later, after manning two Leucadian ships and three Ambraciot ships in addition to their own ten.

2 From Tarentum, Gylippus first sent an embassy to Thurii and renewed the citizenship his father had held there, but he could not win them over. He then set sail along the Italian coast. Off the Terinaean Gulf he was caught by a strong wind that blows steadily from the north there, and was driven out to sea. After being badly battered by the storm, he returned to Tarentum. He pulled ashore the ships that had suffered most in the storm and repaired them.

3 Nicias learned that Gylippus was sailing toward him, but dismissed the small number of ships, just as the people of Thurii had done. He thought they were equipped more for piracy and took no precautions yet.

CHAPTER 105

1 About the same time that summer, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded the territory of Argos and devastated most of the land. The Athenians sent thirty ships to help the Argives. These ships marked their clearest breach of the treaty with the Lacedaemonians.

2 Previously they had fought alongside the Argives and Mantineans by making raids from Pylos and landing elsewhere around the Peloponnese rather than in Laconia. The Argives had often urged them merely to make an armed landing in Laconia, destroy even the smallest amount of property with them, and then leave. But the Athenians had refused. Now, however, under the command of Pythodorus, Laespodias, and Demaratus, they landed at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiae, and other places and devastated the land. This gave the Lacedaemonians a better justification for blaming the Athenians and taking action against them.

3 After the Athenians had sailed away from Argos and the Lacedaemonians had also withdrawn, the Argives invaded the territory of Phlius. They ravaged some of its land, killed some people, and returned home.

Book 7



CHAPTER 1

1 After repairing their ships, Gylippus and Pythen sailed along the coast from Tarentum to Epizephyrian Locri. They now learned more definitely that Syracuse was not yet completely walled off. An army could still enter by way of Epipolae. They considered two options. They could keep Sicily on their right and risk sailing into Syracuse. Or they could keep it on their left, sail first to Himera, recruit the people there and any other troops they could persuade to join them, and travel overland.

2 They decided to sail to Himera. One further reason was that the four Athenian ships had not yet reached Rhegium. Nicias had nevertheless sent these when he learned that they were at Locri. Getting ahead of this patrol, they passed through the strait. They stopped at Rhegium and Messene and reached Himera.

3 There they persuaded the Himeraeans to join the war, march with them in person, and provide weapons for any sailors from their ships who had none. They had hauled their ships ashore at Himera. They also sent a message telling the Selinuntians to meet them at a certain place with their whole army.

4 The people of Gela and some of the Sicels also promised to send them a small force. The Sicels were now much more willing to join them. Archonides had recently died. He had ruled some of the Sicels in that region, had considerable power, and was friendly to the Athenians. Gylippus also seemed to have come from Lacedaemon with a strong commitment to helping them.

5 Gylippus set out for Syracuse with about seven hundred armed men from his own sailors and marines. He also took a thousand Himeraean hoplites and light-armed troops in all, and a hundred cavalry. There were also some light-armed troops and cavalry from Selinus, a few men from Gela, and about a thousand Sicels altogether.

CHAPTER 2

1 Meanwhile, the Corinthians were hurrying from Leucas to bring help with the rest of their ships. Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, had been the last to set out, with a single ship, but reached Syracuse first, shortly before Gylippus. He found the Syracusans about to hold an assembly to discuss ending the war. He stopped them and encouraged them by saying that more ships were still on their way, and that the Lacedaemonians had sent Gylippus son of Cleandridas as commander.

2 The Syracusans gained confidence. They immediately marched out with their whole army to meet Gylippus, since they had already learned that he was nearby.

3 Gylippus had meanwhile captured Ietae, a Sicel fort on his route. He arranged his men for battle and reached Epipolae. He climbed up by Euryelus, the same way the Athenians had first come, and advanced with the Syracusans toward the Athenian fortifications.

4 He happened to arrive at the following stage of the work. The Athenians had already completed a double wall extending seven or eight stades to the Great Harbor. Only a short stretch near the sea remained, and they were still building

it. For most of the rest of their circuit, toward Trogilus and the sea on the other side, stones had already been laid out. Some stretches of wall had been left half finished, and others were complete. This was how close Syracuse had come to disaster.

CHAPTER 3

1 The Athenians were alarmed at first by the sudden approach of Gylippus and the Syracusans, but they drew up for battle. Gylippus halted his troops nearby and sent them a herald. His message was that he was ready to make a truce if they were willing to take their own belongings and leave Sicily within five days.

2 They treated the offer with contempt and sent the herald away without an answer. After this, both sides prepared to fight each other.

3 Gylippus saw that the Syracusans were in confusion and had trouble getting into formation. He moved the army back onto more open ground. Nicias did not lead the Athenians forward, but stayed by their own wall. When Gylippus realized that they were not coming toward him, he led his army away to the high ground called Temenites. They camped there.

4 The next day he led out most of his army and drew it up facing the Athenian walls, to stop the Athenians from sending help elsewhere. He sent a detachment against the fort at Labdalum and captured it. He killed everyone he caught inside. The Athenians could not see this position from where they were.

5 On the same day, the Syracusans also captured an Athenian trireme that was keeping watch off the harbor.

CHAPTER 4

1 After this, the Syracusans and their allies began building a single wall from the city up across Epipolae toward the cross-wall. Unless the Athenians could stop them, this would make it impossible for the Athenians to complete the

encirclement.

2 The Athenians had now finished their wall down to the sea and had moved up to the higher ground. There was a weak point in their wall, and Gylippus took his army toward it at night.

3 The Athenians happened to be camping outside. When they noticed his approach, they moved out to meet him. Gylippus saw this and quickly led his men back. The Athenians built this part of the wall higher and guarded it themselves. They now assigned the other allies their separate posts along the rest of the fortifications.

4 Nicias decided to fortify the place called Plemmyrium. This is a headland opposite the city. It projects into the Great Harbor and narrows its entrance. He thought that fortifying it would make bringing in supplies easier. They would be able to keep watch closer to the Syracusan harbor. If the enemy made a move with their fleet, they would no longer have to put out from the innermost part of the harbor, as they did now. He was already paying more attention to the war at sea. He saw that, since Gylippus had arrived, their prospects on land were less promising.

5 He therefore moved troops and the ships across and built three forts. Most of the equipment was stored in them. The large transport ships and the fast warships were now moored there too.

6 This was when the ships' crews first began to suffer serious losses. Water was scarce and had to be fetched from a distance. When the sailors went out for it or to collect firewood, the Syracusan cavalry, who controlled the countryside, killed them. The Syracusans had stationed a third of their cavalry at the small settlement by the Olympieum to prevent the men at Plemmyrium from coming out to damage the countryside.

7 Nicias also learned that the rest of the Corinthian ships were approaching. He sent twenty ships to intercept them, with orders to lie in wait around Locri and Rhegium and at the approach to Sicily.

CHAPTER 5

1 Gylippus continued building the wall across Epipolae, using the stones the Athenians had previously laid out for themselves. At the same time, he regularly led the Syracusans and their allies out in front of the fortifications and drew them up for battle. The Athenians drew up opposite them.

2 When Gylippus thought the moment was right, he led the attack. They met and fought at close quarters between the walls, where the Syracusan cavalry could be of no use.

3 The Syracusans and their allies were defeated. They recovered their dead under a truce, and the Athenians set up a victory marker. Gylippus called his army together and said the fault had been his, not theirs. By placing their battle line too far inside the space between the walls, he had deprived them of the help of their cavalry and javelin throwers. Now he would lead them into battle again.

4 He told them to keep this in mind: their equipment would be no worse than the enemy's. As for their determination, it would be intolerable if they, as Peloponnesians and Dorians, did not think it their duty to defeat Ionians, islanders, and a mixed crowd of men, and drive them out of the country.

CHAPTER 6

1 After this, when the moment was right, he led them forward again. Nicias and the Athenians believed that, even if the enemy did not want to start a battle, they themselves had to stop the wall being built past their own. The enemy's wall had already almost passed the end of the Athenian wall. If it went any farther, winning every battle from then on would do them no more good than not fighting at all. So they advanced to meet the Syracusans.

2 Gylippus brought his hoplites farther out from the walls than before and engaged the Athenians. He had placed his cavalry and javelin throwers on the Athenians' flank, on the open ground where construction of both walls ended.

3 During the battle, the cavalry attacked the Athenian left wing, which was opposite them, and put it to flight. As a result, the rest of the Athenian army was also defeated by the Syracusans and driven back in confusion into the fortifications.

4 During the following night, the Syracusans managed to extend their wall beyond the Athenian construction before they could be stopped. The Athenians could no longer obstruct them. Even if the Athenians won in battle, they had now completely lost the chance to wall the Syracusans in.

CHAPTER 7

1 After this, the twelve remaining ships from Corinth, Ambracia, and Leucas sailed in without being noticed by the Athenian patrol. Their commander was Erasinides, a Corinthian. Their men helped the Syracusans finish the rest of the wall as far as the cross-wall.

2 Gylippus went to the rest of Sicily to gather forces for both land and sea. He also meant to bring over any cities that were reluctant to help or had so far stayed out of the war altogether.

3 Other Syracusan and Corinthian envoys were sent to Lacedaemon and Corinth to arrange for more troops to cross over. They were to come in merchant ships, smaller vessels, or whatever other means could be found, since the Athenians were also sending for reinforcements.

4 The Syracusans manned a fleet and practiced with it, intending to attempt an attack by sea as well. Their confidence also grew greatly in other areas.

CHAPTER 8

1 Nicias learned of this and saw the enemy's strength growing day by day while his own difficulties increased. He too sent reports to Athens. He had often sent reports before about each development, but now he did so with particular

urgency. He thought they were in serious danger. Unless the Athenians recalled them as quickly as possible or sent a substantial new force, there was no chance of survival.

2 He was afraid the messengers might not report the facts as they were. They might lack the ability to explain them, forget something, or say something to please the crowd. So he wrote a letter. He thought this was the best way for the Athenians to learn his views without anything being lost through the messenger, and to make their decision on the basis of the truth.

3 The men he sent left with the letter and instructions about what they needed to say. Nicias attended to matters in camp, now concentrating on keeping it secure rather than taking risks of his own choice.

CHAPTER 9

1 At the end of the same summer, the Athenian general Euetion campaigned against Amphipolis with Perdiccas and many Thracians. He failed to capture the city. But he brought triremes around into the Strymon and conducted a siege from the river, using Himeraeum as his base. The summer ended.

CHAPTER 10

1 During the following winter, Nicias' messengers arrived in Athens. They delivered the oral message they had been given, answered any questions put to them, and handed over the letter. The city's secretary came forward and read it to the Athenians. It said the following.

CHAPTER 11

1 "Athenians, you know what happened earlier from my many previous letters. Now it is just as important for you to learn our present situation and decide what to do.

2 "We had defeated the Syracusans, whom you sent us to fight, in most of our battles. We had also built the walls within which we are now stationed. Then Gylippus the Lacedaemonian arrived with an army from the Peloponnese and some of the cities in Sicily. We defeated him in the first battle. But in the next battle, large numbers of cavalry and javelin throwers overpowered us, and we withdrew inside our walls.

3 "So now we have stopped building the encircling wall because of the enemy's numbers, and we are taking no action. We cannot even use our whole army, since guarding the walls takes up part of our hoplite force. The enemy have built a single wall past ours. We can no longer wall them in unless someone attacks and captures this blocking wall with a large army.

4 "We are supposed to be besieging others. Instead, at least on land, we are more like the ones under siege. Their cavalry prevents us from going far into the countryside.

CHAPTER 12

1 "They have also sent envoys to the Peloponnese for another army. Gylippus has gone to the cities in Sicily. He means to persuade those that are now inactive to join the war. From the others he will bring more land troops and, if he can, resources for a fleet.

2 "From what I hear, they intend to attack our walls with their army and at the same time attack us at sea with their ships.

3 "None of you should be surprised that they mean to attack at sea too. Our fleet was at its best at the start, with dry ships and crews at full strength, as the enemy also know from reports. Now the ships are waterlogged after being at sea for so long, and the crews have been depleted.

4 "We cannot haul our ships ashore to dry them out. The enemy's ships are equal to ours in number, or even more numerous, so we must constantly expect them to attack.

5 "We can see them practicing. They can choose when to attack, and they have more opportunity to dry out their own ships. They are not keeping up a naval blockade against anyone else.

CHAPTER 13

1 "We could scarcely do that even with a large surplus of ships, and if we were not forced, as we are now, to use all of them on guard duty. If we relax our watch even a little, we will have no supplies. Even now, we have trouble bringing them in past the enemy's city.

2 "These are the reasons our crews have been losing men and are still losing them. Some sailors are killed by the cavalry while gathering firewood, raiding for supplies, or fetching water from far away. The slaves are deserting now that we are no stronger than the enemy. Among the foreigners, those who were forced aboard leave for the various cities at the first opportunity. Others were originally attracted by high pay and expected to make money rather than fight. Now, against their expectations, they see the enemy holding out with a fleet as well as in other ways. Some leave under the pretense of going over to the enemy; others get away however they can. Sicily is a large place. Some have even gone into trade themselves and persuaded the trireme captains to put slaves from Hyccara aboard in their places. This has destroyed the fleet's efficiency.

CHAPTER 14

1 "You know already what I am writing: a crew stays at its best for only a short time. Few sailors have the skill to get a ship moving and keep the rowing together.

2 "The worst difficulties of all are these. As general, I cannot prevent these things, since your people are hard to command. And we have no source of replacement crews, whereas the enemy have many. We must meet both our current needs

and our losses from the men we brought with us. Our present allied cities, Naxos and Catana, cannot help us.

3 "The enemy may gain one further advantage. The places in Italy that feed us may see our condition, and see that you are not coming to help, and go over to them. If that happens, they will have won [the war] without a fight, by starving us into surrender.

4 "I could have written you other things that would be more pleasant to hear. But they would not be more useful, if you are to decide what to do with a clear knowledge of the situation here. I also know your character. You want to hear the most pleasing reports, but later you make accusations if the results do not match them. So I thought it safer to tell you the truth.

CHAPTER 15

1 "Be assured that neither your soldiers nor your commanders deserve blame for their handling of the task we originally came to carry out. But now all Sicily is joining forces against us, and the enemy expect another army from the Peloponnese. You must make your decision knowing that our men here are not strong enough even for the forces already facing them. You must either recall them or send another force at least as large as this one, both an army and a fleet, with a large amount of money. You must also send someone to replace me. I have a kidney disease and cannot stay on.

2 "I ask you to allow me this. When I was healthy, I did you much good in my commands. Whatever you intend to do, do it as soon as spring begins, without delay. The enemy can obtain their reinforcements in Sicily quickly. Those from the Peloponnese will take longer. Even so, unless you pay attention, some will arrive without your noticing, as they did before, and others will get here before you can act."

CHAPTER 16

1 This was what Nicias' letter said. After hearing it, the Athenians did not release him from command. Instead, until the new joint commanders could be elected and arrive, they chose two men who were already there, Menander and Euthydemus, to assist him. They did not want him to struggle alone while ill. They also voted to send another force, both ships and land troops, made up of Athenians called up from the military rolls and men from the allies.

2 They elected Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes and Eurymedon son of Thucles to share his command. They sent Eurymedon to Sicily immediately, around the winter solstice, with ten ships and a hundred and twenty talents of silver. He was also to tell the men there that help would come and that their needs would be attended to.

CHAPTER 17

1 Demosthenes stayed behind and prepared to sail as soon as spring began. He sent orders to the allies for troops and got money, ships, and hoplites ready in Athens.

2 The Athenians also sent twenty ships around the Peloponnese to keep watch and prevent anyone from crossing to Sicily from Corinth or the Peloponnese.

3 The Corinthians had received their envoys, who reported that things were going better in Sicily. They felt that their earlier decision to send the ships had been well timed, and this greatly increased their confidence. They were preparing to send hoplites to Sicily in merchant ships. The Lacedaemonians were preparing to send men from the rest of the Peloponnese in the same way.

4 The Corinthians also manned twenty-five ships. They intended to try a sea battle against the squadron on guard at Naupactus. The Athenian ships at Naupactus would then be less able to stop the merchant ships from leaving, since they would have to keep watch against the triremes facing them.

CHAPTER 18

1 The Lacedaemonians were also preparing to invade Attica, as they had previously decided. The Syracusans and Corinthians urged them to do so. They had learned that reinforcements were coming from Athens to Sicily and wanted an invasion to prevent their departure. Alcibiades also kept pressing the Lacedaemonians to fortify Decelea and not let up in the war.

2 Two things especially encouraged the Lacedaemonians. They thought the Athenians would be easier to defeat now that they were fighting two wars, against themselves and the Sicilian Greeks. They also believed the Athenians had been the first to break the treaty. In the previous war, they thought the fault had been more their own. The Thebans had entered Plataea during the truce. Also, the earlier agreement said that neither side should take up arms if the other was willing to submit to arbitration. Yet they themselves had refused when the Athenians challenged them to arbitrate. For this reason they thought their misfortunes had been deserved. They recalled the disaster at Pylos and any other disasters they had suffered.

3 But the Athenians had now used their thirty ships based at Argos to devastate parts of Epidaurus and Prasiae and other places. They were also making raids from Pylos. Whenever a disagreement arose over a disputed point under the treaty, the Lacedaemonians challenged them to arbitrate, but they refused to submit the matter. The Lacedaemonians now thought that the Athenians had taken on the same wrongdoing that they themselves had committed before. So they were eager for war.

4 During this winter they sent orders to their allies for iron and prepared the other tools needed to build the fort in enemy territory. At the same time, they gathered reinforcements to send to the men in Sicily in merchant ships and pressed the other Peloponnesians to do the same. The winter ended, and the eighteenth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

CHAPTER 19

1 At the very start of the following spring, as early as possible, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Attica. Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, led them. First they devastated the countryside around the plain. Then they began fortifying Decelea, dividing the work among the cities.

2 Decelea is about a hundred and twenty stades from Athens. Its distance from Boeotia is much the same, or not much greater. The fort was being built in a position overlooking the plain and the best land, so that the invaders could damage them. It was visible all the way to Athens.

3 While the Peloponnesians and their allies in Attica were building the fort, those in the Peloponnese were sending the hoplites to Sicily in cargo ships at about the same time. The Lacedaemonians selected their best men from the Helots and the newly enfranchised men, about six hundred hoplites from the two groups together. Eccritus, a Spartan, commanded them. The Boeotians sent three hundred hoplites under Xenon and Nicon, both Thebans, and Hegesander of Thespiae.

4 These troops were among the first to set out. They put out to open sea from Taenarum in Laconia. Not long afterward, the Corinthians sent five hundred hoplites. Some came from Corinth itself, and they hired the rest from Arcadia. They appointed Alexarchus, a Corinthian, to command them. The Sicyonians also sent two hundred hoplites along with the Corinthians, under Sargeus of Sicyon.

5 The twenty-five Corinthian ships that had been crewed during the winter remained stationed opposite the twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus until these hoplites had sailed from the Peloponnese in their cargo ships. That was why the Corinthians had crewed their ships in the first place: to keep the Athenians' attention on the triremes rather than the cargo ships.

CHAPTER 20

1 Meanwhile, just as spring began and Decelea was being fortified, the Athenians sent thirty ships around the Peloponnese under Charicles son of Apollodorus. He had orders to go to Argos and invoke the alliance to ask the Argives to send hoplites aboard the ships.

2 They were also sending Demosthenes to Sicily, as they had planned, with sixty Athenian ships and five Chian ships. He had twelve hundred Athenian hoplites drawn from the muster roll, and as many islanders as they could get from each island. They had also collected anything useful for the war that their other subject allies could provide. He had orders first to sail around with Charicles and join his campaign along the Laconian coast.

3 Demosthenes sailed to Aegina. There he waited for any part of his force that had not yet arrived, and for Charicles to pick up the Argives.

CHAPTER 21

1 In Sicily, at about the same time that spring, Gylippus reached Syracuse. He brought as many troops as he could get from each of the cities he had persuaded to help.

2 He called the Syracusans together and said they should crew as many ships as possible and try fighting a naval battle. He hoped this would achieve something in the war that would justify the risk.

3 Hermocrates also did a great deal to persuade them not to lose heart about taking on the Athenians at sea. He said that the Athenians' skill at sea was neither inherited from their ancestors nor something they had always possessed. They had been even more of a land-based people than the Syracusans, and the Persians had forced them to become sailors. Bold men like the Athenians would find the toughest opponents [for them] in men who dared to match their bold-

ness. Sometimes the Athenians attacked their neighbors without having greater strength, and frightened them simply by their daring. The Syracusans could do exactly the same thing to their opponents.

4 He said the Syracusans should be sure of this: if they unexpectedly dared to stand up to the Athenian fleet, the shock would give them a greater advantage than Athenian skill could gain from the Syracusans' lack of experience. So he urged them to try their strength at sea and not hold back.

5 Persuaded by Gylippus, Hermocrates, and anyone else who spoke in support, the Syracusans became eager for a naval battle and began crewing their ships.

CHAPTER 22

1 Once Gylippus had the fleet ready, he led the entire land army out at night. He himself intended to attack the forts at Plemmyrium by land. At the same time, on an agreed signal, thirty-five Syracusan triremes sailed out from the Great Harbor. The other forty-five sailed out from the smaller harbor, where their shipyard was, and headed around the coast. They wanted to join the ships inside the Great Harbor and approach Plemmyrium together, so that the Athenians would face confusion from both directions.

2 The Athenians quickly crewed sixty ships to oppose them. With twenty-five they fought the thirty-five Syracusan ships in the Great Harbor. With the rest they went to meet those sailing around from the shipyard. They immediately began fighting in front of the Great Harbor's entrance. Both sides held their ground for a long time. The Syracusans wanted to force their way in, and the Athenians wanted to stop them.

CHAPTER 23

1 Meanwhile, the Athenians at Plemmyrium had gone down to the sea and were concentrating on the naval battle. Gylippus took the opportunity to launch a surprise attack on the forts at dawn. He captured the largest one first, then the

two smaller ones. Their guards did not stand their ground once they saw how easily the largest had been taken.

2 The men from the first fort to fall who escaped to the boats and a cargo ship had great difficulty getting back to the camp. The Syracusans were winning the naval battle with their ships in the Great Harbor, and a single fast trireme pursued the fugitives. But by the time the two smaller forts were taken, the Syracusans were already losing. The men escaping from those forts sailed past more easily.

3 The Syracusan ships fighting in front of the entrance had forced their way past the Athenian ships, but they entered the harbor in no order. They got in one another's way and handed the victory to the Athenians. The Athenians routed both these ships and those that had initially been beating them inside the harbor.

4 The Athenians sank eleven Syracusan ships and killed most of the men, except those from three ships whom they took alive. Three of their own ships were destroyed. They hauled the Syracusan wrecks ashore and set up a victory monument on the little island in front of Plemmyrium. Then they returned to their own camp.

CHAPTER 24

1 That was how the Syracusans had fared in the naval battle. But they held the forts at Plemmyrium and put up three victory monuments for their capture. They demolished one of the two forts taken last. They repaired the other two and stationed guards in them.

2 Many men were killed or captured when the forts fell, and a large amount of property was taken altogether. The Athenians had used the forts as storehouses. There were large stocks of merchants' goods and grain inside, as well as

much property belonging to the trireme commanders. The captures included sails and other equipment for forty triremes, and three triremes that had been hauled ashore.

3 The loss of Plemmyrium was one of the first and most damaging blows to the Athenian army. Even the passage into the harbor for supply ships was no longer safe. The Syracusans stationed ships there to block them, and supplies now had to be fought through. The loss also left the army frightened and discouraged in other ways.

CHAPTER 25

1 After this, the Syracusans sent out twelve ships under Agatharchus, a Syracusan. One went to the Peloponnese carrying envoys. They were to report that the Syracusans were hopeful about their situation and to urge that the war there be pursued even harder. The other eleven ships sailed toward Italy. They had heard that ships loaded with supplies were on their way to the Athenians.

2 They came across these ships and destroyed most of them. In the territory of Caulonia they also burned timber that was ready for the Athenians to use in shipbuilding.

3 Next they went to Locri. While they were at anchor there, one of the cargo ships from the Peloponnese arrived, carrying hoplites from Thespiae.

4 The Syracusans took these men aboard their own ships and sailed along the coast toward home. The Athenians waited for them near Megara with twenty ships and captured one ship with all its men. They could not catch the others, which escaped to Syracuse.

5 There was also a skirmish in the harbor over the stakes that the Syracusans had driven into the sea in front of their old ship sheds. They had put them there so that their ships could anchor behind them, out of reach of Athenian ramming attacks.

6 The Athenians brought up a cargo ship with a capacity of ten thousand talents, fitted with wooden towers and protective screens. Working from small boats, they fastened ropes to the stakes, winched them up, and broke them off. Divers also sawed them through underwater. The Syracusans shot at them from the ship sheds, and the men on the cargo ship shot back. In the end the Athenians removed most of the stakes.

7 The most troublesome part of this barrier was the hidden stakes. Some had been driven in without sticking up above the water. This made it dangerous to approach: a sailor might not see one in time and run his ship onto it as if it were a reef. But divers were paid to go underwater and saw these through as well. Even so, the Syracusans drove in more stakes.

8 The two sides also devised many other ways to attack each other, as was natural with their camps close together and facing each other. They carried out skirmishes and tried every kind of attack.

9 The Syracusans also sent envoys from among the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Lacedaemonians to the cities. They were to announce the capture of Plemmyrium and explain that the naval defeat had been due more to their own confusion than to the enemy's strength. They were [also] to make clear that the general situation gave them hope, and ask for help from both ships and land troops. More Athenian troops were expected. If they could first destroy the Athenian force already there, the war would be over. That was what the two sides were doing in Sicily.

CHAPTER 26

1 Once Demosthenes had assembled the force he needed to take to Sicily as reinforcements, he sailed from Aegina toward the Peloponnese. He joined Charicles and the thirty Athenian ships. They took Argive hoplites aboard their ships and sailed to Laconia.

