

History of the Peloponnesian War

THUCYDIDES

Musean Translation

MOUSEIA



History of the Peloponnesian War



THUCYDIDES

Musean Translation

Translated by Michael Berardi

MOUSEIA

THIS EDITION

Mouseia's complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete Attic Greek text of all eight books, 917 chapters and 3,587 sections (Henry Stuart Jones's Oxford text, Perseus Digital Library), for fidelity, the force of the speeches, clarity and structure.

TRANSLATOR

Michael Berardi

THE WORK

Written c. 431–400 BCE · History

SOURCE

Original text from the Perseus Digital Library.

GAPS AND UNCERTAINTIES

Words Stuart Jones brackets as probable interpolations are kept in square brackets in every edition. The History breaks off unfinished in the winter of 411 BCE (8.109), as it does in every manuscript.

Mouseia · mouseia.org
Edition dated 25 October 2026

Contents



Book 1 1

Book 2 101

Book 3 180

Book 4 262

Book 5 356

Book 6 429

Book 7 506

Book 8 574

Book 1



CHAPTER 1

1 Thucydides the Athenian wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, recounting how they fought one another. He began as soon as it broke out, expecting it to be great and more worthy of record than any that had preceded it. His grounds were that both sides entered it at the height of their strength, with their entire resources prepared, and that he saw the rest of the Greek world aligning itself with one side or the other, some at once, others still considering it.

2 For this was the greatest upheaval to befall the Greeks and a part of the barbarian world—indeed, one might say, the greater part of humanity.

3 As for what came before it, and the still more distant past, the length of time made clear discovery impossible. Yet from the evidence I find credible when I carry my inquiry as far back as possible, I judge that neither the wars nor anything else that happened then was on a great scale.

CHAPTER 2

1 For the country now called Hellas plainly had no settled population in early times. Instead, migrations were frequent, and each people readily abandoned its own land under pressure from others who were always more numerous.

2 There was no commerce, nor could people move freely among one another without fear, either by land or by sea. Each cultivated its own territory only enough to live on, without surplus wealth or planted estates: no one knew when another might come and strip them of everything, especially since they had no walls. Believing they could secure their necessary daily food anywhere, they had little difficulty moving away. For this reason they had neither the strength of great cities nor other resources of power.

3 It was always the best land that underwent the most changes of inhabitants: what is now called Thessaly, Boeotia, most of the Peloponnese except Arcadia, and the richest parts of the rest of the country.

4 For the excellence of the soil increased the power of certain men and so bred civil strife, through which the inhabitants ruined themselves; at the same time, they were more exposed to designs by outsiders.

5 Attica, at any rate, whose thin soil kept it for the longest time free of civil strife, was always inhabited by the same people.

6 Here is a particularly strong illustration of the argument that migrations prevented the rest of Hellas from growing to the same extent. The most powerful of those driven out of other parts of Hellas by war or civil strife took refuge among the Athenians, since their country was secure. Becoming citizens, they increased the city's population still further from very early times, until later the Athenians even sent colonies to Ionia because Attica could no longer hold them.

CHAPTER 3

1 Another especially clear indication, to my mind, of the weakness of early times is this: before the Trojan War, Hellas appears to have undertaken nothing in common.

2 Indeed, I believe it did not yet even bear this name as a whole. Before Hellen son of Deucalion, the designation seems not to have existed at all; the different peoples, and most widely the Pelasgians, gave their own names to their respective territories. But when Hellen and his sons became powerful in Phthiotis, and other cities brought them in for assistance, these communities individually came increasingly to be called Greeks through their association with them. Yet only after a long time [could] the name prevail for them all.

3 Homer supplies the strongest evidence. Though he lived much later even than the Trojan War, nowhere does he use this name for them all, nor for any except the men who came with Achilles from Phthiotis, who were indeed the first Greeks. In his poems he calls them Danaans, Argives, and Achaeans. Nor, however, does he speak of barbarians, because, as I see it, the Greeks had not yet been set apart under a single, contrasting name.

4 Those, then, who were called Greeks—first the separate cities whose people understood one another, and later the whole body—accomplished nothing together before the Trojan War, because they were weak and had little intercourse with one another. Even that expedition they undertook jointly only when they had begun to make greater use of the sea.

CHAPTER 4

1 Minos is the earliest figure known to us by report to have acquired a navy. He gained control over most of what is now the Greek sea, ruled the Cycladic islands, and was the first to colonize most of them, expelling the Carians and

installing his own sons as governors. He also, as one would expect, cleared piracy from the sea as far as he could, so that his revenues might reach him more readily.

CHAPTER 5

1 For in early times the Greeks, and those barbarians who inhabited the mainland coasts or held islands, turned to piracy as they began to cross more often in ships to one another's shores. Their leaders were men of considerable power, seeking both their own profit and food for the weak. They fell upon unwalled towns, whose inhabitants lived in scattered villages, and plundered them, drawing most of their livelihood from this activity. The occupation as yet carried no shame; rather, it even brought some glory.

2 Evidence survives among certain mainland peoples even now, for whom skill in this is an honor, and in the older poets, who everywhere put the same question to those arriving by sea: whether they are pirates. Those questioned evidently disowned no such occupation, and those who wished to know were not reproaching them.

3 They also plundered one another on land. Even to this day much of Hellas lives in the old manner, among the Ozolian Locrians, the Aetolians, the Acarnanians, and the mainland in that region. Among these mainland peoples the custom of carrying weapons has persisted from the piracy of old.

CHAPTER 6

1 For all Hellas once carried weapons: its settlements were unprotected, and travel between them was unsafe. Living under arms became their habitual way of life, as it is among the barbarians.

2 Those parts of Hellas where life is still conducted in this fashion are evidence of the practices once shared by all.

3 The Athenians were among the first to lay aside their weapons and adopt a more relaxed and luxurious way of life. Indeed, it is not long since the older men among their wealthy citizens gave up the linen tunics and the knots of hair fastened with golden cicadas that they wore in their taste for refinement. Through kinship with them, the older Ionians too long retained this fashion.

4 The Lacedaemonians, by contrast, were the first to wear modest clothing of the present kind; and in other respects too, those who possessed more adopted, to an unusual degree, the same way of life as the multitude.

5 They were also the first to strip naked, taking off their clothes in public and rubbing themselves with oil when they exercised. Formerly, even in the Olympic games, athletes competed wearing loincloths over their genitals, and it is not many years since the practice ceased. Even now some barbarians, especially those in Asia, offer prizes for boxing and wrestling, and compete in loincloths.

6 Many other instances could be adduced to show that the Greeks of old lived in the same manner as the barbarians of today.

CHAPTER 7

1 The more recently founded cities, established when navigation had become safer and wealth more abundant, were built with walls on the very shores. They occupied the isthmuses both for commerce and to strengthen themselves against their respective neighbors. The older cities, however, both on the islands and on the mainland, were founded farther from the sea because piracy long persisted. For the pirates plundered one another, and also those other people who were not seafarers but lived near the coast. These cities remain inland to this day.

CHAPTER 8

1 The islanders were no less given to piracy: they were Carians and Phoenicians, for these peoples inhabited most of the islands. There is evidence for this. When the Athenians purified Delos during this war and removed all the tombs of the dead on the island, more than half proved to be those of Carians. They were identified by the weapons buried with them and by the manner of burial, which the Carians still practice today.

2 But once Minos had established his navy, passage between peoples became safer —for he expelled the wrongdoers from the islands at the very time when he was colonizing most of them.

3 The coastal populations now devoted themselves more to acquiring wealth and lived with greater security, and some even built walls around their towns as they grew richer than before. For the desire for gain led the weaker to endure subjection to the stronger, while the more powerful, possessing surplus wealth, brought the smaller cities under their authority.

4 It was when this condition was already further advanced that, at a later date, they made their expedition against Troy.

CHAPTER 9

1 Agamemnon, too, seems to me to have assembled the expedition because he surpassed his contemporaries in power, rather than because he led Helen's suitors under the constraint of the oaths they had sworn to Tyndareus.

2 Those Peloponnesians who have received the clearest traditions from their predecessors also say that Pelops first won power through the great wealth he brought from Asia to an impoverished people, and, though an immigrant, gave his name to their country. Still greater fortunes later fell to his descendants. Eurystheus was killed in Attica by the descendants of Heracles; Atreus was his mother's brother, and when Eurystheus went on campaign he had entrusted Mycenae and the government to him as a kinsman. Atreus happened at the

time to be in flight from his father because of the death of Chrysippus. When Eurystheus did not return, Atreus took over the kingship of Mycenae and all the territories Eurystheus had ruled. The Mycenaeans themselves desired this, both from fear of the descendants of Heracles and because Atreus seemed powerful and had cultivated the people. Thus the descendants of Pelops became greater than those of Perseus.

3 Agamemnon, I believe, inherited these resources and at the same time acquired greater naval strength than the others; he assembled and led the expedition more through fear than goodwill.

4 For he evidently arrived with the largest number of ships himself and also supplied ships to the Arcadians, as Homer has made clear, if his testimony is sufficient for anyone. In his account of the scepter's transmission he also says that Agamemnon / "ruled over many islands and all Argos." / Now, as a mainland ruler, he could not have controlled islands beyond those close by—which cannot have been many—unless he also possessed some naval force. From this expedition one must also infer the character of the times that preceded it.

CHAPTER 10

1 That Mycenae was a small place, or that any town of that age now seems insignificant, would not be sound evidence for disbelieving that the expedition was as large as the poets have said and tradition maintains.

2 For if the city of the Lacedaemonians were deserted and only its sanctuaries and the foundations of its buildings remained, I think that, after much time had passed, later generations would find its power hard to credit in comparison with its fame. Yet they occupy two-fifths of the Peloponnese and lead the whole of it, as well as many allies outside it. Nevertheless, because their city is not gathered into a single settlement and has no costly sanctuaries or buildings, but is settled in villages in the old manner of Hellas, it would appear inferior. If the same fate befell the Athenians, their power would be estimated from the city's visible appearance at twice what it is.

3 There is therefore no reason for disbelief, nor should one look to the appearance of cities rather than their power. We should judge that expedition the greatest of those before it, but inferior to those of our own day—if here too we should place any trust in Homer's poetry. Though, as a poet, he probably embellished and magnified it, even on his account it appears inferior.

4 For of the twelve hundred ships in his poem he gives the Boeotian ships a hundred and twenty men each and those of Philoctetes fifty, indicating, as I believe, the largest and the smallest; at any rate, he mentions the size of no others in his catalogue of ships. That all the men rowed as well as fought he makes clear in the case of Philoctetes' ships, for he represents all the oarsmen as archers. It is unlikely that many sailed as passengers apart from the kings and those of highest rank, especially since they were to cross the open sea with military equipment, and their ships were not fully decked but fitted out in the old style, more like pirate vessels.

5 Taking an average, then, between the largest and the smallest ships, one sees that not many men went, considering that they were sent jointly from all Hellas.

CHAPTER 11

1 The cause was not so much a shortage of men as a shortage of money. Lack of provisions made them bring a smaller army, only as large as they hoped could live off the country while fighting. Once they arrived, they won a battle—this is clear, for otherwise they could not have built the defenses of their camp. Yet even then they evidently did not employ their whole strength, but turned to farming the Chersonese and to piracy because provisions were scarce. Their dispersal enabled the Trojans all the more to hold out in the field throughout the ten years, since they were a match for whatever force remained at any time.

2 Had they come with abundant provisions and kept together, prosecuting the war continuously without piracy or farming, they would easily have taken Troy through victory in battle: even when dispersed, they held their own with what-

ever portion of their force was present. By settling down to a siege, moreover, they would have captured Troy in less time and with less trouble.

3 But lack of money kept the earlier undertakings weak; and even this one, the most celebrated of all that preceded it, proves in its actual achievements inferior to its fame and to the account of it that has now prevailed through the poets.

CHAPTER 12

1 Even after the Trojan War, Hellas was still undergoing migrations and resettlement, so that it had no peace in which to grow.

2 For the Greeks' long-delayed return from Ilium brought many changes, and civil strife was widespread in the cities; those expelled in these struggles founded new cities.

3 The present Boeotians, for example, were driven out of Arne by the Thessalians in the sixtieth year after the capture of Ilium, and settled the country now called Boeotia, but formerly the land of Cadmus. A portion of their people had already been in this country earlier, and some of these had joined the expedition to Ilium. In the eightieth year the Dorians, together with the descendants of Heracles, took possession of the Peloponnese.

4 Only after a long time did Hellas at last attain secure peace, free from further displacement, and send out colonies. The Athenians settled the Ionians and most of the islanders; the Peloponnesians settled most of Italy and Sicily, as well as certain places in the rest of Hellas. All these settlements were founded after the Trojan War.

CHAPTER 13

1 As Hellas grew more powerful and devoted itself still more than before to acquiring wealth, tyrannies were established in most cities as their revenues increased. Earlier there had been hereditary kingships with specified privileges.

Hellas also began to equip fleets, and the Greeks applied themselves more closely to the sea.

2 The Corinthians are said to have been the first to bring naval practice close to its present form, and Corinth was the first place in Hellas where triremes were built.

3 The Corinthian shipbuilder Ameinocles is also known to have built four ships for the Samians. It was about three hundred years before the end of this war that Ameinocles went to Samos.

4 The earliest sea battle known to us was fought between the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans; this too was about two hundred and sixty years before the same date.

5 For with their city situated on the Isthmus, the Corinthians had always possessed a trading center. In early times the Greeks, both within and outside the Peloponnese, traveled through Corinthian territory to reach one another, more often by land than by sea. The Corinthians were therefore wealthy and powerful, as even the early poets have shown: they gave the place the epithet "rich." When the Greeks took more to sailing, the Corinthians acquired their ships and suppressed piracy; by providing a trading center for both routes, they made their city powerful through its revenues.

6 Later the Ionians too acquired a substantial navy, under Cyrus, the first king of the Persians, and his son Cambyses. At war with Cyrus, they controlled their own sea for a time. Polycrates also, tyrant of Samos under Cambyses, used his naval strength to subject other islands and, after taking Rhenea, dedicated it to Delian Apollo. The Phocaeans, while founding Massalia, defeated the Carthaginians at sea.

CHAPTER 14

1 For these were the strongest navies. Yet even these, though they arose many generations after the Trojan War, evidently used few triremes: they were still equipped with fifty-oared ships and long vessels, like the fleets of that earlier age.

2 Shortly before the Persian Wars and the death of Darius, who became king of the Persians after Cambyses, the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyraeans acquired large numbers of triremes. For these were the last navies of any account to be established in Hellas before Xerxes' expedition.

3 The Aeginetans, the Athenians, and any others possessed few ships, mostly fifty-oared vessels. Only quite recently had Themistocles persuaded the Athenians, who were at war with the Aeginetans and also expecting the barbarian's invasion, to build the ships with which they fought their sea battles; and even these did not yet have continuous decks.

CHAPTER 15

1 Such, then, were the Greek navies, both the early fleets and those formed later. Those who applied themselves to them nevertheless acquired considerable power, through revenues and rule over others. For they sailed against the islands and subdued them, the peoples with insufficient territory of their own being especially active.

2 On land, however, no war arose that brought any substantial increase in power. All the wars that did occur were fought by each people against its own neighbors; the Greeks did not mount expeditions far from home to conquer others. They had not combined as subjects under the greatest cities, nor, on the other hand, did they make joint expeditions of their own as equals. Rather, each neighboring people fought separately against the others.

3 It was chiefly in the ancient war between the Chalcidians and the Eretrians that the rest of the Greek world divided into alliances with the two sides.

CHAPTER 16

1 Different obstacles to growth arose in different places. When the Ionians' affairs had advanced far, Cyrus and the Persian kingdom, after overthrowing Croesus and all the territory between the river Halys and the sea, made war upon them and enslaved their mainland cities. Later Darius, commanding the Phoenician navy, enslaved the islands as well.

CHAPTER 17

1 The tyrants in the Greek cities looked only to their own interests—the safety of their persons and the increase of their private households—and governed their cities with as much caution as possible. They accomplished no deed of consequence, apart from any action each took against its own neighbors; for it was the tyrants in Sicily who advanced furthest in power. Thus Hellas was held back on every side for a long time: it accomplished nothing conspicuous in common, and its separate cities were less venturesome.

CHAPTER 18

1 The tyrants of Athens and most of the last tyrants elsewhere in Hellas, which had already been under tyrannies for a long time, were overthrown by the Lacedaemonians, with the exception of those in Sicily. For although Lacedaemon, after its settlement by the Dorians who now inhabit it, experienced civil strife for the longest period known to us, it nevertheless secured good government at a very early date and was always free of tyranny. By the end of this war, the Lacedaemonians had lived under the same constitution for a little more than four hundred years; the strength this gave them enabled them to regulate affairs in the other cities as well. Not many years after the overthrow of the tyrants in Hellas, the battle of Marathon was fought between the Medes and the Athenians.

2 In the tenth year after it, the barbarian returned with his great armament to enslave Hellas. With this immense danger hanging over them, the Lacedaemonians, preeminent in power, took command of the Greeks who fought together, while the Athenians, as the Medes approached, resolved to abandon their city, removed their possessions, and embarked on their ships, becoming a naval people. Having jointly driven back the barbarian, not long afterward the Greeks who had revolted from the King and those who had fought against him divided between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians. For these two powers stood out as the greatest: the one was strong on land, the other at sea.

3 Their common military alliance lasted only a short time. Then the Lacedaemonians and Athenians quarreled and fought one another with their allies; and whenever any of the other Greeks fell into dispute, they now joined one side or the other. Thus from the Persian Wars down to this war, sometimes at peace under treaty, sometimes fighting one another or their own rebellious allies, they developed their military resources and became more experienced, practicing their skills amid real dangers.

CHAPTER 19

1 The Lacedaemonians led their allies without subjecting them to tribute, taking care only that they should be governed by oligarchies favorable to Lacedaemonian interests. The Athenians, by contrast, in time took over the cities' ships, except those of Chios and Lesbos, and fixed payments of money for all. By the time of this war, their own military resources were greater than ever they had been at the height of their strength with their alliance unimpaired.

CHAPTER 20

1 Such were my findings concerning early times, though it is difficult to trust every successive piece of evidence. For people accept accounts of the past from one another without testing them, even when the events belong to their own country.

2 Most Athenians, for example, believe that Hipparchus was tyrant when Harmodius and Aristogiton killed him. They do not know that Hippias, as the eldest of Pisistratus' sons, held power, while Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brothers. On that very day, at the last moment, Harmodius and Aristogiton suspected that one of their fellow conspirators had informed Hippias. Believing him forewarned, they left him alone; but wanting to strike a blow at whatever risk before they were arrested, they came upon Hipparchus arranging the Panathenaic procession near the place called the Leocorium and killed him.

3 The other Greeks too hold many mistaken beliefs, even about things that still exist and have not been obscured by time: that each of the Lacedaemonian kings casts two votes rather than one, for instance, and that they have a Pitanate company, which never existed at all. So little trouble do most people take in searching for the truth; they turn instead to what lies ready to hand.

CHAPTER 21

1 Nevertheless, anyone who concludes from the evidence given that events were substantially as I have related them would not be mistaken. He should put no greater trust in the poets, who have celebrated them with magnifying embellishments, or in the prose chroniclers, who have composed their accounts more to attract an audience than to tell the truth. Their subjects cannot be verified, and time has for the most part carried them beyond belief into the realm of fable. Rather, he should consider that my findings, drawn from the clearest indications, are adequate given the antiquity of the events.

2 And although people always judge the war they are fighting to be the greatest while it lasts, but marvel more at ancient wars once it is over, this war will nevertheless prove greater than those earlier wars to anyone who examines the events themselves.

CHAPTER 22

1 As for what the various speakers said, either before entering the war or when already engaged in it, it was difficult to remember the precise words, both for me in the speeches I heard myself and for those who reported to me from elsewhere. I have therefore presented the speeches as I thought each speaker would have expressed what the circumstances at each moment most demanded, while keeping as close as possible to the overall purport of what was actually said.

2 As for the actions of the war, I did not think it right to write from whatever report came my way, nor according to my own impressions. I investigated each event with the greatest precision possible, both those at which I was present myself and those I learned of from others.

3 The facts were established only with difficulty, because those present at each event did not give the same account of the same things, but spoke according to their sympathy for one side or the other, or according to their memory.

4 The absence of fable in these accounts may perhaps make them less pleasing to hear. But I shall be content if they are judged useful by those who wish to examine clearly what happened, and what, human nature being what it is, will happen again at some future time in the same or a similar form. The work has been composed as an enduring possession, rather than a performance-piece for the moment's hearing.

CHAPTER 23

1 Of earlier achievements, the greatest was the war against the Medes; yet even that was swiftly decided by two naval battles and two battles on land. This war, by contrast, extended over a great length of time, and in its course sufferings befell Hellas unlike any others within an equal span.

2 Never had so many cities been captured and laid waste, some by barbarians, others by the Greeks themselves as they fought one another; some even changed their inhabitants after capture. Never had so many people been driven into exile, or so much blood been shed, whether in the war itself or through civil strife.

3 And things previously reported by hearsay, but more rarely confirmed in fact, ceased to seem incredible: earthquakes, the same shocks extending at once over the widest tracts of land with the utmost violence; eclipses of the sun, occurring more frequently than those remembered from earlier times; severe droughts in some places, with famines following them; and the pestilential disease, which did no less harm and destroyed part of the population. For all these calamities fell upon Hellas together with this war.

4 The Athenians and Peloponnesians began it by breaking the thirty-year truce they had concluded after the capture of Euboea.

5 As to why they broke it, I have first set out the accusations and disputes, so that no one should ever have to ask how so great a war arose among the Greeks.

6 The truest cause, though least openly expressed, was, I believe, the growing power of Athens and the fear it inspired in the Lacedaemonians, which compelled them to go to war. But the accusations openly voiced on either side, which led them to break the truce and enter upon the war, were as follows.

CHAPTER 24

1 Epidamnus is a city on the right as one sails into the Ionian Gulf. Its neighbors are the Taulantians, barbarians of Illyrian stock.

2 The Corcyraeans colonized it, but its founder was Phalius son of Eratoclides, a Corinthian of the line of Heracles, summoned from the mother city in accordance with the ancient custom. Some Corinthians and others of Dorian stock also joined in the settlement.

3 As time passed, the power of the Epidamnians grew great and their population numerous.

4 But after many years of civil strife among themselves, they were, it is said, ruined by a war with the neighboring barbarians and stripped of much of their power.

5 Finally, just before this war, their people drove out the powerful men. These returned with the barbarians and plundered those in the city by land and sea.

6 Under this pressure, the Epidamnians in the city sent ambassadors to Corcyra, their mother city, begging the Corcyraeans not to stand by and watch their destruction, but to reconcile them with the exiles and put an end to the war with the barbarians.

7 They made these pleas seated as suppliants in the sanctuary of Hera. The Corcyraeans, however, rejected their supplication and sent them away without accomplishing anything.

CHAPTER 25

1 When the Epidamnians realized that no help would come from Corcyra, they were at a loss how to settle their present troubles. They sent to Delphi and asked the god whether they should hand their city over to the Corinthians as its founders and try to secure some assistance from them. His response was that they should hand it over and take the Corinthians as their leaders.

2 The Epidamnians accordingly went to Corinth and, in obedience to the oracle, handed over the colony. They demonstrated that their founder came from Corinth, made known the oracle's response, and begged the Corinthians not to stand by and watch their destruction, but to come to their defense.

3 The Corinthians undertook to help, both on grounds of right, since they considered the colony no less theirs than the Corcyraeans', and also out of hatred for the Corcyraeans, who, though their colonists, treated them with neglect.

4 For at common festivals they neither granted the customary honors nor allowed a Corinthian to inaugurate the sacrificial rites, as the other colonies did. Instead, they despised them: in wealth they then matched the richest of the Greeks, and in equipment for war they were stronger than the Corinthians. At times they even prided themselves on their great naval superiority, encouraged also by the fame in seamanship of the Phaeacians, Corcyra's earlier inhabitants. This made them equip their navy all the more zealously, and they were by no means weak: they possessed a hundred and twenty triremes when they began the war.

CHAPTER 26

1 With all these grievances against them, the Corinthians gladly sent assistance to Epidamnus, inviting anyone who wished to go as a settler, and sending a garrison drawn from the Ambraciots, the Leucadians, and themselves.

2 They traveled overland to Apollonia, a Corinthian colony, for fear that the Corcyraeans would obstruct their passage if they crossed by sea.

3 When the Corcyraeans learned that settlers and a garrison had reached Epidamnus and that the colony had been handed over to Corinth, they were furious. They sailed out at once with twenty-five ships, and later with a further fleet, and insolently ordered the Epidamnians to receive the exiles back and dis-

miss the garrison and settlers sent by Corinth. For the Epidamnian exiles had come to Corcyra, pointing to ancestral tombs and appealing to their kinship as grounds for their plea to be restored.

4 The Epidamnians obeyed none of these demands. The Corcyraeans therefore advanced against them with forty ships, accompanied by the exiles whom they meant to restore, and with Illyrians whom they had taken as allies.

5 Taking up positions before the city, they proclaimed that any Epidamnian who wished, as well as the foreigners, could leave unharmed; otherwise they would be treated as enemies. When the inhabitants refused to comply, the Corcyraeans laid siege to the city, which stands on an isthmus.

CHAPTER 27

1 When messengers came from Epidamnus to tell the Corinthians of the siege, they prepared an expedition. At the same time they proclaimed a settlement at Epidamnus, inviting anyone who wished to go on terms of full equality. Anyone unwilling to sail at once, but wishing to have a share in the colony, could remain behind on depositing fifty Corinthian drachmas. Many sailed, and many also paid the money.

2 They also asked the Megarians to escort them with ships, in case the Corcyraeans tried to prevent their passage. The Megarians prepared to accompany them with eight ships, and Pale in Cephallenia with four. They appealed to the Epidaurians too, who supplied five ships; Hermione supplied one, Troezen two, Leucas ten, and Ambracia eight. They asked the Thebans and Phliasians for money, and the Eleans for empty ships as well as money. The Corinthians themselves prepared thirty ships and three thousand hoplites.

CHAPTER 28

1 When the Corcyraeans learned of these preparations, they went to Corinth, bringing with them Lacedaemonian and Sicyonian ambassadors, and demanded that the Corinthians withdraw the garrison and settlers at Epidamnus, since they had no claim to that city.

2 If the Corinthians asserted a claim, the Corcyraeans were willing to submit to arbitration before such cities in the Peloponnese as both parties could agree upon; whichever side was judged to own the colony should retain it. They were also willing to refer the matter to the oracle at Delphi.

3 They urged the Corinthians not to make war. Otherwise, they said, Corinthian aggression would compel them too, for the sake of assistance, to make friends outside their present circle—a course they did not desire.

4 The Corinthians replied that they would consider the matter if the Corcyraeans withdrew their ships and the barbarians from Epidamnus; before that, it was not proper for the Epidamnians to be under siege while the Corinthians went to arbitration.

5 The Corcyraeans countered that they would do so if the Corinthians also withdrew their men from Epidamnus. They were also ready for both sides to remain where they were and conclude a truce until judgment was given.

CHAPTER 29

1 The Corinthians accepted none of these proposals. Once their ships were fully manned and their allies had arrived, they first sent a herald to declare war on the Corcyraeans, then put to sea with seventy-five ships and two thousand hoplites, sailing for Epidamnus to fight against the Corcyraeans.

2 The fleet was commanded by Aristeus son of Pellichus, Callicrates son of Callias, and Timanor son of Timanthes; the land force by Archetimus son of Eurytimus and Isarchidas son of Isarchus.

3 When they reached Actium in the territory of Anactorium, where the sanctuary of Apollo stands at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, the Corcyraeans sent a herald ahead in a small boat to forbid their advancing against them. Meanwhile they were manning their ships, bracing the old ones to make them seaworthy and repairing the rest.

4 When the herald returned with no peaceful answer from the Corinthians, and their own eighty ships were fully manned—for forty were besieging Epidamnus—they put out to meet the enemy, formed their line, and fought a naval battle.

5 The Corcyraeans won a decisive victory and destroyed fifteen Corinthian ships. On that same day, as it happened, their force besieging Epidamnus also secured its surrender on terms: the newcomers were to be sold into slavery, while the Corinthians were to be kept in chains until some further decision was reached.

CHAPTER 30

1 After the naval battle the Corcyraeans set up a trophy on Leucimme, a headland of Corcyra. They killed all the other prisoners they had taken, but kept the Corinthians in chains.

2 Later, when the Corinthians and their allies had returned home after their defeat at sea, the Corcyraeans held command of all the waters in that region. They sailed to Leucas, the Corinthian colony, and ravaged its land; they also burned Cyllene, the port of the Eleans, because the Eleans had supplied Corinth with ships and money.

3 For most of the time after the naval battle they controlled the sea, sailing against Corinth's allies and laying their lands waste. This continued until the Corinthians, as summer advanced, sent ships and an army to relieve their hard-pressed allies and encamped at Actium and around Chimerium in Thesprotis, to protect Leucas and the other cities friendly to them.

4 The Corcyraeans in turn encamped opposite them at Leucimme, with ships and land forces. Neither side sailed against the other. They remained facing one another throughout that summer, and only when winter had arrived did each return home.

CHAPTER 31

1 Throughout the year after the naval battle and the following year, the Corinthians, pursuing their war against Corcyra in anger, built ships and exerted themselves to equip the strongest possible fleet, recruiting rowers for pay both from the Peloponnese itself and from the rest of Hellas.

2 The Corcyraeans learned of these preparations and became afraid. Since they were bound by treaty to none of the Greeks, and had enrolled themselves neither in the Athenian alliance nor in the Lacedaemonian, they resolved to approach the Athenians, become their allies, and try to obtain some assistance from them.

3 On learning this, the Corinthians also went to Athens on an embassy, lest the Athenian navy should join the Corcyraean and prevent them from bringing the war to the conclusion they desired.

4 An assembly was convened, and the two sides came forward to argue their cases. The Corcyraeans spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 32

1 "Athenians, those who come to their neighbors to request assistance, as we now do, without a great service to their credit or an existing alliance, ought first to show that what they ask is to the others' advantage—or, failing that, at least does them no harm—and then that their gratitude will be lasting. If they establish none of this clearly, they should not resent a refusal.

2 "The Corcyraeans have sent us to ask for an alliance, confident that we can give you firm assurances on these points as well.

3 "Yet the very policy we have followed has made our present appeal to you inconsistent, and has also proved disadvantageous to our own interests in this crisis.

4 "For though we have never before voluntarily become anyone's allies, we now come to ask this of others; and in our present war with Corinth that same policy has left us isolated. What once seemed our prudence—refusing, through an alliance with others, to share dangers at a neighbor's discretion—has now turned out to be folly and weakness.

5 "In the naval battle already fought, we repelled the Corinthians alone and unaided. But now they have set out against us with a greater force drawn from the Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas. We see that our own strength alone cannot prevail, and the danger is great if we fall under their power. We must therefore ask assistance from you and everyone else; and we deserve indulgence for now venturing upon a course opposed to our former abstention from affairs: our earlier judgment was mistaken, not base.

CHAPTER 33

1 "If you grant our request, the occasion of our need will bring you many honorable advantages. First, you will be assisting men who suffer injustice, not men who injure others. Then, by receiving us when our greatest interests are in danger, you will lay up gratitude with the most enduring possible witness to your kindness. Moreover, we possess the largest navy apart from your own.

2 "Consider: what good fortune could be rarer, or more painful to your enemies, than for a power whose accession you would have prized above great sums of money and great obligations to come of its own accord and offer itself without danger or expense? It brings you, besides, a reputation for virtue before the world, gratitude from those you defend, and strength for yourselves. In all his-

tory few have gained all these things at once; and few who ask for an alliance come offering those they approach as much security and distinction as they themselves will receive.

3 "If any of you thinks that the war in which we could be useful will not come, his judgment is mistaken. He does not perceive that the Lacedaemonians, afraid of you, are eager for war, or that the Corinthians, influential with them and hostile to you, are now seizing the opportunity to subdue us before attacking you. They mean to prevent us from standing together against them in our common enmity, and to forestall us in at least one of two aims: weakening us or strengthening themselves.

4 "Our task, in turn, is to act before them—we by offering the alliance, you by accepting it—and to lay our plans against them first, rather than answer plans already laid against us.

CHAPTER 34

1 "If they say that you have no right to receive their colonists, let them learn that every colony honors its mother city when well treated, but becomes estranged when wronged. Colonists are sent out not to be slaves, but to be equals of those who remain behind.

2 "That they were in the wrong is clear: when invited to arbitrate over Epidamnus, they chose to pursue their grievances by war rather than on equal terms of justice.

3 "Let their treatment of us, their kinsmen, be a warning to you too, so that you are neither misled by their deceit nor ready to serve them when they ask outright. A man will remain most secure if he gives his adversaries the fewest favors that he later has cause to regret.

CHAPTER 35

1 "Nor will you break your treaty with the Lacedaemonians by receiving us, since we are allies of neither side.

2 "For it is stated in the treaty that any Greek city allied with neither may join whichever side it pleases.

3 "It would be monstrous if these men were allowed to man their ships from the treaty states, and also from the rest of Hellas—not least from your own subjects—yet barred us from the alliance now offered and from assistance anywhere else, and then charged you with wrongdoing if you granted our request.

4 "We shall have much greater grounds for complaint if we fail to persuade you. For you will be rejecting us, though we are in danger and are not your enemies, while these men, who are your enemies and are attacking us, you will not merely fail to restrain: you will even stand by while they draw additional strength from your empire. That is not just. You should either bar them too from recruiting mercenaries in your dominions, or send us whatever assistance you can be persuaded to give; best of all, you should receive us openly and come to our aid.

5 "As we said at the outset, we can demonstrate many advantages, the greatest being that we have the same enemies—the surest pledge of loyalty—and that these enemies are not weak, but capable of harming those who change sides. Moreover, since the alliance offered is naval, not continental, its rejection has quite a different weight. Your best course, if you can, is to let no one else possess ships; failing that, to have the strongest naval power as your friend.

CHAPTER 36

1 "If anyone finds these arguments advantageous but fears that accepting them will break the treaty, let him understand that his apprehension, with strength behind it, will frighten his adversaries more, while his confidence, if he rejects us, will have only weakness behind it and leave his powerful enemies less afraid.

Let him understand too that his decision now concerns Athens no less than Corcyra, and that he is not taking the best thought for Athens if, with war approaching and all but upon him, he looks only to the immediate moment and hesitates to acquire a place whose friendship or hostility is of the greatest strategic consequence.

2 "For it lies well on the coastal route to Italy and Sicily, enabling you to prevent a navy from coming from there to reinforce the Peloponnesians, and to escort your own fleet from here to those regions; it is also highly advantageous in other respects.

3 "To sum up as briefly as possible, this one consideration should teach you, collectively and individually, not to abandon us. There are three navies of any account among the Greeks: yours, ours, and the Corinthians'. If you allow two of them to combine, and the Corinthians secure us first, you will fight at sea against Corcyraeans and Peloponnesians together. But if you receive us, you will have our ships added to yours when you contend against them."

4 Such was the speech of the Corcyraeans. After them the Corinthians spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 37

1 "Since these Corcyraeans have spoken not only about your receiving them, but also claimed that we are unjust and that they are being attacked without good cause, we too must first touch on both these matters before proceeding with the rest of our argument. Thus you will have a firmer understanding of our claim, and will not dismiss their request without due consideration.

2 "They say they have never yet accepted an alliance with anyone out of prudence. But they adopted this practice to serve wrongdoing, not virtue: they wanted no ally to witness their injustices, and no shame to face when they called him in.

3 "At the same time their city's self-sufficient position allows them to judge for themselves the injuries they inflict, rather than submit to agreed procedures. They themselves very seldom sail to their neighbors, while others are constantly compelled to put in at Corcyra.

4 "They have put forward this plausible refusal of treaties not to avoid sharing in the wrongdoing of others, but to do wrong alone: to use force where they are stronger, to gain an advantage where they escape notice, and, if they incur any reproach, to brazen it out.

5 "Yet if they were honorable men, as they claim, the harder it was for their neighbors to reach them, the more clearly they could have displayed their virtue by giving and accepting justice.

CHAPTER 38

1 "But this is not how they behave, either toward others or toward us. Though our colonists, they have always stood apart from us, and now they make war, saying that they were not sent out to be mistreated.

2 "We too deny that we founded their settlement in order to suffer their insults: we meant to be their leaders and to receive the respect that is our due.

3 "Our other colonies, at any rate, honor us, and no people are more devoted to us than our colonists.

4 "It is plain that, if we satisfy the greater number, these men alone have no just cause for dissatisfaction. Nor would we take the extraordinary step of making war on them if we had not also suffered extraordinary wrong.

5 "Even if we were at fault, it would have been honorable for them to yield to our anger, and shameful for us to override their moderation by force.

6 "But in their arrogance and the license wealth gives them, they have committed many other offenses against us. And Epidamnus, which is ours, they disowned when it was in distress; yet when we came to its assistance, they seized it by

force and hold it still.

CHAPTER 39

1 "They say, indeed, that they were willing first to submit to arbitration. But such an offer should carry weight not when made from a position of advantage and safety, but when the man making it places deeds and words alike on equal terms before resorting to a contest of arms.

2 "These men offered the fair appearance of arbitration not before besieging the place, but only when they believed we would not stand by. And now they have come here, not merely having done wrong there themselves, but asking you to be not their allies but their accomplices in injustice, and to receive them while they are at odds with us.

3 "They should have approached you when they were most secure, not now, when we have been wronged and they are in danger; not now, when you, who had no share in their strength then, would give them a share of your assistance, and, though innocent of their offenses, bear an equal share of our blame. They should long ago have shared their power with you if they were to share its consequences as well.

CHAPTER 40

1 "We have shown, then, that we come with justified grievances, and that these men are violent and grasping. You must now learn why you could not justly receive them.

2 "For although the treaty states that any city not enrolled in either alliance may join whichever side it wishes, this provision does not cover those who join to injure others. It covers the city that seeks security without depriving another of its allegiance, and that will not bring war instead of peace upon those who receive it, if they are prudent. That is what you would now suffer if you did not listen to us.

3 "For you would become not merely their helpers, but our enemies instead of our treaty partners. If you go with them, we must defend ourselves against them and you together.

4 "Yet justice requires you above all to stand aside from both parties; failing that, you should on the contrary join us against them. You are bound by treaty to Corinth, whereas with Corcyra you have never even entered into a suspension of hostilities. Nor should you establish the precedent of receiving those who revolt from others.

5 "When the Samians revolted, we did not cast our vote against you, though the other Peloponnesians were divided in their voting over whether to help them. Instead, we openly argued that each power should discipline its own allies.

6 "For if you receive and assist those who do wrong, no fewer of your own allies will plainly come over to us, and you will establish a precedent that bears more heavily upon yourselves than upon us.

CHAPTER 41

1 "These, then, are our claims upon you, sufficient under the customs of the Greeks. We also offer this counsel and ask repayment of a favor, which we say is due to us now: we are neither enemies seeking to harm you nor friends entitled to impose upon you.

2 "For once, when you lacked warships for your war against the Aeginetans before the Persian Wars, you received twenty ships from Corinth. This service, and our service concerning the Samians—when we prevented the Peloponnesians from helping them—enabled you to overcome the Aeginetans and punish the Samians. Both services came at moments when men advancing against their enemies care for nothing beside victory.

3 "For they regard the man who serves them as a friend, even if he was formerly an enemy, and the man who opposes them as an enemy, even if he happens to be a friend. They even put their own interests second to winning the immedi-

ate contest.

CHAPTER 42

1 "Remember these things—and let the younger men learn them from their elders—and resolve to repay us in kind. Do not suppose that what we say is just, but that, if you go to war, your advantage lies elsewhere.

2 "For advantage attends above all the course in which one makes the fewest mistakes. The future war with which the Corcyraeans frighten you, urging you to act unjustly, still lies out of sight; it is not worth being carried away by it into acquiring open enmity with the Corinthians now, not at some future time. Prudence lies rather in dispelling the suspicion that already exists over Megara (for the most recent favor, if timely,

3 "even if smaller, can cancel a greater grievance),

4 "and not in being drawn along by the great naval alliance they offer. To do no wrong to one's equals is a more secure source of strength than to be carried away by the immediate, visible prospect of gain and pursue an advantage through dangers.

CHAPTER 43

1 "We now find ourselves in the very circumstances for which we ourselves laid down the principle at Lacedaemon: that each power should discipline its own allies. We ask to receive the same treatment from you, and that you, who benefited by our vote, should not injure us by yours.

2 "Repay us on equal terms, recognizing that this is precisely the occasion on which a man who renders service shows himself most truly a friend, and one who opposes us an enemy.

3 "Do not receive these Corcyraeans as allies against our will, or defend them in their wrongdoing.

4 "By acting thus you will both do what is right and take the course best for yourselves."

CHAPTER 44

1 Such was the Corinthians' speech in their turn. The Athenians heard both sides, and the assembly met twice. At the first meeting they were no less receptive to the Corinthian arguments; at the second they changed their minds. They decided not to make an alliance with the Corcyraeans binding them to regard the same powers as enemies and friends—for if the Corcyraeans called on them to sail against Corinth, their treaty with the Peloponnesians would be broken. Instead they made a defensive alliance, pledging to help one another if anyone attacked Corcyra or Athens or their allies.

2 For they believed that war with the Peloponnesians would come in any case, and they did not wish to abandon Corcyra, with so great a navy, to the Corinthians. Rather, they wanted the two powers to clash as violently as possible, so that, should the need arise, the Corinthians and the other naval powers would be weaker when the Athenians went to war with them.

3 At the same time, the island seemed to them well placed on the coastal route to Italy and Sicily.

CHAPTER 45

1 With this purpose the Athenians accepted the Corcyraeans, and not long after the Corinthians had departed they sent ten ships to their aid.

2 Their generals were Lacedaemonius son of Cimon, Diotimus son of Strombichus, and Proteas son of Epicles.

3 They instructed them not to fight the Corinthians at sea unless they sailed against Corcyra and were about to land there or in some other part of its territory; in that event they were to prevent them with all their strength. These

instructions were given to avoid breaking the treaty.

CHAPTER 46

1 The ships duly arrived at Corcyra. The Corinthians, when their preparations were complete, sailed against Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships: ten from Elis, twelve from Megara, ten from Leucas, twenty-seven from Ambracia, one from Anactorium, and ninety of their own.

2 Each city's contingent had its own generals; the Corinthians were commanded by Xenoclides son of Euthycles and four colleagues.

3 Sailing from Leucas, they approached the mainland opposite Corcyra and anchored at Chimerium in Thesprotia.

4 There is a harbor there, and above it, inland from the sea, lies the city of Ephyra, in the Elaeatis district of Thesprotia. Beside it the Acherusian Lake discharges into the sea; the river Acheron flows through Thesprotia into this lake, which takes its name from the river. The river Thyamis also flows here, forming the boundary between Thesprotia and Cestrine. Between these rivers the promontory of Chimerium projects into the sea.

5 Here, then, on the mainland the Corinthians anchored and made their camp.

CHAPTER 47

1 When the Corcyraeans learned of their approach, they manned a hundred and ten ships, under Miciades, Aesimides, and Eurybatus, and encamped on one of the islands called Sybota. The ten Athenian ships were also present.

2 Their land force was stationed at Cape Leucimme, together with a thousand hoplites who had come to their aid from Zacynthus.

3 Many barbarians had also come to support the Corinthians on the mainland, for the mainland peoples of this region have always been friendly to them.

CHAPTER 48

1 When the Corinthians were ready, they took provisions for three days and put out from Chimerium by night to give battle at sea.

2 As dawn broke on their voyage, they sighted the Corcyraean ships out at sea and sailing toward them.

3 When the two sides saw one another, they formed opposing lines. On the Corcyraean right were the Athenian ships; the Corcyraeans themselves held the rest of the line, their ships divided into three squadrons, each commanded by one of the three generals.

4 Such was the Corcyraean formation. On the Corinthian side, the Megarian and Ambraciot ships held the right wing, and the other allies the center, each in their own contingent. The Corinthians themselves held the left wing with their best-sailing ships, facing the Athenians and the Corcyraean right.

CHAPTER 49

1 When the signals had been raised on both sides, they closed and began the battle. Both carried many hoplites on their decks, as well as many archers and javelin throwers; they were still prepared for battle in the old-fashioned, less skillful manner.

2 The sea battle was fierce, though not distinguished for skill; for the most part it resembled a battle on land.

3 Once they collided, they could not easily draw apart, both because the ships were so numerous and crowded together, and because they relied chiefly for victory on the hoplites on deck, who stood and fought while the ships lay motionless. There were no maneuvers to break through the enemy line; they fought at sea more by courage and strength than by knowledge.

4 Everywhere there was great tumult, and the sea battle was a confusion. In its course the Athenian ships would come up to support the Corcyraeans wherever they were hard pressed, striking fear into their opponents but not beginning an engagement: their generals were afraid to disregard the Athenians' instructions.

5 The Corinthian right wing suffered most. The Corcyraeans routed it with twenty ships, pursued its scattered vessels to the mainland, and sailed as far as the enemy camp. Landing there, they burned the deserted tents and plundered the property.

6 Here, then, the Corinthians and their allies were defeated and the Corcyraeans had the upper hand. But on the left, where the Corinthians themselves were stationed, they were winning decisively: the Corcyraeans, whose fleet was smaller to begin with, were missing the twenty ships engaged in the pursuit.

7 Seeing the Corcyraeans hard pressed, the Athenians now came more openly to their aid, though at first they held back from ramming any ship. But when the rout became unmistakable and the Corinthians pressed on, everyone was soon caught up in the action, and distinctions were no longer observed. Necessity had brought matters to the point where Corinthians and Athenians attacked one another.

CHAPTER 50

1 After the rout, the Corinthians did not fasten lines to the hulls of the ships they had sunk and take them in tow. Instead they turned on the men, sailing through the wreckage to kill rather than capture them alive. They also killed their own friends without recognizing them, unaware that their right wing had been defeated.

2 With so many ships on either side, spread over so great an expanse of sea, once they had become entangled it was not easy to distinguish who was winning and who was losing. For in number of ships this was the greatest sea battle yet

fought by Greeks against Greeks.

3 When the Corinthians had pursued the Corcyraeans to land, they turned to their own wrecks and dead. They secured most of them and brought them to Sybota, where the barbarian land force had come to their support. Sybota is an uninhabited harbor in Thesprotia. Having done this, they gathered their ships again and sailed against the Corcyraeans.

4 The Corcyraeans, with such ships as were still seaworthy and remained to them, together with the Athenian ships, sailed out in their turn to meet them, afraid that they would attempt to land in their territory.

5 It was already late, and the paean had been sung for the attack, when the Corinthians suddenly began backing water. They had sighted twenty Athenian ships approaching, sent out as reinforcements after the first ten. The Athenians had feared that the Corcyraeans might be defeated—as indeed they were—and that their own ten ships would be too few to defend them.

CHAPTER 51

1 The Corinthians, then, saw these ships first and began to withdraw, suspecting that more ships were coming from Athens than they could see.

2 The Corcyraeans had not seen them, for the direction of their approach kept them more out of sight. They wondered why the Corinthians were backing water, until some men caught sight of the ships and said that ships were sailing up over there. Then they too withdrew: it was already growing dark, and the Corinthians had turned away and broken off the engagement.

3 Thus the two sides parted, and the sea battle ended as night fell.

4 These twenty ships from Athens, commanded by Glaucon son of Leagrus and Andocides son of Leogoras, made their way through the dead and the wrecks to the Corcyraeans' camp at Leucimme, reaching it not long after they had first been sighted.

5 Since it was night, the Corcyraeans feared that they were enemy ships; then they recognized them, and the ships came to anchor.

CHAPTER 52

1 On the following day the thirty Athenian ships and all the Corcyraean ships that were seaworthy put out and sailed toward the harbor at Sybota where the Corinthians lay, wishing to discover whether they would give battle.

2 The Corinthians took their ships out from shore and formed a line in open water, but remained still. They had no intention of beginning a sea battle of their own accord, seeing that fresh ships had arrived from Athens and that they themselves faced many difficulties: guarding the prisoners they had aboard, and having no means of repairing their ships in an uninhabited place.

3 Rather, they were considering how to make their voyage home, afraid that the Athenians, since they had come to blows, might regard the treaty as broken and refuse to let them sail away.

CHAPTER 53

1 They therefore decided to put men aboard a small boat and send them to the Athenians without a herald's staff, to test their intentions. They sent them with this message:

2 "You are doing wrong, Athenians, in beginning war and breaking the treaty. As we seek to punish our own enemies, you stand in our way, raising arms against us. If you mean to prevent us from sailing against Corcyra or anywhere else we wish, and are breaking the treaty, take us here first and treat us as enemies."

3 Such was their message. All those in the Corcyraean force who heard it immediately shouted that they should be seized and put to death. But the Athenians answered as follows:

4 "We are neither beginning war, Peloponnesians, nor breaking the treaty. We have come to aid these Corcyraeans, who are our allies. If you wish to sail anywhere else, we do not prevent you; but if you sail against Corcyra or any part of its territory, we shall not stand aside, so far as it is in our power to act."

CHAPTER 54

1 After this answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians prepared for their voyage home and set up a trophy at Sybota on the mainland. The Corcyraeans recovered the wrecks and dead that had been carried toward their side by the current and by a wind which had risen during the night and scattered them in every direction. They too set up a trophy, on the island of Sybota, claiming victory.

2 Each side claimed victory on the following grounds. The Corinthians had prevailed in the sea battle until nightfall, so that they had brought in most of the wrecks and dead; they held no fewer than a thousand prisoners and had sunk about seventy ships. On these grounds they raised a trophy. The Corcyraeans had destroyed some thirty ships and, after the Athenians arrived, had recovered the wrecks and dead that lay on their side. Moreover, on the previous day the Corinthians had backed water and withdrawn before them at the sight of the Athenian ships, and after the Athenians' arrival they had not sailed out from Sybota to meet them. For these reasons the Corcyraeans raised their trophy.

CHAPTER 55

1 Thus each side claimed the victory. As they sailed home, the Corinthians seized by deceit Anactorium, at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, a place held jointly by themselves and the Corcyraeans. After settling Corinthian inhabitants there, they returned home. Of their Corcyraean prisoners they sold eight hundred who were slaves, but kept two hundred and fifty under guard in

chains, treating them with great consideration, so that on their return they might win Corcyra over to Corinth. Most of these men were in fact among the foremost in the city in influence.

2 In this way Corcyra came through its war with the Corinthians, and the Athenian ships departed from the island. This became the Corinthians' first grievance against the Athenians leading to the war: that, while the treaty was in force, they had fought against them at sea alongside the Corcyraeans.

CHAPTER 56

1 Immediately afterward, the following further dispute arose between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, drawing them toward war.

2 While the Corinthians were seeking means of revenge, the Athenians, suspecting their hostility, issued orders to the Potidaeans, who live on the isthmus of Pallene. Though colonists of Corinth, they were allies of Athens and subject to tribute. They were to demolish their wall facing Pallene, give hostages, and dismiss the magistrates whom the Corinthians sent each year, receiving no more in future. The Athenians feared that, persuaded by Perdiccas and the Corinthians, they might revolt and draw the other allies in the Thracian region into revolt with them.

CHAPTER 57

1 The Athenians began taking these precautions concerning the Potidaeans immediately after the sea battle at Corcyra.

2 For the Corinthians were now openly hostile, and Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, had become their enemy, though formerly an ally and friend.

3 He had become their enemy because the Athenians had made an alliance with his brother Philip and with Derdas, who were acting together against him.

4 Alarmed, he sent to Lacedaemon and worked to bring about war between Athens and the Peloponnesians; he also sought the Corinthians' support for the revolt of Potidaea.

5 He approached the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans in the Thracian region as well, urging them to join the revolt. He believed that, with these neighboring territories as allies, he could more easily wage war in their company.

6 The Athenians learned of this and wished to forestall the cities' revolt. They happened to be sending thirty ships and a thousand hoplites against his territory, under Archestratus son of Lycomedes and ten other generals. They therefore instructed the commanders of the ships to take hostages from the Potidaeans and demolish their wall, and to keep watch over the neighboring cities to prevent their revolt.

CHAPTER 58

1 The Potidaeans had sent envoys to Athens to see whether they could persuade the Athenians to make no change in their treatment of them. They had also gone to Lacedaemon with the Corinthians and [sought] to arrange assistance if needed. Their prolonged negotiations at Athens, however, brought them no satisfactory result: the ships were sailing against them no less than against Macedonia. And the Lacedaemonian authorities had promised that, if the Athenians attacked Potidaea, they would invade Attica. At this juncture, then, the Potidaeans revolted, binding themselves by a common oath with the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans.

2 Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon and demolish their coastal cities and move inland to Olynthus, making this single city strong. To those who abandoned their homes he granted the use of land of his own in Mygdonia around Lake Bolbe, for as long as the war with the Athenians should last. So they demolished their cities, moved inland, and prepared for war.

CHAPTER 59

1 The thirty Athenian ships arrived in the Thracian region and found that Potidaea and the other places had already revolted.

2 Believing it impossible with their present force to fight both Perdiccas and the places that had joined the revolt, the generals turned toward Macedonia, their original destination. They established themselves there and fought alongside Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded from the interior with an army.

CHAPTER 60

1 Meanwhile the Corinthians, with Potidaea in revolt and the Athenian ships off Macedonia, feared for the place and regarded its peril as their own. They sent volunteers from among their own people and men from the rest of the Peloponnese whom they induced to serve for pay: sixteen hundred hoplites in all, and four hundred light-armed troops.

2 Their general was Aristeus son of Adeimantus. Personal friendship with him was a principal reason why most of the soldiers from Corinth volunteered to accompany him, for he had always been well disposed toward the Potidaeans.

3 They arrived in the Thracian region on the fortieth day after Potidaea's revolt.

CHAPTER 61

1 News that the cities had revolted reached the Athenians at once. When they learned that Aristeus and his men were also on their way, they sent two thousand of their own hoplites and forty ships against the rebellious places, with Callias son of Calliades and four other generals.

2 On arriving in Macedonia, they first found that the earlier force of a thousand had just taken Therme and was besieging Pydna.

3 They too took up positions before Pydna and joined the siege. But then, making a settlement and, under pressure of necessity, an alliance with Perdiccas, they withdrew from Macedonia: affairs at Potidaea and the arrival of Aristeus demanded their urgent attention.

4 They went to Beroea and from there to Strepsa, where they first attempted to take the place but failed. They then marched overland toward Potidaea with three thousand hoplites of their own, besides many allies, and six hundred Macedonian cavalry under Philip and Pausanias. At the same time seventy ships sailed along the coast.

5 Advancing by short stages, they reached Gigonus on the third day and encamped.

CHAPTER 62

1 The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus, awaiting the Athenians, were encamped on the isthmus on the side toward Olynthus, and had established a market outside the city.

2 The allies had chosen Aristeus as general of the entire infantry force, and Perdiccas to command the cavalry. For he had immediately deserted the Athenians again and was fighting alongside the Potidaeans, having appointed Iolaus to govern in his place.

3 Aristeus' plan was to hold his own force on the isthmus and watch for an Athenian advance, while the Chalcidians, the allies from beyond the isthmus, and the two hundred cavalry furnished by Perdiccas remained at Olynthus. When the Athenians advanced against him, these forces were to come to his support from the rear and catch the enemy between them.

4 Callias, the Athenian general, and his fellow commanders, for their part, sent the Macedonian cavalry and a few of the allies toward Olynthus to prevent the forces there from coming to the enemy's aid. They themselves broke camp and advanced toward Potidaea.

5 When they reached the isthmus and saw the enemy preparing for battle, they too drew up in opposing order, and soon afterward the two sides engaged.

6 The wing of Aristeus himself, with the picked Corinthians and other troops around him, routed the force opposite and pressed far ahead in pursuit. But the rest of the Potidaean and Peloponnesian army was defeated by the Athenians and fled inside the walls.

CHAPTER 63

1 Returning from the pursuit, Aristeus saw that the rest of the army had been defeated and hesitated over which way to risk going, toward Olynthus or into Potidaea. He decided to gather his men into the most compact body possible and force his way at a run into Potidaea. He made his way through the water beside the harbor mole, under attack and with difficulty, losing a few men but saving most.

2 The forces at Olynthus that were to support the Potidaeans—the place is about sixty stades away and within sight—advanced a short distance to their aid when the battle began and the signals were raised. The Macedonian cavalry drew up opposite to stop them. But the Athenians soon won the victory and the signals were lowered; the men from Olynthus withdrew inside their walls, and the Macedonians returned to the Athenians. Neither side's cavalry took part in the battle.

3 After the battle the Athenians raised a trophy and returned the dead to the Potidaeans under truce. The Potidaeans and their allies lost a little fewer than three hundred men; the Athenians themselves lost a hundred and fifty, and their general Callias fell.

CHAPTER 64

1 The Athenians immediately enclosed the [wall] on the isthmus side with a siege wall and kept guard there, but the Pallene side remained without a siege wall. They did not think their numbers sufficient both to guard the isthmus and to cross over to Pallene and build fortifications, fearing that the Potidaeans and their allies might attack them once their force was divided.

2 When the Athenians at home learned that the Pallene side had not been enclosed, they later sent sixteen hundred hoplites of their own under the general Phormio son of Asopius. He arrived in Pallene and, using Aphytis as his base, led his army toward Potidaea by short stages, ravaging the land as he went. When no one came out to offer battle, he enclosed the [wall] on the Pallene side with a siege wall.

3 Potidaea was now under close siege from both sides, and from the sea as well, where ships maintained a blockade.

CHAPTER 65

1 When the city had been walled off, Aristeus saw no hope of deliverance unless something came from the Peloponnese or some other unexpected turn occurred. He advised all but five hundred to wait for a favorable wind and sail away, so that the grain would last longer; he himself was willing to be among those who remained. But he could not persuade them, and, wishing to make the arrangements that the situation required and put affairs outside the city on the best possible footing, he sailed out undetected by the Athenian guard.

2 Remaining among the Chalcidians, he fought alongside them in other actions and ambushed the Sermylians near their city, killing many. He also pursued negotiations in the Peloponnese to obtain some assistance.

3 After Potidaea had been walled off, Phormio, with his sixteen hundred men, ravaged Chalcidice and Bottice and captured some of their smaller towns.

CHAPTER 66

1 These, then, were the grievances that had arisen between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. The Corinthians complained that the Athenians were besieging Potidaea, their own colony, with Corinthians and Peloponnesians inside it. The Athenians complained that the Peloponnesians had brought about the revolt of a city allied to Athens and subject to tribute, and had come and openly fought against them alongside the Potidaeans. Yet war had not actually broken out; the truce still held, for the Corinthians had acted on their own.

CHAPTER 67

1 With Potidaea under siege, the Corinthians did not remain inactive: their own men were inside, and they feared for the place as well. They immediately summoned the allies to Lacedaemon and, on arriving, loudly denounced the Athenians for having broken the treaty and wronged the Peloponnese.

2 The Aeginetans, though they sent no embassy openly for fear of the Athenians, secretly joined them in pressing for war as vigorously as any, saying that they were not autonomous as the treaty required.

3 The Lacedaemonians extended the invitation to their allies and to anyone else who claimed to have suffered any wrong at Athenian hands. They convened their own customary assembly and invited them to speak.

4 Various speakers came forward to make their respective complaints, among them the Megarians. They set out numerous other grounds of dispute, but above all protested that they were excluded from the harbors of the Athenian empire and from the market of Attica, contrary to the treaty.

5 The Corinthians came forward last, having let the others first inflame the Lacedaemonians, and spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 68

1 "The trust that governs your own political life and dealings with one another, Lacedaemonians, makes you less ready to trust what we say about others. From it you gain self-restraint, but you approach affairs abroad with a greater measure of ignorance.

2 "For though we often warned you of the injuries the Athenians were about to inflict on us, you never sought to learn about the matters we explained on each occasion; instead you suspected the speakers of speaking for the sake of their own private differences. That is why you have summoned these allies not before we suffered, but only now that we are in the midst of the trouble. Among them we have as much right as any to speak, since we also have the gravest complaints: the Athenians outrage us, and you neglect us.

3 "If they were wronging Greece somewhere out of sight, you would need instruction, as men who did not know. But as things stand, why speak at length? You see some Greeks already enslaved, and the Athenians plotting against others—not least our own allies—and long since prepared for the possibility of war.

4 "Otherwise they would not have taken Corcyra under their protection and held it against our will, or be besieging Potidaea: the latter is a position of the greatest strategic value for operations along the Thracian coast, while the former would have furnished the Peloponnesians with a very great navy.

CHAPTER 69

1 "And you are responsible for this. First you allowed them to fortify their city after the Persian Wars, and later to erect the Long Walls; and down to this day you have continually deprived of freedom not only those whom they have enslaved but now your own allies as well. For the truer agent of enslavement is not the man who imposes it, but the man who could stop it and looks on—especially if he also claims the honor of being the liberator of Greece.

2 “Only with difficulty have we assembled even now, and even now with no clear purpose. For we ought no longer to be considering whether we are wronged, but how we shall defend ourselves. Those who act have made their plans and are already advancing, not merely intending to advance, against men who have yet to decide.

3 “We know the course the Athenians follow, and that they advance upon their neighbors little by little. So long as they think your insensibility keeps you from noticing, they act with less confidence; once they know that you see and look on, they will press hard upon us.

4 “For you alone among the Greeks, Lacedaemonians, remain inactive, defending yourselves against an enemy not by force but by delay, and you alone destroy the growth of your enemies’ power not at its beginning but when it has doubled.

5 “Yet you were said to be men on whom one could rely: your reputation, it seems, surpassed your deeds. We ourselves know that the Persian reached the Peloponnese from the ends of the earth before any adequate force from you went out to meet him. And now you look on at the Athenians, who are not far away, as he was, but close at hand. Rather than attack them yourselves, you prefer to resist when they attack, and to enter a contest of chance against opponents far stronger than you. Yet you know that the barbarian came to grief chiefly through his own mistakes, and that against the Athenians themselves we have often survived through their errors rather than through assistance from you. Indeed, hopes placed in you have already destroyed some who trusted them and were left unprepared.

6 “Let none of you think that these words spring more from hostility than from reproach. Reproach is for friends who err; accusation is for enemies who do wrong.

CHAPTER 70

1 "At the same time, we believe that we have as much right as anyone to censure our neighbors, especially when such great interests are at stake. You seem to us unaware of them, and never to have reckoned what sort of men the Athenians are against whom your contest will be fought—how far they differ from you, and how completely.

2 "They are innovators, swift to conceive a plan and to accomplish in deed what they have resolved; you preserve what you possess, conceive nothing new, and in action fall short even of what necessity demands.

3 "Again, they are bold beyond their strength, take risks beyond their judgment, and are hopeful amid dangers; your way is to achieve less than your strength allows, distrust even what your judgment finds secure, and think you will never be delivered from danger.

4 "They are tireless where you delay, travelers abroad where you are the most inveterate stay-at-homes. For they think that absence may bring them some gain, while you think that an advance may damage even what you already have.

5 "When they defeat their enemies, they pursue their advantage to the utmost; when defeated, they fall back as little as possible.

6 "Moreover, they expend their bodies for their city as though these belonged least to themselves, but use their judgment on her behalf as their most intimate possession.

7 "If they conceive a plan and fail to carry it through, they believe they have been deprived of what was their own; what they win by an advance they count a small achievement beside what they will gain next. If an attempt should fail, they make good the loss by turning their hopes elsewhere. They alone possess what they conceive almost as soon as they hope for it, so quickly do they set about whatever they resolve.

8 "At all this they labor throughout their lives amid toil and danger. They enjoy what they have least of all, because they are always acquiring more, regard no occasion as a festival except the performance of what must be done, and consider idle tranquillity no less a misfortune than laborious activity.

9 "In short, if someone said that they were born neither to be at rest themselves nor to let the rest of mankind be so, he would speak the truth.

CHAPTER 71

1 "Yet with such a city ranged against you, Lacedaemonians, you still delay. You do not think that peace lasts longest for those who, while acting justly, keep themselves prepared and make plain their resolve not to submit to injury; instead, you base your notion of fair dealing on neither harming others nor suffering harm yourselves in defending against them.

2 "You would scarcely attain that even if your neighbor were a city like your own. As things stand, however, as we have just shown, your practices are antiquated beside theirs.

3 "In politics, as in a craft, the latest developments must always prevail. For a city at peace, unchanged customs are best; but those compelled to meet many challenges also need much invention. That is precisely why the Athenians' methods, through their wide experience, have been renewed far beyond yours.

4 "Let this, then, be the limit of your slowness. Now come quickly to the aid of the others and of the Potidaeans, as you promised, by invading Attica. Do not abandon friends and kinsmen to their bitterest enemies, or drive the rest of us in despair to seek some other alliance.

5 "In doing so we would commit no wrong, either before the gods who guard our oaths or before men who understand. For it is not those who turn to others when abandoned who break a treaty, but those who fail to aid the men to whom they have sworn alliance.

6 "If you are willing to act with vigor, we shall remain. For in changing sides we would neither act piously nor find others more closely bound to us by long association.

7 "Consider these things well, and try to lead a Peloponnese no smaller than the one your fathers handed down to you."

CHAPTER 72

1 Such were the words of the Corinthians. An Athenian embassy happened already to be at Lacedaemon on other business. When its members learned of the speeches, they decided that they should appear before the Lacedaemonians, not to answer any of the charges brought by the cities, but to make clear, on the question as a whole, that the Lacedaemonians should not decide in haste but examine it at greater length. At the same time they wished to show how great their city's power was, reminding the older men of what they knew and informing the younger of what lay outside their experience. They thought their words would incline the Lacedaemonians toward remaining at peace rather than making war.

2 They therefore approached the Lacedaemonians and said that they too wished to address their assembly, unless there was some objection. The Lacedaemonians invited them to come forward, and the Athenians did so and spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 73

1 "Our embassy was sent not to dispute with your allies, but on the business for which our city dispatched us. Yet on learning of the great outcry against us, we have come forward—not to answer the cities' charges, for neither our speeches nor theirs would be made before you as our judges, but to prevent you from too readily accepting your allies' persuasion and deciding badly on matters of

great importance. At the same time, in response to the whole account now given of us, we wish to make clear that our possessions are not unreasonably held, and that our city deserves consideration.

2 "Why speak of the most distant past, when hearsay rather than the eyewitness of our listeners would bear witness to our words? But we must speak of the Persian Wars and of events you yourselves know, even if our constant mention of them is somewhat wearisome. For when we acted then, the risks we ran were for a benefit in whose actual fruits you shared; let us not be deprived of all credit in words, if that does us any good.

3 "We shall speak not so much to plead our cause as to furnish evidence and show what sort of city you will have to fight if you decide unwisely.

4 "We claim that at Marathon we alone faced the barbarian in the forefront of danger, and that when he came a second time, being unable to defend ourselves on land, we embarked with our whole people and fought beside the others at Salamis. This prevented him from sailing against your cities one by one and ravaging the Peloponnese, since you could not have come to one another's aid against so many ships.

5 "He himself supplied the strongest proof: defeated at sea, he withdrew swiftly with the greater part of his army, since his power was no longer what it had been.

CHAPTER 74

1 "That being the outcome, and it being plainly shown that the Greeks' fortunes depended on their ships, we furnished the three things most useful to the result: the greatest number of ships, the most intelligent general, and the most unflagging zeal. Of the four hundred ships, ours were a little short of two-thirds; our commander was Themistocles, who was chiefly responsible for

fighting the sea battle in the strait, which most clearly saved the cause. For this you yourselves honored him more highly than any foreigner who ever came to you.

2 "And the zeal we displayed was by far the most daring. When no one helped us on land, and the others as far as our borders were already enslaved, we thought it right to abandon our city and sacrifice our possessions, yet even so not to desert the common cause of the allies who remained, or scatter and become useless to them. Instead we embarked and faced the danger, without resenting your failure to come to our defense beforehand.

3 "So we claim to have benefited you no less than you benefited us. For you came to help from cities still inhabited, and in order to continue enjoying them, when you became afraid chiefly for yourselves, not for us—at any rate, while we were still unharmed, you did not appear. We, setting out from a city that no longer existed and risking ourselves for one whose recovery offered little hope, bore our share in saving both you and ourselves.

4 "If earlier we had gone over to the Persian out of fear for our country, as others did, or had not later dared to embark because we were already ruined, there would have been no further need for you to fight at sea with too few ships: his designs would have advanced unopposed, just as he wished.

CHAPTER 75

1 "Do we not deserve, Lacedaemonians, in view of our zeal then and the intelligence of our judgment, that the Greeks should not regard the empire we hold with such excessive resentment?

2 "For we acquired this very empire not by force, but because you were unwilling to remain and deal with what was left of the barbarian's power, while the allies approached us and themselves asked us to become their leaders.

3 "The course of events itself first compelled us to advance it to its present extent, chiefly through fear, then through honor, and later through advantage as well.

4 "And it no longer seemed safe to relax our hold and run the risk, hated as we were by most, with some already subdued after revolt, and with you no longer as friendly to us as before, but suspicious and at odds with us. For those who revolted would have gone over to you.

5 "No one can be blamed for securing his own interests in the face of the greatest dangers.

CHAPTER 76

1 "You yourselves, Lacedaemonians, lead the cities of the Peloponnese after arranging their affairs to suit your own advantage. If you had remained in command then and had incurred lasting hatred, as we have, we know well that you would have been no less burdensome to the allies, and would have been compelled either to rule with a firm hand or to endanger yourselves.

2 "So we too have done nothing extraordinary or contrary to human nature in accepting an empire when it was offered and not relinquishing it, overcome by three of the strongest motives—honor, fear, and advantage. Nor were we the first to act in this way: it has always been established that the weaker is held down by the stronger. Besides, we thought ourselves worthy of our position, and you agreed, until now, when calculations of your own advantage have led you to invoke the argument of justice. Yet no one who had the chance to acquire something by strength has ever put that argument first and turned aside from gaining more.

3 "Those deserve praise who, following human nature in ruling others, prove more just than their actual power requires.

4 "We believe that if others took over our position, they would show most clearly whatever moderation we exercise. Yet for us even our fairness has, against all reason, brought disrepute rather than praise.

CHAPTER 77

1 "For although we accept disadvantages in lawsuits arising from agreements with our allies, and have established hearings before our own courts under equal laws, we are thought litigious.

2 "None of them considers why this reproach is not leveled at those who hold empires elsewhere and are less moderate toward their subjects than we are. Those who are free to use force have no further need of lawsuits.

3 "But our allies, accustomed to dealing with us on equal terms, take it hard if, contrary to their belief that they ought not to be, they are put at any disadvantage by a decision, by the power our empire gives us, or in any way at all. They are not grateful that they are not deprived of more; instead, they resent the deficiency more bitterly than if we had set law aside from the outset and openly sought our own advantage. In that case, not even they would have disputed that the weaker must yield to the stronger.

4 "People, it seems, are angrier at being wronged than at being subjected to force: the first looks like being overreached by an equal, the second like being compelled by a superior.

5 "At any rate, they endured worse treatment than this under the Persian, yet our rule seems harsh to them. Naturally so: the present always weighs heavily on subjects.

6 "If you were to overthrow us and take power, you would soon transform the goodwill you have won through fear of us, if your judgment now resembled the conduct you showed during your brief command against the Persian. For your own customs are incompatible with those of others; moreover, each of you who goes abroad observes neither those customs nor those followed by the rest of Greece.

CHAPTER 78

1 "Deliberate slowly, then, for the stakes are not small, and do not let the opinions and complaints of others persuade you to add to your own burdens. Before you enter it, recognize in advance how great is the unpredictable element in war.

2 "For as it lengthens, it tends for the most part to become a matter of chance, over which neither side has an advantage; and the risk is taken in uncertainty as to which way it will turn.

3 "When men go to war, they take to deeds first, though these should come later; only when they are already suffering do they turn to words.

4 "We have not yet made such a mistake ourselves, nor do we see that you have done so. We therefore urge you, while sound judgment is still a free choice for us both, not to break the treaty or violate your oaths, but to settle our differences by arbitration according to the agreement. Otherwise, calling the gods who guard our oaths to witness, we shall try to defend ourselves against your opening of war, following whatever course you lead us into."

CHAPTER 79

1 Such were the words of the Athenians. After hearing both their allies' charges against the Athenians and what the Athenians had said, the Lacedaemonians dismissed everyone and deliberated by themselves on the situation.

2 The opinions of the majority converged on the same conclusion: the Athenians were already doing wrong, and war must be made quickly. But their king Archidamus, a man reputed both intelligent and prudent, came forward and spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 80

1 "I myself, Lacedaemonians, have by now experienced many wars, and I see among you men of my own age with the same experience. Let no one, then, desire the undertaking through inexperience, as many might, or because he thinks it good and safe.

2 "And this war, on which you are now deliberating, you would find no small one, if you reckoned it soberly.

3 "Against Peloponnesians and our neighboring peoples, our strength is comparable, and we can quickly reach each objective. But against men whose country is far away, who are also most experienced at sea and superbly equipped in every other respect—with private and public wealth, ships, horses, arms, and a population such as no other single place in Greece possesses—and who have in addition many tribute-paying allies, how can we lightly take up war? On what should we rely in rushing into it unprepared?

4 "Our ships? There we are inferior; and if we are to train and build a fleet to match theirs, that will take time. Our money, then? There we fall further short still: we have none in the common treasury, and we are not ready to contribute from our private resources.

CHAPTER 81

1 "Perhaps someone may take confidence from our superiority in arms and numbers, which would enable us to make repeated incursions and ravage their land.

2 "But they have much other land under their rule, and they will import by sea whatever they need.

3 "If, again, we try to make their allies revolt, we shall need ships to help these too, since most of them are islanders.

4 "What sort of war, then, will ours be? Unless we prevail at sea or cut off the revenues from which they maintain their navy, we shall suffer the greater harm.

5 "And in that position it will no longer even be honorable to make peace, especially if we are thought to have been the ones who began the quarrel.

6 "Let us not be carried away by the hope that the war will soon end if we lay waste their land. I fear rather that we may even bequeath it to our children. Such is the Athenians' spirit that they are unlikely either to become slaves to their land or to be terrified by war as though they had never known it.

CHAPTER 82

1 "Yet I do not urge you to let them injure our allies without taking notice, or to leave their plots undetected. Rather, we should not yet take up arms, but send envoys and make our complaints, neither plainly threatening war nor suggesting that we shall submit. Meanwhile we should put our own affairs in order, securing additional allies, both Greeks and barbarians, wherever we can gain some further strength in ships or money. No blame attaches to those who, like us, are threatened by Athenian designs if they secure their safety by enlisting barbarians as well as Greeks. At the same time, let us develop our own resources.

2 "If they listen to our embassies, that will be best. If not, after two or three years we shall go against them better armed, should we so decide.

3 "Perhaps, seeing both our preparations and the corresponding message conveyed by our words, they would be more inclined to yield, while their land was still unravaged and they were deliberating over good things still theirs and not yet destroyed.

4 "For you must regard their land as nothing other than a hostage in your hands, all the more valuable for being so well cultivated. We must spare it as long as possible, and not drive them to desperation and so make them harder to bring to terms.

5 "For if, hurried on by our allies' complaints, we ravage it unprepared, beware that we do not bring greater shame and difficulty upon the Peloponnese.

6 “Complaints, whether of cities or individuals, can be settled; but once we have all taken up a war for particular interests, when there is no knowing how it will develop, it is not easy to lay it down with honor.

CHAPTER 83

1 “And let no one think it cowardice that so many should not at once attack a single city.

2 “They too have no fewer allies, who contribute money; and war is a matter not so much of arms as of the expenditure that makes arms effective, especially for a land power against a sea power.

3 “Let us first provide that money, then, and not be stirred into action beforehand by our allies’ words. Since it is we who shall bear the greater responsibility for the outcome, whether good or bad, let us also take a calm look ahead at what it may be.

CHAPTER 84

1 “And do not be ashamed of the slowness and delay for which they reproach us most. If you hurry, you may be slower to finish, because you begin unprepared; moreover, we have always inhabited a city both free and of the highest renown.

2 “This quality may most truly be called intelligent self-restraint. Through it we alone do not grow insolent in prosperity, and yield less than others to misfortune. When men urge us with praise into dangers contrary to our judgment, we are not carried away by pleasure; and if someone provokes us with accusations, our vexation makes us no more likely to be persuaded.

3 “Our discipline makes us both warlike and sound in counsel: warlike because a sense of shame is bound up above all with self-restraint, and courage with shame; sound in counsel because our education leaves us too little learned to despise the laws, and its severity makes us too self-controlled to disobey them.

We are not excessively clever in useless matters, brilliantly disparaging our enemies' preparations in words only to fall short when we confront them in deeds. Rather, we are taught to believe that our neighbors' designs are much like our own, and that the accidents of fortune cannot be analyzed by reasoning.

4 "We always prepare in deed on the assumption that our opponents plan well. We must base our hopes not on their making mistakes, but on the soundness of our own foresight. Nor should we think that one man differs greatly from another: the best is the one trained in what is most necessary.

CHAPTER 85

1 "Let us not abandon these practices, handed down to us by our fathers and preserved by ourselves to our lasting benefit. Nor, hurried on in a brief fraction of a day, should we decide the fate of many lives, much wealth, many cities, and our good name: let us deliberate calmly. Our strength gives us more freedom than others to do so.

2 "Send to the Athenians about Potidaea, and send about the wrongs our allies say they have suffered, especially since the Athenians are ready to submit to arbitration. It is not lawful to attack someone who offers arbitration as a wrongdoer before taking up that offer. At the same time prepare for war. This will be both the wisest course for yourselves and the most alarming to your opponents."

3 Such were the words of Archidamus. Last of all Sthenelaidas, who was then one of the ephors, came forward and spoke [to the Lacedaemonians] as follows.

CHAPTER 86

1 "I do not understand the Athenians' many words. After praising themselves at length, they nowhere denied that they are wronging our allies and the Peloponnese. Yet if they were brave against the Medes then, but are wicked

toward us now, they deserve a double punishment, because they have turned from good men into bad.

2 "We are the same now as we were then, and if we are sensible, we shall not stand by while our allies are wronged, nor delay their defense. Their suffering is no longer a thing to come.

3 "Others may have abundant money, ships, and horses; we have good allies, whom we must not surrender to the Athenians. Nor should we settle the matter by lawsuits and words, when their injuries are not merely words: we must defend them swiftly and with all our strength.

4 "Let no one teach us that we, the injured, ought to deliberate. It is rather those who mean to do injury who ought to deliberate long.

5 "Vote, then, Lacedaemonians, for war in a manner worthy of Sparta. Do not allow the Athenians to grow greater, and let us not utterly betray our allies. With the gods beside us, let us advance against the aggressors."

CHAPTER 87

1 Having spoken in this manner, he himself, as ephor, put the question to the Lacedaemonian assembly.

2 They decide by acclamation, not by ballot, and he said that he could not distinguish which shout was louder. Wishing, however, to make them declare their judgment openly and so give them a stronger impulse toward war, he said, "Those of you, Lacedaemonians, who judge that the treaty has been broken and the Athenians are in the wrong, stand over there"—pointing out a place to them—"and those who do not, on the other side." They rose and separated,

3 and those who judged the treaty broken were by far the greater number.

4 They summoned the allies and told them that in their own judgment the Athenians were in the wrong, but that they wished to call in all the allies and put the matter to a vote, so that, after deliberating together, they might make

war if that was their decision.

5 Having accomplished this, the allies departed for home; the Athenian envoys left later, after conducting the business for which they had come.

6 This decision of the assembly, that the treaty had been broken, was reached in the fourteenth year of the Thirty Years' Treaty, concluded after the events in Euboea.

CHAPTER 88

1 The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken and that they must go to war, not so much because the allies' arguments persuaded them as because they feared that the Athenians might become still more powerful, seeing that most of Hellas was already subject to them.

CHAPTER 89

1 For it was in the following manner that the Athenians came into the position in which their power grew.

2 After the Medes had withdrawn from Europe, defeated by the Greeks both at sea and on land, and those of them who had taken refuge with their ships at Mycale had been destroyed, Leotychidas, king of the Lacedaemonians, who had commanded the Greeks at Mycale, returned home with the allies from the Peloponnese. The Athenians and the allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, who had already revolted from the King, remained behind and besieged Sestos, which the Medes held. They stayed through the winter and took it when the barbarians abandoned it; afterward they sailed out of the Hellespont, each contingent to its own city.

3 Once the barbarians had left their country, the Athenian people immediately began bringing back their children, wives, and surviving possessions from the places where they had put them for safety, and prepared to rebuild the city and

its walls. Only short stretches of the circuit wall remained standing, and most of the houses had fallen; the few that survived were those in which the leading Persians themselves had lodged.

CHAPTER 90

1 Learning what was intended, the Lacedaemonians sent an embassy. They themselves would have preferred to see neither the Athenians nor anyone else possessing a wall, but still more they were urged on by their allies, who feared both the size of the Athenian fleet, which had not existed before, and the daring they had displayed in the war against the Medes.

2 They asked the Athenians not to fortify their city, but rather to join them in pulling down the circuit walls of all the cities outside the Peloponnese that still had them. They did not reveal to the Athenians the purpose and suspicion behind their proposal, but argued that, if the barbarian invaded again, he would have no fortified base from which to operate, as he had lately operated from Thebes. The Peloponnese, they said, was sufficient for everyone as both a refuge and a base.

3 On Themistocles' advice, the Athenians answered the Lacedaemonians' proposals by saying that they would send envoys to discuss them, and immediately dismissed them. Themistocles urged that he himself be sent to Lacedaemon as quickly as possible, but that the other envoys chosen to accompany him should not be sent at once: they should be held back until the wall had been raised to the minimum height needed to fight from it. Everyone in the city was to join in building it [the men themselves, the women, and the children], sparing no private or public building from which anything useful for the work could be taken, but demolishing them all.

4 After giving these instructions, and intimating that he would manage matters at Lacedaemon himself, he departed.

5 When he arrived in Lacedaemon, he did not approach the authorities, but kept delaying and offering excuses. Whenever one of the officials asked why he did not appear before the public body, he said that he was waiting for his fellow envoys: some pressing business had detained them, but he expected them shortly and was surprised that they had not yet arrived.

CHAPTER 91

1 His listeners believed Themistocles because of their friendship for him; but when others arrived and reported positively that the wall was being built and already gaining height, they could find no reason to disbelieve them.

2 Realizing this, he urged them not to be led astray by reports, but instead to send trustworthy men of their own who would inspect the work and bring back a reliable account.

3 They therefore sent men, and Themistocles secretly sent word to the Athenians about them, ordering that they be detained as unobtrusively as possible and not released until he and his colleagues had returned. For by now his fellow envoys, Habronichus son of Lysicles and Aristides son of Lysimachus, had arrived and reported that the wall was high enough. He feared that the Lacedaemonians, once they learned the truth beyond doubt, would no longer let them go.

4 The Athenians accordingly detained the envoys as instructed, while Themistocles now appeared before the Lacedaemonians and declared openly that their city was already walled sufficiently to protect its inhabitants. If the Lacedaemonians or their allies wished to send an embassy to Athens, they must henceforth approach people capable of judging both their own interests and those of all.

5 When they had thought it best to abandon their city and embark on their ships, the envoys said, they had resolved on that bold course without consulting the Lacedaemonians; and whenever they had taken counsel together with them, their judgment had proved second to none.

6 So now too they judged it better that their own city should have a wall, and believed that this would benefit both its citizens individually and all the allies.

7 For without equivalent means of defense it was impossible to take counsel for the common good on anything like equal or similar terms. Either all must be allies without walls, he said, or they must acknowledge that what had been done was right.

CHAPTER 92

1 On hearing this, the Lacedaemonians showed no open anger toward the Athenians. Their embassy, after all, had ostensibly been sent not to prohibit the work but to offer advice for the common good; besides, at that time they felt the warmest friendship for the Athenians because of their zeal against the Mede. Nevertheless, thwarted in their wishes, they were secretly resentful. The envoys on both sides returned home without any formal complaint.

CHAPTER 93

1 In this way the Athenians walled their city in a short time.

2 Even now the construction makes its haste apparent. The foundations are laid with stones of every sort, in places not even fitted together, but just as each was brought up; many gravestones and dressed blocks were incorporated into the work. For the circuit of the city had been extended outward on every side, and in their haste they laid hands on everything indiscriminately.

3 Themistocles also persuaded them to finish building the walls of Piraeus. He had begun the work earlier, during the year in which he held office as the Athenians' archon. He considered the site excellent, with its three natural harbors, and thought that, now they had become a seafaring people, it gave them a great advantage

4 in acquiring power. He was indeed the first to venture to say that they must hold fast to the sea, and from the outset he was laying the foundations of their empire as well.

5 On his advice they built the wall around Piraeus to the thickness still visible today: two wagons, meeting each other, could bring up stones side by side. There was neither rubble nor clay inside, but large stones laid together, cut square and bound to one another on their outer faces with iron and lead. The height, however, was completed to only about half what he had intended.

6 He wished its size and thickness to discourage enemy designs, and thought that a few men, even the least serviceable, would suffice to guard it, leaving the rest to embark on the ships.

7 For his chief concern was with the ships, having perceived, as I think, that an advance by sea was easier for the King's army than one by land. He considered Piraeus more useful than the upper city, and often advised the Athenians that, if they were ever overpowered on land, they should go down to it and resist all comers with their ships.

8 Thus the Athenians built their fortifications and made their other preparations immediately after the withdrawal of the Medes.

CHAPTER 94

1 Pausanias son of Cleombrotus was sent out from Lacedaemon as general of the Greeks with twenty ships from the Peloponnese. The Athenians sailed with him in thirty ships, accompanied by a large force of the other allies.

2 They campaigned in Cyprus and subdued most of it, and afterward went against Byzantium, which the Medes held, and took it by siege while he was still in command.

CHAPTER 95

1 By now his violent conduct was provoking resentment among the other Greeks, especially the Ionians and all who had lately been liberated from the King. They kept approaching the Athenians and asking them, as their kinsmen, to become their leaders and not to submit to Pausanias if he tried to use force against them.

2 The Athenians accepted their proposals and applied themselves to protecting them from such treatment and arranging everything else as seemed best for their own interests.

3 Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians recalled Pausanias to investigate the reports that were reaching them. Greeks arriving there accused him of many wrongs, and his behavior seemed more an imitation of tyranny than the exercise of military command.

4 His recall coincided with the transfer of the allies to the Athenian side out of hatred for him, except for the troops from the Peloponnese.

5 On his arrival in Lacedaemon, he was convicted of wrongs committed against particular individuals, but acquitted of the gravest charges. The chief accusation against him was collaboration with the Medes, and this seemed most clearly established.

6 They did not send him out again as commander, but sent Dorcis and some others with a small force. The allies, however, would no longer concede the leadership to them.

7 When they realized this, they withdrew; and the Lacedaemonians sent no others out afterward. They feared that men who went abroad might become corrupted, as they had seen happen with Pausanias; they also wanted to be rid of the war against the Medes, and considered the Athenians capable of leading it and, at that time, friendly toward themselves.

CHAPTER 96

1 Having thus assumed the leadership with the consent of the allies, owing to their hatred of Pausanias, the Athenians determined which cities were to supply money for the war against the barbarian and which were to supply ships. Their declared purpose was to avenge their sufferings by ravaging the King's country.

2 The Athenians then first established the office of Hellenotamiae, who received the tribute—for this was the name given to the monetary contribution. The first tribute assessed was four hundred and sixty talents. Delos was their treasury, and the meetings were held in the sanctuary.

CHAPTER 97

1 At first the Athenians led allies who were autonomous and deliberated in common meetings. In the interval between the war against the Medes and this war, they accomplished the following through warfare and the conduct of affairs, in struggles against the barbarian, against their own allies when they revolted, and against whichever Peloponnesians they encountered on each occasion.

2 I have recorded these events and made this digression because all my predecessors left this period untreated, composing either accounts of Greek affairs before the wars against the Medes or accounts of those wars themselves. Hellanicus, the one who did touch on this period in his history of Attica, mentioned it briefly and without chronological precision. At the same time, this account shows how the Athenian empire was established.

CHAPTER 98

1 First, under the command of Cimon son of Miltiades, they besieged and captured Eion on the Strymon, which the Medes held, and enslaved its inhabitants.

2 Next they enslaved the inhabitants of Scyros, the island in the Aegean occupied by Dolopians, and settled it themselves.

3 They also went to war with the Carystians, without the involvement of the other Euboeans, and in time reached a settlement with them.

4 Afterward they fought the Naxians, who had revolted, and reduced them by siege. This was the first allied city to be enslaved in violation of the established arrangement; later the others suffered the same fate as circumstances befell each of them.

CHAPTER 99

1 There were various causes of the revolts, but the chief were failures to provide the tribute and ships, and, in some cases, failure to serve on campaign. For the Athenians exacted their dues strictly and made themselves odious by imposing obligations on people neither accustomed nor willing to bear hardship.

2 In other respects too, the Athenians were no longer as welcome as leaders; campaigns were no longer conducted on equal terms, and it was easy for them to subdue those who revolted.

3 The allies themselves were responsible for this. Their reluctance to serve on campaigns led most of them, so that they need not leave home, to agree to contribute the equivalent expense in money instead of ships. Thus the Athenian navy grew from the funds they contributed, while they themselves, whenever they revolted, found themselves unprepared and inexperienced in war.

CHAPTER 100

1 After this came the battle on land and the battle at sea at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia, between the Athenians and their allies and the Medes. Under the command of Cimon son of Miltiades, the Athenians won both on the same day, capturing and destroying some two hundred Phoenician triremes in all.

2 Some time later the Thasians revolted from them after a dispute over the trading stations on the opposite coast of Thrace and the mine they worked. The Athenians sailed against Thasos, won a naval battle, and landed on the island.

3 About the same time they sent ten thousand settlers, drawn from their own people and their allies, to the Strymon, intending to settle what was then called Nine Ways and is now Amphipolis. They gained possession of Nine Ways, which the Edonians held, but on advancing into the interior of Thrace they were destroyed at Drabescus in Edonian territory by the united Thracians, who regarded the settlement of the place [Nine Ways] as a hostile act.

CHAPTER 101

1 Defeated in battle and under siege, the Thasians appealed to the Lacedaemonians, asking them to come to their aid by invading Attica.

2 Without the Athenians' knowledge, they promised to do so and were preparing to act, but were prevented by the earthquake that occurred. During it, their Helots and, among the perioeci, the Thurians and Aethaeans revolted and withdrew to Ithome. Most of the Helots were descendants of the ancient Messenians who had been enslaved at that time; for this reason all the rebels were called Messenians.

3 Thus the Lacedaemonians became engaged in war with the rebels at Ithome. The Thasians, in the third year of the siege, came to terms with the Athenians: they pulled down their wall, surrendered their ships, agreed on the money they must pay at once and the tribute they must contribute thereafter, and relinquished the mainland and the mine.

CHAPTER 102

1 As their war against the rebels at Ithome dragged on, the Lacedaemonians called in their allies, including the Athenians, who came in considerable strength under Cimon's command.

2 They summoned them chiefly because they were thought skilled in attacking fortifications. The prolonged siege showed that the Lacedaemonians were deficient in this skill; otherwise they would have taken the place by assault.

3 This expedition brought the first open breach between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians. When the place could not be taken by assault, the Lacedaemonians grew afraid of the Athenians' daring and love of innovation; regarding them also as a people of different stock, they feared that, if they remained, the rebels at Ithome might persuade them to attempt some upheaval. They therefore dismissed the Athenians alone among the allies, not disclosing their suspicion but saying that they no longer needed them.

4 The Athenians understood that they were being dismissed not for the more honorable reason offered, but because some suspicion had arisen. They took deep offense, judging such treatment from the Lacedaemonians undeserved. Immediately on returning, they renounced the alliance they had made with them against the Mede and allied themselves with their enemies, the Argives. At the same time both peoples entered into an alliance with the Thessalians, under the same oaths.

CHAPTER 103

1 In the tenth year, those in Ithome, unable to hold out any longer, reached an agreement with the Lacedaemonians: they were to leave the Peloponnese under a truce and never set foot there again. Anyone caught doing so would be the slave of his captor.

2 The Lacedaemonians had also previously received a Pythian oracle instructing them to release the suppliant of Zeus of Ithome.

3 They departed with their children and wives, and the Athenians, by now hostile to the Lacedaemonians, received them and settled them at Naupactus, which they had recently captured from the Ozolian Locrians.

4 The Megarians too deserted the Lacedaemonians and joined the Athenian alliance, because the Corinthians were pressing them in a war over their territorial boundaries. The Athenians took possession of Megara and Pegae, built for the Megarians the Long Walls from their city to Nisaea, and garrisoned them themselves. This was a principal source of the Corinthians' bitter hatred of the Athenians, which now first arose.

CHAPTER 104

1 Inarus son of Psammetichus, a Libyan and king of the Libyans bordering Egypt, set out from Marea, the city inland from Pharos, and brought most of Egypt into revolt against King Artaxerxes. Having made himself ruler, he called in the Athenians.

2 They happened to be campaigning in Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and their allies. Leaving Cyprus, they came to him and sailed up the Nile from the sea. They gained command of the river and two-thirds of Memphis, and made war on the remaining third, called the White Wall. There the Persians and Medes who had fled had taken refuge, together with the Egyptians who had not joined the revolt.

CHAPTER 105

1 The Athenians landed from their ships at Haliae and fought a battle against the Corinthians and Epidaurians, in which the Corinthians were victorious. Later the Athenians fought a naval battle off Cecryphalea against Peloponnesian ships, and the Athenians won.

2 After this, war broke out between the Athenians and the Aeginetans, and a great naval battle was fought off Aegina, with the allies present on either side. The Athenians were victorious, captured seventy of the enemy's ships, and landed on the island, where they began a siege under the command of Leocrates son of Stroebus.

3 The Peloponnesians then wished to help the Aeginetans. They first ferried three hundred Corinthian and Epidaurian hoplites over to Aegina as reinforcements; the Corinthians and their allies then occupied the heights of Geraneia and descended into Megarian territory. They thought that the Athenians would be unable to help the Megarians with so large a force away in Aegina and Egypt, or that, if they did come to their aid, they would abandon Aegina.

4 The Athenians, however, did not move their army from Aegina. Instead, the oldest and youngest of those left in the city went to Megara under Myronides' command.

5 They fought an evenly balanced battle against the Corinthians and then separated, each side believing that it had not had the worse of the action.

6 The Athenians, who had after all held something of an advantage, set up a trophy when the Corinthians withdrew. The Corinthians, reproached for cowardice by the older men in their city, made preparations and returned about twelve days later to erect a trophy of their own, claiming victory. The Athenians sallied out from Megara, killed those setting up the trophy, and engaged and defeated the rest.

CHAPTER 106

1 The defeated troops retreated, and a considerable body of them, hard pressed and missing the road, stumbled into a private enclosure which happened to be surrounded by a large ditch and offered no way out.

2 Seeing this, the Athenians blocked the front with their hoplites and stationed their light-armed troops all around, stoning to death everyone who had entered. This was a grievous disaster for the Corinthians, though the main body of their army returned home.

CHAPTER 107

1 About this time the Athenians also began building the Long Walls to the sea, one to Phalerum and the other to Piraeus.

2 The Phocians invaded the Dorians' territory, the motherland of the Lacedaemonians—Boeum, Cytinium, and Erineus—and captured one of these towns. The Lacedaemonians came to the Dorians' aid with fifteen hundred hoplites of their own and ten thousand allies, commanded by Nicomedes son of Cleombrotus on behalf of King Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, who was still young. They compelled the Phocians by agreement to restore the town and then began their return.

3 If they wished to cross the Crisaean Gulf by sea, the Athenians were ready to sail around and prevent them with their fleet. Nor did a march through Geraneia seem safe, since the Athenians held Megara and Pegae. Geraneia was difficult to traverse and was always guarded by the Athenians, and they now learned that the Athenians intended to block them there as well.

4 They decided to remain in Boeotia and consider the safest way to get through. Certain Athenians were also secretly inviting them in, hoping to put an end both to the democracy and to the construction of the Long Walls.

5 The Athenians marched against them in full force, together with a thousand Argives and contingents from their other allies, numbering fourteen thousand in all.

6 They took the field against them because they believed them at a loss how to get through, and also in part because they suspected a plot to overthrow the democracy.

7 Thessalian cavalry also came to the Athenians in accordance with their alliance, but went over to the Lacedaemonians during the battle.

CHAPTER 108

1 A battle was fought at Tanagra in Boeotia, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies were victorious, with heavy losses on both sides.

2 The Lacedaemonians entered Megarian territory, cut down its trees, and returned home through Geraneia and the Isthmus. On the sixty-second day after the battle, the Athenians marched against the Boeotians under Myronides' command,

3 and, defeating them in battle at Oenophyta, gained control of Boeotia and Phocis, demolished the wall of Tanagra, and took the hundred wealthiest Opuntian Locrians as hostages. They also completed their own Long Walls.

4 After this the Aeginetans too came to terms with the Athenians, pulling down their walls, surrendering their ships, and agreeing to pay tribute in the future.

5 The Athenians also sailed around the Peloponnese under the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus. They burned the Lacedaemonians' dockyard, captured Chalcis, a Corinthian town, and landed in Sicyonian territory, where they defeated the Sicyonians in battle.

CHAPTER 109

1 The Athenians and their allies in Egypt remained there, and their warfare took many forms.

2 At first the Athenians were masters of Egypt, and the King sent Megabazus, a Persian, to Lacedaemon with money, hoping to induce the Peloponnesians to invade Attica and so draw the Athenians away from Egypt.

3 When he made no headway and the money was being spent to no purpose, Megabazus returned to Asia with what remained of it. The King then sent Megabyzus son of Zopyrus, a Persian, with a large army.

4 He arrived by land, defeated the Egyptians and their allies in battle, and drove the Greeks out of Memphis. Finally he shut them up on the island of Prosopitis and besieged them there for a year and six months, until, by draining the canal and diverting its water elsewhere, he left their ships on dry ground and joined most of the island to the mainland. He then crossed over on foot and captured the island.

CHAPTER 110

1 Thus the Greeks' undertaking came to ruin after six years of war. Only a few out of many survived, making their way through Libya to Cyrene; most perished.

2 Egypt came once more under the king's rule, except for Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes. They could not capture him because of the marsh's vast extent; besides, its inhabitants are the most warlike of the Egyptians.

3 Inarus, the king of the Libyans, who had brought about the whole movement in Egypt, was captured through betrayal and impaled.

4 Fifty triremes from Athens and the rest of the alliance, sailing to Egypt as a relief force, put in at the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, knowing nothing of what had happened. Infantry attacked them from the land and a Phoenician fleet from the sea, destroying most of their ships; the smaller number escaped back home.

5 Such was the end of the great expedition of the Athenians and their allies to Egypt.

CHAPTER 111

1 Orestes, the son of Echecratidas, king of the Thessalians, was in exile from Thessaly and persuaded the Athenians to restore him. Taking with them their Boeotian and Phocian allies, the Athenians marched against Pharsalus in

Thessaly. They controlled the countryside only so far as they could go without straying far from their armed force, for the Thessalian cavalry held them in check. They neither captured the city nor made any progress toward the other objects of their expedition, but withdrew with Orestes, having accomplished nothing.

2 Not long afterward, a thousand Athenians embarked on the ships at Pegae, which they themselves held, and sailed along the coast to Sicyon under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus. They landed and defeated in battle those Sicyonians who came to meet them.

3 They at once took Achaeans with them, sailed across to Acarnania, and campaigned against Oeniadae, which they besieged. They did not, however, capture it, but withdrew home.

CHAPTER 112

1 Later, after an interval of three years, the Peloponnesians and Athenians concluded a five-year truce.

2 The Athenians suspended their war against the Greeks, but campaigned against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and their allies, under Cimon's command.

3 Sixty of these ships sailed to Egypt at the summons of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes; the others besieged Citium.

4 But Cimon died, and a shortage of food arose, so they withdrew from Citium. Sailing off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought the Phoenicians, Cypriots, and Cilicians simultaneously at sea and on land. Victorious in both battles, they withdrew home, together with the ships that had returned from Egypt.

5 After this the Lacedaemonians undertook the campaign called the Sacred War; they gained possession of the sanctuary at Delphi and handed it over to the Delphians. Later, after their withdrawal, the Athenians in turn campaigned

there, gained possession, and handed it over to the Phocians.

CHAPTER 113

1 Some time afterward, when Boeotian exiles held Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and certain other places in Boeotia, the Athenians campaigned against these hostile positions with a thousand hoplites of their own and contingents from the several allies, under the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus. They captured Chaeronea, enslaved its inhabitants, and withdrew after installing a garrison.

2 As they marched through Coronea, the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus attacked them, together with Locrians, exiles from Euboea, and all who shared their views. They defeated the Athenians in battle, killing some and taking others alive.

3 The Athenians abandoned all Boeotia, making a truce on condition that their men should be returned.

4 The Boeotian exiles returned, and all the others too became autonomous once more.

CHAPTER 114

1 Not long afterward, Euboea revolted from the Athenians. Pericles had already crossed there with an Athenian army when news reached him that Megara had revolted, that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica, and that the Athenian garrison had been killed by the Megarians, apart from those who had escaped to Nisaea. The Megarians had brought in Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians to support their revolt. Pericles hurriedly brought the army back from Euboea.

2 After this the Peloponnesians invaded Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria and laid waste the land, led by Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians. They advanced no farther, but withdrew home.

3 The Athenians crossed again to Euboea under Pericles' command and subdued the whole island. They settled the rest of it by agreement, but expelled the Hestiaeans and occupied their land themselves.

CHAPTER 115

1 Not long after their return from Euboea, they concluded a thirty-year truce with the Lacedaemonians and their allies, giving up Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea; these were the possessions they held belonging to the Peloponnesians.

2 In the sixth year, war broke out between the Samians and Milesians over Priene. The Milesians, getting the worse of the war, came to Athens and loudly accused the Samians. Private individuals from Samos itself, who wanted to change the constitution, joined in supporting them.

3 The Athenians therefore sailed to Samos with forty ships and established a democracy. They took fifty Samian boys and as many men as hostages and placed them on Lemnos, then withdrew, leaving a garrison behind.

4 For some of the Samians had not stayed, but had fled to the mainland. They made an alliance with the most powerful men in the city and with Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes, who then governed Sardis, collected some seven hundred mercenaries, and crossed over to Samos by night.

5 First they rose against the people and overpowered most of them; then they stole their hostages out of Lemnos and revolted. They handed over the Athenian garrison and the officials stationed among them to Pissuthnes, and immediately prepared to march against Miletus. The Byzantines joined them in revolt.

CHAPTER 116

1 When the Athenians learned of this, they sailed against Samos with sixty ships, though sixteen of these were not available for the engagement: some had gone toward Caria to watch for the Phoenician ships, and others to Chios and Lesbos to call for assistance. With forty-four ships, under Pericles and nine other generals, they fought off the island of Tragia against seventy Samian ships, twenty of them troop transports. The whole Samian fleet was then sailing from Miletus. The Athenians were victorious.

2 Later, forty ships from Athens and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos came to their aid. They landed, won the upper hand on land, and besieged the city with three walls, blockading it by sea as well.

3 Pericles took sixty ships from the blockading fleet and sailed in haste toward Caunus and Caria, after a report that Phoenician ships were sailing against them. Indeed, Stesagoras and others had also left Samos with five ships to meet the Phoenician fleet.

CHAPTER 117

1 Meanwhile the Samians made a sudden sortie by sea and fell upon the unfortified camp. They destroyed the ships on advance guard and defeated in battle those that put out to oppose them. For about fourteen days they controlled the sea around their island, bringing in and sending out whatever they wished.

2 When Pericles returned, they were shut in again by his fleet. Later, further reinforcements arrived from Athens: forty ships under Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio, and twenty under Tlepolemus and Anticles; thirty also came from Chios and Lesbos.

3 The Samians fought one brief naval engagement, but, unable to hold out, were reduced by siege in the ninth month and surrendered on agreed terms. They dismantled their wall, gave hostages, handed over their ships, and undertook to

repay the money spent on the war in scheduled installments. The Byzantines too agreed to be subjects as before.

CHAPTER 118

1 Not many years after these events came the affairs already recounted—those of Corcyra and Potidaea, and all that furnished the grounds for this war.

2 All these actions of the Greeks against one another and against the barbarian took place in some fifty years between Xerxes' withdrawal and the beginning of this war. In that time the Athenians made their empire more secure and themselves advanced to great power. The Lacedaemonians perceived this but did not check it except briefly, remaining inactive for most of the time: even before this they had been slow to go to war unless compelled, and to some extent wars of their own had kept them occupied. At last the Athenians' power was plainly rising, and they were encroaching on the Lacedaemonians' alliance. Then the Lacedaemonians could endure it no longer; they resolved to undertake this war with all their strength and, if they could, bring that power down.

3 The Lacedaemonians themselves had accordingly decided that the truce had been broken and the Athenians were in the wrong. They sent to Delphi to ask the god whether it would be better for them to go to war. He answered, it is said, that if they fought with all their strength they would win, and declared that he himself would assist them, whether called upon or uninvited.

CHAPTER 119

1 They summoned the allies again, intending to put to a vote whether they should go to war. When the envoys from the alliance had arrived and the assembly met, the other speakers stated their views, most accusing the Athenians and urging war. The Corinthians had already appealed separately to each city to vote for war, fearing that Potidaea might be lost in the meantime. They were present on this occasion too, and came forward last to speak as follows.

CHAPTER 120

1 "Men of the alliance, we can no longer reproach the Lacedaemonians: they have themselves voted for war and have now assembled us for that purpose. Leaders must manage their own affairs on an equal footing with the rest, while taking forethought for the common interest, just as in other respects they are honored above all.

2 "Those of us who have already had dealings with the Athenians need no instruction in guarding against them. But those who live farther inland, away from the trade routes, must understand that unless they defend the coastal peoples, they will find it harder to bring their seasonal produce down to the sea and receive in return what the sea supplies to the mainland. They must not prove poor judges of the present arguments, as though these did not concern them; they must expect that, if they abandon the coast, the danger may one day reach them too, and that what they now deliberate concerns themselves no less.

3 "They must therefore not hesitate to exchange peace for war. It is the part of prudent men to remain at peace when they suffer no wrong, but of brave men, when wronged, to turn from peace to war, and, when a good opportunity offers, to make peace again. They must neither be elated by success in war nor, out of delight in the tranquillity of peace, submit to injustice.

4 "For the man who hesitates for the sake of pleasure may, if he stays inactive, soonest lose that delight in ease for which he hesitates; and the man who presses his advantage too far through success in war has failed to see that the audacity carrying him away is untrustworthy.