2 First they devastated part of the territory of Epidaurus Limera. Then they landed on the Laconian coast opposite Cythera, where the sanctuary of Apollo stands. They devastated some of the land and fortified a place shaped like an isthmus. The aim was to give the Lacedaemonians' Helots a place to desert to, and also to provide a base for raiders to go out and plunder, as they did from Pylos.

3 As soon as Demosthenes had helped secure the site, he sailed along the coast toward Corcyra. He wanted to pick up allies there too and make the voyage to Sicily as quickly as possible. Charicles stayed until he had finished fortifying the site and left a garrison there. Later he too sailed home with the thirty ships, and the Argives went with him.

CHAPTER 27

1 During that same summer, thirteen hundred light-armed troops carrying small shields arrived in Athens. They were sword-carrying Thracians of the tribe of the Dii. They were supposed to sail to Sicily with Demosthenes.

2 Since they had arrived too late, the Athenians planned to send them back to Thrace, where they had come from. Keeping them for the fighting against Decelea seemed too expensive: each man was paid a drachma a day.

3 Decelea had first been fortified that summer by the whole enemy army. Afterward, garrisons from the different cities took turns occupying it and attacking the countryside. It did the Athenians a great deal of harm. The losses of property and men that it caused were among the main reasons their position became so much worse.

4 Earlier invasions had been brief and had not stopped them using their land the rest of the time. Now the enemy stayed there continuously. Sometimes larger forces joined them. At other times the regular garrison had to do the work of

overrunning and plundering the countryside. Agis, the Lacedaemonian king, was there in person and treated the war as his main business. So the Athenians suffered heavy losses.

5 They were cut off from all their land. More than twenty thousand slaves had deserted, most of them skilled workers. All their sheep and other livestock, as well as their pack animals, had been lost. The cavalry rode out every day to raid Decelea and patrol the countryside. Some of their horses went lame from constant hard work on rough ground, while others were wounded.

CHAPTER 28

1 Supplies from Euboea had previously traveled more quickly by land from Oropus through Decelea. Now they had to come by sea around Sunium, at great expense. The city also had to import everything it needed. It had become a fortress instead of a city.

2 The Athenians took turns guarding the battlements by day. At night they all served except the cavalry, some resting under arms and others on the wall. Summer and winter, this wore them down.

3 Their greatest burden was having two wars on their hands at once. They had become so determined to win that, before it happened, no one would have believed it possible. The Peloponnesians were besieging them from a fort in their own territory. Yet even then they did not withdraw from Sicily. Instead, they went on besieging Syracuse there in the same way, a city which, considered on its own, was no smaller than Athens. They surprised the Greeks by showing far more strength and daring than anyone had expected. At the start of the war, some thought they would last one year if the Peloponnesians invaded their land, others two, but no one more than three. Yet in the seventeenth year after the first invasion, already worn down in every way by the war, they went to Sicily. They took on another war no smaller than the one they already had against the Peloponnesians.

4 For these reasons, with Decelea causing so much damage and other heavy expenses piling up, they now ran short of money. Around this time they replaced their subjects' tribute with a five-percent duty on goods carried by sea. They thought this would bring in more money. Their expenses were no longer what they had been, but far greater, in proportion to the increase in the war. Meanwhile, their revenues were disappearing.

CHAPTER 29

1 Because they were so short of money, they did not want to spend it on the Thracians who had arrived too late for Demosthenes. They immediately sent them back and put Diitrephes in charge of taking them home. They also told him to use them to do whatever damage he could to the enemy on the voyage along the coast. Their route took them through the Euripus.

2 He landed them in the territory of Tanagra and quickly carried out a raid for plunder. Then, setting out in the evening from Chalcis in Euboea, he crossed the Euripus, landed in Boeotia, and led them toward Mycalessus.

3 He camped unnoticed for the night near the Hermaeum, about sixteen stades from Mycalessus. At daybreak he attacked the town, which was not large, and captured it. The people were off guard. They had never expected anyone to come so far inland from the sea to attack them. The wall was weak, had fallen down in places, and was low where it still stood. The gates were open too, because the people felt safe.

4 The Thracians burst into Mycalessus, looted the houses and sanctuaries, and murdered the people. They spared neither old nor young, but killed everyone they came across, children and women included. They also killed the pack animals and any other living creatures they saw. For the Thracian people, like the most bloodthirsty of the non-Greek peoples, are extremely murderous whenever they feel confident.

5 There was widespread confusion and destruction of every kind. They broke into the largest school for children in the town, where the children had just come in, and hacked them all to death. The disaster that struck the whole town was as unexpected and terrible as any.

CHAPTER 30

1 When the Thebans heard what had happened, they came to help. They caught up with the Thracians before they had gone far, took away their plunder, and put them to flight. They pursued them toward the Euripus and the sea, where the ships that had brought them were anchored.

2 They killed the largest number as the Thracians tried to board the ships. The Thracians could not swim, and the men aboard, seeing what was happening on land, had moved the ships out beyond bowshot. During the rest of the retreat, the Thracians had defended themselves quite well against the Theban cavalry, which had attacked them first. They rushed out to attack and then gathered into tight groups in their own customary formation. Few of them were killed during that stage. Some were also caught in the town itself while looting and were killed. Altogether, two hundred and fifty of the thirteen hundred Thracians died.

3 They also killed about twenty of the Thebans and the others who had come to help, counting cavalry and hoplites together. They also killed Scirphondas, one of the Theban Boeotarchs. Some of the people of Mycalessus were killed. Such was what happened at Mycalessus. In proportion to the town's size, its suffering deserved as much pity as any disaster in this war.

CHAPTER 31

1 At this time Demosthenes was sailing toward Corcyra after building the fort in Laconia. He found a cargo ship at anchor at Pheia in Elis. The Corinthian hoplites intended to cross to Sicily in it. He destroyed the ship, but the men

escaped. Later they got another ship and sailed on.

2 After this Demosthenes reached Zacynthus and Cephallenia, where he picked up hoplites. He also sent for some of the Messenians at Naupactus. Then he crossed to the mainland of Acarnania opposite, to Alyzia and Anactorium, which the Athenians held.

3 While he was in this area, Eurymedon met him on his return voyage from Sicily. He was the man who had been sent out during the winter with money for the army. Along with his other news, he reported that he had learned after starting his voyage that the Syracusans had captured Plemmyrium.

4 Conon, the commander at Naupactus, also came to meet them. He reported that the twenty-five Corinthian ships stationed opposite his force were not giving up the fighting and were about to fight a naval battle. He asked them to send ships: his own eighteen were not enough to fight the Corinthians' twenty-five.

5 Demosthenes and Eurymedon therefore sent ten of their fastest ships with Conon to join the fleet at Naupactus. They themselves worked on assembling their army. Eurymedon sailed to Corcyra, told the people there to crew fifteen ships, and enrolled hoplites. He had now turned back and was sharing the command with Demosthenes, as he had originally been appointed to do. Demosthenes collected slingers and javelin throwers from the places around Acarnania.

CHAPTER 32

1 The envoys who had left Syracuse for the cities after the capture of Plemmyrium had now persuaded them to help, assembled an army, and were about to bring it back. Nicias learned of this in advance. He sent to the Sicels who were Athenian allies and controlled the route, including the Centoripans, the Halicyaeans, and others. He asked them not to let the enemy through, but

to join forces and block their passage. The enemy would not even try another route, since the people of Acragas would not allow them through their territory.

2 When the Sicilian Greeks were already on the march, the Sicels did as the Athenians had asked. They set an ambush in three places, caught them off guard in a surprise attack, and killed about eight hundred. They also killed all the envoys except the Corinthian. He brought the men who escaped, about fifteen hundred, to Syracuse.

CHAPTER 33

1 Around the same time, the Camarinaeans also arrived to help them, with five hundred hoplites, three hundred javelin throwers, and three hundred archers. The people of Gela also sent crews for five ships, four hundred javelin throwers, and two hundred cavalry.

2 By now almost all Sicily had joined together to help the Syracusans against the Athenians. Even those who had previously stood aside were now helping. The only exception was Acragas, which supported neither side.

3 After the disaster among the Sicels, the Syracusans put off their immediate attack on the Athenians. Meanwhile, the troops from Corcyra and the mainland were now ready. Demosthenes and Eurymedon took the whole force across the Ionian Sea to the Iapygian headland.

4 From there they sailed to the Choerades islands off Iapygia. They took aboard a hundred and fifty Iapygian javelin throwers from the Messapian people. They also renewed an old friendship with Artas, the local ruler who had supplied these men. Then they reached Metapontium in Italy.

5 They persuaded the people of Metapontium to send three hundred javelin throwers and two triremes with them under the terms of their alliance. After taking these reinforcements aboard, they sailed along the coast to Thurii. There

they found that the opponents of Athens had recently been driven out in civil strife.

6 They wanted to bring all their troops together there, including any who had fallen behind, and review them. They also wanted to persuade the Thurians to join their expedition with all possible enthusiasm and, given their present turn of fortune, to regard the same people as friends and enemies as the Athenians did. So they stayed at Thurii and worked on these matters.

CHAPTER 34

1 At about this same time, the Peloponnesians in the twenty-five ships prepared for a sea battle. They had been stationed opposite the ships at Naupactus to protect the transport ships on their voyage to Sicily. They now manned more ships, bringing their number to just below that of the Athenian ships. They anchored off Erineus in the territory of Rhypes in Achaea.

2 Their anchorage was shaped like a crescent. Infantry from Corinth and the local allies had come to support them and were drawn up on the projecting headlands on either side. The ships filled the space between them, blocking it off. Polyanthes of Corinth commanded the fleet.

3 The Athenians sailed out against them from Naupactus with thirty-three ships, commanded by Diphilus.

4 At first the Corinthians held their position. Then, when they thought the time was right and the signal was raised, they advanced against the Athenians and began the sea battle. The two sides held out against each other for a long time.

5 Three Corinthian ships were destroyed. No Athenian ship was actually sunk, but about seven were put out of action. They were rammed head-on and had their projecting oar frames torn open by the Corinthian ships. These had been fitted with thicker bow timbers for this very purpose.

6 The battle was evenly matched, and each side claimed victory. The Athenians did, however, gain control of the wrecks, because the wind carried them out to sea and the Corinthians did not come out again. The fleets separated without a chase, and neither side took any prisoners. The Corinthians and Peloponnesians had fought close to land and could easily get to safety. On the Athenian side, no ship had sunk.

7 Once the Athenians had sailed away to Naupactus, the Corinthians immediately set up a trophy to claim victory. They had put more of the enemy's ships out of action. They also judged that they had not lost for the very reason that the other side had not won. The Corinthians considered themselves the winners unless they had suffered a heavy defeat. The Athenians thought they had lost because they had not won a major victory.

8 After the Peloponnesians sailed away and the infantry dispersed, the Athenians also set up a trophy in Achaea to claim victory. It was about twenty stades from Erineus, where the Corinthians had anchored. This was how the sea battle ended.

CHAPTER 35

1 The Thurians now had seven hundred hoplites and three hundred javelin throwers ready to join Demosthenes and Eurymedon. The two commanders ordered the ships to sail along the coast toward the territory of Croton. They themselves first reviewed all the infantry at the river Sybaris, then led them through Thurian territory.

2 When they reached the river Hylias, the people of Croton sent messengers to say that they did not want the army passing through their land. So the commanders went down toward the sea and camped at the mouth of the Hylias. Their ships met them there. The next day they took the troops aboard and sailed along the coast. They stopped at the cities along the way, except Locri, until they reached Petra in the territory of Rhegium.

CHAPTER 36

1 Meanwhile, the Syracusans learned that they were approaching by sea. They wanted to try another attack with their ships and with the rest of their land forces. They had been assembling these forces for this very purpose, because they wanted to strike before the reinforcements arrived.

2 They had also made other preparations for their fleet, using what they had learned in the previous sea battle to gain an advantage. They also shortened their ships' bows to make them stronger. They fitted thick timbers to the bows and ran braces from these to the ships' sides for about six cubits, both inside and outside. This was the same way the Corinthians had strengthened their ships' bows for their battle against the fleet at Naupactus.

3 The Syracusans thought this would put them at no disadvantage against the Athenian ships. Those ships were not built to match theirs in this respect. Their bows were lightly built, because the Athenians preferred to sail around an enemy ship and ram it rather than ram it head-on. The Syracusans also thought that fighting in the Great Harbor would favor them, since many ships would be fighting in a small space. By ramming head-on, they would smash the Athenian bows. Their solid, heavy rams would strike against hollow, weak structures.

4 In the cramped space, the Athenians would be unable either to sail around the Syracusan ships or to break through their line. These were the maneuvers in which they trusted their skill most. The Syracusans would do all they could to stop them from breaking through, and the lack of space would stop them from sailing around.

5 They would make the most use of head-on collisions, a tactic previously thought to show a helmsman's lack of skill. This would give them their greatest advantage. When the Athenians were forced back, they would have nowhere to back water except toward the shore, only a short distance away, and into the

small space directly in front of their own camp. The Syracusans would control the rest of the harbor. If the Athenians came under pressure anywhere, they would all be forced together

6 into the same small space. They would collide with each other and fall into confusion. This was, in fact, what hurt the Athenians most in all the sea battles. They could not back water freely throughout the harbor as the Syracusans could. Nor would they be able to sail around into open water, since the Syracusans would control the approaches from the sea and the room for backing water. This would be especially difficult because Plemmyrium was now in enemy hands and the harbor entrance was narrow.

CHAPTER 37

1 The Syracusans worked out these plans to suit their own skills and strength. They also felt more confident now because of the previous sea battle. They began an attack by land and sea at the same time.

2 A little earlier, Gylippus had led the infantry out of the city and brought them up to the part of the Athenian wall facing the city. From the Olympieum, all the hoplites stationed there, together with the Syracusan cavalry and light infantry, approached the wall from the other side. Immediately afterward, the ships of the Syracusans and their allies sailed out.

3 At first the Athenians thought the enemy would attack only by land. When they suddenly saw the ships coming at them too, they were thrown into confusion. Some took up positions on the walls and in front of them to face the advancing troops. Others went out to meet the large force of cavalry and javelin throwers moving quickly from the Olympieum and the area outside the city. Others manned the ships while also rushing to help along the beach. When the crews were aboard, they put out to meet the enemy with seventy-five ships. The Syracusans had about eighty.

CHAPTER 38

1 For much of the day the fleets advanced and backed water, testing each other. Neither could achieve anything important, except that the Syracusans sank one or two Athenian ships. Then they separated, and the infantry withdrew from the walls at the same time.

2 The next day the Syracusans stayed quiet and gave no sign of what they would do next. Nicias saw that the sea battle had been evenly matched and expected them to attack again. He made the trireme captains repair any damage to their ships. He also anchored merchant ships in front of the Athenian line of stakes. The stakes had been fixed in the sea in front of their warships to serve as an enclosed harbor.

3 He placed the merchant ships about two plethra apart. This would give any warship under pressure a safe refuge and allow it to sail out again without difficulty. The Athenians spent the entire day making these preparations, right up to nightfall.

CHAPTER 39

1 The following day the Syracusans attacked the Athenians earlier in the morning, but with the same combined assault by land and sea.

2 The ships faced each other again in the same way and spent much of the day testing each other. Then Ariston son of Pyrrhichus, a Corinthian and the best helmsman on the Syracusan side, persuaded his naval commanders to send orders to the officials in the city. They were to move the market and its goods down to the sea as quickly as possible. They were to make everyone bring whatever food they had there and sell it. The commanders could then land their sailors and have them eat their midday meal immediately beside the ships. After a short break they could attack again that same day, taking the Athenians by surprise.

CHAPTER 40

1 The commanders agreed and sent a messenger, and the market was made ready. The Syracusans suddenly backed water and sailed back toward the city. They immediately went ashore and ate their midday meal on the spot.

2 The Athenians thought the Syracusans had pulled back toward the city because they had been beaten. They went ashore without hurrying and attended to their other business and their midday meal. They did not expect to fight another sea battle that day.

3 Suddenly the Syracusans manned their ships and sailed at them again. In great confusion, and with most of them still without food, the Athenians boarded in no order at all. Only with difficulty did they finally put out to meet them.

4 For a while the two fleets kept their distance, each on its guard against the other. Then the Athenians decided not to let their own delay leave them exhausted and beaten. Instead they would attack as quickly as possible. With shouts of encouragement they advanced and began the battle.

5 The Syracusans met the attack head-on, as they had planned. Their specially fitted rams tore open long stretches of the Athenian ships' projecting oar frames. Men throwing javelins from their decks also did heavy damage to the Athenians. Still more damage was done by the Syracusans who moved around in small boats. They slipped underneath the oars of the enemy ships and came alongside, throwing javelins from their boats at the sailors.

CHAPTER 41

1 By fighting in this way, the Syracusans finally won a decisive sea victory. The Athenians turned and fled between the merchant ships into their own anchorage.

2 The Syracusan ships pursued them as far as the merchant ships. Then they were stopped by the beams projecting from the merchant ships over the entrances, with heavy dolphin-shaped weights hanging from them.

3 Two Syracusan ships, carried away by their victory, came close to these defenses and were destroyed. One of them was captured with its entire crew.

4 The Syracusans had sunk seven Athenian ships and badly damaged many others. They had captured most of the men and killed the others. They withdrew and set up trophies for both sea battles. They now felt firmly confident that they were far stronger at sea, and they thought they would also defeat the land army.

CHAPTER 42

1 They were preparing to attack again by land and sea when Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the reinforcements from Athens. They had about seventy-three ships, including the foreign ships, and about five thousand hoplites from Athens and its allies. They also had a large number of Greek and non-Greek javelin throwers, slingers, archers, and plenty of other equipment.

2 At first the Syracusans and their allies were badly shaken. They wondered whether they would ever escape from danger. Despite the fortification of Decelea, a fresh army as large and much like the first had arrived. Athenian power seemed great everywhere. The original Athenian army, meanwhile, recovered some strength after its troubles.

3 Demosthenes saw the situation and decided that he could not waste time or repeat what had happened to Nicias. When Nicias first arrived, he had inspired fear. But he did not immediately attack Syracuse. Instead he spent the winter at Catana, and the Syracusans came to look down on him. Gylippus had time to arrive before he acted, bringing an army from the Peloponnese. The Syracusans would not even have sent for that army if Nicias had attacked at once. They would have thought they were strong enough on their own. By the time they

discovered they were weaker, they would already have been walled in. Even if they had then sent for help, it could no longer have been of the same use to them. Demosthenes considered all this. He knew that he too was most frightening to the enemy now, on the first day. So he wanted to make use of the shock caused by his army as quickly as possible.

4 He saw that the Syracusan cross-wall, which had stopped the Athenians from walling them in, was only a single wall. If they gained control of the way up to Epipolae and then of the camp on the heights, they could easily capture it. He thought no one would even stand against them.

5 So he was eager to make the attempt. He thought it was the quickest way to settle the war. Either he would succeed and take Syracuse, or he would lead the army away. He would not let the Athenians serving on the expedition, or the city as a whole, wear themselves out for nothing.

6 First the Athenians went out and laid waste to Syracusan land around the Anapus. Their forces had the upper hand again, as at the beginning, both on land and at sea. The Syracusans did not come out against them in either field, except with cavalry and javelin throwers from the Olympieum.

CHAPTER 43

1 Then Demosthenes decided to try the siege engines against the cross-wall first. But when he brought them up, the enemy defending the wall burned them. His other troops attacked at many points but were driven back. He decided to delay no longer. After winning over Nicias and the other commanders, he made the attack on Epipolae that he had been planning.

2 He thought it would be impossible to approach and climb up unnoticed in daylight. He ordered the men to take five days' food. He took all the stoneworkers and carpenters, along with a supply of arrows and everything else

they would need for building fortifications if they won. After the first sleep of the night, he set out for Epipolae with Eurymedon and Menander, taking the whole army. Nicias had been left behind inside the walls.

3 They reached the heights by way of Euryelus, where the original army had first climbed up. They got past the Syracusan guards unnoticed, attacked the Syracusan fort there, and captured it. They killed some of its guards.

4 Most of the guards escaped straight to the camps and reported the attack. There were three camps in fortified enclosures on Epipolae: one for the Syracusans, one for the other Sicilian Greeks, and one for the allies. The fugitives also warned the six hundred Syracusans who formed the forward guard on this part of Epipolae.

5 These immediately came to help. Demosthenes and the Athenians met them and put them to flight, despite their determined resistance. The Athenians pressed straight ahead. They wanted to use their present momentum to carry out the task they had come for without delay. Other troops had begun capturing the Syracusan cross-wall at the start of the attack, as its guards did not stand their ground, and were tearing down its battlements.

6 The Syracusans and their allies, along with Gylippus and his men, came to help from the fortified enclosures. This daring night attack had caught them by surprise. They were shaken when they attacked the Athenians, and at first they were forced back and retreated.

7 The Athenians were now advancing in increasing disorder, as if they had already won. They wanted to get through all the enemy troops who had not yet fought as quickly as possible. They did not want to ease their attack and give the enemy time to rally. But the Boeotians were the first to stand firm against them. They attacked, routed the Athenians, and put them to flight.

CHAPTER 44

1 The Athenians now fell into great confusion and did not know what to do. It was hard even to find out from either side how each event had happened. In daylight things are clearer. Even then, those who are present can scarcely know everything beyond what happens to each of them personally. So how could anyone know anything clearly in a night battle, the only one fought by large armies in this war?

2 The moon was bright, but they could see each other only as well as people can by moonlight. They could make out the shape of a body ahead of them, but could not be sure whether it belonged to a friend. Large numbers of hoplites from both sides were moving about in a confined space.

3 Some Athenians were already being defeated, while others were still advancing, unbeaten since their first attack. A large part of the rest of their army had only just reached the top or was still coming up. These men did not know where to go. Once the rout had begun, everything in front was already in confusion, and the shouting made it hard to tell what was happening.

4 The Syracusans and their allies, confident that they were winning, shouted loudly to encourage each other. At night they had no other way to signal. At the same time they met the troops coming at them. The Athenians were looking for their own men. They took everyone coming toward them for an enemy, even friends who had already turned and were running back. They kept asking for the password, since they had no other way to recognize each other. With everyone asking at once, they created great confusion among themselves and also made the password clear to the enemy.

5 The Athenians did not know the enemy's password in the same way. The enemy were winning and had not broken up, so they had less trouble recognizing one another. As a result, when Athenians met a weaker group of the enemy, the enemy could escape because they knew the Athenian password. But when Athenians themselves could not answer a challenge, they were killed.

6 The battle songs also did enormous damage, as much as anything else. The songs on both sides sounded much alike and caused uncertainty. Whenever the Argives, the Corcyraeans, or any of the other Dorians serving with Athens sang their battle song, it frightened the Athenians, just as the enemy's song did.

7 In the end, once confusion had set in, they collided with their own men in many parts of the army. Friends met friends and fellow citizens met fellow citizens. They not only frightened each other but even came to blows, and could hardly pull apart.

8 As they were pursued, many threw themselves over the cliffs and died, because the path back down from Epipolae was narrow. When the survivors reached the level ground below, most of them escaped to the camp. So did all those from the original army, who knew the country better. But some of the recent arrivals missed the paths and wandered through the countryside. At daybreak the Syracusan cavalry surrounded them and killed them.

CHAPTER 45

1 The next day the Syracusans set up two victory monuments. One was on Epipolae at the point where the Athenians had climbed up. The other was where the Boeotians had first stood against them. The Athenians recovered their dead under a truce.

2 Many Athenians and allies had died. But more sets of arms were captured than the number of men killed. Men had been forced to jump down the cliffs without their equipment [without their shields]. Some died, but others survived.

CHAPTER 46

1 After this unexpected success, the Syracusans felt a fresh surge of confidence, as they had before. They sent Sicanus with fifteen ships to Acragas, where there was civil strife. He was to bring the city over to their side if he could. Gylippus

again went overland to the rest of Sicily to bring in more troops. After what had happened on Epipolae, he hoped to take even the Athenian walls by force.

CHAPTER 47

1 Meanwhile the Athenian generals discussed their recent defeat and the weakness that now affected every part of the army. They could see that their attacks were failing and that the soldiers resented staying where they were.

2 Disease was wearing the soldiers down for two reasons. It was the season when people were most likely to fall sick, and their camp was also in a marshy, unhealthy place. In every other way, too, their situation seemed hopeless to them.

3 Demosthenes therefore thought they should stay no longer. His proposal was the one he had had in mind when he risked the attack on Epipolae: now that it had failed, they should leave without delay. They could still make the sea crossing, and the ships that had recently arrived, at least, gave their forces the upper hand at sea.

4 He said it would be more useful to Athens to fight the enemy who were building a fortified position in Athenian territory than to fight the Syracusans, who would no longer be easy to defeat. Nor was it reasonable to go on with the siege, spending large sums for nothing.

CHAPTER 48

1 That was Demosthenes' opinion. Nicias too thought their situation was bad. But he did not want to admit their weakness openly in discussion. Nor did he want them to vote openly for withdrawal before a large gathering and have the news reach the enemy. That would make it much harder to leave undetected whenever they chose.

2 He also knew more than the others about the enemy's affairs. What he knew gave him some hope that, if they kept up the siege, the enemy's position would become worse than their own. They would wear the enemy down through lack of money, especially now that the ships at their disposal gave the Athenians greater control of the sea. There was also a group in Syracuse that wanted to hand the city over to the Athenians. Its members kept sending messages to Nicias and urging him not to leave.

3 With this knowledge, he was in fact still considering both alternatives and holding back while he examined them. But in the discussion at that time he openly said he would not take the army away. He knew very well that the Athenians would not accept their leaving without a vote authorizing it. The men who would pass judgment on the generals [themselves] would not have seen the situation as the generals had. Their knowledge would come from hearing other people's accusations. They would be persuaded by whatever accusations a skillful speaker brought against the generals.

4 He said that many of the soldiers there—indeed, most of them—were now shouting about their terrible situation. But once back in Athens they would shout the opposite: that the generals had taken bribes, betrayed the army, and left. He himself knew the Athenian character. He would rather risk his life at the enemy's hands and die, if he had to, on his own responsibility than be unjustly put to death by the Athenians on a disgraceful charge.

5 He said the Syracusans were still in a worse position than they were. They had to pay mercenaries, spend money on garrison posts as well, and support a large fleet, which they had now maintained for a year. They were already short of some things and would soon have no way of getting others. They had already spent two thousand talents and still owed a great deal more. If failure to pay for its support forced them to give up even a small part of their present force, their position would collapse. Their force depended more on hired troops, whereas the Athenians' own men served because they had to.

6 So, he said, they should stay and wear the enemy down. They should not leave because they had been beaten financially, when they had far more money.

CHAPTER 49

1 Nicias argued strongly for this position. He had accurate information about conditions in Syracuse, its shortage of money, and the large group there that wanted control to pass to the Athenians and kept sending him messages urging him not to leave. At the same time, he was now more confident than before that they would win, at least with their fleet.

2 Demosthenes would not agree to continue the siege on any terms. If they must not take the army home without an Athenian vote but must spend more time in Sicily, he said they should move to Thapsus or Catana and wait there. From there their infantry could raid wide stretches of the countryside, feeding themselves by ravaging the enemy's land and hurting the enemy at the same time. Their ships could fight on the open sea, not in confined waters that favored the enemy. In open water their skill would be useful. They could withdraw or attack without having to set out from, or return to, a small and restricted area.

3 In short, he said, he was completely against staying any longer in the same place. They should move out as quickly as possible, without delay. Eurymedon supported this view.

4 But Nicias opposed them, and this caused hesitation and delay. There was also a suspicion that he might be insisting because he knew something more. So the Athenians kept putting off a decision and stayed where they were.

CHAPTER 50

1 Meanwhile Gylippus and Sicanus returned to Syracuse. Sicanus had failed at Acragas: while he was still at Gela, the faction friendly to Syracuse had been driven out. Gylippus brought many more troops from Sicily. He also brought the

hoplites sent from the Peloponnese in merchant ships that spring, who had reached Selinus from Libya.

2 They had been driven off course to Libya. The Cyrenaeans had given them two triremes and guides for the voyage. As they sailed along the coast, they helped the people of Euesperides, who were under siege by the Libyans, and defeated the Libyans. From there they sailed along the coast to Neapolis, a Carthaginian trading port. This was the shortest crossing to Sicily, a voyage of two days and a night. They then crossed from there to Selinus.

3 As soon as these troops arrived, the Syracusans prepared to attack the Athenians again with both their ships and their land army. The Athenian generals saw that another army had reinforced the enemy. Their own situation, meanwhile, was not improving. Every aspect of it grew worse each day, and the men's sickness was their greatest burden. They regretted not having left earlier. Nicias no longer opposed them as strongly as before. He only insisted that they should not vote openly on the decision. So they gave everyone in the camp orders, as secretly as they could, to prepare to sail out when the signal was given.

4 Everything was ready and they were about to sail when there was an eclipse of the moon, which was full at the time. Most of the Athenians took this to heart and urged the generals to wait. Nicias, who was somewhat too devoted to divination and such things, said he would not even discuss setting out until they had waited three times nine days, as the diviners instructed. This was why the Athenians delayed and stayed where they were.

CHAPTER 51

1 When the Syracusans too learned of this, they were much more determined not to ease their pressure on the Athenians. They thought the Athenians themselves had now admitted that they were no longer superior either at sea or on land. Otherwise they would not have planned to sail away. The Syracusans also

did not want them to settle somewhere else in Sicily and become harder to fight. Instead they wanted to force them into a sea battle as soon as possible, right where they were, in a place that favored the Syracusans.

2 So they manned their ships and trained for as many days as they thought necessary. When the time came, they attacked the Athenian walls on the first day. A small force of hoplites and cavalry came out against them through one of the gates. The Syracusans cut off some of the hoplites, routed them, and pursued them. The entrance was narrow, and the Athenians lost seventy horses and a few hoplites.

CHAPTER 52

1 The Syracusan army withdrew for that day. The next day they sailed out with seventy-six ships, while their infantry advanced against the walls. The Athenians sailed out to meet them with eighty-six ships. The fleets came together and fought.

2 Eurymedon commanded the Athenian right wing. He wanted to surround the enemy ships and extended his line farther toward the shore. But the Syracusans and their allies first defeated the Athenian center. Then they cut him off too, in the inner recess of the harbor, and killed him and destroyed the ships that had followed him. After that they pursued the whole Athenian fleet and drove it ashore.

CHAPTER 53

1 Gylippus saw the enemy ships being defeated and driven ashore outside their stockades and camp. He wanted to kill the men as they came ashore and make it easier for the Syracusans to tow off the ships by bringing the shore under friendly control. So he hurried along to the harbor mole with part of his army.

2 The Tyrrhenians were guarding this part of the shore for the Athenians. When they saw the troops approaching in disorder, they rushed out and attacked the men in front. They routed them and drove them into the lake called Lysimeleia.

3 Later, more Syracusan and allied troops arrived. The Athenians also came to help, fearing for their ships. They fought the enemy, defeated and pursued them, and killed a few hoplites. They saved most of their ships and brought them together by the camp. But the Syracusans and their allies captured eighteen of them and killed all the men aboard.

4 They also wanted to burn the remaining ships. They filled an old merchant ship with vine cuttings and pinewood, set it on fire, and let [the ship] go. The wind was blowing toward the Athenians. Fearing for their ships, the Athenians devised ways to put out the fire and keep the burning ship away. They stopped the flames and prevented the merchant ship from coming close, and so escaped the danger.

CHAPTER 54

1 After this the Syracusans set up victory monuments for the sea battle and for cutting off the hoplites inland by the wall, where they had also captured the horses. The Athenians set up monuments for the Tyrrhenians' rout of the infantry into the lake and for their own victory with the rest of their army.

CHAPTER 55

1 The Syracusans had now won a clear victory with their fleet as well, although before this they had feared the ships that had arrived with Demosthenes. The Athenians were completely discouraged. Their shock at this unexpected result was great, and their regret at having made the expedition was greater still.

2 These were the only cities they had yet attacked that were like their own. They too were democracies, and they were large cities with fleets and cavalry. The Athenians could not create political divisions by changing their governments and so win them over. Nor could they bring a vastly superior force against them. Most of their efforts failed. They had already been at a loss before this, and now they had been defeated even at sea, which they had thought impossible. This left them far more at a loss than before.

CHAPTER 56

1 The Syracusans immediately began sailing around the harbor without fear. They planned to close its mouth so that the Athenians could no longer slip out to sea undetected, even if they wanted to.

2 They were no longer concerned only with saving themselves. They also wanted to prevent the Athenians from escaping. They believed, correctly, that in the present circumstances they had a great advantage. If they could defeat the Athenians and their allies both on land and at sea, their achievement would win honor among the Greeks. Some of the other Greeks would immediately gain their freedom, and the rest would be freed from fear. What remained of Athenian power would not be strong enough to withstand the war that would be brought against it afterward. The Syracusans would get the credit for this and be greatly admired, both by the rest of the world and by future generations.

3 Their struggle did deserve recognition for these reasons. They were also overcoming not only the Athenians but their many allies, and they were not doing it alone but with the allies who had come to their aid. They had taken the lead alongside the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians. They had put their own city forward to face the danger first and had made great progress in naval warfare.

4 More peoples came together at this one city than at any other, except for the total number that joined the sides of Athens and Lacedaemon in this war.

CHAPTER 57

1 The following peoples on each side fought at Syracuse, coming to Sicily or fighting over it. Some came to help conquer the country, others to help save it. They took sides not so much because of justice or kinship as because circumstances brought each of them there through self-interest or compulsion.

2 The Athenians themselves were Ionians and willingly attacked the Dorian Syracusans. They were joined by the Lemnians, Imbrians, and Aeginetans—the people who then held Aegina—and by the Hestiaeans living at Hestiaea in Euboea. These were Athenian colonists who still shared the Athenians' language and customs.

3 Of the others who joined the expedition, some were subjects, some were independent allies, and some were mercenaries.

4 From among the subject and tribute-paying peoples came the Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styrians, and Carystians from Euboea; the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians from the islands; and the Milesians, Samians, and Chians from Ionia. The Chians, however, paid no tribute. They joined as independent allies who supplied ships. Nearly all these peoples were Ionians of Athenian origin. The exception was the Carystians, who were Dryopes. Although they followed as subjects under compulsion, they were at least Ionians fighting Dorians.

5 There were Aeolians too. The Methymnaeans were subjects who supplied ships rather than tribute; the Tenedians and Aenianians paid tribute. These Aeolians were forced to fight the Boeotians, who were also Aeolians and had founded their settlements but were now on the Syracusan side. The Plataeans, by contrast, were the only Boeotians fighting other Boeotians. Their hostility made that natural.

6 The Rhodians and Cytherians were both Dorians. The Cytherians were colonists of the Lacedaemonians, yet fought on the Athenian side against the Lacedaemonians with Gylippus. The Rhodians were of Argive descent. They

were forced to fight the Syracusans, who were Dorians, and the people of Gela, who were their own colonists and were serving with the Syracusans.

7 Among the islanders around the Peloponnese, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians were independent. But as islanders they were more exposed to pressure, since the Athenians controlled the sea, and so they joined them. The Corcyraeans were not only Dorians but specifically Corinthians. They followed against the Corinthians, whose colonists they were, and the Syracusans, who were their relatives. Their stated reason was compulsion, but their hatred of the Corinthians gave them no less reason to join willingly.

8 The people now called Messenians were brought into the war from Naupactus and from Pylos, which the Athenians then held. There were also a few Megarian exiles. Circumstances had brought them into a war against the Selinuntians, who were Megarians themselves.

9 The remaining peoples took part more willingly. The Argives were Dorians who followed the Ionian Athenians against Dorians. Their alliance was no greater reason for this than their hatred of the Lacedaemonians and the immediate personal benefit each man gained. The Mantineans and other Arcadians were mercenaries, accustomed to fight whoever was designated as their enemy. On this occasion the prospect of profit made them treat the Arcadians who had come with the Corinthians as enemies just as much as anyone else. The Cretans and Aetolians too were persuaded by pay. The Cretans had helped the Rhodians found Gela. Yet now they willingly came for pay, not to join their colonists but to fight against them.

10 Some Acarnanians also came to help as allies. Profit played a part, but their main reasons were friendship with Demosthenes and goodwill toward the Athenians.

11 The peoples listed so far came from this side of the Ionian Gulf. Among the Greeks of Italy, the Thurians and Metapontians joined the expedition because periods of civil strife had then placed them under such pressures. Among the

Greeks of Sicily, the Naxians and Catanaeans joined. The non-Greeks included the Egestaeans, who had brought the Athenians over in the first place, and most of the Sicels. From outside Sicily came some Tyrrhenians, because of a quarrel with the Syracusans, and Iapygian mercenaries. These were the peoples who fought with the Athenians.

CHAPTER 58

1 The Camarinaeans, who were neighbors of the Syracusans, came to help them against the Athenians. So did the people of Gela, who lived next along the coast. The people of Acragas stayed out of the war, but beyond them the Selinuntians also joined.

2 These peoples lived on the side of Sicily facing Libya. The Himeraeans came from the side facing the Tyrrhenian Sea. They were the only Greeks living in that region and the only people from it to send help.

3 These were the Greek peoples of Sicily who joined the Syracusans. They were all Dorians and independent. Of the non-Greeks, only those Sicels who had not gone over to the Athenians joined them. Among the Greeks from outside Sicily, the Lacedaemonians supplied a Spartan commander; the rest of their men were newly enfranchised men and Helots [newly enfranchised means already free]. The Corinthians were the only ones to come with both ships and infantry. The Leucadians and Ambraciots came because of kinship. From Arcadia came mercenaries sent by the Corinthians, and the Sicyonians were forced to serve. From outside the Peloponnese came the Boeotians.

4 Compared with these troops from abroad, the Greeks of Sicily themselves supplied greater numbers in every category, since they lived in large cities. They assembled many hoplites, ships, and cavalry, and a large number of other troops. The Syracusans themselves, in turn, provided more than practically all the others combined, because of the size of their city and because they faced the greatest danger.

CHAPTER 59

1 These were the forces gathered to support each side. By this time all of them had arrived, and no further reinforcements came to either side.

2 The Syracusans and their allies naturally thought it would be a fine achievement to follow their victory at sea by capturing the whole Athenian army, large as it was, and allowing none of it to escape by either sea or land.

3 So they immediately began closing the Great Harbor, whose mouth was about eight stades wide. They anchored triremes broadside across it, together with merchant vessels and small boats. They also made their other preparations in case the Athenians dared to fight another sea battle. All their plans, in every area, were ambitious.

CHAPTER 60

1 The Athenians saw the harbor being blocked and realized what else the enemy intended. They decided they needed to discuss what to do.

2 The generals and the infantry commanders met to consider their present difficulties. Besides their other problems, they had no provisions left for immediate use: when they had expected to sail away, they had sent word ahead to Catana not to bring any more. Nor would they have provisions in the future unless they won control of the sea. They decided to abandon the upper walls. Right beside the ships, they would build a crosswall to enclose as small an area as possible, just enough for their equipment and the sick, and guard it. They would use the rest of the infantry to man every ship they had, both the seaworthy ones and those less fit to sail, putting everyone aboard. Then they would fight their way out. If they won, they would go to Catana. If not, they would burn the ships, form up for a march, and retreat by whatever route would bring them soonest to a friendly place, whether non-Greek or Greek.

3 Once they had decided on this plan, they carried it out. They came down from the upper walls and manned all their ships. They forced everyone aboard who seemed even remotely fit for service and of an age to take part.

4 They manned about a hundred and ten ships in all. They put many archers and javelin throwers aboard, drawn from the Acarnanians and the other foreign troops. They made the rest of their preparations as well as they could under the pressure of necessity and with this plan in mind.

5 When most of the preparations were complete, Nicias saw that the soldiers were discouraged by their naval defeat, so different from what they were used to. Their shortage of provisions also made them want to risk a battle as soon as possible. He called them all together and first encouraged them with the following speech.

CHAPTER 61

1 "Athenian soldiers and soldiers from our other allies, the coming battle concerns all of us alike. Each of us will be fighting for survival and for his homeland, no less than our enemies will. If we win with our ships now, each man has a chance to see his own city again, wherever it is.

2 "We must not lose heart. We must not act like people with no experience, who fail in their first battles and then always expect the disasters they fear to match those they have already suffered.

3 "Those of you here who are Athenians have experience of many wars already. Those who are allies have always fought alongside us. Remember how unpredictable war can be. Hope that luck may take our side too. Get ready to fight back in a way that does justice to this great force, whose size you can see for yourselves.

CHAPTER 62

1 "We have considered, together with the helmsmen, everything that could help us in the narrow harbor, with the crowd of ships that will be there, and against the enemy's equipment on deck. These things harmed us before. Now we too have made all the preparations our resources allow.

2 "Many archers and javelin throwers will board the ships, along with a large number of other men. We would not use such a crowd in a sea battle out in open water. Their weight would make the ships heavy and prevent us from using our skill. But here we are forced to fight what amounts to a land battle from our ships, and these men will be useful.

3 "We have also worked out the changes we need to make to our ships. To counter the enemy's thick projecting bow timbers, which did us the most damage, we will throw iron grappling hooks onto their ships. These will stop a ship that has struck us from backing away, if the marines do their part after that.

4 "We have been forced into this position: we must fight a land battle from our ships. It seems best neither to back away ourselves nor to let the enemy do so. This is especially true because the land is hostile, except for the stretch our army holds.

CHAPTER 63

1 "Remember this and fight with all your strength. Do not let yourselves be driven onto that land. When your ship meets another, do not agree to separate until you have swept the hoplites off the enemy's deck.

2 "I am urging this on the hoplites no less than on the sailors, since this task is more the responsibility of the men on deck. Even now our army is still stronger in most respects.

3 "At the same time I advise the sailors, and appeal to them, not to be too frightened by our setbacks. We now have better equipment on deck and more ships. Remember too the pleasure of the position you have enjoyed, and how well worth keeping it is. Until now, although you were not Athenians, people thought you were. Your knowledge of our language and your imitation of our ways won you admiration throughout Hellas. You had no smaller share in the benefits of our empire. In fact, you had a much greater share in the fear you inspired in its subjects and in protection from mistreatment.

4 "So you alone share our empire with us as free men. It is only right that you should not betray it now. Look down on the Corinthians, whom you have beaten so often, and on the Greeks of Sicily. None of them thought they could even stand up to us while our navy was at its height. Fight them off. Show that even with weakness and setbacks, your skill is stronger than someone else's strength backed by good luck.

CHAPTER 64

1 "Now I remind the Athenians among you once again of this. You have not left behind other ships in the dockyards to match these, or a reserve of men of hoplite age. If the result is anything other than victory for you, our enemies here will sail straight for Athens. Our people left there will be unable to fight off both the enemies already there and the new arrivals. You here would immediately fall under the power of the Syracusans. You know for yourselves what your intentions were when you attacked them. Our people at home would fall under the power of the Lacedaemonians.

2 "So this one battle will decide the fate of both groups. Stand firm now as never before. Each of you, and all of you together, must keep this in mind: those of you who are about to go aboard are Athens' army, its fleet, what is left of its city, and its great name. If any man has more skill or courage than another, he could never show it at a better time. By doing so he will help himself and save us all."

CHAPTER 65

1 After giving this encouragement, Nicias immediately ordered the men to crew the ships. Gylippus and the Syracusans could see the preparations themselves and recognize that the Athenians were going to fight at sea. They had also been told in advance about the use of iron grappling hooks.

2 They made preparations to meet each of the other measures, and this one too. They covered the bows and much of the upper part of their ships with hides. This would make a grappling hook slide off when it was thrown aboard, instead of finding a hold.

3 When everything was ready, the generals and Gylippus encouraged their men with these words.

CHAPTER 66

1 "Syracusans and allies, we think most of you know that what you have already achieved is a fine thing, and that the battle ahead will be fought for fine rewards. Otherwise you would not have taken it on so eagerly. If anyone has not understood this fully, we will explain it.

2 "The Athenians came to this country intending first to enslave Sicily. Then, if they succeeded, they meant to enslave the Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas too. They already held the greatest empire any Greeks have ever possessed, in the past or in our own time. You were the first people to stand up to their navy, the force they used to gain all this. You have already won sea battles against them, and you are likely to win the one ahead.

3 "When men suffer a setback in the thing in which they claim to excel, what remains of their confidence is weaker than it would have been if they had never had that opinion of themselves. Their pride meets an unexpected defeat, and they give way more than the actual strength of their forces would require. The Athenians have probably suffered this now.

CHAPTER 67

1 "Our original courage, which made us dare to fight even when we still lacked skill, is now more firmly established. Added to it is the belief that we must be the best if we have beaten the best. So each man's confidence has doubled. In most undertakings, the greatest confidence also produces the greatest enthusiasm.

2 "They have copied our equipment. But we are used to that way of fighting, and we will be able to deal with each of their measures. They, on the other hand, will have many hoplites on deck, contrary to their usual practice. They will also have many javelin throwers aboard, Acarnanians and others who are, so to speak, men of the land rather than the sea. These men will not even know how to throw a javelin while sitting down. How can they fail to make the ships unsteady? And how can they avoid getting in each other's way, when none of them is moving as he is used to?

3 "Their greater number of ships will not help them either, in case any of you is also frightened at the thought of fighting an unequal number. Many ships in a small space will be slower to do what they intend, and very easy to damage with the equipment we have prepared.

4 "Learn the real truth from information that we believe is reliable. Their troubles have become overwhelming, and their present lack of a way out has driven them to desperation. They are relying less on their preparations than on taking a chance with luck, any way they can. They hope either to force their way out to sea or to retreat by land afterward. They believe that nothing they do could make their position worse than it is now.

CHAPTER 68

1 "So let us angrily attack our bitterest enemies, whose ranks are in such disorder and whose fate is now in our hands. Let us consider it entirely right to satisfy our anger against our opponents when we mean to punish them for attacking

us. And let us remember that we will have the chance to pay back our enemies, which, as people say, is the greatest pleasure.

2 "You all know that they are enemies, and the bitterest enemies. They came to our country to enslave us. If they had succeeded, they would have inflicted the worst suffering on our men, the worst indignities on our children and women, and the most shameful name on our whole city.

3 "In return for this, no one should weaken or think it a gain just to let them get away safely. They will do that anyway if they win. But if we achieve what we want, as we probably will, we will punish these men and give all Sicily a firmer hold on the freedom it already enjoys. That is a fine goal to fight for. There are very few risks like this, where failure causes so little harm and success brings such great benefits."

CHAPTER 69

1 After the Syracusan generals and Gylippus had encouraged their own soldiers in this way, they too began to crew their ships, as soon as they saw the Athenians doing so.

2 Nicias was shaken by the situation. He saw how great the danger was, and how close it already [was], since the ships were just about to set out. As often happens to people facing a great struggle, he thought that everything they had done was still inadequate, and that he had not yet said enough to the men. He called each trireme captain back again, addressing him by his father's name, his own name, and his tribe. If a man had any personal distinction, Nicias urged him not to betray it. He urged them not to wipe out the record of their fathers' courage, which had made their ancestors famous. He reminded them that their homeland was the freest of all, and that everyone there could live as he chose, without anyone ordering him about. He also said all the other things people say when they reach such a moment. They do not worry that someone may think they are repeating old phrases. They make much the same appeals on behalf of

all that matters to them, bringing up wives, children, and ancestral gods. In the terror of the moment, they shout these things out because they think they will help.

3 He felt that his words of advice were necessary, even if they were not enough. He then withdrew, led the land army to the sea, and spread it out along as wide a front as he could. He wanted it to give the men in the ships as much encouragement as possible.

4 Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus were the Athenian generals who went aboard the ships. They put out from their own camp and sailed straight for the barrier across the harbor and the opening left for sailing through it. They intended to force their way out.

CHAPTER 70

1 The Syracusans and their allies had already put out, with about as many ships as before. They used part of their fleet to guard the exit, and the rest to guard positions around the harbor. This would let them attack the Athenians from every side at once. Their land army also came to help wherever the ships came in to shore. Sicanus and Agatharchus commanded the Syracusan fleet, each holding one wing of the whole force. Pythen and the Corinthians held the center.

2 When the rest of the Athenians approached the barrier, the first rush of their attack overcame the ships stationed there, and they tried to open the blocked passage. Then the Syracusans and their allies attacked them from every side. The battle was no longer being fought only at the barrier, but throughout the harbor. It was fierce, and unlike any of the earlier battles.

3 The sailors on both sides put all their energy into driving their ships forward whenever they were ordered. The helmsmen competed intensely, each trying to outdo the others in skill. Whenever ship met ship, the marines worked to make

sure that the fighting on deck lived up to the skill shown elsewhere. Every man hurried to show that he was the best at his assigned task.

4 Many ships were crowded together in a small space. No greater number had ever fought in so little room: the two fleets together came to just under two hundred ships. There were few ramming attacks, since the ships could not back away or sail through the enemy's line. But accidental collisions were more frequent, as one ship struck another while fleeing or sailing to attack a different ship.

5 While a ship was approaching, the men on deck showered it with javelins, arrows, and stones. When the ships came together, the marines fought hand to hand and tried to board each other's ships.

6 Because of the lack of space, it often happened that ships struck others on one side while being struck themselves on another. Two ships, and sometimes more, were forced into a tangled group around one. The helmsmen had to defend against some and plan attacks on others, not one at a time, but against many threats from every direction. The great crash of so many ships colliding was terrifying in itself. It also made it impossible to hear the orders shouted by the men directing the rowers.

7 These men on both sides shouted many orders and appeals, both to direct the work and to spur the men on in the immediate struggle to win. They called on the Athenians to force their way out and to make an eager effort, now if ever, to get home safely once more. They told the Syracusans and their allies that it would be a fine thing to stop the enemy from escaping, and by victory to make each man's homeland greater.

8 The generals on either side also called out whenever they saw a ship backing away without being forced to. They addressed its captain by name. The Athenian generals asked whether the men were retreating because they now thought the bitterly hostile land was more their own than the sea they had won

at such great cost. The Syracusan generals asked whether they were themselves fleeing from the fleeing Athenians, when they knew perfectly well that the Athenians were trying every means of escape.

CHAPTER 71

1 As the sea battle remained evenly balanced, the armies of both sides on land were under great strain, their minds locked on the struggle. The local army was eager to win an even greater success. The invaders were afraid of ending up worse off than they already were.

2 Everything the Athenians had was at stake in their ships, so their fear for the future was unlike anything else. Because the sea battle was going differently in different places, the men watching from shore also saw different things.

3 They were watching from close by, and not everyone was looking at the same place at once. Whenever some saw their own side winning somewhere, they would take courage and turn to calling on the gods not to deny them safety. Others, looking at a place where their side was losing, would cry out and weep. What they saw happening broke their spirits even more than those of the men actually fighting. Others were watching a part of the sea battle where the sides were evenly matched. As the contest went on without a decision, they anxiously moved their own bodies this way and that in time with their fears. Their distress was extreme. At every moment they were only a little way from either escaping or being destroyed.

4 As long as the sea battle was closely balanced, all these sounds could be heard together within the same Athenian army: weeping, shouting, cries of victory and defeat, and all the other different sounds that a great army in great danger is forced to make.

5 The Athenians aboard the ships felt much the same way. Finally, after the battle had held out for a long time, the Syracusans and their allies put the Athenians to flight. They pressed their attack hard, shouting loudly and urging one

another on, and chased them toward the land.