5 "Many ill-conceived plans have succeeded against adversaries still less wise, and still more plans thought well conceived have ended shamefully in the opposite result. No one conceives a plan and carries it into action with equal confidence: we form our judgments in safety, but in action fear makes us fall short.

CHAPTER 121

1 "We now stir up war because we are being wronged and have ample grounds for complaint; once we have retaliated against the Athenians, we shall lay it aside at the proper time.

2 "We have many reasons to expect victory: first, our superiority in numbers and experience of war; next, the equal readiness of us all to obey orders.

3 "And a fleet, in which their strength lies, we shall equip from the resources each of us possesses and from the funds at Delphi and Olympia. By taking out a loan we can draw away their foreign sailors with higher pay. For Athenian power is bought rather than native; ours is less exposed to this danger, since its strength lies more in men than in money.

4 "A single victory at sea will in all likelihood bring them down. If they hold out, we too shall practice seamanship over a longer time; and once we have brought our skill to equality with theirs, in courage at least we shall surely prevail. The natural excellence we possess cannot be theirs through teaching; the superiority in knowledge they possess can be overcome by our practice.

5 "We shall contribute money to meet these expenses. It would be monstrous if their allies never wearied of contributing to their own enslavement, while we refused to spend in order to punish our enemies and save ourselves at the same time—and to keep them from taking our money and using those very resources to harm us.

CHAPTER 122

1 "We have other ways of waging war as well: the revolt of their allies, which would above all deprive them of the revenues that sustain their strength; fortified posts in their country; and other measures no one can now foresee. War least of all proceeds by settled rules: for the most part it devises its own methods to meet each turn of events. In dealing with it, the man who keeps his temper is more secure, while the man who loses it is no less liable to stumble.

2 "Let us also consider that if each of us were disputing a boundary with an equal opponent, that would be bearable. As things stand, the Athenians are a match for us all together, and stronger still against each city separately. Unless, then, we resist them with a single purpose, both collectively and by peoples and individual cities, they will subdue us without effort if we remain divided. And let anyone who finds it terrible even to hear understand that defeat brings nothing less than outright slavery.

3 "For the Peloponnese, even to entertain such a possibility in words is a disgrace: so many cities suffering at the hands of one. In that event we would be thought either to deserve our suffering or to endure it through cowardice, and would appear worse than our fathers. They liberated Hellas; we do not even secure that liberty for ourselves, but allow a tyrant city to be established, though we claim the right to overthrow the sole rulers within individual cities.

4 "We cannot see how such conduct escapes one of three great failings: lack of judgment, weakness, or neglect. Surely you have not avoided these only to fall into contemptuous confidence, which has harmed the greatest number, and which, from bringing so many to grief, has been renamed by its opposite—folly.

CHAPTER 123

1 "But why prolong our accusations about the past beyond what serves the present? We must instead labor for the future by coming to the aid of our present cause. It is your ancestral way to win distinction through hardship; do not change that habit if you now enjoy some advantage in wealth and freedom of action, for it is not right that abundance should lose what poverty acquired. Rather, go confidently to war for all these reasons: the god has given his answer and himself promised to assist us, and all the rest of Hellas will join our struggle, some from fear, others for advantage.

2 "You will not be the first to break the truce: the god himself, in bidding us go to war, judges it already violated. Rather, you will defend it against injustice. Those who defend themselves do not break a truce; those who attack first do.

CHAPTER 124

1 "Since, then, every circumstance favors your going to war, and we urge this course in the common interest—if indeed a community of interest is the surest bond for cities and individuals alike—do not delay in bringing aid to the Potidaeans, who are Dorians besieged by Ionians, though formerly the reverse was true, and in recovering freedom for the rest. We can no longer wait while some are already suffering injury and others will suffer the same before long, if it becomes known that we assembled but did not dare defend ourselves.

2 "Recognize, men of the alliance, that necessity is upon you and that this counsel is the best, and vote for war. Do not fear the immediate danger, but desire the longer-lasting peace that will follow it. Peace is made more secure by war; refusing to fight merely to remain at ease is not equally free from danger.

3 "Consider that the tyrant city established in Hellas stands against us all alike, ruling some already and intending to rule the rest. Let us attack and subdue it, so that we ourselves may live in future without danger and may liberate the Greeks now enslaved." Such was the speech of the Corinthians.

CHAPTER 125

1 When the Lacedaemonians had heard the opinion of every delegation, they put the question to all the allies present in turn, larger and smaller cities alike. The majority voted for war.

2 Although the decision had been taken, they could not act at once, being unprepared. They resolved that each should procure what was needed, without delay. Nevertheless, they spent less than a year making the necessary preparations before invading Attica and openly beginning the war.

CHAPTER 126

1 During this time they sent embassies to the Athenians, putting forward grievances, so that, if the Athenians would not listen to their demands, they might have the strongest possible grounds for war.

2 First the Lacedaemonians sent envoys demanding that the Athenians drive out the curse of the goddess. The curse arose as follows.

3 Cylon was an Athenian of earlier times, an Olympic victor, noble and powerful. He had married the daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian who was at that time tyrant of Megara.

4 When Cylon consulted the oracle at Delphi, the god told him to seize the Athenian Acropolis at the greatest festival of Zeus.

5 He obtained a force from Theagenes and won over his friends. When the Olympic festival in the Peloponnese came round, he seized the Acropolis with the aim of becoming tyrant, believing this to be Zeus's greatest festival and to have a particular connection with himself as an Olympic victor.

6 Whether the greatest festival meant was in Attica or somewhere else he had not further considered, nor did the oracle make it clear. For the Athenians too have what is called the Diasia, a very great festival of Zeus Meilichius outside the city, at which the whole people offer sacrifices, many of them not animal victims but the pure offerings customary there. Believing, however, that he understood correctly, he undertook the attempt.

7 When the Athenians learned of it, they came in full force from the countryside against him and his men, settled down before the Acropolis, and besieged them.

8 As time passed, the Athenians grew weary of maintaining the siege, and most went away. They entrusted the watch to the nine archons and gave them full authority to settle the whole affair as they judged best. At that time the nine archons conducted most public business.

9 Cylon's besieged companions were in a desperate state from lack of food and water.

10 Cylon himself and his brother escaped. The rest, hard pressed and with some already dying of hunger, seated themselves as suppliants at the altar on the Acropolis.

11 The Athenians entrusted with the watch saw that they were dying in the sanctuary and made them rise, promising to do them no harm. They led them away and killed them; some who, on the way, seated themselves at the altars of the Venerable Goddesses were also put to death. From this, both the killers and their descendants were called accursed and offenders against the goddess.

12 The Athenians themselves expelled these accursed men, and later Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian expelled them too, with the help of an Athenian faction. They banished the living and dug up and cast out the bones of the dead. Afterward, however, they returned, and their descendants are still in the city.

CHAPTER 127

1 This, then, was the curse the Lacedaemonians demanded should be driven out. They professed above all to be vindicating the gods, but knew that Pericles son of Xanthippus was implicated through his mother's family, and believed that, if he were expelled, their dealings with the Athenians would go more easily.

2 Yet they hoped less to bring about his expulsion than to discredit him with the city, on the ground that the war would be due in part to his personal misfortune.

3 For he was the most powerful man of his time and led the government; he opposed the Lacedaemonians in everything and would not allow concessions, but urged the Athenians toward war.

CHAPTER 128

1 The Athenians in turn demanded that the Lacedaemonians drive out the curse arising from Taenarum. For the Lacedaemonians had once made some Helot suppliants rise from Poseidon's sanctuary [at Taenarum], led them away, and killed them. They themselves believe that this was the reason for the great earthquake at Sparta.

2 They also demanded that the Lacedaemonians drive out the curse of the Goddess of the Bronze House. It arose as follows.

3 After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian had first been recalled by the Spartans from his command in the Hellespont, tried by them, and acquitted of wrongdoing, he was no longer sent out in an official capacity. Instead, he took a trireme from Hermione on his own account and, without Lacedaemonian authority, went to the Hellespont. In word he went to serve in the Greeks' war; in deed, to pursue his dealings with the king, as he had attempted the first time too, aspiring to dominion over the Greeks.

4 He first laid the king under an obligation to him in the following way, and so began the whole affair.

5 On his previous arrival, after withdrawing from Cyprus, he had captured Byzantium. Medes held it, and among those captured there were certain connections and relatives of the king. These prisoners he then sent back to the king without the knowledge of the other allies, though his stated account was that they had escaped from him.

6 He acted in concert with Gongylus of Eretria, to whom he had entrusted both Byzantium and the prisoners. He also sent Gongylus to carry a letter to the king. As was later discovered, it contained the following.

7 "Pausanias, commander of Sparta, sends you these men, whom he took by the spear, wishing to do you a favor. I propose, if it also seems good to you, to marry your daughter and make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to you. I

believe I can accomplish this in consultation with you. If, then, any of these proposals pleases you, send a trustworthy man to the coast through whom we may conduct our further discussions."

CHAPTER 129

1 Such was the substance of the letter. Xerxes was delighted with it and sent Artabazus son of Pharnaces to the coast, ordering him to take over the Dascylian satrapy, replacing Megabates, its previous governor. He also entrusted him with a letter in reply, to be sent on to Pausanias at Byzantium as quickly as possible, and told him to show Pausanias the seal and to carry out, as well and faithfully as possible, whatever instructions Pausanias gave him concerning the king's affairs.

2 On arriving, Artabazus carried out the other orders as directed and forwarded the letter.

3 The reply read as follows: "Thus says King Xerxes to Pausanias. For the men you saved for me from Byzantium across the sea, your service shall stand recorded forever in our house; and I approve the proposals you have sent. Let neither night nor day hold you back and make you slacken in accomplishing anything you promise me. Let neither the expense in gold and silver nor the size of an army, if one must be brought anywhere, stand in your way. Rather, with Artabazus, a good man whom I have sent you, act confidently in your interests and mine, in whatever way will be finest and best for us both."

CHAPTER 130

1 When Pausanias received this letter, he was already held in great honor by the Greeks for his command at Plataea, but now his pride rose far higher, and he could no longer endure the customary way of life. He would leave Byzantium dressed in Median clothes; Medes and Egyptians served as his bodyguard as he

traveled through Thrace; and he had his table laid in the Persian manner. Unable to keep his purpose to himself, he revealed in small actions the greater deeds he intended to carry out in time to come.

2 He made himself difficult to approach, and treated everyone alike with such a harsh temper that no one could come near him. This was among the chief reasons why the alliance passed over to the Athenians.

CHAPTER 131

1 When the Lacedaemonians learned of this, they recalled him on the first occasion for precisely these reasons. Later, after he had sailed out a second time in the ship from Hermione without their orders, he was found to be behaving in the same way. Though the Athenians had forcibly driven him out of Byzantium by siege, he did not return to Sparta, but settled at Colonae in the Troad; reports reached them that he was negotiating with the barbarians and staying there for no good purpose. Then they delayed no longer: the ephors sent a herald with a coded dispatch and told him not to fall behind the herald on the return journey; otherwise, the Spartans declared war on him.

2 Wishing to arouse as little suspicion as possible, and confident that he could use money to dispose of the accusation, he returned to Sparta a second time. At first the ephors threw him into prison—they have the power to do this even to the king—but later he secured his release and offered to stand trial before anyone who wished to bring these charges against him.

CHAPTER 132

1 Yet neither his enemies among the Spartans nor the city as a whole had any clear evidence on which they could confidently rely to punish a man of the royal house who also held office at the time: as cousin of Pleistarchus, the son of Leonidas and still a young king, he was acting as his guardian.

2 His lawless conduct and imitation of the barbarians nevertheless gave them many grounds to suspect that he did not wish to remain on an equal footing with his fellow citizens. They examined his other behavior for any departure from established customs, including the occasion when he had presumed to inscribe, on his own authority, the following elegiac couplet on the tripod at Delphi which the Greeks had dedicated as the first fruits of the spoils from the Medes: / After destroying the army of the Medes as leader of the Greeks, / Pausanias dedicated this memorial to Phoebus.

3 The Lacedaemonians had at once had this couplet chiseled off the tripod and inscribed instead the names of the cities that had joined in overthrowing the barbarian and set up the offering. Even then it had been considered an offense on Pausanias' part; now that he had come to this predicament, the act seemed much more plainly in keeping with his present designs.

4 They also learned that he was intriguing with the Helots, and this was indeed the case: he was promising them freedom and citizenship if they would rise with him and help him carry the whole enterprise through.

5 Even so, they would not trust certain Helot informers enough to take drastic action against him. They followed their customary practice toward their own people, never hastily deciding on an irreparable measure against a Spartan without indisputable proof. At last, it is said, the man who was to carry his final letters to the King by way of Artabazus turned informer: a man from Argilus, once his boy lover and most trusted by him. Reflecting that none of the messengers before him had ever returned, he became afraid. He made a copy of the seal, so that if his suspicion proved mistaken, or Pausanias asked to make some alteration to the letter, he would not discover what had happened; then he opened the letters. Suspecting that some such instruction had been added, he found that his own death too was ordered in them.

CHAPTER 133

1 When he showed them the letter, the ephors were more convinced, but still wished to hear Pausanias himself say something. By arrangement the man went to Taenarum as a suppliant and put up a hut divided into two chambers by a partition, behind which he concealed some of the ephors. Pausanias came to him and asked why he had taken refuge as a suppliant, and they heard everything plainly. The man complained of what had been written about him and set out the rest in detail: he had never once compromised Pausanias in his services to the King, yet the special reward chosen for him was to die like the mass of his servants. Pausanias acknowledged these very charges, urged him not to be angry about the present affair, gave him a pledge of safety if he left the sanctuary, and demanded that he set out as quickly as possible and not obstruct the enterprise.

CHAPTER 134

1 Having heard the facts clearly, the ephors withdrew for the moment; now certain of the truth, they set about arresting him in the city. It is said that, when he was about to be seized in the street, he saw the face of one of the ephors approaching and understood his purpose; another, out of goodwill, gave him a secret nod to warn him. He ran to the sanctuary of the Goddess of the Bronze House and reached its shelter before they could seize him, for the sacred precinct was close by. He entered a small building belonging to the sanctuary, to avoid the hardship of remaining in the open, and stayed there quietly.

2 For the moment his pursuers were too late. Afterward they removed the roof of the building and, watching until he was inside, shut him in and walled up the doors. They stationed themselves outside and besieged him with starvation.

3 When they realized that he was about to breathe his last there in the building, they brought him out of the sanctuary while he was still alive; immediately after being brought out, he died.

4 They had intended to throw him into the Caeadas [where they threw criminals], but then decided to bury him somewhere nearby. Later the god at Delphi instructed the Lacedaemonians to transfer his tomb to the place where he died —he now lies in the entrance precinct, as inscribed pillars indicate—and, since their deed had brought pollution upon them, to give the Goddess of the Bronze House two bodies in return for one. They therefore made two bronze statues and dedicated them in place of Pausanias.

CHAPTER 135

1 The Athenians, on the ground that the god too had judged this a pollution, made a counter-demand that the Lacedaemonians expel it.

2 The Lacedaemonians also sent envoys to Athens and implicated Themistocles in Pausanias' dealings with the Medes, on the evidence they had found in the inquiry into Pausanias, demanding that he receive the same punishment.

3 The Athenians were persuaded. Themistocles had by then been ostracized and was living at Argos, though he also visited other parts of the Peloponnese. They sent men with orders to arrest him wherever they found him, together with the Lacedaemonians, who were eager to join the pursuit.

CHAPTER 136

1 Themistocles learned of this beforehand and fled from the Peloponnese to Corcyra, whose people he had benefited. But the Corcyraeans said they were afraid to keep him and so incur the enmity of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, and conveyed him to the mainland opposite.

2 Pursued by the men appointed to arrest him, who followed reports of his movements, he was driven by a desperate predicament to seek lodging with Admetus, king of the Molossians, who was no friend of his.

3 Admetus happened to be away from home. Themistocles became a suppliant to his wife, and she instructed him to take their child and sit down at the hearth.

4 When Admetus returned not long afterward, Themistocles told him who he was. If he had opposed some request Admetus had once made to the Athenians, he urged him not to take vengeance now that he was a fugitive: that would mean inflicting harm on a man now far weaker than himself, whereas it was noble to take vengeance on equals from a position of equality. Besides, his own opposition had concerned some request, not the preservation of Admetus' life; but if Admetus surrendered him—and he explained who was pursuing him and on what charge—he would be depriving him of his very life.

CHAPTER 137

1 On hearing this, Admetus raised him up together with his own son, whom Themistocles was still holding as he sat—this was the most binding form of supplication. When the Lacedaemonians and Athenians arrived not long afterward, he refused to surrender him despite all their arguments. Instead, since Themistocles wished to go to the King, he sent him overland to the other sea, to Pydna in Alexander's dominions.

2 There he found a merchant ship setting sail for Ionia and went aboard, but a storm carried him down to the Athenian force besieging Naxos. Alarmed—for no one aboard knew him—he told the shipmaster who he was and why he was in flight. If the man did not save him, he said, he would declare that he had taken him aboard for a bribe. Their safety lay in allowing no one to leave the ship until they could sail again; if he obeyed, Themistocles would repay the favor worthily. The shipmaster did as he asked and, after riding offshore from the camp for a day and a night, eventually reached Ephesus.

3 Themistocles rewarded him with a gift of money: the funds he had placed in safety at Athens and Argos were afterward brought to him, those from Athens by his friends. He then traveled inland with one of the Persians of the coastal

region and sent in a letter to King Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, who had recently come to the throne.

4 The letter said: "I, Themistocles, have come to you. Of all the Greeks, I did your house the greatest harm for as long as necessity compelled me to defend myself against your father's invasion, but afterward I did it far greater good, when I was in safety and his journey home was in danger. You owe me a return for my service"—here he wrote of the advance warning he had sent from Salamis about the retreat, and of his having prevented the destruction of the bridges at that time, a credit he falsely claimed—"and now I am here, able to do you great good, pursued by the Greeks because of my friendship with you. I wish to wait a year and then explain to you in person the purpose of my coming."

CHAPTER 138

1 The King, it is said, admired his intent and told him to do so. During the interval he had requested, Themistocles learned as much as he could of the Persian language and the customs of the country.

2 When he appeared after the year, he gained greater influence with the King than any Greek before him, both because of his previous standing and because of the hope he held out of enslaving the Greek world for him, but above all because, when put to the test, he proved himself a man of intelligence.

3 For Themistocles gave the surest demonstration of the strength of natural ability, and in this respect deserved admiration beyond anyone else. By his native intelligence, with no education beforehand to develop it and none acquired later, he was the best judge of an immediate situation after the briefest deliberation, and the most discerning in forecasting what would happen in the most distant future. Whatever he had in hand he could also explain; nor, in matters beyond his experience, was he without the power to judge adequately. Above

all, he could foresee the better or worse outcome while it still lay hidden. In short, through the force of his nature and with the least need for preparation, he surpassed all others in devising what the moment required.

4 He fell ill and died. Some say, however, that he deliberately took poison, believing it impossible to fulfill his promises to the King.

5 His monument stands in the marketplace at Magnesia in Asia. He had governed this district: the King had given him Magnesia for his bread, which yielded fifty talents a year; Lampsacus for his wine, since it was considered richer in wine than any other place at the time; and Myus for the other provisions of his table.

6 His relatives say that, at his own command, his bones were brought home and buried in Attica without the Athenians' knowledge: burial there was forbidden him as an exile for treason. Such was the end of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian and Themistocles the Athenian, the most illustrious Greeks of their time.

CHAPTER 139

1 Such were the demands the Lacedaemonians made on their first embassy, and the counter-demands they received, concerning the expulsion of those under a curse. On subsequent visits to Athens they demanded that the Athenians withdraw from Potidaea and leave Aegina autonomous. Above all, they declared most emphatically that there would be no war if the Athenians repealed the decree concerning the Megarians, which barred them from the harbors within the Athenian empire and from the market in Attica.

2 The Athenians would neither comply with the other demands nor repeal the decree. They accused the Megarians of cultivating sacred land and land whose boundaries were unsettled, and of harboring runaway slaves.

3 At last the final envoys arrived from Lacedaemon—Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander. They said nothing of the usual earlier demands, but only this: "The Lacedaemonians wish for peace, and peace is possible if you leave the Greeks

autonomous." The Athenians held an assembly and opened the question to debate among themselves; they decided to deliberate on all the issues once and for all and then give their answer.

4 Many came forward and spoke on either side, some arguing that they must go to war, others that the decree should not stand in the way of peace but should be repealed. Pericles son of Xanthippus also came forward—the foremost Athenian of his time, the ablest in speech and action—and advised them as follows.

CHAPTER 140

1 "Athenians, I hold to the same judgment as always: we must not yield to the Peloponnesians. I know that men do not carry the same ardor into the actual conduct of war as they do when persuaded to undertake it, but change their judgments with their fortunes. Even now I see that my advice must be the same, or much the same; and I claim that those of you whom it persuades must support our common decisions even if we meet with some reverse, or else claim no share in the wisdom of them when we succeed. For the course of events may be as senseless as the thoughts of men: that is why, when things turn out against calculation, we habitually blame fortune.

2 "The Lacedaemonians have plainly plotted against us before, and do so no less plainly now. Though the agreement requires us to submit our disputes to judgment and accept judgment from one another, each side retaining what it holds, they have neither asked for such judgment themselves nor accepted our offer of it. They prefer to settle their grievances by war rather than discussion, and now come issuing commands, no longer making complaints.

3 "They order us to withdraw from Potidaea, leave Aegina autonomous, and repeal the decree concerning the Megarians; these latest envoys even demand that we leave the Greeks autonomous.

4 "Let none of you think that we would be going to war over a trifle if we refused to repeal the Megarian decree. They put this foremost, saying that if it were repealed there would be no war; but do not leave yourselves grounds for self-reproach, as though you had gone to war over a small thing.

5 "For this small thing contains the whole confirmation and test of your resolve. If you concede it to them, you will immediately be ordered to make some greater concession, on the assumption that here too you obeyed from fear. But by firmly refusing, you would make it clear that they must rather deal with you as equals.

CHAPTER 141

1 "Decide here and now either to submit before suffering any injury, or, if we are to fight—as I think the better course—to yield on neither a great pretext nor a small one, and not to hold our possessions in fear. For the greatest claim and the least, when imposed as a command by equals on their neighbors before judgment, amount to the same enslavement.

2 "As for the war and the resources of either side, hear the particulars and learn why our position will not be the weaker.

3 "The Peloponnesians work their land themselves and have no money either privately or in their public treasuries. They also lack experience of protracted wars or wars overseas, since poverty allows them only brief campaigns against one another.

4 "Men in such circumstances cannot repeatedly man fleets or send armies into the field: they would be away from their own properties while spending their own resources, and would moreover be shut out from the sea.

5 "Wars are sustained by reserves rather than forced contributions. Those who work their own land are readier to fight with their bodies than with their money: they trust that they may survive the dangers, but have no assurance that

their money will not be spent before the end, especially if the war lasts longer than they expect, as it probably will.

6 "In a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies could stand against all the Greeks, but they cannot wage war against a power equipped differently from themselves. They have no single council to act promptly at need, and, with equal votes but belonging to different peoples, each presses his own interest. From this it generally follows that nothing is accomplished.

7 "Some wish above all to take vengeance on someone, others to suffer as little damage as possible to their own possessions. They assemble only at long intervals, and spend a small part of the time considering common interests, but the greater part pursuing their own. Each thinks that his own neglect will do no harm, and that someone else will take care to foresee what is needed on his behalf; thus, because all separately reason in the same way, the common cause is ruined as a whole without their noticing.

CHAPTER 142

1 "Most important, lack of money will hamper them, as they delay over the slow business of procuring it; but the opportunities of war will not wait.

2 "Nor, indeed, need we fear either their building a fortified position against us or their fleet.

3 "It would be difficult even in peacetime to establish a rival city, much more so in enemy territory, with us no less firmly fortified against them.

4 "If they build a fort, they might damage part of our land by raids and the desertions it encourages; but it will not be enough to prevent us from sailing to their country and fortifying a position against them, or from using our ships, the source of our strength, to defend ourselves.

5 "For we gain more experience of warfare on land from our naval activity than they gain of naval warfare from their activity on land.

6 "Nor will they readily acquire skill at sea.

7 "Even you, who have practiced it ever since the Median Wars, have not yet perfected it. How, then, could men who are farmers, not seamen, accomplish anything worthwhile, when we shall not even allow them to practice, but shall always lie off their coasts with a large fleet?

8 "With only a few ships blockading them, they might venture a battle, their numbers emboldening their ignorance; but shut in by many, they will keep still, and through lack of practice become less skillful and therefore more timid.

9 "Seamanship is an art like any other. It cannot be practiced casually, as a sideline whenever the occasion offers; rather, it allows no other occupation even as a sideline.

CHAPTER 143

1 "Even if they were to lay hands on the money at Olympia or Delphi and try, by offering higher pay, to draw away the foreign sailors in our service, that would be alarming only if we, embarking ourselves along with our resident aliens, were not a match for them. As it is, we have this resource, and, most important, our own citizens supply us with more and better helmsmen and other skilled crewmen than all the rest of Hellas together.

2 "In the face of the danger, none of the foreigners would accept exile from his own country and join them in a struggle with the poorer prospect of success, merely for the gift of higher pay for a few days.

3 "Such, or something like it, is my view of the Peloponnesians' position. Our own is free of the weaknesses I have found in theirs, and has other great advantages that they cannot match.

4 "If they march against our country by land, we shall sail against theirs; and the devastation of even a part of the Peloponnese will not be comparable to that of all Attica. They cannot acquire other land in its place without fighting, whereas

we have abundant land both on islands and on the mainland.

5 "For command of the sea is a great thing. Consider: if we were islanders, who could be less vulnerable to capture? Even now we must think of ourselves as nearly as possible in that position, abandon our land and houses, and guard the sea and the city. We must not let anger over those losses draw us into battle with the far more numerous Peloponnesians: if we defeat them, we shall fight just as many again, while if we lose, we lose as well our hold on the allies, the source of our strength. They will not remain quiet if we are no longer able to send armies against them. We should mourn not houses and land but human lives; it is not these possessions that acquire men, but men who acquire them. If I thought I could persuade you, I would tell you to go out and devastate them yourselves, and show the Peloponnesians that you will not submit for their sake.

CHAPTER 144

1 "I have many other reasons to hope that we shall prevail, provided you are willing not to add to our empire while at war, or to incur further dangers of your own choosing. I fear our own mistakes more than our enemies' designs.

2 "But those matters will be explained in another speech, as events unfold. For now, let us dismiss these envoys with this answer: we shall allow the Megarians to use our market and harbors if the Lacedaemonians, for their part, cease expelling us and our allies as foreigners, since neither measure is forbidden by the treaty. We shall leave the cities autonomous if they were autonomous when we made the treaty, and when the Lacedaemonians too restore to their own cities the right to govern themselves, not in ways convenient to them [the Lacedaemonians], but as each city itself desires. We are willing to submit to judgment according to the agreement; we shall not begin a war, but shall defend ourselves against those who do. Such an answer is just and at the same time worthy of this city.

3 "We must recognize that war is inevitable, and that the more willingly we accept it, the less fiercely our enemies will press us; and that the greatest dangers bring the greatest honors, to city and individual alike.

4 "Our fathers, at least, stood against the Medes without starting from resources as great as ours—indeed, abandoning even what they had. By judgment more than fortune, and daring greater than their strength, they drove back the barbarian and raised our power to its present height. We must not fall short of them, but resist our enemies in every way and strive to hand on that power undiminished to those who come after us."

CHAPTER 145

1 Such was Pericles' speech. The Athenians judged his advice the best for them and voted as he proposed. Their answer to the Lacedaemonians followed his judgment, both in the particulars he had set out and in its general substance: they would do nothing at another's command, but were ready to have the grievances settled by judgment under the agreement, on equal and reciprocal terms. The envoys returned home, and no further embassies followed.

CHAPTER 146

1 These were the charges and disputes between the two sides before the war, beginning directly with the affairs of Epidamnus and Corcyra. Even while these continued, they still had dealings with one another and traveled to each other's countries without a herald, though not without suspicion. For what was happening amounted to the dissolution of the treaty and furnished grounds for war.

Book 2



CHAPTER 1

1 Here now begins the war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and the allies of each, in which they no longer had dealings with one another except through heralds, but, once engaged, fought without interruption. The events are recorded in the order in which they occurred, by summer and winter.

CHAPTER 2

1 The thirty-year truce concluded after the capture of Euboea had lasted fourteen years. In the fifteenth year, when Chrysis had been priestess at Argos for forty-eight years, Aenesias was ephor at Sparta, and Pythodorus still had two months to serve as archon at Athens, in the sixth month after the battle at Potidaea and just as spring began, a little more than three hundred Thebans entered Plataea in Boeotia, an ally of Athens, under arms, at about the hour of first sleep. Their commanders were the Boeotarchs Pythangelus son of Phyleides and Diemporus son of Onetorides.

2 Some Plataeans, Nauclides and his associates, had invited them in and opened the gates. To secure power for themselves, they wanted to kill their opponents among the citizens and bring the city over to Thebes.

3 They arranged this through Eurymachus son of Leontiades, a man of the greatest influence at Thebes. Foreseeing that war would come, the Thebans wanted to seize Plataea, which had always been at odds with them, while peace still lasted and before war had openly broken out. This also made it easier for them to enter unnoticed, since no guard had been posted.

4 Taking up their position under arms in the marketplace, they refused to follow the advice of those who had brought them in, who urged them to act at once and attack their enemies' houses. Instead, they resolved to make reassuring proclamations and bring the city to an agreement and friendship. The herald announced that anyone who wished to join the alliance according to the ancestral customs of all the Boeotians should take his station under arms beside them. They thought the city would readily come over to them by this means.

CHAPTER 3

1 When the Plataeans realized that the Thebans were inside and that their city had suddenly been seized, they were terrified. Thinking that far more men had entered than was the case—they could not see them in the darkness—they moved toward an agreement, accepted the proposals, and kept quiet, especially since the Thebans were taking no hostile action against anyone.

2 While these dealings were in progress, however, they discovered that the Thebans were few and thought they could easily overpower them by an attack; for most of the Plataeans had no wish to revolt from Athens.

3 They therefore decided to make the attempt. They gathered by breaking through the shared walls between their houses, so that they would not be seen moving through the streets. They set wagons without their draft animals across the streets to serve as barricades, and made whatever other preparations seemed likely to help in the circumstances.

4 When all was as ready as they could make it, they waited until the last darkness just before dawn and came out of the houses against them. They did not want to engage in daylight, when the Thebans would have greater confidence and meet them on equal terms, but in darkness, when their greater fear would leave them at a disadvantage against the Plataeans' knowledge of the city. They attacked at once and quickly came to close quarters.

CHAPTER 4

1 When the Thebans realized that they had been deceived, they closed ranks and beat back the attacks wherever they fell.

2 They repulsed them two or three times. But then the Plataeans charged with a great uproar, while the women and household slaves shouted and shrieked from the houses, hurling stones and roof tiles. Heavy rain had also fallen during the night. The Thebans lost their nerve, turned, and fled through the city. Most did not know the ways to safety amid the darkness and mud—it was the end of the month—and their pursuers knew well how to prevent their escape. Thus most of them were killed.

3 One of the Plataeans shut the gates through which they had entered, the only ones that were open, using the butt-spike of a javelin in place of a pin to secure the bar. There was no longer an exit even there.

4 Pursued through the city, some climbed the wall and threw themselves down outside; most of these died. A few escaped unnoticed through an unguarded gate, where a woman gave them an axe and they cut through the bar, but not many got out, for they were soon discovered. Others perished scattered about the city.

5 The largest body, which had kept most closely together, rushed into a large building adjoining the wall whose doors happened to be open, thinking that its doors were city gates and offered a passage straight through to the outside.

6 Seeing them trapped, the Plataeans debated whether to set the building on fire and burn them where they stood, or deal with them in some other way.

7 In the end, these men and all the other Thebans still alive and wandering through the city agreed to surrender themselves and their arms to the Plataeans, to be dealt with as they pleased.

8 Such was the fate of the men inside Plataea.

CHAPTER 5

1 The rest of the Thebans were to have arrived with their full army while it was still night, in case anything went wrong for those who had entered. When news of what had happened reached them on the road, they hurried to the rescue.

2 Plataea is seventy stades from Thebes, and the rain that had fallen in the night delayed their arrival: the river Asopus was running high and was difficult to cross.

3 Marching in the rain and crossing the river with difficulty, they arrived too late, when some of their men had already been killed and the survivors were held prisoner.

4 When the Thebans learned what had happened, they began planning an attack on the Plataeans outside the city. People and property were still out in the fields, since the disaster had come unexpectedly in peacetime. They wanted any people they captured to serve as an exchange for their men inside, if any had been taken alive. Such was their intention.

5 While they were still deliberating, the Plataeans, suspecting some such move and fearing for those outside, sent a herald to the Thebans. They said that the attempt to seize their city during a truce had been an act of impiety, and warned them not to harm anything outside. Otherwise, they said, they too would kill the men they held alive; but if the Thebans withdrew from their territory, they would return the prisoners.

6 This is the Theban account, and they say that the Plataeans also swore to it. The Plataeans deny having promised to return the men unconditionally: there were first to be discussions, and they would return them if an agreement was reached. They also deny having sworn an oath.

7 In any event, the Thebans withdrew from the territory without doing any harm. The Plataeans hurriedly brought in their people and property from the countryside and immediately killed the prisoners. There were a hundred and eighty captives, among them Eurymachus, with whom the betrayers had made their arrangements.

CHAPTER 6

1 After doing this, they sent a messenger to Athens, returned the dead to the Thebans under a truce, and arranged matters in the city as they thought the situation required.

2 The Athenians received immediate news of what had happened at Plataea. They at once arrested all the Boeotians in Attica and sent a herald to Plataea with instructions to say that nothing further should be done to the Theban prisoners until they too had considered their fate.

3 For they had not been told that the men were dead. The first messenger had left as the Thebans entered, the second just after they had been defeated and captured; of later events the Athenians knew nothing. They sent their instructions in this ignorance, and the herald arrived to find the men already killed.

4 After this the Athenians marched to Plataea, brought in grain, left a garrison, and evacuated the men least fit for service, together with the women and children.

CHAPTER 7

1 With the affair at Plataea and the unmistakable breaking of the truce, the Athenians prepared for war, as did the Lacedaemonians and their allies. Both sides intended to send embassies to the King and elsewhere among the barbarians, wherever they hoped to gain some assistance, and sought to make allies of cities outside their own sphere of power.

2 Besides the ships already available locally, the cities in Italy and Sicily that had chosen the Lacedaemonian side were ordered to build ships in proportion to their size, to bring the whole fleet to five hundred, and to prepare a specified sum of money. In other respects they were to remain quiet and admit Athenians coming in a single ship until these preparations were complete.

3 The Athenians reviewed their existing alliance and sent embassies especially to the regions around the Peloponnese—Corcyra, Cephallenia, the Acarnanians, and Zacynthus—seeing that, if these were securely friendly, they could wage war against the Peloponnese on every side.

CHAPTER 8

1 Neither side conceived anything small; both threw themselves into the war with vigor, as was natural. At the beginning everyone takes hold more eagerly; and there were then many young men both in the Peloponnese and in Athens whose inexperience made them embrace the war willingly. All the rest of Greece hung in suspense as its foremost cities came into collision.

2 Many prophecies were repeated, and the oracle-reciters chanted many predictions, both in the cities about to go to war and elsewhere.

3 Shortly before these events Delos too had been shaken by an earthquake, although it had never been shaken before within Greek memory. This was spoken of and regarded as a sign of what was to come. Any other occurrence of that kind was also eagerly sought out.

4 People's sympathies lay far more with the Lacedaemonians, especially since they had proclaimed that they were liberating Greece. Every person and every city was eager to help them, in word and deed, wherever possible; each believed that success was being hindered wherever he himself did not lend a hand.

5 Such was the anger of most people against the Athenians: some wished to be released from their rule, others feared being brought under it.

CHAPTER 9

1 With such preparations and in such a spirit they set out, each entering the war with the following cities as allies.

2 The allies of the Lacedaemonians were these: all the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus except the Argives and Achaeans, who were friendly to both sides. Of the Achaeans, only the Pellenians fought alongside them at first, though later all did so. Outside the Peloponnese their allies were the Megarians, Boeotians, Locrians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians.

3 Of these, the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians supplied naval forces; the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians supplied cavalry; and the other cities supplied infantry. Such was the alliance of the Lacedaemonians.

4 The allies of the Athenians were the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, Messenians at Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyraeans, the Zacynthians, and the other tribute-paying cities in the following regions: coastal Caria, the Dorians neighboring the Carians, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian coast, and the islands to the east of the Peloponnese and Crete, including all the Cyclades except Melos and Thera.

5 Of these, the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyraeans supplied naval forces; the rest supplied infantry and money.

6 Such were the alliances of the two sides and their preparations for war.

CHAPTER 10

1 Immediately after the events at Plataea, the Lacedaemonians sent word throughout the Peloponnese and to their allies outside it, ordering the cities to prepare troops and the supplies needed for a campaign abroad, with a view to invading Attica.

2 As each city completed its preparations, two-thirds of its forces assembled at the Isthmus at the appointed time.

3 When the whole army had gathered, Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians who commanded this expedition, summoned the generals of all the cities and their chief officers and most distinguished men, and addressed them as follows.

CHAPTER 11

1 "Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many campaigns both within the Peloponnese itself and beyond it, and the older men among us are not without experience of war. Yet never have we taken the field with a greater force than this: we are now advancing against a city of the greatest power, and our own army is the largest and the best.

2 "We must therefore show ourselves neither inferior to our fathers nor unequal to our own reputation. All Greece is stirred by this undertaking and watches it intently, wishing us success in our designs because of its hatred of Athens.

3 "Even if someone thinks that we attack in overwhelming numbers and that there is little danger of the enemy meeting us in battle, that is no reason to advance with any less care in our preparations. Rather, every commander and soldier from every city must always expect that he himself will encounter danger.

4 "For war is uncertain: attacks commonly spring from a slight occasion and are made in anger. Often a smaller force, because it was afraid, has defended itself more successfully against a larger one whose contempt had left it unprepared.

5 "In an enemy's country we must always campaign with confidence in our minds, but with the practical preparations of men who are afraid. In this way we will have the greatest courage to attack the enemy and the greatest security against attack.

6 "The city we are approaching is by no means so incapable of defending itself; it is most thoroughly prepared in every respect. We must therefore fully expect its people to come out to battle, if they have not already resolved to do so before our arrival, then when they see us in their country, laying it waste and destroying their possessions.

7 "For everyone is seized by anger at the immediate sight of an unaccustomed injury inflicted before his eyes; and where calculation has least hold, passion carries men furthest into action.

8 "The Athenians are likely to act in this way even more than others, since they claim the right to rule the rest and to invade and ravage their neighbors' land rather than see their own ravaged.

9 "Since, then, we are campaigning against so great a city, and the outcome will bring the greatest honor or dishonor upon our ancestors and ourselves, follow wherever your commanders lead, making discipline and vigilance your highest concern, and responding promptly to orders. For nothing is finer or safer than a great multitude visibly governed by a single discipline."

CHAPTER 12

1 After this address Archidamus dismissed the gathering and first sent to Athens Melesippus son of Diacritus, a Spartan, to see whether the Athenians might be more inclined to yield now that they saw the army already on its way.

2 But they would not admit him into the city or give him a public hearing. A proposal of Pericles had already prevailed, that they should receive no herald or embassy from the Lacedaemonians once these had taken the field. They therefore sent him away unheard, ordering him to be beyond their borders that very day; in future, if the Lacedaemonians wanted anything, they must first withdraw to their own territory and then send an embassy. They sent escorts with Melesippus to prevent him from speaking to anyone.

3 When he reached the border and was about to part from his escorts, he spoke only these words before going on: "This day will mark the beginning of great evils for the Greeks."

4 When he returned to the camp and Archidamus learned that the Athenians would still make no concessions, he broke camp and advanced with his army into their territory.

5 The Boeotians supplied their contingent and cavalry to join the Peloponnesian campaign, and with their remaining troops marched to Plataea and ravaged its territory.

CHAPTER 13

1 While the Peloponnesians were still gathering at the Isthmus and on the march, before they invaded Attica, Pericles son of Xanthippus, one of the ten Athenian generals, recognized that the invasion was coming. Since Archidamus was his guest-friend, he suspected that he might pass over his estates and leave them unravaged, either from a personal wish to oblige him or on the orders of the Lacedaemonians, to cast suspicion upon him—as they had also demanded the expulsion of those under the curses on his account. He therefore declared in advance to the Athenians in the assembly that Archidamus was indeed his guest-friend, but that this relationship would bring no harm to the city. If the enemy did not ravage his estates and houses as they did those of everyone else, he gave them up as public property, and no suspicion should attach to him on that score.

2 As for the present situation, he gave the same advice as before: they should prepare for war and bring in their possessions from the countryside; they should not go out to battle but come inside and guard the city, equip the fleet, in which their strength lay, and keep a firm hold on their allies. Their power, he said, came from the money these paid in revenue, and success in war depended chiefly on sound judgment and ample reserves of money.

3 He urged confidence: apart from the other revenue, tribute from the allies brought the city an average of six hundred talents a year, and at that time six thousand talents of coined silver still lay on the Acropolis. At its highest the reserve had reached nine thousand seven hundred talents, from which money had been spent on the gateways of the Acropolis and the other buildings, and on Potidaea.

4 This was apart from uncoined gold and silver in private and public dedications, the sacred vessels used in processions and contests, the spoils taken from the Medes, and other such treasures, whose value [was] no less than five hundred talents.

5 He added the considerable sums held in the other temples, which they could use; and if they were wholly cut off from all other resources, they could even use the gold with which the goddess herself was adorned. The statue, he explained, carried forty talents' weight of refined gold, all of it removable. If they used it for their preservation, however, they must replace it afterward with no less.

6 Such were the financial resources with which he encouraged them. They had thirteen thousand hoplites, apart from the sixteen thousand stationed in the forts and along the battlements.

7 That was the number on guard at first whenever the enemy invaded, drawn from the oldest and youngest citizens and from the resident aliens who served as hoplites. The Phaleric Wall ran thirty-five stades to the circuit wall of the city, and the part of that circuit which was guarded measured forty-three stades; a

section between the Long Wall and the Phaleric Wall was left unguarded. The Long Walls to Piraeus were forty stades in length, and the outer one was guarded. The whole circuit of Piraeus, including Munychia, measured sixty stades, of which half was guarded.

8 He also stated that they had twelve hundred cavalry, including mounted archers, sixteen hundred archers, and three hundred seaworthy triremes.

9 Such were the resources of the Athenians, none of these figures being an overstatement, when the first Peloponnesian invasion was imminent and they were entering the war. Pericles also advanced his other customary arguments to demonstrate that they would prevail in the war.

CHAPTER 14

1 The Athenians listened and were persuaded. They began bringing in their children and wives from the countryside, together with the rest of their household belongings, even dismantling the woodwork of their houses. Their sheep and draft animals they sent across to Euboea and the neighboring islands.

2 The removal was hard upon them, since most had always been accustomed to living in the countryside.

CHAPTER 15

1 This had been the Athenian way of life more than that of other peoples from the remotest times. Under Cecrops and the earliest kings, down to Theseus, Attica was always inhabited in separate towns, each with its own town hall and magistrates. Unless there was some danger to fear, they did not gather to deliberate with the king, but each community governed itself and held its own councils. Some even made war on the kings, as the Eleusinians under Eumolpus did against Erechtheus.

2 But when Theseus became king, combining intelligence with power, he reorganized the country in other respects and abolished the council chambers and magistracies of the other towns. Establishing a single council chamber and town hall in the present city, he united everyone in it. Although each continued to occupy his own land as before, he compelled them to recognize this one city alone. With everyone now contributing to it, the city grew great, and in this condition Theseus handed it down to those who followed. From that time to this the Athenians have celebrated the Synoecia, a publicly funded festival in honor of the goddess.

3 Before that, the city consisted of what is now the Acropolis, together with the ground below it, chiefly toward the south.

4 Here is the evidence: on the Acropolis itself are sanctuaries of other deities as well, and those outside it lie chiefly toward this part of the city—the sanctuary of Olympian Zeus, the Pythian sanctuary, the sanctuary of Earth, and that of Dionysus in the Marshes. In his honor the more ancient Dionysia are celebrated [on the twelfth] in the month of Anthesterion, a custom still observed by the Ionians descended from Athens. Other ancient sanctuaries also stand in this quarter.

5 The spring now called Enneacrunus, from the form given it by the tyrants, was formerly called Callirrhoe, when its sources were uncovered. Because it was close by, those early inhabitants used it for their most important purposes; and from that ancient practice its water is still customarily used before weddings and for other sacred rites.

6 Because the ancient settlement was here, the Acropolis is still called the City by the Athenians to this day.

CHAPTER 16

1 The Athenians, then, had long shared in this life of independent settlements across the countryside; and even after their union, most of them, in the earlier generations and those that followed down to this war, continued from habit to be born and live in the country. They did not readily uproot their entire households, especially since they had only lately restored their properties after the Persian Wars.

2 They were grieved and deeply distressed to leave their houses and the sanctuaries that had always been theirs by ancestral inheritance from the old political order. They faced a change in their way of life, and each man felt that he was leaving nothing less than his own city.

CHAPTER 17

1 When they reached the city, a few had houses of their own, and some found refuge with friends or relatives; but most occupied the empty spaces of the city and all the sanctuaries and shrines of heroes, except the Acropolis, the Eleusinium, and any other precinct firmly closed to them. Even the place called the Pelargic, below the Acropolis, was occupied under the pressure of immediate necessity, although a curse forbade settlement there and the closing words of a Pythian oracle also prohibited it: "The Pelargic is better left idle."

2 To my mind, the oracle came true in the opposite way to what people expected. The city's misfortunes did not arise from the unlawful occupation; rather, the war created the necessity of occupation. Without naming the war, the oracle foresaw that the place would never be settled for any good.

3 Many also made homes in the towers of the walls and wherever else they could. The city could not hold them all when they gathered inside; later they divided up and occupied the Long Walls and much of Piraeus.

4 At the same time they took up their preparations for war, assembling their allies and fitting out a hundred ships for an attack on the Peloponnese.

5 Such was the stage their preparations had reached.

CHAPTER 18

1 The Peloponnesian army advanced and came first to Oenoe in Attica, at the point where they intended to invade. Once encamped, they prepared to assault its wall with siege engines and by other means.

2 Oenoe, lying on the frontier between Attica and Boeotia, had been fortified, and the Athenians used it as a stronghold whenever war overtook them. They accordingly made ready their assaults, and otherwise spent some time around the place.

3 This brought Archidamus no small share of blame. Even during the preparations for war he had been thought irresolute and well disposed toward the Athenians, since he had shown no eagerness in urging war. Once the army was assembling, the halt at the Isthmus and the slow pace of the rest of the march discredited him, but above all the delay at Oenoe.

4 For during this time the Athenians were bringing their property into the city, and the Peloponnesians believed that, had they advanced swiftly, they would have found everything still outside, but for his hesitation.

5 Such was the army's resentment against Archidamus while they lay encamped. But he held back, expecting, it is said, that while their land remained untouched the Athenians would make some concession, and would shrink from watching it ravaged.

CHAPTER 19

1 When, however, they had assaulted Oenoe and tried every method without being able to take it, and the Athenians sent no herald to negotiate, they at last set out from there and invaded Attica. It was about the eightieth day after the

events at Plataea [involving the Thebans who had entered it], in summer, when the grain was ripe. Their commander was Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians.

2 They encamped and first ravaged Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, routing a body of Athenian cavalry near the streams called the Rheiti. Then they advanced through Cropia, keeping Mount Aegaleos on their right, until they reached Acharnae, the largest of the districts of Attica called demes. There they settled into camp and remained a long time, ravaging the land.

CHAPTER 20

1 Archidamus is said to have had the following purpose in remaining near Acharnae with his army drawn up as if for battle, rather than descending into the plain during that invasion.

2 He hoped that the Athenians, strong in their multitude of young men and equipped for war as never before, might come out against him and refuse to look on while their land was ravaged.

3 Since they had not met him at Eleusis or in the Thriasian plain, he stayed near Acharnae to test whether they would march out.

4 The position seemed to him suitable for a camp; and he also thought that the Acharnians, who formed a great part of the citizen body—they furnished three thousand hoplites—would not look on while their own possessions were destroyed, but would impel the whole people to battle. Even if the Athenians did not come out during that invasion, he could thereafter ravage the plain and advance against the city itself with less to fear. For the Acharnians, stripped of their own property, would not be equally eager to risk their lives for that of others, and opinion would be divided.

5 With this intention Archidamus remained near Acharnae.

CHAPTER 21

1 As long as the army was near Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, the Athenians still had some hope that it would advance no closer. They remembered how Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, had invaded Attica with a Peloponnesian army fourteen years before this war, reached Eleusis and Thria, and then withdrawn without advancing farther. This was indeed the reason for his exile from Sparta: he was suspected of having been bribed [to withdraw].

2 But when they saw the army near Acharnae, sixty stades from the city, they could bear it no longer. Naturally enough, the ravaging of their land before their eyes—a sight the younger men had never seen, nor the older men except during the Persian Wars—seemed terrible to them. The general feeling, strongest among the young, was that they should march out and not stand by.

3 They gathered in groups and argued fiercely, some urging a sortie, others opposing it. Reciters of oracles chanted predictions of every kind, and each man listened as his own impulse led him. The Acharnians, believing themselves no insignificant part of the Athenian people, pressed hardest for a sortie, since it was their land that was being ravaged. The city was inflamed in every way. They were angry with Pericles and remembered nothing of his earlier advice, but denounced him for not leading them out when he was their general, and held him responsible for all they were suffering.

CHAPTER 22

1 Pericles saw that they were embittered by the present situation and were not judging what was best. Confident that his decision against a sortie was right, he convened neither an assembly nor any other gathering, lest they meet in anger rather than with judgment and make a disastrous mistake. He guarded the city and kept it as quiet as he could.

2 He did, however, keep sending out cavalry to prevent advance parties from the enemy army from falling upon and damaging the farms near the city. A brief cavalry engagement took place at Phrygia between one squadron of Athenian cavalry, with Thessalians beside them, and the Boeotian cavalry. The Athenians and Thessalians held their own until hoplites came to the Boeotians' support; then they were routed, and a few Thessalians and Athenians were killed. They nevertheless recovered their dead that same day without a truce.

3 The Peloponnesians set up a trophy the next day. The Thessalians had brought this assistance to the Athenians under their ancient alliance. Those who came were Larisaeans, Pharsalians, [Parasians], Crannonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheraeans. Their commanders from Larisa were Polymedes and Aristonous, each representing one of the rival factions, and from Pharsalus, Menon. The other cities also had their own commanders.

CHAPTER 23

1 When the Athenians did not come out to meet them in battle, the Peloponnesians broke camp at Acharnae and laid waste some of the other demes between Mount Parnes and Mount Brilessus.

2 While they were still in the country, the Athenians dispatched the hundred ships they had been preparing to sail around the Peloponnese, carrying a thousand hoplites and four hundred archers. The generals were Carcinus son of Xenotimus, Proteas son of Epicles, and Socrates son of Antigenes.

3 These put to sea with this force and began their voyage around the coast. The Peloponnesians, after remaining in Attica as long as their provisions lasted, withdrew through Boeotia, not by the route of their invasion. As they passed Oropus, they ravaged the land called Graice, occupied by the Oropians, who were subjects of Athens. On reaching the Peloponnese they dispersed, each contingent to its own city.

CHAPTER 24

1 After their withdrawal, the Athenians established guards on land and at sea, intending to maintain them throughout the war. They also resolved to set aside a thousand talents from the money on the Acropolis as a separate reserve, not to be spent: the war was to be financed from the remaining funds. They imposed the penalty of death on anyone who proposed or put to the vote the use of this money for any other purpose, unless the enemy attacked the city with a naval force and it became necessary to defend it.

2 Along with this money, they reserved each year a hundred of their best triremes, with captains appointed to them. None of these ships was to be used for any other purpose, but only, if necessary, together with the money to meet that same danger.

CHAPTER 25

1 The Athenians in the hundred ships sailing around the Peloponnese were joined by Corcyraeans who had come to their aid with fifty ships, and by some of their other allies in that region. As they sailed, they damaged various places, and, landing at Methone in Laconia, they assaulted its wall, which was weak and had no men to defend it.

2 Brasidas son of Tellis, a Spartan, happened to be in that district with a guard force. On hearing of the attack, he hastened to the aid of the people in the town with a hundred hoplites. He dashed through the Athenian army, which was scattered over the countryside and facing the wall, and burst into Methone. Losing only a few of his men in the rush, he saved the city, and for this daring deed became the first man in the war to receive public praise at Sparta.

3 The Athenians put to sea and continued along the coast. Landing at Pheia in Elis, they ravaged the land for two days and defeated in battle three hundred picked men from Hollow Elis and Eleans from the surrounding district itself who had come to its defense.

4 A strong wind came down, and they were caught in rough weather on a harborless shore. Most embarked and sailed around the headland called Ichthys to the harbor at Pheia; meanwhile the Messenians and some others who could not get aboard marched overland and captured Pheia.

5 Later the ships came around, took them aboard, and put out to sea, abandoning Pheia; by then the main Elean army had arrived in support. The Athenians sailed on to other places and ravaged them.

CHAPTER 26

1 About this same time the Athenians sent thirty ships to cruise along Locris and at the same time guard Euboea. Their general was Cleopompus son of Clinias.

2 Making landings, he ravaged parts of the coast, captured Thronium and took hostages from its people, and defeated in battle at Alope the Locrians who had come in support.

CHAPTER 27

1 That same summer the Athenians also expelled the Aeginetans from Aegina, together with their children and wives, charging them with no small responsibility for the war. Besides, with Aegina lying so close to the Peloponnese, they thought it safer to possess the island themselves by sending settlers there. They dispatched the settlers not long afterward.

2 The Lacedaemonians gave the displaced Aeginetans Thyrea to live in and its land to cultivate, both because of their hostility toward the Athenians and because the Aeginetans had been their benefactors at the time of the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots. The territory of Thyrea lies on the border between Argive and Laconian land and extends down to the sea. Some of the Aeginetans settled there; the rest scattered throughout the other parts of Greece.

CHAPTER 28

1 That same summer, at the new moon—the only time, it seems, when such a thing can happen—the sun was eclipsed after midday and then became full again, having taken the shape of a crescent while some stars appeared.

CHAPTER 29

1 In the same summer the Athenians appointed Nymphodorus son of Pythes, a man of Abdera, as their proxenus and summoned him to Athens, though they had previously regarded him as an enemy. Sitalces had married his sister, and he wielded great influence with him; the Athenians wanted Sitalces son of Teres, king of the Thracians, to become their ally.

2 This Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first to extend the great Odrysian kingdom over much of the rest of Thrace; for a large part of the Thracians are independent.

3 This Teres has no connection with Tereus, who married Procne daughter of Pandion from Athens, nor did they come from the same part of Thrace. The latter [Tereus] lived at Daulia, in the land now called Phocis, which was then inhabited by Thracians. It was in this land that the women committed the deed concerning Itys; indeed, many poets, when speaking of the nightingale, have named the bird Daulian. It is also more likely that Pandion contracted his daughter's marriage over so short a distance, for mutual advantage, rather than as far away as the Odrysians, a journey of many days. Teres, whose name is not even the same, was the first king to establish the power of the Odrysians.

4 It was his son Sitalces whom the Athenians were making their ally, wanting his help in subduing the places on the Thracian coast and Perdiccas.

5 Nymphodorus came to Athens and secured the alliance with Sitalces and Athenian citizenship for his son Sadocus. He also undertook to bring the war in Thrace to an end: he would persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians a Thracian army of cavalry and peltasts.

6 He also reconciled Perdiccas with the Athenians and persuaded them to restore Therme to him. Perdiccas immediately joined the Athenians and Phormio in a campaign against the Chalcidians.

7 Thus Sitalces son of Teres, king of the Thracians, and Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, became allies of the Athenians.

CHAPTER 30

1 The Athenians in the hundred ships, still sailing around the Peloponnese, captured Sollium, a Corinthian town, and handed over its land and town for the exclusive possession of the Acarnanians of Palaerus. They also took Astacus by force, drove out its tyrant Euarchus, and brought the place into their alliance.

2 Sailing next to the island of Cephallenia, they brought it over without a battle. Cephallenia lies opposite Acarnania and Leucas and has four cities: Pale, Cranii, Same, and Pronni. Not long afterward the ships returned to Athens.

CHAPTER 31

1 Toward the autumn of that summer the Athenians invaded the Megarid in full force, citizens and resident foreigners alike, under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus. The Athenians in the hundred ships that had been sailing around the Peloponnese happened by then to be at Aegina on their way home. When they learned that the entire army from the city was in Megarian territory, they sailed there and joined it.

2 This was the largest Athenian army ever assembled in one body, while the city was still at full strength and had not yet suffered from the plague. The Athenian citizens themselves numbered no fewer than ten thousand hoplites, apart from their three thousand at Potidaea; the resident foreigners who joined the invasion furnished no fewer than three thousand hoplites, besides a considerable mass of light-armed troops. After laying waste most of the land, they withdrew.

3 Later in the war the Athenians made further invasions of the Megarid every year, sometimes with cavalry and sometimes with their whole army, until they captured Nisaea.

CHAPTER 32

1 At the close of that summer the Athenians also fortified Atalanta as a stronghold. This previously uninhabited island lies off the Opuntian Locrians; the fort was intended to prevent raiders from sailing out of Opus and the rest of Locris to plunder Euboea. These were the events of that summer after the Peloponnesian withdrawal from Attica.

CHAPTER 33

1 In the following winter Euarchus the Acarnanian, wishing to return to Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to sail with forty ships and fifteen hundred hoplites to restore him. He also hired some mercenaries himself. The commanders of the force were Euphamidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis.

2 They sailed and restored him. They also wished to gain possession of some other places on the Acarnanian coast, but, after trying and failing, they sailed for home.

3 On the way along the coast they put in at Cephallenia and landed in the territory of the Cranii. The Cranii deceived them by some agreement and attacked them unawares, causing losses among their men. They put to sea in some haste and made their way home.

CHAPTER 34

1 That same winter the Athenians, following their ancestral custom, held a public funeral for the first to die in this war. The ceremony was conducted in this way.

2 Two days before the funeral, they erect a tent and lay out the bones of the dead; each person brings whatever offering he wishes for his own.

3 When the funeral procession takes place, wagons carry coffins of cypress wood, one for each tribe. Within each lie the bones of those who belonged to that tribe. One empty bier, covered with a cloth, is carried for the missing whose bodies could not be found for recovery.

4 Anyone who wishes, citizen or foreigner, joins the procession, and the women related to the dead are present at the tomb to lament.

5 They lay the remains in the public burial ground, in the most beautiful suburb of the city. They always bury the war dead there, except for those who fell at Marathon: judging their valor exceptional, they made their tomb on the battlefield itself.

6 When the remains have been covered with earth, a man chosen by the city, considered a man of intelligence and eminent in standing, delivers a fitting speech in their praise. After this the people depart.

7 Such is their manner of burial, and throughout the war they observed this custom whenever the occasion arose.

8 For these first dead, Pericles son of Xanthippus was chosen to speak. When the moment came, he stepped forward from the tomb onto a high platform built so that his voice might reach as far as possible into the crowd, and spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 35

1 "Most of those who have spoken here before have praised the man who added this speech to our custom, holding it a fine thing that it should be delivered at the burial of those who die in war. To me it would have seemed enough that men who proved themselves brave in deeds should also have their honors dis-

played in deeds, as you see in the public arrangements here around this tomb, rather than that the valor of many should depend for its credibility on one man's speech, whether he speaks well or poorly.

2 "For it is difficult to speak with due measure where it is hard even to establish confidence in the truth. The listener who knows the facts and is well disposed may think that something has been presented less fully than he wishes and knows it to deserve; the listener without such knowledge may, from envy, think some things exaggerated, if he hears of anything beyond his own powers. Praise spoken of others is tolerable only so far as each man thinks himself capable of doing something of what he hears; what surpasses that limit provokes envy and then disbelief.

3 "But since those before us judged this practice right, I too must obey the custom and try, so far as possible, to meet the wishes and expectations of each of you.

CHAPTER 36

1 "I shall begin with our ancestors. It is both just and fitting that on such an occasion they should receive this tribute of remembrance. For the same people have always inhabited this land, and, through the succession of generations, have handed it down free to this day by their valor.

2 "They deserve praise, and our fathers deserve still more: through no little toil they added to their inheritance the empire we possess and left it to us who live today.

3 "Most of its expansion has been our own work, the work of those here today, most of us now in the settled prime of life. We have also furnished the city with everything, making it fully sufficient for itself in war and in peace.

4 "I shall pass over the deeds of war by which each possession was won, or the occasions when we or our fathers resolutely repelled a barbarian or Greek enemy's attack; I do not wish to speak at length to those who know these things.

But I shall first explain the habits by which we attained our power, the constitution under which it grew, and the character from which our greatness sprang, and then proceed to praise these men. I think such an account will suit this occasion and benefit the whole gathering, citizens and foreigners alike, who hear it.

CHAPTER 37

1 "Our constitution does not emulate the laws of our neighbors; we are ourselves an example to some rather than imitators of others. It is called a democracy because its administration serves not the few but the many. In private disputes the laws afford equality to all; in public distinction, each man is preferred according to the reputation he has earned in some field, not for belonging to a class so much as for his merit. Nor, if he can render some service to the city, is he hindered by poverty and the obscurity of his standing.

2 "We conduct our public life in freedom, and do not watch one another's daily pursuits with suspicion: we do not resent our neighbor for doing what pleases him, or burden him with looks of disapproval which, though harmless, are painful to see.

3 "But while we deal with one another without constraint in private, in public affairs reverence above all keeps us from breaking the law. We obey those who hold office at any time and the laws, especially those laid down to protect the injured, and those unwritten laws whose breach brings acknowledged shame.

CHAPTER 38

1 "We have also provided the mind with abundant relief from toil, observing games and sacrifices throughout the year, and maintaining handsome private homes, whose daily pleasure drives sorrow away.

2 "The greatness of our city brings everything to us from every land, so that we enjoy the good things produced here with no more sense of familiarity than those of other peoples.

CHAPTER 39

1 "In our preparations for war, too, we differ from our opponents in these ways. We throw our city open to all, and never expel foreigners to prevent anyone from learning or seeing something that an enemy might profit by observing if it were not concealed. We trust less in preparations and stratagems than in the courage that springs from ourselves when action comes. In education, they pursue courage from their earliest youth through laborious training; we live at ease, yet face dangers as great as theirs with no less resolve.

2 "Here is the proof: the Lacedaemonians do not invade our land alone, but with all their allies; we invade our neighbors' land ourselves and, fighting on foreign soil against men defending their own possessions, generally defeat them without difficulty.

3 "No enemy has yet encountered our whole strength together, since we must at the same time attend to our navy and send our own men on many missions by land. Yet if they engage some part of our force, on defeating a few of us they boast that they have driven us all back, and on being defeated they claim to have lost to us all.

4 "And yet, if we are willing to face danger through ease rather than arduous training, and with courage born of character rather than enforced by law, we gain this advantage: we do not exhaust ourselves in advance over sufferings still to come, and when we meet them we prove no less daring than those who are always laboring. Our city deserves admiration for these things, and for others as well.

CHAPTER 40

1 "For we cultivate beauty without extravagance and thought without softness. We use wealth as a resource for action rather than a boast in words; and to acknowledge poverty is no disgrace to anyone, but not to escape it through effort is more disgraceful.

2 "The same men can attend at once to their own affairs and to the city's, and those occupied with their trades can still have a sound understanding of public matters. For we alone regard the man who takes no part in these not as one who minds his own business, but as useless; and we ourselves either judge affairs or think them through correctly, believing that words do not impair deeds: the greater harm is to enter upon the necessary action without first being instructed by discussion.

3 "For in this too we are distinctive: the same men are both exceptionally daring and exact in calculating what they will undertake. In others, ignorance brings rashness, calculation hesitation. Yet those may justly be judged strongest in spirit who know most clearly what is terrible and what is pleasant, and are not thereby turned aside from danger.

4 "In generosity too we take the opposite course from most: we acquire friends not by receiving kindness but by doing it. The giver of a favor is the firmer friend, seeking through goodwill toward its recipient to keep the debt alive; the man who owes a favor in return is less eager, knowing that he will repay his generosity not as a kindness but as a debt.

5 "And we alone help others without misgiving, trusting not so much to calculations of advantage as to the confidence born of freedom.

CHAPTER 41

1 "In sum, I say that our city as a whole is an education for Hellas, and that, individually, the same man among us could, I believe, prove equal in his own person to the widest variety of tasks, with the greatest grace and versatility.

2 "That this is not a boast in words for the occasion, but the truth of deeds, is shown by the very power of the city, which we have acquired through these ways of life.

3 "For she alone among the cities of today proves greater in experience than in report; she alone gives neither an attacking enemy cause to resent the quality of those at whose hands he suffers, nor a subject cause to complain that his rulers are unworthy.

4 "We have displayed our power with great signs and certainly not without witnesses, and shall be admired by those who live now and those who come after. We have no need of Homer to praise us, nor of anyone whose verses will give momentary pleasure only for the truth to damage the impression they convey of our deeds. Rather, we have compelled every sea and land to open to our daring, and everywhere have established enduring memorials of the harm and the good we have done.

5 "For such a city these men died fighting, nobly resolving that she should not be taken from them; and it is only fitting that every survivor should willingly labor for her.

CHAPTER 42

1 "This is why I have spoken at length about the city: to show that the stakes of our struggle are not the same as those of men who possess none of these advantages in equal measure, and at the same time to establish by clear evidence the praise of those about whom I now speak.

2 "The greatest part of that praise has already been spoken. For the glories for which I celebrated the city were the adornment bestowed by the valor of these men and men like them; and for few of the Greeks would words appear so evenly matched with deeds as for these. Their present end seems to me to reveal a man's worth, both as its first disclosure and as its final confirmation.

3 "For even in men inferior in other respects, it is just to give precedence to their courage in war on behalf of their country. By effacing evil with good, they benefited the community more than they harmed it through their private lives.

4 "Of these men, none grew fainthearted through preferring the wealth he might still enjoy, nor did any, in the hope that he might yet escape poverty and become rich, postpone the danger. They held vengeance upon their opponents more desirable than these things and considered this the noblest of risks; with it they chose to punish their enemies and relinquish those other hopes. They entrusted the unseen prospect of success to hope, but in action, confronting what already lay before their eyes, they thought it right to rely on themselves. Judging it better to suffer while resisting than to yield and survive, they escaped the shame of reproach and bore the deed with their bodies; in the briefest turn of fortune they passed away at the height of glory rather than of fear.

CHAPTER 43

1 "Such, then, these men proved themselves, as befitted the city. Those who remain must pray for a safer resolve against the enemy, but consider none less daring acceptable. You must not weigh its benefit in words alone—someone might speak at length to you, who know it no less well yourselves, of all the good that lies in resisting the enemy. Rather, behold the city's power daily in its deeds and become her lovers; and whenever she seems great to you, reflect that men acquired this greatness by daring, by knowing what duty required, and by a sense of shame in action. Even when they failed in some attempt, they did not think that the city too should be deprived of their valor, but freely offered her the noblest contribution.

2 "For in giving their bodies to the common cause, each received for himself praise that never ages and the most conspicuous of tombs—not so much the one in which they lie as that in which their glory is left, eternally remembered whenever an occasion for word or deed presents itself.

3 "For the whole earth is the tomb of distinguished men. It is not only an inscription on pillars in their own land that marks them: even in a land not their own, an unwritten memory lives within each person, a memory of their resolve rather than of their deed.

4 "Take them now as your example; judge happiness to be freedom and freedom courage, and do not stand aside from the dangers of war.

5 "For it is not the unfortunate, who have no hope of good, who have the greater reason to be unsparing of their lives, but those who still risk a reversal while they live and stand to lose most if they stumble.

6 "For to a man with pride, the degradation that accompanies [an act of] cowardice is more painful than the unfelt death that comes with vigor and shared hope.

CHAPTER 44

1 "And so, to those parents of these men who are here, I offer consolation rather than lament. They know that they have grown up amid fortune's many turns. Fortunate are those whose lot is most honorable—death, as it is now for these men, or grief, as for you—and whose allotted span of happiness was also the measure of their lives.

2 "I know, indeed, that it is hard to persuade you of this, when you will so often find reminders in the good fortune of others, in which you too once rejoiced. Grief is not for the good things one loses without ever having known them, but for what is taken away after one has grown accustomed to it.

3 "Those who are still of an age to have children must find endurance also in the hope of others. In private life, children born afterward will help some to forget those who are gone; and the city will benefit in two ways, in not being depopulated and in its security. For men cannot deliberate fairly or justly unless they too expose their children to danger on equal terms.

4 "As for those past that age, count as gain the greater part of your lives in which you were fortunate, and remember that what remains will be brief; find relief in these men's renown. For the love of honor alone does not age, and in life's years of uselessness it is not gain, as some say, that gives the greater pleasure, but being honored.

CHAPTER 45

1 "For those here who are sons or brothers of these men, I see a great contest ahead. Everyone is accustomed to praise the dead, and even with extraordinary valor you would scarcely be judged a little below them, let alone their equals. The living meet envy from their rivals; those no longer in the way are honored with goodwill free of rivalry.

2 "And if I must also say something of the virtue of women, for those who will now be widows, a brief exhortation will convey it all. Great is your glory if you do not fall below the nature that is yours; and great too is hers whose name is least spoken of among men, whether for virtue or for blame.

CHAPTER 46

1 "I too have now spoken, as the law requires, what words I had that suited the occasion. In deed, those being buried have already received their honors; for what remains, the city will henceforth rear their children at public expense until they come of age, setting before these men and the survivors a crown of real benefit for such contests. For where the greatest prizes are established for valor, there also the best men live as citizens.

2 "Now, when each of you has mourned his own, depart."

CHAPTER 47

1 Such was the funeral held during this winter; and when the winter passed, the first year of this war came to an end.

2 As soon as summer began, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica with two-thirds of their forces, as on the first occasion. They were led by Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians; they established themselves and ravaged the land.

3 They had not yet been in Attica many days when the disease first began among the Athenians. It was said to have struck before in many places, around Lemnos and elsewhere; but nowhere was there any memory of so great a pestilence or such destruction of human life.

4 At first the doctors, treating it without knowledge, could give no help; indeed, they themselves died most, since they came into closest contact with it. Nor could any other human art avail. All the supplications they made at sanctuaries, their resort to oracles and the like, were useless; and at last, overcome by the calamity, they abandoned these too.

CHAPTER 48

1 It began, it is said, in Ethiopia beyond Egypt, then descended into Egypt and Libya and into most of the King's territory.

2 It fell suddenly upon the city of the Athenians, first attacking the people in Piraeus, so that they even said the Peloponnesians had thrown poison into the wells: there were as yet no fountains there. Later it reached the upper city too, and deaths now became far more numerous.

3 Let each speak according to his knowledge, physician and layman alike, about its probable origin and whatever causes he thinks could have had the power to bring about so great a change. I shall describe what the disease was like, and set out the signs by which anyone studying them might best recognize it, with some foreknowledge, if it should ever strike again. For I suffered from it myself and myself saw others suffering.

CHAPTER 49

1 That year, as was generally agreed, happened to be freer of other illnesses than any other; and if anyone was already unwell, it all developed into this.

2 The others, without any apparent cause, were suddenly seized while in full health, first by fierce heat in the head and redness and inflammation of the eyes; the parts within, the throat and tongue, were at once blood-red and gave off breath that was strange and foul-smelling.

3 These symptoms were followed by sneezing and hoarseness, and before long the pain descended to the chest with a violent cough. When it settled in the pit of the stomach, it turned it over, and there followed discharges of bile of every kind named by physicians, accompanied by great distress.

4 Most also suffered dry retching, which brought on violent spasms; in some these abated at this stage, in others only much later.

5 To the touch, the body's surface was neither excessively hot nor pale, but reddish and livid, breaking out in small blisters and sores. Inside, however, it burned so fiercely that the sufferers could not bear even the lightest clothing or linen laid over them, or anything but nakedness; they would most gladly have thrown themselves into cold water. Many of those left untended did indeed throw themselves into wells, driven by an unquenchable thirst; drinking more or less made no difference.

6 The torment of restlessness and sleeplessness pressed on them throughout. Yet while the disease was at its height the body did not waste away, but withstood the suffering beyond expectation. Thus most died on the ninth or seventh day from the inward burning, while they still had some strength; or, if they escaped this, the disease descended into the bowels, producing severe ulceration and uncontrollable diarrhea, through which most of them later died of weakness.

7 For the affliction, first lodged in the head, passed from above through the whole body; and even if someone survived its worst effects, its attack on the extremities left its mark.

8 For it struck the genitals and the ends of the hands and feet, and many escaped with the loss of these parts, some with the loss of their eyes as well. Others, on first recovering, were seized by a complete loss of memory and recognized neither themselves nor their friends and family.

CHAPTER 50

1 The character of the disease defied description: not only did it attack each sufferer more harshly than human nature could bear, but in this especially it showed itself something different from the familiar illnesses. Though many bodies lay unburied, the birds and four-footed animals that feed on human flesh either would not approach them or died after tasting them.

2 The evidence was this: birds of that kind conspicuously disappeared, and were seen neither near any such bodies nor anywhere else. Dogs, because they live with human beings, made the outcome easier to observe.

CHAPTER 51

1 Such was the disease in its general character; I pass over many other peculiarities in which one person's experience differed from another's. At that time none of the usual illnesses caused any additional distress; whatever did occur ended in this.

2 Some died from neglect, others despite the most careful treatment. There was not a single remedy, one might say, whose administration could be relied upon to help: what benefited one person harmed another.

3 No constitution, whether strong or weak, proved capable of resisting it; it carried off all alike, even those tended with every care in their regimen.

4 The most terrible features of the whole calamity were the despair that came whenever anyone felt himself falling ill—for their minds turned at once to hopelessness, and they abandoned themselves far more readily instead of resist-

ing—and the way they caught the infection from one another through nursing and died like sheep. This caused the greatest destruction.

5 For if fear made them unwilling to approach one another, they died alone, and many households were emptied for want of anyone to nurse them. If they did approach, they perished, especially those who laid any claim to virtue: shame made them unsparing of themselves in visiting their friends, when even the relatives at last grew too weary to lament the dead, overcome by the weight of calamity.

6 Yet those who had escaped the disease showed greater pity for the dying and the afflicted, both because they already knew the disease and because they were now themselves free of fear. For it did not strike the same person twice, at least not fatally. Others called them fortunate; and in their own overwhelming joy at the moment they entertained an idle hope for the future too, that they would never again be carried off even by another disease.

CHAPTER 52

1 Besides the suffering already upon them, the influx from the country into the city pressed them still harder, and the newcomers no less than the rest.

2 For there were no houses available, and they lived in huts stifling at that season of the year, so that death came amid utter disorder. As people died, their bodies lay heaped upon one another; the half-dead writhed in the streets and around every fountain in their longing for water.

3 The sanctuaries in which they had lodged were full of corpses, since people died there on the spot. For as the calamity overwhelmed them, people, not knowing where to turn, grew equally heedless of sacred things and religious obligations.

4 All the customs they had previously observed in burial were thrown into confusion, and each buried his dead as he could. Many resorted to shameless ways of burial, lacking the necessary supplies because so many of their own had

already died. Some put their own dead on another's pyre and lit it before those who had built it could arrive; others threw the body they were carrying on top of another already burning, and went away.

CHAPTER 53

1 The disease also first brought a greater lawlessness to the city in other matters. Men more readily dared to pursue pleasures they had previously concealed, seeing the swift reversals both of the prosperous, suddenly dying, and of those who had formerly owned nothing, but at once possessed their property.

2 So they thought they should enjoy what they had quickly and for pleasure, judging their bodies and their wealth alike things of a day.

3 No one was eager to endure further hardship for what was thought noble, considering it uncertain whether he would perish before attaining it. Whatever was pleasant at once, and whatever gain could serve that pleasure from any source, came to be considered both noble and useful.

4 Neither fear of the gods nor human law restrained them. As for the gods, seeing everyone perish alike, they judged that worship and its neglect came to the same thing; as for their offenses, no one expected to live until judgment was passed and pay the penalty. Rather, they felt that a far greater sentence had already been pronounced against them and hung over their heads, and that before it fell it was only reasonable to enjoy something of life.

CHAPTER 54

1 Such was the affliction that beset and oppressed the Athenians, with people dying within and their land being ravaged outside.

2 In their misery, as was natural, they also recalled this verse, which the older men said had long ago been sung: / "A Dorian war will come, and plague along with it."

3 There was a dispute among people over whether the ancients had named not plague but famine in the verse; but in the circumstances the view that plague had been spoken naturally prevailed, for people shaped their memory to their sufferings. Yet if another Dorian war should ever follow this one, I think, and a famine happen to occur, they will probably sing it that way.

4 Those who knew it also remembered the oracle given to the Lacedaemonians: when they asked the god whether they should go to war, he answered that if they fought with all their strength, victory would be theirs, and said that he himself would assist them.

5 So they conjectured that events accorded with the oracle. The disease began immediately after the Peloponnesians invaded; it did not enter the Peloponnese to any extent worth mentioning, but spread most widely over Athens, and then over the most populous of the other places. Such were the events connected with the disease.

CHAPTER 55

1 After ravaging the plain, the Peloponnesians advanced into the district called the Paralus as far as Laurium, where the Athenians have their silver mines. First they ravaged the part facing the Peloponnese, then that turned toward Euboea and Andros.

2 Pericles, who was general then too, held to the same opinion as during the former invasion: the Athenians should not march out against them.

CHAPTER 56

1 While they were still in the plain, before they reached the coast, he was preparing an expedition of a hundred ships against the Peloponnese; and when all was ready, he put to sea.

2 He carried on the ships four thousand Athenian hoplites, and three hundred cavalry in horse-transports, converted then for the first time from old ships. Chians and Lesbians also joined the expedition with fifty ships.

3 When this Athenian force put to sea, it left the Peloponnesians in the coastal district of Attica.

4 On reaching Epidaurus in the Peloponnese, they ravaged most of its territory; they also attacked the city and came to hope they could capture it, but did not succeed.

5 Putting out from Epidaurus, they ravaged the territories of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, all coastal districts of the Peloponnese.

6 Sailing from these, they reached Prasiae, a small coastal town in Laconia, ravaged its territory, and captured and sacked the town itself. After doing this they returned home. They no longer found the Peloponnesians in Attica: they had withdrawn.

CHAPTER 57

1 For as long as the Peloponnesians were in Athenian territory and the Athenians were campaigning aboard their ships, the disease destroyed Athenians both in the expeditionary force and in the city. It was even said that the Peloponnesians left the land more quickly out of fear of the disease, having learned from deserters that it was in the city and being aware at the same time of the burials.

2 Yet in this invasion they stayed longer than in any other and ravaged the whole country: they spent about forty days in Attica.

CHAPTER 58

1 During the same summer, Hagnon son of Nicias and Cleopompus son of Clinias, fellow generals of Pericles, took the force he had employed and at once campaigned against the Chalcidians in the Thracian region and against

Potidaea, which was still under siege. On arrival they brought siege engines against Potidaea and tried every means of taking it.

2 They made no progress toward capturing the city, nor did their other efforts meet with success commensurate with their preparations. For the disease fell upon them and now pressed the Athenians very hard, destroying the army; even the Athenian troops already there, who had previously been healthy, became infected from Hagnon's force. Phormio and his sixteen hundred men were no longer in the Chalcidian region.

3 Hagnon therefore returned with the ships to Athens, having lost to the disease one thousand and fifty out of four thousand hoplites in about forty days. The troops who had been there before remained in position and continued the siege of Potidaea.

CHAPTER 59

1 After the Peloponnesians' second invasion, the Athenians began to change their minds, as their land had been ravaged a second time and disease and war pressed upon them together.

2 They blamed Pericles for having persuaded them to go to war, holding him responsible for the disasters into which they had fallen, and were eager to come to terms with the Lacedaemonians. They sent ambassadors to them, but achieved nothing. Finding no way out in any direction, they pressed their attacks on Pericles.

3 He saw them embittered by their present circumstances and doing everything he had expected. Calling an assembly—for he was still general—he wished to hearten them and, by turning their minds from anger, bring them to a calmer and less fearful temper. He came forward and spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 60

1 "Your anger against me has come as I expected—I understand its causes—and that is why I have called this assembly: to remind you of certain things and to rebuke you if you are either angry with me or yielding to your misfortunes without just cause.

2 "For I believe that a city prospering as a whole brings its individual citizens greater benefit than one in which each citizen prospers but the community falls to ruin.

3 "A man whose private affairs are flourishing is nevertheless destroyed along with his country when it perishes; but a man suffering misfortune in a fortunate city has a far better chance of surviving.

4 "Since, then, a city can bear the misfortunes of individuals, while no individual can bear those of the city, how can it not be everyone's duty to defend it, instead of doing what you are doing now? Stunned by your troubles at home, you abandon the common safety, and blame both me, who advised you to fight, and yourselves, who agreed.

5 "And yet the man with whom you are angry is one who considers himself second to none in discerning what must be done and explaining it, a lover of his city and above the power of money.

6 "For a man who understands but cannot explain clearly is no better placed than if he had never formed the thought. One who possesses both gifts but bears his city ill will cannot speak with the same devotion to its interests; and if he has this devotion too, but yields to money, all the rest will be sold for this one thing.

7 "So if you were persuaded to go to war because you believed that I possessed these qualities even somewhat more than others, it would not be reasonable now to charge me, at least, with wrongdoing.

CHAPTER 61

1 "For those who have a choice and are otherwise fortunate, going to war is great folly. But if the choice was necessarily between yielding to one's neighbors and submitting at once, or facing danger and prevailing, the man who evades the danger deserves more blame than the man who confronts it.

2 "I remain the same and do not shift my ground; it is you who change. You were persuaded when unharmed, but repent now that you suffer, and my advice appears wrong through the weakness of your judgment. Each of you already feels the pain, while the benefit is not yet apparent to anyone; and with a great reversal falling upon you in so short a time, your minds lack the strength to persevere in what you resolved.

3 "For the sudden, the unexpected, and what happens most contrary to calculation enslave the spirit; and this, besides your other troubles, has happened to you above all in the plague.

4 "Yet as citizens of a great city, brought up in habits worthy of it, you must be willing to face even the greatest misfortunes and not efface your standing. People think it equally just to blame the man who falls short of his established reputation through weakness and to hate the man who reaches boldly for a reputation he has no right to. You must put aside the pain of your private losses and take up the defense of the common safety.

CHAPTER 62

1 "As for your fear that the labor of war may prove great without bringing us victory, you should be satisfied with the many arguments by which I have shown on other occasions that this suspicion is unfounded. But I shall also make clear something about the extent of your imperial power which, I think, you have never considered for yourselves, nor have I set out in my earlier speeches. I would not have employed it now either, since its claim has a somewhat boastful air, had I not seen you unreasonably cast down.

2 "You think that you rule only your allies; but I declare that, of the two realms open to human use, land and sea, you are absolute masters of the whole of one —not merely as far as you now range, but farther too, if you wish. With your present naval resources, neither the King nor any other people now in existence can prevent you from sailing.

3 "This power plainly bears no comparison with the use of houses and land, whose loss you consider so great. Rather than grieve over them, you should think little of them, regarding them beside this power as a garden plot, an ornament of wealth. Recognize that freedom, if we hold fast and preserve it, will readily recover these things, whereas submission to others commonly diminishes even what was possessed before. Do not prove inferior to your fathers in either respect: they secured these things through labor, not by receiving them from others, and, preserving them as well, handed them down to you. To be stripped of what one holds is more shameful than to fail in acquiring it. Meet your enemies not merely with confidence, but with contempt.

4 "For even a coward may acquire a boastful spirit through ignorance favored by fortune; but contempt belongs to the man who trusts his judgment that he is superior to his opponents—and that is our position.

5 "And when fortune is equal, intelligence makes the daring born of a sense of superiority more secure. It relies less on hope, whose strength lies in helplessness, than on judgment drawn from the resources at hand, whose foresight is more dependable.

CHAPTER 63

1 "It is right that you should defend the city's honor, which comes from ruling and in which you all glory: you must not shun its labors, unless you also renounce its honors. Nor should you think that the struggle concerns only one thing, slavery instead of freedom; it also concerns the loss of empire and the danger from those whose hatred you have earned in exercising it.

2 "You can no longer withdraw from that empire, even if someone, frightened by the present crisis, would play the virtuous man by remaining inactive. For by now you hold it as a tyranny: taking it may seem unjust, but letting it go is dangerous.

3 "Such men would very quickly destroy a city, whether by persuading others or by settling somewhere independently on their own. For inactivity cannot survive unless it takes its place beside action; nor is it advantageous in a ruling city, but in a subject city, to live safely as a slave.

CHAPTER 64

1 "Do not let such citizens lead you astray, and do not be angry with me, when you yourselves joined me in deciding on war. Our enemies have invaded and done what was to be expected when you refused to submit; and beyond what we anticipated this plague has come upon us—the one event of all that has surpassed expectation. I know that it accounts for some further share of your hatred of me, but unjustly, unless you will also give me credit whenever you prosper beyond calculation.

2 "What comes from the gods must be borne as necessity, and what comes from our enemies with courage. This has long been the city's practice; do not let it be broken in your time.

3 "Know that the city has the greatest name among all peoples because it does not yield to misfortune, and has expended more lives and labor in war than any other; that it has acquired the greatest power yet known; and that the memory of this power will remain forever among those who come after us, even if we should now at some point give ground—for all things naturally decline. They will remember that we Greeks ruled over more Greeks than any others, withstood the greatest wars against them all together and separately, and inhabited a city richer in every resource and greater than any other.

4 "The inactive man may find fault with these things; but anyone who wishes to achieve something himself will emulate them, while anyone who lacks them will envy them.

5 "To be hated and to cause distress for the moment has been the lot of all who have claimed the right to rule others. But the man who accepts that burden of envy for the greatest ends judges rightly. For hatred does not last long, while present splendor and glory in the time to come remain in everlasting memory.

6 "Look ahead to the honor of the future and to the avoidance of disgrace now, and secure both by an immediate show of resolve. Send no more heralds to the Lacedaemonians, and do not reveal how heavily your present hardships weigh upon you. For those who are least distressed in spirit by misfortune and most steadfast against it in action are the strongest, whether cities or individuals."

CHAPTER 65

1 By speaking in this way, Pericles tried to release the Athenians from their anger against him and turn their thoughts away from their present terrors.

2 In public affairs they were persuaded by his words: they no longer sent to the Lacedaemonians and pursued the war with greater determination. In private, however, they grieved over their sufferings: the common people because, having started with little, they had lost even that; the powerful because they had lost fine estates in the countryside, with their buildings and costly fittings; and, most of all, because they had war instead of peace.

3 Nevertheless, the whole body of citizens did not cease to be angry with him until they had imposed a fine upon him.

4 Not long afterward, in the usual manner of a crowd, they elected him general again and entrusted all affairs to him. Each man's pain over his private losses had by then grown less acute, and they considered him the most valuable man for the needs of the city as a whole.

5 For throughout the time when he led the city in peace, he guided it with moderation and kept it safe, and under him it became greatest; and when war broke out, he evidently foresaw its strength in this too.

6 He lived for two years and six months after its outbreak; and after his death the foresight of his judgment about the war became still more apparent.

7 For he said that they would prevail if they remained on the defensive, attended to the fleet, and neither sought to extend their empire during the war nor put the city at risk. They did the opposite in all these respects, and, pursuing private ambitions and private gains, mismanaged even matters seemingly unconnected with the war, to the harm of themselves and their allies. When such policies succeeded, they chiefly brought honor and advantage to individuals; when they failed, the damage fell upon the city in its conduct of the war.

8 The reason was that Pericles, powerful through his standing and judgment, and manifestly incorruptible in matters of money, held the people in check without curtailing their freedom; he led them rather than being led by them. Since he did not seek to acquire power by improper means, he had no need to speak to please them; his standing instead enabled him to contradict them even at the cost of their anger.

9 Whenever he saw them emboldened by arrogance at the wrong moment, his words struck them with fear; and when they were unreasonably afraid, he restored their confidence. What existed was a democracy in word, but in deed the rule of the foremost man.

10 His successors, being more nearly equal to one another and each striving to become foremost, turned to pleasing the people and surrendered even the conduct of affairs to them.

11 From this arose many errors, as was to be expected in a great city possessing an empire, and in particular the expedition to Sicily. This was not so much a misjudgment concerning the people they were attacking as a failure by those who sent it to decide on measures suited to the men abroad. Instead, through pri-

vate slanders in their contest for leadership of the people, they both blunted the army's effectiveness and, for the first time, brought the city's affairs into turmoil through their quarrels with one another.

12 Though they had lost other forces and the greater part of their fleet in Sicily, and civil strife was already upon the city, they nevertheless held out for three years against their original enemies, the Sicilians who joined them, most of their own allies, who had now revolted, and later Cyrus, the King's son, who joined the opposing side and supplied the Peloponnesians with money for their fleet. They did not give in until they had fallen upon one another in their private quarrels and brought about their own overthrow.

13 So ample was the margin in Pericles' estimate at the time: on the grounds he had foreseen, the city could quite easily have prevailed in the war against the Peloponnesians alone.

CHAPTER 66

1 In the same summer, the Lacedaemonians and their allies sailed with a hundred ships against the island of Zacynthus, which lies opposite Elis. Its inhabitants are colonists of the Achaeans of the Peloponnese and were allied with Athens.

2 A thousand Lacedaemonian hoplites were aboard, with Cnemus, a Spartan, as admiral. They landed and ravaged most of the country; but when the inhabitants would not come to terms, they sailed home.

CHAPTER 67

1 At the end of the same summer, Aristeus the Corinthian, the Lacedaemonian envoys Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Pratodamus, Timagoras of Tegea, and Pollis, an Argive traveling in a private capacity, were on their way to Asia to visit the King, hoping to persuade him to provide money and join the war. They first came to Sitalces son of Teres in Thrace. They wished, if possible, to persuade him to abandon his alliance with Athens and march against Potidaea, where an

Athenian army was conducting the siege, and also to obtain passage through his territory on their intended journey across the Hellespont to Pharnaces son of Pharnabazus, who was to send them on to the King.

2 The Athenian envoys Learchus son of Callimachus and Ameiniades son of Philemon happened to be with Sitalces. They persuaded his son Sadocus, who had become an Athenian citizen, to hand the men over to them, so that they should not cross over to the King and do their part in harming his adopted city.

3 Won over, Sadocus sent others with Learchus and Ameiniades and had the men arrested as they traveled through Thrace toward the vessel in which they intended to cross the Hellespont, before they embarked. He ordered their captors to hand them over to the Athenian envoys, who took charge of them and brought them to Athens.

4 Upon their arrival, the Athenians feared that Aristeus might escape and do them still greater harm, since he was known to have been responsible already for the whole affair at Potidaea and on the Thracian coast. That very day they put all the men to death without trial, though they wished to make certain statements, and threw them into a ravine. They considered themselves justified in retaliating by the same means that the Lacedaemonians had first employed, when they killed the Athenian and allied merchants they caught sailing in cargo ships around the Peloponnese and threw them into ravines. For at the beginning of the war the Lacedaemonians killed as enemies everyone they captured at sea, both those fighting alongside Athens and those on neither side.

CHAPTER 68

1 About the same time, at the end of the summer, the Ambraciots, having mobilized many of the barbarians as well as their own forces, marched against Amphilochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia.

2 Their hostility toward the Argives first arose as follows.

3 After the Trojan War, Amphilochus son of Amphiaraus returned home and, dissatisfied with the state of affairs at Argos, founded Amphilochian Argos and settled the rest of Amphilochia on the Ambracian Gulf, naming Argos after his own native city.

4 (This city was the largest in Amphilochia and had the most powerful inhabitants.)

5 Many generations later, however, under pressure from misfortunes, the Argives invited the Ambraciots, whose territory bordered Amphilochia, to settle with them. It was then, through these Ambraciot settlers, that they first acquired the Greek language they now speak; the other Amphilochians are barbarians.

6 In time, then, the Ambraciots expelled the Argives and occupied the city themselves.

7 After this happened, the Amphilochians entrusted themselves to the Acarnanians. Both peoples then called in the Athenians, who sent them the general Phormio and thirty ships. When Phormio arrived, they took Argos by storm and enslaved the Ambraciots; Amphilochians and Acarnanians settled there together.

8 It was after this that the alliance between the Athenians and the Acarnanians first came into being.

9 The Ambraciots' hostility toward the Argives began with this enslavement of their own people. Later, during the war, they undertook the present expedition with their own forces, the Chaonians, and some of the other neighboring barbarians. When they reached Argos, they gained control of the countryside, but their assault failed to capture the city; they withdrew home and dispersed to their respective peoples. Such were the events of the summer.

CHAPTER 69

1 In the following winter, the Athenians sent twenty ships around the Peloponnese under the general Phormio. Based at Naupactus, he kept watch to prevent anyone from sailing out of Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf or sailing in. They sent another six ships under the general Melesander toward Caria and Lycia, to collect money in those regions and prevent Peloponnesian pirates from using them as bases to interfere with the passage of cargo ships from Phaselis, Phoenicia, and the mainland in that direction.

2 Melesander marched inland into Lycia with a force of Athenians from the ships and allies; he was defeated in battle and killed, and lost part of his army.

CHAPTER 70

1 During the same winter, the Potidaeans could no longer hold out under siege. The Peloponnesian invasions of Attica had done nothing to dislodge the Athenians, their food had run out, many other desperate expedients for obtaining nourishment had already been tried there, and some had even tasted one another's flesh. In these circumstances they approached the Athenian generals commanding against them—Xenophon son of Euripides, Hestiodorus son of Aristoclides, and Phanomachus son of Callimachus—to discuss an agreement.

2 The generals accepted the proposal, seeing the army's hardship in a place exposed to winter weather, and knowing that the city had already spent two thousand talents on the siege.

3 They therefore agreed on these terms: the inhabitants, their children and wives, and the mercenaries were to leave with one garment each, the women with two, and a specified sum of money for their journey.

4 They left under the protection of the agreement, going to Chalcidice and wherever each could. The Athenians blamed the generals for reaching an agreement without consulting them, for they believed they could have secured the city on

whatever terms they wished. Later they sent settlers of their own to Potidaea and established them there. These were the events of the winter, and the second year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

CHAPTER 71

1 In the following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies did not invade Attica, but marched against Plataea, led by Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. He encamped with his army and was about to ravage the land when the Plataeans immediately sent envoys to him, who spoke as follows:

2 "Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, in marching against the land of Plataea you act unjustly and unworthily both of yourselves and of the fathers from whom you descend. For Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedaemonian, freed Hellas from the Medes with those Greeks who were willing to share the danger of the battle fought here. After sacrificing to Zeus the Liberator in the marketplace of Plataea and summoning all the allies, he restored their own land and city to the Plataeans, to inhabit in independence. No one was ever to march against them unjustly or to enslave them; otherwise, the allies then present were to defend them to the best of their ability.

3 "Your fathers granted us this for the courage and zeal we displayed in those dangers; but you do the opposite. You have come with the Thebans, our bitterest enemies, to enslave us.

4 "Calling as witnesses the gods who sanctioned the oaths then, your ancestral gods, and the gods of our own land, we tell you not to wrong the territory of Plataea or violate the oaths, but to let us live in independence, as Pausanias judged right."

CHAPTER 72

1 When the Plataeans had said this, Archidamus answered: "Your words are just, men of Plataea, if your actions match them. As Pausanias granted you, live in independence yourselves, and help to free the others who shared in the dangers of that time and swore the oaths with you, but are now under Athenian rule. This great armament has been raised and this war begun to liberate them and the rest. Best of all, join in that liberation and so keep your oaths yourselves. Failing that, as we have already proposed before, remain at peace, enjoying your own possessions, and take neither side. Receive both as friends, but neither for purposes of war. That will satisfy us."

2 Such was Archidamus' answer. After hearing it, the Plataean envoys went into the city and communicated his words to the people. They replied that they could not do as he proposed without the Athenians' consent, since their children and wives were with them. They also feared for the whole city: once the Lacedaemonians withdrew, the Athenians might come and refuse to allow the arrangement, or the Thebans might again try to seize their city, invoking the oath's requirement that both sides be admitted.

3 To reassure them on these points, he said: "Hand over your city and houses to us Lacedaemonians, mark out the boundaries of your land, and give us a count of your trees and anything else that can be counted. Move away yourselves wherever you wish for the duration of the war. When it is over, we shall return what we have received. Until then we shall hold it in trust, cultivating the land and paying you a return sufficient for your needs."

CHAPTER 73

1 On hearing this they went back into the city and, after consulting the people, said that they wished first to communicate his proposal to the Athenians; if they persuaded them, they would do as he asked. In the meantime, they

requested a truce and asked him not to ravage their land. He granted a truce for as many days as their journey could reasonably be expected to take, and left the land unharmed.

2 The [Plataean] envoys went to the Athenians and consulted them, then returned and reported to those in the city as follows:

3 "Men of Plataea, the Athenians say that never in the past, from the time we became allies, have they abandoned you when you were wronged, nor will they stand by now: they will help you to the best of their ability. They charge you, by the oaths your fathers swore, to make no change in the alliance."

CHAPTER 74

1 When the envoys had delivered this report, the Plataeans resolved not to betray the Athenians, but to endure the sight of their land being ravaged, if necessary, and whatever else might befall them. No one was to go out again; instead they would answer from the wall that they could not do as the Lacedaemonians proposed.

2 After they had given their answer, King Archidamus first appealed to the gods and heroes of the land to bear witness, speaking as follows: "Gods and heroes who possess the land of Plataea, be witnesses that our coming into this land was not unjust in the first place: these men had already abandoned our common oath. This is the land where our fathers prayed to you and defeated the Medes, and you made it favorable to the Greeks in their struggle. Nor shall we act unjustly in anything we may now do; for we have made many reasonable proposals and have not prevailed. Give your assent: let those who first committed injustice suffer punishment, and let those who lawfully bring it upon them obtain redress."

CHAPTER 75

1 After this appeal to the gods, he set his army to war. First they enclosed the Plataeans with a palisade made from the trees they had cut down, to prevent anyone from coming out; then they began raising a mound against the city, expecting that with so great an army at work they would capture it very quickly.

2 They cut timber from Cithaeron and built up both sides, laying it crosswise like wickerwork in place of walls, so that the mound would not spread too far. Into it they carried brushwood, stones, earth, and anything else whose addition might advance the work.

3 For seventy days and nights they kept building without interruption, divided into shifts for rest, so that some carried material while others took food and sleep. The Lacedaemonian officers commanding the contingents from each city joined in supervising them and drove them on with the work.

4 When the Plataeans saw the mound rising, they assembled a wooden framework and set it on their own wall where the mound was approaching. Within this they built up bricks, which they took from the neighboring houses as they pulled them down.

5 The timber bound the bricks together, to keep the structure from becoming weak as it rose; and it had screens of hides and leather, so that both the workmen and the timber would be protected against fire-bearing arrows and kept safe.

6 The wall was rising to a great height, and the mound rose to meet it no less quickly. The Plataeans then devised this expedient: they broke through their wall where the mound pressed against it and carried the earth inside.

CHAPTER 76

1 When the Peloponnesians discovered this, they packed clay into reed frames and threw them into the breach, so that the material could not crumble like earth and be carried away.

2 Blocked in this direction, the Plataeans abandoned that method. Instead they dug a tunnel from the city, calculated its course beneath the mound, and once again drew the soil away into their own lines. For a long time the men outside did not discover them; thus their additions made less progress, as the mound was being undermined from below and continually settling into the space left empty.

3 But fearing that even so they would be unable, with their few men against so many, to hold out, they devised a further measure. They stopped work on the great structure facing the mound and, starting on either side of it from the low wall, built an inward-curving crescent of wall within the city. If the great wall were taken, this would hold out, and the enemy would have to build another mound against it; as they advanced inward, they would face twice the labor and be more exposed to attack from both sides.

4 Along with their work on the mound, the Peloponnesians brought siege engines against the city. One, brought up on the mound against the great structure, shook it severely and frightened the Plataeans; others were brought against other parts of the wall. The Plataeans threw nooses around these and hauled them upward. They also suspended great beams by long iron chains attached at either end to two sloping spars that projected beyond the wall, and drew the beams up crosswise. Whenever an engine was about to strike at any point, they let the beam go, allowing the chains to slacken instead of holding it in hand; falling with force, it snapped off the projecting head of the ram.

CHAPTER 77

1 After this, since their engines achieved nothing and a counterwall was rising against their mound, the Peloponnesians judged that the means of attack at their disposal offered no way to take the city, and began preparing to enclose it with a wall.

2 First, however, they decided to try fire, to see whether, if a wind arose, they could burn down the city, which was not large. They were devising every possible means of bringing it into their hands without expense and a siege.

3 They carried bundles of brushwood and threw them from the mound, first into the space between the wall and the earthwork. With so many hands at work, this was soon filled; then they piled more over as much of the rest of the city as they could reach from their elevated position. They threw in fire with sulfur and pitch and set the wood alight.

4 A blaze arose greater than any fire made by human hands that anyone had yet seen, at least up to that time; for in the mountains, woodland had before now, through the friction of trees in the wind, spontaneously kindled and sent up flames.

5 This fire was enormous, and came very near to destroying the Plataeans, who had escaped all the other dangers. A large part of the city could not be approached; and if a wind had arisen to drive the fire into it, as the enemy hoped, they would not have escaped.

6 As it was, this too is said to have occurred: heavy rain [from the sky] and thunder came, quenching the flames and so ending the danger.

CHAPTER 78

1 When the Peloponnesians failed in this attempt as well, they retained part of their army and dismissed the greater part, then built a wall all around the city, dividing the ground among the contingents from each city. There was a ditch

both inside and outside, from which they made their bricks.

2 When everything was finished, about the rising of Arcturus, they left guards for half the wall—the Boeotians guarded the other half—and withdrew their army, dispersing to their several cities.

3 The Plataeans had previously sent their children, women, oldest men, and the mass of those unfit for service to Athens. Those left behind to endure the siege were four hundred Plataeans, eighty Athenians, and a hundred and ten women who prepared their food.

4 These were their entire numbers when the siege began; there was no one else within the walls, slave or free. Such were the preparations for the siege of Plataea.

CHAPTER 79

1 In the same summer, at the time of the expedition against Plataea, the Athenians campaigned against the Chalcidians in Thrace and the Bottiaeans with two thousand of their own hoplites and two hundred cavalry, when the grain was ripe. Xenophon son of Euripides was general, with two colleagues.

2 They came beneath the walls of Spartolus in Bottice and destroyed the grain. It seemed that the city would also come over to them, through the efforts of certain men within. But those who opposed this sent to Olynthus, and hoplites and other troops arrived to guard the city. When this force came out of Spartolus, the Athenians engaged it in battle immediately below the city.

3 The Chalcidian hoplites and some auxiliaries with them were defeated by the Athenians and withdrew into Spartolus, but the Chalcidian cavalry and light troops defeated the Athenian cavalry and light troops.

4 The Chalcidians also had a few peltasts from the country called Crusis. The battle had only just ended when more peltasts came to their aid from Olynthus.

5 When the light troops from Spartolus saw them, encouraged both by these reinforcements and by their own earlier success, they attacked the Athenians again, together with the Chalcidian cavalry and the men who had come to help. The Athenians withdrew toward the two companies they had left beside the baggage.

6 Whenever the Athenians advanced, the enemy gave way; when they withdrew, the enemy pressed them and hurled javelins. The Chalcidian cavalry rode up and attacked wherever they thought best, and by the fear they inspired contributed greatly to routing the Athenians, whom they pursued a long way.

7 The Athenians took refuge in Potidaea. Later they recovered their dead under truce and returned to Athens with the remnant of their army. Four hundred and thirty of their men had died, and all their generals. The Chalcidians and Bottiaeans set up a trophy, recovered their own dead, and dispersed to their several cities.

CHAPTER 80

1 In the same summer, not long after these events, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, wishing to subdue the whole of Acarnania and detach it from Athens, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to equip a fleet from their allies and send a thousand hoplites against Acarnania. They argued that if the Lacedaemonians joined them with ships and infantry at the same time, the Acarnanians on the coast would be unable to unite in the defense: they would easily secure Acarnania and then master Zacynthus and Cephallenia as well. The Athenians would no longer be able to sail around the Peloponnese as before; there was even hope of taking Naupactus.

2 The Lacedaemonians were persuaded and immediately sent Cnemus, who was still admiral, with the hoplites in a few ships. They instructed the fleet to make ready and sail to Leucas as quickly as possible.

3 The Corinthians were especially eager to support the Ambraciots, who were their colonists. The ships from Corinth, Sicyon, and the places in that region were still being prepared, while those from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia had arrived earlier and were waiting at Leucas.

4 Cnemus and the thousand hoplites with him crossed over undetected by Phormio, who commanded the twenty Athenian ships keeping watch around Naupactus, and at once began preparing the expedition by land.

5 Of the Greeks, he had with him Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians he had brought himself; of the barbarians, a thousand Chaonians, who had no king and were led by Photius and Nicanor, members of the ruling family who held the chief office for the year. The Thesprotians, who likewise had no king, campaigned with the Chaonians.

6 Sabylinthus led the Molossians and Atintanians, acting as guardian to King Tharyps, who was still a child; Oroedus, their king, led the Parauaeans. A thousand Orestians, whose king was Antiochus, campaigned with the Parauaeans, Antiochus having entrusted their command to Oroedus.

7 Perdiccas also sent a thousand Macedonians without the Athenians' knowledge; these arrived later.

8 With this army Cnemus advanced, without waiting for the fleet from Corinth. Passing through Argeia, they sacked Limnaea, an unwalled village. They came against Stratus, the largest city in Acarnania, believing that if they took this first, the rest would readily come over to them.

CHAPTER 81

1 When the Acarnanians learned that a large army had invaded by land and that the enemy would arrive by sea with ships at the same time, they did not unite in the defense, but each guarded their own territory. They sent to Phormio, asking him to help; he replied that with a fleet about to sail from Corinth, he could not leave Naupactus unprotected.

2 The Peloponnesians and their allies divided themselves into three bodies and advanced toward the city of the Stratians, intending to camp close by and, if persuasion failed, to attempt the wall by force.

3 The Chaonians and the other barbarians advanced in the center; to their right were the Leucadians, Anactorians, and those with them, and on the left Cnemus, the Peloponnesians, and the Ambraciots. They were widely separated from one another, sometimes even out of sight.

4 The Greeks advanced in formation, maintaining their guard until they encamped in a suitable place. But the Chaonians, confident in themselves and regarded by the mainland peoples of that region as the most warlike, did not wait to establish a camp. They rushed forward with the other barbarians, thinking to take the city at the first shout and make the achievement their own.

5 The Stratians perceived this while they were still approaching. Judging that if they defeated them in isolation, the Greeks would no longer advance against them with the same confidence, they laid ambushes beforehand around the city. When the enemy came close, they charged out from the city and fell upon them from the ambushes.

6 The Chaonians were thrown into panic and many were killed; when the other barbarians saw them giving way, they no longer stood their ground but took to flight.

7 Neither of the Greek divisions knew of the battle, since the barbarians had gone far ahead and were thought to be hurrying to establish a camp.

8 But when the fleeing barbarians came pressing back upon them, they took them in, united their divisions, and stayed quietly where they were for the day. The Stratians did not come to close quarters, since the other Acarnanians had not yet joined them, but slung stones from a distance and reduced them to helplessness: they could not move without their armor. The Acarnanians are considered unsurpassed in the use of the sling.

CHAPTER 82

1 When night came, Cnemus withdrew his army in haste to the river Anapus, eighty stades from Stratus. The next day he recovered his dead under truce, and, when men from Oeniadae came to him as friends, he withdrew to their city before the Acarnanian reinforcements arrived. From there each contingent returned home. The Stratians set up a trophy for the battle against the barbarians.

CHAPTER 83

1 The fleet from Corinth and the other allies in the Crisaean Gulf, which was to have joined Cnemus to prevent the Acarnanians on the coast from bringing help inland, did not arrive. Instead, about the same days as the battle at Stratus, it was compelled to fight a sea battle against Phormio and the twenty Athenian ships stationed at Naupactus.

2 For Phormio was watching them as they sailed along out of the gulf, intending to attack in open water.

3 The Corinthians and their allies were sailing with equipment intended not for a sea battle but rather for a land campaign in Acarnania, and did not think the Athenians would venture to fight their forty-seven ships with only twenty of their own. But they saw the Athenians keeping pace with them as they sailed along the coast; and when they crossed from Patrae in Achaea toward the opposite mainland, making for Acarnania, they observed the Athenians sailing toward them from Chalcis and the river Evenus. Nor had their departure by night escaped notice. Thus they were compelled to fight in the middle of the strait.

4 Each of the cities contributing ships had its own commanders; those of the Corinthians were Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas.

5 The Peloponnesians formed their ships into as wide a circle as they could without allowing the enemy to sail through, with prows outward and sterns inward. They placed inside both the small craft accompanying them and their five fastest ships, so that these could emerge at short notice to support any point the enemy attacked.

CHAPTER 84

1 The Athenians, ranged in single file, sailed around them, continually passing close alongside and making as if to ram at once, forcing them into an ever narrower space. But Phormio had ordered them not to attack until he himself gave the signal.

2 He expected that their formation would not hold like an infantry formation on land: the ships would collide, and the small craft would cause confusion. If the wind blew out of the gulf—the wind he was awaiting as he circled, which usually arose toward dawn—they would not remain steady for a moment. Since his own ships handled better, he considered that the choice of when to attack lay with him, and that this would be the best moment.

3 The wind came down, and the ships, already confined in a narrow space, were thrown into confusion by the combined pressure of the wind and the small craft. Ship struck ship, and the men pushed them apart with poles; amid their shouting, warnings, and abuse of one another, they could hear neither orders nor the rowing-masters. Inexperienced men, unable to lift their oars clear of the waves, made their ships less responsive to the helmsmen. At precisely this moment Phormio gave the signal. The Athenians fell upon them and first sank one of the commanders' ships, then destroyed the others wherever they went. They brought them to such a state that in their confusion none turned to resist, but all fled toward Patrae and Dyme in Achaea.

4 The Athenians pursued, captured twelve ships, and took aboard most of their crews, then sailed away to Molycreum. They set up a trophy on Rhium, dedicated a ship to Poseidon, and returned to Naupactus.

5 The Peloponnesians too sailed at once with their remaining ships from Dyme and Patrae to Cyllene, the port of the Eleans. After the battle at Stratus, Cnemus and the ships from Leucas, which were to have joined this fleet, also arrived at Cyllene.

CHAPTER 85

1 The Lacedaemonians also sent Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron to the fleet as advisers to Cnemus, ordering him to prepare for another, more successful sea battle and not to let a few ships bar him from the sea.

2 The outcome seemed to them utterly contrary to expectation, especially since this was their first experience of a sea battle. They did not believe their fleet so inferior, but thought there must have been some failure of nerve; they did not weigh the Athenians' long experience against their own brief training. They therefore sent the advisers in anger.

3 On arriving, these men, together with Cnemus, sent orders to the cities for additional ships and fitted out those already there for a sea battle.

4 Phormio too sent men to Athens to report the enemy's preparations and give an account of the sea battle they had won, requesting that as many ships as possible be sent to him quickly, since he expected from day to day to fight at any moment.

5 The Athenians dispatched twenty ships to him, but gave their commander additional orders to go first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortyn who was their proxenus, persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, saying that he would bring it over to them, though it was hostile. He was bringing them there to oblige the Polichnitans, who were neighbors of the Cydonians.

6 The commander took the ships to Crete and, together with the Polichnitans, ravaged the Cydonians' land. Winds and weather unfit for sailing kept him there a considerable time.

CHAPTER 86

1 While the Athenians were detained around Crete, the Peloponnesians at Cyllene, now prepared for a sea battle, sailed along to Panormus in Achaea, where the Peloponnesian land army had come to their support.

2 Phormio too sailed along to Molycrian Rhium and anchored outside it with the twenty ships with which he had fought the battle.

3 This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians; the other Rhium lies opposite, in the Peloponnese. About seven stades of sea separate them, and this is the mouth of the Crisaean Gulf.

4 When they saw the Athenians, the Peloponnesians likewise anchored with their seventy-seven ships at Achaean Rhium, not far from Panormus, where their infantry lay.

5 For six or seven days they lay at anchor facing one another, training and preparing for the battle. The Peloponnesians intended not to sail outside the Rhiums into open water, fearing a repetition of their earlier disaster; the Athenians intended not to enter the narrows, believing that a battle in confined water would favor the enemy.

6 Then Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian generals, wishing to bring on the sea battle quickly, before any reinforcements could arrive from Athens, first assembled their troops. Seeing that most were afraid because of their earlier defeat and reluctant to fight, they encouraged them with these words:

CHAPTER 87

1 "Men of the Peloponnese, if any of you fears the coming sea battle because of the one already fought, that battle gives him no sound ground for his fear.

2 "For our preparations, as you know, were deficient, and we were sailing not so much for a sea battle as for a land campaign. Many accidents of fortune also went against us, and inexperience doubtless contributed to our failure, since this was our first sea battle.

3 "Our defeat, then, did not come from cowardice. Nor should our resolve, which was not overpowered outright and still has an answer to give, be blunted by the outcome of that misfortune. We should recognize that men may be brought down by fortune, yet the same men rightly remain courageous in spirit; and that, when courage is theirs, they cannot reasonably turn coward in anything by making inexperience their excuse.

4 "Your deficiency in experience is not even as great as your superiority in daring. Their skill, which you fear most, will, if it has courage with it, also have the presence of mind in danger to practice what it has learned; but without stoutness of heart no art has power against peril. Fear drives out memory, and art without fighting spirit is of no use.

5 "Against their greater experience, then, set your greater daring; against the fear born of defeat, the fact that you were then unprepared.

6 "You have, besides, superiority in numbers of ships, and will fight close to your own land with hoplites at hand. Victory generally belongs to those who are more numerous and better prepared.

7 "Thus we can find not a single respect in which we should reasonably expect to fail. The very errors we made before, now added to our experience, will teach us.

8 "Take courage, then, helmsmen and sailors alike, and let each perform his own part, without leaving the post assigned to him.

9 "We shall prepare the attack no worse than your former commanders, and shall give no one an excuse to act the coward. If anyone should nevertheless choose to do so, he will receive the punishment he deserves; the brave will be honored

with the rewards proper to their valor."

CHAPTER 88

1 Such was the encouragement the commanders gave the Peloponnesians. Phormio, himself concerned at his men's apprehension and aware that they were gathering in groups among themselves in fear of the enemy's numbers of ships, wished to assemble them, restore their confidence, and offer the counsel the moment required.

2 For he had always told them before, preparing their minds in advance, that however great the fleet that attacked them, they must stand their ground. The men had long since taken this conviction to heart: as Athenians, they would not give way before any multitude of Peloponnesian ships.

3 But now, seeing them disheartened at the actual sight before them, he wished to remind them to be confident. He assembled the Athenians and spoke as follows:

CHAPTER 89

1 "Soldiers, I have assembled you because I see you alarmed at the enemy's numbers, and do not think you should be in dread of what is not to be feared.

2 "In the first place, it is because they have already been defeated and do not themselves believe they are our equals that they have equipped so many ships rather than a force equal to ours. Then, as for the chief ground of confidence with which they approach—the belief that courage is their natural due—they are confident for no other reason than that their experience on land generally brings them success, and they think it will do the same for them at sea.

3 "But the advantage should now rightly be ours, if indeed it is theirs on land, since they are in no way superior in courage: each of us is bolder in the field where we have more experience.

4 "The Lacedaemonians who command them, for the sake of their own reputation, are bringing most of them unwillingly into danger; otherwise, after so complete a defeat, they would never have attempted another sea battle.

5 "Do not, then, fear their daring. You inspire in them a far greater and better-founded fear, both because you have defeated them already and because they believe you would not stand against them unless you expected some success to justify facing such unequal odds.

6 "For an enemy superior in numbers, like this one, advances relying more on strength than on judgment; but those who, with far inferior numbers and under no compulsion, dare to oppose him must possess great firmness of purpose. These men reckon with that, and fear us more for conduct beyond their expectations than for the force that reason would lead them to expect.

7 "Many armies have already fallen to smaller forces through inexperience, and some through lack of daring; of neither failing do we now have any share.

8 "I shall not willingly fight the battle in the gulf, nor shall I sail into it. For I see that confined waters do not favor a few ships, well handled and with better sailing qualities, against many unskilled ones. A man cannot advance properly to ram without sight of the enemy from far off, nor withdraw at the right moment when hard pressed. There is no sailing through the enemy's line and no turning back to attack—maneuvers that belong to better-handled ships. Instead the sea battle must become a land battle, and in that the more numerous ships have the advantage.

9 "I shall take thought for these matters as far as I can. You, remaining in good order beside your ships, must receive commands promptly, especially since an attack can come over so short a distance. In action, prize order and silence above all: they are useful in most operations of war, and not least in a sea battle. Resist these men in a manner worthy of your earlier achievements.

10 "Great is the contest before you: either to destroy the Peloponnesians' hope of naval power, or to bring the Athenians closer to fearing for their command of the sea.

11 "Again I remind you that you have defeated most of them already; and men who have been defeated do not readily face the same dangers with the same spirit."

CHAPTER 90

1 Such was Phormio's exhortation also. Since the Athenians would not sail into the gulf and its narrow waters to attack them, the Peloponnesians sought to draw them inside against their will. At dawn they put out, with their ships formed four abreast, and sailed along their own coast into the gulf, their right wing leading, in the same order in which they had lain at anchor.

2 On this wing they had stationed their twenty fastest ships, so that if Phormio supposed they were sailing against Naupactus and himself sailed along the coast to its relief, the Athenians should not escape their attack by passing outside their wing, but should be enclosed by these ships.

3 As they had anticipated, when he saw them putting out, he feared for the undefended town; reluctantly and in haste he embarked his men and sailed along the shore. The Messenian infantry hurried along beside him to give support.

4 When the Peloponnesians saw them sailing past in single file, already inside the gulf and close to land—just where they most wanted them—at a single signal they suddenly wheeled their ships and sailed in line abreast against the Athenians, each as fast as it could. They hoped to cut off the whole fleet.

5 But eleven of the leading ships slipped past the Peloponnesian wing as it wheeled and escaped into open water. The rest the Peloponnesians overtook as they tried to escape, drove ashore, and wrecked; they killed all the Athenians aboard who did not swim clear.

6 They made fast to some of the empty ships and began towing them away; one they had already captured with its crew. But the Messenians came to the rescue, waded into the sea in their armor, climbed aboard, and fought from the decks, recovering some of the ships even as they were being towed off.

CHAPTER 91

1 Here, then, the Peloponnesians had the advantage and were wrecking the Athenian ships. Their twenty ships from the right wing pursued the eleven Athenian ships that had escaped their wheeling movement into open water. All but one reached Naupactus ahead of their pursuers and, taking up positions with their bows facing outward opposite the temple of Apollo, prepared to defend themselves if the enemy sailed in against them at the shore.

2 The Peloponnesians came on behind, singing the paean as they sailed, as though victory was theirs already. One Leucadian ship, far ahead of the rest, was pursuing the single Athenian ship left behind.

3 A merchant ship happened to be lying at anchor offshore. The Athenian ship reached it first, sailed around it, struck the pursuing Leucadian amidships, and sank it.

4 This unexpected event, so contrary to all calculation, struck fear into the Peloponnesians. Their pursuit was already disordered by their sense of victory: some ships now halted with their oars held in the water, wishing to wait for the main body—a dangerous thing to do with an enemy so close, ready to attack—while others, unfamiliar with the waters, ran aground on shoals.

CHAPTER 92

1 The sight gave the Athenians courage. At a single command they raised a shout and charged. Encumbered by their earlier mistakes and their present disorder, the Peloponnesians held out a little while, then turned and fled to Panormus, from which they had put out.

2 In pursuit the Athenians captured the six enemy ships nearest them and recovered their own, which the Peloponnesians had first wrecked near the shore and then taken in tow. Some of the men they killed; others they took alive.

3 Timocrates the Lacedaemonian, who was aboard the Leucadian ship that sank beside the merchantman, cut his own throat as the ship was lost. His body washed into the harbor of Naupactus.

4 On their return the Athenians set up a trophy at the place from which they had put out to gain their victory. They recovered the dead and wreckage that lay near their own shore and returned the enemy's dead under a truce.

5 The Peloponnesians too set up a trophy, claiming victory for the rout in which they had wrecked the ships against the shore. The ship they had captured they dedicated beside the trophy on Achaean Rhium.

6 After this, fearing the reinforcements from Athens, they all, except the Leucadians, sailed under cover of night into the Crisaean Gulf and on to Corinth.

7 Not long after the fleet's departure, the Athenians from Crete arrived at Naupactus with the twenty ships that should have joined Phormio before the sea battle. And the summer ended.

CHAPTER 93

1 Before the fleet that had withdrawn to Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf was dispersed, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders resolved, at the beginning of winter and on the advice of the Megarians, to attempt an attack on Piraeus, the port of Athens. It was unguarded and its entrance unbarred, as was natural given the Athenians' overwhelming naval superiority.

2 Their plan was for each sailor to take his oar, his rowing cushion, and his oar strap, and march from Corinth to the sea on the Athenian side. They were to reach Megara quickly, launch the forty ships that happened to be in its dock-

yard at Nisaea, and sail directly against Piraeus.

3 There was no fleet stationed there on guard, nor any expectation that the enemy might ever make so sudden a naval attack. The Athenians thought they would not dare even a deliberate attack in the open, and that, if they planned one, they themselves would learn of it beforehand.

4 Once they had decided, they set out at once. They arrived by night, launched the ships from Nisaea, and sailed—not against Piraeus, as they had intended, for they had taken fright at the danger, and a wind is also said to have hindered them, but against the headland of Salamis facing Megara. On it stood a fort, with a guard of three ships to prevent any shipping from entering or leaving Megara. They attacked the fort, towed away the empty triremes, and, falling upon the people unawares, ravaged the rest of Salamis.

CHAPTER 94

1 Fire signals warning of the enemy were raised toward Athens, and the alarm was as great as any in the war. Those in the city thought the enemy had already sailed into Piraeus; those in Piraeus thought Salamis had been taken and the enemy were all but sailing in upon them. Indeed, had they chosen not to shrink from it, this could easily have happened, and no wind would have prevented it.

2 At daybreak the Athenians hastened in full force to Piraeus and launched their ships. Embarking in haste and great confusion, they sailed for Salamis, while their land forces took up guard positions in Piraeus.

3 When the Peloponnesians learned that help was coming, they sailed quickly back to Nisaea, having overrun most of Salamis and taken prisoners, plunder, and the three ships from the fort at Budorum. Their own ships also caused them some alarm: they had been launched after a long interval and were anything but watertight. On reaching Megara they withdrew to Corinth again by land.

4 The Athenians, finding them gone from Salamis, sailed back as well. After this they took greater precautions for the security of Piraeus, barring its harbors and attending to its defense in other ways.

CHAPTER 95

1 At about the same time, as this winter began, Sitalces son of Teres, the Odrysian king of the Thracians, marched against Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and against the Chalcidians in Thrace. Two promises were at issue: he wished to exact fulfillment of one and fulfill the other himself.

2 Perdiccas had made promises to him if he would reconcile him with the Athenians, who were pressing him hard at the beginning of the war, and would not restore his hostile brother Philip to the throne; but he had not performed what he had undertaken. Sitalces himself, when making his alliance with the Athenians, had agreed to bring the Chalcidian war in Thrace to an end.

3 He therefore made the expedition on both accounts, taking with him Philip's son Amyntas to place him on the Macedonian throne, as well as the Athenian envoys who happened to be there on this business, and Hagnon as commander. The Athenians too were to come against the Chalcidians with ships and as large an army as possible.

CHAPTER 96

1 Starting from the Odrysian country, he first called out the Thracians under his rule on this side of Mount Haemus and Rhodope, as far as the sea [toward both the Euxine Sea and the Hellespont]; then the Getae beyond Haemus and the other peoples settled on this side of the river Ister, nearer the coast of the Euxine Sea. The Getae and the peoples of this region border on the Scythians and are equipped like them: all are mounted archers.

2 He also summoned many of the independent, sword-bearing mountain Thracians called Dii, most of whom inhabit Rhodope. Some he induced to come for pay; others followed of their own accord.

3 He called out the Agrianians and Laeaeans as well, and all the other Paeonian peoples he ruled; these were the furthest limits of his dominion. For it extended as far as the Laeaean Paeonians and the river Strymon, which flows from Mount Scombrus through the Agrianians and Laeaeans; [there] it bordered on the Paeonians who were independent.

4 Toward the Triballians, who were also independent, the Treres and Tilataeans marked the boundary. They live north of Mount Scombrus and extend westward to the river Oscius. This river rises in the same mountain as the Nestus and Hebrus—a great, uninhabited mountain adjoining Rhodope.

CHAPTER 97

1 Along the sea, the Odrysian dominion stretched from the city of Abdera into the Euxine Sea as far as the river Ister. By the shortest course, with the wind always astern, the voyage along this coast takes a merchantman four days and as many nights; by land, a lightly equipped man completes the shortest journey from Abdera to the Ister in eleven days.

2 Such was its extent along the coast. Inland, from Byzantium to the Laeaeans and the Strymon—for here it reached furthest up from the sea—the distance was a thirteen-day journey for a lightly equipped man.

3 The tribute from the whole barbarian territory and the Greek cities, at the level it reached under Seuthes, who succeeded Sitalces as king and raised it to its highest point, amounted to about four hundred talents of silver, paid in gold and silver. Gifts of gold and silver were brought in to no less a value, apart from textiles, figured and plain, and other furnishings—not only for the king himself but also for the Odrysian nobles and those who shared his power.

4 For they had established a custom opposite to that of the Persian kingdom: to receive rather than to give. The custom existed among the other Thracians too —it was more shameful to refuse a request than to make one and fail—but the Odrysians, as their power allowed, practiced it on a greater scale. Nothing could be accomplished without giving gifts. Thus the kingdom attained great strength.

5 Of all the kingdoms in Europe between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine Sea, it became the greatest in revenue and general prosperity, though in fighting strength and the size of its army it stood far below the Scythian kingdom, which ranked first.

6 In this respect no power in Europe can equal the Scythians; indeed, not even in Asia is there a single people that could stand against them, nation against nation, if all the Scythians were of one mind. Yet in other respects—in sound judgment and understanding of the practical needs of life—they do not measure up to others.

CHAPTER 98

1 Ruling so extensive a country, Sitalces was assembling his army. When his preparations were complete, he set out for Macedonia, first through his own dominion and then across Cercine, an uninhabited mountain on the boundary between the Sinti and the Paeonians. He crossed it by the road he himself had previously cut through the forest when he marched against the Paeonians.

2 As they crossed the mountain from the Odrysian country, they had the Paeonians on their right and the Sinti and Maedi on their left. After crossing it they reached Doberus in Paeonia.

3 On the march his army lost no men except a few to sickness, but it gained more: many independent Thracians followed uninvited in hope of plunder. Thus the whole force is said to have numbered no fewer than a hundred and fifty thousand.

4 The greater part was infantry, and about a third cavalry. Most of the cavalry was furnished by the Odrysians themselves, and next by the Getae. Of the infantry, the most warlike were the independent swordsmen who had come down from Rhodope; the rest followed as a mixed multitude, most formidable in its numbers.

CHAPTER 99

1 They therefore gathered at Doberus and prepared to descend from the heights into lower Macedonia, which Perdiccas ruled.

2 For the Lyncestians, Elimiotae, and other peoples of the uplands are Macedonians too; they are allies and subjects of these lowland Macedonians, but have kingships of their own.

3 The present coastal Macedonia was first acquired and ruled by Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors, who were originally Temenids from Argos. They expelled by force of arms the Pierians from Pieria; these later settled at Phagres and other places beneath Mount Pangaeum, beyond the Strymon, and even now the coastal land below Pangaeum is called the Pierian Gulf. From the country called Bottia they expelled the Bottiaeans, who now live beside the Chalcidians.

4 They also acquired a narrow strip of Paeonia along the river Axius, extending down from the interior to Pella and the sea; and beyond the Axius, as far as the Strymon, they occupy the country called Mygdonia, having driven out the Edonians.

5 They also expelled the Eordians from what is now called Eordia. Most of them perished, but a small remnant is settled around Physca. They expelled the Almopians from Almopia as well.

6 These Macedonians also subdued the other peoples whose lands they still hold: Anthemus, Crestonia, Bisaltia, and much of Macedonia proper. The whole is called Macedonia, and Perdiccas son of Alexander was its king when Sitalces

invaded.

CHAPTER 100

1 Unable to resist the great army advancing upon them, these Macedonians took refuge in the strongholds and fortified places that existed in the country.

2 These were not many. Later, when Archelaus son of Perdiccas became king, he built the fortifications now in the country, cut straight roads, and put its other affairs in order. In horses, arms, and the rest of his military provision, he achieved more than all the eight kings before him together.

3 The Thracian army advanced from Doberus first into what had once been Philip's dominion. It took Idomene by storm; Gortynia, Atalanta, and certain other places surrendered by agreement out of friendship for Philip's son Amyntas, who was with the army. Europus they besieged, but could not take.

4 Then the army advanced into the rest of Macedonia, to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. They did not penetrate beyond these places into Bottiaea and Pieria, but ravaged Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus.

5 The Macedonians had no thought of resisting with infantry. They summoned additional cavalry from their upland allies and, few against many, charged the Thracian army wherever an opportunity seemed to offer. Wherever they struck, no one stood against them: they were good horsemen, protected by breastplates. But when they were surrounded by the multitude, they exposed themselves to danger from a mass many times their own number. In the end they remained inactive, judging themselves unequal to taking risks against such superior numbers.

CHAPTER 101

1 Sitalces was negotiating with Perdiccas over the objects of his expedition. Since the Athenians had not arrived with their ships, doubting whether he would come, but had sent gifts and envoys instead, he dispatched part of his army against the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans. He confined them within their walls and ravaged their land.

2 While he remained in these regions, the Thessalians to the south, the Magnetes and the other subjects of Thessaly, and the Greeks as far as Thermopylae feared that the army might advance against them too, and made preparations.

3 Fear also seized the Thracians who occupied the plains northward beyond the Strymon: the Panaeans, Odomantians, Droans, and Dersaeans. All these are independent.

4 Among the Greeks hostile to Athens, too, the expedition prompted talk that the Athenians might lead the Thracians against them under the terms of their alliance.

5 Sitalces occupied and ravaged Chalcidice, Bottice, and Macedonia together. But he was accomplishing none of the objects of his invasion, his army was short of food, and it was suffering from the winter weather. Seuthes son of Sparadocus, his nephew and the most powerful man after himself, persuaded him to depart quickly. Perdiccas had secretly won Seuthes over by promising him his sister in marriage with a dowry.

6 Sitalces yielded and, after staying thirty days in all, eight of them among the Chalcidians, withdrew his army homeward in haste. Perdiccas later gave his sister Stratonice to Seuthes, as he had promised. Such were the events of Sitalces' expedition.

CHAPTER 102

1 During the same winter, after the Peloponnesian fleet had dispersed, the Athenians at Naupactus made an expedition under Phormio. They sailed along the coast to Astacus, disembarked, and marched into the interior of Acarnania with four hundred Athenian hoplites from the ships and four hundred Messenians. They expelled from Stratus, Coronta, and other places men whose loyalty seemed doubtful, restored Cynes son of Theolytus to Coronta, and returned to their ships.

2 They did not think it possible in winter to march against Oeniadae, the only Acarnanians who had always been their enemies. For the river Achelous flows from Mount Pindus through Dolopia, the country of the Agraeans and Amphilochians, and the Acarnanian plain, passing the city of Stratus in its upper course and entering the sea beside Oeniadae. It forms a lake around their city, and its waters make a winter campaign impossible.

3 Most of the Echinades islands also lie directly opposite Oeniadae, close to the mouths of the Achelous. The river, being large, continually deposits silt, and some of the islands have already become part of the mainland; it is to be expected that all will meet the same fate before very long.

4 For the stream is powerful, voluminous, and muddy, and the islands lie close together, helping to bind the silt between them [by preventing its dispersal]. They lie staggered rather than in a row and leave no straight channels through which the water can pass out to sea.

5 They are uninhabited and small. It is said that when Alcmaeon son of Amphiaraus was wandering after the murder of his mother, Apollo's oracle told him to settle in this land. The god declared that there would be no release from his terrors until he found and inhabited a country which, when he killed his mother, had not yet been seen by the sun and was not yet land; all the rest of the earth was polluted for him.

6 At a loss, as the story goes, he at last thought of this deposit of the Achelous. It seemed to him that enough land for him to live on might have accumulated during the considerable time he had wandered since killing his mother. He settled in the region around Oeniadae, became its ruler, and left the country named after his son Acarnan. Such is the account of Alcmaeon that has come down to us.

CHAPTER 103

1 The Athenians and Phormio sailed from Acarnania to Naupactus and, at the beginning of spring, sailed home to Athens. They brought the free men among the prisoners from the sea battles, who were exchanged man for man, and the ships they had captured.

2 And this winter ended, and the third year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

Book 3



CHAPTER 1

1 The following summer, when the grain was ripening, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica. Their commander was Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians.

2 They established themselves and ravaged the land. The Athenian cavalry made their customary attacks wherever opportunity offered, preventing the mass of light-armed troops from advancing beyond the hoplites to damage the country near the city.

3 After remaining as long as their provisions lasted, they withdrew and dispersed to their several cities.

CHAPTER 2

1 Immediately after the Peloponnesian invasion, Lesbos, except for Methymna, revolted from Athens. They had wished to do so even before the war, but the Lacedaemonians had refused to receive them; and now too they were forced to revolt earlier than they intended.

2 They were waiting for the completion of their harbor moles, the building of walls and the construction of ships, and for the arrival from the Black Sea of the archers, grain, and other supplies they had sent for.

3 But the Tenedians, who were at odds with them, the Methymnaeans, and certain Mytilenaeans themselves—men of the opposing faction who served as Athens' representatives—reported to the Athenians that they were forcibly uniting Lesbos under Mytilene and pressing forward all their preparations for revolt in concert with the Lacedaemonians and their Boeotian kinsmen. Unless someone forestalled them at once, Athens would lose Lesbos.

CHAPTER 3

1 The Athenians, worn down by the plague and by the war, which had only just begun and was already at its height, thought it a formidable undertaking to add Lesbos to their enemies, with its fleet and its strength unimpaired. At first they would not accept the accusations, giving greater weight to their wish that they should not be true. But when the envoys they sent could not persuade the Mytilenaeans to abandon either the unification or their preparations, alarm made them resolve to strike first.

2 They suddenly dispatched forty ships which happened to be ready for a voyage around the Peloponnese. Cleippides son of Deinias was in command, with two other generals.

3 For they had been informed of a festival of Apollo Maloeis outside the city, celebrated by the entire Mytilenaean population, and hoped, by making haste, to fall upon them unawares. If the attempt succeeded, their purpose would be achieved; if not, they were to order the Mytilenaeans to surrender their ships and demolish their walls, and to make war if they refused.

4 The ships sailed. Meanwhile, the Athenians detained the ten Mytilenaean triremes which happened to be with them as an allied contingent, and put their crews under guard.

5 But a man crossed from Athens to Euboea, made his way overland to Geraestus, and found a merchant ship putting to sea. He took passage and reached Mytilene on the third day after leaving Athens, bringing news of the approaching fleet.

6 The Mytilenaeans therefore did not go out to the sanctuary of Maloeis. They also barricaded the unfinished portions of their walls and harbors and kept guard.

CHAPTER 4

1 The Athenians sailed in not long afterward. Finding this state of affairs, the generals delivered their instructions; when the Mytilenaeans would not obey, they began hostilities.

2 Unprepared and suddenly forced into war, the Mytilenaeans took their ships a short distance outside the harbor as though to offer battle, but were chased back by the Athenian fleet. They then approached the generals with proposals, wishing, if possible, to secure some reasonable agreement that would send the ships away for the present.

3 The Athenian generals accepted their proposals, being themselves afraid that their force might not be sufficient to make war on all Lesbos.

4 A truce was concluded, and the Mytilenaeans sent to Athens one of their accusers, who had already repented, together with other envoys, to see whether they could persuade the Athenians to withdraw the ships on the grounds that they were planning no revolt.

5 Meanwhile they also dispatched envoys to Lacedaemon in a trireme, escaping the notice of the Athenian fleet, which lay at anchor at Malea, north of the city. They had no confidence that their negotiations at Athens would succeed.

6 The envoys to Lacedaemon made a difficult passage across the open sea and worked to obtain some assistance for their people.

CHAPTER 5

1 When the envoys returned from Athens without having achieved anything, the Mytilenaeans and the rest of Lesbos, except Methymna, entered upon war. The Methymnaeans had come to the Athenians' aid, as had the Imbrians, the Lemnians, and a few of their other allies.

2 The Mytilenaeans made a sortie in full force against the Athenian camp. A battle followed in which they held their own, but they neither bivouacked on the field nor trusted their strength, and withdrew. Afterward they remained quiet, wishing to take their risks with additional preparations and whatever reinforcements might arrive from the Peloponnese. Indeed, Meleas the Laconian and Hermaeondas the Theban had reached them. These men had been sent out before the revolt, but had failed to arrive ahead of the Athenian fleet; they now slipped into harbor in a trireme after the battle. They urged the Mytilenaeans to send another trireme and envoys back with them, and these were dispatched.

CHAPTER 6

1 Greatly encouraged by the Mytilenaeans' inaction, the Athenians summoned their allies, who came much more readily when they saw no vigorous action from the Lesbians. Moving their anchorage around to the south of the city, they fortified two camps, one on either side, and maintained a naval blockade of both harbors.

2 Thus they denied the Mytilenaeans the use of the sea. On land, however, the Mytilenaeans and the other Lesbians, who had now come to their assistance, controlled the rest of the country; the Athenians held only a small area around their camps. Malea served them chiefly as a station for their ships and a market. Such was the course of the war around Mytilene.

CHAPTER 7

1 At about the same time that summer, the Athenians also sent thirty ships around the Peloponnese under the command of Asopius son of Phormio. The Acarnanians had asked them to send a son or some other kinsman of Phormio to lead them.

2 As the ships sailed along the Laconian coast, they ravaged its coastal settlements.

3 Asopius then sent most of the ships home, while he himself reached Naupactus with twelve. Later he called out the whole Acarnanian population and campaigned against Oeniadae, sailing with the ships along the Achelous while his land army ravaged the country.

4 When the inhabitants would not submit, he dismissed the land forces, sailed to Leucas, and made a landing at Nericus. During his withdrawal he and part of his army were killed by the local people who had come to the defense, together with a few garrison troops.

5 Later the Athenians sailed to recover their dead from the Leucadians under a truce.

CHAPTER 8

1 The Mytilenaean envoys sent out in the first ship reached Olympia, having been told by the Lacedaemonians to attend there so that the other allies too could hear them and deliberate. This was the Olympiad in which Dorieus of Rhodes won his second victory.

2 When they were admitted to speak after the festival, they said the following.

CHAPTER 9

1 "Lacedaemonians and allies, we know the established custom among the Greeks. Those who receive men who revolt during a war and abandon their former alliance welcome them for the benefit they bring, but think less of them as traitors to their former friends.

2 "And this judgment is not unjust, if those who revolt and those from whom they part have been equal in their intentions and goodwill toward one another, matched in resources and strength, and if no reasonable ground for revolt exists. But that was not the case between us and Athens.

3 "Let no one think less of us, then, because, though honored by them in peace, we revolt in their hour of danger.

CHAPTER 10

1 "For our first words must concern justice and good faith, especially since we are asking for an alliance. We know that neither lasting friendship between individuals nor effective partnership between cities can exist unless each believes in the other's integrity and their ways are otherwise alike. Divergence of purpose produces differences in action.

2 "Our alliance with the Athenians first arose when you withdrew from the war against the Persians, while they remained to complete the tasks still unfinished.

3 "We became allies, however, not of the Athenians for the enslavement of the Greeks, but of the Greeks for their liberation from the Persian.

4 "As long as they led us as equals, we followed willingly. But when we saw them relaxing their hostility toward the Persian and advancing toward the enslavement of their allies, we no longer felt secure.

5 "Divided among many voices and unable to unite in resistance, the allies were enslaved, except for ourselves and the Chians. We continued to campaign with them, autonomous, supposedly, and free in name.

6 “But we no longer trusted the Athenians as leaders, judging by the examples before us. It was not likely that, after subduing those who had entered the treaty alongside us, they would refrain from doing the same to the survivors if ever they could.

CHAPTER 11

1 “Had we all remained autonomous, we would have had firmer assurance that they would make no move against us. But with the majority in subjection, and ourselves still dealing with them as equals, they were naturally going to find this harder to bear: they were already yielding to the pull of their greater power, while our state alone still stood on equal terms. This was all the more so as their own strength increased and we became more isolated.

2 “Only a balance of fear makes an alliance secure. A man wishing to violate it is deterred by knowing that he would have no superiority in an attack.

3 “We were left autonomous for no other reason than that they thought their empire could be secured through plausible language and the advances of policy rather than force.

4 “For one thing, they used us as evidence that men with equal votes would not join their campaigns unwillingly unless those they attacked were in the wrong. At the same time, they first brought the strongest against the weaker states, leaving the strongest until last, when, with the rest stripped away, they would find them weaker.

5 “Had they begun with us, while all the allies still possessed their own strength and a point around which to rally, they would not have subdued us so easily.

6 “Our fleet also caused them some fear: united with yours, or attached to some other power, it might one day endanger them.

7 “We also owed our survival in part to courting both their people as a body and their successive leaders.

8 "Yet, judging by their treatment of the others, we did not think we could have held out for long had this war not broken out.

CHAPTER 12

1 "What friendship was this, then, or what dependable freedom, when we welcomed one another against our true feelings? In war they courted us out of fear, and in peace we did the same to them. The security that goodwill above all establishes for other men was supplied to us by fear: held together more by dread than friendship, we remained allies. Whichever side first gained confidence from a sense of safety would also be the first to break the bond.

2 "So anyone who thinks us wrong to have revolted before they carried out the harm they were delaying against us, instead of waiting to learn for certain whether any of it would come, judges wrongly.

3 "If we had been equally able to plot against them in return and to delay in our turn, what need would there have been, on equal terms, to put ourselves at their mercy? But since the power to attack always rests with them, the right to forestall the attack must rest with us.

CHAPTER 13

1 "Such, Lacedaemonians and allies, were the grounds and reasons for our revolt: clear enough for our hearers to understand that we acted reasonably, and grave enough to alarm us and turn us toward some means of safety. We had wished to do this long ago, when we sent to you about revolt while peace still lasted, but your refusal to receive us prevented it. Now, when the Boeotians invited us, we answered at once. We believed our secession would serve two ends: toward the Greeks, that we should no longer join the Athenians in harming them, but join in liberating them; toward the Athenians, that we should not ourselves be destroyed by them later, but act first.

2 "Our revolt, however, has come sooner than intended and before we were prepared. All the more reason for you to receive us as allies and send help quickly, so that you may be seen defending those you ought to defend and at the same time injuring your enemies.

3 "The opportunity is without precedent. The Athenians have been devastated by plague and the drain on their funds; their ships are either off your coasts or stationed against us.

4 "They are therefore unlikely to have ships to spare if you invade for a second time this summer, by sea and land together. Either they will not resist your fleet as it approaches, or they will withdraw from both your country and ours.

5 "Let no one imagine that he will face danger himself for the sake of another's land. Whoever thinks Lesbos far away will find its benefits close at hand. For the war will turn not on Attica, as some suppose, but on what sustains Attica.

6 "Its revenue comes from its allies, and that revenue will grow still greater if they subdue us: no one else will revolt, our resources will be added to theirs, and we may suffer more terribly than those already enslaved.

7 "But if you help us with vigor, you will gain a city with a great fleet, the very thing you most need; you will more easily overthrow the Athenians by drawing away their allies, since everyone will come over with greater confidence; and you will escape the charge you have incurred of failing to help those who revolt. If you show yourselves liberators, you will hold a firmer mastery of the war.

CHAPTER 14

1 "Respect, then, both the hopes the Greeks place in you and Olympian Zeus, in whose sanctuary we stand as suppliants in all but name: become allies of the Mytilenaeans and defend us. Do not abandon us, who put our own lives alone at risk but will share the benefit of success with everyone—and spread the injury still more widely if, through your refusal, we fall.

2 "Show yourselves the men the Greeks believe you to be and our fear needs you to be."

CHAPTER 15

1 Such was the Mytilenaeans' speech. The Lacedaemonians and their allies heard and accepted their arguments, and admitted the Lesbians to their alliance. Intending to invade Attica, they instructed the allies present to come quickly to the Isthmus with two-thirds of their forces. They themselves arrived first and prepared hauling equipment at the Isthmus for the ships, intending to carry them across from Corinth into the sea facing Athens and attack by land and sea together.

2 They pursued these preparations eagerly, but the other allies assembled slowly: they were occupied with bringing in the harvest and had little appetite for campaigning.

CHAPTER 16

1 The Athenians realized that these preparations rested on a conviction of their weakness. Wishing to show that this judgment was mistaken, and that without moving their fleet from Lesbos they could easily repel the force advancing from the Peloponnese, they manned a hundred ships. The citizens themselves embarked, except for the cavalry and the five-hundred-measure property class, together with the resident foreigners. They sailed up to the Isthmus, displaying their strength and making landings wherever they chose in the Peloponnese.

2 The Lacedaemonians, seeing how far events had confounded their expectations, thought the Lesbians' account untrue. They saw no way forward: their allies had not assembled, and reports were also coming in that the thirty Athenian ships cruising around the Peloponnese were ravaging the country of their perioeci. They therefore withdrew home.

3 Later they began fitting out a fleet to send to Lesbos. They ordered the cities to furnish a total of forty ships and appointed Alcidas admiral to command the expedition.

4 The Athenians too withdrew with their hundred ships when they saw the Lacedaemonians depart.

CHAPTER 17

1 [At the time when these ships were sailing, the ships they had simultaneously in active service were among their most numerous and finest; at the beginning of the war they had had a comparable number, indeed even more.

2 For a hundred guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis, while another hundred operated around the Peloponnese, besides those at Potidaea and elsewhere. Thus in a single summer their ships in simultaneous service numbered two hundred and fifty.

3 This, together with Potidaea, did most to drain their funds.

4 For the hoplites maintaining the siege of Potidaea received two drachmas a day —one for each man himself and one for his attendant. There were the original three thousand, whose numbers never fell below that throughout the siege, and sixteen hundred with Phormio, who left earlier. The crews of all the ships received the same rate of pay. Such was the initial depletion of their funds, and this was the greatest number of ships they ever manned.]

CHAPTER 18

1 While the Lacedaemonians were at the Isthmus, the Mytilenaeans and their auxiliaries marched overland against Methymna, expecting it to be betrayed to them. They attacked the city, but when events did not unfold as they expected, they went off to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus. After placing affairs in these cities on a firmer footing and strengthening their walls, they returned home in haste.

2 When they had withdrawn, the Methymnaeans in their turn marched against Antissa. The Antissaeans and their auxiliaries made a sortie and defeated them, killing many; the survivors retreated hurriedly.

3 On learning of these events, and that the Mytilenaeans controlled the countryside while their own soldiers were too few to prevent it, the Athenians sent out Paches son of Epicurus as general with a thousand of their own hoplites, when autumn was already beginning.

4 They rowed their own ships on the passage, reached Mytilene, and enclosed it with a single circuit of wall. At certain strong positions forts were built into it.

5 Mytilene was now firmly blockaded on both sides, by land and by sea, and winter was coming on.

CHAPTER 19

1 Needing more money for the siege, the Athenians now for the first time contributed a levy of two hundred talents themselves, and also sent twelve money-collecting ships to their allies under Lysicles and four other generals.

2 Lysicles sailed about collecting money at various places. Advancing inland from Myus in Caria through the plain of the Maeander as far as the hill of Sandius, he was attacked by the Carians and Anaeans, and was killed along with many of his soldiers.

CHAPTER 20

1 That same winter, the Plataeans, still besieged by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians, were hard pressed by failing provisions. With no hope of relief from Athens and no other prospect of deliverance, they and the Athenians besieged with them planned at first to break out all together and cross the enemy walls, if

they could force their way. The attempt was proposed by Theaenetus son of Tolmides, a seer, and Eupompidas son of Daimachus, who was also their general.

2 Afterward about half lost their resolve, judging the danger too great. But some two hundred and twenty men remained willing to make the escape, in the following manner.

3 They made ladders equal in height to the enemy wall, measuring it by the courses of bricks at a point facing them where the wall happened not to have been plastered. Many counted the courses at the same time: some would be mistaken, but most would arrive at the true reckoning, especially as they counted repeatedly and were not far away, but could readily see the portion of the wall they needed.

4 In this way they obtained the dimensions for their ladders, calculating the height from the thickness of a brick.

CHAPTER 21

1 The Peloponnesians' wall was constructed as follows. It had two circuits, one facing Plataea, the other facing any force that might approach from Athens outside. The circuits stood about sixteen feet apart.

2 This intervening space [the sixteen feet] had been built up with quarters allotted to the guards, all continuous, so that the whole appeared to be a single thick wall with battlements on both sides.

3 At intervals of ten battlements stood great towers, as broad as the wall and extending across it from its inner face to its outer. There was therefore no passage beside a tower; the men passed through the middle of the towers themselves.

4 On nights of rain and storm the guards left the battlements and kept watch from the towers, which stood close together and were roofed above. Such was the wall that held the Plataeans enclosed.

CHAPTER 22

1 When their preparations were complete, they waited for a moonless night of storm, rain, and wind, and went out, led by the very men who had devised the attempt. First they crossed the ditch that surrounded them; then they approached the enemy wall unnoticed by the guards, who could not see them in the darkness or hear the sound of their approach above the wind's answering roar.

2 They also advanced at wide intervals, so that their weapons would not clash together and betray them. They were lightly equipped and wore a shoe only on the left foot, to give them a firmer hold in the mud.

3 They approached the battlements between two towers, knowing them to be deserted. First came the men carrying the ladders, which they set in place; then twelve lightly armed men with short swords and breastplates climbed up. Their leader was Ammeas son of Coroebus, who was the first to ascend. His followers climbed up after him, six toward each tower. Other lightly armed men with short spears followed, while others behind carried their shields to make the climb easier for them, intending to hand them over when they were close to the enemy.

4 When more men had reached the top, the guards in the towers became aware of them. One of the Plataeans, taking hold of the battlements, had dislodged a tile, which fell with a crash.

5 At once a shout went up, and the army rushed toward the wall. But in the darkness and storm they did not know where the danger lay. At the same time the Plataeans left in the city came out and attacked the Peloponnesian wall on the

side opposite to that where their men were crossing, to distract attention from them as much as possible.

6 The guards remained at their posts in confusion. No one dared leave his own station to give assistance, and they could not make out what was happening.

7 The three hundred assigned to give help wherever it was needed moved outside the wall toward the shouting. Fire signals warning of an enemy were raised toward Thebes.

8 But the Plataeans in the city raised many answering fire signals from their wall, prepared beforehand for this very purpose: to confuse the enemy's reading of the signals, so that they would mistake what was happening for something else and not come to help before the men making their escape had got clear and reached safety.

CHAPTER 23

1 Meanwhile, as the Plataeans were crossing the wall, their leading men, once they had climbed up, killed the guards in both towers and secured them. They stationed themselves in the passageways through the towers, guarding against anyone bringing help by that route; then they set ladders against the towers from the wall and sent more men up. Some, throwing missiles from the towers, held off reinforcements both below and above, while the greater number meanwhile set up many ladders, pushed away the battlements, and crossed the stretch of wall between the towers.

2 Each man, as he crossed, took his stand on the edge of the ditch; from there they shot arrows and hurled javelins at anyone who came to help along the wall and threatened to obstruct the crossing.

3 When all had made their way over, the men from the towers, the last to descend, struggled down and moved toward the ditch. At this moment the three hundred advanced against them carrying torches.

4 The Plataeans, standing in the darkness on the edge of the ditch, could see these men more clearly and shot arrows and javelins at their exposed bodies; they themselves remained concealed and were harder to make out because of the torches. Thus even the last Plataeans crossed the ditch before the enemy reached them, though with difficulty and strenuous effort.

5 For ice had formed in it, not firm enough to walk on, but rather slushy, as it is with an east [or north] wind; and the snow falling that night with such a wind had filled the ditch with water, which they crossed with barely their heads above it. Indeed, it was chiefly the violence of the storm that made their escape possible.

CHAPTER 24

1 Leaving the ditch, the Plataeans moved in a body along the road toward Thebes, keeping the hero-shrine of Androcrates on their right. They thought their enemies would least suspect them of taking this road, which led toward the enemy; at the same time they could see the Peloponnesians pursuing with torches along the road toward Cithaeron and Dryoscephalae, the road to Athens.

2 The Plataeans followed the Theban road for six or seven stades, then turned back and took the road toward the mountain, to Erythrae and Hysiae. Reaching the mountains, they escaped to Athens: two hundred and twelve men out of a larger number. Some had turned back into the city before crossing the wall, and one archer was captured at the outer ditch.

3 The Peloponnesians abandoned their pursuit and returned to their stations. The Plataeans in the city knew nothing of what had happened, but those who had turned back reported that no one had survived. At daybreak they therefore sent out a herald and made a truce to recover the dead; when they learned the truth, they desisted. In this way these Plataean men crossed the wall and were saved.

CHAPTER 25

1 As the same winter drew to its end, Salaethus the Lacedaemonian was sent from Lacedaemon to Mytilene in a trireme. He sailed to Pyrrha, then went on foot along a ravine where the surrounding siege wall could be crossed, and entered Mytilene undetected. He told the presiding magistrates that there would be an invasion of Attica and, at the same time, the arrival of the forty ships that were to assist them; he himself had been sent ahead for this purpose and also to attend to the other arrangements.

2 The Mytilenaeans took courage and were less inclined to come to terms with the Athenians. This winter ended, and with it ended the fourth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote.

CHAPTER 26

1 The following summer, after dispatching the forty-two ships to Mytilene under Alcidas, whom they appointed to command as their admiral, the Peloponnesians and their allies themselves invaded Attica. Their purpose was to distract the Athenians on both sides and leave them less able to act against the ships sailing to Mytilene.

2 This invasion was led by Cleomenes in place of Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, who was king but still too young; Cleomenes was his father's brother.

3 They ravaged the parts of Attica laid waste before, [and] whatever had sprouted again, as well as everything left untouched in the earlier invasions. After the second invasion, this was the most grievous for the Athenians.

4 For they kept waiting to hear from Lesbos of some action by the ships, which they supposed had already completed the crossing, and meanwhile ranged through the land, laying waste most of it. But when none of their expectations was fulfilled and their food had run out, they withdrew and dispersed to their cities.

CHAPTER 27

1 Meanwhile the Mytilenaeans, whose ships from the Peloponnese had not arrived but were long delayed, and whose food had run out, were compelled to come to terms with the Athenians in the following circumstances.

2 Salaethus, himself no longer expecting the ships, equipped the people, who had previously been without heavy arms, intending to march out against the Athenians.

3 Once they had received arms, however, they no longer obeyed the authorities. Gathering in groups, they demanded that the powerful bring out their grain for all to see and distribute it to everyone; otherwise, they declared, they would themselves reach an agreement with the Athenians and hand over the city.

CHAPTER 28

1 Those in power realized that they could not prevent this and that they would be in danger if excluded from the agreement. They therefore made a settlement on behalf of all with Paches and his army: the Athenians were to have the right to decide whatever they wished concerning the Mytilenaeans, who were to admit the army into the city; the Mytilenaeans were to send an embassy to Athens to plead their case; and until its return Paches was neither to imprison nor enslave nor kill any Mytilenaean.

2 Such was the agreement. Yet those Mytilenaeans who had dealt most closely with the Lacedaemonians were terrified, and when the army entered they could not hold their ground: despite the agreement they took refuge at the altars. Paches persuaded them to rise with a promise to do them no harm, and placed them in custody on Tenedos until the Athenians should reach a decision.

3 He also sent triremes to Antissa and brought it over, and arranged the other affairs of the army as he thought best.

CHAPTER 29

1 The Peloponnesians in the forty ships, who should have arrived with all speed, had lingered on the voyage around the Peloponnese itself and made the rest of their passage at leisure. They escaped the notice of the Athenians in the city until they put in at Delos; sailing from there to Icarus and Myconus, they first learned that Mytilene had fallen.

2 Wishing to establish the truth, they sailed into Embatum in the territory of Erythrae. Mytilene had fallen about seven days before they reached Embatum. Once they had confirmed the news, they deliberated in the light of their circumstances, and Teutiaplus, an Elean, addressed them as follows.

CHAPTER 30

1 "Alcidas, and all of us Peloponnesians here who command the force, I propose that we sail for Mytilene just as we are, before our presence becomes known.

2 "For, as is natural with men who have only just taken a city, we shall probably find much left unguarded, above all on the seaward side, where they would never expect an enemy to appear and where our strength chiefly lies. Their infantry, too, is likely to be scattered carelessly among the houses, as happens with victors.

3 "If, then, we strike suddenly and by night, I hope that, with the help of those inside—if any friend of ours still remains—we may gain control of the situation.

4 "Let us not shrink from the danger, but recognize that this is precisely the unguarded moment in war: the general who guards against it in himself and strikes when he sees it in his enemy will achieve the greatest successes."

CHAPTER 31

1 These words failed to persuade Alcidas. Some of the Ionian exiles and the Lesbians sailing with him urged that, if he feared this risk, he should seize one of the Ionian cities or Cyme in Aeolis. From a city as their base they could bring Ionia into revolt—there was hope of this, for no one had been unwilling to see them arrive—and deprive the Athenians of this, their greatest source of revenue, while also putting them to expense if they established a blockade against them. They thought they could persuade Pissuthnes, too, to join in the war.

2 But he would not accept these proposals either. Having come too late for Mytilene, his overriding intention was to reach the Peloponnese again as quickly as possible.

CHAPTER 32

1 Putting out from Embatum, he sailed along the coast; on touching at Myonnesus in Teian territory, he slaughtered most of the prisoners he had taken on the voyage.

2 When he anchored at Ephesus, envoys came from the Samians at Anaea and told him that he was not going the right way about liberating Greece if he killed men who neither raised a hand against him nor were his enemies, but were allies of Athens under compulsion. Unless he stopped, they said, he would win over few of his enemies as friends, but turn far more of his friends into enemies.

3 He was persuaded and released all the Chians he still held, along with some of the others. For on seeing the ships, people had not fled but rather approached, taking them for Athenian vessels; they had not the faintest expectation that, with Athens mistress of the sea, Peloponnesian ships would ever reach Ionia.

CHAPTER 33

1 From Ephesus Alcidas sailed in haste, making his voyage a flight. For the Salaminia and the Paralus had sighted him while he was still at anchor near Clarus—they happened to be sailing from Athens—and, afraid of pursuit, he struck out across the open sea, determined to touch willingly at no land except the Peloponnese.

2 News reached Paches and the Athenians from Erythraean territory and came in from every quarter. Since Ionia was unfortified, there was great fear that the Peloponnesians, even if they had no intention of remaining, might descend on the cities as they sailed past and plunder them. The Paralus and the Salaminia, having themselves seen him at Clarus, brought an eyewitness report.

3 Paches pursued with the greatest urgency, following him as far as the island of Patmos; when capture no longer seemed possible, he turned back. Since he had not encountered the ships at sea, he counted it a gain that they had not been trapped anywhere and forced to establish a camp, leaving the Athenians to guard and blockade them.

CHAPTER 34

1 On his return along the coast he also put in at Notium, belonging to the Colophonians. Colophonians had settled there after their upper city was captured by Itamanes and the barbarians, who had been brought in during their own civil strife. Its capture took place about the time of the Peloponnesians' second invasion of Attica.

2 Those who had fled to Notium and settled there now fell into civil strife again. One party brought in Arcadian and barbarian mercenaries from Pissuthnes and kept them within a dividing wall; joined by the Colophonians from the upper city who had sided with the Medes, they governed together. The other party, which had withdrawn before them and was in exile, called in Paches.

3 He invited Hippias, commander of the Arcadians inside the dividing wall, to a conference, on the understanding that, if nothing said proved satisfactory, he would bring him back inside the wall safe and sound. Hippias came out to him; Paches held him under guard, though not in chains, and himself suddenly attacked the fortification. Taking its defenders by surprise, he captured it and killed the Arcadians and all the barbarians inside. He then brought Hippias back within the wall, as he had agreed, and once he was inside seized him and had him shot down with arrows.

4 He handed Notium over to the Colophonians, except those who had sided with the Medes. Later the Athenians sent founders and settled Notium under their own laws, gathering together all the Colophonians who were to be found in any of the cities.

CHAPTER 35

1 On reaching Mytilene, Paches secured the submission of Pyrrha and Eresus. He also captured Salaethus the Lacedaemonian, who was hiding in the city, and sent him to Athens, along with the Mytilenaeans he had placed in custody on Tenedos and anyone else he considered responsible for the revolt.

2 He sent away the greater part of the army as well; remaining with the rest, he arranged affairs in Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos as he thought best.

CHAPTER 36

1 When these men and Salaethus arrived, the Athenians immediately put Salaethus to death, although among other offers he undertook to have the Peloponnesians withdraw from Plataea, which was still under siege.

2 They deliberated over the other men, and in their anger resolved to kill not only those present but every adult male Mytilenaean, and to enslave the women and children. Their grievance against the revolt was sharpened by the fact that the Mytilenaeans had undertaken it without being subject to their rule like the

other allies; and no small addition to their fury came from the Peloponnesian ships, which had dared to venture into Ionia to assist them. For the revolt seemed to have been no hastily conceived design.

3 They therefore sent a trireme to Paches to announce their decision, ordering him to dispose of the Mytilenaeans without delay.

4 The very next day, however, they felt some change of heart and began to reflect that their decision had been savage and momentous: to destroy a whole city rather than only the guilty.

5 When the Mytilenaean envoys present in Athens and their Athenian supporters perceived this, they induced the authorities to reopen the question for debate. They persuaded them the more easily because the authorities themselves could plainly see that most of the citizens wanted someone to give them another opportunity to deliberate.

6 An assembly was called at once, and various speakers put forward their opinions. Cleon son of Cleaenetus, who had carried the previous motion for the executions, came forward again and spoke as follows. In other respects too he was the most violent of the citizens, and at that time by far the most persuasive with the people.

CHAPTER 37

1 "Often before now I have recognized that a democracy is incapable of ruling others, but never more clearly than in your present change of heart over the Mytilenaeans.

2 "Because in daily life you have no fear or suspicion of one another, you take the same attitude toward your allies. Whenever their words mislead you into error or pity makes you yield, you do not see that your weakness endangers yourselves without winning your allies' gratitude. You fail to consider that your

empire is a tyranny, exercised over men who plot against you and submit unwillingly; they obey you not for the favors you grant at your own expense, but because you prevail by strength rather than by their goodwill.

3 "Most alarming of all would be that nothing we once decide should stand firm, and that we should fail to recognize that a city with inferior laws which remain unshaken is stronger than one with good laws which have no authority; that ignorance joined with self-restraint is more useful than cleverness joined with license; and that, as a rule, ordinary men administer their cities better than their more intelligent fellows.

4 "For the latter wish to appear wiser than the laws and to defeat every argument made in public, as though they could find no more important field in which to display their judgment; and this is how they generally bring their cities to ruin. The others, distrusting their own intelligence, acknowledge that they know less than the laws and are less capable of finding fault with a well-delivered argument; acting as impartial judges rather than contestants, they generally reach sound decisions.

5 "We too must act in this way, and not, carried away by eloquence and a contest of intelligence, advise your multitude against our own convictions.

CHAPTER 38

1 "For my part, I stand by my opinion. I am astonished both at those who have reopened debate about the Mytilenaeans and so caused delay, which favors the wrongdoers—for the injured man pursues the offender with blunted anger, whereas retaliation, following as closely as possible upon the injury and answering it in kind, most fully exacts redress—and at whoever will rise to oppose me and claim to show that the Mytilenaeans' offenses benefit us, while our misfortunes bring harm to our allies.

2 "Plainly, either he will trust in his eloquence and strive to show that what seems perfectly clear has not been established, or, spurred by gain, he will elaborate a specious argument and try to lead you astray.

3 "From contests of this kind the city awards the prizes to others, but bears the dangers itself.

4 "You are to blame, for you preside badly over these contests: you habitually become spectators of words and listeners to deeds. You judge the feasibility of future actions by the eloquence of their advocates, and actions already accomplished by the eloquence of their critics, trusting what you hear more than the evidence of what you have seen done.

5 "No one is better at being deceived by a novel argument, or less willing to follow one that has been tested; you are slaves to each new paradox and scornful of what is familiar.

6 "Each of you wishes above all to be able to speak himself; failing that, you rival the speakers by trying not to appear slow in following their thought, applauding a sharp remark before it is fully spoken. You are eager to anticipate what is being said, but slow to foresee what will follow from it.

7 "You seek, one might say, a world other than the one in which we live, yet cannot even judge our present circumstances adequately. In short, you surrender to the pleasure of listening and sit more like an audience at a display by sophists than men deliberating on their city's affairs.

CHAPTER 39

1 "To turn you from these habits, I declare that no single city has wronged you more than Mytilene.

2 "For I can pardon those who revolt because they cannot endure your rule or are compelled by the enemy. But these men possessed an island protected by walls; they had to fear our enemies only by sea, where their own fleet of triremes

afforded no small defense; they lived under their own laws and received the highest honors from us. When men in such a position acted as they did, what was it but a plot and an insurrection rather than a revolt—for revolt is the act of those suffering oppression—and an attempt to destroy us by joining our bitterest enemies? This is more terrible than if they had acquired strength on their own and made war against us.

3 "They took no warning from the disasters of their neighbors who had already revolted from us and been subdued; nor did their present prosperity make them hesitate to enter upon danger. Reckless in the face of the future, with hopes that outran their strength but fell short of their desire, they took up war, choosing to set force before justice. For it was when they thought they would prevail that they attacked us, not when they were being wronged.

4 "Cities to which unexpected good fortune comes most suddenly and abundantly tend to turn to arrogance. Success that accords with reasonable expectation is usually safer for men than success beyond their hopes; and, broadly speaking, they find it easier to drive away adversity than to preserve prosperity.

5 "We should never have honored the Mytilenaeans above the rest, and they would not have grown so insolent. For it is human nature in general to despise those who court us and admire those who refuse to yield.

6 "Even now let their punishment match their offense. Do not lay the blame on the few and acquit the people. They all alike attacked you, although, had they turned to us, they could now be back in their city. Instead, judging it safer to share the danger with the few, they joined in the revolt.

7 "Consider your allies: if you impose the same penalties on those forced into revolt by the enemy and those who revolt of their own will, which of them, do you think, will not revolt on the slightest pretext, when success brings freedom and failure no irreparable suffering?

8 "Against each city we shall stake our money and our lives. If successful, you will take over a ruined city and be deprived thereafter of the revenue that gives us strength; if we fail, we shall have more enemies in addition to those we have already, and spend the time in which we ought to resist our existing enemies at war with our own allies.

CHAPTER 40

1 "You must therefore hold out no hope, whether made persuasive by argument or purchased with money, that they will receive pardon for having erred as human beings do. They did not harm us unwillingly, but plotted with full knowledge; it is the involuntary act that deserves pardon.

2 "Both when we first debated and now, I insist that you must not reverse your earlier decision, or fall into error through the three things most harmful to an empire: pity, pleasure in words, and leniency.

3 "For compassion is justly exchanged between those who feel alike, not bestowed on men who will show none in return and are necessarily our enemies forever. Speakers who delight us with words will have their contest on other, less important occasions, not on one where the city will pay heavily for a brief pleasure, while they reap a handsome reward for their fine speaking. And leniency is better granted to those who will remain our friends in the future than to men who will remain unchanged and no less our enemies.

4 "To sum it up in a word: if you follow me, you will do what is both just toward the Mytilenaeans and advantageous to yourselves; if you decide otherwise, you will win no gratitude from them, but rather pass sentence against yourselves. For if they were right to revolt, you must be wrong to rule. Yet if, even without a right, you claim to exercise that rule, these men too must be punished against strict justice for your advantage; otherwise you must abandon your empire and practice virtue free of danger.

5 "Resolve to exact in return the same punishment they would have inflicted, and, having escaped, do not show yourselves more indifferent than those who plotted against you. Consider what they would probably have done had they overcome you, especially since they were the first to commit injustice.

6 "Indeed, those who wrong others without cause are the most determined to pursue them to destruction, fearing the danger from an enemy left alive. For the man who has suffered an injury without deserving it, if he escapes, is a fiercer enemy than one whose hostility began on equal terms.

7 "Do not, then, betray yourselves. Bring your minds as close as possible to the moment of suffering, and remember how you would have valued above everything the chance to subdue them. Repay them now, without yielding to the feelings of the immediate present or forgetting the terror that once hung over you.

8 "Punish these men as they deserve, and set a clear example to your other allies that whoever revolts will pay with his life. Once they know this, you will be less often forced to neglect your enemies and fight your own allies."

CHAPTER 41

1 Such were Cleon's words. After him Diodotus son of Eucrates, who in the previous assembly had most strongly opposed putting the Mytilenaeans to death, came forward again and spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 42

1 "I neither blame those who have reopened the question of the Mytilenaeans nor praise those who object to repeated deliberation on matters of the greatest importance. I believe that sound judgment has two chief enemies: haste and anger. The one is commonly joined with folly, the other with lack of education and narrowness of mind.

2 "Anyone who contends that words cannot teach us about actions is either without understanding or has some private interest at stake: without understanding, if he thinks that the future, which is not yet visible, can be explained by any other means; privately interested, if, wishing to persuade you to something shameful, he thinks he cannot speak well on behalf of what is wrong, but can, by skillful slander, intimidate both his opponents and his audience.

3 "Most dangerous of all are those who add the charge that a speaker is making a display for money. If the accusation were ignorance, a man who failed to persuade would retire with a reputation for being more foolish than dishonest. But when dishonesty is alleged, success leaves him under suspicion, and failure makes him both foolish and dishonest.

4 "The city gains nothing from this: fear robs it of its counselors. Indeed, its affairs would prosper most if citizens of this kind were powerless to speak, for then it would be least often persuaded into error.

5 "The good citizen should prove himself the better speaker not by frightening his opponents but by meeting them on equal terms. A wise city should neither add to the honor of the man whose counsels most often succeed nor diminish what he already enjoys; and the man whose judgment fails should not be punished, or even disgraced.

6 "In this way the successful speaker would be least tempted to say something against his judgment merely to please you and win still greater honors; nor would the unsuccessful one seek, by the same appeal to your pleasure, to win the multitude over to himself.

CHAPTER 43

1 "We do the opposite. Worse still, if a man is suspected of speaking for profit, even though his advice is the best, our resentment at the uncertain prospect of his gains deprives the city of a manifest benefit.

2 "We have reached the point where good advice plainly spoken is no less suspect than bad: the man who wishes to persuade you to the most terrible course must win over the multitude by deceit, and the man who gives better counsel must likewise lie to make himself believed.

3 "Ours is the only city whose excessive cleverness makes it impossible to do it an open service without deception. For anyone who openly bestows a benefit is suspected, in return, of secretly securing something more for himself.

4 "Yet even under these conditions, when the greatest matters are at stake, we should claim the right to speak with a longer view than yours, who look at things only briefly—especially since our advice is subject to account, while your hearing of it is not.

5 "For if the man who persuaded and the man who followed suffered equally, you would judge more soberly. As it is, when you sometimes go wrong, you punish, in whatever anger happens to seize you, the single judgment of the man who persuaded you, but not your own judgments, numerous though they were, which shared in the mistake.

CHAPTER 44

1 "I have come forward neither to defend the Mytilenaeans nor to prosecute them. If we are sensible, our contest is not over their wrongdoing but over our own good judgment.

2 "For even if I prove them guilty of the gravest wrong, I shall not therefore urge their death unless it is to our advantage; nor, if they have some claim to pardon, shall I urge it if it would bring the city no good.

3 "I believe we are deliberating more about the future than the present. Cleon's strongest contention is that it will benefit us hereafter to prescribe death as the penalty, making revolt less frequent. I too rest my case on our future welfare, but reach the opposite conclusion.

4 "And I ask you not to reject the usefulness of my argument for the fair appearance of his. His argument, being the more just, may well appeal to your present anger against the Mytilenaeans. But we are not conducting a lawsuit against them, with a need to establish justice; we are deliberating about them, to determine how they may serve our interests.

CHAPTER 45

1 "In the cities, then, death is prescribed for many offenses, not merely as grave as this one, but less grave. Yet men are carried away by hope and take the risk; no one has ever embarked on a dangerous conspiracy after condemning his own design to failure.

2 "And what city has ever attempted revolt believing its resources, whether its own or those supplied by its allies, inadequate to the task?

3 "All men, in private and in public alike, are by nature prone to wrongdoing, and no law will restrain them. Indeed, men have run through the whole range of penalties, increasing them in the hope of suffering less at the hands of criminals. It is likely that in ancient times the penalties for the greatest offenses were milder, but as these were transgressed, most penalties in time rose to death. Yet even this is transgressed.

4 "Either, then, we must discover some terror greater than death, or admit that death at least is no restraint. Poverty, giving boldness through necessity; power, giving greed through arrogance and pride; and the other conditions of human life, each possessed by some overpowering, incurable passion—all drive men into danger.

5 "Hope and desire are present in every venture, desire leading and hope following: desire devises the plot, hope suggests that fortune will furnish the means. They do the greatest harm, and, invisible themselves, are stronger than the terrors before our eyes.

6 "Fortune, too, contributes no less to men's elation. Sometimes she appears unexpectedly and encourages a man to take risks even with inferior resources. Cities are no less affected, since their stakes are the greatest—freedom or dominion over others—and each man, with everyone beside him, unreasoningly forms an exaggerated opinion of himself.

7 "In short, there is no turning human nature back, once it is eagerly bent on some action, by the force of law or any other terror; and it is great simplicity to think there is.

CHAPTER 46

1 "We must not, then, make worse decisions by trusting in the death penalty as a sure guarantee; nor must we deprive those who have revolted of all hope that they may change their minds and end their offense in the shortest possible time.

2 "Consider: as things stand, a city that has revolted, if it recognizes that it cannot prevail, may come to terms while it is still able to repay our expenses and pay tribute in the future. But under the other policy, what city do you think would fail to prepare better than now and hold out under siege to the last, if a late surrender and an early one bring the same result?

3 "And how can it fail to harm us to sit there spending money because agreement is impossible, and, if we capture the city, to take it over in ruins, deprived thereafter of its revenue? It is this revenue that gives us strength against our enemies.

4 "Thus we must not injure ourselves by acting as exacting judges of offenders. Rather, by punishing moderately, we must see that in future we can make use of cities still strong in their financial resources. And we must seek our safeguard not in the severity of our laws but in the care we take over our actions.

5 "At present we do the reverse: if we subdue a free people, ruled by force, who have naturally revolted in pursuit of self-government, we think that we ought to punish them harshly.

6 "But with free peoples we should not punish fiercely after they revolt; we should guard fiercely before they revolt, forestalling them so that they never even conceive the thought. And once we have prevailed, we should hold as few as possible responsible.

CHAPTER 47

1 "Consider also how great a mistake you would make in this further respect by following Cleon.

2 "At present the people in every city are well disposed toward you. Either they do not join the oligarchs in revolt, or, if compelled to do so, they are from the outset enemies of those who brought about the revolt; and when you go to war with a city opposing you, you have its multitude as your ally.

3 "But if you destroy the people of Mytilene, who took no part in the revolt and, as soon as they gained possession of arms, voluntarily surrendered the city, you will first commit a wrong by killing your benefactors; then you will give the powerful precisely what they most desire. For when they bring cities into revolt, they will immediately have the people as allies, since you will have demonstrated beforehand that the same penalty awaits the guilty and the innocent alike.

4 "Even if they have done wrong, we must pretend not to notice, so that the one ally still left to us does not become an enemy.

5 "For the preservation of our empire I consider it far more advantageous that we should willingly suffer wrong than justly destroy those whom we ought not to destroy. And Cleon's claim that the punishment is at once just and advantageous proves impossible to realize in the same act.

CHAPTER 48

1 "Recognize that this is the better course, and, giving no greater weight to pity or to leniency—motives to which I too forbid you to yield—be persuaded by the counsel itself and follow me: judge at leisure those Mytilenaeans whom Paches sent here as guilty, and leave the rest to inhabit their city.

2 "For this will be good for the future and will alarm our enemies now. The man who judges wisely against his opponents is stronger than the man who attacks without understanding, though his deeds are backed by force."

CHAPTER 49

1 Such were Diodotus' words. Although these were the two proposals most directly opposed to each other, the Athenians nevertheless remained divided in judgment, and the show of hands was nearly equal; but Diodotus' proposal prevailed.

2 They immediately dispatched another trireme in all haste, lest the first should arrive ahead of them and they find the city destroyed. It had a lead of about a day and a night.

3 The Mytilenaean envoys furnished the ship with wine and barley meal, promising great rewards if they arrived in time. So urgent was the voyage that the men ate as they rowed, taking barley meal kneaded with wine and oil, and slept in turns while the others rowed.

4 By good fortune no wind opposed them. The first ship sailed without enthusiasm on its dreadful errand, while the second pressed forward in this fashion. The first arrived only so far ahead that Paches had read the decree and was about to carry out its orders when the second put in behind it and prevented the destruction. So close did Mytilene come to destruction.

CHAPTER 50

1 The other men whom Paches had sent away as chiefly responsible for the revolt —a little more than a thousand—the Athenians put to death on Cleon's proposal. They also demolished the Mytilenaeans' walls and took possession of their ships.

2 Later they imposed no tribute on the Lesbians, but divided their land, except that of the Methymnaeans, into three thousand allotments. Three hundred they set apart as sacred to the gods; to the rest they sent allotment-holders from among themselves, chosen by lot. The Lesbians agreed to pay these men two minas a year for each allotment and cultivated the land themselves.

3 The Athenians also took over all the small towns on the mainland under Mytilenaean control, and these thereafter became subjects of Athens. Such was the course of events on Lesbos.

CHAPTER 51

1 In the same summer, after the capture of Lesbos, the Athenians, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, made an expedition against the island of Minoa, which lies off Megara. The Megarians had built a tower on it and used it as a fortified post.

2 Nicias wanted the Athenians to keep watch from there at closer range, rather than from Budorum and Salamis. He also wished to prevent the Peloponnesians from slipping out unobserved, either with triremes, as they had done before, or by dispatching privateers, and at the same time to stop anything from sailing in to the Megarians.

3 First, then, using siege engines from the sea, he captured two towers projecting from Nisaea and cleared the entrance to the channel between the island and the mainland. He also began walling off the approach from the mainland, where reinforcements reached the island by a bridge across a marsh, for the island lay only a short distance from the mainland.

4 When they had completed this in a few days, he then left a fortification and a garrison on the island itself and withdrew with his army.

CHAPTER 52

1 At about the same time that summer, the Plataeans, with no food left and no longer able to endure the siege, came to terms with the Peloponnesians in the following way.

2 The Peloponnesians were attacking their wall, and they could not defend themselves. The Lacedaemonian commander recognized their weakness, but did not wish to take the city by force: he had received instructions from Lacedaemon to ensure that, if a treaty should ever be made with the Athenians and both sides agreed to restore the places they held through warfare, Plataea should not have to be restored, since its inhabitants would have come over voluntarily. He therefore sent a herald to ask whether they were willing to surrender their city voluntarily to the Lacedaemonians and accept them as judges, who would punish the guilty, but no one contrary to justice.

3 This was the herald's message, and the Plataeans, already reduced to the utmost weakness, surrendered the city. The Peloponnesians fed them for some days, until the five men appointed as judges arrived from Lacedaemon.

4 When they arrived, no charge was brought forward. They summoned the Plataeans and asked them this question alone: whether they had done any good [at all] to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the present war.

5 The Plataeans asked leave to speak at greater length and appointed two of their number to speak for them: Astymachus son of Asopolaus and Lacon son of Aeimnestus, who was a proxenus of the Lacedaemonians. These came forward and spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 53

1 "Lacedaemonians, we surrendered our city because we trusted you, expecting to undergo not a trial of this kind but one more in keeping with established law. Nor would we have consented to stand, as we now do, before any other judges [than you], believing that from you above all we would receive impartial treatment.

2 "Now we fear that we have been mistaken in both respects. We have good reason to suspect that the gravest issues are at stake in this trial and that you may prove not to be impartial. Our evidence is that no prior accusation has been brought against us for us to answer—we ourselves had to ask leave to speak—and that your brief question is one to which a truthful answer tells against us, while a false one can be exposed.

3 "Hemmed in on every side, we are compelled to speak, and think it safer to face the danger after saying something. For men in our position might reproach themselves for a speech left unspoken, thinking that, had it been made, it might have saved them.

4 "Besides our other difficulties, persuasion itself is hard for us. If we were strangers to one another, we might benefit by presenting evidence of things unknown to you. As it is, we shall address men who know everything; and our fear is not that, having already judged our merits inferior to your own, you will make that a charge against us, but that, to gratify others, you are bringing us before a court whose judgment has already been decided.

CHAPTER 54

1 "Nevertheless, we shall present the grounds of justice we possess, both in our quarrel with the Thebans and in our relations with you and the other Greeks; we shall recall our good deeds and try to persuade you.

2 "To your brief question, whether we have done any good to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in this war, we reply: if you question us as enemies, you have suffered no wrong in receiving no benefit; but if you regard us as friends, then those who marched against us are themselves the ones at fault.

3 "In the peace and against the Mede we proved ourselves worthy: we were not the first to break the peace now, and then we alone of the Boeotians joined in the attack upon him for the freedom of Greece.

4 "For though we were an inland people, we fought at sea off Artemisium, and at the battle fought in our own land we stood beside you and Pausanias. In whatever other peril befell the Greeks at that time, we took a share beyond our strength.

5 "And to you in particular, Lacedaemonians, when the greatest terror threatened Sparta after the earthquake, with the Helots in revolt at Ithome, we sent a third of our own people to your aid. It is not right to forget these things.

CHAPTER 55

1 "Such was the part we thought ourselves bound to play in those great events of the past. Later we became your enemies; but you were responsible. When the Thebans used force against us and we asked for an alliance, you rejected us and told us to turn to the Athenians, who were near, while you lived far away.

2 "Yet in this war you have neither suffered anything exceptional at our hands nor had any prospect of doing so.

3 "If we refused to abandon the Athenians at your command, we committed no wrong. They came to our aid against the Thebans when you held back, and it was no longer honorable to betray them—especially men whom we had sought as allies in our own need, from whom we had received benefits and a share in their citizenship. It was only right that we should readily answer their summons.

4 "As for the courses that each of you prescribes to your allies, if anything has been done amiss, the blame rests not with those who follow, but with those who lead them into what is wrong.

CHAPTER 56

1 "The Thebans have wronged us in many other ways, but you yourselves know their latest offense, which has brought our present sufferings upon us.

2 "For when they tried to seize our city during a truce, and in a sacred month besides, we rightly punished them according to the law established among all men: that it is lawful in the sight of the gods to defend oneself against an attacking enemy. It would not now be reasonable for us to suffer on their account.

3 "For if you measure justice by your immediate advantage and their hostility to us, you will show yourselves not true judges of what is right, but servants rather of expediency.

4 "And yet, if they seem useful to you now, we and the other Greeks were far more useful then, when you stood in greater danger. Now it is you who advance, formidable, against others; but in that hour, when the barbarian brought slavery upon everyone, these men were at his side.

5 "It is only just to set our zeal of that time against our present fault, if indeed any fault has been committed. You will find great things weighed against small, and done at a time when it was rare for any Greek to set his valor against Xerxes' might. Praise went rather to those who, instead of securing their own advantage and safety against the invasion, were willing to risk danger and dare the noblest course.

6 "We were among those men and received the highest honors; yet now we fear that the same principles will bring our destruction, because we chose the Athenians honorably rather than you for gain.

7 "Yet you should show yourselves consistent in judging the same matters by the same standards. You should consider nothing else advantageous than that your worthy allies always have an assured return of gratitude for their valor, while your own immediate interests are also served.

CHAPTER 57

1 "Consider further that most Greeks now regard you as a model of manly virtue. But if you pass an unreasonable judgment upon us—this trial will not be hidden, and you are men of high repute, while we too are free from reproach —take care lest they refuse to approve an unworthy verdict upon worthy men from men still worthier, or the dedication at the common sanctuaries of spoils taken from us, the benefactors of Greece.

2 "It will seem a terrible thing that Lacedaemonians have laid Plataea waste: that your fathers inscribed our city's name upon the tripod at Delphi for its valor, but you, for the sake of the Thebans, have wiped it and every household within it from the whole Greek world.

3 "For this is the depth of misfortune we have reached: we were doomed if the Medes prevailed, and now, before you who were once our dearest friends, we are losing our case to the Thebans. We have undergone two struggles of the gravest kind: then, to perish of hunger unless we surrendered our city; now, to stand trial for our lives.

4 "We Plataeans, whose zeal for the Greeks exceeded our strength, have been cast aside by everyone, abandoned and without defenders. None of our former allies helps us; and we fear that you, Lacedaemonians, our only hope, may prove unworthy of our trust.

CHAPTER 58

1 "Yet we ask you, by the gods who once witnessed our alliance and by our service to the Greeks, to relent and change your minds if the Thebans have persuaded you otherwise. Ask of them this gift in return: that you should not kill men whom it would dishonor you to kill. Secure credit for wisdom rather than shame, and do not purchase others' pleasure with your own disgrace.

2 "For it is a brief task to destroy our bodies, but a labor to efface the infamy of it. You cannot reasonably punish us as enemies: we are men well disposed toward you who fought against you under compulsion.

3 "Thus by granting us safety for our lives you would judge in accordance with divine law, remembering also that you received us in voluntary surrender, with hands outstretched—and Greek law forbids the killing of such men—and that we have been your benefactors throughout.

4 "Look at the tombs of your fathers, who died at the hands of the Medes and were buried in our land. Every year we have publicly honored them with garments and the other customary rites, bringing first offerings of all the seasonal produce of our soil, as friends from a friendly land and allies to men who once fought beside us. You would do the reverse if you judged wrongly.

5 "Consider: Pausanias buried them believing that he was laying them in friendly soil and among men such as we are. But if you kill us and turn Plataean territory into Theban, what else will you do but leave your fathers and kinsmen in hostile soil, among their killers, deprived of the honors they now enjoy? Moreover, you will enslave the land where the Greeks won their freedom, desolate the sanctuaries of the gods to whom they prayed before defeating the Medes, and take away the ancestral sacrifices from those who established and founded them.

CHAPTER 59

1 "Such conduct does not befit your reputation, Lacedaemonians: neither to offend against the common laws of the Greeks and against your ancestors, nor to destroy us, your benefactors, for another's enmity, when you yourselves have suffered no wrong. Rather, spare us and let your judgment yield to a wise compassion, considering not only the horror of what we shall suffer, but the character of those who will suffer it, and how incalculable misfortune is, falling as it may upon anyone, however undeserving.

2 "And we, as befits us and as necessity compels, beg you to be persuaded by these pleas, invoking the gods whose altars the Greeks share in common. We appeal to the oaths your fathers swore and ask you not to forget them; we become suppliants at your ancestral tombs and call upon the dead not to let us fall under Theban power, nor allow their dearest friends to be handed over to their bitterest enemies. We remind you of that day when we joined them in their most glorious deeds, while on this day we face the danger of the most terrible suffering.

3 "Yet we must do what is both necessary and hardest for men in our plight: end our speech, since with its end the peril to our lives draws near. In closing, then, we say that we did not surrender our city to the Thebans—for before that we would have chosen to perish by starvation, the most shameful of deaths—but approached you in trust. And if we fail to persuade you, it is only just that you restore us to our former position and let us choose for ourselves the danger we must face.

4 "At the same time we solemnly entreat you: do not let us, the Plataeans, who showed the greatest zeal for the Greeks, be delivered to the Thebans, our bitterest enemies, from your hands and from the security of your pledge, when we are your suppliants, Lacedaemonians. Become our saviors, and do not, while liberating the other Greeks, destroy us."

CHAPTER 60

1 Such was the Plataeans' speech. The Thebans, fearing that their words might cause the Lacedaemonians to relent, came forward and said that they too wished to speak, since, contrary to their own expectation, the Plataeans had been granted a speech extending beyond an answer to the question. Given permission, they spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 61

1 "We would not have asked to speak if they too had answered the question briefly, instead of turning upon us with accusations and offering a lengthy defense of themselves on matters outside the issue and not even charged against them, and praise for actions no one had censured. As it is, we must answer some of their statements and expose the falsehood of others, so that neither our supposed wickedness nor their reputation may profit them, but you may hear the truth about both sides and judge.

2 "Our first quarrel with them arose because, after we had founded Plataea later than the rest of Boeotia, along with other places which we took into our possession after driving out their mixed populations, these men refused to accept our leadership, as had originally been ordained. They stood apart from the other Boeotians and transgressed ancestral custom; when pressure was brought upon them, they went over to the Athenians and, with them, did us much harm, for which they suffered in return.

CHAPTER 62

1 "When the barbarian invaded Hellas, they say that they alone among the Boeotians did not side with the Medes, and on this above all they pride themselves and revile us.

2 "We say that they did not side with the Medes because the Athenians did not either; yet when the Athenians later advanced against the Greeks in the same fashion, these men, alone again among the Boeotians, sided with Athens.

3 "Consider, however, the form of government under which each of us acted. Our city at that time was governed neither by an oligarchy with equality before the law nor by a democracy. Power lay with a narrow ruling clique—the arrangement most hostile to law and to sound government, and nearest to tyranny.

4 "These men, hoping to strengthen their own power still further if the Mede prevailed, held the people down by force and brought him in. The city as a whole acted without being its own master, and cannot justly be reproached for offenses committed when it was not governed by law.

5 "But once the Mede had withdrawn and the city had recovered its laws, you must consider whether, when the Athenians later advanced and tried to bring the rest of Hellas and our own country under their rule, already holding most of our country through civil strife, we did not fight and defeat them at Coronea and liberate Boeotia; and whether we are not now zealously helping to liberate the others, providing cavalry and resources on a scale unequaled by any of the allies.

CHAPTER 63

1 "So much we offer in defense of our siding with the Medes. We shall now try to show that you have done the Greeks greater wrong and deserve every punishment far more.

2 "You became allies and fellow citizens of the Athenians, you say, to secure their protection against us. Then you ought to have called them in only against us, and not joined them in attacking others. If the Athenians were leading you somewhere against your will, you had a choice: your alliance with these Lacedaemonians had already been made against the Mede—the very alliance

you chiefly invoke. It was sufficient to keep us from you and, most important, to let you deliberate without fear. Instead, willingly and under no further compulsion, you preferred the Athenian cause.

3 "You say it would have been shameful to betray your benefactors. Yet it was far more shameful and unjust to betray all the Greeks, to whom you were bound by oath, than the Athenians alone, when the latter were enslaving Hellas and the former were liberating it.

4 "Nor was your repayment of their favor either equivalent or free of shame. For you called them in, you say, when you were suffering injustice, but became their accomplices when they inflicted injustice on others. Yet failure to repay a favor in kind is more shameful than failure to repay a debt justly incurred when its repayment would mean injustice.

CHAPTER 64

1 "You have also made it clear that even then you alone refused to side with the Medes not for the Greeks' sake, but because the Athenians refused: you wished to act in concert with them and in opposition to us.

2 "And now you claim the benefit of worthy deeds whose merit you owed to others. That is unreasonable. You chose the Athenians: fight beside them, and do not invoke the sworn alliance of that time as grounds for your salvation now.

3 "For you abandoned it; in breach of it, you helped enslave the Aeginetans and certain others who had sworn it, instead of preventing their enslavement. And you did this willingly, under the same laws that you have retained to this day, with no one forcing you as we were forced. Nor did you accept our last invitation, before you were walled in, to remain at peace and support neither side.

4 "Who, then, could more justly be hated by all the Greeks than you, who displayed your valor to their injury? The deeds in which you once proved yourselves worthy, as you claim, you have now shown to be foreign to you; what

your nature always desired has been revealed in truth, for you joined the Athenians on their unjust course.

5 "Such is what we have to show concerning our unwilling support for the Medes and your willing support for Athens.

CHAPTER 65

1 "As for the latest wrong you claim to have suffered—that we unlawfully entered your city during a truce and a sacred festival—we do not believe that even here we were more at fault than you.

2 "For if we had come of our own accord to fight against your city and ravage your land as enemies, we would have been in the wrong. But if your foremost men in wealth and birth freely invited us, wishing to end your alliance with outsiders and restore you to the ancestral institutions common to all Boeotians, what wrong did we do? Those who lead the way break the law more than those who follow.

3 "But in our judgment neither they nor we broke it. Citizens like yourselves, and risking more, they opened their own walls and brought us into their own city as friends, not enemies. They wished the worse men among you to cease gaining the upper hand, and the better to receive their due. They sought to discipline your judgment, not to deprive the city of its people, but to unite it with its kindred, making you enemies to no one and at peace with all alike.

CHAPTER 66

1 "Here is proof that our actions were not hostile: we harmed no one, and proclaimed that anyone who wished to live under the ancestral institutions of all the Boeotians should join us.

2 "You gladly came over, made an agreement, and at first remained quiet. Later, when you realized how few we were—even if you thought we had acted somewhat unfairly in entering without the consent of your people—you did not repay us in kind, refraining from violence and seeking by words to persuade us to leave. Instead you attacked us in breach of the agreement. We do not grieve in the same way for those you killed in the fighting, for they suffered under a certain law of war. But those who stretched out their hands, whom you took alive and afterwards promised us not to kill, you unlawfully murdered: how can such deeds be anything but monstrous?

3 "And though you committed three wrongs in a short span—the agreement you broke, the men's subsequent execution, and your false promise to us not to kill them if we did no harm to your property in the countryside—you nevertheless say that we broke the law, and claim exemption from punishment yourselves. No, not if these men judge rightly: you will be punished for all of them.

CHAPTER 67

1 "We have gone through these matters, Lacedaemonians, for your sake and ours, so that you may know that your condemnation of them will be just, and we that our vengeance will be still more righteous.

2 "Do not relent on hearing of their ancient virtues, if indeed they ever possessed any. Such virtues should assist those who suffer injustice, but double the punishment of those who do something shameful, since their offenses belie what was expected of them. Nor let lamentation and pity profit them, as they invoke your fathers' tombs and their own abandonment.

3 "For against these we can show the far more terrible suffering of our young men whom they destroyed. Some of their fathers died at Coronea while bringing Boeotia over to you; others, left in old age, and their desolate households, make a far juster supplication to you for punishment of these men.

4 "Those who suffer what they do not deserve have the greater claim to men's pity; those who suffer justly, as these do, deserve on the contrary to have men rejoice at their fate.

5 "For their present abandonment they have themselves to blame: they willingly rejected the better allies. They broke the law without first suffering at our hands, judging by hatred rather than justice. Nor is the penalty they now pay an equal return: they will suffer lawfully, and not, as they claim, as men stretching out their hands in surrender after battle, but as men who handed themselves over for judgment under an agreement.

6 "Defend, then, Lacedaemonians, the law of the Greeks which these men have violated; and to us, who have suffered unlawfully, render a just return for the zeal we have shown. Do not let their words thrust us aside in your esteem, but set an example to the Greeks, making the contest turn not on words but on deeds. When deeds are good, a brief account suffices; when they are wrong, speeches adorned with fine phrases become screens to hide them.

7 "But if those who lead, as you do now, reduce the issues to their essentials and give judgment for all accordingly, men will be less inclined to seek fine words for unjust deeds."

CHAPTER 68

1 Such was the Thebans' speech. The Lacedaemonian judges thought it proper to ask whether the Plataeans had done them any service in the war. For they maintained that, in the preceding period, the Plataeans ought to have remained at peace under the old treaty made by Pausanias after the Mede's invasion; and later, when they had offered them neutrality on those terms before walling them in, they had refused. The judges therefore held that their own intentions had been just, while the Plataeans had put themselves outside the treaty and done them harm. Bringing them forward one by one, they asked the same ques-

tion again: had they done any service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the war? Whenever a man said no, they led him away and killed him, making no exception.

2 They killed no fewer than two hundred of the Plataeans themselves and twenty-five Athenians who had shared the siege with them; the women they enslaved.

3 For about a year [the Thebans] gave the city over for habitation to Megarians exiled through civil strife and to the surviving Plataeans who favored their cause. Later they razed the entire city to its foundations and built beside Hera's sanctuary a lodging house two hundred feet along each side, with rooms all around on the lower and upper floors. They used the Plataeans' roofs and doorframes, and from the other furnishings within the walls—the bronze and iron—they made couches and dedicated them to Hera. They also built her a stone temple a hundred feet long. Making the land public property, they leased it out for ten years, and Thebans farmed it.

4 Indeed, the Lacedaemonians' estrangement from the Plataeans in this whole affair was almost entirely for the Thebans' sake: they thought them useful for the war, which was then only just getting under way.

5 Such was the end of Plataea, in the ninety-third year after its people became allies of the Athenians.

CHAPTER 69

1 The forty Peloponnesian ships which had gone to aid Lesbos, after fleeing across the open sea, pursued by the Athenians, had been caught in a storm off Crete and driven from there in scattered groups to the Peloponnese. At Cyllene they found thirteen triremes of the Leucadians and Ambraciots, and Brasidas son of Tellis, who had arrived as adviser to Alcidas.

2 Having failed at Lesbos, the Lacedaemonians wished to enlarge their fleet and sail against Corcyra, where civil strife was raging. The Athenians had only twelve ships in the neighborhood of Naupactus, and the Lacedaemonians hoped to forestall the arrival of any larger naval force from Athens. Brasidas and Alcidas were making preparations for this.

CHAPTER 70

1 The Corcyraeans had been engaged in civil strife since the return of the prisoners taken in the sea battles over Epidamnus and released by the Corinthians. In word, their proxenoi had stood surety for eight hundred talents; in deed, the prisoners had been won over to bring Corcyra into the Corinthian interest. They approached the citizens one by one, working to detach the city from Athens.

2 When an Athenian ship and a Corinthian ship arrived, each carrying envoys, discussions were held, and the Corcyraeans voted to remain allies of the Athenians under their agreement, but friends of the Peloponnesians as before.

3 There was a certain Peithias, a voluntary proxenos of the Athenians and leader of the people. These men brought him to trial, charging that he was enslaving Corcyra to Athens.

4 Acquitted, he prosecuted the five richest of them in turn, alleging that they cut stakes from the sacred precincts of Zeus and Alcinous. The penalty for each stake was one stater.

5 When they were convicted, they seated themselves as suppliants at the sanctuaries, asking, because of the size of the fine, to pay it in agreed installments. But Peithias, who also happened to be a member of the council, persuaded it to enforce the law.

6 Barred by the law from securing this relief, and learning at the same time that Peithias intended, while still a council member, to persuade the people to recognize the same friends and enemies as the Athenians, they conspired together.

Armed with daggers, they suddenly entered the council and killed Peithias and about sixty others, both council members and private citizens. A few of those who shared Peithias's views escaped to the Athenian trireme, which was still there.

CHAPTER 71

1 After this deed they assembled the Corcyraeans and declared that what had happened was for the best, and would keep them most securely from enslavement by Athens. In future, they should receive neither side except when coming peacefully in a single ship; anything more should be regarded as hostile. Having spoken, they compelled the people to ratify their proposal.

2 They also immediately sent envoys to Athens to explain that their actions had been for the city's good, and to persuade those who had taken refuge there to do nothing hostile, so that no counterstroke might follow.

CHAPTER 72

1 When they arrived, the Athenians arrested the envoys as revolutionaries, along with those they had persuaded, and detained them on Aegina.

2 Meanwhile, after a Corinthian trireme and Lacedaemonian envoys had arrived, those who held power in Corcyra attacked the people and defeated them in battle.

3 At nightfall the people took refuge in the citadel and the higher parts of the city, where they gathered and established themselves; they also held the Hyllaic harbor. The others occupied the marketplace, where most of them lived, and the harbor beside it, facing the mainland.

CHAPTER 73

1 The following day there was a little skirmishing, and both sides sent throughout the countryside, calling upon the slaves and promising them freedom. Most of the household slaves joined the people as allies, while eight hundred mercenaries from the mainland joined the other side.

CHAPTER 74

1 After a day had intervened, battle broke out again, and the people won, having the advantage both in the strength of their positions and in numbers. The women too boldly joined in, throwing roof tiles from the houses and enduring the tumult in defiance of their nature.

2 The rout came late in the afternoon. Fearing that the people might rush forward, seize the dockyard at the first onset, and destroy them, the oligarchs set fire to the houses and apartment buildings around the marketplace to block the approach, sparing neither their own property nor anyone else's. Much merchandise belonging to traders was burned, and the entire city was at risk of destruction if a wind arose to carry the flames toward it.

3 The fighting ceased, and both sides remained quiet and kept watch through the night. With the people victorious, the Corinthian ship slipped out to sea, and most of the mercenaries crossed secretly to the mainland.

CHAPTER 75

1 On the following day Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, an Athenian general, arrived from Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred Messenian hoplites to give assistance. He worked for a settlement and persuaded the two sides to agree that the ten men chiefly responsible should stand trial—they no longer remained—and that the rest should live in the city, having made a treaty with one another and with the Athenians, recognizing the same enemies and friends.

2 Having arranged this, he was about to sail away. But the leaders of the people persuaded him to leave five of his ships with them, to discourage their opponents from making any move, while they themselves would man an equal number with their own people and send them with him.

3 He agreed, and they began enrolling their enemies for the ships. Fearing that they would be sent to Athens, these men seated themselves in the sanctuary of the Dioscuri.

4 Nicostratus tried to make them rise, reassuring them. When he failed to persuade them, the people took up arms, alleging that their distrustful refusal to sail showed that they had no honest intentions. They seized their weapons from their houses and would have killed some of the men they encountered had Nicostratus not prevented it.

5 Seeing what was happening, the others seated themselves as suppliants in Hera's sanctuary, no fewer than four hundred in all. Fearing that they might attempt a revolution, the people persuaded them to rise and conveyed them to the island in front of the sanctuary, sending provisions across to them there.

CHAPTER 76

1 While the civil strife stood at this point, on the fourth or fifth day after the men had been conveyed to the island, the Peloponnesian ships arrived from Cyllene, where they had lain at anchor after their voyage from Ionia. There were fifty-three of them. Alcidas commanded, as before, and Brasidas sailed with him as adviser. They put in at Sybota, a harbor on the mainland, and at dawn sailed against Corcyra.

CHAPTER 77

1 The Corcyraeans, in great confusion and alarm both at events within the city and at the approaching fleet, began preparing sixty ships, sending each one out against the enemy as soon as it was manned. The Athenians urged them instead

to let the Athenian ships sail out first and then follow with all their own together.

2 As their ships approached the enemy in scattered order, two immediately deserted, while on others the men aboard fought one another. There was no order in anything they did.

3 Seeing the confusion, the Peloponnesians deployed twenty ships against the Corcyraeans and the rest against the twelve Athenian ships, two of which were the Salaminia and the Paralus.

CHAPTER 78

1 The Corcyraeans, attacking badly and a few ships at a time, were hard pressed in their part of the battle. The Athenians, fearing the enemy's numbers and the danger of encirclement, did not attack the ships arrayed against them as a whole or at their center, but struck at one wing and sank a ship. After this, when the enemy formed a circle, they sailed around it, trying to throw them into confusion.

2 Those engaged against the Corcyraeans saw what was happening and, fearing a repetition of events at Naupactus, came to the rescue. The ships united and advanced together against the Athenians.

3 The Athenians now began to withdraw, backing water, and at the same time sought to give the Corcyraean ships the fullest possible opportunity to reach safety first, by retreating slowly themselves and keeping the enemy drawn up against them.

4 Such was the course of the sea battle, which ended at sunset.

CHAPTER 79

1 The Corcyraeans feared that the victorious enemy might sail against the city and either recover the men on the island or attempt some other upheaval. They therefore conveyed the men from the island back to Hera's sanctuary and kept guard over the city.

2 But despite their victory at sea, the enemy did not dare sail against the city. Taking thirteen Corcyraean ships with them, they sailed back to the mainland from which they had put out.

3 The following day they were no more inclined to sail against the city, despite the great confusion and fear of its inhabitants and although Brasidas, it is said, urged Alcidas to do so; he had no equal vote in the decision. Instead they landed at the promontory of Leucimme and ravaged the countryside.

CHAPTER 80

1 Meanwhile the Corcyraean people, terrified that the ships would attack, entered into discussions with the suppliants and the others about how the city might be saved, and persuaded some of them to go aboard the ships. For they nevertheless manned thirty, awaiting the attack.

2 The Peloponnesians ravaged the land until midday and sailed away. Toward nightfall beacon signals informed them that sixty Athenian ships were approaching from Leucas. The Athenians had sent them, with Eurymedon son of Thucles as general, on learning of the civil strife and that the ships under Alcidas intended to sail against Corcyra.

CHAPTER 81

1 The Peloponnesians therefore set off home at once that night, making all speed along the coast. They carried their ships across the Leucadian isthmus, so that they would not be seen sailing around it, and withdrew.

2 When the Corcyraeans learned that the Attic ships were approaching and those of the enemy had gone, they brought into the city the Messenians who had previously been outside. They ordered the ships they had manned to sail around to the Hyllaic harbor, and while these were making the circuit, killed any of their enemies they could catch. They also took off the ships all those they had persuaded to embark and put them to death. Going to the sanctuary of Hera, they persuaded some fifty of the suppliants to submit to trial, and condemned every one of them to death.

3 The greater number of the suppliants, who had not been persuaded, saw what was happening and killed one another there in the sanctuary. Some hanged themselves from the trees; others ended their lives however they could.

4 For seven days, while Eurymedon remained after arriving with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans murdered those of their fellow citizens whom they regarded as enemies. The charge they brought was an attempt to overthrow the democracy, but some died for private enmities, and others were killed by men who had borrowed money from them.

5 Death assumed every form; as commonly happens in such times, there was no horror that did not occur, and worse still. Fathers killed their sons; men were dragged from sanctuaries and slain beside them; some were even walled up in the sanctuary of Dionysus and died there.

CHAPTER 82

1 To such savagery did civil strife advance; and it seemed the more savage because it was among the first of these outbreaks. Later, virtually the whole Greek world was convulsed, with divisions everywhere: the leaders of the people sought to bring in the Athenians, the oligarchs the Lacedaemonians. In peace they would have had neither a pretext nor the readiness to call them in; but now that the two powers were at war, and an alliance offered either faction the means both to injure its opponents and, by the same act, to gain strength for itself, those who desired revolution could readily secure their intervention.

2 Many grievous sufferings fell upon the cities through civil strife, such as occur and always will occur as long as human nature remains the same, though more violent or more temperate, and varying in their forms, as successive changes of circumstance bring them on. In peace and prosperity, cities and individuals alike have better dispositions because they do not fall under necessities imposed against their will. But war, stripping away the easy provision of daily life, is a violent teacher, and brings the passions of the multitude into accord with their circumstances.

3 So civil strife spread through the cities, and those in which it came later, hearing of what had happened before, carried innovation in their designs much further, both in the ingenuity of their attacks and in the monstrous character of their reprisals.

4 They altered the customary judgments that words conveyed about actions, to suit their own justifications. Unreasoning daring was counted courage loyal to one's party; prudent hesitation, cowardice in a respectable guise; self-restraint, a cloak for unmanliness; intelligence alive to every side of a question, incapacity to act on any. Impetuous violence was assigned to the manly character, while plotting with an eye to safety was a plausible excuse for holding back.

5 The man who raged was always trustworthy; whoever contradicted him was suspect. A successful plotter was clever, but a man who detected a plot was cleverer still. Anyone who took thought to ensure that neither should be needed was a breaker of party ties and terrified of his opponents. In short, praise went to the man who forestalled someone about to do an injury, and to the man who urged someone who had never intended injury to commit it.

6 Kinship itself became a less intimate bond than party fellowship, because party members were readier for reckless action without excuse. Such associations did not exist to seek advantage under the established laws, but to grasp more in defiance of them. Their pledges to one another were secured less by divine law than by complicity in some breach of law.

7 Fair proposals from opponents were received, when the recipients had the advantage, with vigilance in action, not with generosity of spirit. Revenge upon another mattered more than escaping injury oneself. If oaths of reconciliation were ever exchanged, they held good for the immediate crisis, each side giving them because it was at a loss and had no strength to draw upon elsewhere. But when opportunity came, whichever side first regained confidence, if it saw the other unguarded, took greater pleasure in vengeance through a breach of trust than in an open attack. It reckoned both on its safety and on the prize for cleverness it won by prevailing through deceit. Most people more readily accept being called skillful scoundrels than honest fools: they are ashamed of the latter and proud of the former.

8 The cause of all this was the pursuit of power through greed and ambition; from these, once rivalry had taken hold, came the zeal for victory. The leaders in each city, on either side, adopted a respectable name: the one professed to prefer political equality for the people, the other a temperate aristocracy. In word they served the public interest; in fact they made it the prize of their contest. Struggling by every means to overcome one another, they dared the most terrible deeds and pursued still greater reprisals, setting no limit at justice or the city's good, but always at whatever would give either side pleasure. Whether by an unjust vote of condemnation or by force, they were ready to seize mastery and satisfy their immediate rivalry. Neither side paid any regard to piety; those who managed to accomplish something hateful under a respectable cloak of words won the better reputation. Citizens in the middle were destroyed by both, either for refusing to join their struggle or from envy that they should survive.

CHAPTER 83

1 Thus every form of moral corruption took root in the Greek world through civil strife. The simplicity in which nobility has so large a share was laughed out of existence, while a spirit of mutual distrust and antagonism everywhere

prevailed.

2 For there was nothing to reconcile them, no word secure enough, no oath formidable enough. All, convinced by their calculations that lasting security was hopeless, looked rather to protecting themselves from harm than to finding the capacity for trust.

3 And those of lesser intelligence generally prevailed. Fearful of their own inadequacy and their opponents' cleverness—lest they should be worsted in debate and forestalled by the plots of more versatile minds—they went boldly into action.

4 The others, contemptuously confident that they would foresee the danger, and that they had no need to secure by action what intelligence could secure, were more often caught unguarded and destroyed.

CHAPTER 84

1 [In Corcyra, then, most of these outrages were first ventured: all that men taking revenge might do when those who had given them cause for retaliation had ruled them with arrogance rather than moderation; all the unjust designs of men seeking release from their accustomed poverty, passionately craving above all the possessions of their neighbors; and all the cruel and merciless attacks of those who acted not for gain, but chiefly against their equals, carried to extremes by the undisciplined force of anger.

2 When the city's life had been thrown into confusion at this crisis, human nature, accustomed to wrongdoing even in defiance of the laws, now triumphed over them and gladly showed itself powerless over passion, stronger than justice, and hostile to everything above it. Otherwise men would not have preferred revenge to piety and gain to innocence, had envy not wielded a destructive power.

3 In taking vengeance upon others, men presume to overthrow in advance the common laws that govern such matters, on which all rest their hope of preservation should they themselves suffer disaster. They will not leave those laws standing against a time when one of them, in danger, may need their help.]

CHAPTER 85

1 Such were the passions the Corcyraeans in the city first unleashed against one another. Eurymedon and the Athenians sailed away with their fleet.

2 Later the Corcyraean exiles—some five hundred of them had survived—seized the forts on the mainland and controlled their own territory across the water. Making this their base, they plundered those on the island and did great damage, and a severe famine arose in the city.

3 They also sent embassies to Lacedaemon and Corinth to seek their restoration. When they achieved nothing, after some time they equipped ships and hired mercenaries, and crossed to the island, about six hundred in all.

4 They burned their ships, to extinguish every hope but that of mastering the country, and went up to Mount Istone. There they built a fort, ravaged those in the city, and held the countryside.

CHAPTER 86

1 At the close of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty ships to Sicily, under the command of Laches son of Melanopus and Charoeades son of Euphiletus.

2 The Syracusans and Leontines had gone to war with one another. Allied with the Syracusans were all the other Dorian cities except Camarina, the same cities that had ranged themselves with the Lacedaemonian alliance when the war first

began, though they had not actually taken part in the fighting. The Chalcidian cities and Camarina were allied with the Leontines. In Italy, Locri sided with the Syracusans, while Rhegium, through kinship, sided with the Leontines.

3 The allies of the Leontines therefore sent to Athens and, invoking an ancient alliance and their Ionian descent, persuaded the Athenians to send them ships; for the Syracusans were excluding them from both land and sea.

4 The Athenians sent them, professedly on the grounds of kinship, but wishing in reality to prevent grain from being carried from there to the Peloponnese, and to make a first trial of whether they could bring affairs in Sicily under their control.

5 They established themselves at Rhegium in Italy and carried on the war with their allies. And the summer ended.

CHAPTER 87

1 In the following winter the disease fell upon the Athenians a second time. It had never entirely disappeared, though there had been some respite.