6 Then the men of the fleet who had not been captured out on the water were driven ashore at different points and rushed out into the camp. The land army no longer reacted in different ways. All now shared the same impulse, wailing and groaning at what was happening. Some hurried to help at the ships. Others went to guard what remained of the wall. Others, now the largest group, were looking out for themselves and trying to work out how to escape.

7 The shock at that moment was as great as any they had ever suffered. They were now experiencing something like what they themselves had done at Pylos. When the Lacedaemonians' ships were destroyed, they also lost the men who had crossed to the island. Now the Athenians had no hope of escaping by land unless something unexpected happened.

CHAPTER 72

1 The sea battle had been fierce, and both sides had lost many ships and men. The victorious Syracusans and their allies collected the wrecks and the dead, sailed back to the city, and set up a victory trophy.

2 The Athenians were so overwhelmed by their present troubles that they did not even think of asking permission to recover their dead or their wrecks. Instead they planned to retreat at once during the night.

3 Demosthenes went to Nicias and proposed that they should crew the remaining ships and try to force their way out at dawn, if they could. He said they still had more usable ships left than the enemy. The Athenians had about sixty remaining, while their opponents had fewer than fifty.

4 Nicias agreed to the plan, and they wanted to crew the ships. But the sailors refused to board. The defeat had terrified them, and they no longer believed they could win.

CHAPTER 73

1 By now all the Athenians had made up their minds to retreat by land. But Hermocrates the Syracusan guessed what they intended. He thought it would be dangerous if so large an army retreated inland, established itself somewhere in Sicily, and wanted to renew the war against them. He went to the authorities and urged them not to stand by and let the Athenians withdraw that night. He explained his concerns and proposed that all the Syracusans and their allies should march out at once, block the roads with walls, and take up positions in advance to guard the narrow passes.

2 The authorities understood this just as well as he did, and agreed that it ought to be done. But they thought the men would not readily obey. They had only just come to rest after a great sea battle and were enjoying their relief. There was also a festival: a sacrifice to Heracles happened to fall on that day. In their delight at the victory, most of the men had turned to drinking at the festival. The authorities expected them to do anything they were told rather than take up their weapons and march out at that moment.

3 The authorities thought these difficulties could not be overcome, and Hermocrates could no longer persuade them. So he came up with the following plan. He was afraid that the Athenians might get a head start in the night and pass quietly through the most difficult ground. As darkness was falling, he sent some of his own companions with horsemen to the Athenian camp. They rode up to within earshot and called for some of the men, pretending to be friends of the Athenians. Nicias did in fact have people inside the city who sent him messages. They told the men to warn Nicias not to lead his army away that night, because the Syracusans were guarding the roads. Instead, he should take his time preparing and withdraw by day.

4 After saying this, they left. Those who had heard them passed the message to the Athenian generals.

CHAPTER 74

1 In response to the message, the generals stayed where they were that night, believing it was not a trick. Since they had not set out at once after all, they decided to wait through the next day too. This would let the soldiers pack the most useful things they could from what was available. They were to leave everything else behind and set out with only the supplies they could carry to keep themselves alive.

2 The Syracusans and Gylippus marched out ahead of them with the land army. They blocked the roads through the country that the Athenians were likely to take, guarded the crossings over streams and rivers, and took up positions wherever they thought best to meet and stop the army. Meanwhile they sailed up to the Athenian ships and towed them off the beach. The Athenians themselves burned a few, as they had planned. The Syracusans fastened towlines to the rest wherever each had been driven ashore, and brought them back to the city at their leisure, with no one stopping them.

CHAPTER 75

1 After this, when Nicias and Demosthenes thought their preparations were complete, the army finally broke camp. It was the third day after the sea battle.

2 Their situation was terrible in more ways than one. They were retreating after losing all their ships. Their great hopes had given way to danger for both themselves and their city. But leaving the camp also brought each man painful sights and painful thoughts.

3 The dead were still unburied. Whenever a man saw one of his friends lying there, he felt grief mixed with fear. But the living men left behind, the wounded and sick, caused the survivors much more distress than the dead did. Their own condition was even more miserable than that of the men who had died.

4 They begged and cried out, leaving the others at a loss about what to do. They demanded to be taken along and called out to anyone they saw among their friends or relatives, one man after another. As their tentmates left, they clung to them and followed as far as they could. When their strength and bodies failed them, they were left behind with some cries to the gods and groans. The whole army was full of tears and this feeling of helplessness. They found it hard to start, even though they were leaving enemy territory. They had already suffered things too great for tears, and feared still more such suffering in the unknown future.

5 At the same time, they were deeply dejected and bitterly blamed themselves. They looked like nothing so much as the population of a city fleeing after its capture in a siege—and not a small city, either. The whole crowd marching together numbered at least forty thousand. Everyone else carried whatever useful things he could. The hoplites and cavalrymen, contrary to their usual practice, carried their own food along with their weapons. Some had no servants; others did not trust them. Servants had been deserting for a long time, and most had left just now. Even the food they carried was not enough, since there was no longer any grain in the camp.

6 Everyone had an equal share in their other suffering. Sharing troubles with so many others did offer some relief. Even so, their suffering seemed hard to bear in their present situation. This was especially true when they thought of the splendor and pride of their departure and the humiliating end they had now reached.

7 No Greek army had ever experienced a greater reversal. They had come to enslave others, but were leaving in greater fear of being enslaved themselves. They had sailed out with prayers and songs of victory; now they were setting out to cries that meant the opposite. They were traveling on foot instead of aboard ships, and depended on hoplites rather than a fleet. Yet the enormous danger still hanging over them made all this seem bearable.

CHAPTER 76

1 Nicias saw how discouraged the army was and how great a reversal it had suffered. He went along the ranks, encouraging and comforting the men as best he could in the circumstances. As he reached each group, his eagerness made him raise his voice still higher. He wanted to be heard as far away as possible and do some good.

CHAPTER 77

1 "Athenians and allies, even in our present situation we must have hope. Others have escaped from dangers worse than these. Do not blame yourselves too much for our misfortunes or for the suffering you now endure, which you do not deserve.

2 "I am no stronger than any of you. You can see what my illness has done to me. And although I was thought to be as fortunate as anyone, both in my private life and in other ways, I now face the same uncertain danger as the least fortunate among you. Yet throughout my life I have carefully observed my duties to the gods and treated people justly, without giving them grounds for resentment.

3 "That is why I still have strong hopes for the future, and why our misfortunes do not frighten me as much as their scale might suggest. They may even ease soon. Our enemies have already had enough good fortune. And if our expedition made any god resent us, we have already been punished enough.

4 "Others have invaded foreign countries before. They acted as humans do, and what they suffered was bearable. We too now have reason to hope for gentler treatment from the gods. We deserve their pity now more than their resentment. Look at yourselves: think how good you are as hoplites, and how many of you are marching together in formation. Do not be too alarmed. Remember

that wherever you settle, you immediately form a city yourselves. No other city in Sicily could easily withstand your attack or drive you out once you had established yourselves somewhere.

5 "Make sure yourselves that the march is safe and orderly. Each man should keep this one thought in mind: wherever he is forced to fight, if he wins, that place will be his country and his protecting wall.

6 "We will have to hurry on our way by night as well as by day, since we have little food. If we reach some friendly territory belonging to the Sicels, you can consider yourselves safe. They are still loyal to us because they fear the Syracusans. We have already sent ahead to them, telling them to meet us and bring more food.

7 "In short, soldiers, understand that you must be brave. There is nowhere nearby where you can find safety if you lose your courage. If you escape the enemy now, those of you from other cities will see the things you long to see again. And you Athenians will restore your city's great power, even though it has fallen. A city is its men, not walls or ships with no men in them."

CHAPTER 78

1 Nicias went along the army giving encouragement of this kind. Wherever he saw men scattered and marching out of formation, he brought them together and put them in order. Demosthenes was doing just as much for his own troops, speaking to them in the same or similar terms.

2 The army marched in a hollow square, with Nicias' force leading and Demosthenes' following. The hoplites kept the baggage carriers and most of the crowd inside their formation.

3 When they reached the crossing of the river Anapus, they found a force of Syracusans and allies drawn up there. They routed them, gained control of the crossing, and moved forward. The Syracusan cavalry rode alongside and kept attacking them, while the light troops threw javelins at them.

4 That day the Athenians advanced about forty stades and camped by a hill. The next day they set out early and went about twenty stades. They came down to a level area and camped there. There were people living in the district, so they wanted to get some food from the houses. They also wanted to take water with them from there, since water was scarce for many stades ahead along their intended route.

5 Meanwhile, the Syracusans went ahead and were building a wall across the pass farther along the route. The position was a strong hill with a steep-sided ravine on either side. It was called Acraeum Lepas.

6 The next day the Athenians moved forward. Large numbers of Syracusan and allied cavalry and javelin throwers blocked them on both sides, throwing javelins and riding alongside them. The Athenians fought for a long time, then withdrew to the same camp. They no longer had the same supply of food, since the cavalry now prevented them from going out to get it.

CHAPTER 79

1 They set out early and marched again. They forced their way to the hill where the wall had been built. There they found the enemy infantry drawn up ahead of them above the wall. The ranks were many shields deep, since the ground was narrow.

2 The Athenians attacked the wall. Many men on the steep hill above threw missiles down at them, and those above could reach them more easily. Unable to force their way through, the Athenians withdrew again and rested.

3 There also happened to be some thunder and rain, as is usual when the year is already approaching autumn. This discouraged the Athenians still more. They thought that all these things too were happening to bring about their destruction.

4 While they were resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans sent part of their army to build another wall behind them, across the route by which they had advanced. The Athenians sent some of their own men against them and prevented this.

5 After this, the Athenians withdrew with their whole army closer to the plain and camped for the night. The next day they moved forward. The Syracusans attacked them on every side and wounded many of them. When the Athenians advanced against them, they fell back; when the Athenians withdrew, they pressed forward. They attacked the men at the rear in particular. They hoped that by routing a few at a time they might panic the whole army.

6 The Athenians held out against these tactics for a long time. Then, after advancing five or six stades, they stopped to rest on the plain. The Syracusans also left them and returned to their own camp.

CHAPTER 80

1 That night Nicias and Demosthenes decided to light as many fires as possible and lead the army away. It was in bad condition, now short of every kind of supply, and many men had been wounded in the enemy's repeated attacks. They would no longer take their intended route. Instead, they would go toward the sea, in the opposite direction from the route the Syracusans were guarding.

2 This route as a whole led the army not toward Catana, but toward the other side of Sicily, in the direction of Camarina, Gela, and the other cities in that region, both Greek and non-Greek.

3 So they lit many fires and marched away in the night. But confusion broke out among them. Fear and panic can affect any army, especially a very large one, and all the more when it is marching by night through enemy territory with the enemy close by.

4 Nicias' force, which was in the lead, stayed together and got a long way ahead. But Demosthenes' force, which made up about half the army or more, became separated and marched in greater disorder.

5 Nevertheless, at dawn they reached the sea. They took the road called the Helorine Road and marched along it. Their plan was to turn inland when they reached the river Cacyparis, following it upstream. They also hoped to meet the Sicels there whom they had sent for.

6 When they reached the river, they found a Syracusan guard force there too, building a wall and a line of stakes across the crossing. They forced their way past the guards, crossed the river, and moved on toward another river, the Erineus. That was the way their guides told them to go.

CHAPTER 81

1 Meanwhile, when day came and the Syracusans and their allies learned that the Athenians had gone, most blamed Gylippus for deliberately letting them escape. They quickly set off in pursuit. It was easy to find out which way the Athenians had gone, and they caught up with them around the time of the morning meal.

2 They came up with Demosthenes' troops, who were in the rear and marching more slowly and in greater disorder because of the confusion during the night. They immediately attacked and began fighting. The Syracusan cavalry found it easier to surround them now that they were separated from the other force, and crowded them into one place.

3 Nicias' force was as much as fifty stades ahead. He was moving faster because he thought that in such a situation safety did not lie in choosing to stand and fight. It lay in retreating as fast as possible and fighting only as much as they had to.

4 Demosthenes had generally faced more continuous hardship. Since his force was retreating in the rear, it was the first to be attacked by the enemy. Now, when he realized that the Syracusans were pursuing them, he concentrated on drawing up his men for battle rather than moving forward. As he delayed, the enemy surrounded him, and he and the Athenians with him fell into great confusion. They were trapped in a place enclosed by a low wall, with a road on either side and many olive trees inside. The enemy surrounded them and threw missiles at them.

5 The Syracusans had good reason to use attacks like these instead of close combat. By now, risking a fight with desperate men was no more in their interest than in the Athenians'. With success already certain, each man was anxious not to throw his life away before it came. They also thought that even without close combat they could wear the Athenians down in this way and capture them.

CHAPTER 82

1 They spent the day attacking the Athenians and their allies with missiles from all sides. When they saw that the men were worn down by wounds and their other suffering, Gylippus, the Syracusans, and their allies first made a proclamation to the islanders. Any of them who wanted could come over to their side and keep their freedom. The men from a few cities did leave.

2 Later, they also made an agreement with all the rest of Demosthenes' men. They were to hand over their weapons, and none of them was to die by violence, from imprisonment, or from a lack of the most basic necessities of life.

3 All six thousand men surrendered. They handed over all the money they had, putting it into shields laid face up. They filled four shields. These prisoners were taken to the city at once. That same day, Nicias and his men reached the river Erineus. After crossing it, he settled the army on some high ground.

CHAPTER 83

1 The next day the Syracusans caught up with him. They said that Demosthenes' men had surrendered and told him to do the same. He did not believe them and agreed on a truce so that he could send a cavalryman to find out.

2 The man went and returned with the news that they had surrendered. Nicias then sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusans. He was ready to agree on behalf of the Athenians to repay all the money the Syracusans had spent on the war, if they would let his army go. Until the money was paid, he would give Athenians as hostages, one man for each talent.

3 The Syracusans and Gylippus refused these terms. Instead, they attacked, surrounded these troops too on all sides, and threw missiles at them until late in the day.

4 These men too were in a bad condition from lack of grain and other supplies. Even so, they planned to wait for the quiet part of the night and then march away. But just as they were picking up their weapons, the Syracusans noticed and sang their battle song.

5 Realizing that they had been detected, the Athenians put down their weapons again, except for about three hundred men. These forced their way through the guards and went on through the night wherever they could.

CHAPTER 84

1 At daybreak Nicias led the army on. The Syracusans and their allies kept attacking in the same way, throwing missiles from all sides and striking men down with javelins.

2 The Athenians hurried toward the river Assinarus. The attacks from all sides by large numbers of cavalry and the rest of the enemy force were driving them on. They thought things would be easier if they crossed the river. Their exhaustion and their longing for a drink also drove them forward.

3 When they reached it, they rushed in without any order at all. Every man wanted to get across first, and the enemy's continued attacks were making the crossing very difficult. Forced to move in a mass, they fell over one another and trampled each other. Some were killed at once on their own spears and equipment. Others got tangled in them and fell.

4 The Syracusans took positions on the far bank, which was steep, and threw missiles down at the Athenians. Most of the Athenians were eagerly drinking and jostling one another in confusion down in the riverbed.

5 The Peloponnesians came down after them and slaughtered the men, especially those in the river. The water was immediately fouled, but the men kept drinking it, muddy and bloody as it was. The crowd even fought over it.

CHAPTER 85

1 At last, many bodies were already piled on one another in the river. The army was being destroyed: some died in the river, and any who escaped were killed by the cavalry. Nicias surrendered to Gylippus, whom he trusted more than the Syracusans. He told him that he and the Lacedaemonians could do whatever they wanted with him, but asked them to stop killing the other soldiers.

2 After this, Gylippus ordered his men to take prisoners alive. They gathered up the survivors, except those whom individual captors had kept hidden—and there were many of these. They also sent men in pursuit of the three hundred who had broken through the guards during the night, and captured them.

3 The number of troops collected as public prisoners was therefore not large, but very many were secretly taken by individuals. They were scattered throughout Sicily, since, unlike Demosthenes' men, they had not been captured under an agreement.

4 A considerable number also died. This was the greatest slaughter, as great as any in this [Sicilian] war. Many had also died in the numerous other attacks during the retreat. Yet many escaped, some immediately, and others later, after they

had been enslaved and then run away. These men found refuge in Catana.

CHAPTER 86

1 The Syracusans and their allies gathered together, took as many prisoners as they could and the captured equipment, and returned to the city.

2 They put all the other Athenians and allies they had captured down in the stone quarries, which they thought were the most secure place to keep them. But they executed Nicias and Demosthenes against Gylippus' wishes. In addition to his other achievements, Gylippus thought it would be a fine success to bring the enemy generals back to the Lacedaemonians.

3 Of the two, Demosthenes happened to be their bitterest enemy because of what had happened on the island and at Pylos. Nicias was their closest friend for the same reason. He had worked hard to get the Lacedaemonian prisoners from the island released, persuading the Athenians to make a treaty.

4 The Lacedaemonians were friendly toward him because of this. It was also a major reason why he had trusted Gylippus and surrendered to him. But some of the Syracusans, it was said, had been in secret communication with Nicias. They feared that under torture he might disclose this and cause them trouble just when they were doing well. Others, especially the Corinthians, feared that, since he was rich, he might bribe someone and escape, and then cause them more trouble. They persuaded their allies and had him killed.

5 He died for this reason, or something very close to it. Of all the Greeks of my time, he least deserved to come to such a miserable end, because he had devoted his whole life to following accepted standards of goodness.

CHAPTER 87

1 At first the Syracusans treated the men in the quarries harshly. There were many of them crowded into a small, deep hollow without shelter. Initially they suffered from the sun and the heat, which was still stifling. Then the autumn nights came on cold instead, and the change made them ill.

2 Because they were so cramped, they had to do everything in the same place. The bodies of men who died from wounds, the change in temperature, and similar causes were piled on one another there too. The smells were unbearable. They were also tormented by hunger and thirst. For eight months each man was given a cotyle of water and two cotyles of grain a day. Every other hardship that people trapped in such a place could be expected to suffer also fell on them.

3 They lived like this, all crowded together, for about seventy days. Then the Syracusans sold the others, except the Athenians and any Greeks from Sicily or Italy who had taken part in the expedition.

4 It is hard to give an exact total for the prisoners, but there were at least seven thousand.

5 This proved to be the greatest [Greek] event of this war, and in my opinion the greatest of all Greek events we know of by report. It brought the greatest glory to the victors and the greatest misery to the defeated.

6 They were completely beaten in every way, and their suffering was extreme in every respect. It was, as the saying goes, total destruction: land forces, ships, everything was lost. Out of so many, few returned home. These were the events in Sicily.

Book 8



CHAPTER 1

1 When the news reached Athens, for a long time people refused to believe that the destruction could have been so complete. They would not even believe soldiers who had escaped from the fighting itself and gave clear reports. Once they accepted the truth, they turned against the public speakers who had supported the expedition, as though they had not voted for it themselves. They were also angry with the collectors of oracles, the diviners, and everyone who had made predictions at the time and encouraged them to hope that they would conquer Sicily.

2 The disaster brought them grief from every direction, and they were surrounded by overwhelming fear and shock. Both individual households and the city as a whole felt the loss of so many hoplites and cavalrymen—a body of men of military age that they could see no way to replace. At the same time, they saw that there were not enough ships in the ship sheds, or money in the public treasury, or crews for the ships. For the moment, they had no hope of survival. They thought their enemies in Sicily would sail straight to Piraeus with their fleet, especially after so great a victory. Their enemies nearer home would now double all their preparations and attack with their full strength by land and sea, joined by Athens' own allies in revolt.

3 Even so, they decided that they must not give in. They must use the resources they still had to prepare a fleet, collecting timber wherever they could, and raise money. They must keep their allies secure, especially Euboea. They must also put some of the city's spending on a more sensible, economical basis. They would elect a board of older men to consider measures in advance for the present situation, as each occasion required.

4 In their immediate fear, they were ready to accept discipline in everything, as the people generally are at such times. They put their decisions into practice, and the summer ended.

CHAPTER 2

1 In the following winter, all the Greeks were immediately encouraged by the Athenians' great disaster in Sicily. Those who were allied with neither side thought they must no longer stay out of the war, even if no one invited them to join. They should attack the Athenians of their own accord. Each believed the Athenians would have attacked them too if they had succeeded in Sicily. They also thought the rest of the war would be short and that taking part in it would bring them honor. The Lacedaemonians' allies were more eager than before to make a joint effort and quickly put an end to their many hardships.

2 Above all, the subjects of Athens were ready to revolt, even beyond what their strength allowed. They judged the situation in the heat of their feelings. They would not even allow for the possibility that the Athenians could survive the coming summer.

3 All this gave the Lacedaemonian state confidence. Most of all, it expected its allies from Sicily to arrive in great strength as soon as spring came. Now that these allies had been forced to develop a navy, their arrival seemed likely.

4 With high hopes on every side, the Lacedaemonians intended to commit themselves to the war without holding back. They calculated that, if it ended well, they would be free in the future from dangers like the one Athens would have

brought upon them if it had gained Sicily as well. Once they had brought Athens down, they themselves would hold a secure position as leaders of all Hellas.

CHAPTER 3

1 So, during this winter, their king Agis at once set out from Decelea with part of his army. He collected money from the allies for the navy. Then he turned toward the Malian Gulf. Because of the old hostility between them, he seized a large amount of booty from the Oetaeans and exacted money from them. Despite the protests and opposition of the Thessalians, he also forced the Achaeans of Phthiotis and the other subjects of Thessaly in that region to provide some hostages and money. He placed the hostages at Corinth and tried to bring these peoples into the alliance.

2 The Lacedaemonians assigned the cities a total of 100 ships to build. They assigned 25 each to themselves and the Boeotians; 15 to the Phocians and Locrians together; 15 to the Corinthians; ten to the Arcadians, Pellenians, and Sicyonians together; and ten to the Megarians, Troezenians, Epidaurians, and Hermionians together. They made their other preparations too, intending to take up the war as soon as spring began.

CHAPTER 4

1 During this same winter, the Athenians also carried out the preparations they had planned. They collected timber and built ships. They fortified Sunium so that their grain ships could sail safely around the headland. They abandoned the fort in Laconia that they had built while sailing along the coast to Sicily. They cut other expenses wherever they thought money was being spent needlessly. Above all, they watched the situation among their allies to make sure that they would not revolt.

CHAPTER 5

1 While both sides were doing this, preparing for the war just as though they were starting it for the first time, the Euboeans were the first to send envoys to Agis that winter about revolting from Athens. He accepted their proposals and sent to Lacedaemon for Alcamenes son of Sthenelaidas and Melanthus, to serve as commanders in Euboea. They arrived with about 300 newly enfranchised Helots, and he prepared to send them across.

2 Meanwhile, envoys also came from Lesbos, whose people wanted to revolt too. The Boeotians supported them and persuaded Agis to put the Euboean plan on hold. Instead, he prepared for the revolt of Lesbos. He assigned them Alcamenes as military governor, although Alcamenes had been about to sail to Euboea. The Boeotians promised ten ships, and Agis promised ten.

3 These arrangements were made without consulting the Lacedaemonian state. As long as Agis was at Decelea with his own force, he had authority to send troops wherever he wanted, to raise more troops, and to demand money. At this time, it would be fair to say that the allies obeyed him much more [than] the Lacedaemonians at home. With his force behind him, he could appear anywhere at once and make himself feared.

4 While he was making arrangements with the people of Lesbos, the Chians and Erythraeans, who were also ready to revolt, approached Lacedaemon rather than Agis. An envoy from Tissaphernes came there with them. Tissaphernes governed the coastal region for King Darius son of Artaxerxes.

5 Tissaphernes too was inviting the Peloponnesians to come and promising to provide their maintenance. The king had recently demanded the tribute due from his province. Because of the Athenians, Tissaphernes had been unable to collect it from the Greek cities and had fallen into arrears. He therefore thought that by weakening the Athenians he could collect the tribute more easily. He also hoped to make the Lacedaemonians allies of the king and, as the king had ordered him, either bring in alive or kill Amorges, the illegitimate son of Pissuthnes, who was in revolt in Caria.

CHAPTER 6

1 The Chians and Tissaphernes were working together toward the same goal. At about the same time, Calligeitus son of Laophon, a Megarian, and Timagoras son of Athenagoras, from Cyzicus, arrived in Lacedaemon. Both were exiles from their own cities and were living with Pharnabazus son of Pharnaces. Pharnabazus had sent them to bring ships to the Hellespont. Like Tissaphernes, he wanted, if possible, to make the cities in his province revolt from Athens so that he could collect their tribute. He also wanted to be the one responsible for making the Lacedaemonians allies of the king.

2 The representatives of Pharnabazus and those of Tissaphernes pursued these plans separately. There was intense competition at Lacedaemon. One group tried to persuade the Lacedaemonians to send ships and an army to Ionia and Chios first, while the other wanted them sent to the Hellespont first.

3 The Lacedaemonians were much more receptive to the proposals from Chios and Tissaphernes. Alcibiades was also supporting them. His family had a particularly close connection with Endius, who was then an ephor: their families had long been friends and hosts to one another. That connection was also how Alcibiades' family had acquired its Laconian name: Endius' father was named Alcibiades.

4 Even so, the Lacedaemonians first sent Phrynis, one of the perioeci, to inspect Chios. He was to find out whether the Chians had as many ships as they claimed and whether the city was as powerful in other respects as its reputation suggested. When he reported that what they had heard was true, they immediately made the Chians and Erythraeans their allies. They voted to send them 40 ships, since, according to the Chians, at least 60 were already available there.