2 This later outbreak lasted no less than a year, the earlier one fully two years, so that nothing pressed harder upon the Athenians or did more to cripple their strength.

3 For no fewer than four thousand four hundred hoplites from the ranks died, and three hundred cavalry, while the number among the rest of the population was beyond discovery.

4 It was also at this time that the many earthquakes occurred, in Athens, Euboea, and Boeotia, and especially at Orchomenus in Boeotia.

CHAPTER 88

1 During the same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians made an expedition with thirty ships against the islands called the Islands of Aeolus; in summer the lack of water made an expedition impossible.

2 The Liparaeans, who are colonists of Cnidus, possess these islands. They live on one small island, called Lipara, and from it they go out to cultivate the others, Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera.

3 The people there believe that Hephaestus works at his forge on Hiera, because it is seen to send up a great blaze at night and smoke by day. These islands lie opposite the territory of the Sicels and the Messenians, and were allies of the Syracusans.

4 The Athenians ravaged their land, but as they would not come over, sailed away to Rhegium. And the winter ended, and the fifth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

CHAPTER 89

1 In the following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies advanced as far as the Isthmus, intending to invade Attica, under Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. But frequent earthquakes made them turn back, and no invasion took place.

2 About this time, while the earthquakes continued, the sea at Orobiae in Euboea withdrew from what was then the shoreline, rose into a wave, and swept over part of the city. Some of the water submerged the land and some receded, and what was formerly land is now sea. All who could not run to higher ground in time were killed.

3 A similar inundation occurred around Atalanta, the island off the coast of the Opuntian Locrians. It carried away part of the Athenian fort and shattered one of two ships that had been hauled ashore.

4 At Peparethus too there was a withdrawal of the sea, though no inundation followed; an earthquake brought down part of the wall, the town hall, and a few other houses.

5 In my judgment, the cause of such an event is that, at the point where the earthquake is strongest, it drives the sea back, and the sea, suddenly drawn in again, produces a more violent flood. Without an earthquake, I do not think anything of this kind could happen.

CHAPTER 90

1 During the same summer others too carried on the war in Sicily as circumstances befell them, both the Sicilian Greeks campaigning against one another and the Athenians with their own allies. I shall record those actions most worthy of mention, whether performed by the allies in concert with the Athenians or by their enemies against them.

2 Charoeades, the Athenian general, had by now been killed in battle by the Syracusans. Laches, holding sole command of the fleet, therefore campaigned with the allies against Mylae in Messenian territory. Two Messenian tribes happened to be garrisoning Mylae, and had also laid an ambush for the troops coming from the ships.

3 The Athenians and their allies routed the ambushing force and killed many of them. Then, attacking the fort, they compelled the defenders to agree both to surrender the citadel and to join the expedition against Messene.

4 After this, when the Athenians and their allies advanced, the Messenians themselves also came over, giving hostages and providing the other guarantees required.

CHAPTER 91

1 In the same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships around the Peloponnese under the command of Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes and Procles son of Theodorus, and sixty ships with two thousand hoplites to Melos, under Nicias son of Niceratus.

2 They wished to bring the Melians to submission, since, though islanders, they refused either to obey them or to enter their alliance.

3 But when the Melians would not come over despite the ravaging of their land, the Athenians put out from Melos and sailed to Oropus in Graice. Landing toward nightfall, the hoplites immediately marched inland from the ships to Tanagra in Boeotia.

4 At an agreed signal the Athenians from the city marched out with their full force to meet them at the same place, under Hipponicus son of Callias and Eurymedon son of Thucles.

5 They encamped that day in Tanagraean territory, ravaged it, and spent the night there. On the following day they defeated in battle the Tanagraeans who came out against them, together with some Thebans who had come to their aid. They took arms from the defeated and set up a trophy, then withdrew, some to the city and the others to the ships.

6 Nicias sailed along the coast with his sixty ships, ravaged the coastal districts of Locris, and returned home.

CHAPTER 92

1 About this time the Lacedaemonians founded Heraclea in Trachinia as a colony, for the following reasons.

2 The Malians as a whole are divided into three groups: the Paralians, the Irians, and the Trachinians. Of these, the Trachinians, worn down by war with their neighbors the Oetaeans, at first contemplated attaching themselves to the

Athenians. But fearing that these might not prove trustworthy, they sent to Lacedaemon, choosing Tisamenus as their ambassador.

3 The Dorians, whose country is the motherland of the Lacedaemonians, joined in the embassy with the same request, for they too were suffering at the hands of the Oetaeans.

4 After hearing them, the Lacedaemonians resolved to send out the colony. They wished to aid the Trachinians and Dorians, and at the same time thought the city's position advantageous for their war against Athens. A fleet could be equipped there against Euboea, making the crossing a short one, and the site would be useful for the passage toward Thrace. On all grounds they were eager to settle the place.

5 First, then, they questioned the god at Delphi, and, receiving his approval, sent out settlers from among themselves and the perioeci. They also invited any other Greeks who wished to accompany them, except Ionians, Achaeans, and certain other peoples. Three Lacedaemonians led them as founders: Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon.

6 On arriving, they built the walls of the city, now called Heraclea, on a new site, about forty stades from Thermopylae and twenty from the sea. They also prepared dockyards and walled off the approach toward Thermopylae at the narrow pass itself, so that it could be easily guarded.

CHAPTER 93

1 When this city was being settled, the Athenians were at first alarmed, believing that it was being founded chiefly against Euboea, since the crossing to Cenaeum in Euboea is short. Yet the outcome belied their expectations: no danger came to them from it.

2 The reason was that the Thessalians, who held power in these parts and on whose land the colony was founded, feared the presence of a powerful new neighbor. They ravaged the settlers and made unremitting war upon them,

until they wore them down, though their numbers at first had been very great: with the Lacedaemonians founding the city, everyone went there confidently, believing its security assured. Not least, however, the Lacedaemonian governors themselves who came out ruined its affairs and reduced its population, driving most people away in fear by harsh and sometimes dishonest administration, so that their neighbors could now master them more readily.

CHAPTER 94

1 In the same summer, about the time when the Athenians were detained at Melos, the Athenians aboard the thirty ships around the Peloponnese first ambushed and killed some of the garrison at Ellomenus in Leucadian territory. Later they came against Leucas with a larger force: all the Acarnanians, who followed with their full strength except for the Oeniadae, together with Zacynthians, Cephallenians, and fifteen Corcyraean ships.

2 The Leucadians, overwhelmed by numbers, kept quiet while their territory was ravaged both outside the isthmus and inside it, where Leucas itself and the sanctuary of Apollo stand. The Acarnanians urged Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to cut them off with a wall, believing that they could easily reduce them by siege and rid themselves of a city perpetually hostile to them.

3 At this point, however, the Messenians persuaded Demosthenes that, with so large an army assembled, it would be a fine opportunity to attack the Aetolians, who were enemies of Naupactus; and that, if he defeated them, he would readily win over the rest of the mainland in that region to the Athenians.

4 For although the Aetolians were a large and warlike people, they lived in unwalled villages far apart from one another and used only light equipment. The Messenians declared that it would not be difficult to subdue them before they could combine for mutual defense.

5 They urged him to attack the Apodotians first, then the Ophioneans, and after them the Eurytanians, who form the largest division of the Aetolians, speak a most unintelligible language, and are said to eat raw flesh. Once these were taken, the rest too would readily come over.

CHAPTER 95

1 Demosthenes was persuaded by his regard for the Messenians, and above all by the belief that, without calling on the Athenian forces, he could march overland against the Boeotians with the mainland allies and the Aetolians. His route would pass through the Ozolian Locrians to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Parnassus on his right, until he descended into Phocian territory. The Phocians, he thought, would readily join the expedition because of their longstanding friendship with Athens, or could at least be compelled to do so; and Boeotia already borders on Phocis. He therefore put out from Leucas with his entire army, against the will of the Acarnanians, and sailed along the coast to Sollium.

2 He shared his plan with the Acarnanians, but they rejected it because he had not walled off Leucas. With the rest of his army—the Cephallenians, Messenians, and Zacynthians, and the three hundred Athenian marines from his own ships—he marched against the Aetolians; for the fifteen Corcyraean ships had sailed away.

3 His base was Oeneon in Locris. These Ozolian Locrians were allies, and were to meet the Athenians inland with their whole force. As neighbors of the Aetolians, equipped in the same manner, they were expected to be of great service on the expedition through their familiarity both with Aetolian warfare and with the country.

CHAPTER 96

1 After spending the night with his army in the sanctuary of Nemean Zeus, where the poet Hesiod is said to have been killed by the local inhabitants—an oracle had foretold that he would meet this fate at Nemea—he set out at dawn and marched into Aetolia.

2 On the first day he took Potidania, on the second Crocyleum, and on the third Tichium. He stayed there and sent the booty away to Eupalium in Locris. His intention was to subdue the other places, return to Naupactus, and then campaign later against the Ophioneans if they would not come to terms.

3 The Aetolians had not been unaware of these preparations even when the plan was first being laid; and once the army had invaded, they all came to the defense in great strength. Even the remotest Ophioneans, the Bomians and Callians, whose territory reaches toward the Malian Gulf, came to help.

CHAPTER 97

1 The Messenians gave Demosthenes much the same advice as before. Repeating their original assurance that the Aetolians could easily be conquered, they urged him to advance against the villages as quickly as possible, without waiting for the whole people to assemble and oppose him, but always trying to capture whichever village lay immediately before him.

2 He was persuaded by them, and trusted his good fortune, since nothing had yet opposed him. Without waiting for the Locrians who were to come to his aid—his greatest need was for lightly armed javelin throwers—he advanced against Aegitium and took it by storm. The inhabitants had withdrawn and taken their station on the hills above the town, which stood on high ground about eighty stades from the sea.

3 The Aetolians, who had by now come to the relief of Aegitium, attacked the Athenians and their allies, running down from the hills at different points and hurling javelins. When the Athenian army advanced they withdrew, and when

it retired they pressed upon it. For a long time the fighting continued in this fashion, in pursuits and retreats, in both of which the Athenians were at a disadvantage.

CHAPTER 98

1 As long as their archers had arrows and were able to use them, the Athenians held out, for the lightly armed Aetolians were checked by the shooting. But when the commander of the archers was killed and his men scattered, and the Athenians themselves were exhausted by prolonged endurance of the same struggle, while the Aetolians pressed them hard and showered them with javelins, they finally broke and fled. Plunging into ravines from which there was no escape and into unfamiliar country, they perished; for Chromon the Messenian, their guide along the roads, had also been killed.

2 The Aetolians, swift of foot and lightly armed, caught many of them in close pursuit and killed them with javelins there in the rout. The greater number lost their way and rushed into woodland from which there were no paths out; the Aetolians brought fire and burned it around them.

3 Every form of flight and destruction befell the Athenian army. The survivors barely escaped to the sea and to Oeneon in Locris, the very place from which they had set out.

4 Many of the allies died, and about one hundred and twenty hoplites from the Athenians themselves. Of all the bodies of men of like number and age, these were the finest lost by the city of Athens in this war. Procles, the other general, was also killed.

5 They recovered their dead from the Aetolians under a truce and withdrew to Naupactus, later returning by ship to Athens. Demosthenes, however, remained behind around Naupactus and the neighboring places, afraid of the Athenians because of what had happened.

CHAPTER 99

1 At about the same time, the Athenians operating around Sicily sailed to Locris, defeated the Locrians who came to oppose one of their landings, and captured a small fort on the river Halex.

CHAPTER 100

1 During the same summer the Aetolians, who had already sent ambassadors to Corinth and Lacedaemon—Tolophus the Ophionean, Boriades the Eurytan, and Tisander the Apodotian—persuaded them to send an army against Naupactus, because the Athenians had been brought in against them.

2 Around autumn the Lacedaemonians sent out three thousand allied hoplites. Five hundred of these came from Heraclea in Trachis, a city newly founded at the time. Eurylochus, a Spartan, commanded the army, accompanied by the Spartans Macarius and Menedaius.

CHAPTER 101

1 When the army had assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus opened negotiations through heralds with the Ozolian Locrians: the road to Naupactus ran through their country, and he also wanted to detach them from the Athenians.

2 Of the Locrians, the Amphissians cooperated most readily with him, being afraid because of their hostility with the Phocians. They were the first to give hostages themselves, and persuaded the others, who feared the approaching army, to do the same: first their neighbors the Myonians, since Locris was hardest to enter at this point; then the Ipnians, Messapians, Tritaeans, Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and Oeantheans. All these also joined the expedition. The Olpaeans gave hostages but did not follow; the Hyaeans gave none until a village of theirs called Polis had been captured.

CHAPTER 102

1 When everything was ready and he had deposited the hostages at Cytinium in Doris, he advanced with his army through the Locrian country toward Naupactus. On the march he captured their towns of Oeneon and Eupalium, which had refused to join him.

2 On reaching the territory of Naupactus, with the Aetolians now also there to support them, they ravaged the land and captured the unwalled suburb. They also marched against and captured Molycreum, a Corinthian colony but a subject of Athens.

3 The Athenian Demosthenes, who happened still to be near Naupactus after the events in Aetolia, learned in advance of the army's approach and feared for the city. He went to the Acarnanians and persuaded them to come to its aid, though only with difficulty, because of the withdrawal from Leucas.

4 They sent a thousand hoplites with him by ship, and their entry saved the place. For there was a grave fear that, with so extensive a wall and so few defenders, the city would fail to hold out.

5 When Eurylochus and his companions learned that the force had entered and that the city could not be taken by assault, they withdrew, not toward the Peloponnese, but into Aeolis—the district now called Calydon and Pleuron—and the surrounding country, and to Proschium in Aetolia.

6 For the Ambraciots came to them and persuaded them to join in an attack on Amphilochian Argos, the rest of Amphilochia, and Acarnania as well, saying that, if they mastered these places, the whole mainland would become allied to the Lacedaemonians.

7 Eurylochus agreed, dismissed the Aetolians, and kept his army inactive in these districts until the Ambraciots should march against Argos and require his support. And the summer ended.

CHAPTER 103

1 In the following winter the Athenians in Sicily advanced against Inessa, a Sicel town whose citadel the Syracusans held, together with their Greek allies and those Sicels who had been either under the absolute rule of the Syracusans or their allies, but had revolted [from the Syracusans] and were fighting alongside the Athenians. They assaulted the town, but, unable to take it, withdrew.

2 During the retreat, the Syracusans from the fort attacked the allies as they withdrew behind the Athenians; falling upon them, they routed part of the army and killed a considerable number.

3 After this Laches and the Athenians made several landings from their ships in Locris. By the river Caicinus they defeated in battle about three hundred Locrians who came to oppose them under Proxenus son of Capaton, and withdrew with the captured arms.

CHAPTER 104

1 In the same winter the Athenians also purified Delos, in accordance with an oracle. Pisistratus the tyrant had purified it before, though not the whole island, but only as much as could be seen from the sanctuary. This time the purification extended to the whole island, and was carried out as follows.

2 They removed all the graves of the dead on Delos and proclaimed that in future no one was to die or give birth on the island, but that people in either condition were to be taken across to Rhenea. Rhenea lies so close to Delos that Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, who for a time was powerful at sea and ruled other islands as well, on capturing Rhenea dedicated it to Delian Apollo by fastening it to Delos with a chain. After the purification the Athenians then first celebrated the Delia as a four-yearly festival.

3 Long ago there had also been a great gathering at Delos of the Ionians and the inhabitants of the neighboring islands. They came to attend the festival with their wives and children, as the Ionians now go to the Ephesia; athletic and

musical contests were held there, and the cities brought choruses.

4 Homer gives the clearest evidence that this was so in the following verses, from his prelude to Apollo: / "But when on Delos, Phoebus, your heart found its greatest delight, / there the Ionians in trailing robes gather / with their children and wives along your sacred way; / there with boxing and dancing and song / they honor and delight you, whenever they establish a contest."

5 That there was also a musical contest, and that people came to compete, he makes clear again in these lines from the same prelude. After praising the Delian chorus of women, he ended his praise with the following verses, in which he also mentioned himself: / "Come, may Apollo be gracious, and Artemis with him; / farewell to all of you. And in days to come / remember me, whenever another of earth's men, / a much-traveled stranger, comes here and asks: / 'Girls, who is the sweetest singer of all / who visit you here, and in whom do you most delight?' / Then all of you answer without prompting: / 'A blind man, who lives on rugged Chios.'"

6 Such is Homer's testimony that even in ancient times there was a great gathering and festival at Delos. Later the islanders and the Athenians continued to send choruses with sacrificial offerings, but the contests and most other observances fell away, presumably through misfortunes, until the Athenians then restored the contest and added horse races, which had not been held before.

CHAPTER 105

1 In the same winter the Ambraciots, whose promises had kept Eurylochus and his army waiting, marched against Amphilochian Argos with three thousand hoplites. Invading the territory of Argos, they occupied Olpae, a strong fort on a hill by the sea, which the Acarnanians had once fortified and used as a common court of justice. It lies about twenty-five stades from the city of Argos, which is itself on the coast.

2 Some of the Acarnanians assembled to help at Argos; others encamped at the place in Amphilochia called Crenae, watching to prevent the Peloponnesians under Eurylochus from slipping through to the Ambraciots undetected.

3 They also sent for Demosthenes, who had commanded the Athenians in Aetolia, to become their leader, and for the twenty Athenian ships which happened to be off the Peloponnese under Aristoteles son of Timocrates and Hierophon son of Antimnestus.

4 The Ambraciots at Olpae also sent a messenger to their city, urging the whole population to come to their aid. They feared that Eurylochus and his men might be unable to pass through the Acarnanians, leaving them to fight alone or making any attempt to withdraw unsafe.

CHAPTER 106

1 When the Peloponnesians with Eurylochus learned that the Ambraciots had arrived at Olpae, they broke camp at Proschium and hurried to their aid. Crossing the Achelous, they marched through Acarnania, which was deserted because its men had gone to assist Argos, keeping the city of Stratus and its garrison on their right and the rest of Acarnania on their left.

2 After passing through the territory of Stratus, they marched through Phytia and then along the outskirts of Medeon, and next through Limnaea. They then entered the territory of the Agraeans, no longer Acarnanian land, but friendly to them.

3 Reaching Mount Thyamus, which belongs to the Agraeans, they crossed it and descended into the territory of Argos when night had already fallen. They passed undetected between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian guard at Crenae, and joined the Ambraciots at Olpae.

CHAPTER 107

1 Their forces now united, at daybreak they took up a position at the place called Metropolis and made camp. Not much later the Athenians arrived in the Ambracian Gulf with their twenty ships to help the Argives, and Demosthenes arrived with two hundred Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian archers.

2 The ships blockaded the hill at Olpae from the sea. The Acarnanians and a few Amphilochians—the majority were forcibly held back by the Ambraciots—had already assembled at Argos and were preparing to engage the enemy. They elected Demosthenes commander of the entire allied force, alongside their own generals.

3 He brought them up close to Olpae and encamped, with a deep ravine separating the armies. For five days they remained inactive; on the sixth both sides drew up for battle. The Peloponnesian army was larger and its line extended beyond the enemy's, so Demosthenes, fearing encirclement, placed about four hundred men, hoplites and light troops together, in ambush in a sunken road overgrown with brush. These were to spring up at the very moment of engagement and fall on the rear of the projecting enemy line.

4 When both sides were ready, they came to close quarters. Demosthenes held the right wing with the Messenians and a few Athenians; the Acarnanians, each contingent in its assigned position, held the rest of the line, together with the Amphilochian javelin throwers who were present. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were drawn up intermingled, except for the Mantineans: these were massed together toward the left, though not at the extreme wing. Eurylochus and his men held the far left, facing the Messenians and Demosthenes.

CHAPTER 108

1 When the fighting was already at close quarters and the Peloponnesians' wing extended beyond the enemy and began to encircle their right, the Acarnanians rose from ambush, fell upon their rear, and routed them. They would not stand to resist, and their panic brought most of the army into flight as well: the others were all the more terrified when they saw the force with Eurylochus, their strongest part, being destroyed. The Messenians, who were on this side with Demosthenes, did the greater part of the fighting.

2 The Ambraciots and the troops on the right wing, however, defeated those facing them and pursued them toward Argos; indeed, they are the most warlike people in those parts.

3 As they returned, they saw that the greater part of their army had been defeated, and the other Acarnanians pressed them hard. They struggled to reach safety at Olpae, and many were killed, since they crowded back in disorder and without any formation, except for the Mantineans. These withdrew in better order than any other part of the army. The battle ended late in the day.

CHAPTER 109

1 On the following day Menedaius, who had taken command himself after the deaths of Eurylochus and Macarius, was at a loss after so great a defeat: how could he endure a siege if he stayed, cut off by land and by the Athenian ships at sea, or reach safety if he withdrew? He approached Demosthenes and the Acarnanian generals about a truce and withdrawal, and at the same time about recovering the dead.

2 They gave back the dead, erected a trophy themselves, and recovered their own fallen, about three hundred. They would not openly grant a truce allowing the whole force to withdraw; secretly, however, Demosthenes and his Acarnanian fellow generals made an agreement with the Mantineans, Menedaius, the other Peloponnesian commanders, and the most important men among them, allow-

ing them to depart quickly. He wished to strip the Ambraciots and the body of mercenaries [the foreign troops] of their support, but above all he wanted to discredit the Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesians among the Greeks of that region, as men who had betrayed their allies and put their own interest first.

3 They recovered their dead and hastily buried them, as the agreement permitted; and those who had been given leave to withdraw secretly planned their departure.

CHAPTER 110

1 Meanwhile Demosthenes and the Acarnanians received word that the whole Ambraciot force from the city, responding to the first message from Olpae, was marching through Amphilochia to their aid. They intended to join the men at Olpae and knew nothing of what had happened.

2 He immediately sent a detachment of the army ahead to lay ambushes along the roads and occupy the strong positions, while preparing to advance against them with the rest of his force.

CHAPTER 111

1 Meanwhile the Mantineans and those covered by the agreement went out on the pretext of gathering greens and firewood, and slipped away in small groups, collecting as they went the things they had supposedly come out for. Once they were well away from Olpae, they quickened their retreat.

2 The Ambraciots and the others who happened to have come out together in a body, when they realized that these men were leaving, set off themselves at a run, eager to catch them.

3 At first the Acarnanians thought that all alike were leaving without a truce, and pursued the Peloponnesians too. Someone even threw a javelin at some of their own generals who tried to stop them and declared that an agreement had been

made with these men, believing that they themselves were being betrayed. Afterward, however, they let the Mantineans and Peloponnesians pass, but killed the Ambraciots.

4 There was much dispute and uncertainty over whether a man was an Ambraciot or a Peloponnesian. They killed about two hundred of them; the rest escaped into the neighboring territory of the Agraeans, where Salynthius, their king and a friend of the fugitives, received them.

CHAPTER 112

1 The Ambraciots coming from the city reached Idomene, which consists of two high hills. At nightfall the men Demosthenes had sent ahead from the camp occupied the larger one first, without being detected, and bivouacked there; the Ambraciots had already happened to climb the smaller.

2 After supper, as soon as evening came, Demosthenes set out with the rest of the army. He himself led half the force by the pass, while the other half went through the Amphilochian mountains.

3 At dawn he fell upon the Ambraciots, who were still in their beds and had no advance knowledge of what had happened; indeed, they were much more inclined to suppose that the newcomers were their own men.

4 For Demosthenes had deliberately placed the Messenians in front and ordered them to address the enemy: speaking the Doric dialect, they would reassure the outposts, while the darkness that still lingered kept them from being clearly seen.

5 When he fell upon their army, his men routed it and destroyed most of them on the spot; the survivors took to flight over the mountains.

6 But the roads had already been occupied, and the Amphilochians knew their own country and were lightly armed against hoplites, whereas the fugitives were strangers to the land and had no idea where to turn. They plunged into

ravines and the ambushes already laid for them, and were destroyed.

7 They tried every form of flight. Some even turned toward the sea, which was not far away, and, seeing the Athenian ships, which happened to be sailing past during the action, swam out to them. In their immediate terror they thought it better, if they must die, to be killed by the men in the ships than by the Amphilochians, barbarians and their bitterest enemies.

8 Such was the destruction of the Ambraciots: out of their great number only a few reached the city alive. The Acarnanians stripped the dead, erected trophies, and withdrew to Argos.

CHAPTER 113

1 On the following day a herald came to them from the Ambraciots who had escaped from Olpae into Agraean territory. He was to ask for the recovery of those killed after the first battle, when, without a truce themselves, they had come out with the Mantineans and the men protected by the agreement.

2 When the herald saw the arms of the Ambraciots who had come from the city, he was astonished at their number. He knew nothing of the disaster and thought they belonged to the men of his own force.

3 Someone asked him why he was astonished and how many of his men had died, supposing in turn that the herald had come from the men at Idomene. He said about two hundred. The questioner replied, "These arms look to be those not of so few men,

4 "but of more than a thousand." The herald said in turn, "Then they are not from the men who fought with us." The other answered, "They are, if you fought at Idomene yesterday." "But we fought no one yesterday; it was the day before, during the withdrawal." "Well, it was these men we fought yesterday, who had come to help from the city of Ambracia."

5 When the herald heard this and understood that the relieving force from the city had been destroyed, he broke into lamentation. Stunned by the magnitude of the calamity, he left at once without accomplishing his purpose, and no longer asked for the dead.

6 This was, indeed, the greatest disaster to befall a single Greek city within a comparable span of days during this war. I have not recorded the number of the dead, because the losses reported are incredible in proportion to the city's size. Yet I know that, had the Acarnanians and Amphilochians wished to follow the advice of the Athenians and Demosthenes and take Ambracia, they could have captured it at the first assault. As it was, they feared that the Athenians, if they possessed it, would be more troublesome neighbors to them.

CHAPTER 114

1 After this they allotted a third of the spoils to the Athenians and divided the rest among their cities. The Athenians' share was captured at sea; the three hundred complete suits of armor now dedicated in the Attic sanctuaries were set aside for Demosthenes, who sailed home with them. This success also made his return less hazardous after the disaster in Aetolia.

2 The Athenians in the twenty ships also went back to Naupactus. After the departure of the Athenians and Demosthenes, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians made a truce allowing the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had taken refuge with Salynthius and the Agraeans to withdraw from Oeniadae, to which they had moved from Salynthius' country.

3 For the future, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians made a treaty and alliance with the Ambraciots for a hundred years, on these terms: the Ambraciots were not to campaign with the Acarnanians against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciots against the Athenians, but each was to aid the other's territory; the Ambraciots were to restore whatever Amphilochian places or hostages they held, and were not to send aid to Anactorium, which was at war with the Acarnanians.

4 Having agreed to these terms, they ended the war. Afterward the Corinthians sent a garrison of about three hundred of their own hoplites to Ambracia, under Xenoclides son of Euthycles. They traveled overland and arrived with difficulty. Such were the events at Ambracia.

CHAPTER 115

1 In the same winter the Athenians in Sicily landed from their ships in the territory of Himera, together with the Sicels who had invaded its outer districts from the interior; they also sailed to the islands of Aeolus.

2 On returning to Rhegium, they found Pythodorus son of Isolochus, an Athenian general, who had come to succeed Laches in command of the ships.

3 For the allies in Sicily had sailed to Athens and persuaded the Athenians to send more ships to help them. The Syracusans controlled their land, but were kept from the sea by only a few ships, and were gathering a fleet in preparation, determined not to tolerate this.

4 The Athenians were fitting out forty ships to send to them, both because they believed that the war there would be brought to an end more quickly and because they wished to give their fleet practice.

5 They therefore sent out one of the generals, Pythodorus, with a few ships, and intended to dispatch Sophocles son of Sostratides and Eurymedon son of Thucles with the greater number.

6 Pythodorus, now holding Laches' command of the ships, sailed at the close of winter against the Locrian fort which Laches had previously captured. Defeated in battle by the Locrians, he withdrew.

CHAPTER 116

1 At about the beginning of this same spring, the stream of fire flowed from Etna, as it had before, and devastated part of the land of the Catanaeans, who live beneath Mount Etna, the highest mountain in Sicily.

2 This flow is said to have occurred in the fiftieth year after the previous one, and there are said to have been three eruptions in all since Sicily was settled by Greeks.

3 These events took place during this winter, and the sixth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

Book 4



CHAPTER 1

1 In the following summer, when the grain was coming into ear, ten Syracusan ships and as many Locrian ships sailed to Messene in Sicily and occupied it at the inhabitants' invitation; and Messene revolted from Athens.

2 The Syracusans were chiefly moved to do this because they saw that the place offered an approach to Sicily, and feared that the Athenians might one day make it their base for an attack on them with greater forces. The Locrians acted out of hostility toward Rhegium, seeking to subdue its people by attacking from both sides.

3 At the same time the Locrians had invaded Rhegian territory with their whole army, to prevent the Rhegians from coming to the aid of Messene; they were also being urged on by Rhegian exiles who were with them. Rhegium had long been torn by civil strife and was at present incapable of resisting the Locrians, which made them all the more eager to attack.

4 After ravaging the country, the Locrian land forces withdrew, while the ships remained to guard Messene. Other ships being fitted out were also to anchor there and conduct the war from that base.

CHAPTER 2

1 At about the same time that spring, before the grain was ripe, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and settled down to ravage the land.

2 The Athenians sent off the forty ships for Sicily, as they had been preparing to do, with the two remaining generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles; Pythodorus, the third of them, had already reached Sicily.

3 They instructed these generals, as they sailed past, to attend also to the Corcyraeans in the city, who were being plundered by the exiles in the mountains. Sixty Peloponnesian ships had sailed there to support the men in the mountains, in the belief that the severe famine in the city would make it easy for them to gain control.

4 Demosthenes, who held no public command after his return from Acarnania, had himself requested permission to use these ships around the Peloponnese; they authorized him to do so if he wished.

CHAPTER 3

1 As they sailed along the Laconian coast, they learned that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra. Eurymedon and Sophocles were eager to press on there, but Demosthenes urged them first to put in at Pylos and do what was needed before continuing their voyage. They objected; but a storm happened to arise and drove the ships into Pylos.

2 Demosthenes at once demanded that the place be fortified—this was why he had sailed with them—and pointed out its abundant supplies of timber and stone, its natural strength, and the fact that both the site itself and a wide stretch of the surrounding country were uninhabited. Pylos is about four hundred stades from Sparta, in what was once Messenian territory; the Lacedaemonians call it Coryphasium.

3 The generals replied that there were plenty of deserted headlands in the Peloponnese, if he wished to occupy them and put the city to expense. But he thought this place had particular advantages over others: it possessed a harbor, and the Messenians, who had ancient ties with the country and spoke the same language as the Lacedaemonians, could inflict the greatest harm by operating from it, while also providing a trustworthy garrison for the place.

CHAPTER 4

1 Unable to persuade either the generals or the soldiers, even after consulting the regimental commanders, he remained inactive, prevented by the weather from sailing; until the soldiers themselves, with time on their hands, felt an impulse to set to work and fortify the place.

2 They began the work without iron tools for dressing stone, carrying stones chosen as they found them and fitting each into place as best it would go. Where mortar was needed, they had no containers and carried it on their backs, bending forward to give it the best chance of staying there and clasping their hands behind them to keep it from falling off.

3 They hurried in every way to finish the most vulnerable points before the Lacedaemonians could come to the rescue. Most of the position was naturally strong and needed no wall.

CHAPTER 5

1 The Lacedaemonians happened to be celebrating a festival, and even when they heard the news they treated it lightly: when they marched out, they thought, the enemy would either refuse to face them or be easily taken by force. They were also held back to some extent because their army was still in Attica.

2 In six days the Athenians walled the landward side of the position and the other points most in need of defense. They left Demosthenes there with five ships to guard it, while with the greater part of the fleet they pressed on toward

Corcyra and Sicily.

CHAPTER 6

1 When the Peloponnesians in Attica learned that Pylos had been occupied, they withdrew home in haste. The Lacedaemonians and King Agis regarded the affair at Pylos as their own concern; moreover, since they had invaded early and the grain was still green, most of the troops were short of food, and a spell of weather more severe than was usual for the season bore hard on the army.

2 Thus several causes combined to hasten their withdrawal and make this the shortest of their invasions: they remained in Attica for only fifteen days.

CHAPTER 7

1 At the same time Simonides, an Athenian general, gathered a few Athenians from the garrisons and a large force of the allies in that region, and took Eion on the Thracian coast, a colony of Mende then hostile to Athens, through betrayal from within. But the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans immediately came to its aid; he was driven out and lost many of his soldiers.

CHAPTER 8

1 After the Peloponnesians returned from Attica, the Spartans themselves and the nearest of the perioeci immediately marched to the relief of Pylos. The other Lacedaemonians came up more slowly, having only just returned from another campaign.

2 They also sent word throughout the Peloponnese to come to Pylos as quickly as possible, and summoned their sixty ships from Corcyra. These were hauled over the isthmus of Leucas and, escaping the notice of the Athenian ships at Zacynthus, reached Pylos, where the land army was already present.

3 While the Peloponnesians were still approaching by sea, Demosthenes managed to slip out two ships ahead of them, to tell Eurymedon and the Athenians aboard the ships at Zacynthus to come at once, since the position was in danger.

4 The ships sailed with all speed on Demosthenes' errand, while the Lacedaemonians prepared to assault the fort by land and sea together, expecting an easy capture of a structure hastily built and held by few men.

5 As they also expected the Athenian ships to come to the rescue from Zacynthus, they intended, if they had not already taken the place, to block the entrances to the harbor and prevent the Athenians from anchoring within it.

6 For the island called Sphacteria stretches along the harbor close to its mouth, sheltering it and narrowing its entrances: the one by Pylos and the Athenian fort allows passage for two ships, the other, toward the rest of the mainland, for eight or nine. The whole island was wooded and trackless, being uninhabited, and was about fifteen stades long.

7 They therefore intended to close the entrances with ships packed closely together, bows facing outward. Fearing that the enemy might use the island as a base against them, they sent hoplites across to it and posted others along the mainland.

8 In this way, they thought, both island and mainland would be hostile to the Athenians, with nowhere to land: the seaward coast of Pylos itself, outside the harbor entrance, had no harbors to give them a base from which to help their own men. They themselves could thus, in all probability, reduce the position by siege without a sea battle or any danger, since it had no grain and had been occupied with scant preparation.

9 Having settled on this plan, they sent the hoplites across to the island, selecting them by lot from all the companies. Others had crossed earlier, taking turns, but the last contingent, which was cut off there, numbered four hundred and

twenty, besides the Helots who attended them. Their commander was Epitadas son of Molobrus.

CHAPTER 9

1 Demosthenes, seeing that the Lacedaemonians were about to attack with fleet and infantry together, made his own preparations. He hauled up beneath the fort the triremes still remaining from those left with him, protected them with a palisade, and armed their sailors with poor shields, most of them wickerwork. There was no way to obtain arms in an uninhabited place; even these had come from some Messenians who happened to have arrived in a thirty-oared raiding ship and a light vessel. About forty of these Messenians were hoplites, whom he employed with the rest.

2 He posted most of his men, armed and unarmed alike, on the strongest and most thoroughly fortified parts of the position facing the mainland, with orders to repel the infantry if it attacked. He himself chose sixty hoplites from the whole force and a few archers, and went outside the wall toward the sea, where he particularly expected the enemy to attempt a landing. The ground was difficult and rocky, facing the open sea; but as their wall was weakest there, he thought the enemy would be eager to force an entry at that point.

3 For they themselves had never expected to be defeated at sea and had not built a strong wall there; if the enemy forced a landing, the position could be taken.

4 He therefore advanced on this side to the water's edge and drew up his hoplites to keep the enemy out if he could, encouraging them with these words.

CHAPTER 10

1 "Men who share this danger with me, let none of you, in a crisis like this, wish to appear shrewd by calculating every peril that surrounds us, rather than advance boldly against the enemy, without stopping to reflect, and so win

through. Situations as desperate as ours leave the least room for calculation and demand that we face the danger with the greatest speed.

2 "I see most of the advantages on our side, if we are willing to stand firm and do not, in terror at their numbers, surrender the superior means we possess.

3 "For I count the difficulty of approaching this ground as ours: it becomes our ally if we stand, but if we retreat, difficult though it is, it will be easy to cross with no one to bar the way. And we shall find the enemy more formidable because retreat will not be easy for him, even if we press him hard. On board his ships he is easiest to repel; once ashore, he is already on equal terms.

4 "Nor need we fear their numbers too much. Many though they are, they will fight only a few at a time, for want of room to bring their ships in. This is not a larger army on land, fighting on equal terms, but one attacking from ships, which need many favorable circumstances to coincide at sea.

5 "I therefore judge their difficulties a match for our small numbers. And I call on you as Athenians, who know from experience in making seaborne landings against others that a man who stands firm, and does not fall back in fear of the roar and the terrifying onset of the ships, can never be forced aside: now stand firm yourselves, and by holding them off at the very edge of the surf, save both ourselves and this position."

CHAPTER 11

1 Demosthenes' encouragement gave the Athenians greater confidence; they went down and formed their line at the water's edge.

2 The Lacedaemonians got under way and assaulted the fort with their land army and, simultaneously, with forty-three ships. Their admiral was Thrasymelidas son of Cratesicles, a Spartan. He attacked at the very point Demosthenes had expected.

3 The Athenians defended themselves on both sides, against land and sea. The attackers divided their ships into small groups, since there was no room for more to put in, and made their runs in turns, allowing one group to rest while another attacked. They strained every effort and urged one another on, hoping somehow to drive the defenders back and take the fort.

4 Brasidas was the most conspicuous of them all. Commanding a trireme, he saw that the difficult shore made the captains and helmsmen hesitate even where a landing seemed possible, as they took care not to wreck their ships. He shouted that it was unworthy to spare timber and look on while the enemy held the fort they had built on Lacedaemonian soil. He urged them to smash their own ships in forcing a landing, and called on the allies not to shrink from giving their ships to the Lacedaemonians in the present emergency, in return for the great benefits they had received: they must run aground, land by every means, and master both the men and the position.

CHAPTER 12

1 So he pressed the others on, and, compelling his own helmsman to run the ship aground, moved toward the gangway. As he tried to disembark, the Athenians drove him back; after many wounds he fainted, and as he collapsed onto the outrigger, his shield slipped into the sea. It was washed ashore and picked up by the Athenians, who later used it for the trophy they set up to commemorate this assault.

2 The others were eager enough, but could not land, both because of the difficulty of the ground and because the Athenians stood firm without yielding a step.

3 Fortune had so reversed their positions that the Athenians, on land—and Laconian land at that—were repelling a naval attack, while the Lacedaemonians were trying to land from ships against the Athenians on their

own soil, now hostile to them. For at that time the prevailing reputation of the one people was to be preeminently land fighters, unsurpassed in infantry, and of the other to be seamen, far superior in their fleet.

CHAPTER 13

1 After attacking throughout that day and part of the next, they ceased. On the third day they sent some of their ships to Asine for timber to make siege engines, believing that, though the wall facing the harbor was high, they could take it with engines, since a landing was easiest there.

2 Meanwhile the Athenian ships arrived from Zacynthus, forty in number: some of the guard ships from Naupactus and four Chian ships had joined them in coming to the rescue.

3 They saw both mainland and island crowded with hoplites, and the enemy ships inside the harbor, not coming out. At a loss where to anchor, they sailed for the moment to the nearby uninhabited island of Prote and spent the night there. The next day they prepared for a sea battle and put out, intending to fight in open water if the enemy would sail out to meet them, and otherwise to sail into the harbor themselves.

4 The enemy neither put out to meet them nor had carried out their intended blockade of the entrances. Instead, they remained quietly on shore, manning their ships and making ready to fight, if anyone sailed in, within the harbor, which was no small one.

CHAPTER 14

1 Recognizing this, the Athenians charged them through both entrances. Most of the enemy ships were already afloat with bows facing them; these they attacked and put to flight. Pursuing over a short distance, they damaged many and captured five, one of them with its crew, and rammed the rest after they

had fled to shore. Some were struck while still being manned, before they could put out; others the Athenians took in tow and dragged away empty, their men having fled.

2 The Lacedaemonians saw what was happening and felt the disaster bitterly, above all because their men were being cut off on the island. They rushed to help, wading into the sea in their armor, seizing the ships and pulling against those towing them away. Each man felt that a task was being held back unless he was there himself to take a hand.

3 There was a great tumult, and each side reversed its manner of fighting over the ships: in their ardor and consternation the Lacedaemonians were, so to speak, fighting a sea battle from the land, while the Athenians, victorious and eager to exploit their present good fortune to the utmost, fought a land battle from their ships.

4 After inflicting much hardship and many wounds on one another, they drew apart. The Lacedaemonians saved the empty ships, apart from those captured at the outset.

5 When each side had returned to its camp, the Athenians set up a trophy, gave back the dead, and took possession of the wrecks. They immediately began sailing around the island and keeping it under guard, since the men there were cut off. The Peloponnesians on the mainland, now reinforced from every quarter, remained in position at Pylos.

CHAPTER 15

1 When news of the events at Pylos reached Sparta, the Lacedaemonians resolved that, as in a great calamity, their authorities should go down to the camp, inspect the situation, and at once decide what seemed best.

2 Seeing that it was impossible to help the men, and unwilling to risk their dying of hunger or being overwhelmed by superior numbers and captured, they decided, if the Athenian generals agreed, to conclude a truce concerning Pylos,

send envoys to Athens to negotiate a settlement, and try to recover the men as quickly as possible.

CHAPTER 16

1 The generals accepted the proposal, and a truce was made on these terms. The Lacedaemonians were to bring to Pylos and hand over to the Athenians the ships with which they had fought, together with every warship in Laconia, and were to make no armed attack on the fort by land or sea. The Athenians were to allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send food to the men on the island in a fixed ration, with the barley meal already kneaded: for each man, two Attic choenices of meal, two cotylae of wine, and meat; for each servant, half that allowance. These supplies were to be sent in under Athenian supervision, and no boat was to sail in secretly. The Athenians were to keep their watch on the island no less strictly, but without landing, and were to make no armed attack on the Peloponnesian army by land or sea.

2 If either side violated any of these terms, however slightly, the truce was then to be at an end. It was to remain in force until the Lacedaemonian envoys returned from Athens; the Athenians were to send them there in a trireme and bring them back. On their return the truce was to end, and the Athenians were to restore the ships in the same condition in which they had received them.

3 The truce was concluded on these terms, the ships, about sixty in number, were handed over, and the envoys were sent away. On reaching Athens they spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 17

1 "Athenians, the Lacedaemonians have sent us to negotiate concerning the men on the island, and to persuade you to a course that will serve your interests while bringing us as honorable an outcome to our misfortune as present circumstances allow.

2 "If we speak at greater length, we do not depart from our custom: it is our practice to use few words where few suffice, but more when the occasion calls for explaining a matter of importance and accomplishing through speech what must be done.

3 "Receive our words without hostility, not as though we were teaching you because you lacked understanding, but as a reminder to men already informed of how to deliberate well.

4 "For you can turn your present good fortune to noble account, keeping what you have won and gaining honor and renown besides, without suffering the fate of those who receive some unaccustomed blessing. Because their present success has come beyond their expectations, they always reach out in hope of more.

5 "But those who have experienced the most reversals in either direction have the best reason to distrust prosperity. That lesson, one would naturally expect, experience has taught your city and ours above all.

CHAPTER 18

1 "Recognize it by looking at our present misfortunes. We, who possess the greatest standing among the Greeks, have come before you, though once we thought ourselves better able to grant what we now come to ask of you.

2 "Yet this has not happened to us through lack of power, nor through arrogance born of an increase in it: with our resources unchanged, we have erred in judgment, a risk to which all alike are exposed.

3 "You therefore have no reason to think that, because of your city's present strength and the gains it has made, fortune too will always be on your side.

4 "Prudent men are those who secure their blessings against uncertainty—and the same men would meet misfortune with greater understanding. They recognize that war does not attend upon them within whatever limits they choose to

set its conduct, but according to the course their fortunes prescribe. Such men are least likely to stumble, because they do not grow elated by trusting to success in war, and are most willing to end it while their fortunes are still good.

5 "This is what you now have a fine opportunity to do with us, Athenians. Do not refuse our advice and perhaps suffer a reverse later—there are many ways it could happen—and so be thought to have won even your present successes by chance, when you can leave behind for the future an unchallenged reputation for strength and understanding.

CHAPTER 19

1 "The Lacedaemonians invite you to make a treaty and end the war. They offer peace, alliance, and close ties of friendship and mutual intimacy besides, asking in return for the men on the island. They judge it better for both sides not to hazard the outcome—whether some chance of rescue might allow the men to break free, or whether they might instead be reduced by siege and captured.

2 "We believe that great enmities are most securely ended not when a man takes revenge, gains the upper hand in war, and binds his opponent by compulsory oaths to an unequal settlement, but when, though able to do this, he makes fair terms, surpasses his opponent in generosity, and reaches a moderate agreement beyond what the other had expected.

3 "For the former enemy now feels bound not to retaliate as a victim of force, but to repay generosity, and a sense of honor makes him more willing to abide by the agreement.

4 "Men behave in this way more readily toward their bitterest enemies than toward those with whom their differences have been slight. It is their nature to respond gladly to a voluntary concession by yielding in their turn, but to risk a struggle against overbearing arrogance even against their better judgment.

CHAPTER 20

1 "For both of us, now if ever is the right time for reconciliation, before some irreparable event intervenes and overtakes us, compelling us to bear you an everlasting personal hatred in addition to our public enmity, and depriving you of the advantages we now offer.

2 "While the issue is still undecided, while you can gain glory and our friendship, and we can lay aside our misfortune on reasonable terms before any disgrace, let us be reconciled. Let us choose peace in place of war for ourselves, and give the other Greeks a respite from suffering. For this they will consider you chiefly responsible. They are at war without any clear knowledge of which side began it; but if peace is made, a matter now chiefly in your power, they will give you the credit.

3 "If you so resolve, you can become firm friends with the Lacedaemonians at their own invitation, by doing them a kindness rather than forcing them.

4 "Consider how many advantages this is likely to hold. For if you and we speak with one voice, you know that the rest of the Greeks, being weaker, will show us the greatest deference."

CHAPTER 21

1 Such was the speech of the Lacedaemonians. They thought that the Athenians had previously desired a treaty and been prevented by their opposition, and that now, when peace was offered, they would gladly accept it and give back the men.

2 But the Athenians thought that, with the men on the island in their grasp, a treaty was already theirs for the making whenever they wished, and they reached out for more.

3 They were urged on chiefly by Cleon son of Cleaenetus, who was at that time a leader of the people and the most persuasive speaker with the multitude. He induced them to reply that the men on the island must first surrender their arms and themselves, and be brought to Athens. Once they had arrived, the Lacedaemonians must restore Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea—places they had not taken in war, but had obtained under the earlier agreement, when the Athenians, beset by misfortunes and then in greater need of a treaty, had yielded them. Only then could they recover their men and conclude a treaty for whatever term both sides approved.

CHAPTER 22

1 The envoys made no objection to the reply, but asked the Athenians to choose representatives to meet with them, so that, speaking and listening on each point, they might quietly reach agreement on whatever they could persuade one another to accept.

2 At this Cleon pressed them hard. He had known before, he said, that they had no just purpose in mind, and now it was plain: they would say nothing before the people, but wished to confer with a few men. If their intentions were sound, he demanded that they state them before everyone.

3 The Lacedaemonians saw that they could not speak before the people of any concessions their misfortune might lead them to contemplate: if they made an offer and failed to secure agreement, they would be discredited with their allies. They also saw that the Athenians would not accept their proposals on moderate terms. They therefore left Athens without accomplishing anything.

CHAPTER 23

1 On their return, the truce at Pylos ended at once, and the Lacedaemonians demanded their ships back, as had been agreed. But the Athenians alleged a raid on the fort in breach of the truce, together with other offenses that seemed

insignificant, and refused to return them. They insisted on the provision that the truce was void if any part of it whatever was violated. The Lacedaemonians disputed this, denounced the withholding of the ships as an injustice, and went away to resume the war.

2 Both sides now fought with all their strength at Pylos. By day the Athenians kept two ships constantly circling the island in opposite directions; at night the whole fleet lay around it, except on the seaward side when the wind blew. Twenty ships had also arrived from Athens for the blockade, bringing the total to seventy. The Peloponnesians remained encamped on the mainland and made attacks on the wall, watching for any opportunity that might arise to save their men.

CHAPTER 24

1 Meanwhile in Sicily, the Syracusans and their allies brought up the rest of the fleet they were equipping to join the ships on guard at Messene, and waged war

2 from Messene. The Locrians were especially insistent on this, out of hatred for the Rhegians, and had themselves invaded their territory with their entire force.

3 They also wished to try their strength in a naval battle, seeing how few Athenian ships were present and learning that the larger fleet, which was to have come to Sicily, was blockading the island.

4 For if they gained command at sea, they hoped that by attacking Rhegium with their army and fleet they would easily subdue it, and their position would at once become strong. Rhegium, at the extremity of Italy, and Messene, at that of Sicily, lie close together; the Athenians would thus be unable to maintain a station there and command the strait.

5 The strait is the sea between Rhegium and Messene, where Sicily lies nearest the mainland. This is the place called Charybdis, through which Odysseus is said to have sailed. Its narrowness, and the currents of water pouring into it

from the two great seas, the Tyrrhenian and the Sicilian, naturally gave it a reputation for danger.

CHAPTER 25

1 In this stretch of water, then, the Syracusans and their allies, with a little more than thirty ships, were compelled late in the day to fight a naval battle over a vessel making the crossing. They put out against sixteen Athenian ships and eight Rhegian.

2 Defeated by the Athenians, they sailed off in haste, each as chance allowed, to their respective camps at Messene and Rhegium, with the loss of one ship. Night overtook the action.

3 After this the Locrians withdrew from Rhegian territory, while the ships of the Syracusans and their allies gathered and anchored at Peloris in the territory of Messene. Their land army was there as well.

4 The Athenians and Rhegians sailed up and, seeing the ships empty, attacked them; but an iron grappling hook was thrown onto one of their own ships, which they lost, though its men swam away.

5 After this the Syracusans embarked and sailed along the coast toward Messene under tow. The Athenians attacked again, but the Syracusans turned their bows out to sea and struck first, costing the Athenians another ship.

6 Thus the Syracusans made their way into the harbor at Messene without coming off worse either in their passage along the coast or in the naval action as it developed.

7 The Athenians then sailed to Camarina, having received word that Archias and his associates were betraying it to the Syracusans. Meanwhile the Messenians marched out with their whole force by land, and with their ships at the same time, against neighboring Naxos, a Chalcidian city.

8 On the first day they confined the Naxians within their walls and ravaged the countryside. On the next they sailed round with their ships and ravaged the land by the Acesines River, while their infantry advanced against the city.

9 Meanwhile many Sicels were descending from the heights to bring help against the Messenians. When the Naxians saw them, they took courage and encouraged one another, believing that the Leontines and their other Greek allies were coming to their aid. They suddenly rushed out of the city and fell on the Messenians, routed them, and killed more than a thousand. The rest made their way home with difficulty, for the barbarians also attacked them along the roads and destroyed the greater part of them.

10 The ships put in at Messene and later dispersed to their several homes. The Leontines and their allies, together with the Athenians, immediately marched against Messene in its weakened condition. The Athenians made an attempt with their ships against the harbor, while the infantry attacked the city.

11 But the Messenians, with some Locrians under Demoteles who had been left as a garrison after the disaster, made a sudden sortie. Falling on the Leontine army, they routed the greater part of it and killed many. When the Athenians saw this, they disembarked to give help and, coming upon the Messenians in disorder, drove them back into the city. They set up a trophy and withdrew to Rhegium.

12 After this the Greeks in Sicily continued their land campaigns against one another without the Athenians.

CHAPTER 26

1 At Pylos the Athenians were still besieging the Lacedaemonians on the island, and the Peloponnesian army on the mainland remained in position.

2 The blockade was arduous for the Athenians, who lacked both food and water. There was only one spring, in the citadel of Pylos itself, and that a small one; most of the men dug through the shingle beside the sea and drank the sort of water one would expect.

3 They were also cramped, encamped in so small a space. As there was no anchorage for the ships, some took their food on shore in turns, while the others lay at anchor out at sea.

4 Above all, they were dispirited by the unexpected length of the siege. They had thought that in a few days they would starve out men confined to a deserted island and drinking brackish water.

5 The reason was that the Lacedaemonians had invited anyone willing to bring ground grain, wine, cheese, or any other food useful in a siege into the island, setting a high price for its delivery and promising freedom to any Helot who brought it in.

6 Others ran the risk of bringing supplies, but the Helots in particular did so. They set out from whatever part of the Peloponnese they could and landed, while it was still night, on the seaward side of the island.

7 They watched especially for a wind to carry them in. With a wind blowing from the open sea, they more easily escaped the vigilance of the triremes, which could no longer maintain their stations around the island. The suppliers were reckless in making their approach: they ran their boats ashore, a value having been set on them for compensation, and the hoplites kept watch at the island's landing places. Those who ventured out in calm weather were captured.

8 Swimmers also came through the harbor underwater, towing on a cord skins filled with poppy seed mixed with honey and crushed flaxseed. At first they escaped detection, but later guards were posted against them.

9 Both sides devised every possible means, the one to get provisions in, the other to prevent their passing unnoticed.

CHAPTER 27

1 At Athens, reports of the army's distress and of food being brought to the men on the island caused perplexity and fear that winter would overtake the blockade. They saw that bringing supplies round the Peloponnese would then be impossible, especially to a deserted place, when even in summer they could not send enough. Nor could the fleet maintain its blockade on a coast without harbors. Either the men would survive when the Athenians relaxed their watch, or, waiting for stormy weather, they would sail out in the boats that brought them food.

2 Above all they feared the Lacedaemonians, believing that these must have some strong ground for confidence, since they no longer sent heralds to them. They regretted not having accepted the agreement.

3 Cleon, aware that they suspected him over his obstruction of the settlement, declared that the men bringing the reports were not telling the truth. The men who had arrived urged the Athenians, if they did not believe them, to send inspectors; and Cleon himself was chosen as an inspector, together with Theagenes.

4 He realized that he would be compelled either to repeat the very statements he was attacking, or to contradict them and be exposed as a liar. Seeing also that the Athenians were minded to make a greater military effort, he urged them not to send inspectors or waste the opportunity in delay, but, if they believed the reports true, to sail against the men.

5 He pointedly reproached Nicias son of Niceratus, who was a general and his enemy: it would be easy, with a force properly equipped, to sail out and capture the men on the island, if the generals were men. He himself, at any rate, would do it if he were in command.

CHAPTER 28

1 Some of the Athenians began to shout at Cleon, asking why he did not sail now, if he thought it so easy. Nicias, faced also with Cleon's reproaches, told him that, so far as the generals were concerned, he might take whatever force he wished and make the attempt.

2 At first Cleon was ready, thinking that Nicias was only making a verbal offer; but when he understood that he truly meant to hand over the command, he drew back and said that Nicias, not he, was the general. He was now afraid, and had not expected Nicias to venture to give way to him.

3 But Nicias renewed his offer, resigned the command at Pylos, and called the Athenians to witness. As crowds will do, the more Cleon tried to evade the voyage and retreat from what he had said, the more they urged Nicias to surrender the command and shouted at Cleon to sail.

4 With no way left to escape his own words, he undertook the voyage. Coming forward, he declared that he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians and would sail without taking a single man from the city: he would take the Lemnians and Imbrians who were present, the peltasts who had come as reinforcements from Aenus and elsewhere, and four hundred archers. With these, added to the soldiers at Pylos, he said he would within twenty days either bring the Lacedaemonians back alive or kill them where they were.

5 His reckless words provoked some laughter among the Athenians. Yet the more sober-minded were pleased, reckoning that they would gain one of two benefits: either they would be rid of Cleon, which they thought more likely, or, if their judgment proved mistaken, he would subdue the Lacedaemonians for them.

CHAPTER 29

1 When he had settled everything in the assembly and the Athenians had voted him authority for the voyage, he chose Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, to share his command, and made haste to put to sea.

2 He chose Demosthenes because he had learned that he was planning a landing on the island. The soldiers, suffering from the scant resources of the place, and more besieged than besiegers, were eager to risk a decisive action. The burning of the island had also given Demosthenes fresh confidence.

3 Previously he had been afraid because the greater part of the island was wooded and pathless, having always been uninhabited; he thought this favored the enemy. Even if a large army landed, they could attack from concealment and inflict losses. Their own mistakes and preparations would not be so readily visible to the Athenians through the woods, while every error of the Athenian army would be plain to them. Thus they could strike unexpectedly wherever they wished, for the initiative would lie with them.

4 If, on the other hand, he were forced to close with them in the dense woods, he thought that a smaller force familiar with the country would have the advantage over a larger one that did not know it. His own army, large though it was, might be destroyed without its plight being noticed, since the men could not see where they needed to help one another.

CHAPTER 30

1 These thoughts weighed on him especially because of the disaster in Aetolia, which had been due in part to the woods.

2 Cramped for space, the soldiers had been compelled to put in at the extremities of the island and take their midday meal under the protection of an advance guard. One of them accidentally set fire to a small patch of woodland; a wind then arose, and before they knew it most of the woods had burned down.

3 Demosthenes could now see the Lacedaemonians more clearly and saw that they were more numerous than he had supposed, for he had previously suspected that the food was being brought in for fewer men. The island, too, was easier to land on. He therefore set about preparing the Athenians to press the assault with greater earnestness, as against a worthy enemy, sending for troops from the neighboring allies and making the other preparations.

4 Cleon sent a messenger ahead to announce his coming and arrived at Pylos with the troops he had requested. When the two commanders met, they first sent a herald to the army on the mainland, inviting them, if they wished, to order the men on the island to surrender themselves and their arms without a struggle. The men would be held in reasonable custody until some broader agreement was reached.

CHAPTER 31

1 When the offer was rejected, they waited one day. On the next, during the night, they embarked all the hoplites on a few ships and put out; shortly before dawn they landed on both sides of the island, from the open sea and from the harbor, about eight hundred hoplites in all, and ran forward against the first guard post on the island.

2 The enemy were disposed as follows. At this first post there were about thirty hoplites. The greater part of the force, with Epitadas their commander, held the center of the island, where the ground was most level and the water was. A small detachment guarded the very end of the island facing Pylos, a place precipitous toward the sea and least open to attack from the land. There was also an old fort there, built of stones picked out for the purpose, which they thought would serve them if they were compelled to make a hard-pressed retreat. Such was their disposition.

CHAPTER 32

1 The Athenians at once destroyed the first guards they rushed upon, some still in their beds, others taking up their arms. Their landing had gone unnoticed, since the guards thought the ships were sailing to their customary night stations for the blockade.

2 At daybreak the rest of the force began to land: from a little more than seventy ships, everyone except the rowers on the lowest tier, each with whatever equipment he had; eight hundred archers and at least as many peltasts; the Messenians who had come to help; and all the other men holding Pylos, except the guards on the wall.

3 Under Demosthenes' orders they spread out in detachments of two hundred or more, and in some places fewer, occupying the highest ground. His purpose was to reduce the enemy, surrounded on every side, to the greatest possible perplexity: they would not know which way to face, but would be caught between the masses of their opponents. If they advanced against those in front, they would be struck from behind; if against those on the flank, from the forces ranged on either side.

4 Whichever way they moved, the enemy light troops would always be at their backs, and these were the hardest to deal with. They could fight at long range with arrows, javelins, stones, and slings, yet could not themselves be charged: even in flight they had the advantage, and when the enemy withdrew they pressed upon them. Such was the plan on which Demosthenes had first conceived the landing and which he now put into effect.

CHAPTER 33

1 When Epitadas and the main body of the men on the island saw the first guard post destroyed and an army advancing against them, they formed up and moved against the Athenian hoplites, wishing to come to close quarters. These

stood directly in front of them, while the light troops were on their flanks and behind them.

2 They could neither engage the hoplites nor bring their own skill to bear. The light troops held them off with missiles from either side, while the hoplites remained still instead of advancing to meet them. Wherever the light troops pressed them closest, they charged and drove them back; but these turned and defended themselves again. Lightly equipped, they easily gained a head start in flight over ground that was difficult and rough from its former desolation, where the Lacedaemonians in their armor could not pursue them.

CHAPTER 34

1 For a short time they skirmished with one another in this way. But the Lacedaemonians could no longer dash out swiftly wherever they were attacked, and the light troops recognized that their defense was growing slower. The sight of their own overwhelming numbers had given them most of their confidence; familiarity, too, had made the enemy seem less formidable, since they had not immediately suffered as they had expected when they first landed, their minds cowed by the thought that they were going against Lacedaemonians. Now, despising them, they raised a shout and rushed at them together, pelting them with stones, arrows, and javelins, whatever each man had at hand.

2 The shout accompanying the onrush struck terror into men unaccustomed to such fighting. Dense clouds of dust rose from the newly burned woods, and it was impossible to see what lay ahead through the arrows and stones hurled by so many men and flying together with the dust.

3 The Lacedaemonians' position now became desperate. Their felt caps could not keep out the arrows, and their spearshafts were splintered under the bombardment. They had no means of helping themselves: their eyes could not see ahead, and the louder shouting of the enemy drowned out their own orders. Danger surrounded them on every side, and they had no hope of finding a way to defend themselves and survive.

CHAPTER 35

1 At last, with many already wounded as they continually wheeled about in the same place, they closed ranks and moved toward the fort at the end of the island, which was not far away, and toward their own guards there.

2 Once they gave ground, the light troops, emboldened, pressed them with far louder cries. Any Lacedaemonians caught in the retreat were killed, but most escaped to the fort, where they joined the guards and formed a defensive line along its entire assailable front.

3 The Athenians followed, but the strength of the position prevented them from passing round and surrounding the enemy. Instead, they advanced against them from the front and tried to drive them back.

4 For a long time, through most of the day, both sides held out, tormented by battle, thirst, and sun: the one trying to dislodge the enemy from the height, the other refusing to yield. The Lacedaemonians defended themselves more easily than before, since they were no longer being surrounded on their flanks.

CHAPTER 36

1 When no end was in sight, the Messenian general approached Cleon and Demosthenes and told them that they were laboring in vain. If they would give him a detachment of archers and light troops to work his way round behind the enemy by whatever route he could find, he thought he could force an entry.

2 Receiving the men he requested, he started from a concealed point so that the enemy would not see him. He made his way along the cliff-bound part of the island wherever passage offered, through ground the Lacedaemonians had left unguarded in reliance on its natural strength. With great difficulty he got round unnoticed and suddenly appeared on the height behind them. The surprise appalled the enemy, while the sight of what they had been awaiting gave the Athenians far greater confidence.

3 The Lacedaemonians, now struck from both sides, found themselves in the same predicament as the men at Thermopylae, to compare a small event with a great one. Those men had been destroyed when the Persians came round by the path; these, likewise caught between two forces, could no longer hold out. Few fighting against many, and with their bodies weakened by lack of food, they fell back; the Athenians now controlled the approaches.

CHAPTER 37

1 Cleon and Demosthenes realized [that] if the enemy yielded even a little further, their own army would destroy them. They stopped the battle and held their men back, wishing to bring the Lacedaemonians alive to the Athenians: perhaps, on hearing a proclamation, they might break in spirit, surrender their arms, and succumb to the terror of their present plight.

2 They proclaimed that, if the men wished, they might surrender their arms and themselves to the Athenians, to be dealt with as the Athenians should decide.

CHAPTER 38

1 On hearing this, most of the men lowered their shields and waved their hands to signal their acceptance of the proclamation. A truce followed, and Cleon and Demosthenes met for talks with Styphon son of Pharax on the other side. Of the commanders before him, Epitadas, the first, was dead; Hippagretus, who had been appointed next, lay among the dead, still alive but taken for dead. Styphon himself had been appointed third in command under the law, to take over if anything happened to the other two.

2 Styphon and his companions said that they wished to communicate by herald with the Lacedaemonians on the mainland and ask what they should do.

3 The Athenians would allow none of them to leave, but themselves summoned heralds from the mainland. After two or three exchanges of questions, the last man to cross over to them from the Lacedaemonians on the mainland delivered

this message: "The Lacedaemonians instruct you to decide for yourselves about your own fate, doing nothing dishonorable." They consulted among themselves and surrendered their arms and their persons.

4 The Athenians kept them under guard for that day and the following night. On the next day they set up a trophy on the island, made their other preparations for sailing, and assigned the prisoners to the captains of the triremes for safekeeping. The Lacedaemonians sent a herald and recovered their dead.

5 The numbers killed on the island and taken alive were these. Four hundred and twenty hoplites had crossed over in all; of these, two hundred and ninety-two were brought back alive, and the rest were dead. About a hundred and twenty of the survivors were Spartans. Few Athenians were killed, for the fighting was not a pitched battle.

CHAPTER 39

1 The whole time for which the men on the island were besieged, from the sea battle to the battle on the island, was seventy-two days.

2 For about twenty of these days, while the envoys were away negotiating the treaty, they received provisions; for the rest they lived on supplies brought in by those who sailed across in secret. Some grain and other food were found left on the island: Epitadas, their commander, had allotted each man less than the available supplies allowed.

3 The Athenians and Peloponnesians now each withdrew their forces from Pylos and returned home. Cleon's promise, wild though it was, had come true: within twenty days he brought back the men, just as he had undertaken to do.

CHAPTER 40

1 Of all the events of the war, this was the one that most confounded the Greeks' expectations. They had believed that neither hunger nor any other extremity would induce the Lacedaemonians to surrender their arms: they would hold them to the last, fighting as best they could, and die.

2 They could not believe that the men who surrendered were of the same quality as those who died. Later, when one of the Athenian allies spitefully asked a prisoner from the island whether those of his comrades who had died were brave and honorable men, he answered that the spindle—meaning the arrow—would be worth a great deal if it could distinguish the brave. He meant that stones and arrows killed whoever happened to be in their way.

CHAPTER 41

1 When the men had been brought to Athens, the Athenians resolved to keep them in chains until some agreement was reached, but if the Peloponnesians invaded their land before then, to bring them out and put them to death.

2 They stationed a garrison at Pylos. The Messenians at Naupactus, treating it as their native land—for Pylos belongs to the territory that was once Messenia—sent the most suitable of their own men there; these raided Laconia and did very great damage, aided by their common language with its inhabitants.

3 The Lacedaemonians, unaccustomed until then to raids and warfare of this kind, were deeply troubled. Helots were deserting, and they feared that disorders in the countryside might spread still further. Though unwilling to reveal their distress to the Athenians, they sent embassies to them and tried to recover both Pylos and the men.

4 But the Athenians reached for greater gains, and though the envoys came repeatedly, sent them away without accomplishing anything. Such were the events at Pylos.

CHAPTER 42

1 Immediately afterward, in the same summer, the Athenians campaigned against Corinthian territory with eighty ships, two thousand hoplites of their own, and two hundred cavalry carried in horse transports. Allied troops from Miletus, Andros, and Carystus accompanied them. Nicias son of Niceratus commanded, with two colleagues.

2 They sailed in and at dawn landed between Chersonesus and Rheitus, on the beach below the Solygean hill. In ancient times the Dorians had established themselves on this hill and made war on the Corinthians in the city, who were Aeolians; a village called Solygea now stands on it. From the beach where the ships landed, this village is twelve stades away, the city of Corinth sixty, and the Isthmus twenty.

3 The Corinthians, forewarned from Argos that the Athenian force was coming, had long before marched to the Isthmus with their entire strength, except for those living beyond it. Five hundred of their men were also absent on garrison duty in Ambracia and Leucas. All the rest watched together for the Athenians, to see where they would land.

4 But the Athenians sailed in by night undetected. When signals were raised to warn the Corinthians, they left half their men at Cenchreae, in case the Athenians should go toward Crommyon, and hurried to the rescue.

CHAPTER 43

1 Battus, one of the generals—there were two present at the battle—took a company to defend the unwalled village of Solygea, while Lycophron engaged the enemy with the rest.

2 The Corinthians first attacked the Athenian right wing, which had just landed in front of Chersonesus, and then the rest of the army. The fighting was fierce and entirely at close quarters.

3 The right wing of the Athenians and Carystians—the latter were posted at the extreme end of the line—stood against the Corinthians and with difficulty drove them back. They withdrew to a stone wall, for the whole ground rose steeply, and from their higher position hurled stones; then, singing the paean, they advanced again. The Athenians met them, and the battle was once more hand to hand.

4 A Corinthian company came to support its own left wing, routed the Athenian right, and pursued it to the sea. But from the ships the Athenians and Carystians turned back to face them again.

5 The rest of the two armies fought without interruption, above all the Corinthian right wing, where Lycophron stood defending against the Athenian left: they expected the Athenians to attempt an attack on the village of Solygea.

CHAPTER 44

1 For a long time they held their ground, neither yielding to the other. At last the Corinthians broke and withdrew toward the hill—the Athenian cavalry had been of service in the fighting, while their opponents had none. There they grounded their arms and remained still, making no further descent.

2 It was in this rout, on their right wing, that most of their men were killed, including Lycophron the general. The rest of the army, when forced back in this way, withdrew to the heights and took up a position, without any prolonged pursuit or headlong flight.

3 When the Corinthians no longer advanced to fight them, the Athenians stripped the enemy dead and gathered their own, and at once set up a trophy.

4 The half of the Corinthian force stationed at Cenchreae, watching lest the Athenians sail toward Crommyon, could not see the battle because Mount Oneum lay in the way. But when they saw the dust and [when] they understood what it meant, they came to the rescue at once. The older Corinthians from the city also came out to help when they learned what had happened.

5 Seeing all these men advancing, the Athenians supposed that reinforcements were coming from the neighboring Peloponnesian communities. They hurried back to the ships with their spoils and their own dead, except for two whom they could not find and left behind.

6 They boarded their ships and crossed to the islands nearby. From there they sent a herald and recovered under truce the dead they had left behind. Two hundred and twelve Corinthians died in the battle, and a little fewer than fifty Athenians.

CHAPTER 45

1 Putting out from the islands, the Athenians sailed that same day to Crommyon in Corinthian territory, a hundred and twenty stades from the city. They anchored, laid waste the land, and encamped for the night.

2 The next day they sailed first along the coast to Epidaurian territory and made a landing there; then they came to Methana, between Epidaurus and Troezen. They walled off the isthmus of the peninsula [in which Methone stands] and established a garrison, from which they afterward raided the lands of Troezen, Haliae, and Epidaurus. When they had finished fortifying the place, they sailed home with their ships.

CHAPTER 46

1 At about the same time as these events, Eurymedon and Sophocles, who had left Pylos with the Athenian ships bound for Sicily, arrived at Corcyra. Together with the people of the city, they marched against the Corcyraeans established on Mount Istone, who had crossed over after the civil strife and now controlled the countryside and were doing great damage.

2 They attacked and took the fortification. The men, who had fled together to a height, agreed to surrender their mercenaries, lay down their own arms, and leave the Athenian people to decide their fate.

3 The generals transported them to the island of Ptychia to be kept under guard until they could be sent to Athens. They were protected by a truce, on the condition that if any one of them was caught escaping, it would be void for them all.

4 But the leaders of the Corcyraean people, afraid that the Athenians might not execute the prisoners when they arrived, devised the following scheme.

5 They secretly sent friends to persuade a few of the men on the island. These were instructed to speak as though out of goodwill: their best course was to escape as quickly as possible, and the speakers would themselves provide a boat, for the Athenian generals were about to hand them over to the Corcyraean people.

CHAPTER 47

1 When they had been persuaded and the boat had been arranged, they were caught sailing away. The truce was now void, and all the prisoners were handed over to the Corcyraeans.

2 The Athenian generals contributed in no small measure to this outcome, making the pretext secure and emboldening the authors of the scheme to attempt it: they made it plain that, since they themselves were sailing to Sicily, they were unwilling to have the men conveyed by others, who would then receive the honor of bringing them in.

3 The Corcyraeans took charge of the prisoners and shut them in a large building. Later they brought them out twenty at a time, bound to one another, and led them between two ranks of hoplites drawn up on either side. The soldiers struck and stabbed them whenever anyone recognized a personal enemy; men carrying whips walked beside them and hurried on those who moved too slowly.

CHAPTER 48

1 They brought out and killed about sixty men in this way without those inside the building knowing it; they thought the men were being taken somewhere else to be resettled. But when they realized what was happening and someone told them, they called on the Athenians to kill them themselves, if they wished. They would no longer leave the building and declared that, so far as they could prevent it, they would let no one enter.

2 The Corcyraeans had no intention of forcing their way through the doors. Instead they climbed onto the building, broke open the roof, and hurled tiles and shot arrows down on them.

3 The prisoners defended themselves as best they could, while most also began to take their own lives. They drove the arrows shot at them into their throats, or hanged themselves with cords from some beds that happened to be inside, and with strips torn from their clothes. Through most of the night—for night fell upon their suffering—they destroyed themselves by every means, or died under the missiles from above.

4 When day came, the Corcyraeans piled the bodies on wagons like loads of freight and carried them outside the city. The women captured in the fortification they sold into slavery.

5 In this way the Corcyraeans from the mountain were destroyed by the people, and the civil strife, after reaching such great proportions, came to this end—at least for the duration of this war. Of the opposing party no remnant of any account was left.

6 The Athenians sailed away to Sicily, their original destination, and fought there alongside their allies.

CHAPTER 49

1 At the close of the summer the Athenians at Naupactus and the Acarnanians together made an expedition against Anactorium, a Corinthian city at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, and took it by treachery. The Acarnanians expelled [the Corinthians] and themselves occupied the place with settlers drawn from all their communities. And the summer ended.

CHAPTER 50

1 In the following winter Aristides son of Archippus, one of the generals commanding the Athenian tribute-collecting ships sent out to the allies, arrested at Eion on the Strymon a Persian named Artaphernes, who was traveling from the King to Lacedaemon.

2 He was brought to Athens, where the Athenians translated his letters from the Assyrian script and read them. Among much else, their chief message to the Lacedaemonians was that the King did not understand what they wanted: many envoys had come, but no two said the same thing. If, then, they wished to make any clear proposal, they should send men to him with the Persian.

3 Later the Athenians sent Artaphernes to Ephesus in a trireme, together with envoys of their own. These learned there that King Artaxerxes son of Xerxes had recently died—his death fell at about this time—and returned home.

CHAPTER 51

1 In the same winter the Chians dismantled their new wall at the Athenians' command, who suspected them of planning revolt. They did, however, secure from the Athenians pledges and the strongest possible assurance that no change would be planned in their affairs. And the winter ended, and the seventh year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

CHAPTER 52

1 At the very beginning of the following summer there was a partial eclipse of the sun about the new moon, and an earthquake early in the same month.

2 The exiles from Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, operating chiefly from the mainland, hired mercenaries from the Peloponnese and gathered others locally. They took Rhoeteum, but on receiving two thousand Phocaean staters gave it back without doing any damage.

3 After this they marched against Antandrus and took the city through treachery. Their intention was to liberate the other cities known as the Actaean cities, once held by the Mytilenaeans but now in Athenian hands, and above all Antandrus. Once they had made it secure, it would be easy to build ships there, with timber available on the spot and from nearby Ida, and to furnish the other equipment. Using it as a base, they could readily ravage Lesbos close by and subdue the Aeolian towns on the mainland. Such were the preparations they intended to make.

CHAPTER 53

1 In the same summer the Athenians campaigned against Cythera with sixty ships, two thousand hoplites, and a few cavalry, taking with them Milesians and some other allied troops. Their generals were Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, and Autocles son of Tolmaeus.

2 Cythera is an island lying off Laconia opposite Malea. Its inhabitants are Lacedaemonians of the perioeci; each year an official called the Cytherodices crossed over from Sparta, and the Lacedaemonians regularly sent a garrison of hoplites and took great care of the place.

3 It was a landfall for their merchant ships coming from Egypt and Libya; it also kept pirates from harassing Laconia so much by sea, the only direction from which it could be harmed, since its whole coast faces the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

CHAPTER 54

1 The Athenians landed their force and took the coastal town called Scandea with ten ships and two thousand Milesian hoplites. The rest of the army disembarked on the side of the island facing Malea and advanced toward the Cytherians' town [on the sea], where they at once found the entire population encamped.

2 In the battle that followed the Cytherians held their ground for a short time, then broke and fled to the upper town. Later they agreed with Nicias and his fellow commanders to leave their fate to the Athenians, on condition that they should not be put to death.

3 Nicias had already held discussions with some of the Cytherians, and for this reason the settlement was reached more quickly and on terms more favorable to them, both for the moment and for the future. Otherwise the Athenians would have removed the Cytherians, since they were Lacedaemonians and their island lay so close to Laconia.

4 After the agreement the Athenians took possession of Scandea, the little town at the harbor, and placed a garrison on Cythera. They then sailed to Asine, Helos, and most of the coastal places, landing and encamping wherever the opportunity offered, and laid waste the land for about seven days.

CHAPTER 55

1 The Lacedaemonians saw the Athenians holding Cythera and expected them to make similar landings on their own soil. Nowhere did they oppose them with their full strength; instead they sent garrisons throughout the country, assigning as many hoplites as each place required. In other respects too they kept a close watch, fearing some disturbance of their established order: the disaster on the island had been as great as it was unexpected, Pylos and Cythera were occupied, and on every side they were beset by a war swift in its movements and impossible to guard against.

2 They therefore departed from their usual practice and raised four hundred cavalry and a force of archers. In military affairs they now became more hesitant than ever, involved as they were in a naval struggle contrary to the character of their existing armament, and that against the Athenians, who always regarded an unattempted enterprise as a failure to achieve what they believed possible.

3 At the same time, so many unforeseen blows of fortune in so short a period filled them with the greatest dismay; they feared that another disaster like the one on the island might befall them.

4 This made them less bold in battle, and they imagined that every move they made would go wrong. Their confidence had become insecure because, until then, they had been strangers to misfortune.

CHAPTER 56

1 Thus, while the Athenians were ravaging the coast, the Lacedaemonians generally remained quiet: wherever a landing took place within a garrison's district, its men thought themselves outnumbered, and their spirits were in this condition. One garrison did offer resistance, near Cotyrta and Aphroditia. Its charge scattered the dispersed mass of light-armed troops, but when the hoplites stood against it, it withdrew again. A few of its men were killed and their arms taken; the Athenians set up a trophy and sailed back to Cythera.

2 From there they sailed round to Epidaurus Limera, ravaged part of its territory, and came to Thyrea. This lies in the country called Cynuria, on the border between Argive and Laconian territory. The Lacedaemonians, who held it, had given it to the expelled Aeginetans as a home, in return for their help at the time of the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots, and because, though subject to Athens, they had always stood by Lacedaemonian policy.

CHAPTER 57

1 While the Athenians were still approaching by sea, the Aeginetans abandoned the wall they were then building on the shore and withdrew to the upper town where they lived, about ten stades from the sea.

2 One of the Lacedaemonian garrisons stationed about the country had been helping them build the wall. Though the Aeginetans begged them, its men refused to enter the fortifications with them, thinking it dangerous to be shut up inside. They withdrew to the heights and, believing themselves no match for the enemy, remained quiet.

3 Meanwhile the Athenians landed, advanced at once with their whole army, and took Thyrea. They burned the town and plundered everything in it, then returned to Athens with all the Aeginetans who had not been killed in the fighting, and with Tantalus son of Patrocles, the Lacedaemonian commander stationed among them, who had been wounded and captured alive.

4 They also brought a few men from Cythera whom they thought it safer to remove. The Athenians resolved to confine these on the islands, and to let the other Cytherians live in their own land and pay four talents in tribute. All the captured Aeginetans were to be put to death because of the long-standing enmity, and Tantalus was to be chained up with the other Lacedaemonians taken on the island.

CHAPTER 58

1 In the same summer, in Sicily, the Camarinaeans and Geloans first concluded an armistice with one another. Then the other Siceliots too assembled at Gela, with envoys from every city, and entered into talks to see whether they could reach a settlement. Many opinions were expressed on either side as they disputed and pressed their claims, each according to the losses they thought they had suffered. Hermocrates son of Hermon, a Syracusan, whose influence did most to persuade them, addressed the gathering as follows.

CHAPTER 59

1 "Men of Sicily, I speak as a citizen neither of the least of your cities nor of the one most afflicted by the war, but to set before you openly the course I believe best for all Sicily.

2 "Why should anyone speak at length about the hardships of war, rehearsing every evil it contains to people who know them already? No one is forced into it through ignorance, nor deterred by fear if he thinks he will gain an advantage. Rather, to one side the gains seem greater than the dangers, while the other is willing to face those dangers rather than suffer any immediate loss.

3 "But if either side is pursuing these very aims at the wrong moment, advice to seek a settlement is useful.

4 "For us too, to heed it now would be of the greatest value. Each of us, believing of course that he was arranging his own affairs well, first went to war; now, through argument with one another, we are trying to come to terms. And if it should prove impossible for each to go away with his equal share, we shall fight again.

CHAPTER 60

1 "Yet we must recognize that, if we are wise, this gathering will concern not merely our separate interests, but whether we can still save the whole of Sicily from the designs which, in my judgment, Athens has upon it. And we must regard the Athenians as far more compelling mediators in these disputes than any words of mine. Possessing the greatest power among the Greeks, they are here with a few ships, watching for our mistakes; under the lawful name of alliance, they give a fair appearance to their natural hostility and turn it to their advantage.

2 "For if we choose war and bring them in—men who march even against those who do not invite them—if we injure ourselves at our own expense and at the same time advance their empire, we may well expect that, once they see us worn

down, they will one day come with a larger fleet and attempt to subject all this country to themselves.

CHAPTER 61

1 "Yet if we are wise, each of us should call in allies and expose his own land to fresh dangers to acquire what he does not possess, rather than to damage what he already has. We must recognize that civil strife does more than anything else to destroy cities, and Sicily too: all of us who inhabit it are threatened together, yet city is divided against city.

2 "Knowing this, we must make peace, individual with individual and city with city, and try together to save the whole of Sicily. No one should suppose that the Dorians among us are enemies of Athens, while the Chalcidians are safe through their Ionian kinship.

3 "For the Athenians are not attacking these two peoples out of hatred for one of them because their origins are distinct, but out of desire for the good things of Sicily, which we possess in common.

4 "They have made this plain now in answering the appeal of the Chalcidian people: though these have never yet helped them under the alliance, they themselves have been all the more eager to fulfill their treaty obligations.

5 "That the Athenians should seek these advantages and provide for them in advance is entirely understandable. I blame not those who wish to rule, but those who are too ready to submit. For it is always human nature to rule whoever yields, and to guard against whoever attacks.

6 "But if, knowing this, we fail to take proper precautions, if any of us has come here without judging it his first duty to set right the danger that threatens us all, we are at fault.

7 "The quickest deliverance from it would come if we reached agreement with one another. For the Athenians are not operating from their own country, but from that of those who invited them. In this way our differences are ended without trouble, not by meeting war with war, but by peace. And those who came at our invitation, with a fair pretext for an unjust purpose, will depart with good reason, their purpose unfulfilled.

CHAPTER 62

1 "So great, then, is the advantage that sound deliberation offers us against the Athenians.

2 "And peace, which everyone agrees is best—how can we fail to establish it among ourselves as well? If one of you enjoys some advantage and another suffers the reverse, do you suppose that quiet will not do more than war to end the suffering and preserve the advantage for each, or that peace does not make honors and splendor safer, along with all the other benefits one might describe at length, just as one might discuss warfare? Consider these things, and do not disregard my words; rather, let each man see in them the prospect of his own deliverance.

3 "And if anyone thinks that either justice or force guarantees him some achievement, let him not bitterly resent an unexpected disappointment. Let him recognize that many before now have pursued wrongdoers for vengeance, while others have hoped to gain more through their power: the former, far from avenging themselves, have not even survived, while the latter, instead of gaining more, have lost what was already their own as well.

4 "For vengeance does not succeed by right merely because a wrong has been done; nor is strength secure merely because it is hopeful. The incalculable future has the widest sway, and, though the most treacherous of all things, proves also the most useful: since we fear it equally, we approach one another with greater foresight.

CHAPTER 63

1 "Now, then, alarmed on both counts—by this fear of the unseen, because it cannot be reckoned, and by the Athenians already here, a present terror—and judging that these obstacles have sufficiently thwarted whatever each of us thought to accomplish but failed to achieve, let us send away the enemies who stand over our country. Let us come to terms ourselves, preferably for all time; failing that, let us make a truce for as long as possible and put off our private disputes until another day.

2 "In short, let us understand that, if you listen to me, each of us will have a free city, from which, as our own masters, we can repay good and evil alike with equal valor. But if we reject this counsel and submit to others, there will be no question of punishing anyone: even with the best of fortune, we shall be forced to become friends to our bitterest enemies and enemies to those with whom we should not quarrel.

CHAPTER 64

1 "For my part, as I said at the outset, though I represent the greatest city and am more often the attacker than the defender, I consider it right to foresee these dangers and make concessions. I will not injure my enemies so much that I suffer still greater harm myself, nor pursue victory so foolishly as to think myself as fully master of fortune, which I do not command, as of my own judgment. I will yield as far as is reasonable.

2 "And I ask the rest of you to do the same as I do: make these concessions to one another, not under compulsion from the enemy.

3 "For there is no disgrace in kinsmen yielding to kinsmen—a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to his own kindred. We are all, in short, neighbors, sharing a single country surrounded by the sea and called by a single name, Siceliots. We shall fight, I suppose, when occasion arises, and we shall make peace again among ourselves through common discussion;

4 "but against invaders of another race we shall always defend ourselves together, if we are wise, since harm to individuals endangers us all. Never again shall we bring in allies from outside, or even mediators.

5 "For by acting in this way we shall not deprive Sicily of two present blessings—deliverance from the Athenians and from war among ourselves—and in the future we shall inhabit it ourselves in freedom, less exposed to the designs of others."

CHAPTER 65

1 Hermocrates spoke to this effect, and the Siceliots took his advice. Among themselves they agreed to end the war, each retaining what they held; Morgantina, however, was to belong to the Camarinaeans, who would pay the Syracusans a fixed sum of money.

2 The allies of the Athenians summoned the Athenian commanders and said that they would make a settlement, and that the truce would include them as well. With their approval the agreement was concluded, and afterward the Athenian ships sailed away from Sicily.

3 When the generals returned, the Athenians at home punished Pythodorus and Sophocles with exile and imposed a fine on the third, Eurymedon, alleging that, although they could have subdued Sicily, they had been bribed to withdraw.

4 So thoroughly had their present good fortune persuaded them that they expected nothing to stand in their way, and thought they could achieve the possible and the more difficult alike, with ample resources or with inadequate ones. The cause was their success in most undertakings beyond all calculation, which lent strength to their hopes.

CHAPTER 66

1 During the same summer the Megarians in the city were hard pressed both by the Athenians, who invaded their country with their whole army twice every year, and by their own exiles at Pegae. These men, driven out by the people in the civil strife, were inflicting serious damage through their raids. The citizens began discussing among themselves the need to readmit the exiles rather than let the city be ruined from both sides.

2 The friends of those outside heard the talk and themselves began to urge this policy more openly than before.

3 The leaders of the people, realizing that under these hardships the people would not be able to stand firm with them, grew afraid and entered into discussions with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates son of Ariphron and Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes. They wished to surrender the city, believing this less dangerous to themselves than the return of the men they had expelled. They agreed that the Athenians should first seize the Long Walls, which extended about eight stades from the city to Nisaea, their harbor. This would prevent the Peloponnesians from coming to its aid from Nisaea, where they alone supplied the garrison to keep Megara securely in their hands. Afterward they would try to surrender the upper city too: once the walls had been taken, its inhabitants would be more likely to come over.

CHAPTER 67

1 When both parties had completed their preparations in word and deed, the Athenians sailed under cover of night to Minoa, the Megarians' island, with six hundred hoplites commanded by Hippocrates, and took up a position in a nearby excavation from which bricks had been made for the walls.

2 The men with Demosthenes, the other general—light-armed Plataeans and other patrol troops—lay in ambush at the sanctuary of Enyalius, which was nearer still. No one knew of their presence that night except the men whose

business it was to know.

3 As dawn approached, the Megarians who were betraying the city acted as follows. They had long been contriving to secure the opening of the gates: pretending to be raiders, they had made a practice, with the commander's consent, of taking a small boat with oars on both sides down to the sea on a wagon through the ditch at night, and sailing out. Before daylight they would bring it back on the wagon to the wall and take it in through the gates. Their purpose was to keep their patrol hidden from the Athenians on Minoa, since no vessel was visible in the harbor.

4 On this occasion the wagon was already at the gates. When they were opened as usual, ostensibly for the boat, the Athenians saw it and ran at full speed from their ambush: this was the agreed signal. They wanted to get there before the gates could be shut again, while the wagon was still between them and prevented their closing. At the same time the Megarians acting with them killed the guards at the gates.

5 The Plataeans and patrol troops with Demosthenes were the first to rush in, at the place where the trophy now stands. The nearest Peloponnesians became aware of them, and fighting began immediately inside the gates. The Plataeans defeated those who came to the rescue and secured the gates for the advancing Athenian hoplites.

CHAPTER 68

1 Then, as each successive body of Athenians came inside, it advanced to the wall.

2 A few of the Peloponnesian garrison at first stood their ground and defended themselves, and some of them were killed. Most, however, took to flight, terrified by the enemy's sudden attack in the night and by the Megarian traitors fighting against them; they thought that all the Megarians had betrayed them.

3 For the Athenian herald had also, on his own initiative, proclaimed that any Megarian who wished could come and join the Athenians under arms. When they heard this, they held out no longer, but, convinced that the whole city was indeed fighting against them, fled to Nisaea.

4 At dawn, with the walls already captured and the Megarians in the city in confusion, the men who had been negotiating with the Athenians, together with a considerable body of others privy to the plan, said that they must open the gates and march out to battle.

5 They had agreed that, when the gates were opened, the Athenians would rush in. They themselves were to be clearly recognizable—they would smear themselves with oil—so that they would not be harmed. They felt all the safer about opening the gates because the four thousand Athenian hoplites and six hundred cavalry from Eleusis had also arrived, having marched through the night as arranged.

6 They had already anointed themselves and were at the gates when someone who knew of the plot revealed it to the other party. These men gathered together and came in a body, declaring that they must neither march out—they had never dared do so before, even when stronger—nor expose the city to manifest danger. If anyone refused to obey, the battle would be fought on the spot. They gave no sign that they knew what was being done, but insisted that their advice was for the best, while remaining on guard at the gates. Thus the conspirators could not carry out their purpose.

CHAPTER 69

1 The Athenian generals, realizing that some obstacle had arisen and that they could not take the city by force, immediately began to build a wall around Nisaea. They thought that, if they captured it before relief arrived, this would hasten

2 the surrender of Megara as well. Iron tools, masons, and the other necessities quickly arrived from Athens. Starting from the wall they held, they built a cross-wall on the side facing Megara; from there the army divided the work of digging a ditch and building walls down to the sea on either side of Nisaea. They used stones and bricks from the suburb, and cut down trees and timber to make palisades wherever anything was needed. The houses of the suburb themselves served as fortifications when fitted with battlements.

3 They worked throughout that day. By the afternoon of the next the wall was all but complete, and the men in Nisaea became afraid. They were short of grain, having drawn their supplies day by day from the upper city; they did not think the Peloponnesians would come quickly to their relief, and they regarded the Megarians as enemies. They therefore agreed with the Athenians to surrender their arms, each man to be released for a fixed sum of money. The Athenians, however, were to dispose as they pleased of the Lacedaemonians—the commander and any others who were there.

4 Having agreed to these terms, they came out. The Athenians severed the Long Walls from the city of the Megarians, took possession of Nisaea, and made their further preparations.

CHAPTER 70

1 At this time Brasidas son of Tellis, the Lacedaemonian, happened to be near Sicyon and Corinth, preparing an expedition to Thrace. When he learned of the capture of the walls, he feared both for the Peloponnesians in Nisaea and that Megara might be taken. He sent to the Boeotians, ordering them to meet him with an army as quickly as possible at Tripodiscus—a village of the Megarid below Mount Geraneia—and himself went there with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian hoplites, four hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and as many of his own men as had already assembled. He thought he would still find Nisaea untaken.

2 When he learned what had happened—he had reached Tripodiscus in the night—he picked three hundred men from the army and, before his presence became known, approached the city of the Megarians undetected by the Athenians, who were near the sea. His professed purpose was to make an attempt on Nisaea, and he meant to do so in fact if he could; but his chief aim was to enter the city of the Megarians and secure it. He asked them to admit his men, saying that he had hopes of recovering Nisaea.

CHAPTER 71

1 But the factions among the Megarians were afraid: one feared that he would bring back the exiles and expel them; the other, that the people, fearing precisely this, would attack them and the city would be destroyed in fighting within itself while the Athenians lay close by in wait. They did not admit him; both parties preferred to remain quiet and watch what would happen.

2 For both expected a battle between the Athenians and the relieving force, and thought it would then be safer for them to join whichever side they favored, once it had won. Brasidas, unable to persuade them, withdrew to the rest of his army.

CHAPTER 72

1 At dawn the Boeotians arrived. Even before Brasidas sent to them, they had intended to relieve Megara, regarding the danger as their own, and had already assembled their whole army at Plataea. When the messenger also arrived, they became far more eager, and sent two thousand two hundred hoplites and six hundred cavalry, returning home with the greater part of their forces.

2 The entire army was now assembled, with no fewer than six thousand hoplites. The Athenian hoplites were drawn up near Nisaea and the sea, while their light-armed troops were scattered over the plain. The Boeotian cavalry fell upon

the light-armed troops unawares and drove them toward the sea: until then no relief had yet reached the Megarians from any quarter.

3 The Athenian cavalry rode out against them and came to close quarters. A prolonged cavalry battle followed, in which each side claims to have held its own.

4 The Boeotian cavalry commander and a few others rode right up to Nisaea, where the Athenians killed and stripped them. Holding these bodies, the Athenians returned them under truce and raised a trophy. Neither side, however, gained a decisive result in the action as a whole before they separated, the Boeotians returning to their own men and the Athenians to Nisaea.

CHAPTER 73

1 After this Brasidas and the army moved nearer the sea and the city of the Megarians. They occupied suitable ground, formed their line, and waited, expecting the Athenians to attack them and knowing that the Megarians were watching to see which side would win.

2 They thought this served them well on both counts. They would not be the first to attack or willingly initiate a dangerous battle; yet, having openly shown themselves ready to defend themselves, they could justly claim a victory without a struggle. At the same time the effect upon the Megarians would be favorable.

3 For if they had not appeared, it would have been no question of chance: they would certainly have lost the city at once, as though defeated. Now the Athenians might themselves prove unwilling to fight, allowing them to achieve their purpose without a battle. And that was what happened.

4 For the Megarians saw the Athenians come out and form up beside the Long Walls, but then remain still, since their opponents were not advancing either. The Athenian generals, too, reckoned that the risk was unequal. Having already achieved most of their aims, they would be initiating battle against superior numbers, with Megara to gain if they won, but the finest of their

hoplites to lose if they failed. On the other side, each contingent risked only a fraction of the whole force, even of the force now assembled, and could reasonably be willing to venture. After they had waited for a time and neither side attempted anything, the Athenians withdrew first to Nisaea, and then the Peloponnesians returned to their starting point. Thus the Megarian friends of the exiles, now more confident, opened the gates to Brasidas himself and the commanders from the cities, regarding him as the victor, since the Athenians were no longer willing to fight. They admitted them and entered into discussions; those who had negotiated with the Athenians were already cowed.

CHAPTER 74

1 Later, when the allies had dispersed to their cities, Brasidas himself returned to Corinth and prepared the expedition to Thrace, his original destination.

2 When the Athenians too had gone home, those Megarians in the city who had been most deeply involved in the dealings with them knew that they had been detected and immediately slipped away. The rest conferred with the friends of the exiles and brought back the men from Pegae, binding them by solemn oaths to bear no grudges and to advise what was best for the city.

3 But once in office, they held a review of the men under arms, separated the companies, and selected about a hundred men from among their enemies and those thought to have been most deeply involved in the dealings with the Athenians. They compelled the people to pass judgment on these men by an open vote, and, when they had been condemned, put them to death and established a thoroughgoing oligarchy in the city.

4 This change of government, brought about by a very few men through civil strife, endured for a remarkably long time.

CHAPTER 75

1 During the same summer, as the Mytilenaeans were about to fortify Antandrus as they had planned, the Athenian generals commanding the money-collecting ships, Demodocus and Aristides, were in the Hellespont; their third colleague, Lamachus, had sailed into the Pontus with ten ships. When they learned of the preparations at the place, they feared that it might become like Anaea opposite Samos. The Samian exiles established there helped the Peloponnesians by sending pilots for their fleets, stirred up trouble among the Samians in the city, and received those who left it. They therefore gathered an army from the allies and sailed to Antandrus, defeated in battle the men who came out from it, and recovered the place.

2 Not long afterward Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus, lost his ships while anchored in the Cales River in the territory of Heraclea: rain had fallen upstream, and the torrent came down suddenly. He and his army traveled on foot through the country of the Bithynian Thracians, who live across the water in Asia, and reached Chalcedon, a Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus.

CHAPTER 76

1 In the same summer Demosthenes, the Athenian general, arrived at Naupactus with forty ships, immediately after the withdrawal from the Megarid.

2 For certain men in the Boeotian cities were negotiating with Hippocrates and him, wishing to change the established order and turn it into a democracy on the Athenian model. Chiefly at the instigation of Ptoeodorus, an exile from Thebes, the following plan had been prepared for them.

3 Some men were to betray Siphae, a coastal town in the territory of Thespiae on the Crisaean Gulf. Others from Orchomenus were offering to surrender Chaeronea, which belongs to Orchomenus, formerly called Minyan but now

Boeotian. The Orchomenian exiles were especially active in the scheme and were hiring men from the Peloponnese. Chaeronea lies on the edge of Boeotia beside Phanotis in Phocis, and some Phocians were also involved.

4 The Athenians were to occupy Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo in the territory of Tanagra facing Euboea. All these operations were to take place together on an appointed day, so that the Boeotians would not bring their combined forces to the relief of Delium, but would each attend to disturbances in their own territory.

5 If the attempt succeeded and Delium was fortified, they confidently hoped that, even if no immediate change occurred in the Boeotian governments, the occupation of these positions, the raiding of the country, and the presence of a nearby refuge for each group would prevent affairs from remaining as they were. In time, with the Athenians supporting the rebels while their opponents could not unite their strength, they would bring matters into a favorable state.

CHAPTER 77

1 Such was the plot being prepared. Hippocrates himself intended to march from Athens with an army against the Boeotians when the time came, but sent Demosthenes ahead with the forty ships to Naupactus. He was to gather an army there from the Acarnanians and the other allies of that region and sail to Siphae, which was to be betrayed to him. They had appointed a day on which these operations were to be carried out together.

2 Demosthenes arrived and found that the people of Oeniadae had been compelled by all the Acarnanians to join the Athenian alliance. He himself called out the entire allied force in that region, marched first against Salynthius and the Agraeans, and won them over. He then made his remaining preparations to present himself at Siphae when the time came.

CHAPTER 78

1 At about the same time in the summer, Brasidas was marching toward the Thracian region with seventeen hundred hoplites. When he reached Heraclea in Trachis, he sent a messenger ahead to his friends at Pharsalus, asking them to escort him and his army through the country. Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus, who was proxenus for the Chalcidians, came to Melitaea in Achaea; only then did he proceed.

2 Other Thessalians also escorted him, as did Niconidas from Larisa, a friend of Perdiccas. For Thessaly was not easy to cross without a guide even in ordinary circumstances, and still less with an army. Throughout Greece alike, passage through a neighbor's territory without obtaining consent had come to be regarded with suspicion. Moreover, the Thessalian people had always been well disposed toward the Athenians.

3 Thus, had Thessaly been governed by equal laws rather than by a narrow ruling class, he would never have made his way through. Even as it was, while he was marching, men opposed to his escorts met him at the Enipeus River and tried to stop him, saying that he was doing wrong to pass through without the consent of the community.

4 His guides said that they would not take him through against their will, but were escorting him as his hosts because he had arrived unexpectedly. Brasidas himself said that he was passing through as a friend to the land and people of Thessaly, and was taking up arms against his enemies the Athenians, not against them. He knew of no enmity between Thessalians and Lacedaemonians that should prevent either from using the other's territory. Nor would he now advance against their wishes—indeed, he could not—but he did not think it right that he should be barred.

5 On hearing this they went away. At his guides' urging, Brasidas pressed on at speed without a pause, before any larger force could gather to stop him. On the same day that he left Melitaea he reached Pharsalus and encamped beside the

Apidanus River; from there he went to Phacium, and from Phacium to Perrhaebia.

6 At this point his Thessalian guides turned back. The Perrhaebians, who were subjects of the Thessalians, conducted him to Dium in the dominions of Perdiccas, a small Macedonian town below Olympus facing Thessaly.

CHAPTER 79

1 In this way Brasidas hurried through Thessaly before anyone could prepare to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice.

2 For the successes of the Athenians had alarmed both those in the Thracian region who had revolted from them and Perdiccas, and they had brought the army out of the Peloponnese. The Chalcidians believed that the Athenians would turn against them first; the neighboring cities that had not revolted also secretly joined in bringing the army. Perdiccas, though not openly at war with Athens, was himself afraid on account of their old quarrels, and above all wished to subdue Arrhabaeus, king of the Lyncestians.

3 The present misfortunes of the Lacedaemonians helped them obtain an army from the Peloponnese more easily.

CHAPTER 80

1 For the Athenians were pressing hard upon the Peloponnese, and not least upon Lacedaemonian territory. The Lacedaemonians hoped that the best way to divert them was to send an army against their allies and inflict trouble in return—especially since the allies were ready to maintain it and were inviting them to support a revolt.

2 At the same time they welcomed a pretext for sending away some of the Helots, lest, in the present circumstances, with Pylos occupied, they attempt a revolution.

3 Indeed, their fear of the Helots' fierce temper and their numbers had led them to take the following measure; for most Lacedaemonian arrangements had always been directed above all toward guarding against the Helots. They proclaimed that any Helots who claimed to have served them best in war should submit their claims for judgment, with freedom as the promised reward. This was a test: they thought that those whose spirit led each to claim that he should be freed before the rest would also be the most likely to attack them.

4 They selected about two thousand. These crowned themselves with garlands and went round the sanctuaries as men now free; but not long afterward the Lacedaemonians made them disappear, and no one knew how any one of them had been killed.

5 On this occasion, too, they readily sent seven hundred Helots as hoplites with Brasidas; the rest he recruited for pay from the Peloponnese and led out himself.

CHAPTER 81

1 The Lacedaemonians sent Brasidas himself, who was especially eager to go, and whom the Chalcidians were also eager to have. In Sparta he was considered a man of energy in every undertaking, and once abroad he proved of the greatest value to the Lacedaemonians.

2 For the moment, by showing himself just and moderate toward the cities, he brought most of them to revolt and took some places by betrayal. Thus, when the Lacedaemonians wished to reach a settlement—as they did—they had places to restore and others to recover in exchange, and could obtain relief from the war in the Peloponnese. And in the later war, after the events in Sicily, the excellence and intelligence Brasidas had then displayed did more than anything to inspire the Athenian allies with a longing for the Lacedaemonians: some knew these qualities from experience, others believed in them from report.

3 For he was the first to go abroad, and, by appearing a good man in every respect, left a firm expectation that the others were like him.

CHAPTER 82

1 At the time, then, when the Athenians learned of his arrival in the Thracian region, they declared Perdiccas an enemy, believing him responsible for his passage, and tightened their watch over their allies there.

CHAPTER 83

1 Perdiccas immediately took Brasidas and his army, together with his own forces, on an expedition against his neighbor Arrhabaeus son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestian Macedonians. He had a quarrel with him and wished to subjugate him.

2 But when he and Brasidas reached the entrance to Lyncus with the army, Brasidas said that before resorting to war he wished first to go and negotiate with Arrhabaeus, and, if possible, make him an ally of the Lacedaemonians.

3 Arrhabaeus himself had also made overtures through a herald, declaring his readiness to submit to Brasidas as an impartial judge. The Chalcidian envoys accompanying the expedition urged Brasidas not to remove the dangers facing Perdiccas, so that they might have him more willing to serve their own purposes as well.

4 Moreover, Perdiccas' representatives at Lacedaemon had said something to the effect that he would make many of the places around him their allies. On this understanding Brasidas claimed a greater right to conduct the business with Arrhabaeus in the common interest.

5 Perdiccas said that he had not brought Brasidas to judge their disputes, but rather to overthrow whatever enemies he himself pointed out; and that, since he was maintaining half the army, Brasidas would wrong him by entering into

discussions with Arrhabaeus.

6 Nevertheless, Brasidas met him against Perdiccas' will and despite their quarrel, and, persuaded by his arguments, withdrew the army before invading his territory. After this Perdiccas contributed a third of its maintenance instead of half, considering himself wronged.

CHAPTER 84

1 In the same summer, immediately afterward, Brasidas, with a force that included Chalcidians, marched against Acanthus, a colony of Andros, shortly before the grape harvest.

2 The inhabitants were divided over admitting him: on one side were those who had joined the Chalcidians in bringing him, on the other the people. Yet fear for the crop, still outside the walls, led the mass of the citizens to yield to Brasidas' proposal that they admit him alone, hear him, and then deliberate. They admitted him; and, appearing before the people—he was not an incapable speaker, for a Lacedaemonian—he spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 85

1 "Men of Acanthus, the Lacedaemonians have sent me and this army to make good the declaration we made at the beginning of the war: that we would fight the Athenians to liberate Greece.

2 "If we have been slow to arrive, let no one blame us. Our expectations of the war at home were disappointed: we had hoped that we ourselves could quickly overthrow the Athenians without exposing you to danger. Now that the opportunity has offered, we have come, and together with you we shall try to bring them down.

3 "But I am astonished that you have closed your gates against me, and that my arrival should be unwelcome.

4 "For we Lacedaemonians believed that we were coming to allies—at least in sentiment, even before we actually arrived—and that you would welcome us. On that belief we took this great risk, traveling for many days through foreign territory and offering our whole-hearted effort.

5 "If you have something else in mind, or intend to oppose both your own freedom and that of the other Greeks, it would be a grave matter.

6 "For it is not merely that you yourselves resist: wherever else I go, people will be less ready to join me. They will find it troubling that you, the first people I approached, did not receive me—you who possess a city of such standing and are reputed to have good judgment. I shall have no credible explanation to offer; they will think either that the freedom I bring is unjust, or that I have come too weak and powerless to protect them against the Athenians if they attack.

7 "Yet when I brought relief to Nisaea with this very army, which [I] now command, the Athenians, though more numerous, refused to engage. It is therefore unlikely that they will send against you by sea a force as large as their army at Nisaea.

CHAPTER 86

1 "I have come not to harm the Greeks but to liberate them. I have bound the Lacedaemonian authorities by the most solemn oaths that whatever allies I win over shall be autonomous. Nor have we come to acquire you as allies by force or fraud, but, on the contrary, to ally ourselves with you, whom the Athenians have enslaved.

2 "I therefore claim that I should neither be suspected, when I give the strongest assurances, nor be thought powerless to defend you; and I ask you to join us with confidence.

3 "And if anyone is reluctant through some private fear that I may hand the city over to a particular party, let him trust me above all.

4 "For I have not come to take sides in civil strife, nor would I consider the freedom I bring genuine if I set aside your ancestral constitution and enslaved the many to the few, or the few to the whole people.

5 "That would be harsher than foreign rule, and we Lacedaemonians would earn no gratitude for our labors, but blame rather than honor and renown. The very charges on which we make war against the Athenians would be seen to attach to us, and more hatefully than to men who had made no display of virtue.

6 "For men of standing, to gain an advantage by plausible deceit is more shameful than by open force. Open force proceeds by a claim to the strength that fortune has bestowed; deceit, by the plotting of an unjust mind.

CHAPTER 87

1 "Such care do we take over matters in which our greatest interests are at stake. Beyond our oaths, you could have no stronger assurance than deeds which, examined in the light of our words, compel the conviction that it is also in our interest to act as I have said.

2 "But if, despite these assurances, you say that you cannot join us; if you claim that your goodwill entitles you to turn us away without suffering harm, that freedom does not seem safe for you, and that it is right to offer it to those who can accept it but to force it on no one unwilling—then I shall call the gods and heroes of this land to witness that I have come for your good and cannot persuade you, and shall try to compel you by ravaging your territory.

3 "I shall not then consider myself in the wrong, but justified by two compelling necessities: the interest of the Lacedaemonians, who must not, if you refuse to join us, be harmed by the money you send to Athens despite your goodwill toward us; and that of the Greeks, who must not be prevented by you from escaping slavery.

4 "Otherwise we could have no reasonable ground for acting so; nor ought we Lacedaemonians to liberate the unwilling except for the sake of some common good.

5 "Nor, again, do we aspire to empire. Rather, in our eagerness to put an end to the empire of others, we would wrong the greater number if, while bringing autonomy to all, we overlooked your opposition.

6 "Consider these things well. Strive to be the first to lead the Greeks toward freedom and to lay up imperishable renown; preserve your own possessions from harm, and invest your whole city with the most glorious name."

CHAPTER 88

1 So much Brasidas said. After much had first been said on both sides, the Acanthians voted in secret. Persuaded by Brasidas' speech and afraid for their crop, the majority decided to revolt from Athens. They bound him by the oaths the Lacedaemonian authorities had sworn when they sent him out—that whatever allies he won over should be autonomous—and then admitted the army.

2 Not long afterward Stagirus, another colony of Andros, joined in the revolt. These were the events of that summer.

CHAPTER 89

1 At the very beginning of the following winter, when the arrangements for the betrayal of places in Boeotia to the Athenian generals Hippocrates and Demosthenes were under way, Demosthenes was to arrive with the fleet at Siphae, and Hippocrates at Delium. But there was a mistake over the days on which the two were to take the field. Demosthenes sailed to Siphae too early, with Acarnanians and many allies from that region aboard his ships, and achieved nothing: the plot had been disclosed by Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanoteus, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they in turn told the Boeotians.

2 All the Boeotians came to the rescue—Hippocrates was not yet in their territory troubling them—and Siphae and Chaeronea were occupied in advance. When those conducting the plot learned of the mistake, they made no move within the cities.

CHAPTER 90

1 Hippocrates, meanwhile, raised the entire Athenian population, citizens themselves, resident aliens, and whatever foreigners were present, and reached Delium later, when the Boeotians had already withdrawn from Siphae. He encamped his army and fortified Delium [the sanctuary of Apollo] in the following manner.

2 They dug a trench around the sanctuary and temple, throwing up the excavated earth to serve as a wall. They drove in stakes alongside, cut down the vines around the sanctuary and threw them in, together with stones and bricks taken from demolished buildings nearby; by every means they raised the rampart's height. They erected wooden towers where needed and where no sanctuary building stood, for the colonnade that had been there had fallen down.

3 They began on the third day after leaving home and worked that day, the fourth, and until the midday meal on the fifth.

4 Then, when most of the work was finished, the army went on ahead about ten stades from Delium on its way home. Most of the light troops continued their march at once, while the hoplites grounded their arms and rested. Hippocrates remained behind, posting guards and arranging for the unfinished work on the outer fortification to be completed as required.

CHAPTER 91

1 During these days the Boeotians were assembling at Tanagra. When contingents from every city had arrived and they learned that the Athenians were moving homeward, the other Boeotarchs—there are eleven in all—were against

fighting, since the enemy were no longer in Boeotia; for the Athenians were just about within the borders of Oropian territory when they grounded their arms. But Pagondas son of Aeoladas, Boeotarch from Thebes together with Arianthides son of Lysimachides, and himself holding the chief command, wished to give battle and thought it better to take the risk. He summoned the men by companies, so that they should not all leave their arms at once, and urged the Boeotians to advance against the Athenians and fight, speaking as follows.

CHAPTER 92

1 "Men of Boeotia, the thought should never have entered the mind of any of us commanders that it would be wrong to fight the Athenians if we happened to find them no longer in Boeotia. They crossed from the neighboring country and built a fort within Boeotia in order to ravage it. Surely they are enemies wherever they are found, and wherever they came from to commit their acts of war.

2 "If anyone has thought it safer to refrain, let him now change his mind. Those whose own country is under attack cannot calculate their precautions in the same way as a man who keeps his own possessions secure and voluntarily attacks another in pursuit of more.

3 "It is your ancestral custom to resist an invading army of foreigners alike on your own soil and on your neighbors'. Against the Athenians, who are also our immediate neighbors, this is all the more necessary.

4 "For every people, to be a match for its neighbors is to be free. Against these men, who seek to enslave not only those nearby but even distant peoples, how can we fail to carry the struggle to its utmost limit? We have an example in the Euboeans across the water and in most of the rest of Greece: we know their condition under Athenian rule. We must recognize that, whereas other peoples fight their neighbors over boundaries, for us, if we are defeated, one indisputable boundary will be fixed around our entire country.

5 "For they will force their way in and possess what is ours. So much more dangerous than other neighbors are these men to us. Those who attack their neighbors with the confidence of strength, as the Athenians now do, generally march with less fear against a man who stays quiet and defends himself only on his own land; they are less ready to hold down one who meets them beyond his borders and, when opportunity offers, begins the war himself.

6 "We have experienced this in our own dealings with them. By defeating them at Coronea, when they had occupied our country during our civil strife, we secured for Boeotia great freedom from fear, which has lasted to this day.

7 "Remembering this, we older men must match our former deeds, while the younger, sons of fathers who then proved their valor, must strive not to disgrace the excellence that is theirs by inheritance. Let us trust that the god whose sanctuary they have unlawfully fortified and now occupy will be on our side, and trust in the favorable omens of our sacrifices. Let us close with these men and show them that, though they may gain what they covet by attacking those who will not resist, from men whose noble resolve is always to fight for their own country's freedom and never unjustly to enslave another's, they will not depart without a contest."

CHAPTER 93

1 With this exhortation Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to advance against the Athenians. He quickly set the army in motion and led it forward, for the day was already late. When he came near their army, he halted in a position where a hill between them concealed each side from the other, and drew up his forces and prepared for battle.

2 When Hippocrates, who was still at Delium, received word that the Boeotians were advancing, he sent orders to the army to form its line, and himself joined it not long afterward. He left about three hundred cavalry at Delium, both to guard it against any attack and to watch for an opportunity to fall upon the Boeotians during the battle.

3 The Boeotians posted a force to oppose these men. When their arrangements were complete, they appeared over the hill and grounded their arms in their intended battle order: about seven thousand hoplites, more than ten thousand light troops, a thousand cavalry, and five hundred peltasts.

4 The Thebans and the men of their district held the right wing; in the center were the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copaeans, and the others around the lake; the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians held the left. Cavalry and light troops stood on either wing. The Thebans formed twenty-five shields deep; the others adopted whatever depth each contingent chose.

5 Such were the forces and deployment of the Boeotians.

CHAPTER 94

1 The Athenian hoplites, equal in number to their opponents, formed eight deep along the whole line, with cavalry on either wing. No light troops equipped as an organized force were present, nor had the city raised any. Those who had joined the invasion had been many times more numerous than the enemy's light troops; many had followed without arms, since there had been a general levy of citizens and foreigners present in the city. But they had set off home at the first opportunity, and only a few were there for the battle.

2 When they had taken their places and were about to engage, Hippocrates the general passed along the Athenian line, encouraging the men with these words.

CHAPTER 95

1 "Athenians, my exhortation will be brief, but for brave men it carries the same force, and serves more as a reminder than an appeal.

2 "Let none of you imagine that, because we are on foreign soil, we are taking so great a risk without good reason. On their soil we shall be fighting for ours. If we win, the Peloponnesians will never invade your country without these

men's cavalry; in a single battle you acquire this land and make your own more securely free.

3 "Advance against them, then, as befits your city, which each of you proudly claims as his homeland, foremost among the Greeks; and as befits your fathers, who defeated these men in battle with Myronides at Oenophyta and once held Boeotia."

CHAPTER 96

1 Hippocrates was still delivering this exhortation and had reached only the middle of the line, with no time to go farther, when the Boeotians, after another brief encouragement from Pagondas, sang the paean and advanced down the hill. The Athenians advanced to meet them, and the two sides clashed at a run.

2 The extreme wings of neither army came to close quarters: both were held back by the same obstacle, the watercourses. The rest were locked in fierce battle, shield thrust against shield.

3 The Boeotian left, as far as the center, was being defeated by the Athenians, who pressed the troops there hard, and the Thespians above all. The troops drawn up beside them had withdrawn, leaving them encircled in a narrow space; those Thespians who died were cut down defending themselves at close quarters. Some Athenians, too, confused in the encircling movement, failed to recognize one another and killed their own men.

4 The Boeotians on this side, then, were defeated and took refuge with the part of their army still fighting. But on the right, where the Thebans stood, they were overcoming the Athenians, pushing them back little by little at first and following them up.

5 As their left was hard pressed, Pagondas sent two squadrons of cavalry around the hill out of sight. When these suddenly appeared over the crest, the victorious Athenian wing, thinking another army was coming against them, was thrown into fear.

6 Now, under the pressure of this alarm on one side and of the Thebans following and breaking through their ranks on the other, the entire Athenian army took to flight.

7 Some made for Delium and the sea, others toward Oropus, others toward Mount Parnes, and others wherever each saw some hope of safety.

8 The Boeotians pursued and killed them, especially the cavalry, both their own and the Locrians who had come to their aid just as the rout began. But night overtook the battle, making it easier for the mass of the fugitives to escape.

9 The next day the men at Oropus and those at Delium sailed home, leaving a garrison at Delium, which despite everything they still held.

CHAPTER 97

1 The Boeotians set up a trophy, recovered their own dead, stripped those of the enemy, and, leaving a guard, withdrew to Tanagra, where they laid plans for an assault on Delium.

2 An Athenian herald on his way to recover the dead met a Boeotian herald. The latter turned him back, saying that he would accomplish nothing until he himself had returned from his mission. He then appeared before the Athenians and delivered the Boeotians' message: they had acted unjustly in transgressing the established customs of the Greeks.

3 For it was a rule observed by all that those invading one another's territory should leave its sanctuaries untouched. Yet the Athenians had fortified Delium and were living in it, and everything that men do on unconsecrated ground was being done there. They were even drawing water for their use from a source which the Boeotians themselves were forbidden to touch except for the ritual washing of hands in sacrifices.

4 Therefore the Boeotians, on behalf of the god and themselves, calling upon the deities who shared his altar and upon Apollo, gave the Athenians notice to leave the sanctuary and take away what belonged to them.

CHAPTER 98

1 When the herald had said this, the Athenians sent a herald of their own to the Boeotians and declared that they had done the sanctuary no wrong, nor would they willingly harm it in future. They had not entered it for that purpose in the first place, but to defend themselves from it more effectively against those who wronged them.

2 The established rule among the Greeks was that whoever held power over any territory, great or small, always possessed its sanctuaries as well, tending them with such observances as they could manage in addition to those customary there.

3 Indeed, the Boeotians themselves, and most others who had forcibly displaced a people and occupied its land, had first come upon sanctuaries belonging to strangers and now possessed them as their own.

4 They too, had they been able to conquer more of Boeotian territory, would have held it; as matters stood, they would not willingly abandon the portion they occupied, for they regarded it as their own.

5 As for the water, they had drawn on it under necessity—a necessity they had not wantonly brought upon themselves, but had been forced to accept in defending themselves against the Boeotians, who had first invaded their country.

6 It was entirely reasonable that an act constrained by war and some terrible exigency should receive pardon even from the god. Altars themselves offered refuge for involuntary offenses, and the name of lawlessness belonged to wrongs committed without necessity, not to those who ventured on some act under the pressure of misfortune.

7 Far greater impiety lay with those who demanded the sanctuaries in exchange for returning the dead than with those who refused to purchase, at the price of sanctuaries, what was their due.

8 They demanded a clear answer: not whether they might recover their dead on withdrawing from Boeotian land—for they were no longer on Boeotian land, but on land they had won by the spear—but whether they might do so under a truce according to ancestral custom.

CHAPTER 99

1 The Boeotians replied that if the Athenians were in Boeotia, they should leave Boeotian territory and take away what belonged to them; if they were on their own land, they must judge for themselves what to do. Their reasoning was that Oropia, where the dead happened to lie because the battle had been fought on the border, was subject to Athens, and that the Athenians could not recover the bodies from them by force; yet they would not, of course, grant a truce concerning Athenian territory either. The reply that they should "leave Boeotian territory and recover what they demanded" seemed a suitably worded reply. On hearing it, the Athenian herald departed without success.

CHAPTER 100

1 The Boeotians immediately summoned javelin throwers and slingers from the Malian Gulf. Reinforcements had also reached them after the battle: two thousand Corinthian hoplites, the Peloponnesian garrison troops who had left Nisaea, and Megarians as well. They marched against Delium and assaulted the fortification; after trying other means, they brought up the engine that captured it, constructed as follows.

2 They sawed a great beam in two, hollowed out its entire length, and fitted the halves precisely together again to form a tube. At its end they suspended a cauldron by chains, and an iron nozzle extended downward from the beam into it.

Much of the rest of the timber was also sheathed in iron.

3 They brought it up on wagons from a distance toward the wall, at the point where vine branches and timber had chiefly been used in its construction. When it was close, they inserted great bellows into the end of the beam nearest them and blew.

4 The blast, passing through the airtight tube into the cauldron, which contained burning coals, sulfur, and pitch, raised a great flame and set the wall alight. No one could remain on it any longer; the defenders abandoned it and fled, and in this way the fortification was captured.

5 Some of the garrison were killed, and two hundred were taken prisoner; most of the rest embarked on the ships and were conveyed home.

CHAPTER 101

1 Delium was taken on the seventeenth day after the battle. Not long afterward the Athenian herald, knowing nothing of what had happened, came once more concerning the dead; the Boeotians now returned them and no longer gave the same answer.

2 In the battle the Boeotians lost a little fewer than five hundred men, and the Athenians a little fewer than a thousand, together with Hippocrates the general; many light-armed troops and baggage carriers were also killed.

3 A short time after this battle, Demosthenes too, whose attempt at Siphae had failed when he sailed there in connection with the planned betrayal, made a landing in Sicyonian territory. He had his army aboard the ships—Acarnanians and Agraeans, and four hundred Athenian hoplites.

4 Before all the ships had come in, the Sicyonians rallied, routed those who had landed, and pursued them to their ships, killing some and taking others alive. They set up a trophy and returned the dead under a truce.

5 At about the time of the events at Delium, Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, also died, having campaigned against the Triballians and been defeated in battle. Seuthes son of Sparadocus, his nephew, succeeded him as king of the Odrysians and of the rest of Thrace over which Sitalces had ruled.

CHAPTER 102

1 That same winter Brasidas, with the allies in Thrace, marched against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the river Strymon.

2 Aristagoras of Miletus, fleeing King Darius, had earlier attempted to settle the site on which the city now stands, but had been driven out by the Edonians. Thirty-two years later the Athenians also tried, sending ten thousand settlers drawn from their own people and any others who wished to go; these were destroyed by the Thracians at Drabescus.

3 In the twenty-ninth year after that, the Athenians came again, sending Hagnon son of Nicias to found the colony. They expelled the Edonians and established themselves at this place, which had previously been called Nine Ways.

4 Their base was Eion, a trading port they held on the coast at the river's mouth, twenty-five stades from the present city. Hagnon named the city Amphipolis because the Strymon flows around it on both sides [because it surrounds it]; he enclosed it with a long wall running from river to river, and founded the settlement in a conspicuous position facing both the sea and the mainland.

CHAPTER 103

1 Against this city, then, Brasidas set out from Arnae in Chalcidice and marched with his army. Toward evening he reached Aulon and Bormiscus, where Lake Bolbe empties into the sea; after supper he continued through the night.

2 The weather was stormy, with a little snow falling, which only spurred him on: he wished to escape the notice of everyone in Amphipolis except those who were betraying it.

3 There were Argilian settlers in the city—the Argilians are colonists from Andros—and others who were helping to bring this about, some at the urging of Perdiccas, others of the Chalcidians.

4 The Argilians were especially active. Living close by, always an object of Athenian suspicion, and plotting against the place, they had been negotiating for some time with their fellow citizens settled there to secure its surrender when the opportunity presented itself and Brasidas arrived. They now admitted him into their own city, revolted from Athens, and that night brought his army to the bridge over the river before dawn.

5 The town lies some distance from the crossing, and at that time no walls extended down to it as they do now; only a small guard had been stationed there. Brasidas easily overpowered it, assisted by the treachery, the storm, and the surprise of his attack; he crossed the bridge and immediately gained possession of the property of the Amphipolitans living outside the walls throughout the territory.

CHAPTER 104

1 His crossing came as a sudden shock to those in the city. Many of the people outside were being captured, while others were fleeing inside the walls; the Amphipolitans fell into great confusion, all the more because they distrusted one another.

2 It is said that, had Brasidas chosen not to turn his army to plunder but to advance directly on the city, he would probably have taken it.

3 Instead, after overrunning the country outside, he encamped his army and remained inactive, since nothing was being accomplished for him inside as he had expected.

4 Meanwhile, the opponents of the traitors had sufficient numerical strength to prevent the immediate opening of the gates. Together with Eucles, the general sent from Athens to guard the place, they sent to the other general in the Thracian region, Thucydides son of Olorus, who wrote this history, calling on him to come to their aid. He was near Thasos, an island colonized from Paros, about half a day's voyage from Amphipolis.

5 On receiving the message he sailed with all speed, taking the seven ships that happened to be at hand. His chief hope was to reach Amphipolis before it yielded at all; failing that, he intended to secure Eion first.

CHAPTER 105

1 Meanwhile Brasidas, fearing the relief fleet from Thasos and learning that Thucydides possessed rights to work the gold mines in that part of Thrace, which made him one of the most influential men on the mainland, pressed to secure the city first if he could. He feared that on Thucydides' arrival the mass of the Amphipolitans would no longer submit, hoping that he would preserve them by gathering allied forces from the sea and from Thrace.

2 He therefore offered moderate terms of agreement, proclaiming that any Amphipolitan or Athenian within the city who wished might remain in possession of his property with a full and equal share of civic rights; anyone unwilling to stay might depart within five days, taking his possessions with him.

CHAPTER 106

1 On hearing this the majority changed their minds, especially since only a small part of the citizen body was Athenian, while most were of mixed origin, and many of those captured outside had relatives within. Against the prospect they feared, the proclamation seemed just. The Athenians would gladly leave, believ-

ing themselves exposed to greater danger than the others, and not expecting prompt relief; the rest would not be deprived of their city or their equal standing, and were being released from danger beyond all expectation.

2 Those working with Brasidas therefore began openly to argue for these terms, seeing that the majority had changed sides and no longer heeded the Athenian general present. An agreement was made, and Brasidas was admitted on the terms he had proclaimed.

3 Thus they surrendered the city. Thucydides and his ships reached Eion late that same day.

4 Brasidas had only just secured Amphipolis, and came within a night of taking Eion as well; for if the ships had not arrived so swiftly to relieve it, it would have fallen at dawn.

CHAPTER 107

1 After this Thucydides put Eion in order to make it secure both against an immediate attack by Brasidas and for the future, receiving those who chose to come down from the upper city under the agreement.

2 Brasidas suddenly sailed down the river against Eion with many boats, hoping to seize the headland projecting from the wall and so command the entrance to the harbor; he also attempted an attack by land at the same time. Repulsed on both sides, he turned to organizing affairs around Amphipolis.

3 Myrcinus, an Edonian city, joined him after Pittacus, king of the Edonians, had been killed by the sons of Goaxis and by Brauro, his own wife. Not long afterward Galepsus and Oesyme joined him too; these are Thasian colonies. Perdiccas, who arrived immediately after the capture, also helped him settle these affairs.

CHAPTER 108

1 The loss of Amphipolis filled the Athenians with great alarm, especially because the city was valuable to them for its shipments of shipbuilding timber and its revenue. Moreover, the Lacedaemonians, with Thessalians to conduct them, had previously been able to march as far as the Strymon against the Athenian allies, but without control of the bridge they could not have advanced farther: above it the river broadens into a lake of great extent, while the approaches toward Eion were guarded by triremes. Now further advance had become easy, [they thought]. They also feared that their allies would revolt.

2 For Brasidas showed moderation in his other dealings, and in his speeches everywhere declared that he had been sent out to liberate Hellas.

3 When the cities subject to Athens learned of the capture of Amphipolis, of the terms he offered, and of his mildness, they were greatly stirred toward revolt. They sent heralds to him in secret, urging him to come on to them, each eager to be the first to break away.

4 They believed they could do so safely, underestimating Athenian power by the full measure that later became clear. Their judgments rested more on the uncertainty of desire than on the security of foresight; for people habitually entrust what they long for to unreflecting hope, and thrust aside what they dislike with imperious reasoning.

5 At the same time the Athenians had recently suffered their blow in Boeotia, and Brasidas was making seductive rather than truthful claims: that at Nisaea the Athenians had refused battle against his army alone. These things emboldened the cities and made them confident that no force would come against them.

6 Above all, the immediate pleasure of the prospect, and the chance of making their first attempt while the Lacedaemonians were eager for action, left them ready to run every risk. On learning of this, the Athenians sent garrisons to the

cities, such as they could provide at short notice and in winter. Brasidas sent to Lacedaemon urging the dispatch of an additional army, and himself made preparations to build triremes on the Strymon.

7 The Lacedaemonians did not meet his requests, partly because of jealousy among their leading men, and partly because they preferred to recover the men taken on the island and end the war.

CHAPTER 109

1 During the same winter the Megarians captured and razed to the ground their long walls, which the Athenians had held; and Brasidas, after taking Amphipolis, marched with his allies against the region called Acte.

2 It projects seaward from the King's canal, and ends in Athos, a lofty mountain reaching into the Aegean Sea.

3 Its cities include Sane, a colony from Andros beside the canal itself, facing the sea toward Euboea, and the other towns of Thyssus, Cleonae, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium.

4 These are inhabited by mixed peoples of bilingual barbarians, with a small Chalcidian element as well. Most are Pelasgian—Tyrrhenians who once inhabited Lemnos and Athens—and there are also Bisaltians, Crestonians, and Edonians. They live in small towns.

5 Most of them joined Brasidas, but Sane and Dium resisted, and he remained with his army and ravaged their land.

CHAPTER 110

1 When they would not submit, he immediately marched against Torone in Chalcidice, which was held by the Athenians. A few men were inviting him there, ready to surrender the city. Arriving with his army while it was still night,

close to daybreak, he took up a position by the sanctuary of the Dioscuri, about three stades from the city.

2 His arrival escaped the rest of the Toronaeans and the Athenian garrison. But those working with him knew that he would come; a few had secretly gone out ahead and were watching for his approach. When they knew he was there, they brought in among themselves seven light-armed men carrying daggers—only these, out of the twenty originally detailed, had not been afraid to enter, and their leader was Lysistratus of Olynthus. Slipping through the seaward wall undetected, they climbed up and killed the guards at the highest watchpost, for the city lay against a hill, and broke through the postern facing Canastraeum.

CHAPTER 111

1 Brasidas advanced a little and kept the main army still, but sent a hundred peltasts ahead so that, when a gate was opened and the agreed signal raised, they could be the first to rush in.

2 As time passed they wondered at the delay and gradually drew close to the city. Inside, the Toronaeans making the arrangements with those who had entered, once the postern had been broken through and the gates by the marketplace opened by cutting the bar, first led some of the men around and admitted them through the postern. They meant to strike sudden terror into the unsuspecting people of the city from behind and from both sides. Then they raised the fire signal as agreed, and admitted the rest of the peltasts through the gates by the marketplace.

CHAPTER 112

1 When Brasidas saw the signal, he set his army in motion and rushed forward at a run. They raised a shout together, throwing the people in the city into great terror.

2 Some burst straight in through the gates; others climbed along squared beams that happened to be leaning against a fallen section of wall under reconstruction, for hauling up stones.

3 Brasidas and the main body immediately turned uphill toward the heights of the city, wishing to capture it wholly and securely; the rest scattered alike in every direction.

CHAPTER 113

1 As the city was being taken, most of the Toronaeans, knowing nothing of the plot, fell into confusion; but the conspirators and those who favored their actions at once joined the men who had entered.

2 About fifty Athenian hoplites happened to be sleeping in the marketplace. When they became aware of the attack, a few were killed in close combat; of the rest, some escaped on foot, while others fled aboard the two ships on guard and reached the safety of the fort at Lecythus. The Athenians had occupied and held this point of the city, which projects into the sea and is cut off by a narrow isthmus.

3 Those Toronaeans who were friendly to them also took refuge there with them.

CHAPTER 114

1 When day had come and the city was securely held, Brasidas proclaimed to the Toronaeans who had taken refuge with the Athenians that anyone who wished might come out, recover his property, and live as a citizen without fear. He also sent a herald to the Athenians, ordering them to leave Lecythus under a truce with their possessions, since it belonged to the Chalcidians.

2 They refused to abandon it, but asked him to grant them a day's truce to recover their dead. He granted two. During these days he strengthened the houses nearby, while the Athenians strengthened their own positions.

3 He then assembled the Toronaeans and spoke much as he had at Acanthus. It was unjust, he said, either to think the men who had helped him capture the city inferior citizens or traitors—for they had acted not to enslave it, nor under the persuasion of money, but for the city's welfare and freedom—or for those who had taken no part to think they would not enjoy equal treatment. He had not come to ruin either the city or any individual.

4 That was why he had made his proclamation to those who had taken refuge with the Athenians: he considered them no worse for their friendship with Athens. Once they had experience of his side [the Lacedaemonians], he believed they would feel no less goodwill toward them, but far more, in proportion to the greater justice of their conduct; their present fear came from lack of experience.

5 He urged them all to prepare to be steadfast allies, and to understand that from now on they would be held responsible for any wrongdoing. As for the past, it was not his side that had been wronged: rather, they themselves had suffered at the hands of others stronger than they were, and any opposition they had offered was pardonable.

CHAPTER 115

1 After speaking in this way and reassuring them, Brasidas began his assaults on Lecythus when the truce expired. The Athenians defended themselves from a weak fortification and from houses furnished with battlements.

2 For one day they repelled the attackers. On the next, the enemy were about to bring up an engine from which they intended to throw fire onto the wooden barricades, and the army was already advancing. At the point where they thought the engine most likely to be brought up, and which was most vulnerable to attack, the Athenians erected a wooden tower on a house to oppose it. They carried up many amphoras and large jars of water, together with great stones, and many men climbed up as well.

3 The house, burdened beyond its strength, suddenly collapsed with a great crash. Those Athenians nearby who could see what had happened were distressed rather than frightened; but those farther off, and especially those at the greatest distance, thought the position had already been taken at that point and rushed in flight toward the sea and the ships.

CHAPTER 116

1 Brasidas, noticing that they were abandoning the battlements and seeing what was happening, immediately drove his army forward, captured the fortification, and killed everyone he caught inside.

2 Thus the Athenians abandoned the place and crossed to Pallene in boats and ships. There is a sanctuary of Athena in Lecythus, and Brasidas had proclaimed before the assault that he would give thirty minas of silver to the first man to mount the wall. Believing that the capture had been achieved by some power other than human, he paid the thirty minas into the goddess's sanctuary, then demolished and cleared Lecythus and consecrated the whole of it as sacred ground.

3 For the rest of the winter he settled affairs in the places he held and plotted against the others. With the passing of winter, the eighth year of the war came to an end.

CHAPTER 117

1 At the opening of the next summer, with the coming of spring, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians immediately concluded a year's armistice. The Athenians believed that Brasidas would then detach no further possessions from them before they could prepare at leisure, and that, if matters went well for them, they might also reach a wider settlement. The Lacedaemonians believed that the Athenians felt the very fears they had anticipated, and that

once they had experienced a respite from misery and hardship they would be more eager for reconciliation, returning the prisoners and concluding a treaty for a longer period as well.

2 For they attached greater importance to recovering their men while Brasidas was still successful. If he advanced farther and brought the balance of power level, they would lose their men, and in facing the Athenians on equal terms would have to run risks even to prevail.

3 The following armistice was therefore concluded between them and their allies.

CHAPTER 118

1 "Concerning the sanctuary and oracle of Pythian Apollo, we resolve that anyone who wishes may have access without fraud or fear, according to ancestral laws.

2 "The Lacedaemonians and the allies present approve these terms; they declare that they will send heralds to the Boeotians and Phocians and do all they can to persuade them.

3 "Concerning the god's wealth, we shall take care to discover the wrongdoers, acting rightly and justly according to ancestral laws—you, we, and any others who wish to join us, all observing ancestral laws.

4 "On these matters the Lacedaemonians and the other allies have resolved as stated. They have further resolved that, if the Athenians make a truce, each side shall remain in its own territory, retaining what we now hold. Those in Coryphasium shall remain within Buphras and Tomeus. Those in Cythera shall not enter the territory of the alliance: neither we theirs nor they ours. Those in Nisaea and Minoa shall not cross the road running from the gates by the shrine of Nisus to the sanctuary of Poseidon, and from the sanctuary of Poseidon straight to the bridge leading to Minoa; neither shall the Megarians and their allies cross this road. The Athenians shall retain the island they cap-

tured, and neither side shall enter the other's territory. The Athenians shall also retain whatever they now hold in Troezen, in accordance with the agreement made with them.

5 "In using the sea along their own territory and that of their alliance, the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall sail in no warship, but in other oared vessels of no more than five hundred talents' carrying capacity.

6 "Heralds, embassies, and as many attendants as may be thought fit shall have safe conduct to the Peloponnese and Athens, going and returning by land and sea, on matters concerning the end of the war and the settlement of claims.

7 "During this period neither you nor we shall receive deserters, whether free or slave.

8 "You shall submit to legal judgment at our suit, and we at yours, according to ancestral practice, settling disputed claims by law without war.

9 "These are the resolutions of the Lacedaemonians and their allies. If anything better or more just occurs to you, come to Lacedaemon and explain it; neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies will reject any just proposal you make.

10 "Those who come shall come with full authority, just as you require of us. The truce shall last one year."

11 "Resolved by the people. Acamantis held the prytany; Phaenippus was secretary; Niciades presided. Laches moved: For the good fortune of the Athenians, an armistice shall be concluded on the terms to which the Lacedaemonians and their allies consent and have agreed before the people.

12 "The armistice shall last one year, beginning on this day, the fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion.

13 "During this period ambassadors and heralds shall pass between the two sides to discuss the terms on which the war may be ended.

14 "The generals and prytanes shall convene an assembly, with peace as its first business ... The Athenians shall deliberate on whatever proposals the embassy submits for ending the war. The embassies now present shall immediately swear before the people that they will faithfully abide by the truce for the year."

CHAPTER 119

1 "The Lacedaemonians and their allies concluded this agreement [and swore to it] with the Athenians and their allies on the twelfth day of the month Gerastius at Lacedaemon.

2 "The following concluded the agreement and made the truce: for the Lacedaemonians, Taurus son of Echetimidas, Athenaeus son of Periclidas, and Philocharidas son of Eryxilaidas; for the Corinthians, Aeneas son of Ocytus and Euphamidas son of Aristonymus; for the Sicyonians, Damotimus son of Naucrates and Onasimus son of Megacles; for the Megarians, Nicasus son of Cecalus and Menecrates son of Amphidorus; for the Epidaurians, Amphias son of Eupaidas; for the Athenians, the generals Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Autocles son of Tolmaeus."

3 Such was the armistice that was concluded, and throughout its duration they met continually to discuss a more comprehensive peace.

CHAPTER 120

1 Around these days, while the negotiations were proceeding, Scione, a city in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians and went over to Brasidas. The Scionaeans say that they come from Pellene in the Peloponnese: their first settlers, sailing home from Troy, were driven to this place by the storm that overtook the Achaeans, and settled there.

2 After their revolt Brasidas crossed by night to Scione, with a friendly trireme sailing ahead while he followed at a distance in a small boat. If he encountered any vessel larger than his boat, the trireme was to defend him; if an enemy

trireme appeared, he thought it would turn against the warship rather than the smaller craft, and he would escape in the interval.

3 Once across, he called an assembly of the Scionaeans and spoke as he had at Acanthus and Torone. He added that they deserved the highest praise: although Pallene was cut off at the isthmus by the Athenians holding Potidaea, and they were virtually islanders, they had advanced toward freedom of their own accord, and had not been too timid to act for their manifest good until necessity overtook them. This was a sign that they would courageously face any other trial, however great. If affairs turned out as he intended, he would regard them as the Lacedaemonians' truest and most faithful friends, and honor them in other ways as well.

CHAPTER 121

1 The Scionaeans were uplifted by his words, and all alike took courage, even those who had previously disliked what was being done. They resolved to sustain the war wholeheartedly, gave Brasidas a splendid welcome in every respect, and publicly crowned him with a golden crown as the liberator of Greece; in private they came up to him and bound ribbons about him as though he were a victorious athlete.

2 Leaving them a garrison for the moment, he crossed back, and not long afterward brought over a larger force, intending to attempt Mende and Potidaea with their help. He thought the Athenians would come to the rescue as they would to an island, and wanted to forestall them; he also had negotiations under way for the betrayal of these cities.

CHAPTER 122

1 He was about to attack these cities when the men announcing the armistice arrived to see him in a trireme: Aristonymus for the Athenians and Athenaeus for the Lacedaemonians.

2 The army crossed back to Torone, while the envoys informed Brasidas of the agreement, and all the Lacedaemonian allies in Thrace accepted what had been done.

3 Aristonymus approved the arrangements in all other respects, but when he discovered by reckoning the days that the Scionaeans had revolted after the agreement, he declared that they would not be covered by the truce. Brasidas argued vigorously to the contrary, maintaining that they had revolted before it, and refused to give up the city.

4 When Aristonymus reported the matter at Athens, the Athenians were immediately ready to march against Scione. The Lacedaemonians, however, sent envoys to say that this would violate the truce; trusting Brasidas, they claimed the city and were prepared to submit the dispute over it to arbitration.

5 The Athenians would not risk arbitration, but wished to march as soon as possible. They were enraged that even people who were, in effect, islanders now presumed to revolt from them, trusting in the Lacedaemonians' land power, which could be of no use to them.

6 The truth about the revolt did in fact favor the Athenians' claim: the Scionaeans had revolted two days after the agreement. At once, on Cleon's motion, they passed a decree to capture Scione and put its people to death. Leaving other matters alone, they prepared for this undertaking.

CHAPTER 123

1 Meanwhile Mende, a city in Pallene and a colony of Eretria, revolted from them. Brasidas accepted its people too, thinking that he did no wrong even though they had plainly come over during the armistice; for he in turn accused the Athenians of violating the truce in certain respects.

2 This made the Mendaeans bolder: they saw that Brasidas was willing, and inferred from his conduct over Scione that he would not abandon them. At the same time, the few men among them who were negotiating the revolt, now that

they were on the point of acting, would no longer draw back. Fearing for themselves if they were exposed, they forced the majority to act against its will.

3 As soon as the Athenians heard, they were still more enraged, and made preparations against both cities.

4 Expecting their fleet, Brasidas secretly evacuated the women and children of Scione and Mende to Olynthus in Chalcidice, and sent the two cities five hundred Peloponnesian hoplites and three hundred Chalcidian peltasts, with Polydamidas in command of them all. Together they made their preparations, expecting the Athenians to arrive shortly.

CHAPTER 124

1 Meanwhile Brasidas and Perdiccas made a second joint expedition against Arrhabaeus into Lyncus. Perdiccas led the forces of the Macedonians under his rule and hoplites from the Greeks settled among them; Brasidas, besides the Peloponnesians he still had with him, brought Chalcidians, Acanthians, and contingents from the other allies according to their several strengths. The Greek hoplites numbered about three thousand in all; the Macedonian and Chalcidian cavalry accompanying them amounted to nearly a thousand, and there was also a large body of barbarians.

2 They invaded Arrhabaeus' territory and, finding the Lyncestians encamped to oppose them, encamped opposite in their turn.

3 The infantry on either side held a hill, with a plain between them, and the cavalry of both armies first rode down into it and fought. Then the Lyncestian hoplites came forward first from their hill with their cavalry, ready to fight; Brasidas and Perdiccas brought their own troops forward to meet them, engaged, and routed the Lyncestians. They killed many, while the rest escaped to the heights and remained inactive.

4 After this they set up a trophy and waited two or three days for the Illyrians who were due to arrive as mercenaries in Perdiccas' service. Perdiccas then wanted to advance against Arrhabaeus' villages rather than remain where they were. Brasidas, however, was anxious about Mende, fearing that the Athenians might sail there first and do it harm; and, with the Illyrians still absent, he was unwilling to advance and preferred to withdraw.

CHAPTER 125

1 While they were disputing this, word came that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdiccas and joined Arrhabaeus. Both now thought it best to retreat, afraid of the Illyrians' warlike reputation; but their disagreement had left them without any settled decision on when to depart. Night came on, and the Macedonians and the mass of barbarians suddenly took fright, as large armies are apt to fall into panic for no clear reason. Believing that many times the number who had actually come were advancing against them and were almost upon them, they broke into sudden flight toward home. Perdiccas knew nothing of it at first; when he discovered it, they compelled him to leave before he could see Brasidas, for their camps lay far apart.

2 At dawn Brasidas saw that the Macedonians had gone ahead and that the Illyrians and Arrhabaeus were about to attack. He too assembled his hoplites, formed them into a square with the mass of light troops inside, and prepared to retreat.

3 He assigned the youngest men to rush out against the enemy wherever they attacked, and intended himself to take the rear with three hundred picked men, turning as he withdrew to resist and beat back the foremost of the pursuing enemy.

4 Before the enemy came close, he briefly addressed his soldiers with the following encouragement.

CHAPTER 126

1 "Men of the Peloponnese, if I did not suspect that you were alarmed at being left alone, and at the numbers and barbarian character of the advancing enemy, I would not combine instruction with encouragement in this way. As it is, I shall try, with a brief reminder and exhortation, to convince you of the most important points concerning our friends' desertion and the enemy's numbers.

2 "For you ought to be good soldiers not through the presence of allies on each occasion, but through your own valor, and to fear no multitude of others. You do not even come from states in which the many rule the few, but rather the few rule the many, having won their ascendancy by nothing other than superiority in battle.

3 "As for the barbarians whom you now fear through inexperience, you must learn that they will not prove formidable: you can judge from your previous fighting against some of them alongside the Macedonians, and from what I infer and know from the reports of others.

4 "For when an enemy is in reality weak but reputed strong, true knowledge of him gives those resisting him greater confidence; whereas an enemy with some solid advantage would be attacked more boldly by those who did not know of it beforehand.

5 "These men make a terrifying show of preparing to attack, to those unfamiliar with them. Their numbers are frightening to the eye, the volume of their shouting is unbearable, and the brandishing of weapons in the air carries an appearance of menace. But they are not the same when they close with men who stand their ground against all this. They have no ordered ranks and so feel no shame at abandoning a position under pressure; retreat and advance alike bring them honor, leaving their courage beyond scrutiny. Indeed, fighting in which each man is his own master is best suited to give him a respectable excuse for saving himself. They consider it safer to frighten you without danger to themselves than to come to close quarters; otherwise they would have chosen the latter course rather than the former.

6 "You can plainly see that all the terror they inspire beforehand amounts to little in action, though it overwhelms the eye and ear. Stand firm against it as it comes on, and then, when the moment offers, withdraw again in order and formation: you will reach safety sooner, and learn for the future that when men face the first assault of such mobs, these boast of their courage with distant threats, lingering rather than attacking; but when men give way to them, they are quick to display their valor in the safety of pursuit."

CHAPTER 127

1 With this encouragement Brasidas began to withdraw his army. Seeing it, the barbarians pressed on with loud shouting and uproar, thinking that he was fleeing and that they would catch and destroy him.

2 But the detachments rushed out to meet them wherever they attacked, and Brasidas himself with his picked men stood his ground against their pursuit. Contrary to their expectation, his troops resisted the first onslaught; thereafter they met and beat back each attack, and withdrew when the enemy paused. The main body of the barbarians then left Brasidas' Greeks alone in the open country. Leaving a detachment to follow and attack them, the rest ran after the fleeing Macedonians, killing any they encountered, and hurried ahead to occupy the narrow entrance into Arrhabaeus' territory between two hills, knowing that Brasidas had no other way of retreat. As he was already approaching the difficult stretch of road itself, they moved around him to cut him off.

CHAPTER 128

1 Brasidas saw their intention and ordered his three hundred to run toward the hill he thought the easier of the two to take, each man as fast as he could, without keeping formation, and try to dislodge the barbarians already there before the larger force encircling them could also reach the spot.

2 They charged and overpowered the men on the hill, and the main body of the Greeks could now march toward it more easily. The barbarians were frightened by the rout of their men from the height at this point, and did not pursue much farther, thinking that the Greeks were already near the frontier and had escaped.

3 Having secured the heights in his turn, Brasidas now advanced in greater safety and arrived that same day at Arnissa, the first place in Perdiccas' dominions.

4 The soldiers themselves, angry at the Macedonians' premature retreat, unyoked and slaughtered any of their ox teams they came upon along the road, and appropriated any baggage they found abandoned, as was likely to happen in a frightened withdrawal by night.

5 From this time Perdiccas first regarded Brasidas as an enemy. Thereafter he felt a hatred of the Peloponnesians at odds with his usual sympathies, given his relations with the Athenians; setting aside the demands of his own interests, he worked to find the quickest way of coming to terms with the latter and ridding himself of the former.

CHAPTER 129

1 On withdrawing from Macedonia to Torone, Brasidas found that the Athenians already held Mende. He remained where he was, thinking himself no longer able to cross to Pallene and bring help, and kept Torone under guard.

2 For at about the time of the events in Lyncus the Athenians had sailed against Mende and Scione, as they had been preparing to do, with fifty ships, ten of them Chian, a thousand of their own hoplites, six hundred archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and peltasts from their other allies in the region. Their generals were Nicias son of Niceratus and Nicostratus son of Diitrephes.

3 Sailing from Potidaea, they put in by the sanctuary of Poseidon and advanced against the Mendaeans. These, together with three hundred Scionaeans who had come to help and the Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred hoplites in

all, and their commander Polydamidas, happened to be encamped outside the city on a strong hill.

4 Nicias, with a hundred and twenty light troops from Methone, sixty picked Athenian hoplites, and all the archers, tried to climb the hill by a path, but was wounded by the defenders and could not force his way up. Nicostratus took a longer approach by another route with all the rest of the army, and in advancing against the hill, which was difficult to attack, fell into great confusion. The entire Athenian army came close to defeat.

5 Since the Mendaeans and their allies would not yield that day, the Athenians withdrew and encamped; when night fell the Mendaeans retired into the city.

CHAPTER 130

1 The next day the Athenians sailed around to the side facing Scione, captured the suburb, and ravaged the land all day without anyone coming out against them; there was also some civil strife in the city. During the following night the three hundred Scionaeans withdrew to their own home.

2 On the succeeding day Nicias advanced with half the army, ravaging the land as he went toward the Scionaean frontier, while Nicostratus with the remainder took up a position against the city by the upper gates, on the road to Potidaea.

3 The Mendaeans and their auxiliaries happened to be stationed under arms inside the wall at this point. Polydamidas drew them up for battle and urged the Mendaeans to make a sortie.

4 One of the popular party, speaking in the spirit of their factional quarrel, answered that he would not go out and had no wish to fight. As he spoke, Polydamidas seized him by the arm and roughly handled him. At once the people took up their arms in a fury and advanced against the Peloponnesians and those who had joined them in acting against the popular interest.

5 They attacked and routed them, partly through the suddenness of the clash, partly because the gates were being opened to the Athenians and the defenders took fright: they thought the attack had been arranged beforehand with them.

6 Those who were not killed at once fled to the acropolis, which they had held before. The Athenians—Nicias had by now returned and was also close to the city—rushed into Mende with their entire army and plundered it as a place taken by storm, since it had not been opened to them under an agreement. The generals could scarcely restrain them from killing the inhabitants as well.

7 After this they told the Mendaeans to govern themselves as before and to try among themselves any whom they considered responsible for the revolt. They cut off those in the acropolis with walls running down to the sea on either side, and posted a guard. Once they had secured affairs at Mende, they marched against Scione.

CHAPTER 131

1 The Scionaeans and Peloponnesians came out to meet them and took position on a strong hill before the city. Unless the enemy captured it, they could not build a wall around Scione.

2 The Athenians attacked it with all their strength, dislodged its defenders in battle, and encamped. After setting up a trophy, they prepared to build their enclosing wall.

3 Not long afterward, when work was already under way, the auxiliaries besieged in the acropolis at Mende forced their way past the guard by the sea and arrived by night. Most of them slipped past the army before Scione and entered the city.

CHAPTER 132

1 While Scione was being walled in, Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenian generals and reached an agreement with the Athenians. This was prompted by his hostility toward Brasidas over the retreat from Lyncus; he had begun negotiations at the time of that retreat.

2 The Lacedaemonian Ischagoras was then about to bring an army overland to Brasidas. Nicias urged Perdiccas, now that they had come to terms, to give the Athenians some clear proof of his fidelity; Perdiccas himself also no longer wanted Peloponnesians coming into his territory. He therefore enlisted his guest-friends in Thessaly—he always cultivated the leading men—and blocked the army and its preparations, so that they did not even attempt to pass through Thessaly.

3 Ischagoras himself, however, together with Ameinias and Aristeus, reached Brasidas: the Lacedaemonians had sent them to inspect affairs. They also took men of military age out of Sparta, contrary to law, to appoint them governors of the cities rather than entrust these to whoever happened to be available. Brasidas appointed Clearidas son of Cleonymus at Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas son of Hegesander at Torone.

CHAPTER 133

1 During the same summer the Thebans demolished the wall of Thespiae, accusing the city of siding with Athens. They had always wanted to do this, but their opportunity was now easier, since the flower of the Thespian people had perished in the battle against the Athenians.

2 That same summer the temple of Hera at Argos burned down. Chrysis, the priestess, had placed a lighted lamp near the garlands and fallen asleep, so that everything caught fire and burned before she noticed.

3 Chrysis fled that very night to Phlius, in fear of the Argives. Under the established law they appointed another priestess, named Phaeinis. At the time of her flight Chrysis' priesthood had extended through eight years and half the ninth of this war.

4 By the close of summer Scione had been completely enclosed by a wall; the Athenians left a guard before it and withdrew with the rest of their army.

CHAPTER 134

1 In the following winter the Athenians and Lacedaemonians remained inactive because of the armistice, but the Mantineans and Tegeans, with their respective allies, fought at Laodocium in Oresthis, and the victory was disputed. Each side routed the wing facing it, and both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi.

2 There were, however, many dead on both sides; the battle was closely balanced, and night put an end to the action. The Tegeans bivouacked on the field and immediately set up a trophy, while the Mantineans withdrew to Bucolion and raised a rival trophy later.

CHAPTER 135

1 As the same winter drew to its end and spring was already near, Brasidas also made an attempt on Potidaea. He approached by night and set a ladder against the wall, escaping notice up to that point: the ladder was placed in the interval after the bell had passed along and before the man passing it along returned. But the defenders discovered them immediately afterward, before they could climb up, and he quickly withdrew his army again without waiting for daylight.

2 The winter ended, and the ninth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

Book 5



CHAPTER 1

1 In the summer that followed, the year's truce had expired by the time of the Pythian games. During the armistice the Athenians expelled the Delians from Delos, judging that an ancient offense made them impure in their service to the god, and that their continued presence left the purification incomplete. I have already described that purification, and how the Athenians thought they had acted rightly in removing the tombs of the dead. The Delians settled at Adramyttium in Asia, which Pharnaces gave them, each going as he chose.

CHAPTER 2

1 Cleon, having persuaded the Athenians, sailed after the armistice for the places on the Thracian coast, with twelve hundred Athenian hoplites and three hundred cavalry, a larger number of allies, and thirty ships.

2 He first put in at Scione, which was still under siege, and took on additional hoplites from the besieging force; then he sailed into Cophus, the harbor of the Toronaeans, not far from their city.

3 There he learned from deserters that Brasidas was not in Torone and that its garrison was no match for him. He advanced against the city with his land army and sent ten ships around to sail into the harbor.

4 He came first to the outer circuit of fortifications, which Brasidas had added to the city to bring the suburb within the walls. By breaking through part of the old wall, Brasidas had made the whole a single city.

CHAPTER 3

1 Pasitelidas, the Lacedaemonian commander, and the garrison at hand came to the defense of the fortifications and resisted the Athenian assault. But when they were hard pressed, and the ships sent around to the harbor were coming into view at the same time, Pasitelidas feared that the fleet would seize the city before him while it lay undefended, and that he would be trapped if the fortifications fell. He abandoned them and ran for the city.

2 But the Athenians from the ships captured Torone before he could reach it, while the infantry followed close behind him and burst in with a shout through the breach in the old wall. They killed some of the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans at once in hand-to-hand fighting, and took the others alive, including Pasitelidas, their commander.

3 Brasidas was coming to the relief of Torone, but learned on the road that it had fallen and withdrew. He was about forty stades short of arriving in time.

4 Cleon and the Athenians set up two trophies, one by the harbor and the other at the fortifications. They enslaved the Toronaean women and children and sent the men, together with the Peloponnesians and any other Chalcidians present, to Athens—about seven hundred in all. Of these, the Peloponnesians were released later under the treaty that was concluded; the rest were recovered by the Olynthians in an exchange of man for man.

5 About the same time the Boeotians also took Panactum, an Athenian fortress on the frontier, through treachery.

6 Cleon established a garrison at Torone, then put to sea and sailed around Athos toward Amphipolis.

CHAPTER 4

1 About the same time Phaeax son of Erasistratus sailed for Italy and Sicily as one of three ambassadors whom the Athenians were sending in two ships.

2 After the Athenians had left Sicily following the settlement, the Leontines had enrolled many new citizens, and the people were planning a redistribution of the land.

3 The powerful men learned of this, brought in the Syracusans, and expelled the people. The exiles scattered as each could, while the powerful men came to terms with the Syracusans, left their city deserted, and settled at Syracuse with citizenship there.

4 Later some of them, dissatisfied, left Syracuse in turn and occupied a quarter of the city of Leontini called Phocaeae, and Bricinniae, a stronghold in Leontine territory. Most of the people who had been expelled at that time joined them, and, established within the fortifications, they carried on the war.

5 When the Athenians heard of this, they sent Phaeax to see whether they could save the people of Leontini by persuading their allies there, and the other Siceliots too if possible, to make a joint expedition against the Syracusans, on the grounds that they were building up their power.

6 On his arrival Phaeax won over the Camarinaeans and the Acragantines, but met with opposition at Gela. He went no farther to the other cities, realizing that he would not persuade them, but returned through the country of the Sicels to Catana. On his way he also visited Bricinniae and encouraged its defenders; then he sailed away.

CHAPTER 5

1 On his voyage to Sicily and again on his return, he negotiated with certain cities in Italy as well, concerning friendship with Athens. He encountered the Locrian settlers who had been expelled from Messene. After the settlement among the Siceliots, civil strife had broken out at Messene; one of the factions called in the Locrians, and these men were sent out as settlers, so that for a time Messene belonged to the Locrians.

2 Phaeax therefore did them no harm when he encountered them on their way home, for the Locrians had reached an agreement with him concerning a settlement with the Athenians.

3 They alone among the allies had not made a truce with the Athenians when the Siceliots came to terms; nor would they have done so even now, had they not been hard pressed by their war with the Hipponians and Medmaeans, their neighbors and their own colonists. Phaeax arrived back at Athens some time later.

CHAPTER 6

1 When Cleon had sailed around from Torone toward Amphipolis, he made Eion his base and attacked Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, but failed to take it. He did, however, storm Alepsus, the Thasian colony.

2 He sent ambassadors to Perdiccas, asking him to bring an army in accordance with the alliance, and others into Thrace to Polles, king of the Odomantians, to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as possible. He himself remained at Eion, awaiting them.

3 Brasidas learned of this and took up a position opposite him at Cerdylium. This place belongs to the Argilians and stands on high ground across the river, not far from Amphipolis. Everything could be seen from there, so that Cleon

could not move out with his army unobserved. Brasidas expected him to do just that: to despise the numbers of his opponents and advance against Amphipolis with the troops he already had.

4 Meanwhile Brasidas was making ready fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries and calling out all the Edonians, both peltasts and cavalry. He also had a thousand Myrcinian and Chalcidian peltasts, besides those in Amphipolis.

5 The hoplites assembled numbered about two thousand in all, and there were three hundred Greek cavalry. With some fifteen hundred of these troops Brasidas held his position at Cerdylium; the rest were stationed in Amphipolis with Clearidas.

CHAPTER 7

1 For a time Cleon remained inactive; then he was compelled to do precisely what Brasidas expected.

2 His soldiers were chafing at their idleness and reflecting on the inexperience and weakness of their commander, set against the skill and daring he would face, and on their own reluctance to follow him when they left home. Cleon heard the murmuring, and, unwilling to let them grow discontented through sitting in one place, took up his army and led it forward.

3 He followed the same method whose success at Pylos had given him some confidence in his own understanding. He did not even expect anyone to come out against him in battle, but said that he was going up rather to inspect the ground. He was waiting for the larger force, not to assure himself of superiority if compelled to fight, but to surround the city and take it by force.

4 He came up and stationed his army on a strong hill before Amphipolis, while he himself examined the lake-like expanse of the Strymon and the lie of the city on its Thracian side.

5 He thought he could withdraw whenever he wished without a battle. Indeed, no one could be seen on the wall, no one was coming out through the gates, and all of them were closed. He even thought he had made a mistake in coming up without siege engines: so deserted did the city seem that he could have taken it.

CHAPTER 8

1 As soon as Brasidas saw the Athenians moving, he too came down from Cerdylium and entered Amphipolis.

2 He did not march out and draw up against the Athenians. He distrusted his own force and thought it inferior, not in numbers—for the two sides were roughly equal—but in quality: the Athenian contingent on this expedition was drawn wholly from their own citizens, together with the best troops of Lemnos and Imbros. Instead, he prepared to attack by a stratagem.

3 He thought that showing the enemy his numbers and the makeshift equipment of his men would give him no better chance of victory than keeping them from seeing his troops beforehand and finding solid grounds for contempt.

4 He therefore selected a hundred and fifty hoplites for himself and placed the rest under Clearidas. He planned a sudden attack before the Athenians withdrew, believing that he would never again catch them so isolated if their reinforcements happened to arrive. He called all the soldiers together and, wishing both to encourage them and to explain his plan, spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 9

1 "Men of the Peloponnese, let this brief reminder suffice: the country from which we come has always been free through its courage, and you are Dorians about to fight Ionians, whom you have been accustomed to defeat.

2 “I shall explain how I intend to make the attack, so that our engaging in small detachments, rather than all risking battle together, may not seem a weakness to anyone and rob him of courage.

3 “I judge that the enemy have advanced toward this position in contempt of us, never expecting anyone to come out and fight them, and that now, with their attention turned to inspecting the ground, they are careless and out of order.

4 “The man who most clearly detects such errors in his opponents, and adapts his attack to his own strength, preferring what suits the moment to an open advance in battle array, will achieve the greatest success.

5 “And those stratagems win the fairest renown which most thoroughly deceive the enemy and bring the greatest benefit to friends.

6 “While they are still unprepared in their confidence, and, to judge by what I see, have their minds more on slipping away than on standing their ground, while their purpose is relaxed and before they can gather their resolve, I shall take my own men and, seizing the initiative if I can, charge at the center of their army.

7 “You, Clearidas, must follow when you see me already upon them and, as is likely, throwing them into fear. Take your men, the Amphipolitans and the other allies, suddenly open the gates, rush out, and press on to join battle as quickly as possible.

8 “In this way we have the best hope of terrifying them: a force coming up later inspires more dread in the enemy than the one already before them and engaged.

9 “Prove yourself a brave man, as befits a Spartan; and you, men of the allied cities, follow courageously. Remember that good fighting has three essentials: willingness, a sense of shame, and obedience to commanders. Remember too that this day, if you prove your valor, will secure your freedom and the name of

allies of the Lacedaemonians; otherwise you will be slaves of Athens—at best, if you escape being sold into slavery or put to death—in a servitude harsher than before, and you will have prevented the liberation of the rest of the Greeks.

10 "Do not falter, then, when you see how much is at stake in the contest. For my part, I shall show myself no less ready to advance in deed than to exhort others in words."

CHAPTER 10

1 With these words Brasidas prepared for his own sortie and stationed the rest with Clearidas at the gates called the Thracian Gates, so that they could advance as he had directed.

2 Brasidas had been seen coming down from Cerdylium; within the city, which was visible from outside, he could also be seen sacrificing near the temple of Athena and making these arrangements. Cleon, who had meanwhile gone forward to inspect the ground, received word that the whole enemy army was plainly visible inside the city, and that beneath the gates many feet of horses and men could be made out, as though they were about to come out.

3 On hearing this he came up, and, when he saw for himself, he had no wish to risk a decisive battle before his reinforcements arrived. Thinking he could get away in time, he at once ordered the signal for retreat and directed the withdrawing troops to move off toward Eion by the left wing, the only way open to them.

4 When this seemed to him too slow, he himself wheeled the right wing around and led the army away, exposing its unshielded side to the enemy.

5 At that moment Brasidas saw his opportunity and the Athenian army on the move. He said to his own men and the rest, "These men will not stand against us. The movement of their spears and heads makes it plain: troops in that condition do not usually stand their ground against an attack. Open the gates I have named, and let us rush out at once with confidence."

6 He came out through the gates facing the stockade and the first gates of the long wall that then existed, and ran straight along the road where the trophy now stands as one approaches the strongest part of the position. He struck the Athenians in the center of their army and routed them, already frightened by their own disorder and stunned by his daring.

7 At the same time Clearidas, as directed, came out through the Thracian Gates and charged with his army. The unexpected attack, falling suddenly upon the Athenians from both sides, threw them into confusion.

8 Their left wing, toward Eion, which had already moved ahead, immediately broke away and fled. As it was falling back, Brasidas moved forward on the right and was wounded. The Athenians did not notice his fall, but the men near him lifted him and carried him away.

9 The Athenian right held its ground better. Cleon, who from the first had had no intention of standing, fled at once, but a Myrcinian peltast overtook and killed him. The hoplites rallied there on the hill and repelled Clearidas, even when he attacked two or three times. They did not give way until the Myrcinian and Chalcidian cavalry and the peltasts surrounded them and drove them into flight with their javelins.

10 The whole Athenian army was now in flight. With difficulty, taking many different routes over the mountains, the survivors made their way back to Eion—all who had escaped death either in the immediate hand-to-hand fighting or at the hands of the Chalcidian cavalry and the peltasts.

11 Those who had lifted Brasidas from the battlefield brought him safely into the city, still breathing. He learned that his men were victorious, but died not long afterward.

12 The rest of the army returned from the pursuit with Clearidas, stripped the dead, and set up a trophy.

CHAPTER 11

1 Afterward all the allies followed Brasidas in arms as he was buried at public expense within the city, before what is now the marketplace. The Amphipolitans enclosed his tomb, and ever since have made blood offerings to him as a hero and honored him with games and yearly sacrifices. They credited him with the founding of their colony, tearing down Hagnon's buildings and obliterating anything that might survive as a memorial of his foundation. They considered Brasidas their savior, and for the present, in their fear of the Athenians, they were also cultivating the Lacedaemonian alliance. With Athens now their enemy, they thought it would no longer be either advantageous or agreeable for Hagnon to hold those honors.

2 They returned the dead to the Athenians. About six hundred Athenians had fallen, but only seven of their opponents, since the battle had been less a contest between armies drawn up against each other than an encounter of this kind, with one side terrified before it began.

3 After recovering their dead, the Athenians sailed home, while the others remained with Clearidas to put affairs at Amphipolis in order.

CHAPTER 12

1 About the same time, as summer was ending, the Lacedaemonians Rhamphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas were leading a reinforcement of nine hundred hoplites to the places on the Thracian coast. They reached Heraclea in Trachis and set about correcting whatever they thought amiss there.

2 While they lingered there this battle took place, and the summer ended.

CHAPTER 13

1 At the very beginning of the following winter, Rhamphias and his men advanced as far as Pierium in Thessaly. But the Thessalians barred their way, and Brasidas, to whom they were bringing the army, was dead; so they turned

back home. They judged that the moment for action had passed, since the Athenians had left after their defeat and they themselves were not equal to carrying out any of the plans he too had conceived.

2 Their chief reason for returning was that they knew the Lacedaemonians had already been leaning toward peace when they set out.

CHAPTER 14

1 Immediately after the battle at Amphipolis and Rhamphias' retreat from Thessaly, neither side undertook any further act of war; their thoughts turned rather to peace. The Athenians had been struck at Delium and, soon afterward, again at Amphipolis, and no longer had the same assured confidence in their strength. That confidence had previously kept them from accepting a treaty, since they thought their current good fortune would bring them the upper hand.

2 They also feared that their allies, emboldened by these reverses, might revolt in greater numbers, and regretted not having reached a settlement after the success at Pylos, when the opportunity was favorable.

3 The Lacedaemonians, in turn, were finding that the war had gone against their expectations: they had thought they would destroy Athenian power within a few years if they ravaged its land. Instead they had suffered the disaster on the island, such as Sparta had never known before; their country was being raided from Pylos and Cythera; the Helots were deserting; and there was constant apprehension that those who remained, encouraged by the men outside, might once again seize upon their present circumstances to revolt.

4 It also happened that their thirty-year truce with the Argives was nearing its end, and the Argives would not make another unless the land of Cynuria was restored to them. It seemed impossible to fight both the Argives and the Athenians at once. They also suspected that some of the cities in the Peloponnese would defect to the Argives—as indeed they did.

CHAPTER 15

1 Both sides, then, considered these things and decided that a settlement must be made. The Lacedaemonians were no less eager, in their desire to recover the men captured on the island: the Spartans among them were men of the first rank and kinsmen of their own.

2 They had begun negotiations immediately after the men's capture, but the Athenians, while they were prospering, were in no mood to end the war on equal terms. As soon as the Athenians suffered their reverse at Delium, the Lacedaemonians, recognizing that they would now be more receptive, concluded the year's armistice, during which the two sides were to meet and discuss a longer settlement.

CHAPTER 16

1 The Athenians had now also been defeated at Amphipolis, and Cleon and Brasidas were dead, the two men who on either side had most opposed peace: Brasidas because war brought him success and honor, Cleon because he thought that in quiet times his wrongdoing would be more apparent and his slanders less credible. Now, therefore, the men most intent on leadership in their respective cities—Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, and Nicias son of Niceratus, whose record of success in command surpassed that of his contemporaries—pressed much more eagerly for peace. Nicias wished to preserve his good fortune while he was still unscathed and held in honor, to gain an immediate respite from toil for himself and his fellow citizens, and to leave to posterity a name for having passed through his career without bringing disaster upon the city. He thought this could be achieved by avoiding danger and entrusting oneself as little as possible to fortune, and that peace afforded such security. Pleistoanax, for his part, was being slandered by his enemies over his restoration from exile. Whenever the Lacedaemonians met with a reverse, these enemies kept bringing him to their notice, claiming that their misfortunes came from his unlawful restoration.

2 They accused him and his brother Aristocles of having persuaded the prophetess at Delphi to give the Lacedaemonian sacred envoys, whenever they came, the same response over a long period: they must bring back to their own land from foreign soil the offspring of the demigod son of Zeus; otherwise they would plow with a silver plowshare.

3 In time, they said, she had induced the Lacedaemonians to restore him in the nineteenth year of his exile, with the same dances and sacrifices as when they first founded Lacedaemon and established their kings. He had fled to Lycaeum on suspicion of having once withdrawn from Attica for a bribe, and was then living in a house half within the sanctuary of Zeus, for fear of the Lacedaemonians.

CHAPTER 17

1 Distressed by this accusation, he worked eagerly for a settlement. He thought that in peace, with no reverse occurring and the Lacedaemonians recovering their men, he himself would be beyond his enemies' reproach; but while war continued, those in leading positions must always be slandered on account of its disasters.

2 Throughout this winter they held discussions. As spring approached, the Lacedaemonians also brandished a threat of military preparations, sending orders around the cities for an expedition to establish a fortified post in enemy territory, so that the Athenians would listen more readily. At their meetings, after each side had advanced many claims against the other, they agreed to make peace by restoring what each had taken in the war, except that the Athenians should keep Nisaea. For when the Athenians demanded Plataea in return, the Thebans said they held it not by force or treachery, but through its inhabitants' voluntary surrender by agreement; the Athenians made the same claim for Nisaea. The Lacedaemonians then summoned their allies. All except the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians voted to end the war; these four

disapproved of what was being done. The Lacedaemonians concluded the agreement, made a treaty with the Athenians, and swore to it, as the Athenians did in return, on the following terms.

CHAPTER 18

1 "The Athenians, the Lacedaemonians, and their allies made a treaty on the following terms and swore to it city by city.

2 "Concerning the sanctuaries held in common: whoever wishes shall be free to sacrifice, visit them, consult the oracles, and attend the festivals according to ancestral custom, traveling without fear by land or sea. Apollo's sanctuary and temple at Delphi, and the Delphians themselves, shall be autonomous, independent in taxation and jurisdiction, both in their own affairs and in those of their territory, according to ancestral custom.

3 "The treaty shall last fifty years between the Athenians and their allies and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, without deceit or injury, both by land and by sea.

4 "Neither the Lacedaemonians and their allies against the Athenians and their allies, nor the Athenians and their allies against the Lacedaemonians and their allies, shall be permitted to take up arms to inflict harm, whether by stratagem or by any contrivance whatever. If any dispute arises between them, they shall resort to justice and oaths, on whatever terms they agree.

5 "The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians. In all the cities handed over by the Lacedaemonians to the Athenians, the inhabitants shall be free to depart wherever they wish, taking their possessions with them. The cities shall be autonomous, paying the tribute assessed in the time of Aristides. After the treaty is concluded, the Athenians and their allies shall not be permitted to take up arms to harm them, so long as they pay the tribute. These cities are Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus,

Olynthus, and Spartolus. They shall be allies of neither side, neither the Lacedaemonians nor the Athenians; but if the Athenians persuade the cities, they shall be permitted to make them allies of Athens with their consent.

6 "The Mecybernaeans, Sanaeans, and Singaeans shall inhabit their own cities on the same terms as the Olynthians and Acanthians.

7 "The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore Panactum to the Athenians. The Athenians in turn shall restore to the Lacedaemonians Coryphasium, Cythera, Methana, Pteleum, and Atalanta, and all Lacedaemonian men held in the Athenian public prison or in public custody anywhere else under Athenian rule. They shall also release the Peloponnesians besieged in Scione, all the other allies of the Lacedaemonians in Scione, all those whom Brasidas sent into it, and any ally of the Lacedaemonians held in the public prison at Athens or in public custody anywhere else under Athenian rule. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall likewise restore all Athenians and allies of Athens whom they hold, on the same terms.

8 "As for the Scionaeans, Toronaeans, and Sermylians, and any other city the Athenians hold, the Athenians shall decide concerning them and the other cities as they see fit.

9 "The Athenians shall swear to the Lacedaemonians and their allies city by city. Seventeen men from each city on either side shall swear the strongest oath customary in their country. The oath shall be this: 'I shall abide by this agreement and this treaty justly and without deceit.' The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall swear to the Athenians in the same terms.

10 "Both sides shall renew the oath each year. They shall set up stone pillars at Olympia, Pytho, and the Isthmus, on the Acropolis at Athens, and in the Amyclaeum at Lacedaemon.

11 "If either side has overlooked anything, on any subject, both shall be free, consistently with their oaths and through just discussion, to alter the terms in whatever way both parties, the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, agree.

CHAPTER 19

1 "The treaty takes effect at Lacedaemon under the ephor Pleistolas, on the fourth day from the end of the month Artemisius, and at Athens under the archon Alcaeus, on the sixth day from the end of the month Elaphebolion. The following men swore the oaths and concluded the treaty.

2 "On the Lacedaemonian side: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcinadas, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. On the Athenian side, the following: Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes."

CHAPTER 20

1 This treaty was concluded at the end of winter, as spring began, immediately after the City Dionysia. Ten full years had elapsed, with a difference of only a few days, since the first invasion of Attica and the beginning of this war.

2 One should examine the actual intervals of time, rather than put greater trust in a reckoning by the names of local magistrates or holders of some other office used to date past events. Such a reckoning is not exact: an event may have occurred at the beginning of a man's term, in the middle, or at any chance point in it.

3 But by counting summers and winters, as they are recorded here, with each of the two reckoned as half a year, one will find that this first war comprised ten summers and as many winters.

CHAPTER 21

1 The Lacedaemonians, on whom the lot had fallen to make restitution first, immediately released the prisoners of war in their hands. They also sent Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas as envoys to the Thracian region, with

orders for Clearidas to surrender Amphipolis to the Athenians, and for the others to accept the treaty on the terms prescribed for each.

2 These refused, judging the terms unfavorable. Nor did Clearidas surrender the city: to gratify the Chalcidians, he said that he could not hand it over against their will.

3 He himself went swiftly to Lacedaemon with envoys from the region, both to defend himself if Ischagoras and his colleagues accused him of disobedience, and to learn whether the agreement could still be altered. Finding the Lacedaemonians bound by it, he set out again in haste: they sent him back with orders, if possible, to surrender the place as well, but otherwise to withdraw all the Peloponnesians in it.

CHAPTER 22

1 The allies themselves happened to be at Lacedaemon, and the Lacedaemonians urged those who had not accepted the treaty to conclude it. But, on the same grounds as when they first rejected it, they declared that they would not accept unless a more equitable treaty were made.

2 When they would not listen, the Lacedaemonians dismissed them and proceeded to make an alliance with the Athenians. They thought that this would leave the Argives least able to threaten them and would best keep the rest of the Peloponnese quiet, since these states would, if they could, turn to the Athenians. The Argives had refused to renew their treaty when Ampelidas and Lichas came, believing that the Lacedaemonians without the Athenians were not formidable.

3 Athenian envoys were present; after discussion, agreement was reached, and the oaths were taken and the alliance made on the following terms.

CHAPTER 23

1 "The Lacedaemonians and Athenians shall be allies for fifty years on these terms. If any enemy enters Lacedaemonian territory and harms the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians shall assist the Lacedaemonians in the strongest manner within their power. If the enemy ravages the land and departs, that city shall be an enemy of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians and shall suffer at the hands of both; the two cities shall end the war jointly. These obligations shall be discharged justly, willingly, and without deceit.

2 "And if any enemy enters Athenian territory and harms the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians shall assist the Athenians in the strongest manner within their power. If the enemy ravages the land and departs, that city shall be an enemy of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians and shall suffer at the hands of both; the two cities shall end the war jointly.

3 "These obligations shall be discharged justly, willingly, and without deceit. If the slave population rises in revolt, the Athenians shall aid the Lacedaemonians with all the strength within their power.

4 "The same men on either side who swore to the other treaty shall swear to these terms. The oath shall be renewed annually, the Lacedaemonians going to Athens at the Dionysia, and the Athenians to Lacedaemon at the Hyacinthia.

5 "Each side shall erect a stone pillar: at Lacedaemon, beside Apollo in the sanctuary at Amyclae; at Athens, beside Athena on the Acropolis.

6 "If the Lacedaemonians and Athenians decide to add or remove anything concerning the alliance, whatever they decide shall be consistent with the oath for both parties.

CHAPTER 24

1 "The following Lacedaemonians swore the oath: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus; and the following Athenians: Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes."

2 This alliance was concluded not long after the treaty. The Athenians returned to the Lacedaemonians the men captured on the island, and the summer of the eleventh year began. The foregoing account has described the first war, which continued without interruption through these ten years.

CHAPTER 25

1 After the treaty and alliance between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, concluded after the ten-year war under Pleistolas as ephor at Lacedaemon and Alcaeus as archon at Athens, those who accepted them were at peace. But the Corinthians and some of the cities in the Peloponnese sought to unsettle the arrangements, and immediately a fresh disturbance arose in the relations between the allies and Lacedaemon.

2 At the same time, as time went on, the Athenians too grew suspicious of the Lacedaemonians, since in some respects they were not carrying out the stipulations of their agreement.

3 For six years and ten months they refrained from campaigning against each other's territory; outside it, however, under an insecure truce, they did each other the greatest possible harm. Then, compelled to break the treaty made after the ten years, they once more entered into open war.

CHAPTER 26

1 These events too were written down by the same Thucydides, an Athenian, in their successive order, as each occurred, by summers and winters, until the Lacedaemonians and their allies put an end to the Athenian empire and took possession of the Long Walls and Piraeus. To that point the war lasted twenty-seven years in all.

2 If anyone refuses to count the intervening agreement as war, his judgment will be mistaken. Let him examine the deeds, as they have been set out, and he will find that the period cannot reasonably be judged a peace. In it neither side restored or received everything stipulated; besides this, both committed violations in connection with the war at Mantinea and Epidaurus and in other matters. The allies in the Thracian region remained enemies as before, while the Boeotians maintained a ten-day truce.

3 Thus, counting the actual intervals of time, one will find that the first ten-year war, the mistrustful truce that followed, and the later war that grew out of it together amount to this number of years, with a difference of only a few days; and that, of the claims advanced on the strength of oracles, this alone was borne out with certainty.

4 For I remember that always, from the beginning of the war until its end, many people were repeating that it must last three times nine years.

5 I lived through the whole of it, old enough to understand events and applying my mind to them so as to gain exact knowledge. It also fell to me to spend twenty years in exile from my own country after my command at Amphipolis. With access to the affairs of both sides, and no less to those of the Peloponnesians because of my exile, I could gain a clearer understanding of them at leisure.

6 I shall therefore relate the dissension and confusion surrounding the treaty after the ten years, and how the war was fought thereafter.

CHAPTER 27

1 For after the fifty-year treaty had been concluded, and subsequently the alliance, the embassies from the Peloponnese that had been summoned for these negotiations left Lacedaemon.

2 The others went home, but the Corinthians turned toward Argos and first held discussions with some of the Argive officials. They said that, since the Lacedaemonians had made a treaty and alliance with the Athenians, previously their bitterest enemies, not for the good of the Peloponnese but to enslave it, the Argives must consider how the Peloponnese could be saved. They should decree that any Greek city wishing to do so, provided it was autonomous and submitted disputes to equal and impartial adjudication, might make an alliance with the Argives for the defense of one another's territory. They should appoint a small board with full powers, rather than bring the discussions before the people, so that those who failed to persuade the majority would not be exposed. Many, they said, would join out of hatred of the Lacedaemonians.

3 Having put forward these proposals, the Corinthians withdrew home.

CHAPTER 28

1 The Argive men who had heard them brought the proposals before the authorities and the people. The Argives passed the decree and chose twelve men with whom any Greeks who wished might conclude an alliance, except the Athenians and Lacedaemonians: neither of these could make a treaty without the consent of the Argive people.

2 The Argives welcomed these proposals all the more because they saw that war with the Lacedaemonians was coming—their treaty with them was nearing its end—and at the same time hoped to gain the leadership of the Peloponnese. For at this time Lacedaemon's reputation had sunk to its lowest, and its misfor-

tunes had brought it into contempt, while the Argives were in excellent condition in every respect. They had taken no part in the Athenian war, but had instead profited from being at peace with both sides.

3 In this way the Argives admitted to their alliance any Greeks who wished to join.

CHAPTER 29

1 The Mantineans and their allies were the first to join them, through fear of the Lacedaemonians. While the war against the Athenians was still in progress, the Mantineans had subjected part of Arcadia to their rule, and they thought that the Lacedaemonians, now that they had leisure, would not allow them to retain their dominion. They therefore turned gladly to the Argives, whom they regarded as a great city, always at odds with the Lacedaemonians, and governed, like themselves, by a democracy.

2 With the defection of the Mantineans, the rest of the Peloponnese too began to murmur that they must do the same. They believed that the Mantineans had changed sides on the strength of some superior knowledge, and at the same time they were angry with the Lacedaemonians, among other reasons because the treaty with Athens stipulated that additions and removals could be made without violating the oath, whatever the two cities, Lacedaemon and Athens, might decide.

3 This clause above all alarmed the Peloponnesians and raised their suspicion that the Lacedaemonians wished to enslave them in concert with the Athenians. Any alteration, they thought, should in justice have been made subject to the consent of all the allies.

4 In their fear, most of them were therefore eager to go to the Argives and conclude an alliance, each on its own account.

CHAPTER 30

1 When the Lacedaemonians learned of this agitation in the Peloponnese, and that the Corinthians had instigated it and were themselves about to make a treaty with Argos, they sent envoys to Corinth, wishing to forestall the move. They accused the Corinthians of initiating the whole affair and declared that, if they abandoned them to become allies of the Argives, they would violate their oaths. They were already acting unjustly by refusing to accept the treaty with Athens, since it had been agreed that whatever the majority of the allies voted should be binding, unless some god or hero stood in the way.

2 The Corinthians answered the Lacedaemonians in the presence of those allies who had likewise refused the treaty, whom they had themselves summoned beforehand. They did not openly state the wrongs they had suffered—that the Lacedaemonians had recovered neither Sollium nor Anactorium for them from the Athenians, or whatever other disadvantages they believed they had sustained. Instead, they put forward their refusal to betray the allies in the Thracian region: they had sworn oaths to these separately when they first revolted with the Potidaeans, and further oaths afterward.

3 They were therefore not violating their oaths to the allies, they said, by declining to enter the treaty with Athens. Having pledged their faith to those people in oaths sworn by the gods, they could not betray them and remain true to their oaths. The stipulation was, "unless some god or hero stood in the way"; this, then, appeared to them a divine obstacle.

4 So much they said concerning the old oaths; as for the alliance with Argos, they would consult with their friends and do whatever was just.

5 The Lacedaemonian envoys returned home. Argive envoys also happened to be present at Corinth and urged the Corinthians to enter the alliance without delay; the Corinthians told them to attend the next meeting to be held in their city.

CHAPTER 31

1 An embassy from Elis arrived immediately afterward and first made an alliance with the Corinthians. Then, proceeding from there to Argos, they became allies of the Argives, as has already been related. They happened to be in dispute with the Lacedaemonians over Lepreum.

2 For once, when the Lepreans were at war with some Arcadians, they called in the Eleans as allies in return for half their land. After bringing the war to an end, the Eleans allowed the Lepreans themselves to cultivate the land, but required them to pay a talent to Olympian Zeus.

3 They continued to pay until the Athenian war. When they then stopped, using the war as a pretext, the Eleans tried to compel them, and they turned to the Lacedaemonians. The dispute was submitted to Lacedaemonian arbitration, but the Eleans, suspecting that they would not receive a fair judgment, abandoned the arbitration and ravaged the Lepreans' land.

4 The Lacedaemonians nevertheless ruled that the Lepreans were autonomous and the Eleans in the wrong. Since the Eleans had not abided by the arbitration, they sent a garrison of hoplites into Lepreum.

5 The Eleans considered that the Lacedaemonians had received a city that had revolted from them. They appealed to the agreement stipulating that whatever possessions each state held on entering the Athenian war it should also hold on leaving it; claiming that they had not received equal treatment, they defected to the Argives and, as already related, they too concluded the alliance.

6 Immediately after them the Corinthians and the Chalcidians in the Thracian region also became allies of the Argives. The Boeotians and Megarians, though professing the same views, remained inactive, left to themselves by the Lacedaemonians; being themselves governed by oligarchies, they thought the Argive democracy less congenial to them than the Lacedaemonian constitution.

CHAPTER 32

1 About the same time that summer, the Athenians took Scione by siege, killed the adult males, enslaved the women and children, and gave the land to the Plataeans to cultivate. They also restored the Delians to Delos, reflecting on their misfortunes in battle and acting on an oracle from the god at Delphi.

2 The Phocians and Locrians also began a war.

3 The Corinthians and Argives, now allies, went to Tegea to detach it from the Lacedaemonians. They saw that it carried great weight and believed that, if it joined them, they would command the whole Peloponnese.

4 But when the Tegeans declared that they would not oppose the Lacedaemonians in any respect, the Corinthians, who until then had pursued their aims eagerly, relaxed their efforts in the contest and began to fear that none of the others would now join them.

5 Nevertheless, they went to the Boeotians and urged them to become allies of themselves and the Argives and to act together in other matters. They also asked the Boeotians to accompany them to Athens and obtain for them too the ten-day truce which the Athenians and Boeotians had concluded with each other not long after [this] fifty-year treaty, [on the same terms as the Boeotians had]. If the Athenians refused, the Boeotians were to renounce their truce and in future make no treaty without the Corinthians.

6 In response to these requests, the Boeotians told the Corinthians to wait over the alliance with Argos. They went with them to Athens, but failed to obtain the ten-day truce: the Athenians answered that the Corinthians were covered by the treaty if they were allies of the Lacedaemonians.

7 The Boeotians did not, even so, renounce their ten-day truce, although the Corinthians demanded it and accused them of having agreed to do so. Between the Corinthians and Athenians there was a suspension of hostilities without a treaty.

CHAPTER 33

1 That same summer the Lacedaemonians marched out in full force, under their king Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, against the Parrhasians in Arcadia, who were subject to the Mantineans. A faction in their civil strife had called the Lacedaemonians in; at the same time the Lacedaemonians intended, if they could, to demolish the fort at Cypsela, which the Mantineans had built and themselves garrisoned. It lay in Parrhasian territory, threatening the district of Sciritis in Laconia.

2 The Lacedaemonians ravaged the Parrhasians' land. The Mantineans entrusted their city to Argive guards and themselves defended their allied territory; but, unable to save either the fort at Cypsela or the towns in Parrhasia, they withdrew.

3 The Lacedaemonians made the Parrhasians autonomous, demolished the fort, and returned home.

CHAPTER 34

1 That same summer, when the soldiers who had gone out with Brasidas had now returned from Thrace, brought back by Clearidas after the treaty, the Lacedaemonians decreed that the Helots who had fought with Brasidas should be free and might live wherever they wished. Not long afterward they settled them, together with the neodamodes, at Lepreum, on the border of Laconia and Elis; they were by now at odds with the Eleans.

2 But they deprived of civic rights their own men who had been captured on the island and surrendered their arms, some of whom were already holding office. They feared that, if these men retained their full rights, the belief that their misfortune would bring them inferior treatment might lead them to attempt a revolution. The deprivation was of this kind: they could neither hold office nor make any purchase or sale legally binding. Later, in time, their full rights were restored.

CHAPTER 35

1 That same summer the Dians also captured Thyssus, an Athenian ally on the Athos peninsula.

2 Throughout this summer the Athenians and Peloponnesians had dealings with one another; yet from immediately after the treaty the Athenians and Lacedaemonians distrusted each other because of the failure to restore the places each held.

3 For the Lacedaemonians, though the lot had fallen to them to make restitution first, had not restored Amphipolis or the other places; nor had they secured acceptance of the treaty by the allies in the Thracian region, the Boeotians, or the Corinthians. They kept saying that, if these refused, they would join with the Athenians in compelling them. They also fixed deadlines, without a written agreement, after which those who did not join were to be enemies of both sides.

4 Seeing none of this take effect in deed, the Athenians suspected that the Lacedaemonians had no intention of acting justly. They therefore refused to restore Pylos when the Lacedaemonians demanded it; indeed, they regretted having returned the prisoners from the island. They retained the other places as well, waiting until the Lacedaemonians too fulfilled their promises to them.

5 The Lacedaemonians said that they had done what they could: they had returned the Athenian prisoners in their hands, withdrawn the soldiers from the Thracian region, and done whatever else lay within their power. Amphipolis, they said, was not under their control to surrender; but they would try to bring the Boeotians and Corinthians into the treaty, recover Panactum, and bring back all the Athenians held prisoner in Boeotia.

6 Nevertheless, they demanded the restoration of Pylos, or, failing that, at least the withdrawal of the Messenians and Helots, just as they themselves had withdrawn their men from the Thracian region. The Athenians, if they wished, could garrison the place themselves.

7 After many discussions, repeated throughout this summer, they persuaded the Athenians to withdraw from Pylos the Messenians and the others, both Helots and all who had deserted from Laconia. The Athenians settled them at Cranii in Cephallenia.

8 Thus, during this summer there was quiet, and the two sides visited one another.

CHAPTER 36

1 In the following winter, different ephors were already in office from those under whom the treaty had been made, and some of them opposed it. Embassies arrived from the allied states, and Athenians, Boeotians, and Corinthians were present; after much discussion among them, no agreement was reached. As they were leaving for home, Cleobulus and Xenares, the two ephors most eager to dissolve the treaty, held private discussions with the Boeotians and Corinthians. They urged them to adhere as firmly as possible to this policy, and the Boeotians to try first to become allies of the Argives themselves, then to make the Argives, together with the Boeotians, allies of the Lacedaemonians. In this way the Boeotians would be least likely to be forced to enter the treaty with Athens: the Lacedaemonians would choose to secure the Argives as their friends and allies even at the cost of incurring the Athenians' hostility and dissolving the treaty. For they knew that the Lacedaemonians had always wanted Argos to stand on firm terms of friendship with them, believing that war outside the Peloponnese would then be easier.

2 They did, however, ask the Boeotians to arrange to hand over Panactum to the Lacedaemonians, so that, by recovering Pylos in exchange for it if they could, they might be in a better position to go to war with the Athenians.

CHAPTER 37

1 The Boeotians and Corinthians departed, each for home, charged by Xenares and Cleobulus and their other Lacedaemonian friends to report these proposals to their governments.

2 Two Argive holders of the highest magistracy waited to meet them along their homeward route. On meeting them, they entered into discussions about whether the Boeotians might somehow become their allies, as the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans had done. If this were achieved, they thought they could then readily act with a common policy in making war or peace, with the Lacedaemonians if they wished, or with anyone else as need arose.

3 The Boeotian envoys were pleased with what they heard: by chance, the Argives were asking for precisely what their friends at Lacedaemon had instructed them to do. When the Argive men saw that they welcomed the proposal, they said that they would send envoys to Boeotia and departed.

4 On their arrival, the Boeotians reported to the Boeotarchs both the proposals from Lacedaemon and those of the Argives who had met them. The Boeotarchs approved and were much more eager because the approaches from both sides had coincided: their Lacedaemonian friends were asking for the same thing as the Argives were seeking.

5 Not long afterward Argive envoys arrived to press the proposals already mentioned. The Boeotarchs endorsed their arguments and sent them away with a promise to send envoys to Argos to discuss the alliance.

CHAPTER 38

1 Meanwhile the Boeotarchs, the Corinthians, the Megarians, and the envoys from Thrace decided first to swear oaths to one another: they would aid whichever party needed help in any emergency, and neither make war nor conclude

an agreement with anyone without their common consent. Only then were the Boeotians and Megarians, who were acting together, to make a treaty with the Argives.

2 Before the oaths were sworn, however, the Boeotarchs laid these proposals before the four Boeotian councils, which hold full authority, and urged that oaths should be exchanged with any cities willing to swear a mutual undertaking for their benefit.

3 But the members of the Boeotian councils rejected the proposal, fearing that by swearing an oath with the Corinthians, who had broken with the Lacedaemonians, they would be acting against Lacedaemonian interests. The Boeotarchs had not told them what had come from Lacedaemon: that the ephors Cleobulus and Xenares, together with their friends, advised them first to become allies of the Argives and Corinthians and then to enter the alliance with the Lacedaemonians. They had assumed that, even without being told, the council would vote for whatever they themselves had settled beforehand and recommended.

4 When the proposal met this resistance, the Corinthians and the envoys from Thrace departed without accomplishing anything. The Boeotarchs had intended, if they carried these proposals, to try next to arrange the alliance with Argos; now they no longer brought the Argive question before the councils, nor sent to Argos the envoys they had promised. A certain neglect and delay settled over the whole undertaking.

CHAPTER 39

1 During this same winter the Olynthians made a sudden attack on Mecyberna and captured it, despite its Athenian garrison.

2 After this, since the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were continually discussing the places they held belonging to one another, the Lacedaemonians hoped that if the Athenians recovered Panactum from the Boeotians, they

themselves would recover Pylos. They sent an embassy to the Boeotians and asked them to hand over Panactum and their Athenian prisoners, so that they could recover Pylos in exchange.

3 The Boeotians said they would not surrender them unless the Lacedaemonians made a separate alliance with them, as they had with the Athenians. The Lacedaemonians knew that they would be wronging the Athenians, since it had been stipulated that neither party should make a treaty or wage war without the other. Yet they wanted to receive Panactum in order to recover Pylos in exchange; and those eager to wreck the treaty were also pressing the Boeotian negotiations forward. They therefore concluded the alliance as winter was drawing to its close and spring approaching. Panactum was immediately demolished. And the eleventh year of this war, came to an end.

CHAPTER 40

1 At the first coming of spring in the following summer, the Argives found that the Boeotian envoys who had been promised had not arrived, and learned that Panactum was being demolished and that the Boeotians had made a separate alliance with the Lacedaemonians. They feared that they would be left isolated and the entire alliance would go over to Lacedaemon.

2 They supposed that the Lacedaemonians had persuaded the Boeotians both to demolish Panactum and to enter the treaty with Athens, and that the Athenians knew of these arrangements. This would leave them no prospect even of an alliance with Athens, although previously, because of the disagreements, they had hoped that, if their treaty with the Lacedaemonians did not hold, they would at least have the Athenians as allies.

3 Perplexed by this situation, and afraid that they might have to fight the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans, Boeotians and Athenians all at once, the Argives —who had previously refused the Lacedaemonian treaty and confidently expected to lead the Peloponnese—sent Eustrophus and Aeson to Lacedaemon

as quickly as possible. These were the envoys they believed most welcome there. In the circumstances, they thought it best to secure peace by making a treaty with the Lacedaemonians on whatever terms they could obtain.

CHAPTER 41

1 Their envoys arrived and discussed with the Lacedaemonians the terms on which a treaty might be made.

2 At first the Argives demanded that the dispute over the Cynurian territory should be submitted to the arbitration of some city or private person. This borderland was a perpetual subject of contention; it contains Thyrea and the town of Anthene, and the Lacedaemonians occupy it. The Lacedaemonians would not allow the question even to be raised, but said that if the Argives wished to make a treaty on the former terms, they were ready. Nevertheless, the Argive envoys induced them to agree to this: they would now make a treaty for fifty years, but either side, after issuing a challenge, would be free to fight for this land whenever neither Lacedaemon nor Argos was suffering from disease or war, as they had fought once before, when each claimed the victory. Pursuit, however, would not be permitted beyond the frontiers toward Argos or Lacedaemon.

3 At first the Lacedaemonians thought this folly; afterward, so eager were they to have Argos friendly on any terms, they conceded the demands and put them in writing. Before anything was finalized, however, the Lacedaemonians told the envoys to return to Argos and lay the proposals before the people; if these were approved, they were to come to the Hyacinthia to swear the oaths. The envoys then withdrew.

CHAPTER 42

1 While the Argives were conducting these negotiations, the Lacedaemonian envoys Andromenes, Phaedimus, and Antimenidas, who were to receive Panactum and the prisoners from the Boeotians and restore them to the Athenians, found that the Boeotians themselves had demolished Panactum. Their pretext was that, in an earlier dispute over it, the Athenians and Boeotians had sworn ancient oaths that neither should inhabit the place, but both should use it in common. Andromenes and his colleagues received the Athenian prisoners of war held by the Boeotians, brought them to Athens, and handed them over. They also reported the demolition of Panactum, thinking that this too amounted to its restoration, since no enemy of the Athenians would ever again inhabit it.

2 The Athenians were outraged at this account. They considered themselves wronged by the Lacedaemonians in the demolition of Panactum, which should have been handed over intact; and they learned that the Lacedaemonians had also made a separate alliance with the Boeotians, though they had previously declared that together they would compel those who rejected the treaty to accept it. They examined all the other provisions of the agreement that the Lacedaemonians had failed to fulfill and felt that they had been deceived. They therefore gave the envoys a harsh answer and dismissed them.

CHAPTER 43

1 With the Lacedaemonians and Athenians thus at odds, those in Athens who, for their part, wanted to dissolve the treaty immediately pressed their attack.

2 Among them was Alcibiades son of Clinias, a man still young at that time by the standards of any other city, but honored for the distinction of his ancestry. He did believe that it was better to turn instead toward the Argives; yet wounded pride and rivalry also drove his opposition. The Lacedaemonians had negotiated the treaty through Nicias and Laches, overlooking him because of his youth and showing no regard for his family's old position as their public

guest-friends. His grandfather had renounced that connection, but he himself had intended to renew it through the attentions he paid to their prisoners from the island.

3 Feeling slighted on every side, he had opposed the treaty from the outset, declaring that the Lacedaemonians were not to be trusted: they were making peace only so that they could remove the Argives from the conflict by a treaty, and then attack the Athenians alone once more. Now, when the disagreement arose, he immediately sent a private message to Argos, urging the Argives to come as quickly as possible with the Mantineans and Eleans and propose an alliance. The moment was favorable, he said, and he himself would give them every assistance.

CHAPTER 44

1 On receiving this message, and learning that the Boeotian alliance had been made without Athenian participation, and that the Athenians were instead in serious disagreement with the Lacedaemonians, the Argives lost interest in their envoys, who were then away in Lacedaemon negotiating the treaty, and turned their thoughts rather toward Athens. They reckoned that a city friendly to them from ancient times, governed like themselves by a democracy, and possessing great naval strength would fight beside them if they became involved in war.

2 They therefore immediately sent envoys to the Athenians to negotiate the alliance. The Eleans and Mantineans joined in the embassy.

3 Lacedaemonian envoys also arrived in haste: Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius, men thought to be well disposed toward the Athenians. The Lacedaemonians feared that in their anger the Athenians might make the alliance with Argos; at the same time, the envoys were to demand Pylos in exchange for Panactum and to defend the alliance with the Boeotians, explaining that it had not been made to Athens' detriment.

CHAPTER 45

1 They addressed the council on these matters and declared that they had come with full powers to settle every point of dispute. Alcibiades feared that if they said the same before the people, they might win over the multitude and the Argive alliance would be rejected.

2 Alcibiades therefore devised this stratagem against them. He persuaded the Lacedaemonians by giving them his assurance that, if they did not acknowledge before the people that they had come with full powers, he would restore Pylos to them—he himself would persuade the Athenians, just as he was now opposing its return—and settle the other differences.

3 He did this to detach them from Nicias, and to discredit them before the people as men who had no honest intentions and never told the same story twice, so that he could make the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans allies. And so it happened.

4 When they came before the people and were questioned, they denied, contrary to what they had said in the council, that they had come with full powers. The Athenians would hear no more of them. Alcibiades denounced the Lacedaemonians far more vehemently than before, and the people listened; they were ready at once to bring forward the Argives and their companions and make them allies. But an earthquake occurred before anything was ratified, and this assembly was adjourned.

CHAPTER 46

1 At the assembly the next day, Nicias, though the Lacedaemonians themselves had been deceived and he too had been misled over their denial that they had come with full powers, nevertheless said that they should seek friendship with the Lacedaemonians instead. They should suspend the Argive negotiations, send another embassy to Lacedaemon, and learn what their intentions were. Postponing war, he argued, favored the Athenians and disadvantaged the

Lacedaemonians: since their own affairs were prospering, it was best to preserve that prosperity as long as possible, whereas for the Lacedaemonians, in their misfortune, an early trial of arms would be a welcome opportunity.

2 He persuaded them to send envoys, himself among them, to tell the Lacedaemonians that, if they intended to act justly, they must restore Panactum intact, restore Amphipolis, and abandon the Boeotian alliance unless the Boeotians entered the treaty, in accordance with the stipulation that neither party should make an agreement with anyone without the other.

3 The envoys were also instructed to say that, if the Athenians themselves had wished to act unjustly, they would already have made the Argives their allies: the Argives were present for that very purpose. They entrusted Nicias and his fellow envoys with all their other complaints as well, and sent them off.

4 When they arrived, they delivered their other messages and concluded by saying that, unless the Lacedaemonians abandoned their alliance with the Boeotians if these refused to enter the treaty, the Athenians too would make the Argives and their companions allies. The Lacedaemonians refused to abandon the Boeotian alliance: the ephor Xenares and his supporters, together with the others who shared their views, prevailed in securing this decision. At Nicias' request, however, they renewed the oaths. He feared that if he returned with nothing accomplished, he would be attacked—as indeed he was—because he was held responsible for the treaty with the Lacedaemonians.

5 When he returned and the Athenians heard that nothing had been achieved at Lacedaemon, they were immediately enraged. Believing themselves wronged, they concluded the following treaty and alliance with the Argives and their allies, who happened to be present and whom Alcibiades brought before the assembly.

CHAPTER 47

1 "The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans have made a treaty with one another for a hundred years, on behalf of themselves and the allies over whom each exercises authority, without fraud or injury, by land and by sea.

2 "Neither the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies shall be permitted to take up arms to harm the Athenians and the allies over whom the Athenians exercise authority, nor the Athenians and the allies over whom the Athenians exercise authority to harm the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies, by any artifice or contrivance whatever.

3 "The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans shall be allies for a hundred years on the following terms. If enemies invade the territory of the Athenians, the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans shall come to the aid of Athens when summoned by the Athenians, with the greatest force they can muster, to the extent of their ability. If the enemy departs after ravaging the land, that city shall be an enemy of the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, and shall be attacked by all these cities. No city shall be permitted to end the war against that city unless all agree.

4 "The Athenians shall likewise come to the aid of Argos, Mantinea, and Elis if enemies invade the territory of the Argives, Mantineans, or Eleans, when summoned by these cities, with the greatest force they can muster, to the extent of their ability. If the enemy departs after ravaging the land, that city shall be an enemy of the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, and shall be attacked by all these cities. No city shall be permitted to end the war against that city unless all [the cities] agree.

5 "They shall not allow armed men on a hostile expedition to pass through their own territory or that of the allies over whom each exercises authority, nor by sea, unless all the cities—the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans—have voted to grant passage.

6 "For forces coming to give aid, the city that sends them shall provide food for up to thirty days after their arrival in the city that has summoned them, and likewise on their return. If the city that summoned them wishes to employ the army for a longer period, it shall provide a food allowance of three Aeginetan obols each day for every hoplite, light-armed soldier, and archer, and one Aeginetan drachma for every cavalryman.

7 "The city that summoned the army shall have command when the war is in its own territory. If all the cities decide to undertake a campaign together elsewhere, all the cities shall share equally in the command.

8 "The Athenians shall swear to the treaty on behalf of themselves and their allies; the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and their allies shall swear city by city. Each shall swear its most binding local oath over full-grown sacrificial victims. The oath shall be this: 'I shall abide by the alliance according to the agreed terms, justly and without injury or deceit, and shall not transgress it by any artifice or contrivance whatever.'

9 "At Athens the council and the magistrates resident in the city shall swear, and the prytanes shall administer the oath. At Argos the council, the Eighty, and the artynae shall swear, and the Eighty shall administer the oath. At Mantinea the demiurges, the council, and the other magistrates shall swear, and the theori and polemarchs shall administer the oath. At Elis the demiurges, those holding the chief offices, and the Six Hundred shall swear, and the demiurges and guardians of the laws shall administer the oath.

10 "The Athenians shall go to Elis, Mantinea, and Argos to renew the oaths thirty days before the Olympic festival; the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to Athens ten days before the Great Panathenaea.

11 "The agreements concerning the treaty, the oaths, and the alliance shall be inscribed on a stone stele: by the Athenians on the Acropolis, by the Argives in the sanctuary of Apollo in the marketplace, and by the Mantineans in the sanc-

tuary of Zeus in the marketplace. They shall also jointly erect a bronze stele at Olympia at the present Olympic festival.

12 "If these cities think it better to add anything to the agreed terms, whatever all the cities decide upon in common deliberation shall be binding."

CHAPTER 48

1 Such were the terms on which the treaty and alliance were made. The treaty and alliance between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians were not on that account renounced by either party.

2 The Corinthians, though allies of the Argives, did not enter this agreement. Nor had they sworn to the alliance previously made by the Eleans, Argives, and Mantineans, which required them to make war and peace with the same states. They said that the original defensive alliance was enough for them: they would help one another, but join no one in an offensive campaign.

3 Thus the Corinthians drew apart from their allies and turned their thoughts once more toward the Lacedaemonians.

CHAPTER 49

1 The Olympic games were held that summer, at which Androsthenes the Arcadian won his first victory in the pancration. The Eleans excluded the Lacedaemonians from the sanctuary, forbidding them to sacrifice or compete, because they had not paid the fine imposed upon them by the Eleans under Olympic law. The charge was that they had taken up arms against the Eleans at the fort of Phyrcus and sent hoplites of their own into Lepreum during the Olympic truce. The fine was two thousand minas, two minas for each hoplite, as the law prescribed.

2 The Lacedaemonians sent envoys to contest the judgment as unjust, saying that the truce had not yet been proclaimed at Lacedaemon when they sent in the hoplites.

3 The Eleans replied that the truce was already in force among themselves, since they proclaimed it first to their own people. They had therefore been keeping quiet and expecting no attack, as they were under truce, when the Lacedaemonians struck them unawares in violation of it.

4 The Lacedaemonians countered that the Eleans ought not then to have proclaimed the truce at Lacedaemon if they already regarded them as offenders: their proclamation showed that they did not regard them so. Nor, they added, had they since taken up arms against the Eleans anywhere.

5 The Eleans held to their argument: they would not be persuaded that the Lacedaemonians had done no wrong. But if the Lacedaemonians were willing to restore Lepreum to them, they would remit their own share of the money and themselves pay on the Lacedaemonians' behalf the portion due to the god.

CHAPTER 50

1 When the Lacedaemonians would not agree, the Eleans made a further proposal: they need not restore Lepreum if they did not wish to, but, since they were eager to use the sanctuary, they should ascend the altar of Olympian Zeus and swear before the Greeks that they would indeed pay the fine later.

2 When they refused this too, the Lacedaemonians remained excluded from the sanctuary [from sacrifices and contests] and sacrificed at home. The rest of the Greeks, except the Lepreans, attended the festival.

3 Nevertheless, the Eleans feared that the Lacedaemonians might force their way in to sacrifice, and kept a guard of their younger men under arms. A thousand Argives and a thousand Mantineans also came to their aid, along with Athenian cavalry, who waited at Harpina during the festival.

4 The festival gathering was greatly afraid that the Lacedaemonians would come in arms, especially after Lichas son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedaemonian, was beaten by the rod-bearers at the games. His own team had won, but because he was forbidden to compete, it had been proclaimed as an entry of the Boeotian state. He had then come forward into the arena and placed a ribbon on the charioteer, wishing to show that the chariot was his. This made everyone much more alarmed, and they expected some fresh disturbance. The Lacedaemonians, however, kept quiet, and the festival passed off for them in this way.

5 After the Olympic games the Argives and their allies came to Corinth to ask the Corinthians to join them. Lacedaemonian envoys happened also to be present. Much was said, but in the end nothing was accomplished; an earthquake occurred, and they broke up and each returned home. And the summer came to an end.

CHAPTER 51

1 During the following winter the people of Heraclea in Trachis fought a battle against the Aenianians, Dolopians, Malians, and some of the Thessalians.

2 These neighboring peoples were hostile to the city, for it was on their own land, and no one else's, that the fortified settlement had been built. From the moment of its foundation they had opposed it, doing as much damage as they could; now they defeated the Heracleans in battle. Xenares son of Cnidis, their Lacedaemonian governor, was killed, and other Heracleans perished as well. And the winter came to an end, and the twelfth year of this war, came to an end.

CHAPTER 52

1 At the very beginning of the following summer the Boeotians took over Heraclea, which had been suffering severely since the battle, and expelled the Lacedaemonian Hagesippidas on the ground that he was governing badly.

They took possession of the place because they feared that, while the Lacedaemonians were distracted by troubles in the Peloponnese, the Athenians might seize it. The Lacedaemonians, however, were angry with them.

2 That same summer Alcibiades son of Clinias, now an Athenian general, came to the Peloponnese with a few Athenian hoplites and archers, with the cooperation of the Argives and the allies. Taking additional troops from the local allies, he marched through the Peloponnese with his army, helping to put the affairs of the alliance in order. He persuaded the people of Patrae to extend their walls down to the sea, and himself intended to build another fort at Achaean Rhium. But the Corinthians and Sicyonians, together with those who would be harmed by its fortification, came to the rescue and prevented it.

CHAPTER 53

1 During the same summer war broke out between the Epidaurians and Argives, ostensibly over the sacrificial victim due to Apollo Pythaeus, which the Epidaurians were obliged to deliver as a payment for grazing but had not sent. The Argives held the chief authority over the sanctuary. Even without this grievance, however, Alcibiades and the Argives thought it desirable to bring Epidaurus over to their side if they could, both to keep Corinth quiet and to give the Athenians a shorter route for bringing aid from Aegina than sailing around Scyllaeum. The Argives therefore prepared to invade Epidaurian territory themselves to exact the sacrificial offering.

CHAPTER 54

1 At about the same time the Lacedaemonians also marched out with their entire force to Leuctra, on their own frontier toward Mount Lycaeum, under the command of their king Agis son of Archidamus. No one knew their destination, not even the cities from which troops had been sent.

2 But when the sacrifices for crossing the frontier proved unfavorable, they returned home and sent word to their allies to prepare for a campaign after the coming month. This was Carneus, a sacred month for the Dorians.

3 After their withdrawal the Argives marched out on the fourth day from the end of the month preceding Carneus. Continuing to reckon it as that same day throughout, they invaded Epidaurian territory and ravaged it.

4 The Epidaurians appealed to their allies. Some pleaded the sacred month as an excuse; others actually came to the borders of Epidaurian territory but took no action.