5 At first, they themselves were going to send ten of these ships under Melanchridas, who was their admiral. Then an earthquake occurred. They replaced Melanchridas with Chalcideus and prepared five ships in Laconia instead of ten. The winter ended, and the nineteenth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

CHAPTER 7

1 At the beginning of spring in the next summer season, the Chians immediately pressed for the ships to be sent. They were afraid that the Athenians might discover what was happening, since all these embassies had been sent without their knowledge. The Lacedaemonians sent three Spartans to Corinth. They were to have the ships hauled across the Isthmus as quickly as possible, from the sea on the other side to the sea facing Athens. Then they were to order them all to sail to Chios, including those Agis had been preparing for Lesbos as well as the others. The allied ships there numbered 39 in all.

CHAPTER 8

1 Calligeitus and Timagoras, acting for Pharnabazus, would not take part in the expedition to Chios. Nor would they contribute to it the money they had brought, 25 talents. They intended to sail separately later with another expedition.

2 When Agis saw that the Lacedaemonians were determined to go to Chios first, he did not favor any other course himself. The allies met at Corinth to discuss the matter. They decided to sail first to Chios under Chalcideus, who was preparing the five ships in Laconia, then to Lesbos under Alcamenes, as Agis had planned, and finally to the Hellespont. Clearchus son of Rhamphias had been assigned to command there.

3 They decided to haul half the ships across the Isthmus first and have them sail at once. That way, the Athenians would pay no more attention to the departing ships than to those being brought across later.

4 Indeed, they were making this voyage quite openly. They thought little of the Athenians in their weakness, since no substantial Athenian fleet had yet appeared. In keeping with their decision, they immediately brought 21 ships across.

CHAPTER 9

1 Although the others were pressing for departure, the Corinthians were unwilling to sail with them until they had finished celebrating the Isthmian festival, which was taking place at the time. Agis was willing to make the expedition his own responsibility, so that the Corinthians themselves need not break the Isthmian truce.

2 The Corinthians would not agree, and there was a delay. Meanwhile, the Athenians learned more about the situation in Chios. They sent Aristocrates, one of their generals, to accuse the Chians. When the Chians denied the accusations, the Athenians told them to prove their loyalty by sending ships to serve with them in the allied fleet. They sent seven.

3 They sent the ships because most Chians did not know what was being planned. The small group who did know did not yet want to make enemies of the general population before they had gained some strong support. They also no longer expected the Peloponnesians to come, because of the delay.

CHAPTER 10

1 Meanwhile, the Isthmian festival took place. The Athenians, who had been invited, attended it, and the Chian plans became clearer to them. When they returned, they immediately made preparations to ensure that the ships could not sail from Cenchreae without their knowledge.

2 After the festival, the Peloponnesians set sail for Chios with 21 ships under Alcamenes. At first the Athenians approached with an equal number of ships and tried to draw them out to open sea. When the Peloponnesians did not follow them far but turned away, the Athenians also withdrew. They had the seven Chian ships among their own and did not trust them.

3 Later, however, they crewed more ships, bringing their total to 37. They pursued the Peloponnesians as they sailed along the coast and drove them into Spiraeum in Corinthian territory. This is an uninhabited harbor at the far edge

of the territory, near the border with Epidaurus. The Peloponnesians lost one ship out at sea. They brought the others together and anchored them.

4 The Athenians attacked with their ships from the sea and also landed troops. Great confusion and disorder followed. The Athenians badly damaged most of the ships on shore and killed Alcamenes, their commander. Some Athenians were also killed.

CHAPTER 11

1 When the two sides had drawn apart, the Athenians assigned enough ships to keep watch over the enemy fleet. They anchored the rest at a small island nearby, where they made their camp. They also sent to Athens for reinforcements.

2 The next day the Corinthians came to help the Peloponnesians defend the ships, and shortly afterward the other neighboring peoples arrived too. They saw that guarding the ships in an uninhabited place would be difficult and did not know what to do. They considered burning the ships. Then they decided to haul them ashore and keep their army stationed beside them as a guard until a suitable chance of escape arose. When Agis learned what had happened, he also sent them a Spartan named Thermon.

3 The Lacedaemonians first received news that the ships had sailed from the Isthmus. The ephors had told Alcamenes to send a mounted messenger when this happened. They immediately wanted to send their own five ships under Chalcideus, with Alcibiades accompanying him. Then, just as they were preparing to leave, news arrived that the ships had taken refuge in Spiraeum. This failure at their very first attempt to begin the war in Ionia discouraged them. They no longer intended to send the ships from their own country. They even thought of recalling some that had already put out to sea.

CHAPTER 12

1 When Alcibiades learned this, he again persuaded Endius and the other ephors not to be afraid to make the voyage. He said they would arrive before the Chians heard about the disaster to the ships. Once he himself reached Ionia, he could easily persuade the cities to revolt by telling them about the Athenians' weakness and the Lacedaemonians' eagerness to help. They would find him more convincing than anyone else.

2 He also told Endius privately that it would bring him honor to be responsible for the revolt of Ionia and for making the king an ally of the Lacedaemonians. This achievement should not belong to Agis. Alcibiades himself was at odds with Agis.

3 After persuading Endius and the other ephors, Alcibiades set out in the five ships with Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian. They made the voyage at speed.

CHAPTER 13

1 At about this same time, the 16 Peloponnesian ships that had fought through the war with Gylippus were returning from Sicily. Near Leucas they were cut off and damaged by 27 Athenian ships under Hippocles son of Menippus, who was watching for ships coming from Sicily. All but one of the Peloponnesian ships escaped the Athenians and sailed into Corinth.

CHAPTER 14

1 As Chalcideus and Alcibiades sailed, they detained everyone they met so that news of their approach would not get out. They first reached Corycus on the mainland and released these people there. After meeting some of their Chian supporters, who told them to sail into the city without giving advance notice, they arrived unexpectedly at Chios.

2 Most people were astonished and alarmed. But the small group behind the plan had arranged for the council to be in session at the time. Chalcideus and Alcibiades spoke, saying that many more ships were on their way. They did not reveal that the ships at Spiraeum were under blockade. The Chians revolted from Athens, and the Erythraeans followed.

3 After this, they sailed with three ships to Clazomenae and brought it into revolt too. The Clazomenians immediately crossed to the mainland and began fortifying Polichna. It would give them a place to retreat to from the small island where they lived, if they needed one. All the rebels were now building fortifications and preparing for war.

CHAPTER 15

1 News about Chios quickly reached Athens. The Athenians thought the danger surrounding them was now great and unmistakable. With their largest allied city having changed sides, they did not expect the other allies to stay quiet. In their immediate alarm, they at once removed the penalties for anyone who proposed or put to the vote the use of the 1,000 talents that they had tried so hard not to touch throughout the war. They voted to use this money and crew a substantial number of ships. They also voted to send eight ships immediately from the force keeping watch at Spiraeum. These had left their watch to pursue Chalcideus' ships, failed to catch them, and returned. Their commander was Strombichides son of Diotimus. Twelve more ships under Thrasycles were to follow shortly afterward as reinforcements, also leaving their watch.

2 They withdrew the seven Chian ships that had been helping them blockade the ships at Spiraeum. They freed the slaves aboard them and put the free men in chains. They quickly crewed ten other ships and sent them to replace all those that had left the watch over the Peloponnesians. They also planned to crew another 30. There was great enthusiasm, and every effort was made on a large scale to send help against Chios.

CHAPTER 16

1 Meanwhile, Strombichides arrived at Samos with his eight ships. He took on one Samian ship and sailed to Teos, where he called on the people to remain loyal. Chalcideus was also sailing from Chios toward Teos with 23 ships. At the same time, the land forces of Clazomenae and Erythrae were approaching along the coast.

2 Strombichides learned of their approach in time and put out to sea. Once he was in open water and saw how many ships were coming from Chios, he fled toward Samos. The others pursued him.

3 At first the Teians would not admit the land army. Once the Athenians fled, they let it in. The soldiers waited for Chalcideus to return from the pursuit. When he was slow to arrive, they began tearing down the wall the Athenians had built on the mainland side of the city of Teos. A small force of non-Greeks came to help them demolish it, under Stages, a subordinate of Tissaphernes.

CHAPTER 17

1 After chasing Strombichides to Samos, Chalcideus and Alcibiades armed the sailors from their Peloponnesian ships and left them at Chios. They replaced them with Chian crews, crewed 20 more ships as well, and sailed to Miletus to bring it into revolt.

2 Alcibiades was on friendly terms with the leading men of Miletus. He wanted to bring them over before the ships from the Peloponnese arrived. By bringing as many cities as possible into revolt with Chalcideus and the Chian force, he wanted to win credit for the Chians, himself, Chalcideus, and Endius, who had sent him out, just as he had promised.

3 They went unnoticed for most of the voyage and arrived just ahead of Strombichides and Thrasycles. Thrasycles had just arrived from Athens with twelve ships and was joining in the pursuit. They brought Miletus into revolt.

The Athenians sailed up close behind them with 19 ships. When the Milesians refused to admit them, they anchored off the nearby island of Lade to keep watch.

4 Immediately after the Milesians revolted, the Lacedaemonians made their first alliance with the king, through Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, on the following terms.

CHAPTER 18

1 "The Lacedaemonians and their allies made an alliance with the king and Tissaphernes on these terms. All territory and cities held by the king, and all those held by his ancestors, shall belong to the king. The king, the Lacedaemonians, and their allies shall jointly prevent the Athenians from receiving any money or anything else that used to come to them from these cities.

2 "The king, the Lacedaemonians, and their allies shall wage war against the Athenians together. Neither side may end the war with the Athenians unless both sides agree: the king, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies.

3 "Anyone who revolts from the king shall also be an enemy of the Lacedaemonians and their allies. In the same way, anyone who revolts from the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall be an enemy of the king."

CHAPTER 19

1 This was the alliance they made. Immediately afterward, the Chians crewed ten more ships and sailed to Anaea. They wanted to find out what was happening at Miletus and, at the same time, bring other cities into revolt.

2 A message came from Chalcideus telling them to sail back and warning that Amorges would arrive overland with an army. They sailed to Dios Hieron. There they sighted 16 ships approaching from Athens under Diomedon, who

had set out later than Thrasycles.

3 As soon as they saw them, they fled. One ship went to Ephesus and the others toward Teos. The Athenians captured four empty ships, their crews having escaped ashore first. The rest took refuge in the city of Teos.

4 The Athenians sailed away to Samos. The Chians put to sea with their remaining ships and, together with the land army, brought Lebedus into revolt, and then Aerae. After this, both the army and the ships returned home.

CHAPTER 20

1 At about the same time, the 20 Peloponnesian ships at Spiraeum, which had been driven there earlier and were being watched by an equal number of Athenian ships, suddenly sailed out. They won the sea battle and captured four Athenian ships. Then they sailed to Cenchreae and again prepared for the voyage to Chios and Ionia. Astyochus arrived from Lacedaemon as their admiral. He now had command of the entire fleet.

2 After the land army had withdrawn from Teos, Tissaphernes himself arrived with an army. He demolished whatever was left of the wall at Teos and then withdrew. Not long after he left, Diomedon arrived with ten Athenian ships and made an agreement with the Teians that they would admit the Athenians too. He then sailed along the coast to Aerae and attacked it. When he failed to take the city, he sailed away.

CHAPTER 21

1 At this time, the people of Samos also rose against the powerful men there, with help from Athenians who happened to be present in three ships. The Samian people killed about 200 of the most powerful men in all. They sentenced 400 to exile and divided their land and houses among themselves. After this, the Athenians voted to grant them self-government, considering them now reliable allies. From then on, the people ran the city themselves. They gave

the landowning class no share in anything. No one among the people was any longer allowed to give a daughter in marriage to someone in that class or take a wife from it.

CHAPTER 22

1 Later that same summer, the Chians continued as eagerly as they had begun. They were coming in force to bring cities into revolt, even without the Peloponnesians. They also wanted as many others as possible to share their danger. They themselves sailed against Lesbos with 13 ships. The Lacedaemonians had ordered them to go there as their second destination and then to the Hellespont. At the same time, a land army made up of the Peloponnesians who were present and the local allies marched along the coast by way of Clazomenae and Cyme. Eualas, a Spartan, commanded the army, and Deiniadas, one of the perioeci, commanded the ships.

2 The ships sailed in and first brought Methymna into revolt. Four ships were left there. The others then brought Mytilene into revolt.

CHAPTER 23

1 Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, sailed from Cenchreae with four ships, as he had planned, and reached Chios. On the third day after his arrival, the twenty-five Athenian ships sailed for Lesbos under Leon and Diomedon. Leon had come out later from Athens with ten ships as reinforcements.

2 Astyochus also put to sea late that same day. He took one Chian ship with him and sailed for Lesbos to give whatever help he could. He reached Pyrrha, and the next day went on to Eresus. There he learned that the Athenians had taken Mytilene at the first assault.

3 The Athenians had sailed straight into the harbor without being expected and captured the Chian ships. They then landed, defeated those who resisted them, and took the city.

4 Astyochus heard this from the people of Eresus and from the Chian ships with Eubulus that had come from Methymna. These ships had been left there earlier. When Mytilene fell, they escaped and met him. There were three of them, since the Athenians had captured one. Astyochus now gave up his plan to attack Mytilene. Instead he brought Eresus into revolt and armed its people. He also sent the hoplites from his own ships overland toward Antissa and Methymna, putting Eteonicus in command. He himself sailed along the coast with his own ships and the three Chian ships. He hoped the sight of them would give the people of Methymna confidence and keep them committed to the revolt.

5 But everything in Lesbos went against him. He took his land troops aboard and sailed back to Chios. The allied land army, which had been going to march to the Hellespont, was also taken back to its separate cities. After this, six ships from the Peloponnesian allied fleet at Cenchreae reached them at Chios.

6 The Athenians restored their control in Lesbos. They then sailed from there and captured Polichna, the settlement on the mainland that the Clazomenians were fortifying. They brought the people back to their city on the island, except for those responsible for the revolt, who went away to Daphnus. Clazomenae returned to the Athenian side.

CHAPTER 24

1 During the same summer, the Athenians operating against Miletus with twenty ships based at Lade landed at Panormus in Milesian territory. Chalcideus, the Lacedaemonian commander, came to oppose them with a small force, and they killed him. On the third day afterward they sailed across and put up a victory monument. The Milesians pulled it down because it had been put up without the Athenians holding the ground.

2 Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian ships from Lesbos, carried out attacks on the Chians from the sea. Their bases were the Oenussae, the islands off Chios; Sidussa and Pteleum, fortified positions they held in Erythraean territo-

ry; and Lesbos. The hoplites serving as marines had been drafted from the citizen roll and made to serve.

3 They landed at Cardamyle and Boliscus, defeated the Chians who came to defend them, killed many, and devastated the surrounding districts. They won another battle at Phanae and a third at Leuconium. After this the Chians no longer came out to fight. The Athenians ravaged their countryside, which was well developed and had suffered no damage from the Persian Wars down to that time.

4 Apart from the Lacedaemonians, the Chians are the only people I know who combined prosperity with good judgment. The greater their city became, the more firmly they kept their affairs in order.

5 Even their revolt, if anyone thinks it was a departure from the safer course, was not something they dared to undertake until they could share the risks with many strong allies. They also saw that, after the disaster in Sicily, even the Athenians no longer denied that their situation was [definitely] very bad. If the unpredictable events of human life led them into a mistake, they made that error along with many others who also thought that Athenian power would quickly be destroyed.

6 With the Chians now cut off from the sea and their land being ravaged, some of them tried to bring the city back to the Athenian side. The authorities discovered this but took no action themselves. Instead they brought the admiral Astyochus over from Erythrae with the four ships he had there. They considered how to stop the plot as gently as possible, either by taking hostages or by some other means. This was what they were doing.

CHAPTER 25

1 At the end of the same summer, a force sailed from Athens to Samos under the generals Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides. It consisted of a thousand Athenian, fifteen hundred Argive, and a thousand allied hoplites. Five hundred

of the Argives had been lightly armed, but the Athenians had equipped them as hoplites. They traveled in forty-eight ships, including troop transports. After crossing to Miletus, they made camp.

2 The Milesians came out to meet them with eight hundred hoplites of their own, the Peloponnesians who had come with Chalcideus, and some [foreign] mercenary troops belonging to Tissaphernes. Tissaphernes himself was also there with his cavalry. They fought the Athenians and their allies.

3 The Argives rushed ahead on their own wing. They despised their opponents as Ionians who would not stand their ground, and advanced with too little order. The Milesians defeated them and killed just under three hundred of their men.

4 The Athenians first defeated the Peloponnesians, then drove back the non-Greeks and the rest of the force. They did not engage the Milesians. After routing the Argives, the Milesians saw the rest of their side being defeated and withdrew into the city. The Athenians, now victorious, set up their position right outside Miletus.

5 In this battle it happened that the Ionians on both sides defeated the Dorians: the Athenians beat the Peloponnesians facing them, and the Milesians beat the Argives. The Athenians put up a victory monument and prepared to build a wall cutting off the city, since the site was on an isthmus. They thought that if they won over Miletus, the other places would readily come over to them too.

CHAPTER 26

1 Meanwhile, late in the afternoon, they received news that fifty-five ships from the Peloponnese and Sicily were almost there. Of the Sicilians, the Syracusans had sent twenty ships and the Selinuntians two. Hermocrates of Syracuse had been especially active in urging them to help finish the destruction of Athenian

power. The ships being prepared in the Peloponnese were also now ready. Theramenes the Lacedaemonian had orders to take both fleets to the admiral Astyochus. They first sailed to Leros, the island off Miletus.

2 There they learned that the Athenians were at Miletus. Before going there, they sailed into the Iasic Gulf, wanting to find out the situation at Miletus.

3 They sailed to Teichiussa in Milesian territory and spent the night there. Alcibiades came there on horseback, and they learned from him about the battle. He had been present and had fought alongside the Milesians and Tissaphernes. He urged them to help Miletus as quickly as possible and not let it be walled off, unless they wanted to lose both Ionia and their whole position.

CHAPTER 27

1 They intended to go to its aid at dawn. But Phrynichus, the Athenian general, received reliable news from Leros about the ships. His fellow generals wanted to stay and fight a naval battle. He said that he would not do this himself and would do everything he could to prevent them or anyone else from doing it.

2 They [could] fight later, when they knew for certain how many enemy ships they faced and how many of their own they would have, and had made full preparations without rushing. He would never give in to the shame of being called a coward and take an unreasonable risk.

3 There was no disgrace, he said, in an Athenian fleet withdrawing when the circumstances required it. A defeat would bring them greater disgrace, however it happened. It would also expose their city not just to shame but to the greatest danger. After its recent disasters, the city could scarcely afford to start an attack anywhere, even with solid preparations, either by choice or when driven by urgent need. It certainly should not choose to take risks when no one was forcing it.

4 He urged them to sail for Samos as quickly as possible, taking aboard the wounded, the infantry, and all the equipment they had brought with them. They should leave behind what they had taken from enemy territory, to keep the ships light. Once at Samos, they could gather all their ships and make attacks wherever an opportunity arose.

5 He persuaded them and put this plan into action. Both at the time and afterward, people thought Phrynichus had shown good judgment, not only in this matter but in everything else he undertook.

6 So the Athenians left Miletus as soon as evening came, their victory incomplete. The Argives sailed home from Samos in a hurry, angry at their defeat.

CHAPTER 28

1 At dawn the Peloponnesians sailed from Teichiussa and arrived at Miletus. They stayed for a day. The next day they took along the Chian ships that had originally been chased into the harbor with Chalcideus. They wanted to sail back to Teichiussa to collect the equipment they had unloaded there.

2 When they arrived, Tissaphernes came up with his land army and persuaded them to sail against Iasus, which his enemy Amorges held. They attacked Iasus unexpectedly and took it. Its people had assumed that the ships could only be Athenian. The Syracusans earned the most praise in the action.

3 The Peloponnesians captured Amorges alive. He was an illegitimate son of Pissuthnes and had rebelled against the king. They handed him over to Tissaphernes to take to the king if he wished, as the king had ordered him to do. They sacked Iasus, and the army took a very large amount of money. The place had been wealthy for a long time.

4 They took Amorges' mercenaries into their own force without harming them, since most were from the Peloponnese. They handed over the town to Tissaphernes, along with all the captives, both enslaved and free. They agreed

that he would pay them one Daric stater for each person. Then they returned to Miletus.

5 The Lacedaemonians had sent Pedaritus son of Leon to command at Chios. The Peloponnesians sent him overland as far as Erythrae with the mercenaries taken over from Amorges. They put Philippus in command at Miletus itself. And the summer ended.

CHAPTER 29

1 In the following winter, after securing Iasus with a garrison, Tissaphernes came to Miletus. As he had promised at Lacedaemon, he paid a month's allowance to the whole fleet at the rate of one Attic drachma per man per day. For the future, however, he wanted to give three obols until he had consulted the king. If the king ordered it, he said, he would pay the full drachma.

2 Hermocrates, the Syracusan general, objected. Theramenes was not firm about the pay, since he was not the admiral but was only sailing with the fleet to hand it over to Astyochus. Even so, the agreement gave each man more than three obols, by allowing an extra five ships' worth of pay. Tissaphernes gave thirty talents a month for fifty-five ships. Any additional ships beyond that number were paid at the same rate.

CHAPTER 30

1 That same winter, another thirty-five ships from home reached the Athenians at Samos, along with the generals Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon. They brought together the ships from Chios and all their other ships. They intended to divide their duties by lot: one force would use its fleet to blockade Miletus, while the other would send both ships and land troops against Chios.

2 They did so. Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon drew the assignment to Chios and sailed there with thirty ships. They also took in troop transports some of the thousand hoplites who had come to Miletus. The others stayed at

Samos with seventy-four ships, controlled the sea, and made attacks on Miletus.

CHAPTER 31

1 At this time Astyochus was at Chios, selecting hostages because of the plot to betray the city. When he learned that the ships with Theramenes had arrived and that the alliance's situation had improved, he stopped doing this. He took ten Peloponnesian ships and ten Chian ships and put to sea.

2 He attacked Pteleum but failed to take it. He then sailed along the coast to Clazomenae and ordered the people there who supported Athens to move to Daphnus and join his side. Tamos, the deputy governor of Ionia, joined in giving this order.

3 They would not obey, so he attacked the city, which had no walls, but could not capture it. He then sailed away in a strong wind. He himself went to Phocaea and Cyme, while the other ships put in at the islands off Clazomenae: Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa.

4 The winds kept these ships there for eight days. They plundered and used up some of the property the Clazomenians had moved there for safety. They loaded the rest aboard and sailed to join Astyochus at Phocaea and Cyme.

CHAPTER 32

1 While he was there, envoys arrived from Lesbos, whose people wanted to revolt again. They persuaded Astyochus, but the Corinthians and the other allies were unwilling because of the earlier failure. So he put to sea and sailed for Chios. A storm scattered the ships, and they later reached Chios from different directions.

2 After this, Pedaritus, who had been marching overland from Miletus, reached Erythrae and crossed with his army to Chios. He also had available about five hundred soldiers, left by Chalcideus from the five ships, together with their arms.

3 Some people from Lesbos were offering to arrange a revolt. Astyochus therefore put a proposal to Pedaritus and the Chians: they should go there with their ships and bring Lesbos into revolt. They would either gain more allies or, if they failed, still damage the Athenians. But the others would not listen, and Pedaritus said he would not let Astyochus have the Chian ships.

CHAPTER 33

1 Astyochus took the five Corinthian ships, a sixth from Megara, one from Hermione, and the Laconian ships he had brought out himself, and sailed for Miletus to take up his duties as admiral. He made repeated threats to the Chians, declaring that he would certainly not help them if they needed anything.

2 He put in at Corycus in Erythraean territory and stayed the night. The Athenian force sailing from Samos toward Chios also anchored there, on the other side of a hill that separated them. Neither side knew that the other was there.

3 During the night a letter arrived from Pedaritus. It said that some Erythraean prisoners had been released from Samos and had come to Erythrae to betray it. Astyochus immediately put to sea again for Erythrae. This was all that kept him from encountering the Athenians.

4 Pedaritus also sailed across to meet him. They investigated the suspected traitors and found that the whole story had been made up to get the men safely out of Samos. They cleared them of the accusation and sailed away. Pedaritus went to Chios, while Astyochus continued to Miletus as he had intended.

CHAPTER 34

1 Meanwhile, as the Athenian force sailed around from Corycus, it came across three Chian warships off Arginum and chased them as soon as it saw them. A violent storm came on. The Chian ships barely managed to escape into their harbor. Of the Athenian ships, the three that had pressed ahead most eagerly were wrecked and driven ashore near the city of Chios. Some of their men were captured and others killed. The remaining ships found refuge in the harbor below Mount Mimas called Phoenicus. Later they moved from there to an anchorage at Lesbos and prepared to build their fort.

CHAPTER 35

1 During the same winter, Hippocrates the Lacedaemonian sailed from the Peloponnese and reached Cnidus with ten ships from Thurii, one Laconian ship, and one Syracusan ship. Dorieus son of Diagoras was one of the three commanders of the Thurian ships. Tissaphernes had already brought Cnidus into revolt.

2 When the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of their arrival, they told them to use half their ships to guard Cnidus. The other half were to stay near Triopium and seize merchant ships arriving from Egypt. Triopium is a headland projecting from Cnidian territory, with a sanctuary of Apollo.

3 The Athenians heard about this, sailed from Samos, and captured the six ships keeping watch at Triopium. Their crews escaped. After this the Athenians sailed to Cnidus, attacked the unwalled city, and nearly took it.

4 They attacked again the next day. But the people had put up better defenses during the night, and the men who had escaped from the ships at Triopium had joined them. The Athenians could no longer do as much damage. They withdrew, ravaged the Cnidians' land, and sailed back to Samos.

CHAPTER 36

1 About this same time Astyochus reached Miletus to take command of the fleet. The Peloponnesians still had plenty of everything they needed in their camp. Pay was being provided at an adequate rate, the soldiers had the large sums plundered from Iasus, and the Milesians willingly bore the burdens of the war.