CHAPTER 55

1 While the Argives were in Epidaurian territory, embassies from the cities gathered at Mantinea at the Athenians' invitation. In the discussions Euphamidas the Corinthian said that their words did not accord with their deeds: they were sitting together to discuss peace, while the Epidaurians and their allies stood under arms against the Argives. Delegates from both sides must therefore first go and disband the armies; then they could discuss peace again.

2 They accepted his advice, went, and brought the Argives out of Epidaurian territory. Later they met again in the same place, but even then could reach no agreement; instead, the Argives once more invaded Epidaurian territory and ravaged it.

3 The Lacedaemonians also marched out to Caryae, but when the sacrifices for crossing the frontier proved unfavorable there too, they withdrew.

4 After laying waste about a third of Epidaurian territory, the Argives returned home. A thousand Athenian hoplites also came to their aid, with Alcibiades as general. He had heard that the Lacedaemonians had taken the field; when the Athenians were no longer needed, he withdrew. And so the summer passed.

CHAPTER 56

1 During the following winter the Lacedaemonians, without the Athenians' knowledge, sent three hundred men by sea to garrison Epidaurus, with Hagesippidas as commander.

2 The Argives came to Athens and complained that, although the treaty stipulated that each party should prevent enemies from passing through its territory, the Athenians had allowed them to sail past by sea. Unless the Athenians in their turn brought the Messenians and Helots to Pylos to act against the Lacedaemonians, the Argives would consider themselves wronged.

3 Persuaded by Alcibiades, the Athenians added an inscription beneath the text on the Lacedaemonian treaty stele, stating that the Lacedaemonians had not kept their oaths. They brought the Helots from Cranii to Pylos to carry out raids, but otherwise took no action.

4 Throughout this winter, while the Argives and Epidaurians were at war, there was no pitched battle, but ambushes and raids, in which men on either side were killed as chance determined.

5 As winter was ending and spring already approaching, the Argives came against Epidaurus with ladders, intending to storm it by force, since it had been left deserted because of the war. They withdrew without accomplishing anything. And the winter came to an end, and the thirteenth year of this war, came to an end.

CHAPTER 57

1 At the midpoint of the following summer, the Lacedaemonians saw their allies the Epidaurians hard pressed, while elsewhere in the Peloponnese some states had revolted and others were unsettled. Believing that, unless they forestalled the danger at once, it would spread still further, they marched against Argos in full force, citizens and Helots alike. Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, commanded them.

2 With them marched the Tegeans and all the other Arcadians allied to the Lacedaemonians. Their allies from the rest of the Peloponnese and from outside it assembled at Phlius: five thousand Boeotian hoplites, as many light-armed troops, five hundred cavalry and an equal number of infantry trained to fight alongside the horsemen; two thousand Corinthian hoplites; and the contingents of the other states. The Phliasians served with their entire force, since the army was in their territory.

CHAPTER 58

1 The Argives had received advance warning of the Lacedaemonian preparations; when the Lacedaemonians moved toward Phlius to join the others, they too took the field. The Mantineans came to their aid with their own allies, as did three thousand Elean hoplites.

2 On their advance they met the Lacedaemonians at Methydrium in Arcadia. Each army occupied a hill. The Argives prepared to give battle while the Lacedaemonians were isolated, but Agis broke camp during the night and slipped away to join the other allies at Phlius.

3 When the Argives discovered this, they set out at dawn, first for Argos and then for the road through Nemea, by which they expected the Lacedaemonians and their allies to descend.

4 Agis, however, did not take the route they expected. He gave his orders to the Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians, and led them along another, difficult road down into the Argive plain. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians took a different, steep road. The Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians had orders to descend by the road through Nemea, where the Argives were stationed, so that, if the Argives went down to the plain to oppose Agis and his men, they could follow and bring their cavalry into play.

5 Having made these dispositions and entered the plain, Agis laid waste Saminthus and other places.

CHAPTER 59

1 On learning this, the Argives marched to the rescue from Nemea, by now in daylight. They encountered the Phliasian and Corinthian force and killed a few Phliasians, but themselves lost a somewhat greater number to the Corinthians.

2 The Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians advanced toward Nemea as they had been ordered, but no longer found the Argives there. The Argives had descended and, seeing their own land being ravaged, were drawing up for battle. The Lacedaemonians in turn prepared to face them.

3 The Argives were caught between the enemy forces. In the plain the Lacedaemonians and their companions cut them off from the city; above them stood the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellenians; and toward Nemea the Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Megarians. They had no cavalry with them, for the Athenians alone among their allies had not yet arrived.

4 The mass of the Argives and their allies did not think their present situation so dangerous. They believed instead that they would fight at an advantage, and had trapped the Lacedaemonians in their own country and close to their city.

5 But two Argives, Thrasyllus, one of the five generals, and Alciphron, the Lacedaemonians' representative at Argos, approached Agis when the armies were on the very point of meeting and urged him not to give battle. The Argives, they said, were ready to submit to and seek arbitration on equal and reciprocal terms over any charges the Lacedaemonians had against them, and to conclude a treaty and keep the peace thereafter.

CHAPTER 60

1 These Argives spoke on their own initiative, without instructions from the people. Agis too accepted their proposals on his own authority: he did not consult the larger body, but communicated only with one of the officials accompa-

nying the army. He concluded a truce for four months, within which they were to fulfill the terms discussed, and immediately led his army away without telling any of the other allies.

2 The Lacedaemonians and their allies followed his lead, as the law required, but among themselves they bitterly blamed Agis. They believed they had been offered a fine opportunity to fight, with the enemy hemmed in on every side by cavalry and infantry, yet were departing without having achieved anything worthy of their preparations.

3 For this was indeed the finest Greek army yet assembled. It was seen to best advantage while still concentrated at Nemea: the Lacedaemonians were there with their full levy, and with them Arcadians, Boeotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megarians, all picked men from their respective states. They seemed a match not only for the Argive alliance, but even for any further force that might join it.

4 Thus the army withdrew, blaming Agis, and dispersed, each contingent to its own home.

5 The Argives themselves blamed far more bitterly those who had made the truce without the people's consent. They too believed that they could never have had a finer opportunity, yet had let the Lacedaemonians escape: the contest would have taken place close to their own city, with many brave allies at their side.

6 On their return they began to stone Thrasyllus in the Charadrus, where they judge offenses committed on campaign before entering the city. He escaped death by taking refuge at the altar; his property, however, they confiscated.

CHAPTER 61

1 After this, a thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred cavalry arrived to help, commanded by Laches and Nicostratus. The Argives, still reluctant to break their truce with the Lacedaemonians, told them to leave and would not

bring them before the people when they asked to address it, until the Mantineans and Eleans, who were still there, compelled them by their entreaties.

2 With Alcibiades present as ambassador, the Athenians told the Argives and their allies that the truce had been wrongly concluded without the other allies, and that now, since they themselves had arrived at an opportune moment, they ought to take up the war.

3 Their arguments persuaded the allies, and all except the Argives immediately advanced against Orchomenus in Arcadia. The Argives, though persuaded, at first remained behind, but later they too came.

4 They all sat down before Orchomenus, besieging it and making assaults. They wished to win it over in any case, and in addition the Lacedaemonians had deposited hostages from Arcadia there.

5 The Orchomenians, alarmed at the weakness of their wall and the size of the army, and afraid that with no one coming to their aid they would perish before help arrived, agreed to become allies, to give the Mantineans hostages of their own, and to surrender those the Lacedaemonians had placed there.

CHAPTER 62

1 Now that they held Orchomenus, the allies debated which of their remaining objectives they should attack first. The Eleans urged Lepreum, the Mantineans Tegea; and the Argives and Athenians sided with the Mantineans.

2 Angry that the vote had gone against an attack on Lepreum, the Eleans withdrew home. The other allies made preparations in Mantinean territory to march on Tegea. Some of the inhabitants of that city were also working to betray it to them.

CHAPTER 63

1 After withdrawing from Argos under the four-month truce, the Lacedaemonians bitterly blamed Agis for failing to bring Argos into their power when, as they believed, the opportunity had been better than ever before. It was no easy matter, they said, to assemble so many allies of such quality.

2 When news also came that Orchomenus had fallen, their anger grew far fiercer. In their fury, contrary to their usual temper, they immediately considered razing his house and fining him a hundred thousand drachmas.

3 He begged them to do neither: on another campaign he would wipe out the charges against him by a worthy deed; otherwise they could then do as they pleased.

4 They suspended the fine and the demolition, but for the present enacted a law without precedent among them. They appointed ten Spartans as his advisers, without whose consent he was to have no authority to lead an army out of the city.

CHAPTER 64

1 Meanwhile a message reached them from their friends in Tegea: unless they came at once, Tegea would revolt from them to the Argives and their allies; indeed, it was all but in revolt already.

2 The Lacedaemonians thereupon marched to its relief, citizens and Helots in full force, with a speed and urgency never seen before.

3 They advanced to Orestheum in Maenalia, having instructed their Arcadian allies to assemble and follow close behind them to Tegea. Their whole force went as far as Orestheum; from there they sent home a sixth of their own men,

comprising the oldest and youngest, to guard their homeland, and reached Tegea with the rest of the army. Not long afterward their Arcadian allies arrived.

4 They also sent to Corinth and to the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians, ordering them to come with all speed to Mantinea. But these allies had little notice, and could not easily cross the enemy territory unless they waited for one another and marched together, for it barred their passage. They nevertheless pressed forward.

5 Taking with them the Arcadian allies who were present, the Lacedaemonians invaded Mantinean territory, encamped by the sanctuary of Heracles, and ravaged the land.

CHAPTER 65

1 When the Argives and their allies saw them, they occupied a strong position, difficult of approach, and drew up for battle.

2 The Lacedaemonians immediately advanced against them and came within a stone's throw or a javelin's cast. Then one of the older men, seeing them approach a formidable position, shouted to Agis that he was planning to cure one evil with another. He meant that Agis wished to make amends for his much-blamed withdrawal from Argos by this ill-timed eagerness now.

3 Whether because of this shout, or because some other thought, or the same thought, suddenly struck him, Agis quickly led the army back before the forces clashed.

4 Reaching the borders of Tegean territory, he began diverting the water into Mantinean land. This water, which usually damaged whichever territory it entered, was a cause of war between the Mantineans and Tegeans. His purpose was to bring [the Argives and their allies] down from the hill to counter the diversion when they learned of it, and to fight the battle on level ground.

5 He remained there that day, occupied in diverting the water. The Argives and their allies were at first astonished by the enemy's sudden retreat from so close at hand, and could not understand it. Then, when the retreating army disappeared and they themselves remained idle without following, they again began blaming their generals: previously they had let the Lacedaemonians go when they had them well caught near Argos; now no one pursued them as they slipped away, but the enemy were quietly saving themselves while they were being betrayed.

6 The generals were thrown into confusion at first, but afterward led them down from the hill and advanced onto the level ground, where they encamped, intending to move against the enemy.

CHAPTER 66

1 On the following day the Argives and their allies drew up in order, prepared to fight if they met the enemy. As the Lacedaemonians returned from the water to their former camp by the sanctuary of Heracles, they suddenly saw the enemy close at hand, already fully arrayed and advanced from the hill.

2 Never within their memory had the Lacedaemonians been more startled than at this moment. They had only the briefest interval in which to prepare; at once, in haste, they took up their accustomed formation, King Agis directing each movement according to established practice.

3 For when a king commands, all authority rests with him. He tells the polemarchs what must be done; they tell the regimental commanders; these tell the divisional commanders; they in turn tell the company commanders, and these the company.

4 Any orders they wish to give pass along the same channels and are quickly transmitted. For almost the entire Lacedaemonian army, with few exceptions, consists of officers commanding officers, and responsibility for carrying out a task rests with many men.

CHAPTER 67

1 On this occasion the Sciritae held their left wing, a position which, alone among the Lacedaemonians, they always occupy as a separate corps. Beside them stood the soldiers of Brasidas who had returned from Thrace, with the newly enfranchised Helots alongside them. Next the Lacedaemonians themselves formed their regiments in succession; beside them were the Heraeans of Arcadia, then the Maenalians. On the right wing were the Tegeans, with a few Lacedaemonians at the extreme end; their cavalry stood on either wing.

2 Such was the Lacedaemonian formation. Opposite them, the Mantineans held the right wing, since the battle was being fought in their country. Beside them stood their Arcadian allies, then the thousand picked Argives, whom the city had long trained for war at public expense. Next to these were the other Argives, followed by their allies, the Cleonaeans and Orneatae. Last came the Athenians, holding the extreme left wing, with their own cavalry beside them.

CHAPTER 68

1 Such were the order and equipment of the two armies; the Lacedaemonian force appeared the larger.

2 I could not give an exact account of the numbers on either side, whether by contingent or in all. The size of the Lacedaemonian force was unknown because of the secrecy of their government; the other's numbers were untrustworthy because people are naturally prone to boast of their own strength. Yet the following calculation makes it possible to estimate how many Lacedaemonians were present on this occasion.

3 Seven regiments fought, besides the six hundred Sciritae. Each regiment contained four divisions, each division four companies. Each company had four men fighting in its front rank. They did not all draw up to the same depth, but

each regimental commander arranged it as he wished; in general, however, they stood eight deep. Along the whole line, excluding the Sciritae, the first rank numbered four hundred and forty-eight men.

CHAPTER 69

1 When they were now about to meet, each contingent received exhortations of this kind from its own generals. The Mantineans were told that the battle would be for their homeland, and at the same time for dominion or slavery: they must not let the one be taken from them without a struggle, or taste the other again. The Argives were urged not to endure perpetual exclusion from their ancient leadership and the equal standing they had once enjoyed in the Peloponnese, and at the same time to avenge the many wrongs done them by men who were both their enemies and their neighbors. The Athenians were told that it would be honorable, fighting beside so many brave allies, to fall behind none of them; and that, if they defeated the Lacedaemonians in the Peloponnese, they would make their empire both more secure and greater, and no enemy would ever again invade their land.

2 Such were the exhortations to the Argives and their allies. The Lacedaemonians, individually and together with the martial songs they knew, called upon one another to remember their training and prove themselves brave. They understood that long practice in deeds brings greater safety than a fine exhortation in words delivered at short notice.

CHAPTER 70

1 After this the armies met. The Argives and their allies advanced with force and fury; the Lacedaemonians slowly, to the music of the many flute players stationed throughout their ranks—not for religious reasons, but so that they might approach with an even, rhythmic tread and their formation might not break apart, as large armies commonly do when advancing.

CHAPTER 71

1 While the armies were still approaching, King Agis decided on the following maneuver. All armies tend to do this: as they advance to meet, they push outward toward their right wings, and each side's right extends beyond the enemy's left. Fear makes each man draw his unshielded side as close as possible to the shield of the man stationed on his right, believing that the closer the ranks lock together, the better his protection. The front-rank man at the outer end of the right wing sets this movement going, always eager to keep his own unshielded side out of the enemy's reach; the rest follow from the same fear.

2 On this occasion the Mantineans' wing extended far beyond the Sciritae, while the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans extended still farther beyond the Athenians, in proportion to the greater size of their army.

3 Agis feared that his left wing would be encircled, and thought the Mantineans' overlap excessive. He therefore signaled the Sciritae and the soldiers of Brasidas to move outward from his own line and draw level with the Mantineans. To fill the resulting gap, he ordered the polemarchs Hipponoidas and Aristocles to bring their two regiments across from the right wing and take position there. He believed that his own right would still have strength to spare, while the line facing the Mantineans would be more secure.

CHAPTER 72

1 But since he gave these orders during the advance itself and at short notice, Aristocles and Hipponoidas refused to move across—a charge for which they were later banished from Sparta, being judged guilty of cowardice—and the enemy closed before the maneuver could be made. When the regiments did not come across, Agis ordered the Sciritae to rejoin his line; but by then they too could no longer close the gap.

2 Yet, on an occasion when their skill failed them more completely than ever, the Lacedaemonians proved no less victorious through courage.

3 For when they came to close quarters with the enemy, the Mantinean right routed their Sciritae and the soldiers of Brasidas. The Mantineans, their allies, and the thousand picked Argives poured into the gap that had not been closed, slaughtered the Lacedaemonians, surrounded and routed them, drove them back to the wagons, and killed some of the older men posted there.

4 On this side the Lacedaemonians were defeated. But with the rest of their army, and above all the center, where King Agis stood with the three hundred men around him known as the Horsemen, they fell upon the older Argives, known as the five regiments, the Cleonaeans, the Orneatae, and the Athenians drawn up beside them, and put them to flight. Most did not even wait for hand-to-hand fighting, but gave way as soon as the Lacedaemonians advanced; some were even trampled underfoot because they could not escape being overtaken.

CHAPTER 73

1 As the army of the Argives and their allies gave way here, its line was now breaking on either side. At the same time the overlapping right wing of the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans wheeled around the Athenians, who were threatened from both directions: on one side they were being encircled, on the other their line had already been defeated. They would have suffered more than any other part of the army had their cavalry not been there to help them.

2 It happened that Agis, on learning that his left wing was in trouble against the Mantineans and the thousand Argives, ordered his whole army to move toward the defeated part of his line.

3 When this happened and the army moved across and turned away from them, the Athenians escaped unmolested, along with the defeated Argives beside them. The Mantineans, their allies, and the picked Argives no longer thought of pressing the enemy: seeing their own side defeated and the Lacedaemonians bearing down on them, they turned to flight.

4 A greater number of the Mantineans were killed, but most of the picked Argives escaped. Yet the flight and withdrawal were neither hard pressed nor prolonged. Until they have routed an enemy, the Lacedaemonians fight long and steadfastly, holding their ground; once they have routed them, they pursue for only a short time and no great distance.

CHAPTER 74

1 Such, or as nearly as possible such, was the course of the battle: the greatest fought among Greeks for a very long time, and joined by the most important cities.

2 The Lacedaemonians set out the arms of the enemy dead, immediately erected a trophy, and stripped the bodies. They collected their own dead and carried them to Tegea, where they were buried, and returned those of the enemy under a truce.

3 Seven hundred Argives, Orneatae, and Cleonaeans were killed, two hundred Mantineans, and two hundred Athenians together with Aeginetans, as well as both generals. The Lacedaemonians' allies had not suffered enough to lose any considerable number. As for the Lacedaemonians themselves, the truth was difficult to discover, but about three hundred were said to have died.

CHAPTER 75

1 As the battle was about to take place, Pleistoanax, the other king, also marched to their aid with the older and younger men. He reached Tegea, but on learning of the victory withdrew.

2 The Lacedaemonians sent messengers to turn back the allies coming from Corinth and beyond the Isthmus. They themselves returned home, dismissed their allies, and celebrated the festival, for the time of the Carnea had come.

3 By this single deed they cleared themselves of the charges the Greeks were then bringing against them: cowardice because of the disaster on the island, and lack of judgment and slowness on other occasions. They had, it seemed, been humbled by fortune, but in resolve they were still the same men.

4 On the day before this battle, the Epidaurians had happened to invade Argive territory with their whole force, believing it undefended. They killed many of the Argive guards who had been left behind and had come out against them.

5 After the battle, three thousand Elean hoplites came to the aid of the Mantineans, together with a thousand Athenians in addition to those already there. All these allies at once marched against Epidaurus while the Lacedaemonians were celebrating the Carnea, divided the circuit of the city among themselves, and began building a wall around it.

6 The others abandoned the work, but the Athenians at once completed their assigned task of walling off the promontory where the sanctuary of Hera stood. They all contributed a garrison to this fortification, and then withdrew, each to their own city. And the summer ended.

CHAPTER 76

1 At the very beginning of the following winter, after celebrating the Carnea, the Lacedaemonians took the field and reached Tegea, from where they sent proposals for a settlement ahead to Argos.

2 They had already had friends there who wished to overthrow the democracy at Argos. Now that the battle had been fought, these men were far better able to persuade the mass of the people to accept an agreement. Their plan was first to make a treaty with the Lacedaemonians, then later an alliance, and only then to attack the democracy.

3 Lichas son of Arcesilaus, the Argives' representative at Sparta, came from the Lacedaemonians to Argos carrying two proposals: one setting out the terms if they wished to make war, the other if they wished to keep the peace. There was

much debate, for Alcibiades too happened to be present; but the men working for the Lacedaemonians, now daring to act openly as well, persuaded the Argives to accept the proposal for a settlement. It was as follows.

CHAPTER 77

1 "The assembly of the Lacedaemonians resolves to make an agreement with the Argives on these terms: they are to restore the children to the Orchomenians, the men to the Maenalians, and the men in Mantinea to the Lacedaemonians; they are to withdraw from Epidaurus and demolish the wall.

2 "If the Athenians do not withdraw from Epidaurus, they are to be enemies of the Argives and Lacedaemonians and of the allies of both.

3 "If the Lacedaemonians hold any children, they are to restore them to their respective cities.

4 "As for the offering to the god, if they wish, they are to leave the oath to the Epidaurians; otherwise they are to swear it themselves.

5 "The cities in the Peloponnese, small and great alike, are all to be independent according to their ancestral customs.

6 "If anyone from outside the Peloponnese enters Peloponnesian territory with hostile intent, they are to take counsel together and repel him in whatever way the Peloponnesians judge most just.

7 "The allies of the Lacedaemonians outside the Peloponnese are to enjoy the same terms as the Lacedaemonians, and the allies of the Argives the same terms as the Argives, retaining their own territory.

8 "They are to lay the terms before their allies and conclude the agreement if the allies approve. If the allies have any proposal to make, they are to send it home."

CHAPTER 78

1 The Argives first accepted this proposal, and the Lacedaemonian army withdrew from Tegea to return home. After this, with intercourse between the two sides now restored, the same men soon arranged for the Argives to abandon their alliance with the Mantineans, Athenians, and Eleans and make a treaty and alliance with the Lacedaemonians. Its terms were these.

CHAPTER 79

1 "The Lacedaemonians and Argives have resolved to maintain a treaty and alliance for fifty years, submitting their disputes to judgment on equal and reciprocal terms according to ancestral custom. The other cities in the Peloponnese are to share in the treaty and alliance as independent, self-governing cities, retaining their own territory and submitting their disputes to judgment on equal and reciprocal terms according to ancestral custom.

2 "The allies of the Lacedaemonians outside the Peloponnese are to enjoy the same terms as the Lacedaemonians; the allies of the Argives are to enjoy the same terms as the Argives, retaining their own territory.

3 "If a joint expedition is required anywhere, the Lacedaemonians and Argives are to take counsel and decide upon the course most just to their allies.

4 "If any of the cities, whether inside or outside the Peloponnese, have disputed claims about boundaries or anything else, these are to be adjudicated. If one allied city is at variance with another, they are to submit to a city which both regard as impartial. Private persons are to have their cases judged according to ancestral custom."

CHAPTER 80

1 Such was the treaty and alliance they had made; they also settled all questions arising from possessions taken from one another in war, and any other outstanding matters. Now conducting their affairs jointly, they voted to receive

neither herald nor embassy from the Athenians unless they withdrew from the Peloponnese, abandoning the fortifications, and to make no agreement with anyone, nor wage war, except together.

2 They pursued their other business with vigor, and both sent envoys to the places on the Thracian coast and to Perdiccas, whom they persuaded to join them in a sworn agreement. He did not, however, immediately break with the Athenians, but was considering it, seeing that the Argives too had done so; he himself was originally of Argive descent. They also renewed their old oaths with the Chalcidians and swore others.

3 The Argives also sent envoys to the Athenians, ordering them to abandon the fort at Epidaurus. The Athenians, seeing that their own men were few compared with the others sharing the garrison, sent Demosthenes to bring their men out. On his arrival, he arranged an athletic contest outside the fort as a pretext, and when the rest of the garrison had gone out, he shut the gates against them. Later the Athenians themselves renewed their treaty with the Epidaurians and handed over the fort.

CHAPTER 81

1 After the Argives withdrew from the alliance, the Mantineans too, though they held out at first, proved unable to continue without them; they also came to terms with the Lacedaemonians and relinquished their rule over the cities.

2 The Lacedaemonians and Argives made a joint expedition, a thousand men from each. The Lacedaemonians first went by themselves to Sicyon and placed its government in the hands of a still smaller number; afterward the two contingents together overthrew the democracy at Argos as well, and an oligarchy friendly to the Lacedaemonians was established. These events took place as spring approached and winter was ending, and the fourteenth year of this war, came to an end.

CHAPTER 82

1 The following summer the Dians on Athos revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidians, and the Lacedaemonians were settling affairs in Achaea, where the situation had previously been unfavorable to them.

2 Meanwhile the people of Argos gradually banded together, recovered their confidence, and attacked the oligarchs, choosing the very time of the Lacedaemonians' Gymnopaediae festival. A battle took place in the city; the people prevailed, killing some of their opponents and driving others into exile.

3 The Lacedaemonians had long failed to come while their friends were summoning them, but at last postponed the Gymnopaediae and set out to help. At Tegea they learned that the oligarchs had been defeated and refused to advance any farther, despite the entreaties of those who had escaped. They returned home and celebrated the Gymnopaediae.

4 Later, when envoys arrived both from those in the city [messengers] and from the Argives outside it, the allies were present, and much was said on either side. The Lacedaemonians judged those in the city to be in the wrong and resolved to march against Argos, but delays and postponements followed.

5 Meanwhile the people of Argos, fearing the Lacedaemonians and once more seeking an alliance with the Athenians, which they believed would help them most, began building long walls to the sea. Thus, if they were cut off from their land, they could benefit from supplies brought in by sea with Athenian assistance.

6 Some of the cities in the Peloponnese were also privy to the building of the walls. The Argives worked with their whole population—the men themselves, the women, and the slaves—and carpenters and stonemasons came to them from Athens. And the summer ended.

CHAPTER 83

1 The following winter, when the Lacedaemonians learned that the walls were being built, they marched against Argos with their allies except the Corinthians. They also had some negotiations already under way within Argos itself. The army was commanded by Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians.

2 The plans on which they believed they could count within the city made no further progress. They captured and demolished the walls under construction, took Hysiae, a place in Argive territory, and killed all the free men they captured there; then they withdrew and dispersed to their respective cities.

3 After this the Argives in turn marched into Phliasian territory, ravaged it, and departed, because the Phliasians had received their exiles, most of whom had settled there.

4 That same winter the Athenians also imposed a blockade on the Macedonians. They charged Perdiccas both with the sworn agreement he had made with the Argives and Lacedaemonians and with having betrayed his alliance when they had prepared to lead an army against the Chalcidians on the Thracian coast and Amphipolis under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus: the expedition had broken up chiefly because he withdrew. He was therefore an enemy. And this winter ended, and the fifteenth year of this war, came to an end.

CHAPTER 84

1 The following summer Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships and seized three hundred Argive men who were still considered suspect and sympathetic to the Lacedaemonians; the Athenians confined them on the neighboring islands under their rule. The Athenians also undertook an expedition against the island of Melos, with thirty ships of their own, six Chian and two Lesbian

ships, and twelve hundred of their own hoplites, three hundred archers, and twenty mounted archers, together with about fifteen hundred hoplites from their allies and the islanders.

2 The Melians are colonists of the Lacedaemonians and were unwilling to submit to the Athenians as the other islanders had. At first they remained neutral and kept quiet; afterward, when the Athenians tried to force them by ravaging their land, they entered into open war.

3 The generals, Cleomedes son of Lycomedes and Tisias son of Tisimachus, encamped in Melian territory with this force, but before doing any damage to the land they first sent envoys to open negotiations. The Melians did not bring these before the people, but instructed them to state the purpose of their visit before the magistrates and the few.

CHAPTER 85

1 The Athenian envoys spoke as follows. "Since our discussions are not to take place before the people, evidently to prevent the multitude from being deceived by hearing us deliver a persuasive and unchallenged speech all at once—for we understand that this is the intention behind our being brought before the few —you who sit here should make the procedure safer still. Do not yourselves reply in a single speech either, but consider each point in turn, immediately interrupting anything we say that seems unsatisfactory. First tell us whether this proposal pleases you."

CHAPTER 86

1 The Melian representatives answered: "We do not fault the fairness of calmly explaining our positions to one another. But the realities of war, already here and not merely impending, seem at odds with it. We see that you have come as

judges of what will be said, and that the likely outcome is war for us if our just case prevails and we refuse to yield because of it, but slavery if we are persuaded."

CHAPTER 87

1 Athenians: "If you have assembled to reckon with suspicions about the future, or for any purpose other than to deliberate on your city's preservation in the light of present circumstances and what you see before you, we might as well stop. If that is your purpose, we may proceed."

CHAPTER 88

1 Melians: "It is natural, and pardonable, for men in our position to turn to many arguments and many thoughts. Yet this meeting is indeed concerned with our preservation. Let the discussion proceed, if you wish, in the manner you propose."

CHAPTER 89

1 Athenians: "We, then, will not offer you a long, unconvincing argument dressed in noble language—claiming either that we deserve our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or that we are now attacking you because we have been wronged. Nor do we expect you to think you can persuade us by saying that, though colonists of the Lacedaemonians, you have not joined their campaigns, or that you have done us no wrong. Rather, we should work toward what is possible on the basis of what each side truly thinks. You know as well as we do that in human deliberations questions of justice are decided where the constraint on either side is equal; where power is unequal, the stronger carry through what they can, and the weak give way."

CHAPTER 90

1 Melians: "As we see it, at least, it is useful—for we must speak of advantage, since you have laid down that we should discuss it rather than justice—that you should not destroy the good common to all: that anyone who finds himself in danger should have the benefit of reasonable and just treatment, and that a man who makes a persuasive case should gain something even when his case falls short of the strictest standard. This concerns you no less than us, since, if you fell, your punishment would be the greatest and you would become an example to others."

CHAPTER 91

1 Athenians: "Even if our empire should end, we are not disheartened by the prospect of its fall. It is not those who rule over others, such as the Lacedaemonians, who are to be feared by the defeated—and our contest is not with the Lacedaemonians—but subjects who might themselves attack their former rulers and overcome them.

2 Athenians: "Let us bear that risk. We shall show you that we are here to benefit our empire and that what we now say is intended to preserve your city: we wish to rule you without trouble, and for you to survive to the advantage of us both."

CHAPTER 92

1 Melians: "And how could being enslaved prove as advantageous to us as ruling us would be to you?"

CHAPTER 93

1 Athenians: "Because you would submit before suffering the worst, while we would profit by not destroying you."

CHAPTER 94

1 Melians: "Would you not accept our remaining at peace, friends rather than enemies, but allies of neither side?"

CHAPTER 95

1 Athenians: "No: your enmity does us less harm than your friendship, which would be displayed to our subjects as evidence of our weakness, while your hatred would be evidence of our strength."

CHAPTER 96

1 Melians: "Do your subjects judge what is reasonable so indiscriminately that they put those who have no connection with you on the same footing as those whom you have subdued—most of them your colonists, some of them rebels?"

CHAPTER 97

1 Athenians: "They think neither group lacks a claim of right, but that some preserve their freedom through their strength, and that fear keeps us from attacking them. Thus your subjection would give us security as well as an extension of our rule, especially if you, islanders weaker than others, failed to hold out against us, the masters of the sea."

CHAPTER 98

1 Melians: "And do you see no security in the other course? Here again, since you have driven us away from arguments of justice and urge us to submit to your advantage, we too must explain what is useful to us and try to persuade you, if it happens to coincide with your interest. For how will you avoid making enemies of all who are now allied with neither side, when they look at this and con-

clude that one day you will come against them too? In doing so, what else are you doing but strengthening your existing enemies and bringing against you, unwillingly, men who had never even intended to become your enemies?"

CHAPTER 99

1 Athenians: "We do not regard as the more dangerous those on the mainland who, because they are free, will long put off taking precautions against us. We fear rather the islanders who, like you, are outside our rule, and those already embittered by its compulsion. These are the men most likely to abandon themselves to recklessness and bring both themselves and us into manifest danger."

CHAPTER 100

1 Melians: "Then surely, if you run such risks to keep your empire, and those already enslaved run them to escape it, it would be great baseness and cowardice for us, who are still free, not to try everything before becoming slaves."

CHAPTER 101

1 Athenians: "Not if you deliberate sensibly. Yours is not an equal contest in valor, in which you must avoid incurring disgrace; your deliberation concerns survival rather than honor—not resisting those far stronger than yourselves."

CHAPTER 102

1 Melians: "But we know that the fortunes of war sometimes allow a more equal chance than the disparity in numbers would suggest. For us, yielding means the immediate loss of hope; while we still act, there is hope that we may yet stand upright."

CHAPTER 103

1 Athenians: "Hope offers comfort in danger. Those who draw on it from a position of abundance it may injure, but does not destroy. Yet for those who stake their entire resources on it—for it is by nature extravagant—it reveals its character only when they fall, and leaves no means by which, once they have learned its nature, they may still guard against it.

2 Athenians: "You are weak, and your fate hangs on a single turn: do not choose this experience. Do not resemble the many who, while they could still save themselves by human means, find their visible hopes deserting them under pressure and turn instead to invisible ones—to divination, oracles, and everything of that kind which brings ruin together with hope."

CHAPTER 104

1 Melians: "We too, be assured, think it hard to contend against your power and against fortune, if fortune is not to be impartial. Nevertheless, we trust that the divine dispensation will not leave us worse off in fortune, since we stand as righteous men against the unjust; and that what we lack in strength will be supplied by our alliance with the Lacedaemonians, who are bound to help us, if for no other reason, at least through kinship and a sense of shame. Our confidence is not, then, altogether so irrational."

CHAPTER 105

1 Athenians: "We too believe that we shall not fall short in divine favor. For neither our claims nor our actions depart from what men believe about the gods or desire for themselves.

2 Athenians: "We believe of the divine, and know with certainty of mankind, that by an unvarying compulsion of nature they rule wherever they have the strength. We neither established this law nor were the first to use it once estab-

lished; we found it in existence and shall leave it to exist forever, and we make use of it, knowing that you too, and anyone else who possessed the same power as we do, would act in just the same way.

3 Athenians: "As far as the divine is concerned, then, we have reasonable grounds not to fear being at a disadvantage. As for your opinion of the Lacedaemonians, and your trust that a sense of shame will indeed make them help you, we congratulate you on your innocence but do not envy your folly.

4 Athenians: "In their dealings with one another and in their observance of their country's customs, the Lacedaemonians practice virtue to the highest degree. Much could be said of how they treat others, but the clearest summary is this: of all men known to us, they most conspicuously regard what pleases them as honorable and what profits them as just. Yet such an outlook does nothing to support the deliverance you now hope for so unreasonably."

CHAPTER 106

1 Melians: "On this very ground we place our greatest trust in their self-interest: they will not wish to betray the Melians, their own colonists, and so prove untrustworthy to the Greeks who favor them and useful to their enemies."

CHAPTER 107

1 Athenians: "Do you not think that advantage goes with safety, while justice and honor are practiced at a risk? And such risks the Lacedaemonians are, as a rule, least willing to take."

CHAPTER 108

1 Melians: "But we believe they would be more willing to undertake risks on our behalf, and would consider them more secure than risks for others, since for military operations we lie close to the Peloponnese, while in loyalty our kinship makes us more trustworthy than others."

CHAPTER 109

1 Athenians: "What gives men confidence when they join a struggle is not the goodwill of those who call them in, but a large superiority in effective strength. The Lacedaemonians attend to this even more than others: distrust of their own resources leads them to attack even their neighbors with many allies. They are therefore unlikely to cross over to an island while we command the sea."

CHAPTER 110

1 Melians: "They could also send others. The Cretan Sea is wide, and across it interception is harder for those who control the waters than safe passage is for those who wish to escape notice.

2 "And if they failed in this, they could turn against your land and against the rest of your allies, those whom Brasidas did not attack. Your struggle would then be not so much for a land with no connection to you as for your own territory and your alliance, which concern you more closely."

CHAPTER 111

1 Athenians: "You too might learn something of this by experience, though you know already that the Athenians have never yet withdrawn from a single siege through fear of others.

2 Athenians: "But we observe that, though you said you would deliberate on your preservation, in all this discussion you have said nothing on which men might rely and believe they would be saved. Your strongest supports lie in the future, objects of hope, while your present resources are too slight to overcome what is already arrayed against you. You display great irrationality of judgment, unless, after asking us to withdraw, you still arrive at some wiser decision than this.

3 Athenians: "Surely you will not turn to that sense of shame which so often destroys men amid dangers both disgraceful and plain to see. For many, even while foreseeing where they were being carried, have been drawn on by what is called disgrace: conquered by the seductive power of a word, they have willingly fallen into irreparable disasters in deed, and incurred through folly a shame more shameful than any brought by misfortune.

4 Athenians: "You will guard against this if you deliberate well. You will not think it unbecoming to yield to the greatest city when it offers moderate terms —to become its allies, retaining your own land and paying tribute—nor, when offered a choice between war and safety, will you insist upon the worse. Those who do not yield to their equals, who deal well with their superiors, and who are moderate toward those beneath them are the most likely to prosper.

5 Athenians: "Consider this, then, even after we have withdrawn, and reflect repeatedly that you are deciding the fate of your country. You have only one, and upon a single decision will depend its good fortune or its ruin."

CHAPTER 112

1 The Athenians withdrew from the discussion. Left to themselves, the Melians reached much the same decision as they had maintained in argument, and answered as follows.

2 "Our judgment, Athenians, is no different from what it was at first. We will not, in a brief moment, strip of its freedom a city that has now been inhabited for seven hundred years. Trusting in the divinely granted fortune that has preserved it until now, and in the help of men, the Lacedaemonians, we shall try to save ourselves.

3 "We invite you to let us be friends, but enemies of neither side, and to withdraw from our land after making a treaty on terms that seem suitable to us both."

CHAPTER 113

1 Such was the Melians' answer. As the Athenians now broke off the discussion, they said: "To judge from these decisions, you alone, it seems to us, regard the future as more certain than what is before your eyes, and see the unseen as already happening simply because you wish it so. You have staked most on the Lacedaemonians, on fortune, and on hopes; and because you have trusted most, you will suffer the greatest fall."

CHAPTER 114

1 The Athenian envoys returned to the army. Since the Melians would make no concession, the generals at once turned to war and, dividing the work among the contingents from the different cities, enclosed the Melians with a wall on every side.

2 Later the Athenians left a guard of their own men and their allies, both on land and at sea, and withdrew with the greater part of the army. Those left behind remained and besieged the place.

CHAPTER 115

1 At about the same time the Argives invaded Phliasian territory and were ambushed by the Phliasians and their own exiles; about eighty of them were killed.

2 The Athenians operating from Pylos took much plunder from the Lacedaemonians. In response, the Lacedaemonians waged war on them without even then renouncing the treaty, and proclaimed that any of their people who wished could plunder the Athenians.

3 The Corinthians also fought the Athenians over certain disputes of their own, while the other Peloponnesians remained quiet.

4 The Melians made a night attack and captured the part of the Athenians' encircling wall facing the marketplace. They killed some men, brought in grain and as many other useful supplies as they could, then withdrew and remained quiet. Thereafter the Athenians made better arrangements for their guard. And the summer ended.

CHAPTER 116

1 The following winter the Lacedaemonians intended to invade Argive territory, but when their crossing sacrifices [sacrifices at the frontier] proved unfavorable, they turned back. Because of this intention the Argives suspected certain men within the city and arrested some of them, while others escaped them.

2 At about the same time the Melians again captured another part of the Athenians' encircling wall, where few of the guards were present.

3 Afterward, as these things were happening, another army arrived from Athens under Philocrates son of Demeas. Now besieged with full force, and with some treachery also at work, the Melians surrendered voluntarily to the Athenians, leaving them to decide their fate.

4 The Athenians killed all the Melian men of fighting age whom they captured, and enslaved the children and women. They settled the place themselves, later sending five hundred colonists.

Book 6



CHAPTER 1

1 During the same winter the Athenians again wished to sail against Sicily, with a force greater than the one under Laches and Eurymedon, and conquer it if they could. Most of them knew nothing of the island's size or the number of its inhabitants, both Greeks and barbarians, or that they were taking on a war scarcely less formidable than their war against the Peloponnesians.

2 For a merchant ship, the voyage around Sicily takes not much less than eight days; yet, large as it is, a stretch of sea measuring some twenty stades keeps it from being part of the mainland.

CHAPTER 2

1 Its settlement in ancient times followed this course, and these were all the peoples it contained. The earliest inhabitants of a part of the country are said to have been the Cyclopes and Laestrygonians. I cannot say what people they belonged to, where they came from, or where they went. Let what the poets have said, and whatever anyone may think about them, suffice.

2 After them, the Sicani appear to have been the first settlers—though they themselves claim to have come earlier still, since they are indigenous. The truth, as inquiry establishes it, is that they were Iberians, driven by the Ligurians from the river Sicanus in Iberia. From them the island, previously called Trinacria, then took the name Sicania. They still inhabit the western parts of Sicily today.

3 When Ilium was captured, some of the Trojans escaped the Achaeans and reached Sicily in ships. Settling beside the Sicani, they were collectively called Elymi; their cities were Eryx and Egesta. Some Phocians also joined their settlement: on their voyage from Troy at that time, a storm had carried them first to Libya and then from there to Sicily.

4 The Sicels crossed into Sicily from Italy, where they had been living, as fugitives from the Opicans. According to the likely and accepted account, they crossed on rafts, watching for a wind down the strait; though they may perhaps have sailed over in some other way. There are still Sicels in Italy today, and the country took its name, Italy, from a king of the Sicels called Italus.

5 They came to Sicily as a great host, defeated the Sicani in battle, and drove them back toward its southern and western regions. They caused the island to be called Sicily instead of Sicania, and occupied and settled the best of the land after their crossing, nearly three hundred years before the Greeks came to Sicily. They still hold the central and northern parts of the island today.

6 The Phoenicians too had settlements all around Sicily, occupying headlands on the sea and the little islands offshore for trade with the Sicels. But when the Greeks began coming overseas in large numbers, they abandoned most of these places and concentrated their settlements at Motya, Soloeis, and Panormus, near the Elymi. They relied on their alliance with the Elymi and on the fact that from there the voyage between Sicily and Carthage is shortest. Such, then, were the barbarian peoples that settled Sicily, and such the manner of their settlement.

CHAPTER 3

1 The first Greeks to settle were Chalcidians from Euboea, who sailed over with Thucles as their founder and established Naxos. They set up the altar of Apollo Archegetes which now stands outside the city; sacred envoys setting sail from Sicily first sacrifice upon it.

2 In the following year Archias, one of the Heraclids, came from Corinth and founded Syracuse. He first drove the Sicels out of the island on which the inner city now stands, though it is no longer surrounded by water. Later the outer city too was enclosed within the walls and grew populous.

3 In the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse, Thucles and the Chalcidians set out from Naxos, expelled the Sicels by force, and founded Leontini, and after it Catana. The Catanaeans themselves appointed Euarchus as their founder.

CHAPTER 4

1 About the same time Lamis also arrived in Sicily, leading a colony from Megara. He founded a place called Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas; later he moved from there to Leontini, where his people briefly shared citizenship with the Chalcidians, before being expelled by them. He then founded Thapsus, where he himself died. The others left Thapsus and, with Hyblon, a Sicel king, giving them the land and guiding them there, founded the settlement whose people were called the Hyblaean Megarians.

2 After living there for two hundred and forty-five years, they were driven from their city and territory by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse. Before their expulsion, a hundred years after their own settlement, they had founded Selinus, sending out Pamillus, who came from Megara, their mother city, and helped establish the colony.

3 Gela was founded jointly by Antiphemus from Rhodes and Entimus from Crete, who brought settlers there in the forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse. The city took its name from the river Gelas, but the site on which the city now stands, the first part to be fortified, is called Lindii. Dorian institutions were established for them.

4 About a hundred and eight years after their own settlement, the Geloans founded Acragas. They named the city after the river Acragas, appointed Aristonous and Pystilus as its founders, and gave it the institutions of Gela.

5 Zancle was originally founded by pirates who came from Cumae, a Chalcidian city in Opicia. Later a large body of settlers came from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea and shared in the division of the land. Its founders were Perieres and Crataemenes, the one from Cumae, the other from Chalcis. Its original name was Zancle, given it by the Sicels because the site is shaped like a sickle—the Sicels call a sickle a zanclon. Later the inhabitants were expelled by Samians and other Ionians who, fleeing the Medes, had come to Sicily.

6 Not long afterward Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, expelled the Samians, settled the city himself with a mixed population, and renamed it Messene after his own ancestral homeland.

CHAPTER 5

1 Himera was founded from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon. Most of those who joined the colony were Chalcidians, but some exiles from Syracuse, called the Myletidae, who had been defeated in civil strife, settled with them. Their speech became a mixture of Chalcidian and Doric, but Chalcidian institutions prevailed.

2 Acrae and Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans: Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmenae nearly twenty years after Acrae.

3 Camarina too was first founded by the Syracusans, about a hundred and thirty-five years after the foundation of Syracuse. Its founders were Dascon and Menecolus. When the Camarinaeans revolted, the Syracusans drove them out in war. Later Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, received the territory of Camarina as ransom for Syracusan prisoners of war, and himself became its founder, resettling the city. It was again depopulated by Gelon, and was settled for the third time by the Geloans.

CHAPTER 6

1 So many peoples, Greek and barbarian, inhabited Sicily; and this was the island against which the Athenians were eager to campaign. Their truest motive was the desire to rule it all, though they also wished, under a fair pretext, to assist their own kinsmen and the allies who had since joined them.

2 Above all, they were stirred to action by envoys from Egesta who were present and appealed to them with particular urgency. Egesta bordered on Selinus, and the two had gone to war over certain marriage disputes and contested land. The Selinuntians had brought in the Syracusans as allies and were pressing them hard in the war both on land and at sea. The Egestaeans therefore reminded the Athenians of the alliance with the Leontines made in the time of Laches and the earlier war, and begged them to send ships to their aid. Among their many arguments, the chief was this: if the Syracusans went unpunished for driving out the Leontines, and destroyed the remaining allies of Athens until they themselves held the entire power of Sicily, there was a danger that one day they would bring a great force to aid the Peloponnesians—as Dorians helping their Dorian kin, and as colonists helping those who had sent them out—and join in overthrowing Athenian power as well. It was prudent, they said, to resist the Syracusans with the allies who still remained, especially since they themselves would provide ample money for the war.

3 The Athenians heard these arguments repeatedly in their assemblies, both from the Egestaeans and from those who spoke in their support. They voted first to send envoys to Egesta to examine whether the money really existed in the public treasury and the temples, as was claimed, and at the same time to learn how matters stood in the war against Selinus.

CHAPTER 7

1 The Athenian envoys were accordingly sent to Sicily. During the same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, except the Corinthians, marched into Argive territory. They ravaged a small part of the land and carried away some grain, bringing teams of animals to transport it. They settled the Argive exiles in Orneae and left a few men from the rest of their army with them; then, after concluding a truce for a specified period, under which the Orneatae and Argives were not to harm one another's territory, they withdrew their army home.

2 Not long afterward the Athenians arrived with thirty ships and six hundred hoplites. The Argives marched out in full force with them and besieged the people in Orneae for a day. But at night, when the army had encamped some distance away, those inside Orneae escaped. The next day, when the Argives discovered this, they razed Orneae and withdrew; later the Athenians too sailed home.

3 The Athenians also transported cavalry by sea to Methone, on the border of Macedonia—both their own cavalry and the Macedonian exiles living among them—and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas.

4 The Lacedaemonians sent to the Chalcidians in Thrace, who were observing ten-day truces with the Athenians, and urged them to join Perdiccas in the war; but they refused. The winter ended, and the sixteenth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

CHAPTER 8

1 At the start of the next campaigning season, with the coming of spring, the Athenian envoys returned from Sicily, accompanied by the Egestaeans, who brought sixty talents of uncoined silver as a month's pay for the sixty ships they intended to ask Athens to send.

2 The Athenians held an assembly and heard from the Egestaeans and their own envoys much that was alluring but untrue, including the claim that great sums of money lay ready in the temples and the public treasury. They voted to send sixty ships to Sicily, with Alcibiades son of Clinias, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Lamachus son of Xenophanes as generals with full powers. They were to help the Egestaeans against Selinus, to assist in resettling the Leontines if the war afforded them an opportunity, and to conduct the other affairs of Sicily as they judged best for Athens.

3 On the fifth day after this, another assembly was held to consider how the ships could be made ready most quickly, and to vote the generals anything further they might need for the voyage.

4 Nicias had been chosen to command against his will. He thought the city's decision mistaken: on a slight but plausible pretext it was reaching for all Sicily, an immense undertaking. He came forward, wishing to turn the Athenians from their purpose, and advised them as follows.

CHAPTER 9

1 "This assembly was called to discuss our preparations and how we are to sail to Sicily. Yet I think we must still examine the question itself—whether it is better to send the ships at all—and not, after so little deliberation on matters so great, be persuaded by men of another race to take up a war that does not concern us.

2 "Such an enterprise brings me honor, and I have less fear for my own life than others—though I consider a man no less a good citizen for taking some thought for his life and property: such a man, for his own sake, will be espe-

cially eager for the city to prosper too. Nevertheless, I have never in the past spoken against my judgment for the sake of greater honor, nor shall I now; I shall say what I judge best.

3 "With your temperament, my words would carry little weight if I urged you to preserve what you possess and not risk what is already yours for things unseen and still to come. But I shall show you that your haste is ill-timed, and that what you have set your hearts on will not be easy to hold.

CHAPTER 10

1 "For I maintain that you are leaving many enemies behind you here, and wish to sail there and bring still others upon yourselves.

2 "You perhaps imagine that the treaty you have made has some security. So long as you remain quiet, it will be a treaty in name—such is the arrangement men both here and among our opponents have contrived. But if we suffer a reverse anywhere with a substantial force, our enemies will be quick to attack us. In the first place, misfortunes forced them to make the agreement from a position more humiliating than ours; and then, even within the agreement itself, there are many points in dispute between us.

3 "There are some who have not yet accepted even this settlement, and they are not the weakest. Some are openly at war with us; others, only because the Lacedaemonians still remain quiet, are themselves held back by ten-day truces.

4 "If they should find our strength divided—as we are now hastening to divide it—they might very readily join the Siceliots in attacking us; in the past they would have prized an alliance with them above many other things.

5 "We must therefore give these matters some thought, and not choose to run risks while the city hangs in uncertainty, or reach for another empire before we have secured the one we hold. The Chalcidians in Thrace, after so many years of revolt, are still unsubdued, and some of our other subjects on the mainland

offer only doubtful obedience. Yet we rush to the aid of the Egestaeans, on the grounds that they are our allies and are being wronged, while still delaying to defend ourselves against those whose long-standing revolt wrongs us here.

CHAPTER 11

1 "And yet, if we subdued these people, we could hold them; whereas even if we defeated the others, their distance and their numbers would make them hard to rule. It is folly to attack a people whom victory will not enable us to hold, while failure will leave us worse off than before we undertook the venture.

2 "As for the Siceliots, it seems to me that, in their present circumstances, they would become still less dangerous to us if the Syracusans ruled them—the very prospect with which the Egestaeans most seek to frighten us.

3 "As things stand, their separate cities might perhaps come to gratify the Lacedaemonians; but in that other situation, one empire would hardly march against another. For just as they might join the Peloponnesians in taking our empire away, so they might expect their own to be overthrown by those same people in the same fashion.

4 "The Greeks there would hold us in the greatest awe if we did not come at all; next best would be to display our strength and leave after a short time. We all know that what is farthest away, and has least put its reputation to the test, is most admired. But if we suffered any reverse, they would quickly despise us and join our enemies here in attacking us.

5 "That is precisely your present attitude, Athenians, toward the Lacedaemonians and their allies. Because, contrary to your expectations and your original fears, you have gained the upper hand over them, you now despise them and reach out for Sicily as well.

6 "But we must not let our enemies' misfortunes elate us: confidence should come only when we have thwarted their designs. Nor should we imagine that the Lacedaemonians, stung by their disgrace, are thinking of anything but how,

even now, they may, if they can, bring us down and redeem their own dishonor. The more so because they prize their reputation for valor above all else and have cultivated it longest.

7 "If we are prudent, then, our struggle is not over the Egestaeans in Sicily, a barbarian people, but over how to keep a vigilant guard against a city whose oligarchy plots against us.

CHAPTER 12

1 "We must also remember that we have only lately gained a little respite from a great plague and from war, enough to recover somewhat in wealth and manpower. It is right to expend these resources here on ourselves, not on these exiles who beg for aid. For them it pays to lie persuasively, risking their neighbor's lives while contributing nothing but words: if they succeed, they can repay us with inadequate gratitude; if they fail, they can drag their friends into ruin with them.

2 "And if someone, delighted to have been chosen to command, urges you to sail with an eye only to his own interest—especially one still too young for command, who wants admiration for his horse breeding and, because of his extravagance, some profit from his office—do not enable him to glorify himself at the city's peril. Recognize that such men harm the public interest and squander their private fortunes, and that this undertaking is great, not one for a young man to plan and hastily execute.

CHAPTER 13

1 "I am alarmed to see men of this kind sitting here now at that same man's summons, and I call in turn upon the older men. If one of them sits beside you, do not be ashamed to vote against war for fear of seeming a coward; nor fall, as they may, into a perverse passion for distant things. Understand that desire brings the fewest successes, foresight the most. Cast your votes against the expe-

dition for your country's sake, since she is hazarding the greatest danger she has ever faced. Vote to let the Siceliots retain their own possessions and settle their affairs among themselves, keeping the present boundaries between them and us —boundaries that give no cause for complaint: the Ionian Gulf for one sailing along the coast, and the Sicilian Sea for one crossing open water.

2 "Tell the Egestaeans separately that, since they began their war with Selinus without the Athenians, they should also end it on their own. And in future let us not make allies as we have been accustomed to do—people whom we must defend when they fare badly, but from whom we shall obtain no assistance when we ourselves need it.

CHAPTER 14

1 "And you, presiding officer, if you believe it your duty to care for the city and wish to prove a good citizen, put this to the vote and bring the question before the Athenians again. If you fear to reopen the vote, reflect that with so many witnesses you would incur no charge of breaking the laws, but would become the physician of a city that has made a bad decision. Good government means this: to benefit one's country as much as possible, or at least to do it no deliberate harm."

CHAPTER 15

1 Such was Nicias' speech. Most of the Athenians who came forward urged that the expedition should go ahead and the resolution stand, though some spoke against it.

2 Alcibiades son of Clinias was the most ardent advocate of the expedition. He wished to oppose Nicias, with whom he differed on other matters of policy as well, and who had spoken of him disparagingly; above all, he longed to com-

mand, hoping that through him Sicily and Carthage would be conquered, and that his success would at the same time advance his private wealth and reputation.

3 For although he enjoyed high standing among the citizens, his passions outran his existing fortune, both in his horse breeding and in his other expenditure. This, indeed, contributed greatly to the later downfall of the Athenian city.

4 The people took fright at the scale of the lawlessness in his personal way of life and at the ambition he displayed in every particular undertaking. They became his enemies, believing that he aspired to tyranny; and although his public conduct of the war was excellent, each man's private resentment of his habits led them to entrust affairs to others, and before long they brought the city to disaster.

5 At this time, however, he came forward and advised the Athenians as follows.

CHAPTER 16

1 "Athenians, I have a better claim than others to command—I must begin here, since Nicias has attacked me—and I believe myself worthy of it as well. For the things that make me notorious bring glory to my ancestors and myself, and benefit to my country too.

2 "The splendor of my presence at Olympia made the Greeks judge our city greater even than its actual strength, whereas before they had expected it to be exhausted by the war. For I entered seven chariots, more than any private citizen had ever entered before, and won first, second, and fourth places; in everything else too I made provision worthy of my victory. Such things bring honor by convention, but from the deed itself people also infer power.

3 "Again, whatever distinction I gain in the city through financing choruses or any other means naturally arouses envy among my fellow citizens; but to foreigners this too appears as strength. It is no useless folly when a man, at his own expense, benefits not himself alone but his city as well.

4 "Nor is it unjust that a man proud of himself should refuse to stand on an equal footing with others, since a man in adversity has no one to share his misfortune equally. Just as we receive no greeting when we are unfortunate, so a man must in fairness endure the contempt of the prosperous—or else give equal treatment before demanding it in return.

5 "I know that men of this kind, and all who have stood out in some form of splendor, are troublesome in their own lifetime, above all to their equals, but also to others with whom they associate. Yet they leave behind them a legacy that makes some later men claim kinship with them even where none exists; and their own country boasts of them, not as strangers or men who went astray, but as her own sons who achieved great things.

6 "These are the things I aspire to, and for which I am denounced in private life. But examine whether I manage public affairs worse than anyone else. I brought together the strongest powers in the Peloponnese, without great risk or expense to you, and forced the Lacedaemonians to stake everything upon a single day's battle at Mantinea. Though they won that battle, even now they have not recovered a settled confidence.

CHAPTER 17

1 "It was my youth and supposedly monstrous folly that achieved this, confronting the power of the Peloponnesians with fitting arguments and winning assent by the trust my ardor inspired. Do not be afraid of it now either: while I am still in my prime, with this spirit, and Nicias is thought fortunate, make full use of what each of us can offer.

2 "Do not reverse your decision to sail to Sicily on the grounds that you will be facing a great power. The cities are populous, but their crowds are mixed, and they readily change their citizen bodies and admit newcomers.

3 "For this reason no one equips himself with arms, or makes the usual improvements to his land, as he would for a homeland of his own. Instead, each man prepares to get what he thinks he can from the common stock, either by persuasive speech or by civil strife, and to settle in another land if he fails.

4 "Such a crowd is unlikely either to hear counsel with a single mind or to act in concert. Rather, each group would quickly come over to us if it heard something to its liking, especially if they are torn by civil strife, as we are told.

5 "Nor have they as many hoplites as they boast. The other Greeks too proved less numerous than each people's own reckoning claimed: Hellas had grossly miscalculated its numbers, and in this war barely mustered an adequate force of hoplites.

6 "Such, from what I hear, is the situation there, and it will prove easier still—for we shall have many barbarians who, out of hatred for the Syracusans, will join us in attacking them. Nor will affairs here stand in our way, if you decide wisely.

7 "Our fathers acquired the empire with these very men as enemies, the same men we are now told we shall be leaving behind if we sail, and with the Mede as their enemy besides. Their strength lay in nothing but their superiority at sea.

8 "Never yet have the Peloponnesians had less hope of defeating us than now. Even if they are at full strength, they can invade our land whether we sail or not; but they could do us no harm at sea, for we still have a fleet left that is a match for theirs.

CHAPTER 18

1 "What reasonable plea, then, could we offer either for shrinking from the undertaking ourselves or for refusing our allies there the help they ask? We are bound to defend them, especially since we have sworn to do so, and must not object that they, in turn, give us no help. We did not take them into alliance to bring their help here, but so that, by harassing our enemies there, they might prevent them from coming here against us.

2 "This is how we acquired our empire, and how all others who have held empire acquired theirs: by readily coming to the aid of those, barbarian or Greek, who called upon them. If everyone remained inactive or quibbled over which peoples deserved assistance, we should add little to our empire and put what we already hold in greater danger. For it is not enough to repel a stronger power when it attacks; one must forestall its attack as well.

3 "We cannot measure out exactly how far we wish to rule. Having reached our present position, we must plot against some and keep our hold on others, since we risk being ruled ourselves if we do not rule others. Nor can you judge the attractions of a quiet life by the same standard as other peoples, unless you also mean to adopt their ways.

4 "Let us therefore reckon that an expedition there will rather strengthen our position here, and make the voyage. We shall humble the Peloponnesians' pride if we show ourselves willing to disregard our present respite and sail even to Sicily. At the same time, with the resources there added to ours, we shall probably rule all Greece, or at least cripple the Syracusans, to our own advantage and our allies'.

5 "Our ships will give us the security either to remain, if matters prosper, or to leave: for we shall command the sea even against all the Siceliots together.

6 "Do not let the inactivity Nicias advocates, or his attempt to divide the young from the old, turn you aside. In the accustomed harmony by which our fathers, young and old deliberating together, raised our affairs to their present height, strive now, in the same way, to advance the city. Remember that youth and age can accomplish nothing without each other, but that lesser ability, middling ability, and the most exact intelligence, blended together, have their greatest strength. A city that remains inactive will wear itself away from within, like anything else, and its knowledge of every art will grow old; through continual struggle it will gain experience and become accustomed to defending itself in deed rather than in word.

7 "In short, my judgment is that nothing could ruin an active city more quickly than a change to inactivity, and that people live most securely when their political conduct departs least from their established customs and laws, even if these are inferior."

CHAPTER 19

1 Such were Alcibiades' words. The Athenians, after hearing him and the Egestaeans and the exiles from Leontini, who came forward to plead with them, invoke their oaths, and beg for help, were far more eager than before to undertake the expedition.

2 Nicias saw that he could no longer turn them aside by repeating his arguments, but thought that the scale of the preparations might change their minds if he demanded a large force. He came forward again and spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 20

1 "Since I see, Athenians, that you are wholly bent on this expedition, may it turn out as we wish. For the present, however, I shall tell you what I think.

2 "From what I learn by report, we are about to attack great cities, neither subject to one another nor in need of the sort of change by which someone might gladly pass from forcible enslavement to an easier condition. They are unlikely to exchange freedom for our rule; and their Greek cities are numerous for a single island.

3 "Besides Naxos and Catana, which I hope will join us because of their kinship with the Leontines, there are seven others, all equipped in almost every respect on a scale comparable to our own power—not least Selinus and Syracuse, the chief objects of our voyage.

4 "They have many hoplites, archers, and javelin throwers, many triremes, and a population to man them. They have money in private hands; the Selinuntians also have funds in their temples, while the Syracusans receive contributions from certain barbarian peoples. Above all, they surpass us in possessing many horses and in living on grain grown at home, not imported.

CHAPTER 21

1 "Against such a power we need more than a fleet with a paltry army: a large infantry force must sail with us, if we are to do anything worthy of our design and not be kept off the land by their numerous cavalry. This is especially true if fear unites the cities and we find no friends other than the Egestaeans to supply cavalry with which to meet theirs

2 "—for it would be shameful to be driven away or to send back later for reinforcements because our original decision was ill considered. We must set out from here with adequate equipment, recognizing that we are to sail far from our own country. This will not be like your campaigns here, when you went as allies against one of our subjects and could readily obtain whatever else you needed from friendly territory. We shall cut ourselves off in a land entirely foreign, from which not even a messenger could easily reach us in the four winter months.

CHAPTER 22

1 "We must therefore, in my judgment, take many hoplites, both our own and our allies'—from our subject allies, and from the Peloponnese if we can persuade or hire any there. We need many archers and slingers to hold out against their cavalry, and an overwhelming superiority in ships, so that we can import supplies more easily. We must also bring grain from home in merchant ships, both wheat and roasted barley, and paid breadmakers conscripted by quota from the mills, so that, if weather prevents our sailing anywhere, the army will have provisions: so large an army cannot be accommodated by every city. We

must prepare everything else as fully as possible and not put ourselves in others' hands; above all, we must take as much money as possible from home. As for the funds of the Egestaeans, said to be waiting there, assume that they are waiting chiefly in words.

CHAPTER 23

1 "For if we sail from here equipped not merely to match them—except, of course, in their fighting arm, the hoplites—but to surpass them in every other respect, only then shall we just be able to overcome the enemy and preserve our own forces.

2 "We must consider ourselves settlers going to found a city among foreign and hostile peoples: men who must master the country on the very day they land, or know that, if they fail, everything around them will be hostile.

3 "That is what I fear. I know that much will depend on sound judgment on our part, and still more on good fortune—a hard demand to make, being human. I therefore wish to sail entrusting myself as little as possible to fortune, but secured, so far as reasonable expectation allows, by our preparations.

4 "I consider this the surest course for the city as a whole, and the means of safety for us who are to serve. If anyone thinks otherwise, I surrender the command to him."

CHAPTER 24

1 Nicias spoke at such length in the belief that he would either deter the Athenians by the magnitude of the undertaking or, if compelled to go on the expedition, sail with the greatest possible security.

2 But the burden of preparation did not extinguish their desire for the voyage; they were far more eager than before, and his speech had the opposite effect to the one he intended. They thought his advice sound, and believed that the

expedition would now be thoroughly secure.

3 A passion to sail fell upon them all alike. The older men believed that they would either conquer the land they sailed against or that so great a force could come to no harm; those in the prime of life longed to see and explore a distant country and were confident of returning safely. The mass of the people and the soldiers expected to earn money for the present and to acquire an empire that would furnish an enduring source of paid service.

4 So overwhelming was the majority's desire that anyone who disapproved remained silent, fearing that a vote against the expedition would make him seem disloyal to the city.

CHAPTER 25

1 At last one of the Athenians came forward and called on Nicias to stop making excuses and delaying, and to declare now, before them all, what force he required the Athenians to vote him.

2 Reluctantly, Nicias replied that he would prefer to deliberate at leisure with his fellow commanders. So far as he could judge already, however, they must sail with no fewer than a hundred triremes. As many as they thought necessary would be Athenian troop transports, and further ships must be summoned from the allies. There must be at least five thousand hoplites in all, Athenians and allies, and more if they could obtain them. They would equip and take the rest of the force in proportion: archers from home and from Crete, slingers, and whatever else seemed appropriate.

CHAPTER 26

1 On hearing this, the Athenians immediately voted the generals full authority over the size of the army and every aspect of the voyage, to act as they thought best [for the Athenians].

2 After this the preparations began. They sent to the allies and drew up muster rolls at home. The city had only just recovered from the plague and the unremitting war: a large new generation had reached military age, and money had accumulated during the truce, so that everything was more readily procured. Thus they were occupied with their preparations.

CHAPTER 27

1 Meanwhile, in a single night, most of the stone Herms in the city of Athens had their faces hacked away. These are square pillars in the local style, standing in great numbers both at private doorways and in sanctuaries.

2 No one knew the perpetrators. The city offered large public rewards for information about them, and also decreed that anyone who knew of any other act of impiety—citizen, foreigner, or slave—might report it without fear.

3 They took the affair very seriously. It seemed an omen for the expedition, and at the same time the work of a conspiracy aiming at revolution and the overthrow of the democracy.

CHAPTER 28

1 Reports were accordingly made by certain resident aliens and attendants, though not about the Herms. They concerned earlier mutilations of other statues by young men in drunken play, and celebrations of the Mysteries in private houses as an act of outrage. Alcibiades was among those they accused.

2 His bitterest opponents seized on these reports. He stood in the way of their securing the leadership of the people, and they believed that, if they drove him out, they would stand first. They magnified the affair and cried out that the profanation of the Mysteries and the mutilation of the Herms were aimed at overthrowing the democracy, and that none of it had been done without his involvement. As evidence they cited the undemocratic lawlessness of his conduct in other matters.

CHAPTER 29

1 For the moment he defended himself against the accusations and offered to stand trial before sailing, to establish whether he had committed any of these acts, since the preparations were by now complete. If he had done any of them, he would pay the penalty; if acquitted, he would take up his command.

2 He solemnly protested that they must not receive slanders against him in his absence: if he was guilty, they should put him to death now. It was wiser, he said, not to send him out in command of so great an army under such an accusation before they had reached a verdict.

3 His enemies, however, feared that, if he stood trial at once, he would have the army's goodwill and that the people would relent, favoring him because it was through him that the Argives and some of the Mantineans were joining the expedition. They therefore opposed a trial and pressed for haste, putting forward other speakers to argue that he should sail now rather than hold up the departure, and stand trial on his return, on appointed days. Their intention was to have him recalled to face trial under a weightier burden of slander, which they could more easily build up in his absence. It was decided that Alcibiades should sail.

CHAPTER 30

1 After this, when summer was already at its height, the expedition sailed for Sicily. Most of the allies, together with the grain-carrying merchant ships, the smaller vessels, and all the other accompanying equipment, had previously been ordered to assemble at Corcyra, so that the whole force could cross the Ionian Sea from there to Cape Iapygia. The Athenians themselves, and any allies who were present, went down to Piraeus at dawn on the appointed day and began manning the ships for departure.

2 With them went down virtually the entire remaining population of the city, citizens and foreigners alike. The local people were each seeing off their own—friends, relatives, or sons—and went in hope mingled with lamentation: hope for what they might acquire, grief at the thought that they might never see their loved ones again, as they reflected on the long voyage for which they were sending them away from home.

CHAPTER 31

1 Now, at the moment of parting, when they were about to leave one another amid such dangers, the terrors of the enterprise came home to them more forcibly than when they had voted to sail. Yet the sight of the strength before them, the multitude of everything they saw, restored their confidence. The foreigners and the rest of the crowd had come to watch an undertaking at once mighty and scarcely credible. For no Greek force ever sent to sea by a single city had yet equaled this expedition in cost and splendor.

2 In numbers of ships and hoplites, however, the expedition to Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same force sent to Potidaea under Hagnon, were no smaller. Four thousand Athenian hoplites, three hundred cavalry, and a hundred triremes had sailed on that occasion, with fifty ships from Lesbos and Chios and many more allies.

3 But those had set out on a short voyage with modest equipment; this expedition was fitted out for a long absence, to serve wherever needed both by sea and on land. Immense sums and effort had been spent on the fleet by the trierarchs and the city alike. The treasury paid each sailor a drachma a day and provided the hulls—sixty fast ships and forty hoplite transports—with the finest specialist crews for them. The trierarchs supplemented the public pay of the upper-tier rowers and the specialist seamen, and lavished money on emblems and fittings; each strained to the utmost to make his own ship stand out in beauty and

speed. The infantry, too, had been chosen from carefully drawn muster rolls, and the men vied keenly with one another in their arms and personal equipment.

4 The result was both a contest among themselves, each in the service assigned to him, and, to the other Greeks, the appearance of a display of power and resources rather than preparations for an attack on an enemy.

5 Had anyone reckoned the city's public expenditure and the private spending of those on the expedition—the sums the city had already paid out and those it sent with the generals, what each man had spent on his own equipment or each trierarch on his ship, and what they would still spend—then added the money that everyone would naturally have provided for a long campaign apart from his public pay, and whatever each soldier or merchant carried for trade, the total taken out of the city would have amounted to many talents.

6 The expedition became renowned no less for its astonishing boldness and the splendor of its appearance than for the overwhelming force brought against its intended enemies. It was also the largest expedition yet to cross the sea far from home, and the one launched with the greatest hopes for the future in proportion to what was already possessed.

CHAPTER 32

1 When the ships were manned and everything they were to take had been stowed aboard, a trumpet signaled silence. The customary prayers before departure were offered not ship by ship, but by the whole force together, at a herald's bidding. Wine had been mixed in bowls throughout the fleet, and the soldiers aboard and their commanders poured libations from gold and silver cups.

2 The crowd on shore joined in their prayers, both the citizens and any others present who wished them well. After singing the paean and completing the libations, they put to sea. At first they sailed out in single file, then raced as far

as Aegina. They hastened toward Corcyra, where the rest of the allied force was also assembling.

3 Reports of the approaching fleet reached Syracuse from many quarters, but for a long time none were believed. Indeed, when an assembly was held, speeches of the following tenor were made by various men, some believing the reports of the Athenian expedition, others arguing the contrary. Hermocrates son of Hermon came forward, convinced that he had reliable knowledge of the matter, and addressed them with this advice.

CHAPTER 33

1 "Like some others, I may seem to you to be saying incredible things about the truth of this coming attack. I know that those who state or report what seems unbelievable not only fail to persuade but are thought fools. Yet I shall not be frightened into silence while the city is in danger, convinced as I am that I speak with surer knowledge than others.

2 "For the Athenians, much as you marvel at it, have set out against you with a great force by sea and land. Their pretext is the alliance with the Egestaeans and the restoration of the Leontines, but their real motive is desire for Sicily, and above all for our city: they think that, if they take it, they will easily possess the rest.

3 "Expect them, then, to arrive soon, and consider how best to resist them with the resources you have. Do not let contempt leave you defenseless when they come, or disbelief make you neglect the whole matter.

4 "But even if a man believes the reports, he must not be dismayed by their daring and their power. They will not be able to inflict more harm on us than they suffer themselves. Nor is their coming with a great fleet without advantage: it puts us in a much better position with the other Siceliots, who will be frightened and more willing to become our allies. And if we either destroy them or

drive them away without achieving their aims—for I certainly do not fear that they will gain what they expect—it will be a most glorious achievement for us, and one that I, at least, do not regard as beyond hope.

5 "Few great expeditions, whether Greek or barbarian, have sailed far from home and succeeded. The invaders do not outnumber the inhabitants and their neighbors, for fear unites them all; and if they founder in a foreign land through lack of supplies, they leave the glory to those they attacked, even when most of their reverses are of their own making.

6 "These very Athenians grew great in just this way: the Mede suffered many unexpected reverses, but they gained the credit because his attack was directed against Athens. We too may hope for such an outcome.

CHAPTER 34

1 "Let us therefore take heart and make our preparations here. Let us send to the Sicels to strengthen the allegiance of some and try to gain the friendship and alliance of others; let us also send envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that the danger is common to all, and to Italy, so that its people may either ally themselves with us or refuse to receive the Athenians.

2 "I think it would also be well to send to Carthage. An Athenian attack on their city is not beyond their expectations: they live in constant fear of it. Perhaps, then, if they think that abandoning us would bring danger upon themselves as well, they might be willing to defend us, whether secretly or openly, or at least in one way or another. If willing, they are better able to do so than any other power today, for they possess the greatest stores of gold and silver, which amply supply war and everything else.

3 "Let us send to Lacedaemon and Corinth as well, asking them to bring help here quickly and to renew the war there.

4 “But the course I consider most timely is the one you, accustomed to a quiet life, would be slowest to accept; nevertheless, I shall state it. If all of us Siceliots were willing—or, failing that, as many as possible together with ourselves—to launch our entire available fleet with two months’ provisions, and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and Cape Iapygia, we should show them that before they could fight for Sicily they must fight to cross the Ionian Sea. This would dismay them most and bring home to them that we are defenders operating from friendly territory, for Tarentum receives us, while they must cross a wide sea with their whole force. The length of the voyage would make it difficult for them to keep formation, and their force, coming up slowly and in small detachments, would be easy for us to attack.

5 “If, on the other hand, they lightened their ships and attacked with their fast vessels in a more concentrated force, then, if they had used their oars, we could fall on them exhausted; or, if we thought it best not to, we could withdraw to Tarentum. They, having crossed with scanty supplies in expectation of a sea battle, would find themselves in difficulties along a deserted coast. If they stayed, they would be blockaded; if they tried to sail on along the coast, they would leave the rest of their equipment behind, and uncertainty about whether the cities would receive them would dishearten them.

6 “I therefore believe that, confronted with this prospect, they would never even leave Corcyra. Either, while they deliberated and sent scouts to discover our numbers and position, the advancing season would drive them into winter, or, dismayed by the unexpected, they would abandon the voyage. All the more so since, as I hear, their most experienced general leads them unwillingly and would gladly seize a pretext if any formidable move were seen on our part.

7 “Reports of us would, I am sure, exaggerate our strength. Men’s judgments take their shape from what they hear; and they are more afraid of those who strike first, or at least make clear to their attackers beforehand that they will resist, believing the danger to be as great for themselves as for their opponents.

8 "That is what the Athenians would feel now. They advance against us expecting no resistance, and with reason they have formed a low opinion of us, since we did not join the Lacedaemonians in wearing them down. But if they saw us display a daring contrary to their expectations, the surprise would dismay them more than our actual strength.

9 "Be persuaded, then, above all to dare this course; failing that, make the other preparations for war as quickly as possible. Let every man understand that contempt for an invader must show itself in resolute action, and that the most useful course is to recognize, here and now, that preparations inspired by fear are the safest, and act as men in danger. These men are coming against us: I know well that they are already at sea and will be here at any moment."

CHAPTER 35

1 So much Hermocrates said. The Syracusan people were fiercely divided among themselves. Some maintained that the Athenians would never come and that what he said was untrue; others asked what, even if they came, they could do to them without suffering still greater harm in return. Others again, utterly contemptuous, turned the affair into a jest. Few believed Hermocrates and feared what lay ahead.

2 Athenagoras then came forward. He was a leader of the people and at that time the man most persuasive with the multitude, and he spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 36

1 "Anyone who does not wish the Athenians to be so ill-advised as to come here and fall into our hands is either a coward or no friend to the city. As for those who bring such reports and fill you with alarm, I am not astonished at their audacity, but at their stupidity, if they think they are not transparent.

2 "For men who have private reasons for fear wish to throw the city into panic, so that the general terror may cast a shadow over their own. That is the purpose of these reports now: they have not arisen by chance, but have been concocted by the very men who are always stirring up these troubles.

3 "If you are wise, you will reckon what is likely not by examining what these men report, but by considering what capable men of wide experience—as I judge the Athenians to be—would do.

4 "They are hardly likely to leave the Peloponnesians behind, with the war there not yet securely settled, and willingly embark on another war no less formidable. Indeed, I think they are content that we, with so many cities and such great ones, are not coming against them.

CHAPTER 37

1 "But if they should come, as the reports say, I consider Sicily better able than the Peloponnese to carry a war through, since in every respect it is better equipped. Our city alone, I believe, is far stronger than the army now said to be advancing, even if twice that number should come. For I know that no horses will accompany them, nor will they obtain any here except a few from the Egestaeans; nor, coming by sea, will they bring hoplites equal in number to ours—it is a great undertaking to make so long a voyage here even with the ships themselves lightly laden. And all the other equipment needed for an attack on a city of this size is no small matter to procure.

2 "So great do I judge the disparity to be that, even if they brought another city as large as Syracuse and established it on our borders to wage war from there, I think they would scarcely escape utter destruction. Much less will they do so with all Sicily hostile—for it will unite against them—with their army lodged in a camp improvised on landing, in makeshift tents and with only the bare necessities, and unable to venture far because of our cavalry. In short, I do not think they could even gain control of the countryside: so much stronger do I consider our preparations.

CHAPTER 38

1 "But the Athenians understand these things, as I have explained them, and I am certain that they are safeguarding their own interests. It is men here who invent stories of things that neither exist nor could come to pass.

2 "I have known them, not for the first time now but always, to want to terrify the mass of you with such stories, or with still more vicious ones, or by deeds, and so to rule the city themselves. And I do fear that, after many attempts, they may one day succeed. We, meanwhile, are poor at guarding ourselves before the blow falls, and at pursuing them when we detect them.

3 "That is why our city seldom enjoys peace, but takes upon itself many bouts of civil strife and contests no more often against its enemies than against itself, and at times tyrannies and unjust rule by powerful factions.

4 "If you will follow me, I shall try never to let any of this happen in our time. I shall persuade you, the majority, and punish those who contrive such schemes —not only when caught in the act, for they are hard to catch, but also for what they intend yet cannot accomplish. For we must defend ourselves in advance against an enemy's intentions as well as his deeds, if failure to take precautions means being the first to suffer. As for the few, I shall refute them on some points, keep watch over them on others, and on others instruct them: by these means, I think, I can best turn them away from wrongdoing.

5 "And indeed, a question I have often considered: what is it you want, young men? To hold office already? But that is not lawful; and the law was enacted because you lack the capacity, rather than to dishonor you if you possess it. Or is it that you refuse equality under the law with the many? Yet how is it just that men of the same standing should not be entitled to the same rights?

CHAPTER 39

1 "Someone will say that democracy is neither intelligent nor equitable, and that those who possess wealth are also best qualified to provide the best government. I say, first, that 'the people' is the name of the whole, but 'oligarchy' of a part; next, that the rich are the best guardians of money, the intelligent the best counselors, and the many, after hearing the arguments, the best judges. All these, both as separate groups and together as a whole, have their equal share in a democracy.

2 "An oligarchy gives the many a share in the dangers, but of the benefits it not only takes more than its share: it appropriates and keeps them all. That is what the powerful and the young among you are eager for, though it cannot be maintained in a great city. But even now, most senseless of men, if you do not understand that you are striving for evil, you are the most ignorant Greeks I know; or, if you understand and dare it, the most unjust.

CHAPTER 40

1 "Learn, then, or change your minds, and enlarge the common good of the city for all, recognizing that in this way the able among you may have an equal and even greater share [than the mass of the city's people], whereas if you pursue other aims you risk being deprived of everything. And have done with reports of this kind: you face men who see through them and will not submit.

2 "For this city, even if the Athenians are coming, will repel them in a manner worthy of itself, and we have generals who will attend to these matters. If none of the reports is true, as I believe, the city will not be terrified by your tidings into choosing you as rulers and laying a self-chosen slavery upon itself. It will examine matters for itself, judging your words to have the force of deeds; it will not be stripped of its existing freedom merely by listening, but will seek to preserve it by vigilance in action and by refusing to yield."

CHAPTER 41

1 Such was the speech of Athenagoras. One of the generals rose, allowed no one else to come forward, and himself addressed the present situation as follows.

2 "It is not prudent either to make accusations against one another or for those who hear them to accept them. We should look instead to the reports that reach us, and consider how each of us individually and the city as a whole may prepare well to repel the invaders.

3 "And if there should prove to be no need, there is no harm in the city's being furnished with cavalry and arms

4 "and all the other things that give war its splendor—we shall undertake their supervision and inspection—or in sending missions to the cities to gather intelligence and for any other purpose that seems expedient. Some of this we have already attended to, and whatever we learn we shall bring before you." When the general had said this, the Syracusans dispersed from the meeting.

CHAPTER 42

1 The Athenians themselves and all their allies were by now at Corcyra. The generals first reviewed the force and arranged it in the order in which it was to anchor and encamp. They divided it into three parts and assigned one by lot to each general, so that, instead of sailing all together, they would not lack water, anchorages, and provisions at their stopping places; and so that, organized in divisions under a general, they would be better ordered in other respects and easier to command.

2 They then sent three ships ahead to Italy and Sicily, to discover which cities would receive them. These were instructed to return and meet them, so that they could approach with this knowledge.

CHAPTER 43

1 After this the Athenians put out from Corcyra and crossed toward Sicily with the following force: a hundred and thirty-four triremes in all, and two Rhodian fifty-oared ships. Of these, a hundred were Attic—sixty fast ships and the rest troop transports—and the remainder of the fleet came from Chios and the other allies. The hoplites numbered five thousand one hundred altogether: of these, fifteen hundred Athenians were drawn from the muster roll, and seven hundred were thetes serving as marines aboard the ships; the others who joined the expedition were allies, some from the subject states, and five hundred from Argos and two hundred and fifty Mantineans and mercenaries. There were four hundred and eighty archers in all, eighty of them Cretans; seven hundred Rhodian slingers; a hundred and twenty lightly armed Megarian exiles; and a single horse transport carrying thirty cavalrymen.

CHAPTER 44

1 Such was the first force that sailed across for the war. To carry its supplies there were thirty grain-carrying merchant ships, which also carried bakers, stonemasons, carpenters, and all the tools needed for fortification, and a hundred boats compelled to sail with the merchant ships. Many other boats and merchant ships also followed the army voluntarily for trade. All these now crossed the Ionian Gulf together from Corcyra.

2 The whole expedition made landfall at the Iapygian promontory, at Tarentum, or wherever each contingent could, and proceeded along the Italian coast. The cities would not admit them to a market or within their walls, though they allowed them water and anchorage; Tarentum and Locri would not allow even these. Thus they reached Rhegium, at the extremity of Italy.

3 There they now gathered, and, since they were not admitted within the city, established a camp outside it in the sanctuary of Artemis, where a market was also provided for them; they hauled up their ships and rested. They approached

the Rhegians, urging them, as Chalcidians, to help the Leontinians, who were Chalcidians too. But the Rhegians said they would take neither side, and would do whatever the other Greeks of Italy should agree upon.

4 The Athenians considered how best to approach affairs in Sicily. At the same time they awaited the return from Egesta of the ships sent ahead, wishing to learn whether the money was there as the envoys had claimed at Athens.

CHAPTER 45

1 Meanwhile, the Syracusans were receiving clear reports from many quarters, and from their scouts, that the ships were at Rhegium. They no longer disbelieved, but devoted themselves wholeheartedly to preparations against this threat. They sent guards to some of the Sicels and envoys to others, brought garrisons into the outlying forts in their territory, and examined the state of affairs in the city, reviewing arms and horses to see whether all was complete. In everything else they put themselves on a footing for a war close at hand, indeed almost upon them.

CHAPTER 46

1 The three ships sent ahead to Egesta reached the Athenians at Rhegium and reported that the rest of the promised money did not exist: only thirty talents could be found.

2 The generals were immediately disheartened. This was their first reverse, along with the refusal of the Rhegians to join the expedition: these were the first people they had tried to persuade, and those most likely to agree, since they were kin to the Leontinians and had always been friendly to Athens. Nicias had expected the news from the Egestaeans, but for the other two it was more of a surprise.

3 The Egestaeans had devised the following trick when the first Athenian envoys came to inspect their wealth. They took them into the sanctuary of Aphrodite at Eryx and displayed the offerings—bowls, wine jugs, incense burners, and a considerable array of other furnishings. These were silver, and made a far greater show than their relatively small monetary value warranted. They also entertained the ships' crews in private houses, collecting the gold and silver drinking cups of Egesta itself and borrowing others from the neighboring cities, Phoenician as well as Greek; each host brought these to the feasts as though they were his own.

4 Since almost everyone was using the same objects and a profusion of them appeared everywhere, the Athenians from the triremes were greatly impressed, and on reaching Athens they spread the report that they had seen great wealth.

5 These men, who had themselves been deceived and had then persuaded the others, were now bitterly blamed by the soldiers when word spread that the money did not exist at Egesta. The generals deliberated on the situation before them.

CHAPTER 47

1 Nicias proposed sailing against Selinus with the whole army, the chief purpose for which they had been sent. If the Egestaeans provided money for the entire force, they should take counsel accordingly; if not, they should require them to provide subsistence for the sixty ships they had requested, remain there, and reconcile the Selinuntians with them either by force or by agreement. They should then sail past the other cities, display the power of Athens and demonstrate its zeal for friends and allies, and sail home—unless some sudden opportunity enabled them, within a short time, to help the Leontinians or win over another city—rather than endanger their own city by consuming its resources.

CHAPTER 48

1 Alcibiades said they ought not to have sailed out with so great a force only to depart in disgrace without achieving anything. They should send heralds to all the other cities except Selinus and Syracuse, and try to detach some of the Sicels from the Syracusans and make friends of others, so as to obtain grain and troops. First they should persuade the Messenians: their position lay directly on the passage to Sicily and at its point of approach, and would offer the army an excellent harbor and base of operations. After winning over the cities and knowing whom they would have as partners in war, they should then attack Syracuse and Selinus, unless the Selinuntians came to terms with the Egestaeans and the Syracusans allowed the Leontinians to be restored to their homes.

CHAPTER 49

1 Lamachus said they ought to sail straight against Syracuse and fight at the city as soon as possible, while its people were still unprepared and at the height of their alarm.

2 Every army, he argued, is most terrifying at first; but if it delays before coming into sight, men's spirits revive and they regard even its appearance with greater contempt. If they fell upon the Syracusans suddenly, while they were still awaiting them in dread, they would have the best chance of victory and would terrify them in every way: by their appearance—for now they would seem most numerous—by the expectation of what they would suffer, and above all by the immediate peril of battle.

3 Many would probably be caught outside in the fields because they did not believe the Athenians would come. And while they were bringing their property into the city, the army would not lack resources, if it established itself in force close to the city.

4 The other Sicilian Greeks would then be more likely to refuse alliance with the Syracusans and come over to Athens, rather than delay, watching to see which side would prevail. For a naval base to which they could withdraw and from which they could launch their attacks, he said they should use Megara, which was deserted and only a short voyage or march from Syracuse.

CHAPTER 50

1 Though Lamachus spoke in this way, he too finally supported Alcibiades' proposal. After this Alcibiades crossed in his own ship to Messene and discussed an alliance with its people. He failed to persuade them: they replied that they would not admit the Athenians into the city, but would provide a market outside. He therefore sailed back to Rhegium.

2 The generals immediately manned sixty ships drawn from the whole fleet, took provisions, and sailed along the coast to Naxos, leaving the rest of the army at Rhegium with one of their number.

3 The Naxians admitted them into the city, and they sailed on to Catana. But the Catanaeans would not receive them, for there were men there who favored the Syracusans.

4 They proceeded to the river Terias, where they spent the night, and on the following day sailed against Syracuse, with the main body of their ships in single file. They sent ten ships ahead to sail into the Great Harbor and discover whether any fleet had been launched, and to approach and proclaim from aboard ship that the Athenians had come to restore the Leontinians to their own country in accordance with their alliance and kinship. Any Leontinians in Syracuse should therefore leave without fear and come to the Athenians, their friends and benefactors.

5 When they had made the proclamation and reconnoitered the city, the harbors, and the surrounding country from which they would have to conduct the war, they sailed back to Catana.

CHAPTER 51

1 An assembly was held, and the Catanaeans, though refusing to admit the army, invited the generals to enter and say whatever they wished. While Alcibiades was speaking and the people in the city had their attention fixed on the assembly, the soldiers unnoticed broke through a small gateway that had been poorly walled up, entered the city, and began buying in the market.

2 The Catanaeans who favored the Syracusans—a small number—were at once terrified when they saw the army inside, and slipped away. The rest voted for an alliance with the Athenians and told them to bring the remainder of their army from Rhegium.

3 After this the Athenians crossed to Rhegium, set out again with their entire army for Catana, and on arrival began establishing their camp.

CHAPTER 52

1 Reports reached them from Camarina that its people would come over if they came, and they also heard that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. With their whole force, therefore, they sailed first toward Syracuse. Finding no fleet being manned, they sailed on to Camarina, anchored off the beach, and sent a herald. The Camarinaeans refused to receive them, saying that their sworn agreement was to admit the Athenians when they came in a single ship, unless they themselves summoned more.

2 Having achieved nothing, they sailed away. They landed at a point in Syracusan territory and plundered it; but the Syracusan cavalry came to its defense and killed some of the scattered light troops. The Athenians then returned to Catana.

CHAPTER 53

1 There they found that the ship Salaminia had arrived from Athens to summon Alcibiades home to answer the charges brought against him by the city, and also to fetch certain other soldiers accused along with him of profaning the Mysteries, some of them also in connection with the Herms.

2 For after the army sailed, the Athenians pursued their investigation of the offenses involving the Mysteries and the Herms no less vigorously. Without scrutinizing the informers, but receiving every report with suspicion, they trusted worthless men and arrested and imprisoned citizens of the highest character. They thought it better to probe the affair and discover the truth than to let even a man reputed honest, once accused, escape unexamined because the informer was a scoundrel.

3 The people knew by hearsay that the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had grown harsh toward its end, and moreover that it had been overthrown not by themselves and Harmodius, but by the Lacedaemonians. They were therefore always afraid and received everything with suspicion.

CHAPTER 54

1 The daring enterprise of Aristogiton and Harmodius arose from an incident of love. I shall relate it at greater length and show that neither others nor the Athenians themselves give any accurate account of their own tyrants or of what happened.

2 When Pisistratus died in old age while still tyrant, it was not Hipparchus, as most people suppose, but Hippias, the eldest, who succeeded to power. Harmodius was then conspicuous for the beauty of his youth, and Aristogiton, a citizen of middling station, was his lover.

3 Hipparchus, the son of Pisistratus, made advances to Harmodius and was rejected; Harmodius told Aristogiton. Deeply wounded in his love, and afraid that Hipparchus might use his power to take Harmodius by force, Aristogiton

immediately began plotting to overthrow the tyranny, so far as his existing position allowed.

4 Meanwhile Hipparchus made another attempt and was no more successful in persuading Harmodius. He had no wish to use violence, but prepared to humiliate him in some concealed way, so that this would not appear to be the reason.

5 For in his rule generally he was not oppressive to the multitude, but conducted it without giving offense. Indeed, these tyrants cultivated virtue and intelligence to an exceptional degree, and, exacting from the Athenians only a twentieth of their produce, they adorned their city handsomely, carried on their wars, and offered sacrifices in the sanctuaries.

6 In other respects the city itself continued to observe its previously established laws, except that the tyrants always took care to have one of their own family in office. Among others of the family who held the annual office at Athens was Pisistratus, son of Hippias the tyrant and named after his grandfather. During his term he dedicated the altar of the Twelve Gods in the marketplace and that of Apollo in the precinct of Pythian Apollo.

7 Later, the Athenian people added to the length of the altar in the marketplace and obliterated its inscription. But the inscription in the precinct of Pythian Apollo is still visible even now, in faint letters, and reads as follows: / In memory of his term of office, Pisistratus, Hippias' son, / set this up within the precinct of Pythian Apollo.

CHAPTER 55

1 That Hippias, as the eldest, held the rule, I assert from knowledge gained through more exact accounts than others have heard; but this fact alone would also enable anyone to judge. Of the legitimate brothers, he alone is known to have had children, as both the altar and the pillar set up on the Athenian acropolis to record the crimes of the tyrants show. On that pillar no child of

Thessalus or Hipparchus is inscribed, but five of Hippias, born to him by Myrrhine, daughter of Callias son of Hyperochides. For it was natural that the eldest should marry first.

2 On the same pillar he is also named first after his father, again naturally enough, since he was the eldest after him and had held the tyranny.

3 Nor do I think Hippias could ever have secured the tyranny so easily at that moment if Hipparchus had died as ruler and he himself had taken office that same day. Rather, the fear he had long inspired in the citizens and the firm loyalty of his mercenaries gave him an overwhelming margin of security in retaining power. He was not at a loss, as a younger brother would have been who had not previously been in constant contact with the government.

4 But Hipparchus, through the misfortune of his death, became famous and so acquired, for later generations, the reputation of having been the tyrant as well.

CHAPTER 56

1 Hipparchus, then, carried out his intention of insulting Harmodius after his rejection of the advances. They invited his unmarried sister to come and carry a basket in a procession, then drove her away, declaring that they had never invited her in the first place, since she was unworthy.

2 Harmodius took this bitterly, and Aristogiton, for his sake, was roused to far greater anger still. Their other arrangements with those who were to join in the attack had been made; they were waiting for the Great Panathenaea, the only day when the citizens who were to accompany the procession could assemble in arms without arousing suspicion. They themselves were to begin the attack, and the others were immediately to help them against the bodyguards.

3 For safety's sake, few had been admitted to the conspiracy. They hoped that if even a handful dared to act, those who knew nothing beforehand, having their weapons ready, would be willing on the instant to join in winning their own freedom.

CHAPTER 57

1 When the festival came, Hippias was outside the city in the place called the Ceramicus, with his bodyguards, arranging how each part of the procession was to move forward. Harmodius and Aristogiton, already carrying their daggers, were advancing to the deed.

2 But when they saw one of their fellow conspirators talking familiarly with Hippias—for Hippias was readily approachable by everyone—they grew afraid, believing that they had been betrayed and were on the point of arrest.

3 Before that happened, they wished, if they could, to take revenge upon the man who had hurt them and for whose sake they were risking everything. Just as they were, they rushed inside the gates and came upon Hipparchus near the place called the Leocorium. At once they fell upon him without a thought, in the fiercest anger, one driven by love, the other by the insult he had suffered; they struck and killed him.

4 As the crowd came running together, Aristogiton escaped the bodyguards for the moment, but was later captured and put to a cruel death. Harmodius was killed there on the spot.

CHAPTER 58

1 When the news reached Hippias in the Ceramicus, he went immediately, not to the scene of the deed, but to the hoplites in the procession, before they could learn of it at that distance. Composing his face so that it betrayed nothing of the disaster, he pointed out a place and ordered them to go there without their weapons.

2 They withdrew, thinking he wished to address them. He then told the mercenaries to take possession of the weapons and immediately picked out those he accused, together with anyone found carrying a dagger; for it was customary to take part in the processions with shield and spear.

CHAPTER 59

1 Thus a wound dealt to love gave rise to the plot of Harmodius and Aristogiton, and sudden terror brought them to their reckless act of daring.

2 After this the tyranny became harsher for the Athenians. Hippias, now living in greater fear, killed many citizens and at the same time looked abroad, seeking some refuge that might be open to him if his fortunes changed.

3 It was after this, at any rate, that, Athenian though he was, he gave his daughter Archedice to a Lampsacene, Aeantides son of Hippoclus, tyrant of Lampsacus, knowing that their family had great influence with King Darius. Her tomb at Lampsacus bears this inscription: / "Her father was foremost in Hellas among men of his day: / Hippias, whose daughter Archedice this dust conceals. / Her father, husband, and brothers were tyrants, / And her sons, yet her mind never rose into reckless pride."

4 Hippias continued as tyrant of Athens for three years. In the fourth he was overthrown by the Lacedaemonians and the exiled Alcmaeonids, and departed under a truce, first to Sigeum and to Aeantides at Lampsacus, then from there to King Darius. From there, too, in the twentieth year afterward, when he was already an old man, he set out with the Medes on the expedition to Marathon.

CHAPTER 60

1 With these events in mind, and recalling all they knew of them by hearsay, the Athenian people were at that time harsh and suspicious toward those accused in the affair of the mysteries. Everything, they thought, had been done as part of an oligarchic and tyrannical conspiracy.

2 Their anger over this had already filled the prison with many men of standing, and there was no sign of a pause: each day they grew fiercer and arrested still more. At this point one of the prisoners, the very man who seemed most deeply

implicated, was persuaded by a fellow prisoner to make a disclosure—whether true or not. Both views are conjectured; no one, either then or afterward, has been able to say with certainty who committed the deed.

3 His fellow prisoner persuaded him by saying that, even if he had not done it, he ought to secure immunity and save himself, while releasing the city from its present suspicion. A confession under immunity offered him a surer prospect of safety than a denial followed by trial.

4 He therefore gave information against himself and others in the affair of the Herms. The Athenian people welcomed what they believed to be the truth, having previously thought it intolerable not to know who was plotting against their democracy. They immediately released the informer and all his fellow prisoners whom he had not accused. Those accused were brought to trial: all who had been arrested were put to death, while those who had escaped were condemned to death and a reward was proclaimed for anyone who killed them.

5 It remained uncertain whether those who suffered in this affair had been unjustly punished; the rest of the city, however, had plainly benefited for the time being.

CHAPTER 61

1 As for Alcibiades, his enemies—the same men who had attacked him before he sailed—pressed their charges, and the Athenians took them bitterly. Now that they thought the affair of the Herms had been cleared up, they were all the more convinced that the affair of the mysteries, in which he was implicated, had been his doing also, with the same purpose and as part of the conspiracy against the people.

2 Indeed, at the very time when they were in this turmoil, a small Lacedaemonian army happened to have advanced as far as the Isthmus on some business with the Boeotians. The Athenians therefore believed it had come at an agreed signal, through his contrivance, and not on account of the Boeotians; and that,

had they not forestalled it by arresting the men on the informer's evidence, the city would have been betrayed. For one night they even slept under arms in the sanctuary of Theseus in the city.

3 At the same time Alcibiades' guest-friends in Argos were suspected of plotting an attack on the people. For this reason the Athenians then handed over the Argive hostages held in the islands to the Argive people to be put to death.

4 Suspicion thus closed around Alcibiades from every side. Wishing to bring him to trial and put him to death, they accordingly sent the ship Salaminia to Sicily to fetch him and the others against whom information had been laid.

5 The instructions were to summon him to follow and make his defense, but not to arrest him. They were taking care not to cause a disturbance among either their own soldiers in Sicily or the enemy, and were particularly anxious that the Mantineans and Argives should remain, believing that it was through him that these had been persuaded to join their expedition.

6 Alcibiades, taking his own ship, and those accused along with him sailed from Sicily with the Salaminia, as though bound for Athens. But when they reached Thurii, they followed no farther: they left their ship and disappeared, afraid to sail home for trial under such accusations.

7 The men from the Salaminia searched for Alcibiades and his companions for a time, but when they were nowhere to be found, sailed away. Not long afterward Alcibiades, now an exile, crossed in a vessel from the territory of Thurii to the Peloponnese. The Athenians condemned him and his companions to death in their absence.

CHAPTER 62

1 After this, the remaining Athenian generals in Sicily divided the army into two parts and each took one by lot; then, with the whole force, they sailed toward Selinus and Egesta. They wished to learn whether the Egestaeans would furnish

the money, to examine the situation at Selinus, and to understand its dispute with Egesta.

2 Sailing with Sicily on their left, along the coast facing the Tyrrhenian Gulf, they put in at Himera, the only Greek city in that part of Sicily. When its people refused to receive them, they continued along the coast.

3 On the voyage they captured Hyccara, a small Sicanian town on the coast, hostile to the Egestaeans. They enslaved its inhabitants and handed the town over to the Egestaeans, some of whose cavalry had joined them. Their infantry then marched back through the country of the Sicels until they reached Catana, while the ships sailed around with the captives.

4 Nicias sailed directly from Hyccara to Egesta, transacted the other business, and received thirty talents before rejoining the army. They sold the captives and realized a hundred and twenty talents from them.

5 They also sailed around to their Sicel allies, ordering them to send troops; and with half their own army they advanced against the hostile town of Hybla Geleatis, but failed to take it. And the summer ended.

CHAPTER 63

1 At the very beginning of the following winter, the Athenians began preparing their advance against Syracuse; the Syracusans, for their part, were preparing to march against the Athenians.

2 For when the Athenians did not immediately attack, as their first fears had led them to expect, their confidence revived with each passing day. And when the Athenians were seen sailing along the distant parts of Sicily, far from them, and had gone against Hybla and failed to take it by assault, their contempt grew greater still. They demanded that their generals lead them against Catana, as a crowd emboldened by confidence is apt to do, since the Athenians would not come against them.

3 Syracusan cavalry scouts were constantly riding up to the Athenian army and taunting them, asking, among other insults, whether they had come to settle themselves alongside the Syracusans in a foreign country rather than to restore the Leontines to their own.

CHAPTER 64

1 Aware of this, the Athenian generals wished to draw the Syracusans out of the city in full force and as far away as possible, while they themselves sailed along the coast by night and quietly occupied a suitable campsite. They knew they could not do this so easily if they landed from their ships against a prepared enemy, or were seen approaching by land: the numerous Syracusan cavalry would inflict great damage on their light troops and camp followers, since they themselves had no cavalry. By this means, however, they would secure a position where the cavalry could do them no serious harm. Syracusan exiles accompanying them had told them about the place near the Olympieum which they did in fact occupy. To achieve their purpose, then, the generals devised the following scheme.

2 They sent a man whom they trusted, and whom the Syracusan generals believed to be no less friendly to themselves. He was a Catanaean, and said he had come from men in Catana whose names the generals knew, and whom they knew to be among their well-wishers still remaining in the city.

3 He said that the Athenians spent the night inside the city, away from their arms. If the Syracusans would come in full force against the camp at dawn on an appointed day, the men in Catana would shut in the Athenians who were with them and burn the ships, while the Syracusans would easily capture the army by attacking the palisade. Many Catanaeans, he said, were ready to join in the deed and had already made their preparations; it was from these men that he had come.

CHAPTER 65

1 The Syracusan generals, confident in other respects and already intending, even without this message, to prepare a march against Catana, believed the man with all the less reflection. They immediately agreed on the day when they would arrive and sent him away. Since some of their allies, men from Selinus and elsewhere, had already joined them, they issued orders for the entire Syracusan levy to march out. When their preparations were complete and the agreed time for their arrival was near, they set out toward Catana and camped by the river Symaethus in the territory of Leontini.

2 As soon as the Athenians learned of their approach, they took their entire army, together with all the Sicels and others who had joined them, embarked them in the warships and transports, and sailed for Syracuse by night.

3 At dawn the Athenians were landing near the Olympieum to occupy their campsite, while the Syracusan cavalry, riding ahead into Catana, discovered that the whole army had put to sea. They turned back and reported to the infantry; the entire force now turned around and hurried to the city's defense.

CHAPTER 66

1 Meanwhile, since the Syracusans had a long way to travel, the Athenians settled their army at leisure in a favorable position, where they could begin battle whenever they wished, and where the Syracusan cavalry could least trouble them, either during the action or before it. On one side low walls, houses, trees, and a marsh barred access; along the other were cliffs.

2 They cut down nearby trees, carried them to the sea, and planted a palisade beside the ships. At Dascon, where the enemy could most easily approach, they hastily raised a defense of stones picked up on the spot and timber; they also broke down the bridge over the Anapus.

3 While they were making these preparations, no one came out from the city to hinder them. The Syracusan cavalry were the first to arrive in support, and afterward the whole infantry force assembled. At first they came close to the Athenian army, but when the Athenians did not advance to meet them, they withdrew, crossed the Helorine road, and encamped.

CHAPTER 67

1 The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle and drew up as follows. The Argives and Mantineans held the right wing, the Athenians the center, and the other allies the rest. Half the army was stationed in front, eight deep; the other half formed a square by the camp, also eight deep, with orders to watch and go to the aid of whichever part of the army was hardest pressed. The baggage carriers were placed within this reserve formation.

2 The Syracusans drew up all their hoplites sixteen deep, comprising the full Syracusan levy and the allies who were present. The largest contingent supporting them came from Selinus; there were also cavalry from Gela, about two hundred in all, and about twenty cavalry and fifty archers from Camarina. Their cavalry, no fewer than twelve hundred, they stationed beside the right wing, with the javelin throwers alongside them.

3 As the Athenians were about to open the attack, Nicias went along the ranks of each national contingent and addressed this exhortation to them all.

CHAPTER 68

1 "Men who have come here for the same struggle, what need have we of a long exhortation? The force we have assembled, I think, can inspire confidence more effectively than fine words spoken to a feeble army.

2 "For here we stand, Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the best of the islanders. With allies so numerous and of such quality, how should any man fail to have high hopes of victory? Especially against men defending themselves

with their whole levy, not a picked force like ours, and Siceliots at that—men who despise us but will not stand against us, since their skill falls short of their daring.

3 "Let each man also keep this in mind: we are far from our own land, with no friendly ground at hand except what you win for yourselves in battle. And I remind you of the opposite of what I know the enemy are urging upon themselves. They tell one another that the struggle will be for their native land; I tell you that we are not in our native land, but on ground where we must conquer or find retreat difficult, for their numerous cavalry will press us hard.

4 "Remember your own worth, then, and advance against the enemy with spirit, judging our present necessity and helplessness more terrible than our opponents."

CHAPTER 69

1 With this exhortation Nicias led the army forward at once. The Syracusans had not expected to fight at that moment, and some of them, with the city so near, had even gone away. These came running back in haste to help, but were late; each took his place wherever he happened to join the main body. For neither in this battle nor in the others did they lack spirit or daring. In courage they were no worse, so far as their skill could sustain them; but where that failed, they unwillingly forfeited the strength of their resolve as well. Still, though they had not expected the Athenians to attack first and were compelled to defend themselves in haste, they took up their weapons and immediately advanced to meet them.

2 First the stone throwers, slingers, and archers on either side fought ahead of the main bodies, routing one another in the usual fashion of light troops. Then the seers brought forward the customary sacrificial victims, and the trumpeters sounded the charge for the hoplites.