2 Even so, the Peloponnesians thought that the first agreement with Tissaphernes, made through Chalcideus, was incomplete and not favorable enough to them. While Theramenes was still there, they made another agreement. It was as follows.

CHAPTER 37

1 "The Lacedaemonians and their allies agree with King Darius, the king's sons, and Tissaphernes to establish a truce and friendship on the following terms.

2 "Neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies shall attack or cause any damage to any territory or cities belonging to King Darius, or formerly belonging to his father or his ancestors. Neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies shall collect tribute from these cities. Neither King Darius nor any of his subjects shall attack or cause any damage to the Lacedaemonians or their allies.

3 "If the Lacedaemonians or their allies need anything from the king, or the king needs anything from the Lacedaemonians or their allies, whatever they persuade each other to do shall be acceptable.

4 "Both sides shall wage war together against the Athenians and their allies. If they make peace, both sides shall do so together. The king shall pay the expenses of any army in his territory that he has called in.

5 "If any of the cities that have made this agreement with the king attacks his territory, the others shall stop it and defend the king as far as they can. If anyone from the king's territory or from any land under his rule attacks the territory of

the Lacedaemonians or their allies, the king shall stop them and provide defense as far as he can."

CHAPTER 38

1 After this agreement, Theramenes handed over the ships to Astyochus. He sailed away in a small boat and disappeared.

2 The Athenians had by now brought their army across from Lesbos to Chios. They controlled both land and sea and were fortifying Delphinium. This position was naturally strong on the landward side, had harbors, and was not far from the city of Chios.

3 The Chians had suffered badly in their many earlier battles and were also deeply divided among themselves. Pedaritus had already put Tydeus son of Ion and his associates to death for supporting Athens. The rest of the city was held by force under the control of a few men. The Chians therefore distrusted one another and remained inactive. In these circumstances neither the Chians themselves nor the mercenaries with Pedaritus seemed capable of facing the Athenians in battle.

4 They did, however, send to Miletus and ask Astyochus to help them. When he would not listen, Pedaritus wrote to Lacedaemon, accusing him of failing in his duty.

5 This was how far the Athenians had progressed at Chios. Their ships from Samos made attacks on the fleet at Miletus. But when the enemy did not put out to meet them, they went back to Samos and stayed inactive.

CHAPTER 39

1 During the same winter, twenty-seven ships left the Peloponnese for Ionia around the solstice. The Lacedaemonians had prepared them for Pharnabazus [through] the efforts of Calligeitus of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus.

Antisthenes, a Spartan, sailed with them as commander.

2 The Lacedaemonians also sent eleven Spartans as advisers to Astyochus. One was Lichas son of Arcesilaus. They had orders to reach Miletus and help manage affairs there in whatever way would produce the best results. If they thought it advisable, they were to send these ships, or a larger or smaller number, to Pharnabazus in the Hellespont, appointing Clearchus son of Rhamphias, who was sailing with them, as commander. If the eleven thought it right, they could also remove Astyochus as admiral and replace him with Antisthenes. Pedaritus' letters had made the Lacedaemonians suspicious of him.

3 The ships sailed across the open sea from Malea and put in at Melos. There they encountered ten Athenian ships, captured three without their crews, and burned them. After this they feared that the Athenian ships that had escaped from Melos would report their approach to the Athenians at Samos, as in fact they did. As a precaution, they sailed toward Crete and took a longer route, reaching Caunus in Asia.

4 Once there, they considered themselves safe and sent a message to the fleet at Miletus asking for an escort.

CHAPTER 40

1 At the same time the Chians and Pedaritus kept sending messengers to Astyochus despite his delays. They asked him to come with his whole fleet to help them in the siege. He should not stand by while the largest allied city in Ionia was cut off from the sea and its land devastated by raids.

2 The Chians had many slaves—more than any single city except Lacedaemon. Because there were so many, they were also punished more harshly for offenses. As soon as the Athenian army seemed securely established behind its fortifications, most of the slaves deserted to it. Their knowledge of the countryside enabled them to do the greatest damage.

3 The Chians said that Astyochus must help them while there was still hope and it was still possible to stop the work. Delphinium was still being fortified and was unfinished, and a larger enclosure was being added around it for both the camp and the ships. Because of his earlier threat, Astyochus had not intended to help. But when he saw that the allies too were eager, he made up his mind to go.

CHAPTER 41

1 Meanwhile, news arrived from Caunus that the twenty-seven ships and the Lacedaemonian advisers were there. Astyochus thought everything else should come second to escorting so many ships to join his own, so that they would have greater control of the sea, and to bringing safely across the Lacedaemonians who had come to inspect his conduct. He immediately abandoned his plan to go to Chios and sailed for Caunus.

2 On the way he landed at Cos Meropis and sacked the city. It had no walls and had collapsed in an earthquake that struck its people—the strongest in our memory. The inhabitants had fled into the mountains. He raided the countryside for plunder, but did not take free people; he let them go.

3 From Cos he reached Cnidus at night. At the Cnidians' insistence, he had to keep his sailors aboard and sail on immediately, just as he was, against the twenty Athenian ships. Charminus, one of the generals from Samos, had these ships and was watching for the arrival of the twenty-seven ships from the Peloponnese—the very ships Astyochus was sailing to meet.

4 The Athenians at Samos had learned from Melos that these ships were approaching. Charminus was keeping watch around Syme, Chalce, and Rhodes, and along the coast of Lycia. He had already learned that they were at Caunus.

CHAPTER 42

1 So Astyochus sailed toward Syme with his forces as they were, before anyone could report his approach. He hoped to catch the ships somewhere out at sea. But rain and cloudy skies made his ships lose their way in the darkness and threw them into confusion.

2 At dawn the fleet was scattered. Its left wing was already visible to the Athenians, but the rest was still wandering around the island. Charminus and the Athenians quickly put out to meet them with fewer than their full twenty ships. They thought these were the ships from Caunus that they had been watching for.

3 They attacked at once, sank three ships, and damaged others. They were winning the fight until the larger part of the enemy fleet appeared unexpectedly. Then they found themselves cut off on every side.

4 They turned and fled, losing six ships. With the rest they escaped to the island of Teutlussa, and from there to Halicarnassus. After this the Peloponnesians landed at Cnidus. The twenty-seven ships from Caunus joined them there. They then sailed with the whole fleet to Syme and set up a victory monument before returning to anchor at Cnidus.

CHAPTER 43

1 When the Athenians heard about the sea battle, they sailed to Syme with all their ships from Samos. They did not attack the fleet at Cnidus, nor did that fleet attack them. They collected the ships' equipment left on Syme, attacked Loryma on the mainland, and sailed back to Samos.

2 All the Peloponnesian ships were now together at Cnidus, and they made whatever repairs were needed. Tissaphernes had arrived, and the eleven Lacedaemonian representatives held talks with him. They discussed anything they disliked about what had already been done, and how to fight the rest of the war in the best way and to the greatest advantage of both sides.

3 Lichas examined the arrangements most closely. He said that neither treaty, the one made by Chalcideus or the one made by Therimenes, had been properly drawn up. It would be outrageous if the King now claimed control of every territory that he or his ancestors had ruled in the past. This would mean that all the islands, Thessaly, the Locrians, and the lands as far as Boeotia would be enslaved again. Instead of giving the Greeks freedom, the Lacedaemonians would be putting them under Persian rule.

4 So he demanded that they make a different, better treaty. Otherwise they would not use these treaties, and they wanted no money for their forces on these terms. Tissaphernes was furious. He left them angrily, having achieved nothing.

CHAPTER 44

1 The Peloponnesians planned to sail to Rhodes, since its most powerful men were sending them invitations. They hoped to bring over an island with considerable strength in sailors and land forces. They also thought that their existing alliance would then let them support their ships without asking Tissaphernes for money.

2 So they sailed from Cnidus at once, during the same winter. Their first landing was at Camirus in Rhodian territory, with ninety-four ships. The ordinary people knew nothing about the plans. They were terrified and fled, especially since the city had no walls. Then the Lacedaemonians called these people together with the Rhodians from the other two cities, Lindus and Ialysus. They persuaded them to revolt from Athens, and Rhodes joined the Peloponnesians.

3 Around this time the Athenians heard the news and sailed from Samos with their ships. They wanted to get there first and appeared out at sea, but they were a little too late. For the moment they sailed away to Chalce, and from there to Samos. Later they fought against Rhodes by making naval raids from Chalce and Cos [and from Samos].

4 The Peloponnesians collected about thirty-two talents from the Rhodians. Apart from that they remained inactive for eighty days, with their ships pulled up on shore.

CHAPTER 45

1 Meanwhile, and even earlier, before they left for Rhodes, the following events took place. After Chalcideus' death and the battle at Miletus, the Peloponnesians distrusted Alcibiades. A letter had come from Lacedaemon to Astyochus ordering him to kill Alcibiades. He was an enemy of Agis, and they had other reasons to think him untrustworthy. In fear, he first withdrew to Tissaphernes. Then he did all he could to damage the Peloponnesians' position with him.

2 He became Tissaphernes' adviser on everything. He cut the pay from one Attic drachma to three obols, and even that was not to be paid regularly. He told Tissaphernes to explain that the Athenians, who had much longer experience of naval affairs, paid their men three obols. This was not so much because they were poor. It was to prevent their sailors from having money to spare and misusing it. Some would spend it on things that weakened their bodies. Others would desert their ships if no pay was still owed to them as a guarantee that they would stay.

3 He also advised Tissaphernes [to] pay bribes to the trireme commanders and the generals from the various cities, and persuade them to accept these arrangements. All agreed except the Syracusans. Their commander Hermocrates alone opposed him on behalf of the whole allied force.

4 He also turned away the cities that asked for money, answering them himself on Tissaphernes' behalf. He said the Chians were shameless. They were the richest of the Greeks, yet they depended on outside help for their safety and expected others to risk both their lives and their money for Chian freedom.

5 He said the other cities were also in the wrong. Before they revolted, they had spent money on Athens. It would be wrong if they now refused to contribute just as much, or even more, for their own benefit.

6 He explained that Tissaphernes was now paying for the war with his own money, so it was reasonable for him to be careful with it. But if funds for the forces ever arrived from the King, he would pay them their full wages and give the cities the help they could reasonably expect.

CHAPTER 46

1 He also advised Tissaphernes not to be too eager to end the war. He should not bring in the Phoenician ships he was preparing, or provide pay for more Greeks, in order to give the same people control of both land and sea. Instead he should let the two sides divide power between them. Then the King could always bring one side against the other whenever it caused him trouble.

2 If control of land and sea came into the same hands, he would have no one to help him bring down the dominant power. His only alternative would be to take the field himself eventually, at great expense and risk, and fight the matter out. It would cost less to let the Greeks wear each other down. He could do this for a small fraction of the expense and without putting himself in danger.

3 He said the Athenians would be more suitable partners for him in sharing power. They were less interested in territory on land, and both their stated aims and their actual way of fighting served his interests best. They would help enslave the peoples of the sea for themselves, and the Greeks living in the King's territory for him. The Lacedaemonians, by contrast, had come to free them. It was unlikely that they would now free the Greeks from other Greeks, themselves included, but fail to free them from those others [the non-Greeks], unless the Lacedaemonians failed to defeat the non-Greeks.

4 So he told him first to wear both sides down. Then, after taking as much as possible away from the Athenians, he should finally get the Peloponnesians out of the country.

5 Tissaphernes mostly shared this view, as far as his actions showed. Because he thought Alcibiades' advice on these matters was good, he gave him his trust. He supplied the Peloponnesians poorly with money for their forces and would not let them fight a sea battle. He kept saying that the Phoenician ships would come and that they would then fight with strength to spare. In this way he damaged their cause and took away the fighting edge of their fleet, which had become very strong indeed. In other ways too, he supported their war so half-heartedly that it was impossible not to notice.

CHAPTER 47

1 Alcibiades gave this advice partly because he thought it best for Tissaphernes and the King, with whom he was staying. But he was also trying to arrange his own return home. He knew that, if he did not destroy his country, he would eventually be able to persuade it to let him come back. He thought his best chance of persuading the Athenians was to show that Tissaphernes was his friend. And that is what happened.

2 The Athenian soldiers at Samos learned that he had influence with Tissaphernes. Alcibiades himself had helped this along by sending messages to their most powerful men. They were to speak about him to the leading citizens. He wanted to return under an oligarchy, not under rule by bad men or under the democracy that had expelled him. He would make Tissaphernes their friend and share in their government. But the Athenian trireme commanders and the most powerful men at Samos were moving to overthrow the democracy chiefly on their own initiative.

CHAPTER 48

1 This movement began in the camp and later spread from there to the city. Some men crossed over from Samos and spoke with Alcibiades. He held out the prospect of making first Tissaphernes and then the King their friends, provided they were not governed by a democracy. The King would trust them more under those conditions. The most powerful citizens, who also bore the greatest burdens, had high hopes. They expected to take control of affairs for themselves and defeat their enemies.

2 They returned to Samos and formed a conspiracy among men who shared their aims. They openly told the ordinary soldiers that the King would be their friend and provide money if Alcibiades returned and they gave up democracy.

3 The mass of the soldiers felt some immediate resentment at what was happening. But the prospect of generous pay from the King kept them quiet. After the organizers of the oligarchy had told the soldiers, they again examined Alcibiades' proposals among themselves and with most of their political associates.

4 The others thought the proposals workable and reliable. But Phrynichus, who was still a general, approved of none of them. He thought Alcibiades cared no more for oligarchy than for democracy—and this was true. His only concern was to change the city's existing system so that his associates would invite him back. Their own chief concern, Phrynichus thought, should be to avoid civil strife. Nor would it be easy for the King to side with the Athenians, whom he did not trust, and bring trouble on himself. The Peloponnesians were now an equal force at sea and held some of the most important cities in his empire. He could instead make friends with them, since they had never yet done him any harm.

5 As for the allied cities, the conspirators had apparently promised them oligarchies, since Athens itself would no longer be democratic. Phrynichus said he knew very well that the cities which had revolted would be no more likely to

return, and those still allied would be no more secure. They would not prefer slavery under either an oligarchy or a democracy to freedom under whichever of the two they happened to have.

6 He said the allies thought that the so-called respectable upper classes would cause them no less trouble than the people. These men arranged and proposed the harmful measures that the people adopted, and gained most of the benefit themselves. If it were up to them, the allies would be killed without trial and with greater violence. The people, on the other hand, offered the allies a refuge and kept those men in check.

7 Phrynichus said he knew for certain that the cities held these views, having learned them from actual experience. So he himself approved of nothing in Alcibiades' proposals or in what was now being done.

CHAPTER 49

1 But the conspirators who had met together accepted the proposals, just as they had favored them at first. They prepared to send Pisander and others as ambassadors to Athens. These were to arrange Alcibiades' return, overthrow the democracy there, and make Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians.

CHAPTER 50

1 Phrynichus realized that Alcibiades' return would be discussed and that the Athenians would accept it. He was afraid because he had spoken against it. If Alcibiades came back, he might harm him for having stood in his way. So he took the following course.

2 He secretly sent a letter to Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, who was still near Miletus at the time. He wrote that Alcibiades was damaging their cause by making Tissaphernes a friend of Athens, and gave a clear account of everything else. He said he should be forgiven for plotting against a personal enemy even at the expense of his city.

3 Astyochus had no intention of punishing Alcibiades, especially since he no longer came within his reach as easily as before. Instead he went inland to Magnesia, to Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. He told them what had been written from Samos, himself acting as the informer. It was said that he had put himself at Tissaphernes' disposal for private profit, in this matter and in everything else. That was also why he objected less strongly when the pay was not given in full.

4 Alcibiades immediately sent a letter denouncing Phrynichus to the authorities at Samos. He described what Phrynichus had done and demanded his death.

5 Phrynichus was alarmed. The disclosure had put him in extreme danger. He sent another message to Astyochus, complaining that his earlier communication had not been kept properly secret. He now offered to let them destroy the whole Athenian army at Samos. Since Samos had no walls, he explained in detail how he would do it. He said that, now that their actions had put his life at risk, he could not be blamed for doing this or anything else rather than being destroyed by his worst enemies. Astyochus revealed this too to Alcibiades.

CHAPTER 51

1 Phrynichus realized in advance that Astyochus was betraying him and that a letter about this from Alcibiades was about to arrive. He acted first and told the army himself that the enemy was about to attack the camp. Samos had no walls, and not all the ships were anchored inside the harbor. He said he had definite information about the plan. They must build walls around Samos as quickly as possible and take all other precautions. He was a general and had the authority to carry out these measures himself.

2 They began preparing to build the walls. These events meant that Samos was fortified sooner, though the work would have been done in any case. Not long afterward, the letters from Alcibiades arrived. They said that Phrynichus was betraying the army and that the enemy was about to attack.

3 But Alcibiades was not believed. People thought that he had learned of the enemy's plans in advance and, out of personal hostility, was blaming Phrynichus as an accomplice. So he did Phrynichus no harm. By reporting the same news, he actually gave more support to his account.

CHAPTER 52

1 After this Alcibiades worked to bring Tissaphernes around and persuade him to become a friend of Athens. Tissaphernes feared the Peloponnesians, because they had more ships there than the Athenians. Even so, he wanted to be persuaded if he could, especially after he heard about the Peloponnesians' dispute at Cnidus over Therimenes' treaty. By this time the dispute had already taken place, and they were at Rhodes. In that dispute Lichas had confirmed Alcibiades' earlier claim that the Lacedaemonians intended to free all the cities. Lichas had said it was intolerable for the treaty to give the King control over cities that he or his ancestors had ruled at any time in the past. Alcibiades had a great deal at stake, so he kept working hard to win Tissaphernes over.

CHAPTER 53

1 Meanwhile Pisander and the other Athenian ambassadors sent from Samos arrived at Athens. They spoke to the people, presenting the main points from a longer list of arguments. Above all, they said that if the Athenians brought Alcibiades back and changed the way their democracy was run, they could have the King as an ally and defeat the Peloponnesians.

2 Many others spoke against them in defense of democracy. Alcibiades' enemies also shouted that it would be outrageous if he returned in defiance of the laws. The Eumolpidae and Ceryces gave testimony about the offenses against the Mysteries for which he had been exiled. They called on the gods and urged the people not to bring him back. Faced with all this opposition and angry protest, Pisander came forward. He called up each of his opponents in turn and asked whether he had any hope of saving the city unless someone persuaded the King

to come over to their side. The Peloponnesians faced them at sea with at least as many ships as their own and had more allied cities. The King and Tissaphernes were supplying the enemy with money, while Athens had none left.

3 When those he questioned said they had no such hope, he told them plainly: "Then we cannot achieve this unless we run our government more sensibly and put the offices into fewer hands, so that the King will trust us. For now, we must think more about our survival than about our form of government. Later we will be able to change it again if anything displeases us. We must also bring back Alcibiades. He is the only man who can achieve this at present."

CHAPTER 54

1 At first the people were angry when they heard the proposal for oligarchy. But Pisander made it clear to them that there was no other way to survive. They were frightened, and at the same time they hoped they could change the government again. So they gave in.

2 They voted that Pisander should sail with ten other men and handle the negotiations with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades in whatever way they thought would work best.

3 Pisander also brought accusations against Phrynichus. The people removed him and his fellow commander Scironides from office, and sent Diomedon and Leon to replace them as generals with the fleet. Pisander had accused Phrynichus of betraying Iasus and Amorges. He did so because he thought Phrynichus would oppose the negotiations with Alcibiades.

4 Pisander visited all the political clubs already in the city, which had been organized to influence trials and appointments to office. He urged them to unite, agree on a common plan, and overthrow the democracy. He made the other preparations needed in the present situation so that there would be no further delay. Then he himself sailed with the ten men to Tissaphernes.

CHAPTER 55

1 During the same winter, Leon and Diomedon had already arrived to take command of the Athenian ships. They made a naval attack on Rhodes. They found the Peloponnesian ships pulled up on shore. They landed some troops, defeated the Rhodians who came to resist them, and withdrew to Chalce. They conducted the war from there rather than from Cos, because it was easier for them to watch for any departure of the Peloponnesian fleet.

2 Xenophantidas, a Laconian, also came to Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios. He reported that the Athenians' wall was now complete. Unless they came to help with all their ships, their cause in Chios would be lost. The Peloponnesians planned to send help.

3 Meanwhile Pedaritus took the mercenary force with him and the entire Chian army and attacked the Athenians' defenses around their ships. He captured part of the defenses and gained possession of some ships that had been pulled ashore. But the Athenians came out to help and routed the Chians first. The rest of Pedaritus' force was then defeated too. He himself was killed, along with many Chians, and a large amount of armor and weapons was captured.

CHAPTER 56

1 After this the Chians were blockaded by land and sea even more closely than before. There was severe famine there. Meanwhile Pisander and the other Athenian ambassadors arrived to see Tissaphernes and held talks about the agreement.

2 But Alcibiades could not be at all sure of Tissaphernes' support. Tissaphernes had become more afraid of the Peloponnesians and still wanted to wear both sides down, just as Alcibiades himself had advised. So Alcibiades adopted a different approach: Tissaphernes was to demand so much from the Athenians that no agreement would be reached.

3 I think Tissaphernes wanted the same thing, in his case because of his fear. Alcibiades saw that Tissaphernes was in any event unwilling to agree. He did not want the Athenians to think him unable to persuade Tissaphernes. Instead he wanted them to think that Tissaphernes had been persuaded and was willing to join them, but that they themselves were not offering enough.

4 Alcibiades spoke on behalf of Tissaphernes, who was present, and kept making such excessive demands that the failure could be blamed on the Athenians, even though they agreed to most of what he asked. He demanded that they hand over all Ionia, then the nearby islands as well, and other things. The Athenians did not object. Finally, at the third meeting, he became afraid that his lack of influence would be completely exposed. He demanded that the King be allowed to build ships and sail along his own coast wherever he wanted, with as many ships as he wanted. At that point the Athenians would agree to no more. They thought the terms impossible and believed Alcibiades had deceived them. They left in anger and returned to Samos.

CHAPTER 57

1 Immediately afterward, during the same winter, Tissaphernes went to Caunus. He wanted to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, make yet another treaty on whatever terms he could, and provide money for their forces rather than become their outright enemy. He feared that, if they lacked the means to support their large fleet, they might be forced to fight the Athenians at sea and be defeated. Or their ships might lose their crews, allowing the Athenians to get what they wanted without his help. Above all, he feared that the Peloponnesians would plunder the mainland in search of supplies.

2 Considering all these risks and looking ahead, he wanted, as before, to restore the balance between the Greeks. So he sent for the Peloponnesians, gave them money to support their forces, and made the following third treaty.

CHAPTER 58

1 "In the thirteenth year of King Darius's reign, when Alexippidas was ephor at Lacedaemon, an agreement was made on the plain of the Maeander. The parties were the Lacedaemonians and their allies on one side, and Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces on the other. It concerned the affairs of the king, the Lacedaemonians, and their allies.

2 "The king's territory in Asia, all of it, is to belong to the king. The king may decide what to do with his own territory as he wishes.

3 "The Lacedaemonians and their allies must not enter the king's territory to do any harm. The king must not enter the territory of the Lacedaemonians or their allies to do any harm either.

4 "If any Lacedaemonian or ally enters the king's territory to do harm, the Lacedaemonians and their allies must stop him. If anyone from the king's territory goes against the Lacedaemonians or their allies to do harm, the king must stop him.

5 "Tissaphernes must provide support for the ships now present, on the agreed terms, until the king's ships arrive.

6 "Once the king's ships arrive, the Lacedaemonians and their allies may support their own ships at their own expense if they wish. If they want to receive support from Tissaphernes, he must provide it. When the war ends, the Lacedaemonians and their allies must repay Tissaphernes all the money they have received.

7 "Once the king's ships arrive, the ships of the Lacedaemonians, their allies, and the king must fight the war together, as Tissaphernes, the Lacedaemonians, and their allies decide. If they wish to make peace with the Athenians, they must make peace together on the same terms."

CHAPTER 59

1 This was the treaty they made. Afterward Tissaphernes began preparing to bring up the Phoenician ships, as had been agreed, and to carry out all his other promises. At least he wanted people to see him making preparations.

CHAPTER 60

1 As the winter was ending, the Boeotians captured Oropus through betrayal, though it had an Athenian garrison. Some Eretrians and people from Oropus itself helped them. They were planning a revolt in Euboea. Oropus lay close to Eretria, and while the Athenians held it, it could not fail to cause serious harm to Eretria and the rest of Euboea.

2 With Oropus now in their hands, the Eretrians went to Rhodes and asked the Peloponnesians to come to Euboea. But the Peloponnesians were more eager to help Chios, which was in trouble. They put out from Rhodes with all their ships.

3 When they reached the area of Triopium, they saw the Athenian ships out at sea, sailing from Chalce. Neither side sailed against the other. The Athenians reached Samos, and the Peloponnesians reached Miletus. The Peloponnesians saw that they could no longer help Chios without a sea battle. This winter ended, and the twentieth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

CHAPTER 61

1 At the start of the next summer, just as spring was beginning, Dercylidas, a Spartan, was sent overland toward the Hellespont with a small army to bring about a revolt at Abydos. Its people were colonists from Miletus. Meanwhile, Astyochus could find no way to help the Chians. The pressure of the siege forced them to fight a sea battle.

2 While Astyochus was still at Rhodes, the Chians had brought Leon, a Spartan, from Miletus to command them after Pedaritus's death. Leon had come out with Antisthenes as a marine. They also brought twelve ships which had been guarding Miletus: five from Thurii, four from Syracuse, one from Anaea, one from Miletus, and one belonging to Leon.

3 The Chians marched out with their whole force and occupied a strong position. At the same time, their thirty-six ships put out against the Athenians' thirty-two, and a sea battle followed. It was a hard fight, and the Chians and their allies did at least as well as their opponents. They then withdrew into the city, as it was already late.

CHAPTER 62

1 Immediately afterward, when Dercylidas had made his way overland from Miletus, Abydos in the Hellespont revolted and went over to Dercylidas and Pharnabazus. Lampsacus followed two days later.

2 When Strombichides heard the news at Chios, he hurried to help with twenty-four Athenian ships. These included troop transports carrying hoplites. The people of Lampsacus came out to meet him, but he defeated them in battle and captured their unwalled city in a single attack. He took property and slaves as loot, but let the free people settle in the city again. Then he went to Abydos.

3 The people of Abydos would not come over to him, and he could not capture the city by attacking it. So he sailed across to Sestos, a city in the Chersonese opposite Abydos, which the Medes had once held. He made it a fortified post to keep watch over the whole Hellespont.

CHAPTER 63

1 Meanwhile the Chians gained more control at sea. Astyochus and the Peloponnesians at Miletus gained confidence when they heard about the sea battle and the departure of Strombichides and his ships.

2 Astyochus sailed along the coast to Chios with two ships and brought away the ships there. With his whole fleet now together, he sailed against Samos. The Athenians did not sail out to meet him, because they were suspicious of one another. So he sailed back to Miletus.

3 For by this time, and indeed somewhat earlier, democracy at Athens had been overthrown. When Pisander and the other envoys reached Samos from Tissaphernes, they tightened their hold on the army there. They also persuaded the most powerful Samians to join them in trying to establish an oligarchy. This was despite the Samians' earlier uprising against one another to prevent oligarchy.

4 At the same time, the Athenians at Samos discussed matters among themselves. They decided to leave Alcibiades out, since he was unwilling to join them. Besides, they thought he was not suited to entering an oligarchy. They themselves were already in danger, so they would have to rely on their own resources and find a way to keep the undertaking from being dropped. They must also keep up the war effort and willingly contribute money from their own households, along with anything else needed. They would now be working hard for themselves, not for anyone else.

CHAPTER 64

1 After encouraging one another in these terms, they immediately sent Pisander and half the envoys home to handle matters there. They were told to establish oligarchies in any subject cities where they stopped. They sent the other half in different directions to the remaining subject territories.

2 They also sent Diitrephes, who was near Chios, to take up the command in the Thracian region to which he had been elected. He reached Thasos and overthrew its democracy.

3 Around the second month after he left, the Thasians began fortifying their city. They no longer needed an aristocratic government tied to Athens, and they expected freedom from the Lacedaemonians any day.

4 There was also a group of Thasians whom the Athenians had driven into exile, now living among the Peloponnesians. Together with their supporters in the city, they were doing everything they could to bring in ships and make Thasos revolt. So things turned out just as they wanted. The city could strengthen itself without danger, and the democracy that would have opposed them had been overthrown.

5 At Thasos, then, the result was the opposite of what the Athenians who established the oligarchy intended. In my view, the same was true in many other subject states. Once the cities had gained a moderate government and freedom to act without fear, they moved toward full independence. They preferred this to the supposedly good government offered by Athens, which hid bad intentions.

CHAPTER 65

1 Meanwhile Pisander and his companions sailed along the coast, overthrowing the democracies in the cities as planned. From some places they also took hoplites as their own allies, and so arrived at Athens.

2 They found that their associates had already done most of the work. Some of the younger men had banded together and secretly killed Androcles, one of the leading men of the people. He had also been among those most responsible for driving Alcibiades into exile. They were especially intent on killing him for two reasons: his leadership of the people, and their belief that they would please Alcibiades, whom they expected to return and make Tissaphernes their friend. They had secretly killed some other people they found troublesome in the same way.

3 They had also prepared the ground by openly promoting a proposal. No one was to receive pay except those on military service. No more than five thousand were to take part in government, and these were to be the men best able to help with both their money and their personal service.

CHAPTER 66

1 This was a respectable-looking front for the public. In fact, the very men who were changing the government intended to control the city. The assembly of the people and the council chosen by lot still met. But they considered nothing that the conspirators did not approve. The speakers were themselves members of the conspiracy, and what they would say had been settled beforehand by that group.

2 No one else spoke against them anymore. People were frightened and saw how large the conspiracy was. If anyone did object, he was soon killed by some convenient means. There was no investigation of the killers, nor any prosecution even if they were suspected. The people kept quiet. They were so terrified that anyone who escaped violence considered himself lucky, even if he had to remain silent.

3 They thought the conspiracy was much larger than it really was, and this broke their confidence. The city's size and their lack of knowledge of one another made it impossible to uncover the conspiracy. They had no way [to find out for themselves].

4 For the same reason, an angry person could not even complain to someone else and work out a plan to fight back. He would find that the person he spoke to was either someone he did not know or an acquaintance he could not trust.

5 All supporters of the people approached one another with suspicion, thinking the other person might be involved in what was happening. The conspiracy did include men whom no one would ever have expected to turn to oligarchy.

These men did the most to create distrust among the people. By making the people's distrust of one another firmly established, they did more than anyone to make the rule of the few secure.

CHAPTER 67

1 This was the situation when Pisander and his companions arrived. They immediately took up the remaining work. First they called the people together and proposed choosing ten men with full authority to draw up a plan. These men were to put their proposal for the best way to govern the city in writing and present it to the people on a set day.

2 When that day came, they called the assembly to meet at Colonus. This is a sanctuary of Poseidon outside the city, about ten stades away. The men drafting the plan offered only one proposal: any Athenian could put forward any motion he wished without fear of punishment. They imposed heavy penalties on anyone who prosecuted a speaker for making an illegal proposal or harmed him in any other way.

3 Then the proposal was openly made that no one should hold office any longer under the existing constitution or receive pay. Five men were to be chosen as presiding officers. They would choose a hundred men, and each of the hundred would choose three others to join him. These four hundred were to enter the council chamber and govern with full authority as they thought best. They would summon the Five Thousand whenever they saw fit.

CHAPTER 68

1 Pisander put forward this proposal. He had also taken the most active public role in helping to overthrow the people. But the man who planned the whole undertaking, worked out how to bring it to this point, and had been attending to it longest was Antiphon. In ability he was second to none of the Athenians of his time. He was exceptionally good at thinking things through and explain-

ing his conclusions. He did not address the people and did not willingly take part in any other public dispute. His reputation for cleverness made the public suspicious of him. But anyone involved in a dispute, whether in court or before the people, could benefit more from his advice than from that of any other single man.

2 Later, when the Four Hundred fell and democracy returned, the people prosecuted Antiphon. He was charged with helping to establish that government, and his trial carried the death penalty. He seems to have made the best defense of anyone down to my own time against that very charge.

3 Phrynichus also showed himself more eager than anyone else to establish the oligarchy. He feared Alcibiades and knew that Alcibiades was aware of everything he had done at Samos in his dealings with Astyochus. He thought it unlikely that Alcibiades would ever be recalled under an oligarchy. Once he had committed himself, he proved by far the most dependable in facing dangers.

4 Theramenes son of Hagnon was also among the leaders in overthrowing the people. He was a capable speaker and thinker. So it is not surprising that the undertaking succeeded, great as it was, since many intelligent men carried it out. It was hard to end the freedom of the Athenian people about a hundred years after the tyrants had been overthrown. They had not only been independent but had themselves been used to ruling others for more than half that time.

CHAPTER 69

1 The assembly approved these measures without anyone speaking against them and then broke up. Later they brought the Four Hundred into the council chamber in the following way. Because of the enemy at Decelea, all the Athenians were always on armed duty, some on the wall and others at their stations.

2 On that day they let the men who knew nothing of the plan leave as usual. The conspirators had been told to wait quietly, not right beside their weapons but some distance away. If anyone opposed what was being done, they were to take up their weapons and stop him.

3 There were also men from Andros and Tenos, and three hundred men from Carystus and from the settlers at Aegina whom the Athenians had sent to live there. They had come with their own weapons for this very purpose and had been given the same instructions.

4 With these arrangements made, the Four Hundred came, each carrying a hidden dagger. With them were the hundred and twenty [Greek] young men whom they used whenever any violence was needed. They confronted the council members chosen by lot, who were in the council chamber, and told them to take their pay and leave. They themselves brought the pay for the whole remainder of the council's term and handed it to the members as they left.

CHAPTER 70

1 The council thus left without any objection. The other citizens made no move and remained quiet. The Four Hundred entered the council chamber. First they chose their own presiding committee by lot and performed the prayers and sacrifices to the gods customary on taking office. Later they made many changes to the way the democracy had governed. They did not, however, recall the exiles, because of Alcibiades. In other matters too, they ruled the city with complete control.

2 They killed a few men whom they thought it useful to remove, imprisoned others, and sent some into exile. They also sent messages through heralds to Agis, the Lacedaemonian king at Decelea. They said they wanted a settlement. It was reasonable, they said, for him to make an agreement with them rather than with the untrustworthy people, who no longer governed.

CHAPTER 71

1 But Agis thought the city was not quiet and that the people would not surrender their long-standing freedom so quickly. If they saw a large army of his, he thought, they would not stay quiet. He was not at all sure that they were no longer in turmoil even now. So he gave the envoys from the Four Hundred no answer offering an agreement. Instead, he summoned a large force from the Peloponnese. Not long afterward he brought these troops and the garrison from Decelea down to the very walls of Athens. He hoped that the Athenians would be thrown into confusion and more easily forced to submit on his terms. They might even be taken at the first attack, because of the uproar likely to arise both inside and outside the city. At any rate, he thought he could not fail to take the Long Walls, since they were deserted.

2 But when he came close, the Athenians made no move at all against one another inside the city. They sent out their cavalry and some hoplites, light troops, and archers. These killed some of his men who had come too close and took possession of some weapons and bodies. Agis then understood the situation and led his army back.

3 He and his own troops stayed where they were at Decelea. The reinforcements stayed a few days in Attica, and then he sent them home. After this the Four Hundred continued to send envoys to Agis. He was now more receptive and advised them to send envoys to Lacedaemon too. They did so, hoping to negotiate a settlement and end the conflict.

CHAPTER 72

1 They also sent ten men to Samos to reassure the army. These men were to explain that the oligarchy had been established not to harm the city and its citizens but to save the whole state. They were also to say that five thousand men, not just four hundred, were involved in government. In fact, because of military campaigns and work abroad, the Athenians had never met to consider any matter, however important, at a gathering attended by five thousand men.

2 They gave the envoys other suitable instructions about what to say and sent them off immediately after taking power. They feared that the mass of sailors would refuse to remain under an oligarchy, and that resistance would start there and bring them down. This was in fact what happened.

CHAPTER 73

1 For at Samos, too, moves to establish an oligarchy were already causing unrest. The following events took place at just about the time when the Four Hundred were forming their government.

2 The Samians who had earlier risen against the powerful men and formed the democracy now changed sides again. Pisander persuaded them when he visited, as did the Athenian conspirators at Samos. About three hundred of them formed a conspiracy and planned to attack the rest of the people as supporters of democracy.

3 They killed Hyperbolus, an Athenian and a disreputable man. He had been ostracized not because people feared his power and standing but because of his bad conduct and the disgrace he brought on the city. They carried out the killing with Charminus, one of the generals, and some of the Athenians among them, as a pledge of loyalty to these men. They also worked with them on other acts of this kind and were preparing to attack the majority.

4 But the majority learned of the plan and reported it to the generals Leon and Diomedon. These two disliked the oligarchy because the people had honored them. They also told Thrasybulus, who commanded a trireme, Thrasyllus, who served as a hoplite, and others who had always seemed most opposed to the conspirators. They asked them not to stand by and let them be killed and Samos be lost to Athens. Samos alone had enabled their empire [until now] to survive as long as it had.

5 On hearing this, these men approached the soldiers one by one and urged them not to allow it. They made a special effort with the crew of the Paralus. Every man serving aboard that ship was an Athenian and a free man, and they had always opposed oligarchy, even when none was in place. Whenever Leon and Diomedon sailed elsewhere, they left some ships behind to protect the democrats.

6 So when the Three Hundred attacked them, all these men came to help, especially the crew of the Paralus. The majority of the Samians won. They killed about thirty of the Three Hundred and sentenced the three most responsible to exile. They did not hold a grudge against the rest but afterward lived together with them as fellow citizens under a democracy.

CHAPTER 74

1 The Samians and the soldiers quickly sent the Paralus to Athens with Chaereas son of Archestratus to report what had happened. He was an Athenian who had worked eagerly for the change. They did not yet know that the Four Hundred were in power.

2 As soon as they arrived, the Four Hundred imprisoned two or three of the crew. They took the ship away from the others, transferred them to another ship used as a troop transport, and assigned them to guard duty around Euboea.

3 Chaereas saw the situation and somehow slipped away at once. He returned to Samos and told the soldiers what was happening at Athens, making everything sound much worse. He said that the rulers punished everyone with beatings and that no one could speak against those who controlled the government. He also said that the soldiers' wives and children were being abused. He claimed that the rulers planned to seize and imprison the relatives of all the soldiers at Samos who did not share their views. These relatives would be killed if the soldiers refused to obey. He also told many other lies.

CHAPTER 75

1 When the soldiers heard this, their first impulse was to stone the men most responsible for establishing the oligarchy, as well as the others who had taken part. But people stepped in to stop them and explained that they must not ruin their position when the enemy fleet was anchored nearby, facing them. Then they stopped.

2 After this, Thrasybulus son of Lycus and Thrasyllus wanted to turn the government at Samos decisively toward democracy. They had been the main leaders of the change. They made all the soldiers swear the most binding oaths, especially those who had supported the oligarchy. They swore to maintain democracy, remain united, carry on the war against the Peloponnesians with determination, treat the Four Hundred as enemies, and have no negotiations with them through heralds.

3 All the Samians of military age swore the same oath along with them. The soldiers agreed to share all their affairs with the Samians, including whatever might come from the dangers they faced. They thought that neither they nor the Samians had any way to escape to safety. Whether the Four Hundred won or the enemy from Miletus did, they would be destroyed.

CHAPTER 76

1 The two sides were now competing: one was trying to force the city to be a democracy, and the other to force the army to accept an oligarchy.

2 The soldiers immediately held an assembly. They removed the previous generals and any trireme commanders they suspected. They chose new trireme commanders and generals in their place, including Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus.

3 Men stood up and encouraged one another in various ways. They said they should not lose heart because their city had revolted from them. The smaller group had broken away from the larger, and the larger group had more resources in every way.

4 They held the entire fleet. They could therefore force the other cities they ruled to pay money just as they would if the fleet were based at Athens. They had Samos as their city, and it was no weak one. When Samos had fought Athens, it had come very close to taking away Athens's control of the sea. They would also be defending themselves against the enemy from the same base as before. And because they had the ships, they were better able to obtain supplies than the people in the city.

5 Even before this, the people at Athens had controlled the sea route into Piraeus because the army was stationed out in front at Samos. Now, if the people at home refused to give them back their political rights, the soldiers could shut them off from the sea more easily than those at home could shut the soldiers off.

6 The city had given them very little help in defeating the enemy, and that help was worth nothing. They had lost nothing. The city no longer had money to send them; the soldiers found it themselves. It also had no useful advice to offer, the very thing that gives a city authority over armies. In this respect too, the people at home had done wrong by abolishing their ancestral laws. The soldiers were preserving those laws and would try to force the others to follow them as well. So even in the ability to give good advice, the men among them were no worse than those at home.

7 If they granted Alcibiades immunity and permission to return, he would gladly secure an alliance with the king for them. Most important, if every plan failed, they had so large a fleet that they had many places to withdraw to, where they would find both cities and land.

CHAPTER 77

1 After holding an assembly and encouraging one another in this way, they continued their preparations for war just as actively as before. The men sent to Samos by the Four Hundred [the ten ambassadors] were already on Delos when they learned of these events. They stayed quietly where they were.

CHAPTER 78

1 Around this time, the men serving in the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus were loudly complaining among themselves. They said that Astyochus and Tissaphernes were ruining their cause. Astyochus had refused to fight a sea battle earlier, when they were stronger and the Athenian fleet was small. He still refused now, when the Athenians were reportedly divided by civil strife and their ships had not yet gathered in one place. Instead, they were waiting for the Phoenician ships from Tissaphernes—ships that existed in name only, not in reality. They risked wasting away in the delay. Tissaphernes, for his part, was not bringing those ships, and he was weakening the fleet by failing to provide its pay regularly or in full. They said they should stop delaying and fight a decisive sea battle.

CHAPTER 79

1 The Syracusans pressed this most strongly. The allies and Astyochus heard the complaints and met to discuss them. They decided to fight a decisive sea battle, especially since news of the unrest at Samos was also reaching them. They put to sea with all their ships, 112 in total, and sailed toward Mycale. They also told the Milesians to march there by land.

2 The Athenians' eighty-two ships from Samos happened to be anchored at Glauce, on Mycale. At this point, only a short stretch of water separates Samos from the mainland at Mycale. When the Athenians saw the Peloponnesian ships approaching, they withdrew to Samos. They did not think their numbers were enough to risk everything in a battle.

3 They had also learned in advance that the enemy intended to leave Miletus to fight at sea. So they were expecting Strombichides to come and help them from the Hellespont with the ships that had sailed from Chios to Abydos. A messenger had already been sent to him.

4 So the Athenians withdrew to Samos. The Peloponnesians sailed to Mycale and made camp there, along with the land forces from Miletus and the neighboring communities.

5 The next day, just as they were about to sail against Samos, news came that Strombichides had arrived with the ships from the Hellespont. They immediately sailed back to Miletus.

6 With these additional ships, the Athenians now sailed against Miletus themselves. They had 108 ships and wanted to fight a decisive sea battle. When no one sailed out to meet them, they returned to Samos.

CHAPTER 80

1 Immediately afterward, in the same summer, the Peloponnesians faced a problem. They had not sailed out because they thought they were no match for the united Athenian fleet. But they did not know where they would get money for so many ships, especially since Tissaphernes was providing so little. They therefore sent Clearchus son of Rhamphias to Pharnabazus with forty ships, as they had originally been instructed to do from the Peloponnese.

2 Pharnabazus was inviting them to come and was ready to provide pay. At the same time, Byzantium was sending them messages offering to revolt.

3 These Peloponnesian ships headed out into the open sea to keep the Athenians from noticing their voyage, but they ran into a storm. Most of them reached Delos with Clearchus and later returned to Miletus. Clearchus subsequently traveled overland to the Hellespont and took command there. The other ten ships, under the Megarian general Helixus, reached the Hellespont safely and brought about the revolt of Byzantium.

4 After this, when the Athenians at Samos heard the news, they sent ships to the Hellespont to provide help and guard the area. A small sea battle also took place off Byzantium, with eight ships on each side.

CHAPTER 81

1 The leaders at Samos wanted to bring Alcibiades back. Thrasybulus in particular had kept to this same policy ever since he changed the political situation there. At last he persuaded the mass of the soldiers at an assembly. They voted to recall Alcibiades and guarantee his safety. Thrasybulus then sailed to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades back to Samos. He thought their only chance of survival was to bring Tissaphernes over from the Peloponnesians to their side.

2 An assembly was held. Alcibiades complained about the personal misfortune of his exile and expressed his grief over it. He spoke at length about public affairs and gave the men great hopes for the future. He vastly exaggerated his own influence with Tissaphernes. He wanted the oligarchs at home to fear him and their political associations to break up more readily. He also wanted the men at Samos to value him more highly and feel more confident themselves. And he wanted to make Tissaphernes as suspicious as possible of the enemy, so that they would be cut off [from] their existing hopes.

3 Above all, Alcibiades made the following promises with great boasting. Tissaphernes, he said, had solemnly promised him that, if he could trust the Athenians, they would never lack pay as long as he had any property left. He would even sell his own bed for cash if he had to in the end. He would bring the Phoenician ships, which were already at Aspendus, to help the Athenians, not the Peloponnesians. But he would trust the Athenians only if Alcibiades returned safely and personally guaranteed their good faith to him.

CHAPTER 82

1 After hearing this and much more, they immediately elected him general alongside those already in office and put all their affairs in his hands. Each man now hoped to survive and to punish the Four Hundred, and would not have traded that hope for anything. His words made them so dismissive of the enemy facing them that they were already prepared to sail against Piraeus.

2 But he firmly stopped them from sailing against Piraeus and leaving the enemy nearer at hand behind them, although many were pressing to go. Now that he had been elected general, he said, he would first sail to Tissaphernes to deal with the war.

3 He left immediately after this assembly so that people would think he consulted Tissaphernes about everything. He also wanted Tissaphernes to value him more highly and to see that he had now been elected general and could [already] help him or harm him. Alcibiades was thus using Tissaphernes to frighten the Athenians, and the Athenians to frighten Tissaphernes.

CHAPTER 83

1 When the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of Alcibiades' return, they distrusted Tissaphernes far more than before, although they had already been suspicious of him.

2 After the Athenians sailed against Miletus and the Peloponnesians refused to sail out and fight, Tissaphernes had become much less reliable about paying them. Even before the news of Alcibiades' return, their hatred of Tissaphernes had increased because of Alcibiades.

3 As before, the men gathered in groups to discuss their grievances. Not only the ordinary soldiers but also some of the other men of standing joined in. They said they had never yet received their full pay. What they did get was small, and even that was not paid regularly. Unless someone either fought a decisive sea battle or moved to a place where they could get supplies, the men would desert the ships. Astyochus, they said, was to blame for all of this, because he was indulging Tissaphernes' moods for his own profit.

CHAPTER 84

1 While they were discussing these grievances, the following disturbance also broke out around Astyochus.

2 The Syracusan and Thurian sailors were especially bold in confronting him and demanding their pay, since their crews were mostly free men. He answered them rather arrogantly and threatened them. He even raised his staff at Dorieus, who was speaking up for his own sailors.

3 When the mass of the men saw this, they reacted like sailors: they burst out shouting and rushed at Astyochus to throw stones at him. He saw what was coming and took refuge at an altar. He was not actually hit, however, and the two sides dispersed.

4 The Milesians also made a surprise attack on Tissaphernes' fort, which had been built inside Miletus. They captured it and expelled his garrison. The other allies approved of this, especially the Syracusans.

5 But Lichas disapproved. He said the Milesians and the other inhabitants of the king's territory ought to submit to Tissaphernes within reasonable limits and keep on good terms with him until they had brought the war to a successful end. This and other similar remarks made the Milesians angry with him. Later, when he died of an illness, they refused to let him be buried where the Lacedaemonians who were there wanted to bury him.

CHAPTER 85

1 While they were at odds with Astyochus and Tissaphernes in this way, Mindarus arrived from Lacedaemon to succeed Astyochus as admiral. He took over the command, and Astyochus sailed away.

2 Tissaphernes sent one of his own men with him as an ambassador. His name was Gaulites, a Carian who spoke both languages. He was to accuse the Milesians over the fort and also defend Tissaphernes himself. Tissaphernes knew that the Milesians were going mainly to denounce him, and that Hermocrates was going with them. Hermocrates intended to show that Tissaphernes was working with Alcibiades to ruin the Peloponnesian cause and was playing both sides.

3 Hermocrates had always been at odds with him over the payment of wages. Later, Hermocrates was exiled from Syracuse, and other generals—Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus—came to Miletus to take over the Syracusan ships. Tissaphernes then attacked Hermocrates much more fiercely, now that he was an exile. Among other accusations, he claimed that Hermocrates had once asked him for money, and that his hostility to Tissaphernes came from being refused.

4 So Astyochus, the Milesians, and Hermocrates sailed to Lacedaemon. Alcibiades had already crossed back from Tissaphernes to Samos.

CHAPTER 86

1 The Four Hundred's [ambassadors] now arrived from Delos. These were the men they had sent earlier to reassure the Athenians at Samos and explain the situation to them. Alcibiades was there when they arrived. An assembly was held, and they tried to speak.

2 At first the soldiers refused to listen. They shouted that the men who had overthrown the democracy should be killed. But at last they quieted down with difficulty and heard them out.

3 The ambassadors said that the change of government was intended to save the city, not destroy it. Nor was it intended to hand the city over to the enemy. They could have done that when the enemy invaded, since they were already in power then. All the Five Thousand would take their turn in governing. The soldiers' relatives were not being mistreated, as Chaereas had falsely reported, or suffering any other harm. They were all staying where they were, each in possession of his own property.

4 The ambassadors said much more, but the soldiers were no more willing to listen. They were angry and proposed various courses of action, above all to sail against Piraeus. It seems that this was the first time Alcibiades helped the city as

much as anyone else had. The Athenians at Samos were determined to sail against their own people. This would clearly have put Ionia and the Hellespont into the enemy's hands at once. Alcibiades stopped them.

5 At that moment, no one else could have restrained the crowd. But he stopped the attack and sharply rebuked those who were personally angry with the ambassadors, turning them away from them.

6 He gave the ambassadors his own answer and sent them away. He would not oppose rule by the Five Thousand. But he told them to remove the Four Hundred and restore the council of Five Hundred as it had been before. If they had cut any spending to save money and provide better support for the men on campaign, he thoroughly approved.

7 On other matters too, he told them to hold out and make no concessions to the enemy. If the city survived, there was every hope that the two sides could also come to terms with each other. But if either side fell—the men at Samos or those at home—there would no longer be anyone left for the other side to make peace with.

8 Argive ambassadors were also there, offering help to the Athenian people at Samos. Alcibiades thanked them and told them to come when called on. With that, he sent them away.

9 The Argives had arrived with the crew of the Paralus. The Four Hundred had earlier assigned this crew to a troopship and ordered them to sail around Euboea. They were carrying three Athenian ambassadors [sent] by the Four Hundred to Lacedaemon: Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias. [They] seized the ambassadors when their voyage brought them off Argos and handed them over to the Argives, as men who had been among the leading destroyers of the democracy. The crew did not return to Athens. Instead, they used the same trireme they had with them to bring the Argive ambassadors from Argos to Samos.