3 They advanced: the Syracusans fighting for their native land and, each for himself, for immediate survival and future freedom; on the other side, the Athenians to make another's land their own and not to damage their own through defeat; the Argives and the independent allies to share with the Athenians in winning what they had come for, and to see their own native land again as victors. The subject allies were chiefly spurred by the need for immediate survival, of which there was no hope unless they won; only as a secondary concern did they hope that helping to subdue further lands might ease their own subjection.

CHAPTER 70

1 Once the battle came to close quarters, they held out against one another for a long time. Thunder, lightning, and heavy rain happened to break upon them together, adding to the fear of those fighting for the first time and least familiar with war. The more experienced thought the storm no more than the season might bring; far more alarming to them was the enemy's resistance, so long as it remained unbroken.

2 The Argives first drove back the Syracusan left wing, and after them the Athenians drove back the troops opposite themselves. The rest of the Syracusan army now began to break apart as well and took to flight.

3 The Athenians did not pursue far, for the Syracusan cavalry, numerous and still undefeated, held them back, charging among their hoplites and checking any they saw pressing ahead in pursuit. Following in a compact body as far as was safe, the Athenians then withdrew and set up a trophy.

4 The Syracusans rallied on the Helorine road and re-formed as best they could in the circumstances. Even so, they sent a detachment of their own men to guard the Olympieum, fearing that the Athenians might lay hands on the treasure kept there; the rest withdrew into the city.

CHAPTER 71

1 The Athenians did not approach the sanctuary. They gathered their own dead, laid them on a pyre, and camped where they were. The next day they gave back the Syracusans' dead under a truce—about two hundred and sixty of the Syracusans and their allies had fallen—and collected the bones of their own dead, about fifty of themselves and their allies. Taking the spoils of the enemy, they sailed back to Catana.

2 For it was winter, and they did not yet think it possible to wage the war from that position until they had sent for cavalry from Athens and gathered more from their allies on the spot, so as not to be wholly at the mercy of the enemy's horsemen. They also needed to collect money locally and receive funds from Athens, to win over some of the cities—which they hoped would be more ready to submit after the battle—and to lay in the other preparations, grain and everything required, with a view to attacking Syracuse in the spring.

CHAPTER 72

1 With this intention they sailed away to Naxos and Catana to spend the winter. The Syracusans buried their own dead and held an assembly.

2 Hermocrates son of Hermon came forward to speak. A man second to none in general intelligence, he had also proved himself well versed in war and conspicuous for courage. He encouraged them and would not let them give way under what had happened.

3 Their spirit, he said, had not been defeated; disorder had done the damage. Nor had they fallen as far short as might have been expected, especially since they had faced the foremost Greeks in experience, amateurs, so to speak, competing against craftsmen.

4 The multitude of generals and the division of authority had also done great harm—they had fifteen generals—as had the undisciplined lack of control among the mass of the troops. If they appointed a few experienced generals and

during this winter prepared their hoplite force, providing arms for those who lacked them so as to make their numbers as large as possible, and compelling them to undertake the rest of their training, he said they would in all likelihood overcome the enemy. They already possessed courage; discipline would be added when they came to act. Both qualities would improve: discipline through practice amid danger, and courage itself would grow bolder with the confidence that comes from skill.

5 They ought to choose few generals, with full powers, and swear an oath to let them command as their judgment dictated. In this way matters requiring secrecy would be better concealed, and the other preparations would be made in good order and without room for excuses.

CHAPTER 73

1 After hearing him, the Syracusans voted for all his proposals and elected three generals: Hermocrates himself, Heraclides son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus son of Execestus.

2 They also sent envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon to obtain allied support and persuade the Lacedaemonians to wage war against Athens more resolutely and openly on their behalf, so that the Athenians would either withdraw from Sicily or send fewer reinforcements to their army there.

CHAPTER 74

1 The Athenian army at Catana sailed at once against Messene, expecting the city to be betrayed to them. But the scheme came to nothing. When Alcibiades left his command, having already been recalled and knowing that he would go into exile, he disclosed the impending plot, of which he had knowledge, to the friends of Syracuse in Messene. They had first put the conspirators to death; and now, amid civil strife and under arms, those who favored this policy prevailed in keeping the Athenians out.

2 The Athenians remained for about thirteen days, but, battered by storms, short of supplies, and making no progress, they withdrew to Naxos. There they marked out their camp, enclosed it with a palisade, and passed the winter. They also sent a trireme to Athens for money and cavalry, to arrive at the beginning of spring.

CHAPTER 75

1 During the winter the Syracusans also built a wall extending their city to include the Temenites, along the whole side facing Epipolae, so that, if they suffered a reverse, they could not easily be enclosed by a shorter line of siegeworks. They built a fort at Megara and another at the Olympieum, and drove stakes into the sea along every stretch where a landing was possible.

2 Knowing that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they marched with their whole force against Catana, ravaged part of its territory, burned the Athenian tents and camp, and returned home.

3 When they learned that the Athenians were sending an embassy to Camarina, invoking the alliance made in the time of Laches in the hope of winning them over, they too sent envoys to counter it. They suspected that the Camarinaeans had been reluctant to send even the aid they had supplied for the first battle; and, seeing the Athenians' success in that battle, they might refuse further assistance and be persuaded by their old friendship to join the Athenians instead.

4 So Hermocrates and others arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and Euphemus with others from the Athenians. When the Camarinaeans assembled, Hermocrates, wishing to prejudice them against the Athenians before they spoke, addressed them as follows.

CHAPTER 76

1 "Camarinaeans, we have not sent this embassy chiefly from fear that the Athenian force now here will overawe you, but rather that the arguments they are about to offer will persuade you before you have heard anything from us.

2 "They have come to Sicily with the pretext you have heard, but with the intention we all suspect. In my judgment, they wish not so much to restore the Leontines to their homes as to drive us from ours. It hardly makes sense for them to uproot cities there and restore cities here, or to cherish the Leontines as kinsmen because they are Chalcidians, while keeping the Chalcidians of Euboea, from whom these settlers came, in slavery.

3 "The method by which they gained their possessions there is the same they are now attempting here. They became leaders of the willing Ionians and of the allies descended from themselves, ostensibly to take vengeance on the Mede; then, charging some with desertion, others with making war on one another, and bringing against each whatever plausible accusation they could find, they subdued them.

4 "So neither did the Athenians resist the Mede for the freedom of the Greeks, nor the Greeks for their own: the Athenians fought to enslave them to themselves rather than to him, and the Greeks to exchange their master for one no less shrewd, but shrewder in wrongdoing.

CHAPTER 77

1 "But we have not come now to expose the Athenians, whose city is easy enough to accuse, before men who know its wrongs. Far more do we come to reproach ourselves. We have the example of the Greeks there, enslaved because they failed to defend themselves; and now the same contrivances are being brought against us—the restoration of their Leontine kinsmen, assistance to their Egestaean allies. Yet we will not unite and show them with greater spirit that these are not

Ionians, Hellespontines, or islanders, who continually change their master, whether the Mede or someone else, and remain slaves, but free Dorians, settled in Sicily from the self-governing Peloponnese.

2 "Or shall we wait until we are taken city by city, knowing that this alone makes us vulnerable, and seeing them pursue just this design—to divide some of us by argument, set others at war with one another by the promise of alliance, and injure each as they can by offering something welcome to his ear? When a fellow inhabitant of Sicily, far away, is destroyed first, do we imagine that the danger will not reach us too, and that the sufferer before us is unfortunate only on his own account?

CHAPTER 78

1 "If anyone supposes that the Syracusan, but not he himself, is the Athenian's enemy, and thinks it a hardship to risk himself for my country, let him reflect that in fighting on my soil he is fighting no more for mine than, equally, for his own; and with greater safety, since I shall not already have been destroyed, but he will have me for an ally and will not struggle alone. The Athenian wishes not merely to punish the Syracusan's hostility, but, on the pretext of attacking me, to make this man's friendship no less secure.

2 "If anyone envies us, or even fears us—for greatness provokes both feelings—and therefore wishes Syracuse to suffer enough to teach us moderation, yet to survive for his own security, he hopes for something beyond human power. No man can be master alike of his desires and of fortune.

3 "And if his judgment fails, perhaps, lamenting his own misfortunes, he may one day wish that he could envy my prosperity again. But that will be impossible if he abandons us and refuses to share dangers which are the same in substance, whatever the difference in name: in word he would be preserving our power, but in deed his own survival.

4 "You above all, Camarinaeans, as our neighbors and the next to face the danger, should have foreseen this. Instead of giving us the halfhearted support you now give, you should be coming to us of your own accord, visibly urging us to yield nothing—just as you would appeal to us in your need if the Athenians had invaded Camarina first. But neither you nor the others have yet shown this spirit.

CHAPTER 79

1 "Perhaps, out of cowardice, you will observe justice toward both us and the invaders, saying that you have an alliance with the Athenians. Yet you made it not against your friends, but against any enemy who might attack you; and you undertook to help the Athenians when others wronged them, not when they themselves wronged their neighbors, as they do now.

2 "Even the Rhegians, Chalcidians themselves, refuse to help restore the Chalcidian Leontines. It would be monstrous if they, suspecting the deed behind the fine plea of justice, act wisely without a plausible excuse, while you, with a plausible pretext, choose to help your natural enemies and join your bitterest foes in destroying those who are still more naturally your kinsmen.

3 "That is not just. You must resist, and not fear their armament. It is not formidable if we all stand together, but only if, as they are striving to ensure, we stand apart. Even when they came against us alone and won a battle, they did not achieve their purpose, but quickly withdrew.

CHAPTER 80

1 "United, then, we have no reason to lose heart; rather, we should enter the alliance with greater zeal, especially since help will come from the Peloponnesians, who are altogether superior to these men in warfare. And let no one think that the cautious policy of helping neither side, on the ground that you are allied to both, is fair to us and safe for you.

2 "In deed it is not as fair as its claim sounds. If your refusal to join us brings defeat to the victim and victory to the aggressor, what have you done by the same abstention but withhold the help that would have saved the one, and fail to prevent the other's wrongdoing? Yet it would be nobler to take the side of those who are both wronged and your kinsmen, preserve the common good of Sicily, and prevent the Athenians, your friends as you say, from committing an injustice.

3 "To sum up, we Syracusans say that there is no need to instruct either you or the others at length in matters you understand no less clearly yourselves. We appeal to you, and at the same time, if we fail to persuade you, call you to witness: we Dorians are being attacked by Ionians, our perpetual enemies, and betrayed by you, our fellow Dorians.

4 "If the Athenians subdue us, they will win through your decisions, but the honor will bear their own name; and the prize they take for their victory will be none other than the men who gave it to them. If, on the other hand, we prevail, you who brought these dangers upon us will bear the punishment.

5 "Consider, then, and choose now: immediate slavery without risk, or the chance, by prevailing at our side, both to avoid the disgrace of taking these men as masters and to escape a quarrel with us that would be anything but brief."

CHAPTER 81

1 Such was the speech of Hermocrates. After him Euphemus, the Athenian envoy, spoke as follows.

CHAPTER 82

1 "We came to renew our former alliance; but since the Syracusan has attacked us, we must also explain why we are justified in holding our empire.

2 "He himself has supplied the strongest evidence: the Ionians have always been enemies of the Dorians. The facts bear him out. We, being Ionians, considered how best to avoid subjection to the Peloponnesian Dorians, who outnumber us and live close by.

3 "After the Persian Wars we acquired a fleet and freed ourselves from Lacedaemonian rule and leadership. They had no more right to command us than we them, except insofar as they were stronger at the time. We in turn became leaders of those formerly subject to the King, and have maintained our position, believing that, with the power to defend ourselves, we should be least likely to fall under Peloponnesian rule. And, to speak precisely, there was no injustice in our subjugation of the Ionians and islanders whom the Syracusans say we have enslaved despite their kinship with us.

4 "For they came with the Mede against us, their mother city, and did not dare revolt and sacrifice their possessions, as we did when we abandoned our city. They chose slavery for themselves and sought to impose the same upon us.

CHAPTER 83

1 "For these reasons we hold our empire both as our due—because we furnished the Greeks with the largest fleet and an unstinting zeal, and because those men, showing the same readiness in the Mede's service, did us harm—and in pursuit of the strength we need against the Peloponnesians.

2 "We do not embellish our case with claims that we rightly rule because we alone overthrew the barbarian, or because we faced danger for these men's freedom rather than for that of all the Greeks and ourselves. No one can be blamed for securing his own proper safety. And now, here too, we have come for our own security, and see that your interests coincide with ours.

3 "We shall demonstrate this from the very grounds of their slanders and your most fearful suspicions. We know that men whose suspicions are sharpened by fear may delight for the moment in a pleasing speech, but later, when action

comes, do what serves their interests.

4 "For, as we have said, fear makes us hold our empire there; and the same motive has brought us here to establish security with our friends, not to enslave them, but rather to prevent our own enslavement.

CHAPTER 84

1 "Let no one suppose that we concern ourselves with you when you are no concern of ours. He should recognize that, if you survive and are strong enough to hold the Syracusans in check, we shall suffer less harm from any force they send to the Peloponnesians.

2 "In this respect you are already of the greatest concern to us. That is also why it makes sense to restore the Leontines, not as subjects like their kinsmen in Euboea, but as strong as possible, so that, as neighbors of Syracuse, they may trouble these men from their own territory on our behalf.

3 "At home we are ourselves strong enough to face our enemies; and the Chalcidians—whom he says we have inconsistently enslaved while freeing their kinsmen here—serve our interests by remaining unarmed and paying money alone. Here, however, both the Leontines and our other friends serve us best by enjoying the fullest possible independence.

CHAPTER 85

1 "For a tyrant or an imperial city, no advantage is unreasonable and no kinship counts without trust. In each case one must become an enemy or a friend as circumstances require. Here our advantage lies not in harming our friends, but in making our enemies powerless through our friends' strength.

2 "You need not distrust this. Even at home we order our relations with our allies according to the usefulness of each: the Chians and Methymnaeans retain their independence in return for furnishing ships; most others are more strictly

bound to pay tribute; others again are allies on entirely free terms, although they are islanders and easy to subdue, because they occupy strategic positions around the Peloponnese.

3 "Here too, then, we may reasonably be expected to arrange matters to our advantage and, as we say, out of fear of the Syracusans. They aspire to rule you, and wish to unite you through suspicion of us, then themselves become masters of Sicily, either by force or, once we have departed unsuccessful, with the field left clear. This must happen if you join them: so great a power, once united, will no longer be easy for us to handle, and without us here these men will not be weak in their dealings with you.

CHAPTER 86

1 "If anyone doubts this, the facts themselves refute him. When you first called us in, the only fear you held before us was that, if we stood by while you fell under Syracusan rule, we too would be in danger.

2 "It is not just to distrust now the very argument with which you then claimed to persuade us, or to suspect us because we have come with greater forces to confront their strength. Far more should you distrust these men.

3 "We cannot even remain here without your support; and even if we proved wicked and conquered you, we could not hold you, given the length of the voyage and our lack of means to garrison great cities equipped as mainland powers. These men, however, live beside you not in a camp, but in a city stronger than our force here. They plot against you continually, and whenever they gain an opening against any one of you,

4 "they do not let it go—as they have already shown in other cases, and in their treatment of the Leontines. Yet now they dare to summon you, as though you had no sense, against those who prevent such things and have so far kept Sicily from falling under their rule.

5 "We appeal in return to a far truer security. We ask you not to betray the protection that each of us affords the other. Remember that their numbers always leave them a ready path against you, even without allies, whereas you will not often have the chance to defend yourselves with so great a force at your side. If suspicion makes you allow it to depart unsuccessful, or even defeated, you will one day long to see even a tiny fraction of it, when its arrival can no longer accomplish anything for you.

CHAPTER 87

1 "Do not, then, Camarinaeans, let their slanders persuade either you or the others. We have told you the whole truth about the things that arouse suspicion against us; and we shall recall the main points once more and ask you to be persuaded.

2 "We say that we rule those at home so as not to obey another, and free those here so as not to be harmed by them; that we are compelled to act on many fronts because we have many dangers to guard against; and that, now as before, we have come as allies to those of you here who suffer wrong, not uninvited, but at your call.

3 "Do not set yourselves up as judges or reformers of our conduct and try to turn us aside: that would now be difficult. Instead, take and use whatever share of our restless intervention and our character serves your own interests. Recognize that these qualities do not harm everyone alike, but benefit far more of the Greeks.

4 "For every man everywhere, even where we have no ties, whether he expects to suffer wrong or plots to inflict it, faces a standing prospect: the one of receiving aid from us, the other, if we come, of entering a struggle not free from fear. Both are thus constrained, the one to show restraint against his will, the other to remain safe without exertion.

5 "Do not reject this security, common to all who need it and now present for you. Rather, put yourselves on an equal footing with the others and join us, so that, instead of forever guarding against the Syracusans, you too may sometimes have your share in taking the offensive against them on equal terms."

CHAPTER 88

1 Such was the speech of Euphemus. The Camarinaeans were in this position. They were well disposed toward the Athenians, except insofar as they believed that the Athenians would enslave Sicily; with the Syracusans, as their neighbors, they were perpetually at odds. Yet they feared no less that the Syracusans, being close at hand, might prevail even without them. This was why they had sent them the small force of cavalry at the outset, and they now resolved that their practical assistance in future would favor the Syracusans, though they would give it as sparingly as possible. For the present, however, so as not to appear to give the Athenians less consideration, especially after their victory in battle, they would give both sides an equal answer in words.

2 Having decided on this course, they replied that, since both sides were their allies and were at war with one another, they thought it consistent with their oaths to assist neither for the present. The envoys of both parties departed.

3 The Syracusans continued their own preparations for the war, while the Athenians, encamped at Naxos, negotiated with the Sicels to win over as many as possible.

4 Most of the Sicels nearer the plains, who were subjects of Syracuse, had held aloof. Among those occupying the interior, whose settlements had always been independent, all but a few had at once sided with the Athenians, bringing grain down to the army, and some of them money as well.

5 The Athenians marched against those who would not join them and compelled some to do so; in other cases they were prevented by the Syracusans, who sent garrisons and relief forces. During the winter the Athenians shifted their

anchorage from Naxos to Catana, rebuilt the camp the Syracusans had burned, and wintered there.

6 They sent a trireme to Carthage to seek friendship, in the hope of obtaining some assistance, and sent a mission to Tyrrhenia as well, where certain cities had themselves offered to join them in the war. They also sent messages to the Sicels and to Egesta, ordering them to send as many horses as possible. Meanwhile they prepared bricks, iron, and everything else needed for the siege wall, intending to take up the war as soon as spring began.

7 The Syracusan envoys sent to Corinth and Lacedaemon, as they sailed along the coast, also tried to persuade the Greeks of Italy not to stand by and watch what the Athenians were doing, since these designs threatened them equally. On reaching Corinth, they appealed for help on the grounds of kinship.

8 The Corinthians were the first to vote at once to help with all their zeal. They also sent envoys with them to Lacedaemon, to join in persuading the Lacedaemonians both to wage war more openly against the Athenians at home and to send some assistance to Sicily.

9 The envoys from Corinth arrived at Lacedaemon, as did Alcibiades. Immediately after his escape he and his fellow exiles had crossed on a merchant vessel from Thurian territory to Cyllene in Elis; later he came to Lacedaemon under safe conduct, at the invitation of the Lacedaemonians themselves. He had feared them because of his part in the affair of Mantinea.

10 In the Lacedaemonian assembly, the Corinthians, the Syracusans, and Alcibiades all pressed the same requests upon the Lacedaemonians. The ephors and the other authorities were considering sending envoys to Syracuse to prevent an agreement with Athens, but were reluctant to send help. Alcibiades then came forward and roused the Lacedaemonians to action with the following speech.

CHAPTER 89

1 "I must first speak about the charges that have discredited me in your eyes, so that suspicion of me may not make you listen less favorably to what concerns us all.

2 "My ancestors had renounced their role as your city's hosts over some grievance; I myself renewed it and cultivated your friendship, on other occasions and especially during the disaster at Pylos. Yet, although my goodwill never faltered, when you made peace with Athens you conducted the negotiations through my enemies, investing them with power and me with dishonor.

3 "You were therefore justly harmed when I turned to the Mantineans and Argives and opposed you in other ways. If anyone then, in his suffering, was unreasonably angry with me, let him consider the truth and change his mind. Or if anyone thought less of me because I inclined more toward the people, let him not imagine that this gives him just grounds for resentment either.

4 "My family has always opposed tyrants—and everything opposed to the ruling power has been called 'the people'—so the leadership of the multitude has remained with us from that time. Besides, as the city was governed democratically, we were obliged in most matters to conform to the established order.

5 "Yet amid the prevailing license we tried to show greater moderation in public affairs. There were others, in earlier days as now, who led the crowd into worse courses; these were the very men who drove me out.

6 "We stood at the head of the whole community, believing it right to help preserve the form of government under which the city had been greatest and freest, the constitution each of us had inherited. As for democracy, those of us with any sense knew what it was, and I no less than anyone, since I would have more cause than anyone to revile it. But nothing new could be said about an acknowledged folly; and we did not think it safe to change it while you, our enemies, were stationed at our doors.

CHAPTER 90

1 "Such, then, were the circumstances surrounding the charges against me. Now hear about the matters on which you must deliberate, and on which I must offer advice if my knowledge goes further than yours.

2 "We sailed to Sicily intending first, if we could, to subdue the Sicilian Greeks, then the Greeks of Italy, and after that to make an attempt on the Carthaginian empire and on Carthage itself.

3 "If these plans succeeded, either wholly or for the most part, we then intended to attack the Peloponnese. We would bring over the entire Greek force acquired there, hire large numbers of barbarians—Iberians and others from those parts, acknowledged to be the most warlike barbarians of our day—and build many triremes in addition to our own, since Italy has timber in abundance. With these we would blockade the Peloponnese all around, while our infantry simultaneously attacked the cities by land, taking some by force and enclosing others with siege walls. We hoped thus to bring the war to an easy conclusion and afterward to rule the whole Greek world.

4 "As for money and grain, to provide us with ampler supplies of both, the territories acquired there would themselves furnish enough, without the revenue from here.

CHAPTER 91

1 "You have now heard our intentions for the expedition that has sailed, from the man who knows them most exactly; and the generals who remain will carry them out in the same way if they can. Now learn that, unless you send help, the forces there will not hold out.

2 "The Sicilian Greeks are less experienced, but even now, if they united in a single body, they might prevail. The Syracusans alone, however, already defeated in battle with their whole levy and at the same time hemmed in by ships, will be unable to withstand the force the Athenians now have there.

3 “If this city is taken, all Sicily is taken with it, and Italy at once as well; and the danger from that quarter of which I have just warned you would descend upon you before long.

4 “So let no one suppose that your deliberations concern Sicily alone: they concern the Peloponnese too, unless you promptly take these measures. Send troops there aboard ships, men who will row themselves across and serve as hoplites immediately on arrival; and send what I consider still more useful than the troops—a Spartan commander, to organize the men already there and compel the unwilling to serve. In this way your existing friends will gain confidence, and those who hesitate will join you with less fear.

5 “At the same time you must wage war more openly here, so that the Syracusans, knowing that you are taking thought for them, may resist more firmly, and the Athenians may be less able to send further reinforcements to their own men.

6 “You must also fortify Decelea in Attica: this is what the Athenians have always feared most, and they consider it the one ordeal of the war they have not yet experienced. The surest way to harm an enemy is to discover what he most fears and, once you have established it clearly, bring that upon him. For each man, knowing his own dangers most precisely, is naturally afraid of them.

7 “I will pass over many of the advantages you will gain and the losses you will inflict on your opponents by this fortification, and set out only the chief points. Most of the resources with which the country is furnished will come into your hands, some by capture, others of their own accord. They will at once be deprived of the revenue from the silver mines at Laurium and of all the income they now derive from the land and the law courts; above all, the revenue from their allies will come in less fully, since the allies, seeing that you are now waging war with all your strength, will grow careless about paying.

CHAPTER 92

1 "Whether any of this is done, Lacedaemonians, and done promptly and energetically, rests with you. That it is practicable I am entirely confident, and I do not think my judgment will prove mistaken.

2 "And I claim that none of you should think the worse of me if, though once accounted a patriot, I now assail my own city resolutely in company with its bitterest enemies; nor should you suspect my argument as the product of an exile's zeal.

3 "For I am an exile from the wickedness of those who drove me out, not from the chance to serve your interests, if you listen to me. The greater enemies are not you, who have sometimes harmed your enemies, but those who have forced their friends to become enemies.

4 "My love of my city belongs not to the time when I am wronged, but to the time when I lived there securely as a citizen. Nor do I regard myself as now attacking a country that is still mine, but rather as recovering one that is mine no longer. The true patriot is not the man who, unjustly deprived of his country, refrains from attacking it, but the man who longs for it so deeply that he tries by every means to regain it.

5 "On these grounds I ask you, Lacedaemonians, to employ me without misgiving in every danger and hardship, recognizing the truth of that argument on everyone's lips: if as an enemy I harmed you greatly, as a friend I could also serve you well—all the more because I know the affairs of Athens, whereas yours I could only conjecture. Recognize, too, that the issues now before you are of the greatest consequence, and do not shrink from expeditions to Sicily and Attica. By joining in the struggle there with a small part of your forces, you may save great interests, overthrow the Athenians' present and future power, and afterward live in security yourselves and lead all Hellas, willing and unforced, through its goodwill toward you."

CHAPTER 93

1 Such was the speech of Alcibiades. The Lacedaemonians had already been considering an expedition against Athens, but were still delaying and watching events. Now, as he explained each of these points, they were greatly strengthened in their resolve, believing that they had heard from the man who knew most clearly.

2 They therefore turned their attention to fortifying Decelea and to sending some immediate assistance to the forces in Sicily. They appointed Gylippus son of Cleandridas commander for the Syracusans, and instructed him to consult with them and the Corinthians and arrange for the greatest and speediest assistance possible in the circumstances to reach the men there.

3 He at once instructed the Corinthians to send him two ships to Asine, and to prepare the rest of the ships they intended to send, so that they would be ready to sail when the time came. Having reached this agreement, they departed from Lacedaemon.

4 The Athenian trireme which the generals had sent from Sicily for money and cavalry also arrived. After hearing its report, the Athenians voted to send the army funds for its maintenance and the cavalry. The winter ended, and the seventeenth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

CHAPTER 94

1 With the first coming of spring in the following summer, the Athenians in Sicily sailed from Catana along the coast toward Megara in Sicily. The Syracusans had expelled its inhabitants in the time of the tyrant Gelon, as I have mentioned before, and themselves hold its territory.

2 They landed and ravaged the fields, then advanced against a Syracusan fort, but failed to take it. Moving on again by land and sea to the river Terias, they went inland, ravaged the plain, and burned the grain. They encountered a small party

of Syracusans, killed some of them, set up a trophy, and withdrew to their ships.

3 They sailed back to Catana, took on provisions there, and marched with their whole army against Centoripa, a Sicel town. After bringing it over by agreement, they departed, burning the grain of the Inessaeans and Hyblaeans as they went.

4 On reaching Catana, they found that the cavalry from Athens had arrived: two hundred and fifty men with their equipment but without horses, which were to be obtained locally, together with thirty mounted archers and three hundred talents of silver.

CHAPTER 95

1 In the same spring the Lacedaemonians also marched against Argos and got as far as Cleonae, but an earthquake occurred and they withdrew. After this the Argives invaded the neighboring territory of Thyrea and seized a large quantity of Lacedaemonian booty, which was sold for no less than twenty-five talents.

2 Not long afterward, in the same summer, the people of Thespiae attacked those who held office, but failed to gain control. The Thebans came to the rulers' aid; some of the insurgents were arrested, and others fled to Athens.

CHAPTER 96

1 In the same summer, when the Syracusans learned that cavalry had reached the Athenians and that they were now about to advance against them, they reasoned that unless the Athenians gained possession of Epipolae—a steep height immediately above the city—they could not easily be walled in, even if defeated in battle. They therefore intended to guard its approaches, to prevent the enemy from ascending by these routes unobserved; for they could not come up anywhere else.

2 The rest of the ground rises sheer; the whole area within slopes down toward the city and is visible from it. The Syracusans call it Epipolae because it lies above the surrounding country.

3 At daybreak the Syracusans came out in full force into the meadow beside the river Anapus. Hermocrates and his fellow generals had just taken up their command. They held a review of the troops and first selected six hundred picked hoplites, under Diomilus, an exile from Andros, to guard Epipolae and, should they be needed elsewhere, to assemble quickly and come to the spot.

CHAPTER 97

1 During the night before the day on which the Syracusans held their review, the Athenians had already sailed from Catana with their entire force and, unobserved by them, put in at the place called Leon, six or seven stades from Epipolae. They disembarked their infantry and brought their ships to anchor at Thapsus. This is a peninsula projecting into the open sea from a narrow isthmus, not far from the city of Syracuse either by sea or by land.

2 The Athenian naval force palisaded the isthmus at Thapsus and remained there, while the infantry at once advanced at a run toward Epipolae and succeeded in ascending by Euryelus before the Syracusans, alerted to their presence, could arrive from the meadow and the review.

3 The rest of the Syracusans hurried to the rescue, each as fast as he could, as did the six hundred under Diomilus; but from the meadow they had no less than twenty-five stades to cover before reaching the enemy.

4 Coming against them in this disorderly fashion, the Syracusans were defeated in battle on Epipolae and withdrew into the city. Diomilus was killed, and about three hundred of the others.

5 After this the Athenians set up a trophy and returned the Syracusan dead under a truce. On the following day they descended against the city itself; when the Syracusans did not come out to meet them, they retired and built a fort at

Labdalum, on the edge of the cliffs of Epipolae facing Megara. It was to serve as a store for their equipment and money whenever they advanced to fight or to build walls.

CHAPTER 98

1 Not long afterward three hundred cavalry arrived for them from Egesta, and about a hundred from the Sicels, the Naxians, and certain others. The two hundred and fifty Athenians were already there; for these they obtained some horses from the Egestaeans and Catanaeans and purchased the rest. Altogether six hundred and fifty cavalry were assembled.

2 After posting a garrison at Labdalum, the Athenians advanced to Syce, where they established themselves and rapidly built the circular fort. The speed of the construction alarmed the Syracusans, who came out intending to fight rather than look on without intervening.

3 The two armies were already drawing up against each other when the Syracusan generals, seeing that their force was scattered and could not easily form ranks, led it back into the city, except for a portion of the cavalry. These stayed behind and prevented the Athenians from carrying stones or straying too far afield.

4 One tribal contingent of Athenian hoplites, together with all their cavalry, attacked and routed the Syracusan cavalry, killed some of them, and set up a trophy for the cavalry battle.

CHAPTER 99

1 On the following day some of the Athenians worked on the wall north of the circular fort, while others brought stones and timber and laid them down continuously toward the place called Trogilus, along the shortest line for their siege wall from the Great Harbor to the sea on the other side.

2 The Syracusans, chiefly on the advice of Hermocrates, one of their generals, no longer wished to risk battles against the Athenians with their whole force. They thought it better to build a counterwall across the intended line of the Athenian wall: if they finished first, it would bar the way. If the Athenians intervened while they were at work, they would send part of their army against them, while they themselves hastened to occupy the approaches with stakes. The Athenians would then have to abandon their work and turn their entire force against them.

3 They therefore came out and began building from their own city, carrying a crosswall below the Athenian circular fort, cutting down the olive trees in the sacred precinct and erecting wooden towers.

4 The Athenian ships had not yet sailed around from Thapsus into the Great Harbor. The Syracusans still controlled the coastal districts, and the Athenians brought their supplies overland from Thapsus.

CHAPTER 100

1 When the Syracusans thought that enough of their counterwall had been palisaded and built, they withdrew into the city, leaving one tribal contingent to guard the structure. The Athenians had not come to prevent the work, fearing that if they divided their forces they would be easier to fight, and also pressing on with their own encircling wall. They now destroyed the Syracusans' underground conduits carrying drinking water into the city. Watching for a time at midday when the other Syracusans were in their tents, some had even gone back to the city, and the guards at the palisade were keeping careless watch, they detailed three hundred picked men of their own and some selected light troops, equipped for the attack, to make a sudden rush against the counterwall. The rest of the army advanced in two divisions: one, with one of the generals, toward the city, to meet any relieving force, and the other, with the other general, toward the palisade beside the postern gate.

2 The three hundred attacked and took the palisade. Its guards abandoned it and fled to the outer wall around the Temenites precinct. Their pursuers burst in with them, but once inside were driven out again by force by the Syracusans. Some Argives and a few Athenians were killed there.

3 The entire army then withdrew, demolished the counterwall, pulled up the palisade, carried the stakes back to their own lines, and set up a trophy.

CHAPTER 101

1 On the next day the Athenians continued their wall from the circular fort along the cliff above the marsh, which faces from Epipolae toward the Great Harbor at this point. Here the line of their encircling wall would be shortest as it descended across the level ground and the marsh to the harbor.

2 Meanwhile the Syracusans themselves came out and again began from the city to build a barrier of stakes through the middle of the marsh, digging a ditch alongside it, to prevent the Athenians from walling them off all the way to the sea.

3 Once their work along the cliff was finished, the Athenians again attacked the Syracusans' palisade and ditch. They ordered their ships to sail around from Thapsus into the Great Harbor of Syracuse, while they themselves descended from Epipolae to the level ground before dawn. Across the marsh, where the muddy ground was firmest, they laid doors and broad planks and walked over them. At dawn they took all but a small part of the palisade and the ditch, and later captured what remained.

4 A battle followed, in which the Athenians were victorious. The Syracusan right wing fled toward the city, and their left along the river. Wishing to cut the latter off from the crossing, the three hundred picked Athenians hurried at a run toward the bridge.

5 Alarmed at this, the Syracusans—who also had most of their cavalry there—advanced to meet these three hundred, routed them, and burst into the Athenian right wing. As they struck it, panic spread to the tribal contingent at the end of the wing as well.

6 Seeing this, Lamachus came to their aid from the Athenian left with a few archers, taking the Argives with him. He crossed a ditch and was cut off with a few of those who had crossed alongside him; he himself was killed, together with five or six of his men. The Syracusans at once rushed to seize their bodies and carried them across the river to safety before they could be recovered. They themselves withdrew as the rest of the Athenian army now advanced.

CHAPTER 102

1 Meanwhile those Syracusans who had originally fled toward the city, seeing what was happening, regained confidence and came out from the city to face the Athenians opposite them. They also sent a detachment against the circular fort on Epipolae, thinking they would find it deserted and capture it.

2 They took and sacked the outer fortification, ten plethra in length, but Nicias prevented them from taking the circular fort itself. He happened to have been left there because of illness. Realizing that, for lack of men, they could not prevail in any other way, he ordered the attendants to set fire to the siege engines and all the timber lying in front of the wall.

3 The result was as he intended: the fire prevented the Syracusans from advancing any farther, and they withdrew again. Help was already coming back up to the circular fort from the Athenians below, who had driven off the enemy there; at the same time their ships, as ordered, were sailing in from Thapsus to the Great Harbor.

4 Seeing this, the Syracusans on the heights withdrew in haste, and their whole army retired into the city. They judged that their present strength would no longer suffice to prevent the wall from reaching the sea.

CHAPTER 103

1 After this the Athenians set up a trophy, returned the Syracusan dead under a truce, and recovered Lamachus and those who had fallen with him. With their entire force now present, both fleet and infantry, they began from Epipolae and the cliffs and proceeded to shut the Syracusans in with a double wall extending to the sea.

2 Supplies for the army were brought in from every part of Italy. Many Sicels who had previously held back now joined the Athenians as allies, and three fifty-oared ships came from Tyrrhenia. Everything else, too, was advancing as they hoped.

3 For the Syracusans no longer thought they could prevail in war, since no assistance had reached them even from the Peloponnese. They discussed terms of settlement both among themselves and with Nicias, who now held sole command after the death of Lamachus.

4 Nothing was ratified; but, as was natural with men at a loss and more closely besieged than before, much was said to Nicias, and still more within the city. Their present misfortunes had also aroused some suspicion of one another. They removed the generals under whose command these events had occurred, attributing their losses either to their ill fortune or to their treachery, and elected Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias in their place.

CHAPTER 104

1 Meanwhile Gylippus the Lacedaemonian and the ships from Corinth had already reached the neighborhood of Leucas, eager to bring speedy assistance to Sicily. Alarming reports kept coming to them, all falsely agreeing that Syracuse was already completely walled in. Gylippus therefore abandoned all hope for Sicily, but wished to preserve Italy. He and Pythen the Corinthian crossed the

Ionian Sea to Tarentum as fast as possible, with two Laconian and two Corinthian ships. The Corinthians intended to sail later, after manning two Leucadian ships and three Ambraciot ships in addition to their own ten.

2 From Tarentum Gylippus first sent an embassy to the territory of Thurii and renewed the citizenship his father had held there, but could not win them over. He then put to sea and sailed along the coast of Italy. Off the Terinaean Gulf he was caught by a wind which blows violently there when it has settled in the north, and was swept out to sea. After being severely battered by the storm, he made Tarentum again, where he hauled ashore and repaired the ships that had suffered most.

3 When Nicias heard that he was approaching, he thought little of his small fleet, making the same mistake as the Thurians. He thought they seemed equipped rather for piracy, and took no precautions as yet.

CHAPTER 105

1 At about the same time in this summer, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Argive territory and ravaged most of the land. The Athenians came to the Argives' aid with thirty ships, and these ships constituted their most unmistakable breach of the treaty with the Lacedaemonians.

2 Previously they had fought alongside the Argives and Mantineans by raids from Pylos and by landings around the rest of the Peloponnese rather than in Laconia. Though the Argives had often urged them merely to put in on the Laconian coast under arms, ravage even the smallest stretch of land with them, and depart, they had refused. Now, however, under the command of Pythodorus, Laespodias, and Demaratus, they landed at Epidaurus Limera and Prasiae and ravaged these and other parts of the country, giving the Lacedaemonians a more readily defensible charge against the Athenians as grounds for retaliation.

3 When the Athenians had sailed away from Argos and the Lacedaemonians had also withdrawn, the Argives invaded the territory of Phlius, ravaged part of its land, killed some of the inhabitants, and returned home.

Book 7



CHAPTER 1

1 After repairing their ships, Gylippus and Pythen sailed along the coast from Tarentum to Epizephyrian Locri. There they learned more certainly that Syracuse was not yet completely walled off, but that an army could still make its way in over Epipolae. They considered whether to keep Sicily on their right and risk sailing into Syracuse, or to keep it on their left, sail first to Himera, and, after securing the support of its people and whatever other troops they could persuade to join them, march overland.

2 They decided to sail for Himera, especially since the four Athenian ships which Nicias had nevertheless sent out on hearing that they were at Locri had not yet reached Rhegium. Getting ahead of this guard, they crossed the strait and, after putting in at Rhegium and Messene, reached Himera.

3 There they persuaded the Himeraeans to join the war, accompany them in person, and supply arms to any sailors from their ships who lacked them; for they had hauled the ships ashore at Himera. They also sent to the Selinuntians, instructing them to meet them with their full force at an appointed place.

4 The Geloans and some of the Sicels also promised to send them a small force. The Sicels were now far readier to join them, both because Archonides had recently died—a ruler of some of the Sicels in that region, a man of considerable power and a friend of the Athenians—and because Gylippus seemed to have come from Lacedaemon with a resolute purpose.

5 Gylippus took with him about seven hundred armed men from his own sailors and marines, a thousand Himeraean hoplites and light troops combined and a hundred cavalry, some light troops and cavalry from Selinus, a few Geloans, and about a thousand Sicels in all, and marched toward Syracuse.

CHAPTER 2

1 Meanwhile the Corinthians were coming from Leucas to their aid with the rest of the ships as fast as they could. Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, though the last to set out, arrived first at Syracuse with a single ship, a little before Gylippus. Finding the Syracusans about to hold an assembly on ending the war, he prevented it and heartened them with the news that more ships were still approaching, and that the Lacedaemonians had sent Gylippus son of Cleandridas to take command.

2 The Syracusans took fresh courage and at once marched out with their whole army to meet Gylippus; for they had already learned that he was near.

3 He had meanwhile captured Ietae, a fortified Sicel settlement on his route, and advanced to Epipolae with his men drawn up for battle. Ascending by Euryelus, where the Athenians too had first come up, he marched with the Syracusans against the Athenian fortifications.

4 His arrival happened to fall at the moment when the Athenians had already completed their double wall, seven or eight stades long, down to the Great Harbor, except for a short stretch by the sea, on which they were still working. Along the rest of the circuit, toward Trogilus and the sea on the other side,

stones had already been laid out for the greater part of the wall, and some stretches had been left half built, others finished. So narrowly had Syracuse escaped its peril.

CHAPTER 3

1 The Athenians were at first thrown into confusion by the sudden advance of Gylippus and the Syracusans, but then drew up in battle order. Halting his men nearby, Gylippus sent them a herald to say that, if they were willing to leave Sicily within five days, taking their own possessions with them, he was prepared to make a truce.

2 They treated the offer with contempt and sent the herald away without an answer. After this both sides made ready to fight.

3 But Gylippus, seeing the Syracusans in disorder and finding it difficult to form their ranks, withdrew his army into more open ground. Nicias did not lead the Athenians forward, but remained quiet beside their own wall. When Gylippus realized that they were not advancing, he led his army away to the height called Temenites, and they bivouacked there.

4 The next day he brought up most of his army and formed it in front of the Athenian walls, to prevent the Athenians from sending help elsewhere. He sent a detachment against the fort of Labdalum, captured it, and killed everyone he took inside. The position was out of the Athenians' sight.

5 On the same day the Syracusans also captured an Athenian trireme lying on guard off the harbor.

CHAPTER 4

1 After this the Syracusans and their allies began at the city and built a single wall up across Epipolae toward the transverse wall, so that, unless the Athenians could stop them, they would no longer be able to complete the blockade.

2 The Athenians had by now come up to the heights, having completed their wall to the sea. Gylippus, however, took his army by night and advanced against a weak point in the Athenian wall.

3 The Athenians, who happened to be bivouacking outside, became aware of the movement and advanced to meet him. When he realized this, he quickly withdrew his men. The Athenians built the wall higher at that point and kept guard there themselves, while assigning their other allies stations along the rest of the fortifications, each contingent in the place it was to defend.

4 Nicias decided to fortify the place called Plemmyrium, a headland opposite the city which projects into the entrance of the Great Harbor and narrows its mouth. If it were fortified, he thought that bringing in supplies would be easier: they could keep watch off the Syracusans' harbor from a shorter distance, instead of having to put out from the innermost part of the harbor, as they now did, whenever the enemy made a naval movement. He was already turning his attention more to the war at sea, seeing that, since Gylippus had arrived, their prospects on land were becoming less hopeful.

5 He therefore ferried troops across, moved the ships, and built three forts. Most of the equipment was stored in them, and the large vessels and the fast warships now lay at anchor there.

6 This was a principal cause of the deterioration which now first began among the crews. Water was scarce and had to be fetched from a distance, and whenever the sailors went out to gather firewood they were cut down by the Syracusan cavalry, who controlled the country. For a third of the Syracusan cavalry had been stationed at the little settlement by the Olympieum to deal with the men at Plemmyrium and prevent them from coming out to ravage the land.

7 Nicias also learned that the remaining Corinthian ships were approaching. He sent twenty ships to intercept them, with orders to lie in wait off Locri and Rhegium and along the approach to Sicily.

CHAPTER 5

1 Gylippus continued building the wall across Epipolae, using the stones which the Athenians had laid out for their own use. At the same time he repeatedly led the Syracusans and their allies out and drew them up in front of the fortifications; the Athenians formed up opposite them.

2 When Gylippus judged the moment right, he began the attack. They came to close quarters and fought between the walls, where the Syracusan cavalry could be of no use.

3 The Syracusans and their allies were defeated and recovered their dead under a truce, while the Athenians set up a trophy. Gylippus then assembled his army and said that the fault had been his, not theirs: by placing their line too far inside the space between the walls, he had deprived them of the support of their cavalry and javelin throwers. Now he would lead them forward again.

4 He urged them to bear in mind that in equipment they would be at no disadvantage, while in spirit it would be intolerable if they, Peloponnesians and Dorians, did not consider themselves bound to defeat Ionians, islanders, and a rabble of men from every quarter, and drive them from the country.

CHAPTER 6

1 After this, when the moment came, he led them forward again. Nicias and the Athenians believed that, even if the enemy were unwilling to open the battle, they themselves must not stand by and let the wall be carried past their own. For the enemy's construction had already all but passed the end of the Athenian wall; once it went farther, it would make no difference to the Athenians whether they won every battle or never fought at all. They therefore advanced to meet the Syracusans.

2 Gylippus led his hoplites farther beyond the walls than before and brought them into action, while placing his cavalry and javelin throwers on the Athenians' flank, in the open ground where the construction of both walls

ended.

3 During the battle the cavalry charged the Athenian left wing, which faced them, and put it to flight. As a result the rest of the army too was defeated by the Syracusans and driven headlong back into the fortifications.

4 During the following night the Syracusans succeeded in carrying their wall past the Athenian works before they could be stopped. They themselves could therefore no longer be obstructed by the Athenians, whom they had now wholly deprived of the power to wall them in, even if the Athenians should win in battle.

CHAPTER 7

1 After this the remaining twelve ships of the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians sailed in, eluding the Athenian guard. They were commanded by Erasinides, a Corinthian, and their crews helped the Syracusans complete the rest of the wall as far as the transverse wall.

2 Gylippus went to the rest of Sicily to collect forces for sea and land, and at the same time to bring over any cities that were either lukewarm or still entirely outside the war.

3 Other envoys, Syracusan and Corinthian, were sent to Lacedaemon and Corinth to arrange for more troops to cross, in merchantmen or other vessels, or by whatever means proved practicable; for the Athenians too were sending for reinforcements.

4 The Syracusans manned a fleet and practiced with it, intending to make an attempt at sea as well, and in all other respects their confidence grew greatly.

CHAPTER 8

1 Nicias perceived this and saw the enemy's strength and his own difficulties increasing day by day. He too sent a report to Athens. He had often sent reports before, as each event occurred, but did so with particular urgency now, believing that their position was desperate and that, unless the Athenians either recalled them or sent substantial reinforcements at once, there was no hope of survival.

2 But he feared that his messengers might fail to report the facts, whether through inability to express themselves, a lapse of memory, or a desire to say something that would please the crowd. He therefore wrote a letter, thinking this the best way for the Athenians to learn his judgment without any part of it being obscured in transmission, and so to deliberate upon the truth.

3 The men he sent went off carrying the letter and the instructions for what they were to say. He himself attended to the affairs of the army, now keeping it on the defensive rather than exposing it to risks of his own choosing.

CHAPTER 9

1 At the close of the same summer, Euetion, an Athenian general, marched with Perdiccas and a large force of Thracians against Amphipolis. He failed to capture the city, but brought triremes round into the Strymon and maintained a siege from the river, using Himeraeum as his base. And the summer came to an end.

CHAPTER 10

1 In the following winter the messengers from Nicias reached Athens, delivered the oral instructions they had been given, answered any questions put to them, and handed over the letter. The secretary of the city came forward and read it to the Athenians. Its contents were as follows.

CHAPTER 11

1 "Athenians, you know what was done before from my many other letters. Now it is no less necessary for you to learn our present position before deciding what to do.

2 "After we had defeated the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, in most of our battles and had built the walls within which we now remain, Gylippus the Lacedaemonian arrived with an army from the Peloponnese and some of the cities in Sicily. In the first battle he was defeated by us; in the next we were overpowered by his numerous cavalry and javelin throwers and withdrew within the walls.

3 "We have therefore abandoned the work of encirclement because of the enemy's numbers and remain inactive. We could not even use our whole army, since guarding the walls absorbs part of our hoplite force. The enemy, meanwhile, have built a single wall past ours, so that it is no longer possible to wall them in unless someone attacks this counterwall with a large army and captures it.

4 "Thus, though we seem to be besieging others, we find ourselves rather the besieged, at least on land; for their cavalry prevent us from going far into the country.

CHAPTER 12

1 "They have also sent envoys to the Peloponnese for another army, and Gylippus has gone to the cities of Sicily, to persuade those now inactive to join the war, and to bring from the others additional land forces and, if he can, naval resources as well.

2 "For their intention, as I learn, is to attack our walls with their army and at the same time to assail us with their ships at sea.

3 "Let none of you think it extraordinary that they should attack at sea as well. Our fleet, as they too have learned, was at its best at the outset, with its ships dry and its crews unimpaired; now the ships are waterlogged from so long at sea, and the crews have deteriorated.

4 "We cannot haul the ships ashore and dry them out, because the enemy's ships, equal to ours in number or even more numerous, keep us in constant expectation of an attack.

5 "They can plainly be seen practicing; the initiative rests with them, and they have greater freedom to dry out their own ships, since they are not maintaining a blockade against others.

CHAPTER 13

1 "We could scarcely enjoy that freedom even with a large surplus of ships, and without being compelled, as we now are, to keep them all on guard. For if we withdraw even a small part of our watch, we shall have no supplies: even now we bring them in past the enemy's city only with difficulty.

2 "Our crews have deteriorated, and are still deteriorating, for the following reasons. Some sailors are killed by the cavalry when gathering firewood, plundering, or fetching water from a distance. The slaves desert, now that we have been reduced to an even contest; and of the foreigners, those who were forced aboard slip away to the various cities at the first opportunity. Others, initially drawn by high pay and expecting to make money rather than fight, now find, against their expectations, that the enemy confront them with a fleet as well as every other kind of resistance. Some go off on the pretext of deserting to the enemy, others however they can—Sicily is a large place. Some, trading on their own account, have even persuaded the trierarchs to put slaves from Hyccara aboard in their stead, and so have robbed the fleet of its trained efficiency.

CHAPTER 14

1 "You know, as I write this, that a crew's effective strength lies in a small core of men, and that few of the sailors are the men who give a ship its impetus and keep the rowing together.

2 "The most intractable difficulty of all is that I, the general, cannot prevent these things—your temperaments are hard to govern—and that we have no source from which to replenish our crews, while the enemy have many. We must draw both the men we still have and replacements for our losses from the force with which we arrived; for our present allies, Naxos and Catana, are powerless.

3 "If the enemy gain one further advantage, and the places in Italy which feed us, seeing our position and your failure to come to our aid, go over to them, they will have brought [the war] to its end without a battle, by reducing us through siege.

4 "I could have written you other news, more pleasing than this, but not more useful, if you are to know the situation here clearly before making your decision. Besides, knowing your disposition—to want the most agreeable reports, but afterward to blame the messenger if the outcome falls short of them—I judged it safer to make the truth plain.

CHAPTER 15

1 "For the present, be assured that, in the tasks for which we originally came, neither your soldiers nor your commanders have deserved reproach. But now that all Sicily is uniting against us and another army from the Peloponnese is expected by the enemy, you must decide on the understanding that our forces here cannot meet even their present strength. You must either recall these men or send out another army no smaller than this one, both for land and sea, together with substantial funds, and someone to succeed me, since a disease of the kidneys makes it impossible for me to remain.

2 "I ask for your indulgence: when I was in health, I did you much good in my commands. Whatever you intend, act at the very beginning of spring and without delay. The enemy can obtain their resources in Sicily quickly; those from the Peloponnese will come more slowly, yet unless you are watchful, some will escape your notice, as they did before, and others will forestall you."

CHAPTER 16

1 Such were the contents of Nicias' letter. After hearing it, the Athenians did not relieve Nicias of his command. Instead, until the colleagues they were to elect could arrive, they appointed two men already there, Menander and Euthydemus, to share his command, so that he should not bear the burden alone in his illness. They also voted to send another force for land and sea, drawn from Athenians on the muster roll and from the allies.

2 They elected Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes and Eurymedon son of Thucles as his fellow commanders. Eurymedon they sent out at once to Sicily, about the winter solstice, with ten ships and a hundred and twenty talents of silver, to announce to the men there that help would come and that they would not be neglected.

CHAPTER 17

1 Demosthenes remained behind and prepared to sail at the beginning of spring, requisitioning troops from the allies and making ready money, ships, and hoplites at Athens.

2 The Athenians also sent twenty ships round the Peloponnese to keep watch and prevent anyone from crossing to Sicily from Corinth or the Peloponnese.

3 For when their envoys returned and reported that affairs in Sicily had taken a better turn, the Corinthians felt that their earlier dispatch of the ships had not been ill-timed, and their confidence rose still higher. They prepared to send

hoplites to Sicily in merchantmen, while the Lacedaemonians prepared to send men from the rest of the Peloponnese in the same way.

4 The Corinthians were also manning twenty-five ships, intending to try a sea battle against the squadron on guard at Naupactus. In this way the Athenians at Naupactus would be less able to prevent their merchantmen from putting out, since they would have to keep watch against the triremes arrayed opposite them.

CHAPTER 18

1 The Lacedaemonians were also preparing their invasion of Attica, as they had previously resolved. The Syracusans and Corinthians, on learning of the reinforcements being sent from Athens to Sicily, urged this course upon them, in the hope that an invasion would prevent their dispatch. Alcibiades too pressed them insistently to fortify Decelea and not relax their prosecution of the war.

2 What most strengthened the Lacedaemonians was their belief that the Athenians, with a double war on their hands, against themselves and the Siceliots, would be easier to defeat, and that the Athenians had been the first to break the treaty. In the earlier war they felt that the wrongdoing had been more on their own side: the Thebans had entered Plataea during a truce, and although the earlier agreement forbade an armed attack if the other party was willing to submit to arbitration, they themselves had refused when the Athenians challenged them to arbitrate. For this reason they considered their misfortunes deserved, recalling the disaster at Pylos and whatever other reverses had befallen them.

3 But the Athenians had now used their thirty ships, operating from Argos, to ravage part of the territory of Epidaurus and Prasiae and other places, and were at the same time conducting raids from Pylos. Whenever differences arose over a disputed point under the treaty, the Athenians refused to submit to arbitra-

tion when the Lacedaemonians challenged them to do so. The Lacedaemonians now believed that the same wrongdoing of which they had earlier been guilty had in turn passed to the Athenians, and were eager for war.

4 During this winter they sent round to their allies requisitions for iron and prepared the other tools needed to establish the fortified post. At the same time they themselves gathered forces to send out in merchantmen to the men in Sicily, and compelled the other Peloponnesians to do likewise. And the winter came to an end, and the eighteenth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

CHAPTER 19

1 At the very beginning of the following spring, as early as possible, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Attica under Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. First they ravaged the parts of the country around the plain; then they fortified Decelea, dividing the work among the several cities.

2 Decelea is about a hundred and twenty stades from the city of Athens, and about the same distance, or not much farther, from Boeotia. The fort was built in a position overlooking the plain and the richest parts of the country, so as to lay them waste, and was visible as far away as the city of Athens.

3 While the Peloponnesians and their allies in Attica were building the fort, those in the Peloponnese were sending the hoplites to Sicily in merchant ships at about the same time. The Lacedaemonians selected the best of the Helots and of the newly enfranchised, about six hundred hoplites in all, with Eccritus, a Spartan, as commander. The Boeotians sent three hundred hoplites under Xenon and Nicon, Thebans, and Hegesander, a Thespian.

4 These were among the first to set out, putting to sea from Taenarum in Laconia. Not long afterward the Corinthians sent five hundred hoplites, some from Corinth itself and others hired from Arcadia, appointing Alexarchus, a

Corinthian, to command them. The Sicyonians also sent two hundred hoplites along with the Corinthians, under Sargeus, a Sicyonian.

5 The twenty-five Corinthian ships that had been manned during the winter lay at anchor opposite the twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus until these hoplites of theirs had sailed from the Peloponnese in the merchant ships. This was indeed why they had been manned in the first place: to keep the Athenians' attention on the triremes rather than on the transports.

CHAPTER 20

1 Meanwhile, at the very beginning of spring, while Decelea was being fortified, the Athenians sent thirty ships around the Peloponnese under Charicles son of Apollodorus. He had orders to go to Argos and, under the terms of the alliance, call on the Argives to send hoplites aboard his ships.

2 They were also sending Demosthenes to Sicily, as they had intended, with sixty Athenian ships and five Chian, twelve hundred Athenian hoplites drawn from the muster rolls, and as many islanders as they could obtain from each place. From their other subject allies too they had collected whatever useful contributions to the war were available. His orders were first to sail around with Charicles and join him in operations along the Laconian coast.

3 Demosthenes sailed to Aegina and waited there for any part of his force that had been left behind, and for Charicles to take the Argives aboard.

CHAPTER 21

1 In Sicily, at about this same time in the spring, Gylippus too reached Syracuse, bringing as large a force as he could from each of the cities he had won over.

2 He called the Syracusans together and said that they must man as many ships as possible and put themselves to the test in a naval battle; he hoped by this means to achieve something in the war that would justify the risk.

3 Hermocrates also did much to encourage them not to lose heart at the prospect of attacking the Athenians at sea. The Athenians themselves, he said, had neither inherited their naval experience from their fathers nor possessed it forever: they had been even more a people of the land than the Syracusans, and had been forced by the Medes to become seamen. Against daring men such as the Athenians, those who dared to face them would prove the most formidable opponents [for them]. For the same means by which the Athenians frightened their neighbors—attacking with audacity, even when they had no superiority in strength—could equally well be used by the Syracusans against their enemies.

4 He said that the Syracusans should be well assured of this: by daring, against all expectation, to confront the Athenian fleet, they would gain more from the shock this caused the Athenians than the Athenians, with all their skill, could inflict on Syracusan inexperience. He urged them, then, to make trial of their fleet and not shrink back.

5 Persuaded by Gylippus, Hermocrates, and whoever else spoke in support, the Syracusans were eager for the naval battle and began manning their ships.

CHAPTER 22

1 When Gylippus had made the fleet ready, he led the whole land army out by night, intending himself to attack the forts on Plemmyrium by land. At the same time, on an agreed signal, thirty-five Syracusan triremes sailed out from the Great Harbor, while forty-five from the smaller harbor, where their dockyard was, sailed around to join those inside and advance together against Plemmyrium, so that the Athenians would be thrown into confusion from both directions.

2 The Athenians hurriedly manned sixty ships in response. With twenty-five they fought the thirty-five Syracusan ships in the Great Harbor, while with the remainder they went to meet those sailing around from the dockyard. Battle

began at once outside the entrance to the Great Harbor, and for a long time the two sides held out against each other, one seeking to force an entrance, the other to prevent it.

CHAPTER 23

1 Meanwhile the Athenians on Plemmyrium had gone down to the sea and were intent on the naval battle. Gylippus seized the moment to fall suddenly upon the forts at dawn, taking the largest first and then the two smaller ones, whose guards did not stand their ground once they saw how easily the largest had fallen.

2 From the first fort captured, the men who had taken refuge in the boats and in a merchant ship had difficulty making their way to the camp: the Syracusans were winning the battle with their ships in the Great Harbor, and a single fast-sailing trireme pursued the fugitives. But by the time the two smaller forts were being captured, the Syracusans were already losing, and the men escaping from these sailed past more easily.

3 For the Syracusan ships fighting outside the harbor entrance had forced their way through the Athenian ships, but entered in no order; falling into confusion among themselves, they handed victory to the Athenians. The Athenians routed both these ships and those by which they had at first been defeated inside the harbor.

4 They sank eleven Syracusan ships and killed most of their crews, except for those from three ships whom they took alive; three of their own ships were destroyed. After hauling away the Syracusan wrecks and setting up a trophy on the little island off Plemmyrium, they withdrew to their own camp.

CHAPTER 24

1 Such was the Syracusans' fortune in the naval battle; but they held the forts on Plemmyrium and set up three trophies for their capture. They demolished one of the two forts taken last, repaired the other two, and garrisoned them.

2 Many men were killed or taken alive in the capture of the forts, and a great quantity of property in all was seized. The Athenians had used the forts as a storehouse, and they contained much merchandise and grain belonging to traders, as well as much property belonging to the trierarchs. Indeed, the sails and other equipment of forty triremes were captured there, together with three triremes that had been hauled ashore.

3 The loss of Plemmyrium was one of the first and gravest blows to the Athenian army. Even the passage into the harbor for supply ships was no longer safe: the Syracusans lay at anchor there with their ships to bar the way, and supplies could now be brought in only by fighting. In other respects too the loss spread consternation and despondency through the army.

CHAPTER 25

1 After this the Syracusans sent out twelve ships under Agatharchus, a Syracusan. One of them went to the Peloponnese, carrying envoys who were to report their hopeful situation and press for the war there to be pursued still more vigorously. The other eleven sailed toward Italy, having learned that ships laden with goods were on their way to the Athenians.

2 They encountered these ships and destroyed most of them, and in the territory of Caulonia they burned shipbuilding timber that lay ready for the Athenians.

3 They then went to Locri, and while they lay at anchor there, one of the merchant ships from the Peloponnese sailed in with Thespian hoplites aboard.

4 The Syracusans took these men aboard their own ships and sailed along the coast for home. The Athenians, watching for them with twenty ships near Megara, captured one ship with its crew, but could not take the rest, which escaped to Syracuse.

5 There was also skirmishing in the harbor over the piles which the Syracusans had driven into the sea in front of the old shipsheds. Their purpose was to allow their own ships to lie at anchor inside, out of reach of Athenian attacks by ramming.

6 The Athenians brought up against them a merchantman of ten thousand talents' burden, fitted with wooden towers and protective screens. Working from small boats, they fastened ropes to the piles, winched them up and broke them off; they also dived beneath the water and sawed them through. The Syracusans shot at them from the shipsheds, and the men on the merchantman returned their fire. In the end the Athenians removed most of the piles.

7 The most troublesome part of the barrier was the hidden one. Some of the piles had been driven in without projecting above the water, making it dangerous to approach, for fear that a ship might strike them unseen, as it would a reef. But divers went down and sawed these through as well, for pay. Even so, the Syracusans drove in piles again.

8 They devised many other measures against one another, as was natural with the armies encamped so close and facing each other, and resorted to skirmishes and attempts of every kind.

9 The Syracusans also sent envoys—Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Lacedaemonians—to the cities. They were to announce the capture of Plemmyrium and explain that the defeat at sea had been due less to the enemy's strength than to their own disorder; to make clear [once more] that in other respects their prospects were good; and to ask for help by land and sea against

the Athenians. Another Athenian army was expected, they were to say, and if they could first destroy the army already there, the war would be over. Such were the events in Sicily.

CHAPTER 26

1 When the army with which Demosthenes was to bring aid to Sicily had assembled, he put out from Aegina, sailed toward the Peloponnese, and joined Charicles and the thirty Athenian ships. They took Argive hoplites aboard and sailed to Laconia.

2 First they ravaged part of the territory of Epidaurus Limera. Then they put in on the Laconian coast opposite Cythera, where the sanctuary of Apollo stands, ravaged parts of the land, and fortified a place shaped like an isthmus. They intended it as a refuge to which the Lacedaemonians' Helots could desert, and at the same time as a base from which raiders could plunder, as they did from Pylos.

3 As soon as Demosthenes had helped to seize the place, he sailed along the coast toward Corcyra, to take aboard the allies from there and make the passage to Sicily as quickly as possible. Charicles stayed until he had completed the fortifications and left a garrison; afterward he too returned home with his thirty ships, and the Argives with him.

CHAPTER 27

1 In this same summer thirteen hundred peltasts from the sword-bearing Thracians of the Dii tribe also arrived at Athens. They were to have sailed with Demosthenes to Sicily.

2 Since they had come too late, the Athenians intended to send them back to Thrace, where they had come from. Keeping them for the war arising from Decelea seemed too costly, for each man received a drachma a day.

3 For Decelea, first fortified by the whole army during this summer and afterward occupied by garrisons from the cities, which relieved one another at intervals and attacked the countryside, inflicted great damage on the Athenians. Through the destruction of property and the loss of men it was among the chief causes of the deterioration of their affairs.

4 Previously the invasions had been brief and had not prevented them from enjoying the use of their land for the rest of the time. Now the enemy occupied it continuously: sometimes larger forces came against them, and at other times the regular garrison, driven by necessity, overran the country and plundered it. Agis, the Lacedaemonian king, was there in person and did not treat the war as a secondary concern. The Athenians suffered grievously.

5 They were deprived of their entire countryside, and more than twenty thousand slaves had deserted, most of them skilled workers. All their sheep and beasts of burden had been lost. As the cavalry rode out every day, raiding toward Decelea and keeping watch over the countryside, some horses went lame from constant exertion on hard ground, while others were wounded.

CHAPTER 28

1 The conveyance of supplies from Euboea, formerly quicker by land from Oropus through Decelea, now became expensive, since they had to come by sea around Sunium. The city needed everything alike to be imported, and instead of a city it had become a fortress.

2 By day the Athenians took turns guarding the battlements; by night all but the cavalry were on duty, some under arms and others on the wall. Summer and winter alike they endured this hardship.

3 What weighed most heavily upon them was that they had two wars on their hands at once, and had committed themselves to a struggle of such obstinacy that anyone hearing of it before it happened would have disbelieved it. Though themselves besieged by the Peloponnesians from a fortified position, they did

not even then withdraw from Sicily, but continued there to besiege Syracuse in the same fashion—a city in itself no smaller than Athens. So far did their power and daring surpass the Greeks' calculations: at the beginning of the war some had thought they would hold out for a year, others for two, but no one for more than three if the Peloponnesians invaded their land; yet in the seventeenth year after the first invasion they went to Sicily, already worn down in every way by the war, and took on an additional war no less formidable than the one they already faced from the Peloponnese.

4 For these reasons, with Decelea inflicting great damage and other heavy expenses falling upon them, they now became financially powerless. About this time they imposed on their subjects a levy of one twentieth on seaborne trade in place of tribute, thinking that more money would come in this way. Expenditure was no longer at its former level but had become much greater, in proportion to the greater scale of the war, while revenues were dwindling.

CHAPTER 29

1 Thus, unwilling in their present shortage of money to bear the expense of the Thracians who had arrived too late for Demosthenes, they sent them away at once. They entrusted their return to Diitrephes, with instructions to use them, if he could, to damage the enemy on the voyage along the coast, since their route lay through the Euripus.

2 He landed them in the territory of Tanagra and carried out a hurried raid for plunder. Then, sailing across the Euripus from Chalcis in Euboea in the evening, he disembarked in Boeotia and led them against Mycalessus.

3 He passed the night undetected near the Hermaeum, about sixteen stades from Mycalessus, and at daybreak attacked the town, which was not large. He took it by falling upon people who were unguarded and never expected anyone to come so far inland from the sea to attack them. The wall was weak, in places fallen down, in others built low; the gates too stood open, so secure did they feel.

4 The Thracians burst into Mycalessus, plundered houses and sanctuaries, and butchered the inhabitants, sparing neither old nor young but killing everyone they met in turn, children and women as well, and even beasts of burden and every other living thing they saw. For the Thracian people, like the most savage of the barbarians, are most bloodthirsty when they have nothing to fear.

5 There was great confusion everywhere and destruction in every form. They fell upon a boys' school, the largest in the town, where the children had just come in, and cut them all down. This calamity struck the whole city, as unexpected and terrible as any that ever befell another.

CHAPTER 30

1 The Thebans heard of it and came to the rescue. Overtaking the Thracians before they had gone far, they recovered the plunder, put them to flight, and pursued them to the Euripus and the sea, where the vessels that had brought them lay at anchor.

2 They killed the greatest number as they were embarking: the Thracians could not swim, and the men aboard the vessels, seeing what was happening on shore, had anchored beyond bowshot. In the rest of their retreat the Thracians had defended themselves quite capably against the Theban cavalry, which attacked them first, rushing out ahead and then closing ranks in their native formation; few of them had been killed in this phase. Some who lingered in the town for plunder were also caught there and perished. In all, two hundred and fifty of the thirteen hundred Thracians were killed.

3 They in turn killed about twenty of the Thebans and the others who had come to help, cavalry and hoplites together, and Scirphondas, one of the Theban Boeotarchs. A portion of the population of Mycalessus was wiped out. Such were the events at Mycalessus, whose sufferings, in proportion to its size, deserved lamentation no less than any in this war.

CHAPTER 31

1 Demosthenes, then sailing toward Corcyra after the fortification of the position in Laconia, found a merchant ship at anchor at Pheia in Elis, in which the Corinthian hoplites were to cross to Sicily. He destroyed the ship, but the men escaped, later obtained another, and sailed on.

2 After this Demosthenes reached Zacynthus and Cephallenia, took aboard hoplites, and sent for Messenians from Naupactus. He then crossed to the opposite mainland coast of Acarnania, to Alyzia and to Anactorium, which the Athenians held.

3 While he was in these parts he was met by Eurymedon, sailing back from Sicily, who had been sent out during the winter with the money for the army. Along with his other news, Eurymedon reported that he had learned, when already on his voyage, of the capture of Plemmyrium by the Syracusans.

4 Conon, the commander at Naupactus, also came to them, reporting that the twenty-five Corinthian ships at anchor opposite them were not giving up the war and were preparing for a naval battle. He therefore urged them to send ships, since his own eighteen were not enough to fight the enemy's twenty-five.

5 Demosthenes and Eurymedon accordingly sent Conon ten of the best-sailing ships they had to reinforce those at Naupactus. They themselves made preparations for assembling their army. Eurymedon sailed to Corcyra, ordered the Corcyraeans to man fifteen ships, and enrolled hoplites; for he had now turned back and was sharing the command with Demosthenes, as he had been elected to do. Demosthenes gathered slingers and javelin throwers from the places around Acarnania.

CHAPTER 32

1 When the envoys who had gone from Syracuse to the cities after the capture of Plemmyrium had persuaded them and were about to bring in the army they had assembled, Nicias learned of it beforehand. He sent to those of the Sicels

who controlled the passage and were allies of the Athenians—the people of Centoripa and Halicyae, and others—asking them not to let the enemy pass, but to combine and block their advance. The enemy would not even try another route, since the Agrigentines refused passage through their territory.

2 When the Siceliots were already on the march, the Sicels did as the Athenians had asked: they laid an ambush in three places, fell suddenly upon the unsuspecting enemy, and killed about eight hundred, together with all the envoys except the Corinthian. He brought the survivors, about fifteen hundred, into Syracuse.

CHAPTER 33

1 At about the same time the Camarinaeans also came to their aid, with five hundred hoplites, three hundred javelin throwers, and three hundred archers. The people of Gela, too, sent crews for five ships, four hundred javelin throwers, and two hundred cavalry.

2 For by now almost all Sicily, except the Acragantines—who belonged to neither side—had joined the Syracusans against the Athenians: even those who had previously stood aloof now came to their support.

3 After their setback among the Sicels, the Syracusans held back from an immediate attack on the Athenians. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, meanwhile, now had their force from Corcyra and the mainland ready, and crossed the Ionian Sea with the whole army to the Iapygian headland.

4 Setting out from there, they put in at the Choerades islands off Iapygia and took aboard a hundred and fifty Iapygian javelin throwers of the Messapian people. They renewed an old friendship with Artas, the local ruler who had supplied these men, and reached Metapontium in Italy.

5 They persuaded the Metapontians, under the terms of their alliance, to send three hundred javelin throwers and two triremes with them. Taking these on, they sailed along the coast to Thurii. There they found that the party hostile to

Athens had recently been expelled in civil strife.

6 They wished to assemble and review their entire force there, bringing in any detachments left behind, and to persuade the Thurians both to join their expedition with all possible zeal and, in their present circumstances, to regard the same people as friends and enemies as the Athenians did. They therefore remained at Thurii, attending to these matters.

CHAPTER 34

1 About this same time the Peloponnesians in the twenty-five ships, which had been stationed opposite the ships at Naupactus to protect the passage of the transports to Sicily, prepared for a sea battle. They manned additional ships until their fleet was only slightly smaller than the Athenian, and anchored off Erineus in Achaea, in the territory of Rhypes.

2 The place where they lay was crescent-shaped. The land forces of the Corinthians and the local allies, which had come to their support, were drawn up on the projecting headlands at either end; the ships blocked the space between. Polyanthes, a Corinthian, commanded the fleet.

3 The Athenians sailed against them from Naupactus with thirty-three ships under the command of Diphilus.

4 At first the Corinthians remained still. Then, when they thought the moment had come and their signal was raised, they advanced against the Athenians and engaged them. For a long time the two sides held their ground against each other.

5 Three Corinthian ships were destroyed. Of the Athenian ships none actually sank, but seven or so were disabled: struck bow to bow, their oar outriggers were torn open by the Corinthian ships, whose catheads had been made thicker for this very purpose.

6 The battle was evenly contested, and each side claimed the victory. The Athenians nevertheless secured the wrecks, since the wind carried them out to sea and the Corinthians did not put out again. The fleets then parted, without any pursuit or prisoners taken on either side. The Corinthians and Peloponnesians, fighting close to land, could easily save themselves, while no Athenian ship had sunk.

7 When the Athenians had sailed back to Naupactus, the Corinthians immediately set up a trophy in token of victory, since they had disabled more of the enemy's ships. They considered themselves undefeated for the very reason that their opponents did not consider themselves victorious: the Corinthians counted it a victory not to have suffered a decisive defeat, while the Athenians thought themselves defeated because they had not won decisively.

8 After the Peloponnesians had sailed away and the land forces had dispersed, the Athenians also set up a trophy in Achaea to mark their victory, about twenty stades from Erineus, where the Corinthians had been anchored. Such was the outcome of the sea battle.

CHAPTER 35

1 When the Thurians had made ready to join them with seven hundred hoplites and three hundred javelin throwers, Demosthenes and Eurymedon ordered the ships to sail along the coast toward the territory of Croton. They themselves first reviewed the whole land army at the river Sybaris, then led it through Thurian territory.

2 On reaching the river Hylias, they received a message from the Crotoniates saying that they did not wish the army to pass through their land. They therefore turned down toward the sea and camped at the mouth of the Hylias, where the ships met them. The next day they embarked and sailed along the coast, putting in at the cities, except Locri, until they reached Petra in the territory of Rhegium.

CHAPTER 36

1 Meanwhile the Syracusans, hearing of their approach, wished to make another attempt with their ships and with the rest of their land forces, which they were assembling for this very purpose, eager to strike before the reinforcements arrived.

2 They made the other preparations for their fleet in whatever ways the previous battle had shown might give them an advantage. They also shortened their ships' bows to make them more solid, fitted thick catheads to them, and ran supporting struts from these to the hull for some six cubits, inside and out. This was the same arrangement with which the Corinthians had strengthened their bows before fighting the ships at Naupactus.

3 The Syracusans believed that they would be at no disadvantage against the Athenian ships, which had not been built as solidly to meet them but had light bows, because the Athenians preferred to ram after rowing around an opponent rather than bow to bow. They also thought that a battle in the Great Harbor, with many ships in a confined space, would favor them. By ramming bow to bow they would tear open the enemy's bows, striking with their solid, thick rams against hollow, weak structures.

4 In these narrow waters the Athenians would have no room either to row around their line or to break through it—the maneuvers they most trusted their skill to execute. The Syracusans would prevent a breakthrough as far as they could, while lack of space would prevent an outflanking movement.

5 They themselves would make the fullest use of the head-on collision, previously thought a mark of ignorance in a helmsman, for here their advantage would be greatest. The Athenians, when driven back, would have nowhere to retreat but toward the shore, and even there only a short distance into a narrow space directly in front of their own camp. The Syracusans would control the rest of the harbor, and if forced back at any point the Athenians would be crowded

6 into a small space, all in one place, where collisions would throw them into confusion. This, indeed, did the Athenians the greatest harm in all their sea battles: unlike the Syracusans, they could not retreat throughout the harbor. Nor would they be able to row around into open water, since the Syracusans controlled both the approach from the sea and the retreat toward it; all the more so because Plemmyrium would be hostile to them and the harbor mouth was not wide.

CHAPTER 37

1 Having devised these measures to suit their own skill and strength, and now encouraged further by the previous sea battle, the Syracusans attacked simultaneously with their land army and their ships.

2 A little earlier Gylippus had led the troops out of the city and brought them up against the Athenian wall on the side facing the city. From the Olympieum, all the hoplites stationed there, together with the Syracusan cavalry and light-armed troops, approached the wall from the opposite side. Immediately afterward the ships of the Syracusans and their allies sailed out.

3 The Athenians had at first thought the attack would be made by land alone. When they suddenly saw the ships advancing too, they were thrown into confusion. Some drew up on the walls and in front of them to meet the approaching troops; others went out against the large force of cavalry and javelin throwers rapidly advancing from the Olympieum and the country outside; still others manned the ships and hurried to the shore to help. When the ships were manned, they put out with seventy-five; the Syracusans had about eighty.

CHAPTER 38

1 For much of the day they advanced and backed water, testing each other, but neither side could gain any notable advantage, apart from the Syracusans' sinking one or two Athenian ships. They then separated, and the land army with-

drew from the walls at the same time.

2 The next day the Syracusans remained quiet, giving no indication of what they meant to do. Nicias, seeing that the sea battle had been evenly contested and expecting another attack, compelled the trierarchs to repair any damage their ships had sustained. He also moored merchant ships in front of his palisade, which had been driven into the sea in front of the warships to serve as an enclosed harbor.

3 He stationed the merchant ships about two plethra apart, so that any warship hard pressed would have a safe refuge and could afterward put out again without disturbance. These preparations occupied the Athenians for the whole day, until nightfall.

CHAPTER 39

1 On the following day the Syracusans attacked the Athenians earlier in the morning, but with the same combined assault by land and sea.

2 The fleets faced each other as before and again spent much of the day testing each other. At last Ariston son of Pyrrhichus, a Corinthian and the best helmsman on the Syracusan side, persuaded his naval commanders to send to the officials in the city with orders to move the market to the seashore as quickly as possible, and to compel everyone who had food to bring it there and sell it. They could then disembark their sailors and take their meal immediately beside the ships, so as to attack again after a short interval, that same day, when the Athenians would not expect it.

CHAPTER 40

1 The commanders accepted his advice and sent a messenger; the market was made ready. The Syracusans suddenly backed water and sailed toward the city again, disembarked immediately, and took their meal there.

2 The Athenians supposed that their opponents had backed away toward the city because they were beaten. They disembarked at leisure and attended to their other affairs and their meal, believing that for that day, at least, there would be no more fighting at sea.

3 Suddenly the Syracusans manned their ships and sailed against them again. Amid great confusion the Athenians embarked without any order, most of them still unfed, and only with difficulty at last put out to meet them.

4 For a time they kept their distance, watching each other. Then the Athenians decided not to let their own delays wear them out, but to attack as soon as possible. At the word of command they advanced and engaged.

5 The Syracusans met them bow to bow, as they had planned, and with their specially strengthened rams tore open long stretches of the Athenian ships' oar outriggers. The men throwing javelins from their decks inflicted heavy losses on the Athenians; heavier still were those inflicted by the Syracusans cruising in small boats, darting under the enemy ships' banks of oars, running alongside, and throwing javelins at the sailors from there.

CHAPTER 41

1 In the end the Syracusans, fighting in this manner with overwhelming effect, won the battle, and the Athenians turned and sought refuge through the line of merchant ships in their own anchorage.

2 The Syracusan ships pursued as far as the merchant ships, but were then stopped by the booms raised from these over the passages, carrying suspended dolphin-shaped weights.

3 Two Syracusan ships, carried away by victory, ventured close to them and were destroyed; one was captured with all its crew.

4 The Syracusans had sunk seven Athenian ships and badly damaged many more, taking most of the men alive and killing the others. They withdrew and set up trophies for both sea battles. They now felt securely confident of their marked superiority at sea, and believed they would also overcome the army on land.

CHAPTER 42

1 While they were preparing for another attack on both fronts, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the reinforcements from Athens: about seventy-three ships, including the foreign vessels, some five thousand hoplites, both Athenians and allies, a considerable number of javelin throwers, barbarians and Greeks, as well as slingers, archers, and ample equipment of every other kind.

2 The immediate effect on the Syracusans and their allies was profound dismay: would they never be free of danger? They saw that the fortification of Decelea had done nothing to prevent the arrival of another army equal in size and much like the first, and that Athenian power was displaying its strength on every side. For the original Athenian army, by contrast, this brought a measure of renewed vigor after its hardships.

3 Demosthenes saw the state of affairs and judged that he must neither delay nor repeat Nicias' experience. Nicias had been formidable on his first arrival, but because he had not immediately pressed Syracuse and had instead wintered at Catana, he came to be despised; Gylippus had forestalled him by arriving with an army from the Peloponnese. The Syracusans would not even have summoned that army had Nicias attacked at once. Believing themselves sufficient for their own defense, they would have discovered their inferiority only when they had already been walled in, so that even if they had then sent for help, it could no longer have benefited them to the same extent. Reviewing all this, and recognizing that he himself was most alarming to the enemy now, on the very first day, Demosthenes wished to exploit as quickly as possible the present shock caused by his army.

4 He saw that the Syracusan cross-wall, by which they had prevented the Athenians from surrounding them with a wall, was only a single line. If one could secure the ascent to Epipolae and then the camp on the heights, the wall itself could easily be taken, for no one would stand against them.

5 He was therefore eager to make the attempt, judging this the shortest way to settle the war. Either he would succeed and hold Syracuse, or he would withdraw the army, instead of wearing down to no purpose both the Athenians serving on the expedition and the city as a whole.

6 First, then, the Athenians marched out and ravaged the Syracusan land around the Anapus. As at the beginning, their forces held the upper hand both by land and sea, for on neither front did the Syracusans come out to oppose them, except with cavalry and javelin throwers from the Olympieum.

CHAPTER 43

1 Demosthenes next decided to make a preliminary attempt against the cross-wall with siege engines. But when he brought them up, the defenders on the wall burned them, while attacks by the rest of the army at many points were repulsed. He decided to delay no longer. Having persuaded Nicias and his other fellow commanders, he made his attempt on Epipolae as he had planned.

2 An approach and ascent by daylight, he thought, could not escape detection. He therefore ordered five days' provisions and took all the stonemasons and carpenters, together with a further supply of missiles and everything they would need for building a wall if they won. After the first sleep of the night, he, Eurymedon, and Menander led the whole army toward Epipolae; Nicias was left behind within the walls.

3 They reached the heights by way of Euryelus, where the earlier army had first ascended. They escaped the notice of the Syracusan guards, advanced against the fort that stood there, captured it, and killed some of its garrison.

4 Most of the guards escaped and immediately reported the attack to the camps. There were three of these on Epipolae, within outer fortifications: one for the Syracusans, one for the other Sicilian Greeks, and one for the allies. They also informed the six hundred Syracusans who formed the forward guard in this part of Epipolae.

5 These at once came to help, but Demosthenes and the Athenians encountered them and put them to flight despite their spirited resistance. They themselves pressed forward immediately, eager to use their present momentum and waste no time in accomplishing what they had come for. Others, from the outset, were taking the Syracusan cross-wall, whose guards did not stand their ground, and pulling down its battlements.

6 The Syracusans and their allies, with Gylippus and his men, came to help from the outer fortifications. Stunned by this unexpected night assault, they attacked the Athenians, but were at first overpowered and fell back.

7 The Athenians were now advancing in growing disorder, as though victory were already theirs. They wished to push as quickly as possible through all the enemy troops not yet engaged, lest a slackening of their own assault allow these to rally again. The Boeotians were the first to stand against them; they attacked, routed them, and sent them fleeing.

CHAPTER 44

1 The Athenians now fell into great confusion and bewilderment, and how each event occurred was not easy to discover even from other people's accounts. In daylight things are clearer, yet even then no participant knows the whole course of events, and each scarcely knows what happens around himself. But in a battle by night—the only one fought between large armies in this war—how could anyone know anything clearly?

2 The moon was bright, but they saw each other as one would expect in moonlight: they could make out the outline of a body in front of them, yet could not trust themselves to recognize a friend. Large numbers of hoplites on both sides were moving about in a confined space.

3 Some of the Athenians were already being defeated, while others, still unbeaten in their first assault, continued to advance. Of the considerable force behind them, some had only just reached the heights and others were still coming up; they did not know where to direct their advance. For the rout had already thrown everything ahead into confusion, and the shouting made it hard to distinguish what was happening.

4 The Syracusans and their allies, feeling themselves victorious, were urging one another on with loud cries—there was no other way of signaling at night—and at the same time meeting those who came against them. The Athenians were searching for their own men and took everyone coming toward them for an enemy, even when they were friends already fleeing back. Unable to recognize one another by any other means, they continually demanded the password; with everyone asking at once, they created great confusion among themselves and made it quite plain to the enemy.

5 They did not have the same knowledge of the enemy's password, because the enemy, victorious and not scattered, had less difficulty recognizing one another. Thus, if the Athenians met an enemy party weaker than themselves, their opponents escaped because they knew the Athenian password; but if the Athenians themselves could not answer a challenge, they were killed.

6 The singing of the paean also caused immense harm, as much as anything else. Sounding much alike on both sides, it left them bewildered. Whenever the Argives, the Corcyraeans, or any of the other Dorians serving with the Athenians sang their paean, they frightened the Athenians; and the enemy's singing did the same.

7 Once confusion had taken hold, they finally collided with one another in many parts of the army, friend with friend and fellow citizen with fellow citizen. Not only were they thrown into panic: they even came to blows and could scarcely be parted.

8 As they were pursued, many threw themselves over the cliffs and perished, since the descent back from Epipolae was narrow. Of those who survived the descent to level ground, most, including all the men from the earlier army, escaped to the camp through their better knowledge of the country. But some of the new arrivals missed the paths and wandered through the countryside; when day came, the Syracusan cavalry rode around them and killed them.

CHAPTER 45

1 The next day the Syracusans raised two trophies, one on Epipolae at the point of ascent, the other where the Boeotians had first made their stand; the Athenians recovered their dead under a truce.

2 Not a few of the Athenians and their allies had died, yet the arms captured exceeded even the number of the dead: of those forced to leap down the cliffs stripped of their arms [without their shields], some perished, but others escaped.

CHAPTER 46

1 After this the Syracusans, their spirits once more revived, as before, by an unexpected success, sent Sicanus with fifteen ships to Acragas, which was torn by civil strife, to bring the city over if he could. Gylippus again set off by land into the rest of Sicily to bring back still more troops, hoping now to take even the Athenian walls by storm, since events on Epipolae had turned out as they had.

CHAPTER 47

1 Meanwhile the Athenian generals deliberated on the disaster that had occurred and the pervasive weakness now afflicting their camp. They saw that their undertakings were failing and that the soldiers resented remaining there;

2 for sickness bore heavily on them for two reasons: it was the season of the year when people are most prone to illness, and the ground where they were encamped was also marshy and unhealthy. In all other respects, too, their prospects seemed hopeless.

3 Demosthenes therefore thought they should stay no longer. In keeping with the intention with which he had risked the assault on Epipolae, now that it had failed he voted to leave without delay, while it was still possible to cross the open sea and the army could still command it, at least with the ships that had lately arrived.

4 It would be more profitable for the city, he said, to wage war against those fortifying a position in their own country than against the Syracusans, whom it was no longer easy to subdue; nor was it reasonable to remain at the siege, spending great sums to no purpose.

CHAPTER 48

1 Such was Demosthenes' judgment. Nicias himself also thought their affairs were in a bad state, but he did not wish to expose their weakness in words, or to have an open vote for withdrawal, with many present, make their intentions known to the enemy. That would make it far harder to leave undetected whenever they chose.

2 Moreover, the enemy's affairs, of which his sources gave him fuller knowledge than the others possessed, still offered some hope that their position would become worse than the Athenians' if these persevered in the siege. Lack of money would wear them down, especially now that the Athenians commanded

the sea more widely with the fleet they had. There was indeed a party in Syracuse that wished to surrender control to the Athenians; it was communicating with him through messengers and urging him not to withdraw.

3 Knowing this, he was in fact holding back, still weighing both courses and examining the situation; but in his public statements at the time he refused to lead the army away. He knew well, he said, that the Athenians would not approve their leaving without a vote of their own. For those who would vote on the generals [themselves] would not know the facts as they did, from seeing them rather than hearing them through the denunciations of others; instead, they would be persuaded by whatever accusations a skillful speaker might bring.

4 Many, indeed most, of the soldiers now there, he said, who were crying out about their desperate situation, would on reaching home cry out to the opposite effect: that the generals had taken bribes, betrayed them, and withdrawn. For his own part, knowing the Athenian character, he would not choose to perish unjustly at Athenian hands on a shameful charge rather than, if he must, meet the same fate at the enemy's hands, taking the risk himself.

5 The Syracusans' position, he said, was nevertheless still weaker than their own. Paying mercenaries, spending money on fortified posts as well, and maintaining a large fleet for a full year already, they were short of resources in some respects and would soon be at a loss in others. They had already spent two thousand talents and owed much more besides; and if they allowed any part whatever of their present forces to fall away through failure to pay for its maintenance, their cause would be ruined, since it depended on hired auxiliaries rather than, as the Athenians' did, on compulsory service.

6 They must therefore remain at the siege, he said, and wear the enemy down, not depart defeated in money, the very resource in which they were far stronger.

CHAPTER 49

1 Nicias pressed these arguments firmly, having exact knowledge of affairs in Syracuse, of its shortage of money, and of the large party there which wished control to pass to the Athenians and was sending him messages urging him not to withdraw. At the same time he felt more confident than before that, with the fleet at least, he would prevail.

2 Demosthenes, however, would not hear of continuing the siege on any terms. If they must not lead the army away without an Athenian decree, but must linger there, he said, they should move to Thapsus or Catana and do so there. From either place their infantry could raid wide stretches of the country, feeding themselves by ravaging the enemy's property and inflicting losses on them; their ships, too, would fight on the open sea, not in confined waters, which favored the enemy, but with room to maneuver. There their skill would be of use, and they would have space for retreats and attacks, no longer putting out and coming to land within a narrow, circumscribed area.

3 In short, he said, he could not approve of remaining in the same place on any account: they must move at once, as quickly as possible, and delay no longer. Eurymedon supported his arguments.

4 But Nicias' opposition produced a certain hesitation and delay, along with a suspicion that he might be insisting because he knew something more. In this way the Athenians continued to put matters off and stayed where they were.

CHAPTER 50

1 Meanwhile Gylippus and Sicanus returned to Syracuse. Sicanus had failed at Acragas, for while he was still at Gela the faction friendly to the Syracusans had been driven out. Gylippus came with a large additional army from Sicily, including the hoplites sent from the Peloponnese in merchant ships in the spring, who had reached Selinus by way of Libya.

2 They had been driven off course to Libya, where the Cyrenaeans gave them two triremes and guides for the voyage. Sailing along the coast, they helped the Euesperitae, who were being besieged by Libyans, and defeated the Libyans. From there they sailed along to Neapolis, a Carthaginian trading station, from which Sicily is at its shortest distance, two days' and a night's voyage; crossing from there, they reached Selinus.

3 Immediately upon their arrival the Syracusans prepared to attack the Athenians again both by sea and by land. The Athenian generals, seeing that another army had reinforced the enemy, while their own affairs showed no improvement but grew worse in every respect from day to day, above all under the burden of sickness among the men, regretted not having withdrawn earlier. Since Nicias no longer opposed them as before, except to insist that the vote should not be taken openly, they gave the whole army orders, as secretly as they could, to sail out from the camp and to make ready for the signal.

4 But when everything was ready and they were about to sail, the moon was eclipsed; it happened to be full. Most of the Athenians, taking this to heart as an omen, urged the generals to wait. Nicias, who was indeed somewhat excessively devoted to divination and such things, declared that he would not even consider a proposal to move before they had waited three times nine days, as the soothsayers prescribed. Thus the Athenians delayed, and for this reason their stay was prolonged.

CHAPTER 51

1 When the Syracusans too learned of this, they were far more encouraged to give the Athenians no respite: the Athenians themselves, they reasoned, had now admitted that they were no longer superior either at sea or on land, for otherwise they would not have planned to sail away. Nor did they want them to settle somewhere else in Sicily and become harder to fight; rather, they wished to force them into a sea battle there, as soon as possible and on terms favorable to themselves.

2 They therefore manned their ships and practiced for as many days as they thought sufficient. When the time came, on the first day they attacked the Athenian walls. A small force of hoplites and cavalry came out against them through one of the gates; they cut off some of the hoplites, routed them, and pursued them. Since the entrance was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses and a few hoplites.

CHAPTER 52

1 On that day the Syracusan army withdrew. The next day they put out with seventy-six ships and at the same time advanced with their infantry against the walls. The Athenians sailed out to meet them with eighty-six ships, and the fleets engaged.

2 Eurymedon, who commanded the Athenian right wing, wished to encircle the enemy's ships and was extending his course farther toward the shore. The Syracusans and their allies first defeated the Athenian center, then cut him off as well in the recess at the innermost part of the harbor, killed him, and destroyed the ships that had followed him. They then pursued the entire Athenian fleet and drove it ashore.

CHAPTER 53

1 Gylippus, seeing the enemy's ships defeated and being swept ashore outside their palisades and their own camp, hurried with part of his army to the breakwater. He wanted to kill the men as they disembarked and make it easier for the Syracusans to tow the ships away, with the shore in friendly hands.

2 But the Tyrrhenians, who were guarding this point for the Athenians, saw them approaching in disorder, rushed out to meet them, and fell upon the foremost, routing them and driving them into the marsh called Lysimeleia.

3 Later, when more of the Syracusan and allied army had come up, the Athenians too hurried to the rescue, fearing for their ships. They engaged the enemy, defeated and pursued them, and killed a few hoplites. They saved most of their ships and brought them together by the camp, but the Syracusans and their allies captured eighteen and killed all the men aboard.

4 Wishing to burn the remaining ships, they filled an old merchantman with vine cuttings and pinewood, set it alight, and sent [the ship] adrift, for the wind was blowing toward the Athenians. Alarmed for their fleet, the Athenians devised means to extinguish the fire and barriers to stop the vessel; by quenching the flames and preventing the merchantman from coming near, they escaped the danger.

CHAPTER 54

1 After this the Syracusans raised trophies for the sea battle and for cutting off the hoplites above, near the wall, where they had also captured the horses. The Athenians raised trophies for the rout in which the Tyrrhenians had driven the infantry into the marsh, and for the one they themselves had inflicted with the rest of their army.

CHAPTER 55

1 Now that the Syracusans had won a brilliant victory at sea as well—for before this they had feared the ships that arrived with Demosthenes—the Athenians sank into utter despondency. The shock was great, but their regret for the expedition was greater still.

2 For these were the only cities they had yet attacked that resembled their own in character: democracies like themselves, with ships, cavalry, and large populations. They could gain no advantage by a change of government that would bring them over, nor by a great superiority in equipment; instead they failed in

most of their attempts. They had been at a loss even before, and now that they had been defeated at sea as well, which they would never have expected, they were far more so.

CHAPTER 56

1 The Syracusans at once began sailing about the harbor without fear and planned to close its mouth, so that the Athenians could no longer sail out undetected, even if they wished.

2 Their concern was no longer merely for their own survival, but also to prevent the Athenians' escape. They thought, as was indeed the case, that in the present circumstances their position was far superior, and that if they could defeat the Athenians and their allies both on land and at sea, their achievement would appear glorious to the Greeks. Of the other Greeks, some would at once be set free and others released from fear, since the power left to Athens would no longer be capable of sustaining the war that would then be brought against it; and they themselves, credited with these results, would be greatly admired by the rest of mankind and by generations to come.

3 The contest was indeed worthy of its prize, both for these reasons and because they were prevailing not over the Athenians alone, but over their many other allies as well. Nor were they themselves alone, but fought with those who had come to their aid, having assumed the leadership alongside the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, placed their own city in the forefront of danger, and made great advances in naval power.

4 For more peoples had gathered against this one city than against any other, apart, of course, from the total assembled in this war against the cities of Athens and Lacedaemon.

CHAPTER 57

1 For the following were the peoples on either side who fought in Sicily and for Sicily at Syracuse, some coming to help conquer the country, others to help preserve it. They took their places beside one another less from any claim of right or kinship than as circumstances in each case, interest or compulsion, determined.

2 The Athenians themselves, Ionians, came of their own will against the Dorian Syracusans. With them served the Lemnians and Imbrians, the Aeginetans who then held Aegina, and also the Histiaeans inhabiting Histiaea in Euboea: all were their colonists and still shared their language and customs.

3 Of the others who served with them, some were subjects, others autonomous allies, and some were mercenaries.

4 Among the tribute-paying subjects were the Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styrians, and Carystians from Euboea; from the islands, the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians; and from Ionia, the Milesians, Samians, and Chians. Of these, the Chians accompanied them as an autonomous people, supplying ships rather than paying tribute. All these were for the most part Ionians descended from Athenians, except the Carystians, who are Dryopians; and though subjects serving under compulsion, they were at least Ionians following against Dorians.

5 Besides these there were Aeolians: the Methymnaeans, subjects obliged to furnish ships rather than tribute, and the tribute-paying Tenedians and Aenianians. These Aeolians were compelled to fight against their Aeolian founders, the Boeotians serving with the Syracusans; the Plataeans alone, Boeotians facing Boeotians outright, did so naturally, from hatred.

6 The Rhodians and Cytherians were both Dorians. The Cytherians, colonists of the Lacedaemonians, bore arms with the Athenians against the Lacedaemonians accompanying Gylippus; the Rhodians, Argive by descent, were compelled to fight against the Dorian Syracusans and also against the Geloans, their own colonists, who served with the Syracusans.

7 Of the islanders around the Peloponnese, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians accompanied them as autonomous peoples, though their island position put them rather under constraint, since the Athenians controlled the sea. The Corcyraeans, not merely Dorians but unmistakably Corinthians, served against Corinthians and Syracusans, though colonists of the former and kinsmen of the latter: ostensibly under compulsion, but no less willingly, through their hatred of the Corinthians.

8 Those now called Messenians were also brought into the war, from Naupactus and from Pylos, which the Athenians then held. A few Megarian exiles, too, were brought by circumstance to fight against the Selinuntians, who were Megarians.

9 The rest took part in the expedition more of their own free will. The Argives followed the Ionian Athenians, Dorians against Dorians, less for the alliance than from hatred of the Lacedaemonians and the immediate private advantage of each man. The Mantineans and other Arcadian mercenaries, accustomed to march against whatever enemy was designated for them, now regarded the Arcadians who had come with the Corinthians as enemies no less, for the sake of gain. The Cretans and Aetolians too were induced by pay; and so the Cretans, who had joined the Rhodians in founding Gela, came willingly for wages, not to support their colonists but to attack them.

10 Some Acarnanians also came to their aid as allies, partly for profit, but more from friendship for Demosthenes and goodwill toward the Athenians.

11 These came from the region bounded by the Ionian Gulf. Of the Greeks in Italy, the Thurians and Metapontians served with them, caught at that time in constraints imposed by civil strife; of the Greeks in Sicily, the Naxians and Catanaeans; and of the barbarians, the Egestaeans, who had invited them in, and most of the Sicels. From outside Sicily came some Tyrrhenians, because of their quarrel with the Syracusans, and Iapygian mercenaries. Such were the peoples campaigning with the Athenians.

CHAPTER 58

1 To the Syracusans' aid on the other side came their neighbors the Camarinaeans, and the Geloans, whose territory lay next beyond them; then, since the Acragantines remained neutral, the Selinuntians, settled still farther along.

2 These occupied the part of Sicily facing Libya; the Himeraeans came from the part facing the Tyrrhenian Sea, where they are the only Greek inhabitants, and they alone from that region came to help.

3 These were the Greek peoples of Sicily who fought as allies, all Dorians and all autonomous; of the barbarians, only those Sicels who had not gone over to the Athenians. Of the Greeks from outside Sicily, the Lacedaemonians supplied a Spartan commander, the rest of their men being neodamodes and Helots [the term neodamodes signifies that they were now free]. The Corinthians alone came with both ships and infantry; the Leucadians and Ambraciots came through ties of kinship; from Arcadia came mercenaries sent by the Corinthians, and the Sicyonians served under compulsion; from outside the Peloponnese came the Boeotians.

4 Compared with these forces from abroad, the Sicilian Greeks themselves supplied greater numbers in every category, since they inhabited large cities: many hoplites, ships, and cavalry were assembled, and an abundant multitude of other troops. Compared, in turn, with virtually all the others together, the Syracusans themselves provided more, both because of their city's size and because theirs was the greatest danger.

CHAPTER 59

1 Such were the reinforcements gathered on either side. By this time all were present with their respective armies, and no further force came to either.

2 The Syracusans and their allies therefore reasonably thought that, after their victory in the sea battle, it would be a glorious achievement to capture the whole Athenian army, great as it was, and allow it no means of escape, either by sea or by land.

3 They at once began to close the Great Harbor, whose mouth was about eight stades wide, anchoring triremes broadside across it, together with merchant vessels and small boats. They made their other preparations in case the Athenians should dare to fight another sea battle, and nothing they planned in any respect was on a small scale.

CHAPTER 60

1 The Athenians, seeing the blockade and perceiving the rest of their design, thought they must take counsel.

2 The generals and the commanders of the infantry divisions met to consider their present difficulties, especially the fact that they no longer had provisions even for the immediate present—for, expecting to sail away, they had sent ahead to Catana to forbid further supplies—and would have none in future unless they won command of the sea. They decided to abandon the upper walls and enclose with a cross-wall, close beside the ships themselves, the smallest area that would suffice for the stores and the sick, and to guard it; then, embarking every available man from the rest of the infantry, to fill all the ships, both the seaworthy and those less fit to sail, and fight their way out. If victorious, they would make for Catana; if not, they would burn their ships, form up, and retreat by land along whichever route offered the quickest prospect of reaching some friendly territory, barbarian or Greek.

3 Having resolved on this, they acted accordingly. They came down from the upper walls and manned every ship, compelling everyone whose age seemed to make him fit for service in any capacity to embark.

4 In all, about a hundred and ten ships were manned. They embarked many archers and javelin throwers, both Acarnanians and other foreign troops, and made all the other provision they could under the pressure of necessity and with such a purpose in view.

5 When most preparations were complete, Nicias saw that the soldiers were disheartened by their defeat at sea, so far contrary to their accustomed experience, and that the shortage of provisions made them eager to stake everything as soon as possible. He called them all together and first addressed them with the following words of encouragement.

CHAPTER 61

1 "Soldiers of Athens and of our other allies, the coming struggle will be equally shared by all, for the survival and homeland of each of you, no less than for those of our enemies. For if we win now with our ships, each man may see his own native city once again.

2 "You must not lose heart or behave like the most inexperienced of men, who stumble in their first contests and thereafter let their misfortunes set the measure of all their fearful expectations.

3 "Instead, all you Athenians here, experienced already in many wars, and all you allies who have always campaigned beside us, remember the unexpected turns of war. Hope that fortune may yet take our side, and prepare to renew the struggle in a manner worthy of this multitude, whose strength you can see for yourselves.

CHAPTER 62

1 "Everything we judged would help us against the narrowness of the harbor, with the crowd of ships that will fill it, and against their preparations on deck, from which we suffered before, has now been considered with the helmsmen and made ready for us too, so far as our resources allow.

2 "For many archers and javelin throwers will go aboard, and a mass of men whom we would not employ in a sea battle on the open water, since their weight would hamper our skill by making the ships heavy. But in the land battle aboard ships to which we are compelled here, they will be of service.

3 "We have devised the changes our ships require to counter theirs; and against their thick catheads, which did us the greatest damage, we have grappling irons to throw aboard. These will prevent a ship that strikes us from backing away, if the marines perform the service that must follow.

4 "For we have been driven to the point of fighting a land battle from our ships, and it seems advantageous neither to back away ourselves nor to let them do so, especially since the land is hostile except for the part our army holds.

CHAPTER 63

1 "Remember this and fight with all your strength, resisting any attempt to drive you ashore. When ship meets ship, refuse to break free until you have swept the hoplites from the enemy's deck.

2 "I urge this upon the hoplites no less than upon the sailors, since this task falls rather to the men above; and even now we still have the advantage in most respects with our infantry.

3 "To the sailors I offer the same encouragement and entreat them not to be too overwhelmed by our misfortunes: our preparations on deck are better now, and our ships more numerous. Remember also how well worth preserving is that privilege you have enjoyed. Though not Athenians, you were taken for Athenians, and through your knowledge of our language and imitation of our ways you were admired throughout Greece. You shared no less in the benefits of our empire, and far more in the fear you inspired in its subjects and your freedom from injury.

4 "Since you alone share our empire as free partners, you should in justice not betray it now. Despise the Corinthians, whom you have often defeated, and the Sicilians, not one of whom thought fit even to stand against us while our navy was at its height. Beat them back, and show that even amid weakness and misfortune your skill is stronger than another's strength blessed with success.

CHAPTER 64

1 "And to those of you who are Athenians I give this further reminder: you have left behind neither other ships in the sheds to match these nor a reserve of men of hoplite age. If anything happens to you but victory, the enemy here will sail at once against Athens, and those of us left there will be powerless to resist both the enemies already there and those who come against them. You would fall immediately under the Syracusans—you yourselves know with what intentions you attacked them—and those at home under the Lacedaemonians.

2 "Standing, then, in this single contest for both, hold firm now if ever you did. Remember, each of you and all together, that you who are about to embark are Athens' infantry and fleet, all that remains of her city, and the great name of Athens. In their defense, if one man surpasses another at all in skill or courage, he could never display it at a moment when he would serve himself better or do more to save us all."

CHAPTER 65

1 With this exhortation Nicias immediately ordered the ships to be manned. Gylippus and the Syracusans could see from the preparations themselves that the Athenians were going to fight at sea; they had also been warned of the grappling irons to be thrown aboard,

2 and made their arrangements against this, as against each of the other measures. They covered their bows and much of the upper parts of their ships with hides, so that a grapple thrown aboard would slip off and find no hold.

3 When everything was ready, the generals and Gylippus exhorted their men in these terms:

CHAPTER 66

1 "Syracusans and allies, most of you, we believe, know that our past achievements are glorious and that the coming contest holds glorious prizes; otherwise you would not have taken it up so eagerly. If anyone has not understood this as fully as he should, we will make it clear.

2 "The Athenians came to this country to enslave Sicily first and then, if they succeeded, the Peloponnese and the rest of Greece. They already possessed the greatest empire of any Greeks, past or present. Yet you were the first men to stand against their navy, the very instrument of all their conquests: you have already won the sea battles fought so far, and will in all likelihood win this one now.

3 "For when men are humbled in what they claim as their special strength, what remains of their self-esteem is weaker than if they had never cherished that belief at all. The unexpected overthrow of their pride makes them yield beyond what the actual strength of their forces warrants. This, we may reasonably think, has now happened to the Athenians.

CHAPTER 67

1 "Our former confidence, which emboldened us even when we still lacked experience, is firmer now. Added to it is the conviction that, if we have defeated the best, we must ourselves be best; and so each man's hope is doubled. In undertaking a task, the greatest hope generally brings the greatest eagerness too.