CHAPTER 87

1 In the same summer, Tissaphernes began preparing to go to Aspendus to meet the Phoenician fleet. This was just when the Peloponnesians were particularly angry with him over Alcibiades' return, as well as other matters. They believed he was now openly siding with Athens. His apparent intention was to clear himself of their suspicions. He told Lichas to go with him. He said he would order his deputy Tamos to provide pay for the army while he was away.

2 Accounts differ, and it is not easy to know what his purpose was in going to Aspendus and then failing to bring the ships after he got there.

3 It is clear that 147 Phoenician ships reached Aspendus. But there are many guesses about why they did not come any farther. Some say he went away to delay the Peloponnesians' operations, as he had intended. Certainly Tamos, who had been assigned the job, provided pay no better than before, but even worse. Others say he brought the Phoenicians to Aspendus so that he could get money out of them in return for letting them go. On this view, he had never intended to use them anyway. Others say he went because of the accusations against him at Lacedaemon. He wanted people to say that he was doing nothing wrong and had visibly gone to fetch ships that really were fully manned.

4 My own view is that his clearest purpose in not bringing the fleet was to prolong the conflict among the Greeks and keep the two sides in check. The time spent traveling there and delaying would wear them down. By not joining either side and making it stronger, he would keep their strength balanced. If he had wanted to end the war, he could surely have done so beyond any doubt by appearing with the fleet. Bringing it to the Lacedaemonians would probably have given them victory. Even as things stood, their fleet faced the Athenians on terms that were more equal than inferior.

5 The excuse he gave for not bringing the ships is the strongest evidence against him. He said that fewer had assembled than the king had ordered. But surely he would have earned even greater gratitude by spending less of the king's money and achieving the same results with fewer resources.

6 Whatever his intention, then, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and met the Phoenicians. At his request, the Peloponnesians sent a Lacedaemonian named Philippus with two triremes to meet the fleet.

CHAPTER 88

1 When Alcibiades learned that Tissaphernes was on his way to Aspendus, he too set sail, taking thirteen ships. He promised the men at Samos a great service that they could count on: he would either bring the Phoenician fleet to the Athenians himself or at least prevent it from joining the Peloponnesians. He probably already knew that Tissaphernes had no intention of bringing it. He wanted to make the Peloponnesians as suspicious as possible of Tissaphernes' friendship with himself and the Athenians. This would put more pressure on Tissaphernes to join their side. So Alcibiades put to sea and sailed up the coast toward Phaselis and Caunus.

CHAPTER 89

1 The ambassadors whom the Four Hundred had sent to Samos returned to Athens and reported Alcibiades' answer. He urged them to hold out and make no concessions to the enemy. He had great hopes of reconciling the army with them and defeating the Peloponnesians. This greatly encouraged most of those who shared in the oligarchy. They were already dissatisfied and would gladly have found some safe way out of it.

2 They now began gathering in groups and criticizing the situation. Their leaders included some of the foremost [generals] who held office under the oligarchy, such as Theramenes son of Hagnon, Aristocrates son of Scellias, and others. These men had been among the first to take part in establishing the regime. But now, they said, they were very afraid of the army at Samos and of Alcibiades. They also feared that the ambassadors going to Lacedaemon—[they had sent them]—might harm the city without the consent of the majority. They did not

call for an end to rule by a very small group. Instead, they said that the Five Thousand must be appointed in fact, not just in name, and that the constitution must be made more equal.

3 This was the political form their argument took. But most of them supported this course out of personal ambition. This is what most often destroys an oligarchy that has replaced a democracy. From the very first day, each member expects not merely to be equal to the others but to stand far above them all. In a democracy, when an election is held, a man finds it easier to accept the outcome. He does not feel that men of his own standing have put him at a disadvantage.

4 What most clearly encouraged them was Alcibiades' strong position at Samos and their belief that the oligarchy would not last. So each competed to be the first to become the people's leader.

CHAPTER 90

1 The most powerful leaders of the Four Hundred strongly opposed this course. They included Phrynichus, who had [once] served as general at Samos and had quarreled with Alcibiades then; Aristarchus, one of the strongest and longest-standing opponents of democracy; Pisander; Antiphon; and others. They had already been sending their own ambassadors to Lacedaemon, working eagerly for an agreement, and building the wall at the place called Eetionea. They had begun as soon as they took power and the Athenians at Samos broke away from them and restored democracy. They now pursued these efforts much more intensely after their ambassadors returned from Samos. They could see that most people, including men of their own party whom they had previously thought loyal, were changing sides.

2 Afraid of the situation both at home and at Samos, they hurriedly sent Antiphon, Phrynichus, and ten others to Lacedaemon. Their instructions were to reach an agreement with the Lacedaemonians on any terms that were at all bearable.

3 They also worked still harder on the wall at Eetionea. According to Theramenes and his supporters, the purpose of this wall was not to keep the men from Samos out of Piraeus if they tried to force their way in. Rather, it was to let the enemy in by sea and land whenever the builders wished.

4 Eetionea is a projecting arm of Piraeus, and the harbor entrance runs right beside it. The new wall was being built so that, together with the existing wall on the landward side, it would let a small garrison control the entrance. Both the old landward wall and the new inner wall being built on the seaward side ended at the same tower, one of the two at the narrow mouth of the harbor.

5 They also walled off the largest portico in Piraeus, which stood immediately beside this wall, and took control of it themselves. They forced everyone to unload all grain there, both existing stocks and incoming shipments, and to take it from there for sale.

CHAPTER 91

1 Theramenes had been spreading reports about this for some time. When the ambassadors returned from Lacedaemon without securing an agreement acceptable to the whole community, he said that this wall might bring about the city's destruction as well.

2 At this same time, forty-two ships from the Peloponnese were already anchored at Las in Laconia, preparing to sail to Euboea at the Euboeans' invitation. They included some Italian ships from Tarentum and Locri, as well as some Sicilian ships. Their commander was Agesandridas son of Agesander, a Spartan. Theramenes said they were sailing to help the men fortifying Eetionea as much as to help Euboea. Unless someone took precautions at once, he said, the city would be destroyed before anyone realized it.

3 There was indeed something of this sort in the minds of the accused. The charge was not simply a slander. Their first choice was to keep their oligarchic rule and also rule the allies. Failing that, they wanted to keep the ships and walls

and remain independent. If even that was denied them, they were determined not to let a restored democracy destroy them first and foremost. Rather than that, they would bring in the enemy and make peace at the cost of the walls and fleet. They would accept any condition for the city, provided their own lives were safe.

CHAPTER 92

1 That was why they were so eager to build this wall, with its small gates, entrances, and ways of admitting the enemy. They wanted to finish it before anyone could stop them.

2 At first these things were discussed mainly in small groups and in secret. Then Phrynichus, after returning from his embassy to Lacedaemon, was struck in a planned attack by one of the patrolmen in the crowded marketplace. He walked only a short distance from the council chamber and died immediately. His attacker escaped. An accomplice, an Argive, was caught and tortured by the Four Hundred. But he named no one who had ordered the attack. All he said was that he knew many men met at the patrol commander's house and at other private houses. Nothing further came of the incident. Theramenes, Aristocrates, and the others who shared their views, both inside the Four Hundred and outside it, now moved more boldly into action.

3 Meanwhile, the ships had sailed around from Las, anchored at Epidaurus, and raided Aegina. Theramenes said it made no sense for ships bound for Euboea to turn into the gulf toward Aegina and then anchor again at Epidaurus, unless they had come by invitation for the very purposes he had always alleged. They could no longer remain inactive.

4 Finally, after much divisive talk and growing suspicion, they began to act. The hoplites building the wall at Eetionea in Piraeus arrested Alexicles, a general appointed under the oligarchy who was especially closely connected with the political clubs. Among these hoplites was Aristocrates, commanding his own tribal contingent. They took Alexicles to a house and locked him up.

5 Others helped them, including a man named Hermon, commander of the patrolmen stationed at Munychia. Most importantly, the main body of hoplites supported what they were doing.

6 When the Four Hundred heard the news, they happened to be meeting in the council chamber. Except for those who approved of what had happened, they were immediately ready to take up arms and threatened Theramenes and his supporters. In his defense, Theramenes said he was ready to go at once and help free Alexicles. He took one of the generals who shared his views and went down to Piraeus. Aristarchus and some young cavalrymen also went to help.

7 There was great confusion and alarm. The people in the city already believed that Piraeus had been seized and the prisoner killed. Those in Piraeus thought the men from the city were about to attack them at any moment.

8 The older men struggled to stop the people in the city from running about and rushing to arms. Thucydides of Pharsalus, who served as a representative for Athens, was also present. He actively stood in people's way and shouted to each group not to destroy their country while the enemy lay close by, waiting for their chance. With difficulty, the people quieted down and held back from attacking one another.

9 Theramenes arrived in Piraeus—he too was a general—and made a show of shouting angrily at the hoplites. But Aristarchus and the opposing party were genuinely furious.

10 Most of the hoplites stood by what they had done and had no regrets. They asked Theramenes whether he thought the wall was being built for the good of the city and whether it would be better to tear it down. He said that if they thought it should be torn down, he agreed. At once the hoplites and many of the people of Piraeus climbed onto the fortification and began demolishing it.

11 The call to the crowd was that anyone who wanted the Five Thousand to rule instead of the Four Hundred should join the work. They still used the name of the Five Thousand as a cover. They did not openly call for anyone who wanted

the people to rule, because they feared that the Five Thousand might really exist. A man might unknowingly speak to one of them and get himself into trouble. This was why the Four Hundred wanted neither to appoint the Five Thousand nor to make it clear that they did not exist. They thought that sharing power with so many would amount to outright democracy, while uncertainty would make people afraid of one another.

CHAPTER 93

1 The next day the Four Hundred still met in the council chamber, despite their alarm. The hoplites in Piraeus released Alexicles, whom they had arrested, and demolished the fortification. Then they went to the theater of Dionysus near Munychia, set down their weapons, and held an assembly. After reaching a decision, they immediately marched into the city and again set down their weapons, this time at the Anaceum.

2 Some men chosen by the Four Hundred came to them. They spoke individually to anyone they saw who seemed reasonable, urging him to keep calm himself and hold the others back. They said that they would announce who the Five Thousand were. The Four Hundred would be drawn from these in rotation, as the Five Thousand decided. Meanwhile, they must not ruin the city in any way or drive it into the enemy's hands.

3 After many men had spoken to many others, the hoplites as a whole were calmer than before. Their main fear was for the state as a whole. They agreed to hold an assembly at the sanctuary of Dionysus on a set day to discuss reconciliation.

CHAPTER 94

1 When the time came for the assembly [at the sanctuary of Dionysus], and they had almost gathered, news arrived that Agesandridas and the forty-two ships were sailing from Megara along the coast of Salamis. Everyone [among the mass

of hoplites] thought this was exactly what Theramenes and his supporters had been saying all along: the ships were sailing to the fortification. They thought it was just as well that it had been demolished.

2 Agesandridas may have been cruising around Epidaurus and this area partly because of an agreed plan. But it is also likely that he was waiting there because of the Athenians' current civil strife. He hoped to arrive at the right moment.

3 When the Athenians heard the news, the whole population immediately ran down to Piraeus. The war threatening them from the enemy was greater than their own internal conflict, and it was not far away, but right at the harbor. Some boarded the ships that were ready. Others launched more ships, while others hurried to defend the walls and the harbor entrance.

CHAPTER 95

1 The Peloponnesian ships sailed past, rounded Sunium, and anchored between Thoricus and Prasiae. Later they reached Oropus.

2 The Athenians were forced by the urgency to use crews that had not trained together. Their city was divided by civil strife, and they wanted to rush help to the place that mattered most. With Attica cut off, Euboea meant everything to them. They sent General Thymochares and ships to Eretria.

3 When these arrived, they and the ships already in Euboea made thirty-six in all. They were immediately forced into a naval battle. After his men had eaten their midday meal, Agesandridas had put out from Oropus with his ships. Oropus is about sixty stades by sea from the city of Eretria.

4 As he approached, the Athenians immediately began to crew their own ships. They thought their men were beside the ships. But the men were getting their midday food not from the marketplace—the Eretrians had deliberately arranged for nothing to be sold there—but from houses on the outskirts of the

city. The plan was to delay the boarding so that the enemy could arrive first and force the Athenians to put out in whatever state they happened to be in. A signal had been raised from Eretria to Oropus to tell the enemy when to put out.

5 The Athenians put out with these preparations and fought off Eretria's harbor. Even so, they held out for a short time. Then they turned and fled, and were chased to the shore.

6 Those who took refuge in the city of Eretria, believing it friendly, suffered the worst: the Eretrians killed them. But the men who reached the fort in Eretrian territory, which the Athenians themselves held, survived. So did the ships that reached Chalcis.

7 The Peloponnesians captured twenty-two Athenian ships, killed some of the men, and took others alive. They set up a victory monument. Not long afterward they brought all Euboea into revolt except Oreus, which the Athenians themselves held. They also settled the other affairs of the island.

CHAPTER 96

1 When the Athenians heard what had happened in Euboea, their shock was greater than ever before. Neither the disaster in Sicily, great as it had seemed at the time, nor anything else had yet frightened them so much.

2 The army at Samos had broken with them. They had no other ships and no men to crew them. They were divided by civil strife, and no one knew when they would clash with one another. Now this great disaster had come on top of it all. They had lost ships and, most importantly, Euboea, which supplied them with more than Attica did. How could they reasonably avoid losing heart?

3 Their greatest and most immediate worry was that the enemy, after this victory, might dare to sail straight to Piraeus, where there were no ships. They thought the enemy was almost there already.

4 If the enemy had been bolder, they could easily have done this. By anchoring off the city, they would have divided it still further. Or, if they had stayed and blockaded it, they would have forced even the fleet in Ionia to come to the aid of its own families and the whole city, despite its hostility to the oligarchy. Meanwhile, the Hellespont, Ionia, the islands, and the region as far as Euboea would have been theirs—practically the whole Athenian empire.

5 This was not the only occasion when the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient enemies the Athenians could have had. There were many others. Their characters differed completely: the Athenians were quick, the Lacedaemonians slow; the Athenians took the initiative, the Lacedaemonians lacked daring. This helped the Athenians enormously, especially because their empire depended on their fleet. The Syracusans showed this. Their character was very like the Athenians', and they fought them most effectively.

CHAPTER 97

1 Still, in response to the news, the Athenians crewed twenty ships and called an assembly. This first meeting took place immediately, in the place called the Pnyx, where they had usually met before. There they removed the Four Hundred and voted to hand power to the Five Thousand. These were to include everyone who could provide his own hoplite equipment. No one was to receive pay for holding any public office. They put anyone who did so under a curse.

2 Many more assemblies followed. At these they voted to appoint lawmakers and make the other arrangements for the constitution. During the first period of this government, the Athenians seem to have governed themselves as well as at any time in my lifetime. There was a balanced combination of rule by the few and rule by the many. This was the first thing that helped the city recover from its desperate situation.

3 They also voted to allow Alcibiades and others with him to return. They sent messages to him and to the army at Samos, urging them to take charge of affairs.

CHAPTER 98

1 As soon as this change took place, Pisander, Alexicles, their supporters, and the strongest supporters of the oligarchy slipped away to Decelea. Aristarchus alone went elsewhere. He happened to be a general, and quickly took some archers who knew as little Greek as possible and marched toward Oenoe.

2 This was an Athenian fort on the border with Boeotia. The Corinthians were besieging it on their own initiative, with Boeotians whom they had asked to join them. They had suffered losses when men returning from Decelea were killed by troops from Oenoe.

3 Aristarchus came to an understanding with the besiegers and deceived the men in Oenoe. He said that the people in Athens had made a general agreement with the Lacedaemonians, and that they too must hand their position over to the Boeotians: these were the agreed terms. They trusted him because he was a general. As they were under siege, they knew nothing of what had happened. They came out under a truce.

4 That was how Oenoe was captured and occupied by the Boeotians. The oligarchy and civil strife at Athens also came to an end.

CHAPTER 99

1 At about the same time that summer, the Peloponnesians at Miletus were getting no money for food from any of the men Tissaphernes had put in charge at that time [when he went to Aspendus]. Neither the Phoenician ships nor Tissaphernes himself had yet arrived. Philip, who had been sent with him, had written to the admiral Mindarus. So had another man, Hippocrates, a Spartan who was at Phaselis. They reported that the ships would not come and that

Tissaphernes was treating them unfairly in every way. Pharnabazus was also calling them to join him. He was eager to bring the fleet over and, like Tissaphernes, to make the remaining cities in his own province revolt from Athens. Mindarus hoped to get more help from him. The order to sail was given without warning. He left Miletus with seventy-three ships in a well-organized formation and sailed toward the Hellespont, hoping to escape the notice of the Athenians at Samos. Sixteen ships had already entered the Hellespont earlier that same summer and had raided part of the Chersonese. But a storm caught Mindarus, forcing him to put in at Icarus. Bad sailing weather kept him there for five or six days. Then he reached Chios.

CHAPTER 100

1 When Thrasyllus at Samos learned that Mindarus had left Miletus, he too immediately sailed out with fifty-five ships. He was hurrying to prevent Mindarus from entering the Hellespont first.

2 Then he learned that Mindarus was at Chios and thought he would stay there. He posted lookouts on Lesbos and on the mainland opposite, to make sure any movement of the ships did not go unnoticed. He himself sailed along the coast to Methymna. He ordered barley meal and other supplies to be prepared. If the wait became longer, he intended to make his attacks on Chios from Lesbos.

3 He also wanted to sail against Eresus on Lesbos, which had revolted, and capture it if he could. Some of the more influential exiles from Methymna had brought across about fifty hoplites from Cyme who had joined their cause, and had hired others from the mainland, making about three hundred in all. Anaxander, a Theban, led them because of their common ancestry. They first attacked Methymna. But the Athenian garrison from Mytilene came out, and their attempt failed. They were driven back again in a battle outside the town, crossed the mountains, and brought Eresus into revolt.

4 Thrasyllus therefore sailed there with all his ships, intending to attack. Thrasybulus had already arrived there with five ships from Samos after they heard the news of the exiles' crossing. He had been too late to stop them, but had come to Eresus and was anchored off it.

5 Two ships returning home from the Hellespont also joined them, along with five ships from Methymna. There were now sixty-seven ships in all. With the troops from these ships, they prepared to take Eresus by force if they could, using siege engines and every other means.

CHAPTER 101

1 Meanwhile Mindarus and the Peloponnesian ships at Chios took on food for two days. Each man also received three Chian coins called fortieths from the Chians. On the third day they quickly left Chios. They did not take the open-sea route, to avoid meeting the ships at Eresus. Instead, they sailed toward the mainland with Lesbos on their left.

2 They put in at the harbor of Carterii in Phocaean territory and ate their midday meal. Then they sailed along the coast of Cyme's territory and ate their evening meal at Arginusae on the mainland, opposite Mytilene.

3 From there they sailed along the coast while much of the night still remained, and reached Harmatus on the mainland, directly opposite Methymna. After their midday meal, they quickly sailed past Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus, and the places along that coast. They reached Rhoeteum, now inside the Hellespont, before midnight. Some of the ships put in at Sigeum and elsewhere in that area.

CHAPTER 102

1 The Athenians at Sestos had eighteen ships. Their beacon watchers signaled to them, and they saw many fires suddenly appear in enemy territory. They realized that the Peloponnesians were sailing in. That same night they sailed as fast

as they could, close to the Chersonese, toward Elaeus. They wanted to get past the enemy ships and out into open water.

2 They escaped the notice of the sixteen ships at Abydos. These had been told in advance to watch the Athenians carefully if they tried to sail out when their own friendly fleet approached. But at dawn the Athenians saw Mindarus' ships, which immediately began chasing them. Not all the Athenians escaped in time. Most got away toward Imbros and Lemnos, but the four ships sailing last were caught near Elaeus.

3 The Peloponnesians captured one, crew and all, after it ran aground by the sanctuary of Protesilaus. They captured two others without their crews. The remaining ship they burned, empty, near Imbros.

CHAPTER 103

1 After this, the ships from Abydos joined the rest, making eighty-six in all. With these the Peloponnesians besieged Elaeus that day. When it would not surrender, they sailed back to Abydos.

2 The Athenians had been let down by their lookouts. They had thought the enemy ships could not sail past without their knowledge, and had been taking their time attacking the walls. When they learned what had happened, they immediately left Eresus and hurried to help in the Hellespont.

3 They captured two Peloponnesian ships which, during the earlier pursuit, had boldly ventured farther out to sea and now ran into them. A day later they reached Elaeus and anchored there. They brought back all the ships that had escaped to Imbros and spent five days preparing for battle at sea.

CHAPTER 104

1 After this they fought a naval battle as follows. The Athenians sailed toward Sestos, one ship behind another, close along the shore. When the Peloponnesians saw this, they too put out from Abydos to meet them.

2 Once they knew they were going to fight, they extended their lines. The Athenians' seventy-six ships stretched along the Chersonese from Idacus to Arriani. The Peloponnesians' eighty-six ships stretched from Abydos to Dardanus.

3 On the Peloponnesian side, the Syracusans held the right wing. Mindarus himself held the other wing with the fastest ships. On the Athenian side, Thrasyllus held the left and Thrasybulus the right. The other generals each took their assigned positions.

4 The Peloponnesians were eager to attack first. With their left wing they wanted to extend beyond the Athenians' right and, if possible, cut off their escape to open water. In the center, they wanted to drive them against the nearby shore. The Athenians saw this. They extended their line on the side where the enemy wanted to cut them off, and outsailed them.

5 Their left wing had already passed the headland called Cynossema. These movements left the ships in their center weak and scattered. They were also fewer in number, and the coast around Cynossema made a sharp, angular turn. This hid what was happening on the other side of it.

CHAPTER 105

1 The Peloponnesians attacked in the center, drove the Athenian ships onto dry land, and landed to pursue the men ashore. They had a clear advantage in the fighting.

2 Neither Thrasybulus' men on the right nor Thrasyllus' men on the left could help the center. Thrasybulus was held back by the large number of ships attacking him. Thrasyllus could not see the center because the headland of Cynossema blocked the view. He was also held back by the Syracusans and the other ships facing him, which were no fewer than his own. This lasted until part of the Peloponnesian fleet began to lose its order. Confident after their victory, different ships had begun chasing different enemies without fear.

3 Thrasybulus and his men saw that the ships facing them were holding back. They stopped extending their wing and turned back. They immediately fought back and put those ships to flight. Then they caught the scattered ships from the victorious part of the Peloponnesian fleet and struck them. Most of these panicked without even fighting. The Syracusans, too, had already begun to give way to Thrasyllus and his men. When they saw the others fleeing as well, they fled more urgently.

CHAPTER 106

1 After the defeat, most of the Peloponnesians fled first to the Meidius River and later to Abydos. The Athenians captured only a few ships, because the narrowness of the Hellespont gave the enemy a short distance to escape. But this victory at sea came at an exceptionally important moment for them.

2 Until then they had been afraid of the Peloponnesian fleet because of their small setbacks and the disaster in Sicily. Now they stopped blaming themselves and no longer thought their enemies were worth much at sea.

3 They captured eight Chian ships, five Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Boeotian, and one each from the Leucadians, Lacedaemonians, Syracusans, and Pellenians. They themselves lost fifteen ships.

4 They set up a victory monument on the headland at Cynossema, towed in the wrecks, and returned the enemy's dead under a truce. They also sent a trireme to Athens to report the victory.

5 When the ship arrived, the Athenians heard the unexpected news of success. Coming just after the disasters in Euboea and the civil strife, it gave them great encouragement. They thought they could still win through if they worked hard at it.

CHAPTER 107

1 On the fourth day after the battle, the Athenians at Sestos, having hurriedly repaired their ships, sailed against Cyzicus, which had revolted. They saw the eight ships from Byzantium anchored near Harpagium and Priapus. They sailed against them, defeated the men ashore in battle, and captured the ships. Then they reached Cyzicus, which had no walls, brought it back under their control, and collected money from it.

2 Meanwhile the Peloponnesians sailed from Abydos to Elaeus and recovered all their captured ships that were still sound. The people of Elaeus had burned the others. They also sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea to bring back the ships there.

CHAPTER 108

1 At about the same time, Alcibiades sailed back from Caunus and Phaselis to Samos with his thirteen ships. He reported that he had turned the Phoenician fleet away from helping the Peloponnesians, so that it did not come, and had made Tissaphernes friendlier to the Athenians than before.

2 He crewed nine more ships in addition to those he had, collected a large sum of money from the Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos. After doing this and appointing a governor in Cos, he sailed back to Samos as autumn was approaching.

3 When Tissaphernes learned that the Peloponnesian ships had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, he left Aspendus and traveled toward Ionia.

4 While the Peloponnesians were in the Hellespont, the people of Antandrus, who are Aeolians, brought hoplites from Abydos overland through Mount Ida and admitted them into the city. They were being mistreated by Arsaces, a Persian subordinate of Tissaphernes. This was the same man who had killed the Delians who settled at Adramyttium when the Athenians removed them from Delos to purify the island. He had claimed to be involved in a quarrel, without explaining it, and called on their leading men to join a military expedition. He led them out on the claim that they were friends and allies. Then he waited until they were eating their midday meal, surrounded them with his own men, and had them killed with javelins.

5 Because of this deed, the people of Antandrus feared that he might also commit some crime against them. He was also imposing other burdens they could not bear. So they expelled his guards from the citadel.

CHAPTER 109

1 Tissaphernes learned of this action by the Peloponnesians, in addition to what they had done at Miletus and Cnidus. His guards had been expelled from those places too. He believed that the Peloponnesians had been turned firmly against him, and feared they might do him further harm. He also resented the prospect that Pharnabazus, after hosting them for less time and at less cost, might achieve greater success against the Athenians. He planned to go to them in the Hellespont. He wanted to complain about what had happened at Antandrus and to defend himself as plausibly as possible against the accusations about the Phoenician fleet and everything else. He first went to Ephesus and made a sacrifice to Artemis.

2 [When the winter following this summer ends, the twenty-first year is complete.]