2 "As for their imitation of our equipment, it is familiar to our way of fighting, and we shall be well adapted to meet every part of it. But when they have many hoplites on their decks, contrary to their established practice, and many javelin throwers too—Acarnanians and others, landsmen, so to speak, who have

boarded ships and will not even know how to throw a missile from a seated position—how can they fail to unbalance their ships and fall into confusion among themselves, all moving in ways unfamiliar to them?

3 "Nor will the number of their ships help them, if any of you fears this too, that he will fight against superior numbers. Crowded in a small space, their ships will be less able to do what they wish and more easily damaged by the measures we have prepared.

4 "Learn the truth of their position from what we believe we have reliably ascertained. Their sufferings have become intolerable, and their present straits have forced them into desperation. They are resolved to hazard whatever they can, trusting less in their preparations than in fortune, so as either to force a passage out to sea or afterward to make their retreat by land, since they can fare no worse than they do now.

CHAPTER 68

1 "Let us therefore attack with anger such disorder and the fortune of our bitterest enemies, which has delivered itself into our hands. Let us consider that those who choose to sate their anger against an enemy in punishment for his assault act with the fullest right; and consider too that we shall have the chance to avenge ourselves upon our enemies, which, as the saying goes, is the sweetest thing of all.

2 "That they are enemies, and our bitterest enemies, you all know. They came against our country to enslave it, and had they succeeded they would have inflicted the most grievous suffering on our men, the worst indignities on our children and women, and the most shameful name upon our whole city.

3 "In return for this, no one should weaken or count it a gain merely to see them depart without danger to ourselves. They will do that just the same even if they win. But if, as is likely, we achieve what we intend, we shall punish these men

and hand down to all Sicily, already enjoying freedom, a freedom more secure: a noble prize to contend for. And rarest are those risks which do least harm through failure and bring most benefit through success."

CHAPTER 69

1 After the Syracusan generals and Gylippus had thus exhorted their own soldiers, they too began manning their ships, as soon as they perceived that the Athenians were doing so.

2 Nicias, overwhelmed by their situation and seeing the magnitude of the danger and how near it already [was], now that they were almost on the point of putting out, felt what men feel in great contests: that everything they had done was still inadequate and that he had not yet said enough to them. Once again he called back each of the trierarchs, naming his father, the man himself, and his tribe. He urged any man who had some distinction of his own not to betray it, and not to efface the ancestral virtues for which his forebears had been renowned. He reminded them of their country, the freest of all countries, and of the unrestricted freedom everyone there enjoyed in ordering his life. He said the other things men at such a crisis would say, without guarding against seeming to someone to rehearse old commonplaces: appeals much the same in every case, invoking wives, children, and ancestral gods, which men cry out because they think them useful in the terror of the moment.

3 Then, believing his exhortations not so much sufficient as required by necessity, he withdrew, led the infantry down to the sea, and drew them up along as wide a front as he could, to give the men aboard the ships the greatest possible support to their courage.

4 Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus—the generals who had gone aboard the Athenian ships—put out from their own camp and sailed straight toward the barrier across the harbor and the opening left for passage, intending to force their way out.

CHAPTER 70

1 The Syracusans and their allies had already brought out about as many ships as before. They guarded the outlet with some of them, stationing the rest around the harbor so as to fall on the Athenians from every side at once; their infantry meanwhile came to their support wherever the ships put in. Sicanus and Agatharchus commanded the Syracusan fleet, each holding one wing of the whole force, while Pythen and the Corinthians held the center.

2 When the rest of the Athenians approached the barrier, the first impetus of their attack overpowered the ships stationed there, and they tried to break the closures. But then the Syracusans and their allies bore down upon them from every side, and the sea battle spread beyond the barrier throughout the harbor. It was fierce beyond any of the previous battles.

3 On either side the sailors showed great eagerness to advance whenever the order came, and the helmsmen matched their skill against one another in fierce rivalry. Whenever ship struck ship, the marines took care that their work on deck should not fall short of the skill displayed elsewhere. Each man strove to show himself foremost at his assigned post.

4 So many ships were crowded together in a narrow space—never had so many fought in so little room, for the two fleets together fell little short of two hundred—that there were few ramming attacks, since there was no room to back water or break through the enemy's line. Collisions were more frequent, as one ship happened to run into another while fleeing or advancing against a different ship.

5 While a ship was bearing down, the men on deck poured javelins, arrows, and stones upon it without stint. Once the ships met, the marines fought hand to hand and tried to board one another's vessels.

6 In many places the lack of room meant that, while a ship rammed another, it was itself rammed, and two or sometimes even more ships were locked by necessity around one. The helmsmen had to guard against some and plot

attacks on others, not one at a time but many from every direction. The great crashing of so many ships together spread terror and drowned the voices of the boatswains.

7 For on both sides the boatswains were shouting loud and frequent encouragement, both to direct the work and to spur the immediate struggle for victory. They cried to the Athenians to force their way out and, now if ever, to strive with all their hearts for a safe return to their country; to the Syracusans and their allies, that it would be glorious to prevent the enemy's escape and by their victory enhance each man's own homeland.

8 The generals on both sides, too, whenever they saw a ship backing water without necessity, called its trierarch by name and questioned him. The Athenians asked whether they were retreating because they now considered the most hostile shore friendlier than the sea they had won at no small cost in labor. The Syracusans asked whether they themselves were fleeing before the fleeing Athenians, whom they well knew to be straining every effort to escape.

CHAPTER 71

1 While the sea battle hung in the balance, the infantry of both sides on shore endured a fierce struggle and tension of mind: the local army striving for still greater glory, the invaders fearing a fate worse even than their present distress.

2 For the Athenians had staked everything on their ships, and their fear for the future was beyond comparison. The changing fortunes of the sea battle compelled those watching from the shore to see it in changing ways as well.

3 With the spectacle so close and not all watching the same point at once, some, if they saw their own men prevailing anywhere, took heart and turned to invoking the gods not to deprive them of deliverance. Others, looking toward a part where they were being defeated, broke into loud cries of lamentation; the sight of what was happening enslaved their spirits more than those of the men actually fighting. Still others, watching some evenly matched encounter, endured

the greatest torment: the struggle went on without a decision, and in their fear their very bodies swayed with their apprehensions. At every moment they were a hair's breadth from escape or destruction.

4 While the fighting remained evenly balanced, all sounds could be heard together in the same Athenian army: lamentation, shouting, victory, defeat, and all the many cries that a great army in great peril must utter.

5 The men aboard their ships were experiencing much the same, until at last, after the sea battle had held out for a long time, the Syracusans and their allies routed the Athenians and pressed them hard, pursuing them to shore amid loud shouts and mutual encouragement.

6 Then the men of the fleet, all who had not been captured on the water, were driven ashore at different points and rushed into the camp. The infantry no longer felt conflicting emotions: all with one impulse gave way to wailing and groaning, unable to bear what was happening. Some ran to help at the ships, others to defend what remained of the wall; others again, the greater number, were already looking to themselves and considering how they might escape.

7 The terror of that moment was as great as any they had ever known. What they suffered resembled what they themselves had inflicted at Pylos: when the Lacedaemonians' ships were destroyed, the men who had crossed to the island were lost to them as well. So now the Athenians had no hope of escape by land unless something beyond all expectation should occur.

CHAPTER 72

1 After this fierce sea battle, in which both sides had lost many ships and men, the victorious Syracusans and their allies recovered the wrecks and the dead, sailed back to the city, and set up a trophy.

2 The Athenians, overwhelmed by the scale of their present calamity, did not even think of asking leave to recover their dead or their wrecks. Instead, they planned to retreat at once that night.

3 Demosthenes approached Nicias and proposed manning their remaining ships and trying to force the passage out at daybreak, if they could. He pointed out that they still had more serviceable ships left than the enemy: the Athenians had about sixty remaining, their opponents fewer than fifty.

4 Nicias agreed with this proposal, but when they wished to man the ships, the sailors refused to embark. They were stunned by the defeat and no longer believed they could win.

CHAPTER 73

1 By now they were all resolved to retreat by land. Hermocrates the Syracusan suspected their intention and thought it dangerous that so great an army should withdraw by land, establish itself somewhere in Sicily, and decide to renew the war against them. He went to the authorities and urged them not to let the enemy depart that night, setting out the considerations that weighed with him. All the Syracusans and their allies, he said, should march out at once, wall off the roads, and occupy and guard the narrow passages in advance.

2 They themselves understood all this no less than he did, and thought it should be done. But they did not think the men would readily consent to obey, now that they had gladly taken their rest after a great sea battle and were also celebrating a festival: that day happened to be the day of their sacrifice to Heracles. In the exuberance of victory most had turned to drinking at the festival; the authorities expected them to obey any order rather than take up arms and march out at that moment.

3 Since these considerations made the task seem impossible to the authorities, and Hermocrates could no longer persuade them, he devised the following expedient. He feared that the Athenians would slip through the most difficult country unmolested during the night before they could be stopped. As dusk fell, he sent some of his own companions with horsemen toward the Athenian camp. They rode up within earshot and called out to some of the men, pretending to be friends of the Athenians—for Nicias did have messengers bring-

ing word from inside the city. They told them to warn Nicias not to lead the army away that night, since the Syracusans were guarding the roads, but to make his preparations at leisure and withdraw by day.

4 Having delivered their message, they departed, and those who had heard them passed it on to the Athenian generals.

CHAPTER 74

1 The generals, believing the message was no deception, stayed where they were for the night. And since they had thus failed to set out immediately, they decided to wait through the following day as well, so that the soldiers might pack whatever would be most useful from what was available. They were to leave everything else behind and set out carrying only the necessities they had for their bodily subsistence.

2 Meanwhile the Syracusans and Gylippus marched their infantry out ahead, blocked the roads through the countryside by which the Athenians were likely to go, guarded the crossings of the streams and rivers, and took up positions wherever seemed best for intercepting the army and stopping it. Their ships sailed up and towed the Athenian ships away from the beach. The Athenians themselves had burned a few, as they had intended, but the rest were made fast at leisure wherever each lay stranded and brought back to the city without opposition.

CHAPTER 75

1 After this, when Nicias and Demosthenes judged their preparations sufficient, the army at last broke camp, on the third day after the sea battle.

2 Their plight was terrible on more than one account: not only were they withdrawing with all their ships lost, their great hopes exchanged for danger to themselves and their city, but in abandoning the camp each man encountered sights painful to his eyes and thoughts painful to his mind.

3 The dead lay unburied, and whenever anyone saw a friend lying there, grief mingled with fear overcame him. Yet the living who were being left behind, wounded or sick, caused the living far greater anguish than the dead, and were more pitiable than those already lost.

4 Turning to supplication and lament, they left their comrades at a loss, demanding to be taken along and calling to each man by name whenever they caught sight of a friend or relative. They clung to their tentmates as they were leaving and followed as far as they could; when strength and body failed them, they fell behind with a few appeals to the gods and cries of grief. The whole army was filled with tears and such helplessness that it could scarcely bring itself to depart, though it was leaving enemy country, and though both the sufferings it had already endured and those it feared from the unseen future were too great for tears.

5 There was deep dejection too, and bitter self-reproach. They resembled nothing so much as the people of a city fleeing after a siege had forced its surrender —and no small city, for the whole multitude marching together numbered no fewer than forty thousand. All the others carried whatever useful things each could manage, while the hoplites and cavalry, contrary to their custom, carried their own provisions as well as their weapons, some for lack of attendants, others because they could not trust them: some attendants had deserted long before, and most had done so just now. Even what they carried was insufficient, for there was no longer food in the camp.

6 The rest of their misery, and the equal share all bore in their sufferings, afforded some relief through being shared with so many; yet even so their present condition seemed hard to bear, above all when they considered the splendor and pride of their beginning and the humiliation of their end.

7 Never had a Greek army undergone a greater reversal. They had come to enslave others, and were leaving in greater fear of suffering that fate themselves; in place of the prayers and paeans with which they had sailed out, they now set

off amid cries of the opposite kind, marching on foot instead of sailing aboard ships, and looking to hoplite warfare rather than to their fleet. Yet the magnitude of the danger still hanging over them made all this seem bearable.

CHAPTER 76

1 Seeing the army dispirited and overwhelmed by its reversal, Nicias went along the ranks, encouraging and consoling the men as circumstances allowed. In his earnestness he raised his voice still louder to each group he reached, hoping that, by making himself heard as far as possible, he might do some good.

CHAPTER 77

1 "Athenians and allies, even in our present circumstances we must have hope—others before us have survived worse than these—and you must not reproach yourselves too bitterly for our disasters or for the hardships we now endure beyond our deserts.

2 "I myself am no stronger than any of you—you see how illness has brought me low—and though I was thought inferior to none in good fortune, whether in private life or otherwise, I now hang in the same peril as the humblest man. Yet I have lived with much reverence for the gods, and with much justice toward men, giving no cause for resentment.

3 "For this reason my hope for the future is still confident, and these disasters do not frighten me as much as their gravity warrants. Perhaps they may even abate: our enemies have had good fortune enough, and if our expedition provoked the resentment of any god, we have already been amply punished.

4 "Others too have marched against their neighbors before now, and after acting as men will, have suffered no more than men can bear. We too may reasonably hope for gentler treatment from the divine power, since we now deserve the gods' pity rather than their resentment. And when you look at yourselves, at the quality and number of the hoplites marching in your ranks, do not be too

dismayed. Consider that wherever you settle, you are at once a city yourselves, and no other city in Sicily could easily withstand your assault or drive you out once you had established yourselves anywhere.

5 "See to it yourselves that the march is secure and orderly. Each man must hold to this one thought: whatever ground he is compelled to fight on, if he prevails, will be both his homeland and his fortress.

6 "We shall press on along the road by night and day alike, for our provisions are scanty. Once we reach some friendly district of the Sicels—they remain faithful to us through fear of the Syracusans—consider yourselves already in safety. Messengers have been sent ahead to them with instructions to meet us and bring further supplies.

7 "In short, soldiers, understand that you must prove yourselves brave men: there is no place nearby where you can find safety by giving way. If you escape the enemy now, the rest of you will see again what you long to see, and you Athenians will raise up the great power of your city, fallen though it is. For men are a city, not walls or ships empty of men."

CHAPTER 78

1 With such encouragement Nicias passed along the army, gathering and ordering the men wherever he saw them scattered or marching out of formation. Demosthenes was no less active, saying the same or similar things to the troops under his own command.

2 The army marched in a hollow square, with Nicias' division leading and Demosthenes' following. The hoplites kept the baggage carriers and the greater part of the multitude inside their formation.

3 When they reached the crossing of the river Anapus, they found a force of Syracusans and allies drawn up there. Routing them and securing the ford, they marched forward; but Syracusan cavalry rode alongside and harassed them, while the light troops hurled javelins into their ranks.

4 That day the Athenians advanced about forty stades and bivouacked beside a hill. Early the following morning they marched on for about twenty stades, then descended to a stretch of level ground and encamped there. They wished to get something to eat from the houses, since the district was inhabited, and to carry water away with them: for many stades ahead, along their intended route, water was scarce.

5 Meanwhile the Syracusans went ahead and began walling off the passage before them. It was a strong hill with a steep-sided ravine on either side, called the Acraean Height.

6 The next day the Athenians advanced, but the numerous cavalry and javelin throwers of the Syracusans and their allies obstructed them on either side, hurling javelins and riding alongside. The Athenians fought for a long time, then withdrew to the same camp. They could no longer obtain provisions as before, for the cavalry now prevented them from ranging out.

CHAPTER 79

1 Setting out early, they marched again and forced their way to the hill that had been walled off. There they found the enemy infantry drawn up before them above the barrier, many shields deep, for the ground was narrow.

2 The Athenians advanced to attack the wall, but missiles rained on them from the many men on the steep hillside, whose shots carried more easily from above. Unable to force a passage, they withdrew once more and rested.

3 Thunder and rain happened to come on at the same time, as is usual when the year is already drawing toward autumn. This dispirited the Athenians still further, and they thought that these things too were all conspiring toward their destruction.

4 While they were resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans sent part of their army to wall off the road behind them as well, along which they had advanced. But the Athenians sent some of their own men against them and prevented it.

5 After this the Athenians withdrew with their whole army farther toward the plain and bivouacked. The next day they advanced, while the Syracusans assailed them on every side and wounded many. Whenever the Athenians advanced against them, they withdrew; whenever the Athenians fell back, they pressed upon them, attacking the rearmost men in particular, in the hope that by routing one small part after another they might spread panic through the entire army.

6 For a long time the Athenians held out in this way; then, after advancing five or six stades, they rested on the plain. The Syracusans too withdrew from them to their own camp.

CHAPTER 80

1 That night Nicias and Demosthenes decided that, since their army was in a wretched state, now lacking every kind of provision and with many men badly wounded in the enemy's repeated attacks, they should light as many fires as possible and lead the army away. They would no longer follow the route they had intended, but go in the opposite direction to that which the Syracusans were watching, toward the sea.

2 This route as a whole led the army not toward Catana, but toward the other side of Sicily, in the direction of Camarina and Gela and the cities of that region, Greek and barbarian alike.

3 They therefore lit many fires and set out in the night. Panic and terror commonly arise in all armies, especially the largest, above all when they are marching at night through enemy country with the enemy close at hand; and so confusion fell upon them.

4 Nicias' division, which was leading, kept together and gained a considerable lead, while Demosthenes' division, about half the army or more, became detached and marched in greater disorder.

5 Nevertheless, at dawn they reached the sea, entered the road called the Helorine Way, and marched along it. Their intention was, on reaching the river Cacyparis, to turn upstream and follow it inland; for they hoped that here too they would meet the Sicels whom they had summoned.

6 But when they reached the river, they found a Syracusan guard there also, walling and palisading the ford. Forcing their way through it, they crossed the river and marched on toward another river, the Erineus, for this was the direction their guides advised.

CHAPTER 81

1 Meanwhile, when day came and the Syracusans and their allies discovered that the Athenians had gone, most of them accused Gylippus of deliberately letting them escape. They hurried in pursuit along the route the Athenians had taken, which they found without difficulty, and caught up with them about the time of the morning meal.

2 Coming upon Demosthenes' men, who were behind and marching more slowly and in greater disorder after the confusion of the night, they immediately fell upon them and began fighting. Since the Athenian forces were now separated, the Syracusan cavalry found it easier to encircle these men and drive them together into one place.

3 Nicias' division was as much as fifty stades ahead. He had been leading his men faster, judging that in such circumstances safety lay not in willingly standing their ground to fight, but in retreating as quickly as possible, fighting only when compelled.

4 Demosthenes, on the other hand, had generally been under more continuous pressure, since he was withdrawing in the rear and the enemy attacked him first. Now, when he realized that the Syracusans were pursuing, he concentrated less on advancing than on drawing up for battle, until his delay allowed them to surround him, and he and the Athenians with him were thrown into great con-

fusion. They were penned into a place enclosed by a low wall, with a road on either side and many olive trees within it, and were struck by missiles from all around.

5 The Syracusans had good reason to employ such attacks rather than close combat. Risking battle against desperate men was no longer any more to their advantage than to the Athenians'. Besides, with success now assured, each man was anxious to spare himself from being killed before the end; and they thought that even by this method they would wear the enemy down and capture them.

CHAPTER 82

1 After hurling missiles all day at the Athenians and their allies from every side, and seeing them now exhausted by wounds and their other sufferings, Gylippus, the Syracusans, and their allies first issued a proclamation inviting any of the islanders who wished to come over to them on a guarantee of freedom. A few civic contingents withdrew.

2 Later an agreement was reached with all the others under Demosthenes as well: they were to surrender their arms, and no one was to die by violence, in bonds, or through lack of the bare necessities of life.

3 They all surrendered, six thousand in number, and gave up all the money they had, throwing it into upturned shields; they filled four shields. These men were immediately taken away to the city. That same day Nicias and his troops reached the river Erineus, crossed it, and settled the army on some high ground.

CHAPTER 83

1 The Syracusans caught up with Nicias the next day and told him that Demosthenes' men had surrendered, urging him to do the same. Disbelieving them, he obtained a truce to send a horseman to find out.

2 When the horseman returned and reported that they had indeed surrendered, Nicias sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusans. He was ready, on behalf of the Athenians, to agree to repay all the money the Syracusans had spent on the war, provided they let his army go. Until the money was paid, he would give Athenian men as hostages, one for every talent.

3 The Syracusans and Gylippus rejected these terms. Instead, they attacked, surrounded these men too, and hurled missiles at them from every side until late in the day.

4 They too were in a wretched state for lack of food and other provisions. Nevertheless, they waited for a quiet moment in the night, intending to march. But as they were taking up their arms, the Syracusans became aware of it and raised the paean.

5 Realizing that their movement had been detected, the Athenians laid down their arms again, except for about three hundred men. These forced their way through the guards and made their way through the night as best they could.

CHAPTER 84

1 When day came, Nicias led the army on, while the Syracusans and their allies pressed upon them as before, assailing them from all sides with missiles and javelins.

2 The Athenians hurried toward the river Assinarus, driven both by the attacks of the numerous cavalry and the rest of the enemy throng from every side—they thought their plight might be somewhat easier once they crossed the river—and by their exhaustion and longing to drink.

3 When they reached it, they rushed in with no order left at all. Each man wanted to cross first, and the enemy pressing upon them made the crossing still more difficult. Forced to move in a mass, they fell upon one another and trampled each other underfoot; amid their spears and baggage some died at once, while others became entangled and tumbled down.

4 The Syracusans took up positions on the farther bank, which was precipitous, and hurled missiles down upon the Athenians. Most were drinking eagerly, jostling one another in confusion in the deep riverbed.

5 The Peloponnesians came down into the river and slaughtered the men there above all. The water was at once fouled, yet they drank it all the same, muddy and stained with blood, and most of them fought over it.

CHAPTER 85

1 At last, with many dead already heaped upon one another in the river and the army being destroyed, whether in the river itself or, if any escaped it, by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered to Gylippus, trusting him more than the Syracusans. He told him that he and the Lacedaemonians might do whatever they wished with Nicias himself, but asked them to stop killing the other soldiers.

2 After this Gylippus ordered that the men should now be taken alive. They gathered in all the survivors whom individual captors had not hidden away—and those hidden were many—and sent pursuers after the three hundred who had broken through the guards in the night, and captured them.

3 The part of the army collected into public custody was therefore not large, but the number secretly taken was great, and all Sicily was filled with them: unlike Demosthenes' men, they had not been captured under an agreement.

4 A considerable portion also died. This slaughter was enormous, as great as any in this [Sicilian] war. Not a few had also died in the many other attacks during the retreat. Nevertheless, many escaped, some at once, others by running away later after a period of slavery. These men found refuge in Catana.

CHAPTER 86

1 The Syracusans and their allies gathered together, took up their spoils and as many prisoners as they could, and returned to the city.

2 All the other Athenians and allies they had captured they sent down into the stone quarries, considering these the most secure place of confinement. But they slaughtered Nicias and Demosthenes against Gylippus' wishes: he thought that, to crown his other achievements, bringing the opposing generals to the Lacedaemonians would be a splendid prize.

3 Of the two, Demosthenes happened to be their bitterest enemy because of the events on the island and at Pylos, and Nicias their closest friend for the same reasons. For Nicias had worked zealously for the release of the Lacedaemonian men from the island, persuading the Athenians to make a treaty.

4 The Lacedaemonians were therefore warmly disposed toward him, and it was largely his confidence in this that led him to surrender himself to Gylippus. But some Syracusans, it was said, feared that, since they had been in communication with him, he might under torture expose this and cause them trouble in the midst of their success. Others, particularly the Corinthians, feared that, being wealthy, he might bribe someone and escape, and that he might again bring fresh danger upon them. They persuaded their allies and put him to death.

5 For this reason, or something very close to it, Nicias died—a man who, of all the Greeks of my time, least deserved to reach such a depth of misfortune, since his whole way of life had been devoted to the practice of what is held to be virtue.

CHAPTER 87

1 Those in the quarries were harshly treated by the Syracusans at first. Crowded into a small, hollow space without shelter, they suffered initially from the sun and the still-stifling heat; then the autumn nights came on, cold by contrast, and the change brought illness.

2 Forced by the narrowness of the place to do everything in the same spot, with the bodies of those who died of wounds, the change of weather, and similar causes piled upon one another beside them, they endured an intolerable stench. Hunger and thirst oppressed them too: for eight months each man was given one cotyle of water and two cotyles of grain. Of all the other sufferings likely to befall men cast into such a place, there was none they did not undergo.

3 For some seventy days they lived like this, all together. Then, apart from the Athenians and any Sicilian or Italian Greeks who had served with them, the rest were sold.

4 The total number captured is difficult to state precisely, but it was no fewer than seven thousand.

5 This proved the greatest [Greek] action of the war, and, in my judgment, of all the Greek actions known to us by report: most glorious for the victors, most disastrous for the vanquished.

6 Defeated in every respect and in every way, with no small measure of suffering in any part of their ordeal, they were, as the saying goes, utterly destroyed: army, ships, everything was lost, and few out of many returned home. Such were the events in Sicily.

Book 8



CHAPTER 1

1 When the news reached Athens, for a long time they refused to believe even the very soldiers who had escaped from the action and gave clear accounts of it: the destruction could not have been so utter, so universal. Once they knew the truth, they turned bitterly upon the speakers who had shared their enthusiasm for the expedition, as though they had not voted for it themselves. They were angry, too, with the collectors of oracles, the diviners, and all who had then encouraged them, by some pronouncement of divine authority, to hope that they would conquer Sicily.

2 Grief assailed them on every side, and the disaster left them beset by the deepest fear and consternation. Each man in his private life, and the city as a whole, felt the weight of losing so many hoplites and cavalrymen, and a generation of fighting men whose like they could not see remaining to them. At the same time, finding neither enough ships in the ship sheds, nor money in the treasury, nor crews for the ships, they despaired for the moment of survival. They thought that their enemies in Sicily, above all after so great a victory, would sail at once against Piraeus with their fleet; that their enemies nearer home, now

equipped on every count with twice their former strength, would press them with all their might by land and sea; and that their own allies would revolt and join the attack.

3 Nevertheless, they resolved that, with the resources still at hand, they must not yield. They must prepare a fleet, collecting timber wherever they could, and raise money; secure their hold upon the allies, above all Euboea; bring some economy and restraint to expenditure in the city; and elect a board of older men to frame proposals for the present emergency as circumstances required.

4 In everything they were ready to submit to discipline under the immediate pressure of fear, as a people commonly does. They acted upon their resolutions, and the summer came to an end.

CHAPTER 2

1 In the following winter all the Greeks were at once elated by the Athenians' great disaster in Sicily. Those allied to neither side thought that, even if no one invited them, they must no longer stand apart from the war, but willingly march against Athens. Each believed that the Athenians would have attacked them too, had they succeeded in Sicily; and they also thought that little of the war remained, and that to share in it would be glorious. The allies of the Lacedaemonians, for their part, were more eager than before to join in bringing a swift release from their long hardship.

2 Most eager of all were the subjects of Athens, ready to revolt even beyond their power to sustain it. Passion governed their judgment of affairs, and they would not even allow for the possibility that the Athenians might survive the coming summer.

3 The Lacedaemonian state drew confidence from all this, and most of all from the prospect that their allies from Sicily would in all likelihood arrive with a great force at the opening of spring, now that necessity had also brought them a navy.

4 With grounds for hope on every side, they intended to throw themselves into the war without reserve. They calculated that, if it ended well, they would thereafter be free of dangers such as the Athenians would have brought upon them had they added Sicily to their power; and that, once Athens was overthrown, they themselves would at last lead all Hellas in security.

CHAPTER 3

1 Accordingly, during this winter their king Agis at once set out from Decelea with a force, collected money from the allies for the fleet, and turned toward the Malian Gulf. There, pursuing an old enmity, he carried off the greater part of the Oetaeans' movable property as booty and exacted money from them. Despite the protests and unwillingness of the Thessalians, he also compelled the Achaeans of Phthiotis and the other subjects of Thessaly in that region to give hostages and money. He deposited the hostages at Corinth and tried to bring these peoples into the alliance.

2 The Lacedaemonians apportioned among the cities the building of a hundred ships. They assigned twenty-five each to themselves and the Boeotians, fifteen to the Phocians and Locrians together, fifteen to the Corinthians, ten to the Arcadians, Pellenians, and Sicyonians together, and ten to the Megarians, Troezenians, Epidaurians, and Hermionians together. They made their other preparations as well, intending to take up the war as soon as spring began.

CHAPTER 4

1 During this same winter the Athenians too made the preparations they had resolved upon. They collected timber for shipbuilding and fortified Sunium to secure the passage of their grain ships around the headland. They abandoned the fort in Laconia which they had built while sailing along the coast to Sicily, and reduced other expenditure wherever they thought it served no purpose, bringing it within economical bounds. Above all, they kept watch on affairs among their allies, to prevent revolt.

CHAPTER 5

1 While both sides were thus occupied, preparing for the war as though they were doing nothing less than beginning it anew, the Euboeans were the first, during this winter, to send envoys to Agis about revolt from Athens. He welcomed their proposals and summoned Alcamenes son of Sthenelaidas and Melanthus from Lacedaemon to take command in Euboea. They arrived with about three hundred neodamodes, and he began preparing their crossing.

2 Meanwhile envoys from Lesbos also arrived, wishing to revolt. With the Boeotians supporting them, they persuaded Agis to suspend the Euboean enterprise. Instead he prepared the revolt of the Lesbians, giving them as governor Alcamenes, who had been about to sail to Euboea. The Boeotians promised ten ships, and Agis ten.

3 These arrangements were made without the Lacedaemonian state. For as long as Agis was at Decelea with the force under his command, he had authority to send troops wherever he wished, to raise them, and to exact money. At this time, one might say, the allies obeyed him far more [than] the Lacedaemonians at home: with a force of his own, he could immediately appear anywhere and make himself feared.

4 While he was negotiating with the Lesbians, the Chians and Erythraeans, who were also ready to revolt, turned not to Agis but to Lacedaemon. With them came an envoy from Tissaphernes, the governor of the coastal territories for King Darius son of Artaxerxes.

5 Tissaphernes too was inviting the Peloponnesians over and promising to maintain their forces. The King had recently demanded from him the tribute of his province, which he had allowed to fall into arrears because the Athenians prevented him from collecting it from the Greek cities. By weakening Athens, he believed, he would be better able to recover the tribute, while also making the Lacedaemonians allies of the King and carrying out the King's orders concerning Amorges, the illegitimate son of Pissuthnes, who was in revolt in Caria: he would either bring him in alive or kill him.

CHAPTER 6

1 While the Chians and Tissaphernes were working together toward the same end, Calligeitus son of Laophon, a Megarian, and Timagoras son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, arrived at Lacedaemon at about the same time. Both were exiles from their own countries, living with Pharnabazus son of Pharnaces, who had sent them to bring ships to the Hellespont. Like Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus was eager, if he could, to detach the cities of his province from Athens for the sake of the tribute, and through his own efforts to secure the Lacedaemonians' alliance for the King.

2 The representatives of Pharnabazus and those of Tissaphernes pursued these aims separately, and a keen rivalry arose among them at Lacedaemon: the one party sought to persuade the Lacedaemonians to send ships and troops first to Ionia and Chios, the other to the Hellespont.

3 The Lacedaemonians, however, were far more receptive to the proposals of the Chians and Tissaphernes. Alcibiades also supported them, being bound by a particularly close hereditary guest-friendship to Endius, who was then an ephor. It was through this guest-friendship that Alcibiades' family had acquired its Laconian name: Endius was called the son of Alcibiades.

4 Nevertheless, the Lacedaemonians first sent Phrynis, one of the perioeci, to inspect Chios: had they as many ships as they claimed, and was the city in other respects as powerful as its reported reputation? When he reported that what they had heard was true, they immediately made the Chians and Erythraeans their allies and voted to send them forty ships, since, according to the Chians' account, there were no fewer than sixty already there.

5 At first they themselves intended to send ten of these ships with Melanchridas, their admiral. Then an earthquake occurred, and they sent Chalcideus in place of Melanchridas and began preparing five ships in Laconia instead of ten. The winter ended, and the nineteenth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

CHAPTER 7

1 At the opening of spring in the following summer, the Chians at once pressed for the dispatch of the ships, fearing that the Athenians might discover what was afoot: all these embassies had been conducted in secret from them. The Lacedaemonians therefore sent three Spartans to Corinth, to have the ships hauled as quickly as possible across the Isthmus from the other sea to the side facing Athens, and to order them all to sail for Chios, both those Agis was preparing for Lesbos and the rest. The allied ships there numbered thirty-nine in all.

CHAPTER 8

1 Calligeitus and Timagoras, acting for Pharnabazus, would take no part in the expedition to Chios, nor would they contribute the twenty-five talents they had brought for the dispatch of a fleet. They intended to sail later, separately, with another expedition.

2 When Agis saw that the Lacedaemonians were bent on going first to Chios, he too accepted this course. The allies assembled at Corinth and deliberated. They resolved to sail first to Chios under Chalcideus, who was preparing the five ships in Laconia; next to Lesbos under Alcamenes, as Agis had intended; and last to the Hellespont, for which Clearchus son of Rhamphias had been appointed commander.

3 They also resolved to haul half the ships across the Isthmus first and send these off at once, so that the Athenians would give no more attention to the ships departing than to those being hauled across afterward.

4 Indeed, they were making the voyage on this side openly, in contempt of the Athenians' weakness, since no fleet of any size had yet appeared on their side. In accordance with their decision, they immediately brought twenty-one ships across.

CHAPTER 9

1 Despite their allies' urgency about sailing, the Corinthians were unwilling to join the voyage until they had celebrated the Isthmian festival, which fell at this time. Agis was prepared to let them avoid breaking the Isthmian truce by taking the expedition upon himself.

2 The Corinthians would not consent, and delay ensued. The Athenians learned more about the designs of Chios and sent one of their generals, Aristocrates, to accuse the Chians. When they denied the charges, the Athenians ordered them to send ships to serve with the allied fleet as a pledge of good faith. They sent seven.

3 The reason for sending the ships was that the mass of the Chians knew nothing of the intrigue, while the few who knew and were involved did not yet wish to make enemies of the people before they had secured some substantial support. Moreover, the Peloponnesians' delay had made them cease to expect their arrival.

CHAPTER 10

1 Meanwhile the Isthmian festival was held. The Athenians attended as spectators, having been formally invited, and the Chian intrigue became clearer to them. On returning home, they immediately took measures to ensure that the ships would not put out from Cenchreae without their knowledge.

2 After the festival the Peloponnesians set sail for Chios with twenty-one ships under Alcamenes. At first the Athenians approached with an equal number and tried to draw them out to sea. But the Peloponnesians did not follow them far and turned back; the Athenians also withdrew, for the seven Chian ships were included in their force, and they did not consider them trustworthy.

3 Later, however, they manned more ships, bringing their number to thirty-seven, and pursued the Peloponnesians as they sailed along the coast, driving them into Spiraeum in Corinthian territory, a deserted harbor on its farthest edge

toward the border of Epidaurus. The Peloponnesians lost one ship at sea, but brought the rest together and moored them.

4 The Athenians attacked both with their ships from the sea and by landing on shore. Great disorder and confusion followed; they severely damaged most of the ships on the beach and killed the commander, Alcamenes. Some of their own men were also killed.

CHAPTER 11

1 Once the two sides had disengaged, the Athenians assigned enough ships to maintain the blockade of the enemy vessels, and anchored the remainder at the little island not far off, where they made their camp. They sent to Athens for reinforcements.

2 For on the following day the Corinthians came to assist the Peloponnesian ships, and not much later the other neighboring peoples arrived as well. Seeing how arduous it would be to guard the ships in a deserted place, they were at a loss. They considered burning them, but then decided to haul them ashore and keep watch over them with their army encamped beside them, until some favorable chance of escape should offer itself. Agis too, on hearing of these events, sent them a Spartan named Thermon.

3 The first report to reach the Lacedaemonians was that the ships had put out from the Isthmus: the ephors had ordered Alcamenes to send a horseman when this happened. They immediately wished to dispatch their own five ships under Chalcideus, with Alcibiades accompanying him. Then, just as they were preparing to leave, news came that the ships had taken refuge in Spiraeum. Disheartened by this failure at their first attempt to open the war in Ionia, they no longer intended to send out the ships from their own country, and even thought of recalling some that had already sailed.

CHAPTER 12

1 Learning this, Alcibiades again persuaded Endius and the other ephors not to shrink from the voyage. They would arrive, he said, before the Chians learned of the ships' misfortune; and once he himself reached Ionia, he would readily persuade the cities to revolt by telling them of Athens' weakness and the Lacedaemonians' zeal. He would be more credible than others.

2 To Endius privately he said that it would be glorious for Ionia's revolt and the King's alliance with the Lacedaemonians to be secured through him: this prize must not fall to Agis. For Alcibiades himself happened to be at odds with Agis.

3 Having persuaded Endius and the other ephors, he put to sea with the five ships in company with Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian. They made the voyage with all speed.

CHAPTER 13

1 At about this same time the sixteen Peloponnesian ships which had fought through the war with Gylippus were returning from Sicily. They were intercepted near Leucas and badly damaged by the twenty-seven Attic ships under Hippocles son of Menippus, who was watching for the ships coming from Sicily. The remainder, except for one ship, escaped the Athenians and sailed into Corinth.

CHAPTER 14

1 As Chalcideus and Alcibiades sailed, they detained everyone they encountered to prevent their approach from being reported. They first touched at Corycus on the mainland and released the captives there. After meeting some of their Chian collaborators, who urged them to sail into the city without advance notice, they arrived at Chios unannounced.

2 The mass of the people were astonished and alarmed, but the few had arranged for the council to be in session at that very moment. Chalcideus and Alcibiades spoke, declaring that many more ships were approaching, but saying nothing of the blockade of the ships in Spiraeum. The Chians revolted from Athens, and afterward the Erythraeans did the same.

3 They then sailed with three ships to Clazomenae and brought it too into revolt. The Clazomenians immediately crossed to the mainland and fortified Polichna, to provide themselves with a refuge, should they need one, from the little island where they lived. All the rebels were now fortifying their positions and preparing for war.

CHAPTER 15

1 News of Chios soon reached Athens. The Athenians judged that a great and unmistakable danger now encompassed them, and that their remaining allies would not choose to stay quiet once the greatest city had changed sides. In the alarm of the moment they immediately abolished the penalties imposed on anyone who proposed or put to the vote the use of the thousand talents, which throughout the war they had jealously preserved untouched. They voted to draw upon this reserve and man a considerable number of ships. Of the squadron blockading Spiraeum, eight ships were to be sent at once: these had left the blockade to pursue Chalcideus' ships, failed to catch them, and returned; their commander was Strombichides son of Diotimus. Not long afterward twelve more ships under Thrasycles were to go to the rescue, these too abandoning the blockade.

2 They also took away the seven Chian ships which had been helping them blockade the vessels in Spiraeum, freed the slaves aboard them, and put the free men in chains. In place of all the ships that had left, they swiftly manned ten others and sent them to maintain the blockade of the Peloponnesians; they also intended to man thirty more. Their zeal was great, and no effort was spared in sending help toward Chios.

CHAPTER 16

1 Meanwhile Strombichides reached Samos with his eight ships. Taking one Samian ship in addition, he sailed to Teos and called upon its people to remain quiet. Chalcideus too was sailing from Chios against Teos with twenty-three ships, while the infantry of Clazomenae and Erythrae advanced along the coast at the same time.

2 Strombichides learned of their approach beforehand and put out to sea. Once offshore, seeing the many ships coming from Chios, he fled toward Samos, with the enemy in pursuit.

3 The Teians at first refused to admit the infantry, but let them in when the Athenians fled. The infantry waited for a time for Chalcideus to return from the pursuit. When he delayed, they themselves began pulling down the wall which the Athenians had built on the landward side of the city of Teos. A small force of barbarians also arrived to help them demolish it, commanded by Stages, a subordinate of Tissaphernes.

CHAPTER 17

1 After pursuing Strombichides to Samos, Chalcideus and Alcibiades armed the sailors from the ships that had come from the Peloponnese and left them on Chios. They replaced them with Chian crews, manned twenty more ships from the same source, and sailed to Miletus to bring it into revolt.

2 For Alcibiades, who was on friendly terms with the leading men of Miletus, wished to win them over before the ships from the Peloponnese arrived. By bringing as many cities as possible into revolt with the forces of Chios and Chalcideus, he intended, as he had promised, to secure the credit for the Chians, for himself and Chalcideus, and for Endius, who had sent him out.

3 They therefore escaped notice for most of the voyage and arrived a little ahead of Strombichides and Thrasycles, who had just come from Athens with twelve ships and was joining in the pursuit. They brought Miletus into revolt. The

Athenians followed close upon them with nineteen ships, but, as the Milesians would not admit them, anchored off the city at the neighboring island of Lade.

4 Immediately after the Milesians revolted, the first alliance between the Lacedaemonians and the King was concluded through Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, in the following terms.

CHAPTER 18

1 "The Lacedaemonians and their allies made an alliance with the King and Tissaphernes on these terms. All territory and cities which the King holds and which the King's fathers held shall belong to the King. Whatever money or other supplies used to pass from these cities to the Athenians, the King and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall jointly prevent the Athenians from receiving, whether money or anything else.

2 "The King and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall wage the war against the Athenians jointly. It shall not be permissible to end the war with the Athenians unless both parties agree, the King on the one side and the Lacedaemonians and their allies on the other.

3 "If any revolt from the King, they shall be enemies of the Lacedaemonians and their allies as well. Likewise, if any revolt from the Lacedaemonians and their allies, they shall be enemies of the King."

CHAPTER 19

1 Such was the alliance concluded. Immediately afterward the Chians manned ten more ships and sailed to Anaea, wishing both to learn what was happening at Miletus and to bring the cities into revolt as they went.

2 When a message arrived from Chalcideus directing them to sail back and reporting that Amorges would be approaching overland with an army, they sailed to the sanctuary of Zeus. There they sighted sixteen ships which

Diomedon was bringing from Athens, arriving still later than Thrasycles.

3 At the sight they fled, one ship to Ephesus and the remainder toward Teos. The Athenians captured four empty ships, their men having reached land first; the others found refuge in the city of Teos.

4 The Athenians sailed away toward Samos. The Chians put out with their remaining ships and, together with the infantry accompanying them, brought Lebedus into revolt, and afterward Erae. Then both the infantry and the ships returned to their respective homes.

CHAPTER 20

1 At about the same time the twenty Peloponnesian ships in Spiraeum, which had been driven in there and were being blockaded by an equal number of Athenian ships, made a sudden sortie. They won the sea battle, captured four Athenian ships, and sailed to Cenchreae, where they again prepared for the voyage to Chios and Ionia. Astyochus arrived from Lacedaemon as their admiral; the entire naval command was now to be his.

2 After the infantry had withdrawn from Teos, Tissaphernes himself arrived with an army, demolished whatever still remained of the wall there, and withdrew. Not long after his departure Diomedon arrived with ten Athenian ships and made an agreement with the Teians that they should admit the Athenians too. He then sailed along the coast to Erae and attacked it, but, failing to take the city, sailed away.

CHAPTER 21

1 At this time there was also an uprising at Samos by the people against the powerful, with the support of Athenians who happened to be there in three ships. The Samian people killed about two hundred in all of the most powerful men, condemned four hundred to exile, and divided their land and houses among themselves. The Athenians afterward voted them autonomy, regarding their

loyalty now as secure; the people thereafter governed the city. They allowed the landowners no share in any other rights, nor was any member of the people any longer permitted to give a daughter in marriage to them or to take a wife from them.

CHAPTER 22

1 Later in the same summer the Chians, maintaining all the zeal with which they had begun, and present in sufficient force to detach the cities even without the Peloponnesians, wished to have as many others as possible share their danger. They themselves sailed with thirteen ships against Lesbos, as the Lacedaemonians had ordered: Lesbos was to be their second destination, and from there they were to proceed to the Hellespont. At the same time the infantry, comprising both the Peloponnesians present and the local allies, advanced by way of Clazomenae and Cyme. Eualas, a Spartan, commanded the infantry, and Deiniadas, one of the perioeci, the ships.

2 The ships first sailed into Methymna and brought it into revolt, leaving four ships there. The remainder then brought Mytilene into revolt.

CHAPTER 23

1 Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, sailed from Cenchreae with four ships, as he had intended, and reached Chios. On the third day after his arrival, the twenty-five Attic ships under Leon and Diomedon sailed for Lesbos; Leon had come out later from Athens with ten ships as reinforcements.

2 Astyochus too put out late that same day, took one Chian ship with him, and sailed for Lesbos to give whatever help he could. He reached Pyrrha, and the next day Eresus, where he learned that the Athenians had taken Mytilene at the first assault.

3 For the Athenians had sailed straight into the harbor, putting in unexpectedly, and captured the Chian ships; then they had landed, defeated those who resisted them in battle, and occupied the city.

4 Astyochus learned this both from the Eresians and from the Chian ships with Eubulus from Methymna. These ships, three in number, had been left there at the time and, fleeing when Mytilene fell, had met him; one had been captured by the Athenians. He abandoned his advance on Mytilene, brought Eresus into revolt and armed it, and sent the hoplites from his own ships overland to Antissa and Methymna, placing Eteonicus in command. He himself sailed along the coast with his own ships and the three Chian vessels, hoping that the sight of them would hearten the Methymnaeans and keep them faithful to the revolt.

5 But when everything in Lesbos went against him, he took his infantry aboard and sailed back to Chios. The allied land army, which had been intended for the Hellespont, was also taken back to its several cities. After this, six of the allied Peloponnesian ships at Cenchreae reached them at Chios.

6 The Athenians restored order in Lesbos and sailed from there to Polichna, which the Clazomenians were fortifying on the mainland. They captured it and conveyed the inhabitants back to their island city, except for those responsible for the revolt, who withdrew to Daphnus. Clazomenae thus returned to the Athenian alliance.

CHAPTER 24

1 During the same summer, the Athenians stationed against Miletus with twenty ships at Lade made a landing at Panormus in Milesian territory. They killed the Lacedaemonian commander Chalcideus, who had come to the rescue with a few men, and on the third day afterward sailed across and set up a trophy. The Milesians pulled it down, on the grounds that it had been erected without mastery of the ground.

2 Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian ships from Lesbos, conducted a seaborne war against the Chians, operating from the Oenussae, the islands off Chios, from Sidussa and Pteleum, the forts they held in Erythraean territory, and from Lesbos. Their marines were hoplites compelled to serve from the muster roll.

3 They landed at Cardamyle and Boliscus, defeated the Chians who came to the rescue, killed many of them, and laid those districts waste. They won another battle at Phanae and a third at Leuconium. After this the Chians no longer came out against them, and the Athenians ravaged the countryside, which had been richly developed and had suffered no harm from the Persian Wars until that time.

4 For the Chians alone, after the Lacedaemonians, of all the peoples I have known, combined prosperity with moderation: the greater their city grew, the more securely they ordered it.

5 Even the revolt itself, if that seems a departure from the safer course, they did not dare undertake until they were to share its dangers with many strong allies and perceived that, after the Sicilian disaster, even the Athenians no longer denied that their affairs were [certainly] in desperate straits. If they stumbled amid the incalculable turns of human life, they shared their error with many who had reached the same conclusion—that Athenian power would soon be overthrown.

6 With the Chians thus shut out from the sea and ravaged on land, some of them attempted to bring the city over to Athens. The rulers discovered them, but took no action themselves; instead, they brought the admiral Astyochus from Erythrae with the four ships he had there, and considered how to suppress the conspiracy as gently as possible, either by taking hostages or by some other means. Such were their proceedings.

CHAPTER 25

1 At the close of the same summer, a thousand Athenian hoplites, fifteen hundred Argives, and a thousand allies sailed from Athens to Samos in forty-eight ships, some of them troop transports, under the generals Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides. The Athenians had equipped the five hundred Argives who had been lightly armed as hoplites. Crossing from Samos to Miletus, they encamped there.

2 The Milesians came out to meet them with eight hundred hoplites of their own, the Peloponnesians who had come with Chalcideus, and a body of Tissaphernes' [mercenary] auxiliaries; Tissaphernes himself was present with his cavalry. They engaged the Athenians and their allies.

3 The Argives on their wing dashed ahead, advancing in some disorder, contemptuous of their opponents as Ionians who would not stand their ground. They were defeated by the Milesians, and a little fewer than three hundred of them were killed.

4 The Athenians first defeated the Peloponnesians, then drove back the barbarians and the rest of the mass of troops. They did not engage the Milesians, who, after routing the Argives, withdrew into the city when they saw the defeat of the rest of their side. The Athenians, now masters of the field, took up their position close to the city of Miletus itself.

5 In this battle it happened that on both sides Ionians overcame Dorians: the Athenians defeated the Peloponnesians facing them, and the Milesians the Argives. The Athenians erected a trophy and prepared to build a wall of blockade, since the site formed a kind of isthmus. They thought that, if they won Miletus over, the other places would readily come over to them too.

CHAPTER 26

1 Meanwhile, late in the afternoon, word reached them that the fifty-five ships from the Peloponnese and Sicily were all but there. For the Sicilian Greeks had sent twenty Syracusan ships and two from Selinus, chiefly at the urging of Hermocrates of Syracuse, who pressed them to join in completing the destruction of Athens. The ships being fitted out in the Peloponnese were now ready too. Both contingents had been entrusted to Theramenes the Lacedaemonian, with orders to bring them to the admiral Astyochus, and had first put in at Leros, the island off Miletus.

2 Learning there that the Athenians were before Miletus, they sailed first to the Iasian Gulf, wishing to discover the situation at Miletus.

3 Alcibiades rode to Teichiussa in Milesian territory, where they had sailed into the gulf and made their night's quarters, and told them of the battle; he had himself been present and had fought beside the Milesians and Tissaphernes. He urged them, unless they wished to ruin their cause in Ionia and everywhere else, to relieve Miletus without delay and not allow it to be walled off.

CHAPTER 27

1 They intended to bring relief at dawn. But when Phrynichus, the Athenian general, received definite news of the ships from Leros, his fellow commanders wished to stay and fight a decisive naval battle. He declared that he would do no such thing himself, nor, so far as he could prevent it, allow them or anyone else to do so.

2 When [it was possible] to fight later, knowing exactly how many enemy ships they faced and with how many of their own, and after making adequate preparations at leisure, he would never yield to the reproach of cowardice and run an unreasonable risk.

3 There was no disgrace, he said, in Athenians withdrawing before a fleet when circumstances required it; defeat, whatever the circumstances, would bring greater disgrace, and expose the city not merely to shame but to the gravest danger. After the disasters it had suffered, Athens could scarcely undertake an offensive anywhere, even with assured preparation, whether by its own choice or under the strongest necessity; much less should it enter dangers of its own choosing when under no compulsion.

4 He urged them to take aboard the wounded, the infantry, and all the equipment they had brought with them, but to leave behind what they had taken from enemy territory so that the ships would be light, and sail for Samos at once. From there they could gather all their ships and launch attacks wherever an opportunity offered.

5 He persuaded them and carried this out. Phrynichus was judged a man of sound sense, then and no less afterward, not only in this matter but in all the other responsibilities he undertook.

6 In this way, as soon as evening came, the Athenians withdrew from Miletus, leaving their victory incomplete. The Argives, angered by their misfortune, hastened to sail home from Samos.

CHAPTER 28

1 The Peloponnesians put out from Teichiussa at dawn and sailed into Miletus. They stayed one day; on the next, taking with them the Chian ships which had originally been chased into port with Chalcideus, they intended to sail back to Teichiussa for the equipment they had unloaded there.

2 When they arrived, Tissaphernes came up with his infantry and persuaded them to sail against Iasus, which his enemy Amorges held. They attacked Iasus unexpectedly, and, as the inhabitants assumed the ships could only be Attic, took the city. The Syracusans won the greatest praise for their part in the action.

3 The Peloponnesians captured Amorges alive—the illegitimate son of Pissuthnes, who had revolted from the King—and handed him over to Tissaphernes to take to the King if he wished, as the King had instructed him. They sacked Iasus, and the army took immense wealth, for the place had long been rich.

4 They brought Amorges' mercenaries over to their own side, did them no harm, and enrolled them in their ranks, since most came from the Peloponnese. They handed over the town to Tissaphernes, together with all the captives, slave and free, agreeing to receive from him one Daric stater for each person, and then withdrew to Miletus.

5 The Lacedaemonians had sent Pedaritus son of Leon to command at Chios; they now dispatched him overland as far as Erythrae with the mercenary force formerly serving Amorges, and appointed Philip to remain at Miletus itself. And the summer ended.

CHAPTER 29

1 In the following winter, after placing a garrison in Iasus, Tissaphernes came to Miletus and distributed a month's pay to all the ships at the rate of one Attic drachma per man per day, as he had promised at Lacedaemon. For the remaining period, however, he wished to give three obols per day until he had consulted the King; if the King ordered it, he said, he would pay the full drachma.

2 Hermocrates, the Syracusan general, objected. Theramenes, since he was not admiral but was only accompanying the ships to hand them over to Astyochus, had been yielding over the pay. Nevertheless, the agreement gave each man more than three obols, the surplus amounting to the pay of five ships: Tissaphernes gave thirty talents a month for fifty-five ships, and the same proportion was paid for the others, however many there were beyond that number.

CHAPTER 30

1 During the same winter, thirty-five more ships arrived from home to join the Athenians at Samos, together with the generals Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon. They gathered the ships from Chios and all the others, intending to divide their commands by lot and maintain a naval blockade of Miletus while sending both a fleet and a land force against Chios.

2 This they did. Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, who had drawn the assignment to Chios, sailed there with thirty ships and part of the thousand hoplites who had come to Miletus, carrying these in troop transports. The others remained at Samos with seventy-four ships, commanded the sea, and made attacks on Miletus.

CHAPTER 31

1 Astyochus happened then to be at Chios, selecting hostages on account of the conspiracy. When he learned that Theramenes' ships had arrived and that the prospects of the alliance had improved, he suspended this business and put to sea with ten Peloponnesian and ten Chian ships.

2 He attacked Pteleum, but failed to take it, and sailed along the coast to Clazomenae, where he ordered those who favored Athens to move to Daphnus and join his side. Tamos, the governor of Ionia, joined in the demand.

3 When they would not listen, he attacked the city, which had no walls, but could not take it. He sailed away in a strong wind, making himself for Phocaea and Cyme, while the other ships put in at the islands off Clazomenae, Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa.

4 They were held there by the winds for eight days. Of the property the Clazomenians had removed to the islands for safety, they plundered and consumed some, loaded the rest aboard, and sailed to join Astyochus at Phocaea and Cyme.

CHAPTER 32

1 While he was there, envoys arrived from the Lesbians, who wished to revolt again. They persuaded Astyochus, but the Corinthians and the other allies were unwilling because of the previous failure, so he put out for Chios. A storm scattered the ships, which afterward reached Chios from different directions.

2 After this Pedaritus, who had been marching overland from Miletus, reached Erythrae and crossed with his army to Chios. He also had at his disposal about five hundred soldiers from the five ships, whom Chalcideus had left there with their arms.

3 Some Lesbians were offering to bring about a revolt, and Astyochus laid before Pedaritus and the Chians the proposal that they should sail there and bring Lesbos into revolt: either they would gain more allies, or, if they failed in some way, they would still do harm to the Athenians. They would not listen, and Pedaritus said he would not release the Chian ships to him.

CHAPTER 33

1 Astyochus took the five Corinthian ships, a sixth from Megara, one from Hermione, and the Laconian vessels he had brought with him, and sailed for Miletus to take up his command as admiral. He had repeatedly threatened the Chians that he would certainly not come to their aid if they should need him.

2 He put in at Corycus in Erythraean territory and spent the night there. The Athenians sailing with their army from Samos to Chios also anchored there, on the other side of a hill which separated the two forces; neither knew the other was there.

3 After nightfall a letter arrived from Pedaritus saying that Erythraean prisoners had been released from Samos and had come to Erythrae with a view to betraying it. Astyochus immediately put to sea again for Erythrae, and by this narrow margin escaped encountering the Athenians.

4 Pedaritus also sailed across to join him. They investigated the suspected traitors and found that the whole story had been a pretext to secure the men's release from Samos. They cleared them of the charge and sailed away, Pedaritus to Chios, while Astyochus continued to Miletus as he had intended.

CHAPTER 34

1 Meanwhile the Athenian expedition, sailing round from Corycus, encountered three Chian warships off Arginus and gave chase as soon as they saw them. A violent storm arose. The Chian ships barely escaped into harbor, while the three Athenian ships which had pressed the pursuit most eagerly were wrecked and driven ashore near the city of Chios; some of their men were captured, others killed. The remaining ships found refuge in the harbor called Phoenicus, beneath Mimas. Later they sailed from there to anchor at Lesbos and prepared to build the fort.

CHAPTER 35

1 During the same winter Hippocrates the Lacedaemonian sailed from the Peloponnese with ten Thurian ships, commanded by Dorieus son of Diagoras and two others, one Laconian ship, and one Syracusan. He put in at Cnidus, which Tissaphernes had already brought into revolt.

2 When those at Miletus learned of their arrival, they ordered them to guard Cnidus with half their ships and station the rest off Triopium to seize the merchant vessels arriving from Egypt. Triopium is a cape projecting from the territory of Cnidus, with a sanctuary of Apollo.

3 The Athenians learned of this, sailed from Samos, and captured the six ships on guard at Triopium, though their crews escaped. Afterward they sailed to Cnidus, attacked the unwalled city, and nearly took it.

4 They attacked again the next day, but the inhabitants had strengthened their defenses during the night and had been joined by the men who had escaped from the ships at Triopium. Unable now to do the same damage, the Athenians withdrew, ravaged the Cnidian countryside, and sailed back to Samos.

CHAPTER 36

1 About the same time Astyochus reached Miletus to take command of the fleet. The Peloponnesians still had abundant resources for all the needs of their camp: pay was supplied in sufficient amounts, the soldiers had the great wealth plundered from Iasus, and the Milesians willingly bore the burdens of the war.

2 Nevertheless, the Peloponnesians thought that the first agreement made between Tissaphernes and Chalcideus was deficient and not particularly to their advantage. While Theramenes was still present they concluded another, as follows.

CHAPTER 37

1 "Agreement of the Lacedaemonians and their allies with King Darius, the King's sons, and Tissaphernes: there shall be peace and friendship on the following terms.

2 "Neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies shall advance against any territory or cities which belong to King Darius, or belonged to his father or his ancestors, either to wage war or to inflict any other injury. Neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies shall exact tribute from these cities. Neither King Darius nor any of his subjects shall advance against the Lacedaemonians or their allies to wage war or inflict any other injury.

3 "If the Lacedaemonians or their allies require anything of the King, or the King of the Lacedaemonians or their allies, whatever they agree upon together shall be lawful for them to do.

4 "Both parties shall wage war jointly against the Athenians and their allies; if they make peace, both shall make it jointly. The King shall provide the expenses of any army in the King's territory which has come at his summons.

5 "If any of the cities which have entered into this agreement with the King advances against the King's territory, the others shall prevent it and defend the King to the best of their ability. If anyone in the King's territory, or in any territory under his rule, advances against the territory of the Lacedaemonians or their allies, the King shall prevent it and defend them to the best of his ability."

CHAPTER 38

1 After this agreement Theramenes handed over the ships to Astyochus, sailed away in a light vessel, and disappeared.

2 The Athenians from Lesbos had by now crossed with their army to Chios. Masters of both land and sea, they were fortifying Delphinium, a position naturally strong on the landward side, with harbors, and not far from the city of Chios.

3 The Chians had been badly shaken in their many previous battles, and relations among themselves were already far from good. Pedaritus had by now put to death the party of Tydeus son of Ion for favoring Athens, and the rest of the city was forcibly held under the control of a few. Suspicious of one another, they remained inactive, and for these reasons thought neither themselves nor the mercenaries with Pedaritus a match for the enemy.

4 They did, however, send to Miletus, asking Astyochus to come to their aid. When he would not listen, Pedaritus wrote to Lacedaemon accusing him of misconduct.

5 Such was the position the Athenians had reached at Chios. Their ships from Samos made attacks on those at Miletus; but when the enemy would not sail out against them, they withdrew again to Samos and remained quiet.

CHAPTER 39

1 During the same winter, about the solstice, the twenty-seven ships which the Lacedaemonians had fitted out in the Peloponnese for Pharnabazus, [through] the efforts of Calligeitus the Megarian and Timagoras the Cyzicene, put to sea for Ionia. Antisthenes, a Spartan, sailed with them in command.

2 The Lacedaemonians also sent eleven Spartans as advisers to Astyochus, one of them Lichas son of Arcesilaus. They were instructed, on reaching Miletus, to share in directing affairs as seemed best and, if they thought fit, to send these ships, or a greater or smaller number, to Pharnabazus in the Hellespont, appointing Clearchus son of Rhamphias, who was sailing with them, to command. If the eleven thought fit, they were also to remove Astyochus from the admiralty and appoint Antisthenes in his place; for Pedaritus' letters had aroused suspicion of him.

3 The ships sailed across the open sea from Malea and put in at Melos, where they encountered ten Athenian ships, captured three of them empty, and burned them. After this, fearing that the Athenian ships which escaped from Melos might report their approach to those at Samos—as indeed they did—they sailed toward Crete, lengthening their voyage as a precaution, and made land at Caunus in Asia.

4 From there, thinking themselves now in safety, they sent word to the ships at Miletus to come and escort them.

CHAPTER 40

1 At the same time the Chians and Pedaritus, despite Astyochus' continuing delays, kept sending messengers as insistently as ever, asking him to come with all his ships to their relief under siege, and not look on while the greatest of the allied cities in Ionia was barred from the sea and ravaged on land by raiding parties.

2 For the Chians had many slaves—more than any single city apart from Lacedaemon—and because of their numbers punished their offenses more harshly. As soon as the Athenian army appeared securely established behind its fortifications, most of these slaves promptly deserted to it; knowing the countryside, they inflicted the greatest damage.

3 The Chians therefore said he must help them while hope remained and it was still possible to intervene, while Delphinium was being fortified but remained unfinished, and a larger circuit of defenses was being added for the army and the ships. Although Astyochus had not intended to do so because of his earlier threat, when he saw that the allies too were eager, he prepared to bring relief.

CHAPTER 41

1 Meanwhile news arrived from Caunus that the twenty-seven ships and the Lacedaemonian advisers were there. Astyochus considered everything else secondary to escorting so many ships, which would strengthen their command of the sea, and bringing over safely the Lacedaemonians who had come to inspect his conduct. He immediately abandoned the voyage to Chios and sailed for Caunus.

2 On the way he landed on Meropian Cos and sacked its unwalled city, which had been shattered by an earthquake—the greatest within our memory that had struck its people. The inhabitants had fled to the mountains. He made raids through the countryside and took everything as plunder except free persons, whom he let go.

3 From Cos he reached Cnidus by night. There the Cnidians prevailed on him not to disembark his sailors but to sail on at once, just as he was, against the twenty Athenian ships with which Charminus, one of the generals from Samos, was watching for the approach of these twenty-seven ships from the Peloponnese, the very ships Astyochus was sailing to meet.

4 Those at Samos had learned of their approach from Melos, and Charminus kept watch around Syme, Chalce, and Rhodes and along the Lycian coast; for he already knew that they were at Caunus.

CHAPTER 42

1 Astyochus therefore sailed on toward Syme with his force as it was, before word of his approach could spread, hoping to catch the ships somewhere at sea. But rain and an overcast sky caused his ships to lose their way in the darkness and fall into confusion.

2 At daybreak the fleet was scattered: its left wing was already visible to the Athenians, while the rest was still wandering about the island. Charminus and the Athenians put out against it in haste with fewer than their twenty ships, believing these to be the ships from Caunus for which they were keeping watch.

3 They attacked at once, sank three ships and damaged others, and had the upper hand in the fighting until, contrary to their expectation, the greater part of the enemy fleet came into view and they found themselves hemmed in on every side.

4 They then took to flight, losing six ships, and escaped with the remainder to the island of Teutlussa, and from there to Halicarnassus. After this the Peloponnesians put in at Cnidus, where the twenty-seven ships from Caunus joined them; they then sailed with their entire force to Syme, set up a trophy, and returned to anchor at Cnidus.

CHAPTER 43

1 When the Athenians learned of the sea battle, they sailed to Syme with all their ships from Samos. They made no attack on the fleet at Cnidus, nor did that fleet attack them; but they recovered the ships' equipment at Syme, assaulted Loryma on the mainland, and sailed back to Samos.

2 The Peloponnesian ships, now all together at Cnidus, were undergoing whatever repairs were needed, while the eleven Lacedaemonian commissioners held discussions with Tissaphernes, who had arrived there. They considered anything in the transactions already concluded that displeased them, and how the war should be conducted in future to the best advantage of both parties.

3 Lichas scrutinized the proceedings most closely. He said that neither treaty, whether that of Chalcideus or that of Therimenes, had been well drawn up: it was intolerable that the King should now claim sovereignty over all the territory that he and his ancestors had formerly ruled. This would mean that all the islands, as well as Thessaly, the Locrians, and the country as far as Boeotia, must return to slavery; and instead of freedom the Lacedaemonians would be imposing Median rule upon the Greeks.

4 He therefore demanded that they make another and better treaty; otherwise they would not abide by these agreements, nor did they want any maintenance money on such terms. Tissaphernes, indignant, withdrew from them in anger, having accomplished nothing.

CHAPTER 44

1 The Peloponnesians, meanwhile, intended to sail to Rhodes, whose most powerful men were sending them invitations through heralds. They hoped to bring over an island of no small strength in both seamen and land forces, and at the same time believed that their existing alliance would enable them to maintain their ships without asking Tissaphernes for money.

2 They therefore sailed at once from Cnidus, in the same winter, and with ninety-four ships first attacked Camirus in Rhodian territory. They terrified the mass of the inhabitants, who knew nothing of what was being arranged and fled, especially since the city had no walls. The Lacedaemonians then summoned these people and the Rhodians of the other two cities, Lindus and Ialysus, and persuaded them to revolt from Athens. Thus Rhodes went over to the Peloponnesians.

3 The Athenians learned of this at about the same time and sailed with their ships from Samos, hoping to arrive first; they appeared out at sea, but were a little too late. For the moment they sailed away to Chalce and from there to Samos. Later they made raids upon Rhodes from Chalce and Cos [and from Samos], and carried on the war against it.

4 The Peloponnesians collected some thirty-two talents from the Rhodians, but otherwise remained inactive for eighty days, with their ships hauled ashore.

CHAPTER 45

1 During this interval, and even earlier, before they left for Rhodes, the following events were taking place. After the death of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades was under suspicion among the Peloponnesians, and a letter had come from Lacedaemon to Astyochus ordering his execution: he was an enemy of Agis and was also regarded as untrustworthy on other grounds. In fear, he first withdrew to Tissaphernes, and then did all he could with him to damage the Peloponnesian cause.

2 Becoming his adviser in everything, he reduced the pay from an Attic drachma to three obols, and even this was not to be paid regularly. He instructed Tissaphernes to tell the Peloponnesians that the Athenians, with their longer experience of naval affairs, paid their own men three obols, not so much from poverty as to prevent their sailors from becoming insolent through having more than they needed: some would otherwise ruin their health by spending on the indulgences that produce physical weakness, while others would desert their ships without leaving their outstanding pay behind as a pledge.

3 He also instructed him [to] win over the trierarchs and the generals from the various cities by payments, so that they would accept these terms from him—all except the Syracusans. Hermocrates alone, on their behalf, resisted him in the interests of the entire alliance.

4 When the cities asked for money, Alcibiades himself dismissed them, answering on Tissaphernes' behalf that the Chians were shameless: though the richest of the Greeks, and saved by outside assistance, they nevertheless demanded that others should risk both their lives and their money for Chian freedom.

5 The other cities too, he said, would be acting unjustly if, after spending money on the Athenians before their revolt, they were not now willing to contribute as much, and more besides, on their own behalf.

6 As for Tissaphernes, he declared that, since he was at present waging war with his own money, his economy was reasonable; but if maintenance money ever came down from the King, he would pay their wages in full and give the cities appropriate assistance.

CHAPTER 46

1 He also advised Tissaphernes not to be too eager to bring the war to an end, nor to give the same people command of both land and sea, whether by bringing in the Phoenician ships he was preparing or by providing pay for more Greeks. He should let the two sides keep their power divided, so that the King could always bring one against whichever was troubling him.

2 If dominion over land and sea were united, the King would have no one with whose help he could overthrow the dominant power, unless he chose at some point to take the field himself and fight the issue out at great expense and risk. The cheaper course was this: at a small fraction of the expense, and without danger to himself, to let the Greeks wear one another down.

3 The Athenians, he said, would be more suitable partners for him in dominion. They had fewer ambitions on land, and both the declared purpose and the practice of their warfare suited his interests best. They would help subjugate the maritime world for themselves and the Greeks living in the King's territory for him; the Lacedaemonians, by contrast, had come to liberate them. It was

hardly likely that the Lacedaemonians would now free the Greeks from their fellow Greeks, but not free them from those others [the barbarians], unless they should at some point fail to overthrow the barbarians.

4 He therefore urged him first to wear both sides down, and then, after cutting off as much as possible from the Athenians, to rid the country of the Peloponnesians.

5 Tissaphernes' intentions were for the most part of this kind, so far as one could infer them from his actions. For these reasons he placed his confidence in Alcibiades as a sound adviser in these matters, provided the Peloponnesians poorly with maintenance money, and would not allow them to fight at sea. Instead, by saying that the Phoenician ships would come and they would then fight with overwhelming strength, he ruined their prospects and robbed their fleet of its vigor, which had indeed been very great. In other respects too, his lack of zeal in supporting their war was too evident to escape notice.

CHAPTER 47

1 Alcibiades gave this advice both because he thought it best for Tissaphernes and the King, with whom he was staying, and because he was cultivating his own return to his country. He knew that, unless he destroyed it, he would one day be able to persuade it to take him back; and he thought the strongest means of persuasion would be to appear on friendly terms with Tissaphernes. This was precisely what happened.

2 When the Athenian soldiers at Samos perceived his influence with Tissaphernes, the movement began. Alcibiades had himself contributed to it by sending word to their most powerful men, asking that they speak of him to the best sort of people: he wished to return under an oligarchy, not under a corrupt regime or the democracy that had expelled him, and, after securing Tissaphernes' friendship for them, to share in their government. But the Athenian trierarchs and most powerful men at Samos were moved still more by their own impulse to overthrow the democracy.

CHAPTER 48

1 This movement first arose in the camp and only later reached the city from there. Some men crossed over from Samos and conferred with Alcibiades. He held out the prospect of making first Tissaphernes and then the King their friend, if they ceased to be governed democratically, for the King would then have more confidence in them. The most powerful citizens, who also bore the heaviest burdens, had high hopes both of bringing the government into their own hands and of prevailing over their enemies.

2 Returning to Samos, they bound suitable men together in a conspiracy, while openly telling the mass of the soldiers that the King would be their friend and provide money if Alcibiades returned and they ceased to be governed democratically.

3 The rank and file, though somewhat distressed at first by what was being done, remained quiet, encouraged by the prospect of ample pay from the King. After communicating their plans to the mass of the soldiers, the organizers of the oligarchy again considered Alcibiades' proposals among themselves and with the greater part of their associates.

4 To the others these proposals seemed practicable and trustworthy; but Phrynichus, who was still a general, approved of none of them. He thought that Alcibiades cared no more for oligarchy than for democracy—as was indeed the case—and had no object beyond changing the city's existing constitution so that his associates might invite him home. Their own chief concern should be to avoid civil strife. Nor would it be an easy course for the King to join the Athenians, whom he did not trust, and involve himself in trouble, when the Peloponnesians were already their equals at sea and held cities of no small importance within his dominion. He could instead make friends with the Peloponnesians, from whom he had so far suffered no harm.

5 As for the allied cities, to which they would presumably promise oligarchy on the grounds that they themselves would no longer be democratically governed, he said he knew well that neither would those in revolt be any more likely to

return to them, nor would those still in the alliance become more secure. They would not prefer slavery under either oligarchy or democracy to freedom under whichever of the two they happened to have.

6 They believed that the men called the noble and good would cause them no less trouble than the people: it was these men who procured and proposed to the people the evils from which they themselves drew most of the profit. Under their control, men would be put to death without trial and with greater violence; whereas the people were a refuge for the allies and a restraint upon these men.

7 He himself knew clearly, he said, that the cities held this opinion, having learned it from actual experience. Accordingly, he for his part approved of nothing in Alcibiades' proposals or in the measures now being taken.

CHAPTER 49

1 The assembled conspirators, however, accepted the proposals before them, as they had intended from the first, and prepared to send Pisander and others as envoys to Athens. They were to work for Alcibiades' return and the overthrow of the democracy there, and to make Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians.

CHAPTER 50

1 Phrynichus realized that Alcibiades' return would be proposed and that the Athenians would accept it. In view of the opposition he had expressed, he feared that Alcibiades, if restored, would harm him as the man who had obstructed his return. He therefore resorted to the following device.

2 He sent a secret letter to Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, who was then still near Miletus, saying that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by making Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians, and setting out all the other circumstances clearly in writing. He should be forgiven, he added, for plotting harm against a personal enemy even at his city's expense.

3 Astyochus had no thought of punishing Alcibiades, especially since he no longer came within his reach as readily as before. Instead he went inland to Magnesia to see him and Tissaphernes together, told them what had been written from Samos, and himself became the informer. It was said that he had attached himself to Tissaphernes for private gain, to communicate with him on these and other matters; and this was also why he protested rather feebly [over] the failure to pay the wages in full.

4 Alcibiades immediately sent a letter denouncing Phrynichus to the men in authority at Samos, describing what he had done and demanding his death.

5 Thrown into turmoil and placed in the gravest danger by the disclosure, Phrynichus sent again to Astyochus. He complained that the earlier communication had not been properly concealed, and now offered to put the entire Athenian army at Samos into their hands for destruction. Since Samos was unwalled, he described in detail how he could accomplish this, adding that, with his life imperiled on their account, he could no longer be blamed for doing this or anything else rather than be destroyed by his bitterest enemies. Astyochus disclosed this too to Alcibiades.

CHAPTER 51

1 But Phrynichus learned in advance that Astyochus was betraying him and that a letter from Alcibiades on the matter was all but there. He forestalled it by himself announcing to the army that, since Samos was unwalled and not all the ships were at anchor inside the harbor, the enemy intended to attack the camp. He said he had reliable intelligence of this, and that they must fortify Samos as quickly as possible and take every other precaution. Being a general, he had the authority to carry out these measures himself.

2 They set about preparing the fortifications, and as a result Samos was walled sooner, though it would have been fortified in any case. Not long afterward the letter from Alcibiades arrived, saying that Phrynichus was betraying the army and that the enemy intended to attack.

3 Alcibiades, however, was thought untrustworthy: having learned the enemy's intentions beforehand, he seemed to be laying them maliciously at Phrynichus' door, as though Phrynichus were privy to them. He therefore did him no harm, but rather corroborated his report by announcing the same intelligence.

CHAPTER 52

1 After this Alcibiades worked upon Tissaphernes and sought to persuade him to become a friend of the Athenians. Tissaphernes feared the Peloponnesians, because they were present with more ships than the Athenians, but nevertheless wished, if he somehow could, to be persuaded—especially after learning of the Peloponnesians' dispute at Cnidus over Therimenes' treaty. By this time, when they were at Rhodes, that dispute had already taken place. In it Lichas had borne out Alcibiades' earlier contention that the Lacedaemonians intended to liberate all the cities, by declaring it intolerable for the agreement to give the King dominion over cities which he or his forefathers had ever ruled. Alcibiades, with so much at stake, continued assiduously to court Tissaphernes.

CHAPTER 53

1 The Athenian envoys sent from Samos with Pisander reached Athens and addressed the people. They summed up many arguments, insisting above all that, by restoring Alcibiades and modifying their democracy, the Athenians could gain the King as an ally and overcome the Peloponnesians.

2 Many others spoke against them in defense of the democracy. Alcibiades' enemies also cried out that it would be monstrous if he returned in defiance of the laws, while the Eumolpidae and Ceryces testified about the Mysteries, for whose profanation he had been exiled, and invoked the gods against his return. Amid this loud opposition and indignation Pisander came forward and, calling up each of his opponents in turn, asked whether he had any hope of saving the city unless someone persuaded the King to change sides and join them. The

Peloponnesians had as many ships as they did confronting them at sea, and more allied cities; the King and Tissaphernes were providing their enemies with money, while they themselves had none left.

3 Whenever those questioned said they had none, he then told them plainly: "This, then, cannot come about unless we conduct our government more moderately and place offices more in the hands of a few, so that the King may trust us; unless for the present we deliberate less about our constitution than about our survival—for later we shall be free to change it again if anything displeases us—and unless we restore Alcibiades, the only man now capable of accomplishing this."

CHAPTER 54

1 At first the people heard the proposal for oligarchy with resentment. But when Pisander made it clear that there was no other means of survival, they yielded, both from fear and in the hope that they could change the government again.

2 They voted that Pisander and ten men with him should sail out and conduct the negotiations with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades as they thought best.

3 At the same time Pisander also denounced Phrynichus, and the people removed him and his colleague Scironides from office, sending Diomedon and Leon to the fleet as generals in their place. Pisander accused Phrynichus of betraying Iasus and Amorges, because he thought him ill-disposed toward the negotiations with Alcibiades.

4 Pisander went around to all the conspiratorial clubs already existing in the city for the management of lawsuits and elections, and urged them to unite, take counsel together, and overthrow the democracy. After making all the other preparations demanded by the situation, so that there should be no further delay, he himself sailed with the ten men to Tissaphernes.

CHAPTER 55

1 In the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had now reached the Athenian fleet, made a naval attack on Rhodes. They found the Peloponnesian ships hauled ashore, but made a landing, defeated in battle the Rhodians who came to the rescue, and withdrew to Chalce. From there rather than from Cos they now waged war, since it was easier for them to watch for any departure of the Peloponnesian fleet.

2 Xenophantidas, a Laconian, also came to Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, reporting that the Athenians' wall was now complete and that, unless they came to the rescue with all their ships, their cause in Chios would be lost. They intended to send help.

3 Meanwhile Pedaritus himself, with his mercenary force and the full levy of the Chians, attacked the Athenian fortification around the ships. He captured part of it and gained possession of some ships that had been hauled ashore. But the Athenians came out to the rescue and routed the Chians first; then the rest of the force with Pedaritus was defeated as well. He himself was killed, together with many of the Chians, and a large quantity of arms was captured.

CHAPTER 56

1 After this the Chians were besieged by land and sea even more closely than before, and famine there was severe. Meanwhile the Athenian envoys with Pisander reached Tissaphernes and opened discussions about an agreement.

2 Alcibiades, however, could not altogether rely on Tissaphernes, who had grown more afraid of the Peloponnesians and still wished, as Alcibiades himself had taught him, to wear both sides down. He therefore adopted a device by which Tissaphernes would make the most extravagant demands upon the Athenians and so fail to reach an agreement.

3 In my judgment Tissaphernes wanted the same thing, in his own case out of fear. Alcibiades, seeing that even so Tissaphernes was not inclined to agree, did not want the Athenians to think him incapable of persuasion. Rather, they should think that Tissaphernes had been persuaded and was willing to join them, but that the Athenians were not offering enough.

4 For Alcibiades, speaking on behalf of Tissaphernes in his presence, carried his demands to such extremes that the blame fell on the Athenians, although they conceded most of what he asked. He demanded the surrender of all Ionia, then the adjacent islands and other concessions. The Athenians raised no objection; so at last, at their third meeting, fearing that his lack of influence would be utterly exposed, he demanded that the King be allowed to build ships and sail along his own coast wherever he wished and with as many ships as he pleased. At this they would go no further... Instead, considering the terms impossible and themselves deceived by Alcibiades, the Athenians departed in anger and returned to Samos.

CHAPTER 57

1 Immediately after this, in the same winter, Tissaphernes went to Caunus. He wished to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, conclude yet another agreement on whatever terms he could, and provide maintenance money, rather than become their outright enemy. He feared that, if they lacked the means to support so many ships, they might be forced to fight the Athenians at sea and be defeated, or that their ships might lose their crews and the Athenians gain their wishes without his intervention. Above all, he also feared that in their search for provisions they might ravage the mainland.

2 Taking all these things into his calculations and precautions, and wishing, as he did, to restore the balance between the Greeks, he therefore summoned the Peloponnesians, gave them maintenance money, and concluded this third treaty with them.

CHAPTER 58

1 "In the thirteenth year of Darius's reign, when Alexippidas was ephor at Lacedaemon, an agreement was made in the plain of the Maeander between the Lacedaemonians and their allies on the one side and Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces on the other, concerning the affairs of the King and of the Lacedaemonians and their allies.

2 "The King's territory, insofar as it lies in Asia, shall belong to the King; and concerning his own territory the King shall determine whatever he wishes.

3 "The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not enter the King's territory with any hostile purpose, nor shall the King enter the territory of the Lacedaemonians or their allies with any hostile purpose.

4 "If any of the Lacedaemonians or their allies enters the King's territory with hostile purpose, the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall prevent it; and if anyone from the King's territory advances with hostile purpose against the Lacedaemonians or their allies, the King shall prevent it.

5 "Tissaphernes shall provide maintenance for the ships now present, on the terms agreed, until the King's ships arrive.

6 "When the King's ships arrive, the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall be free to maintain their own ships themselves, if they wish. If they choose to receive their maintenance from Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes shall provide it, but the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall repay Tissaphernes at the end of the war whatever money they have received.

7 "When the King's ships arrive, the ships of the Lacedaemonians and their allies and those of the King shall wage the war jointly, as Tissaphernes and the Lacedaemonians and their allies may decide. If they wish to make peace with the Athenians, they shall do so on the same joint basis."

CHAPTER 59

1 Such was the treaty concluded. After this Tissaphernes began preparing to bring the Phoenician ships, as had been agreed, and to fulfill his other promises; at least, he wished to be seen making preparations.

CHAPTER 60

1 As winter was now drawing to its end, the Boeotians took Oropus by treachery, although an Athenian garrison held it. Men from Eretria and from Oropus itself assisted them, plotting the revolt of Euboea. For the place lay opposite Eretria, and while the Athenians held it, it could not fail to do great harm both to Eretria and to the rest of Euboea.

2 Now that Oropus was in their hands, the Eretrians went to Rhodes to summon the Peloponnesians to Euboea. But the Peloponnesians were more intent on relieving Chios in its distress, and put out from Rhodes with their entire fleet.

3 When they were off Triopium, they sighted the Athenian ships out at sea, sailing from Chalce. Neither fleet advanced against the other: the Athenians reached Samos, the Peloponnesians Miletus. The latter saw that it was no longer possible to relieve Chios without a sea battle. Thus this winter ended, and the twentieth year of this war, which Thucydides wrote, came to an end.

CHAPTER 61

1 In the following summer, just as spring began, Dercylidas, a Spartan, was sent overland toward the Hellespont with a small force to bring about the revolt of Abydos, whose inhabitants are colonists of Miletus. Meanwhile the Chians, hard pressed by the siege, were compelled to fight a sea battle, while Astyochus could find no way to bring them relief.

2 While Astyochus was still at Rhodes, they had brought from Miletus, as commander after the death of Pedaritus, Leon, a Spartan who had sailed out with Antisthenes as a marine. With him they had brought twelve ships which hap-

pened to be guarding Miletus: five Thurian, four Syracusan, one from Anaea, one Milesian, and Leon's own.

3 The Chians marched out in full force and occupied a strong position, while their thirty-six ships put out against the Athenians' thirty-two, and battle was joined at sea. The engagement was stubbornly fought, and the Chians and their allies, who had held their own in the action, withdrew to the city, for it was already late.

CHAPTER 62

1 Immediately after this, when Dercylidas had made his way overland from Miletus, Abydos on the Hellespont revolted to Dercylidas and Pharnabazus, and Lampsacus followed two days later.

2 Strombichides, learning of this at Chios, hastened to the rescue with twenty-four Athenian ships, including transports carrying hoplites. When the Lampsacenes came out against him, he defeated them in battle and took Lampsacus, which was unwalled, at the first assault. He plundered its goods and slaves, but restored the free inhabitants to their homes, and then went against Abydos.

3 When they would neither come over to him nor yield to his assaults, he sailed across from Abydos to Sestos, a city in the Chersonese once held by the Medes, and established it as a fortress and a watch-post over the whole Hellespont.

CHAPTER 63

1 Meanwhile the Chians gained greater command of the sea, and those at Miletus, including Astyochus, took courage on learning of the sea battle and the departure of Strombichides with his ships.

2 Astyochus sailed along the coast to Chios with two ships, brought away the ships there, and now advanced with his whole fleet against Samos. The Athenians, being mutually suspicious, did not put out to meet him, and he sailed back to Miletus.

3 For by this time, indeed somewhat earlier, the democracy at Athens had been overthrown. When Pisander and his fellow envoys returned to Samos from Tissaphernes, they consolidated their position within the army itself and induced the most powerful of the Samians to attempt, together with them, to establish an oligarchy. Yet the Samians had themselves risen against one another precisely to avoid being governed by an oligarchy.

4 At the same time the Athenians at Samos conferred among themselves and resolved to leave Alcibiades aside, since he was unwilling to act—and indeed he was not a suitable man to enter an oligarchy. They must now depend on themselves, already exposed as they were to danger, and consider how to prevent the enterprise from being abandoned. They must also sustain the war effort and willingly contribute money from their own households, and whatever else was needed, since their hardships would now be borne for themselves and no longer for others.

CHAPTER 64

1 After exhorting one another in these terms, they immediately sent Pisander and half the envoys home to arrange matters there. They were instructed to establish oligarchies in any subject cities at which they touched. The other half were dispatched in different directions to the remaining subject territories.

2 They also sent Diitrephes, who was near Chios but had been elected to command in the Thracian region, to take up his post. On reaching Thasos he overthrew the democracy.

3 In about the second month after his departure the Thasians began fortifying their city: they had no further need of an aristocracy tied to Athens, and expected freedom from the Lacedaemonians any day.

4 For some of their people, exiled by the Athenians, were living among the Peloponnesians; and these, together with their friends inside the city, were doing all they could to bring ships and bring about the revolt of Thasos. Thus they obtained exactly what they wanted: their city could recover its strength without danger, and the democracy that would have opposed them had been overthrown.

5 At Thasos, then, events took the opposite course to that intended by the Athenians who established the oligarchy; and, in my judgment, the same was true in many other subject states. Once the cities had acquired political restraint and freedom from fear in their actions, they moved toward outright liberty, refusing to prefer the specious good government offered by Athens.

CHAPTER 65

1 Pisander and his companions, sailing along the coast, overthrew the democracies in the cities as agreed, and arrived at Athens bringing hoplites from certain places as allies of their own.

2 They found that their associates had already accomplished most of the work. Some of the younger men had formed a band and secretly murdered Androcles, a leading champion of the people who had been particularly instrumental in driving Alcibiades into exile. They were the more eager to kill him for both reasons: his leadership of the people, and their belief that they would please Alcibiades, who, they thought, was to return and win them Tissaphernes' friendship. They had also secretly made away with certain other inconvenient men in the same fashion.

3 They had further prepared the ground by openly advancing the argument that no one should receive pay except those on military service, and that no more than five thousand should share in government—those best able to serve with both their wealth and their persons.

CHAPTER 66

1 This was a fair-seeming pretext addressed to the majority, since those who were changing the constitution were themselves to hold the city. Nevertheless, the people and the council chosen by lot still met; but they deliberated on nothing that had not been approved by the conspirators. Even the speakers belonged to that group, and what they would say had been considered beforehand by its members.

2 No one else any longer spoke in opposition, afraid at the sight of the conspiracy's strength. If anyone did oppose them, he was soon dead, by some convenient means; there was neither an investigation of the killers nor a prosecution even if they were suspected. The people remained silent, so terror-stricken that anyone who suffered no violence counted it a gain, even at the cost of holding his tongue.

3 Believing the conspiracy far larger than it really was, they were defeated in spirit; and, unable to discover its extent because of the city's size and their ignorance of one another, they had no way [to find out for themselves].

4 For this same reason it was impossible even for an indignant man to confide his grievances to another and so plan a means of resistance. He would find that the man he meant to address was either a stranger or an acquaintance he could not trust.

5 For all the democrats approached one another with suspicion, each fearing that the other had a share in what was happening. There were indeed men involved whom no one would ever have expected to turn toward oligarchy. These did

most to spread distrust among the people and contributed most to the security of the few, by firmly establishing the people's mistrust of itself.

CHAPTER 67

1 It was at this juncture that Pisander and his companions arrived and immediately set about what remained to be done. First they convened the people and proposed the election of ten commissioners with full powers to draft a proposal and submit it to the people on a stated day, setting out how the city could best be governed.

2 When the day came, they convened the assembly at Colonus, a sanctuary of Poseidon outside the city, some ten stades away. The commissioners brought forward nothing except this one measure: any Athenian should be free to propose whatever he wished without incurring a penalty. They imposed heavy penalties upon anyone who indicted a proposer for illegality or injured him in any other way.

3 The proposal was then openly advanced that no office should any longer be held under the existing constitution, and no pay should be drawn; that five men should be elected as presidents, and these should choose a hundred men, each of whom should choose three others besides himself; and that these four hundred should enter the council chamber and govern with full powers as they judged best, convening the Five Thousand whenever they thought fit.

CHAPTER 68

1 It was Pisander who moved this proposal and who otherwise took the most eager public part in overthrowing the democracy. But the man who devised the whole enterprise, planned how it should reach this outcome, and had given it the longest attention was Antiphon. In merit he was second to none of the Athenians of his time, and unsurpassed in conceiving a plan and expressing his thoughts. He did not willingly appear before the people or in any other public

contest, but was regarded with suspicion by the multitude because of his reputation for formidable ability. Yet for anyone engaged in a contest, whether in court or before the people, no single man could do more to help, if consulted.

2 And when the democracy was subsequently restored, the Four Hundred were overthrown, and their cause came to trial and punishment at the people's hands, Antiphon himself, accused on this very charge of having helped establish their rule, made what appears to me the finest defense in a capital trial delivered by anyone up to my time.

3 Phrynichus too showed himself more zealous for the oligarchy than anyone else. He feared Alcibiades and knew that Alcibiades was aware of all his dealings with Astyochus at Samos; he thought it unlikely that an oligarchy would ever permit Alcibiades to return. Once committed to the enterprise, he proved himself exceptionally steadfast in the face of danger.

4 Theramenes son of Hagnon was also foremost among those who joined in overthrowing the democracy, a man of no mean ability in speech or judgment. With so many intelligent men engaged in the enterprise, it was no wonder that, great as it was, it succeeded. For it was difficult to deprive the Athenian people of freedom nearly a hundred years after the overthrow of the tyrants—a people not only free of subjection, but accustomed for more than half that time to rule others themselves.

CHAPTER 69

1 When the assembly dissolved, having ratified these measures without a word of opposition, the Four Hundred were subsequently brought into the council chamber in the following manner. Because of the enemy at Decelea, all the Athenians were constantly under arms, some on the walls, others at their posts.

2 On that day, therefore, they allowed those not privy to the plot to leave as usual. The conspirators, however, had been told to wait quietly, not beside their arms but some distance away; if anyone resisted what was being done, they were

to take up their arms and prevent him.

3 There were also Andrians, Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and some of the colonists whom the Athenians had sent to settle Aegina, who had come with their own arms for this very purpose. They had received the same instructions.

4 With these arrangements made, the Four Hundred came, each carrying a concealed dagger, accompanied by the hundred and twenty young [Greeks] whom they employed wherever a deed of violence was required. They confronted the councilors chosen by lot in the council chamber and told them to take their pay and leave. They had themselves brought the pay for the entire remainder of the councilors' term, and handed it to them as they went out.

CHAPTER 70

1 When the council had thus withdrawn without a word of opposition, and the other citizens remained quiet and made no move, the Four Hundred entered the council chamber. For the moment they chose executive councilors by lot from among themselves and performed the customary prayers and sacrifices to the gods upon entering office. Thereafter they made sweeping changes in the democratic administration and ruled the city by force in other respects as well, though they did not recall the exiles, because of Alcibiades.

2 They put to death a few men whom they thought it expedient to remove, imprisoned others, and banished still others. They also sent heralds to Agis, the king of the Lacedaemonians, at Decelea, saying that they wished to reach a settlement and that he could reasonably make terms with them more readily than with the untrustworthy people, who no longer governed.

CHAPTER 71

1 Agis, however, believed that the city was not at peace, and that the people would not surrender their ancient freedom so suddenly. If they saw a large Lacedaemonian army, he thought, they would not remain quiet; indeed, he was

far from certain that they were no longer in turmoil even now. He therefore gave the envoys of the Four Hundred no conciliatory answer, but summoned a large force from the Peloponnese. Not long afterward he himself marched down to the very walls of Athens with the garrison from Decelea and the reinforcements. He hoped that, thrown into confusion, the Athenians would more readily fall into his hands on his own terms, or might even be taken at the first assault, amid the commotion likely to arise both inside and outside. The Long Walls, at any rate, he could hardly fail to capture, since they were deserted.

2 But when he came close, the Athenians showed no sign whatever of internal disturbance. Instead they sent out their cavalry and a force of hoplites, light troops, and archers, killed some of his men who had advanced too near, and gained possession of some arms and bodies. Recognizing the situation, he led the army back.

3 He and his own men remained in position at Decelea, while the reinforcements stayed a few days in the country before he sent them home. After this the Four Hundred continued nonetheless to send envoys to Agis; and as he was now more receptive and urged them to do so, they also sent envoys to Lacedaemon to negotiate an agreement, desiring a reconciliation.

CHAPTER 72

1 They also sent ten men to Samos to reassure the army and explain that the oligarchy had been established not to harm the city and its citizens but to preserve the whole state; that those conducting affairs were five thousand, not merely four hundred; and that, owing to military service and occupations abroad, the Athenians had never yet assembled to deliberate on any matter, however important, in numbers as great as five thousand.

2 With these and other appropriate instructions about what to say, they dispatched them immediately after taking power. They feared—as indeed happened—that the mass of sailors would refuse to remain under the oligarchic

constitution, and that the trouble might begin there and bring about their own overthrow.

CHAPTER 73

1 For at Samos there was already upheaval over the oligarchy, and the following events occurred at just the time when the Four Hundred were establishing themselves.

2 Those Samians who had earlier risen against the powerful, and had themselves been democrats, now changed sides again. Persuaded by Pisander when he came, and by the Athenian conspirators at Samos, they formed a conspiracy of some three hundred and prepared to attack the rest as the democratic party.

3 Together with Charminus, one of the generals, and some of the Athenians among them, they killed Hyperbolus, an Athenian, a worthless man who had been ostracized not from fear of his power and standing, but for his villainy and the disgrace he brought upon the city. By this they gave their Athenian partners a pledge of loyalty; they also joined them in other acts of the same kind, and were preparing to attack the majority.

4 The people learned of this and disclosed what was being planned to the generals Leon and Diomedon, who, honored as they were by the people, accepted oligarchy unwillingly. They also informed Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the one a trireme commander, the other a hoplite, and others who seemed consistently most opposed to the conspirators. They begged them not to stand by and see them destroyed and Samos estranged from Athens—Samos, through which alone the Athenian empire had survived to this point [until now].

5 On hearing this, these men approached the soldiers one by one, urging them not to allow it, and particularly the crew of the Paralus, all Athenians and free men, who had always opposed oligarchy, even when none existed. Leon and Diomedon, whenever they sailed anywhere, left some ships behind to guard the people.

6 Thus when the Three Hundred attacked them, all these forces came to their aid, above all the men of the Paralus, and the Samian majority prevailed. They killed some thirty of the Three Hundred and punished the three most culpable with exile. Bearing no grudge against the others, they thereafter lived with them as fellow citizens under a democracy.

CHAPTER 74

1 The Samians and the soldiers hastily sent the Paralus to Athens, with Chaereas son of Archestratus aboard, an Athenian who had been zealous in bringing about the change, to report what had happened. They did not yet know that the Four Hundred were in power.

2 As soon as they reached port, the Four Hundred imprisoned two or three of the crew of the Paralus. They took the ship from the others, transferred them to another vessel, a troop transport, and assigned them to guard duty around Euboea.

3 Chaereas, as soon as he saw the situation, somehow slipped away unnoticed and returned to Samos. There he reported events at Athens to the soldiers, exaggerating every horror: everyone was being punished with beatings, and no opposition whatever to those in power was possible; their wives and children were being outraged; and the rulers intended to seize and imprison the relatives of all the soldiers at Samos who did not share their views, so that, unless the soldiers obeyed, their relatives would be put to death. He added many other falsehoods to his account.

CHAPTER 75

1 On hearing this, the soldiers at first rushed to stone those who had been chiefly responsible for establishing the oligarchy, as well as the others who had taken part. But men of more moderate views restrained them and warned them not

to ruin their cause with the enemy lying at anchor close by, prows facing them; and they desisted.

2 After this, Thrasybulus son of Lycus and Thrasyllus, the foremost leaders of the change, were now determined to turn affairs at Samos openly toward democracy. They bound all the soldiers by the most solemn oaths, especially those who had belonged to the oligarchy: they would live under democracy and in concord, vigorously pursue the war against the Peloponnesians, and be enemies of the Four Hundred, entering into no negotiations with them.

3 All the Samians of military age swore the same oath with them. The soldiers made common cause with the Samians in all affairs and in whatever might result from their perils. They believed that neither the Samians nor they themselves had any refuge that could save them: whether the Four Hundred prevailed or the enemy from Miletus, they would be destroyed.

CHAPTER 76

1 Thus at this time they stood in rivalry, the one side seeking to compel the city to accept democracy, the other to compel the army to accept oligarchy.

2 The soldiers immediately held an assembly, at which they dismissed their former generals and any trireme commanders they suspected, and elected others as trireme commanders and generals in their place. Among the latter were Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus.

3 Men rose to encourage one another in various ways, and urged that they must not lose heart because their city had revolted from them. The smaller body had broken away from the larger, which was also better supplied with resources in every respect.

4 Since they held the entire fleet, they would compel the other cities of their empire to pay their contributions just as if their base were still at Athens. They had Samos as their city, no weak one, but a city which, when it fought them, had come within a hair's breadth of stripping Athens of her command of the

sea; and they would resist the enemy from the same position as before. With the ships in their hands, they were better able than those in the city to procure provisions.

5 It was because they themselves held an advanced position at Samos that the Athenians had previously controlled the approach to Piraeus; and now, unless the men in the city were willing to restore the constitution to them, they would be in a position to shut those men off from the sea more effectively than those men could shut them off.

6 The city's contribution to their victory over the enemy was small and of no account; they had lost nothing. Athens no longer had money to send them—the soldiers procured it themselves—nor sound counsel, the very thing that gives a city authority over its armies. Even in this respect the men in the city were at fault, having overthrown their ancestral laws, while they themselves preserved them and would try to compel the others to do the same. Thus even those among them who could offer useful counsel were no less capable than their counterparts in the city.

7 Alcibiades too, if they granted him immunity and a return from exile, would gladly secure them the King's alliance. Most important of all, should every hope fail, with so great a fleet they had many places of retreat where they would find both cities and land.

CHAPTER 77

1 Such were the arguments they exchanged in their assembly; and, having encouraged one another, they pursued their preparations for war with undiminished vigor. Those sent to Samos by the Four Hundred [the ten ambassadors], who had already reached Delos when they learned of these events, remained quietly there.

CHAPTER 78

1 At about this time the men serving in the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus were also loudly declaring among themselves that Astyochus and Tissaphernes were ruining their cause. Astyochus had refused to fight at sea before, when they themselves were stronger and the Athenian fleet was small, and refused now, when the Athenians were reportedly torn by civil strife and their ships were not yet concentrated. Instead, they were waiting for the Phoenician ships from Tissaphernes—a mere name, not a reality—and risked wasting away in delay. Tissaphernes, for his part, neither brought these ships nor paid their maintenance regularly or in full, and so was destroying the fleet. They must therefore delay no longer, they said, but fight a decisive battle at sea.

CHAPTER 79

1 The Syracusans were the most insistent. When the allies and Astyochus became aware of this outcry, they held a conference and resolved to give battle, especially since reports of the disturbance at Samos were also reaching them. They put out with their entire fleet of a hundred and twelve ships and sailed toward Mycale, ordering the Milesians to march there by land.

2 The Athenians happened to be anchored at Glauce on Mycale with their eighty-two ships from Samos; only a short stretch of water there separates Samos from the mainland opposite Mycale. When they saw the Peloponnesian ships approaching, they withdrew to Samos, judging their numbers insufficient to hazard everything on a battle.

3 They were also expecting Strombichides to come to their aid from the Hellespont with the ships which had sailed from Chios to Abydos. They had received advance warning that the enemy intended to leave Miletus to give battle, and had sent him a messenger ahead.

4 Thus the Athenians withdrew to Samos, while the Peloponnesians sailed into Mycale and encamped there, together with the infantry of the Milesians and their neighbors.

5 On the following day, as they were about to sail against Samos, word came that Strombichides had arrived with the ships from the Hellespont. They immediately sailed back to Miletus.

6 With these ships added to their strength, the Athenians themselves sailed against Miletus with a hundred and eight ships, seeking a decisive battle. When no one put out to meet them, they sailed back to Samos.

CHAPTER 80

1 Immediately afterward, in the same summer, the Peloponnesians, who had declined to put out because they judged themselves no match for the Athenians' united fleet, found themselves at a loss how to obtain money for so many ships, especially with Tissaphernes paying so poorly. They therefore sent Clearchus son of Rhamphias with forty ships to Pharnabazus, as their original orders from the Peloponnese had prescribed.

2 For Pharnabazus was inviting them and was ready to provide maintenance; and at the same time Byzantium was sending them messages offering to revolt.

3 These Peloponnesian ships put out into the open sea to escape the Athenians' notice on their voyage, but were caught in a storm. Most reached Delos with Clearchus and subsequently returned to Miletus; Clearchus himself later traveled overland to the Hellespont and took command. Ten ships, however, under the Megarian general Helixus, reached the Hellespont safely and brought Byzantium into revolt.

4 When those at Samos learned of this, they sent ships to the Hellespont as reinforcements and to keep watch. There was also a small naval engagement off Byzantium, eight ships against eight.

CHAPTER 81

1 The leaders at Samos were working to restore Alcibiades, and Thrasybulus above all, who had consistently held to this purpose ever since he changed the government, at last persuaded the mass of the soldiers in an assembly. They voted for Alcibiades' return and immunity, and Thrasybulus sailed to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades back to Samos, believing that their only salvation lay in detaching Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians and bringing him over to their side.

2 At an assembly Alcibiades protested against his exile and lamented his personal misfortune, spoke at length about public affairs, and filled them with high hopes for the future. He extravagantly magnified his influence with Tissaphernes: the oligarchs at home were to fear him and their conspiracies dissolve the more readily; those at Samos were to hold him in greater honor and themselves gain confidence; and the enemy were to fall as far as possible under Tissaphernes' suspicion and be cast [out of] their present hopes.

3 Alcibiades' grandest and most boastful promises were these: Tissaphernes had pledged to him that, if he could trust the Athenians, they would never lack maintenance while any of his own possessions remained, even if in the end he had to sell his own bed; and he would bring the Phoenician ships, already at Aspendus, to the Athenians, not the Peloponnesians. But he would trust the Athenians only if Alcibiades returned in safety and personally stood surety for them.

CHAPTER 82

1 Hearing this and much else, they immediately elected him general alongside those already in office and entrusted all their affairs to him. Not one of them would have exchanged his newfound hope of salvation and vengeance upon the Four Hundred for anything in the world; and his words had at once made them so contemptuous of the enemy before them that they were now ready to sail for Piraeus.

2 Though many pressed for this, he firmly prevented them from sailing to Piraeus and leaving the nearer enemy behind. Now that he had been elected general, he said, he would first sail to Tissaphernes and attend to the war.

3 He left directly after this assembly, so that he might seem to consult Tissaphernes on everything. At the same time he wished to enhance his standing with him and demonstrate that he had now been elected general and was [now] in a position to do him either good or harm. Thus Alcibiades used Tissaphernes to frighten the Athenians, and the Athenians to frighten Tissaphernes.

CHAPTER 83

1 When the Peloponnesians at Miletus learned of Alcibiades' return, their distrust of Tissaphernes, already strong, became far more bitter.

2 For at the time of the Athenian advance upon Miletus, when they had refused to put out and fight, Tissaphernes had become much less forthcoming with their pay; and even before these events Alcibiades had deepened their hatred of him.

3 The soldiers gathered in groups as before to reckon up their grievances, and now some of the other men of consequence joined them; it was no longer the fighting men alone. They had never yet received their pay in full, they said; what they were given was little, and even that came irregularly. Unless someone either fought a decisive naval battle or took them away to where they could obtain maintenance, the men would abandon their ships. Astyochus was to blame for everything, indulging Tissaphernes' whims for his own profit.

CHAPTER 84

1 While they were reckoning matters in this way, Astyochus also found himself involved in a disturbance of the following kind.

2 The sailors from Syracuse and Thurii, being for the most part free men, approached him with correspondingly bold demands for their pay. He answered somewhat arrogantly and threatened them; indeed, when Dorieus spoke on behalf of his own sailors, he even raised his staff against him.

3 At this sight the mass of the fighting men, with a sailor's sudden fury, shouted out and rushed at Astyochus to stone him. He saw the danger in time and took refuge at an altar. He was not struck, however, and the two sides dispersed.

4 The Milesians also made a surprise attack on the fort Tissaphernes had built inside Miletus, captured it, and expelled his garrison. The other allies approved this action, the Syracusans not least.

5 Lichas, however, disapproved. He said that the Milesians and the other inhabitants of the King's territory must submit to Tissaphernes within reasonable bounds and court his favor until they had brought the war to a successful conclusion. The Milesians were angry with him for this and other statements of the same kind; and when he later died of disease, they refused to allow the Lacedaemonians present to bury him where they wished.

CHAPTER 85

1 While their relations with Astyochus and Tissaphernes were thus embittered, Mindarus arrived from Lacedaemon to succeed Astyochus as admiral and took over the command. Astyochus sailed away.

2 Tissaphernes sent with him an ambassador from among his own men, Gaulites by name, a Carian who spoke both languages, to accuse the Milesians over the fort and at the same time defend Tissaphernes himself. For he knew that the Milesians were going chiefly to denounce him, and that Hermocrates was accompanying them and intended to expose Tissaphernes as playing a double game and ruining the Peloponnesian cause in concert with Alcibiades.

3 Hermocrates had long been at odds with him over the payment of wages. Eventually Hermocrates was exiled from Syracuse, and other generals—Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus—came to Miletus to take over the Syracusan ships. Tissaphernes then pressed his attacks on Hermocrates, now an exile, more fiercely than ever, charging him, among other things, with having once asked him for money and, on being refused, made an enemy of him.

4 Astyochus, the Milesians, and Hermocrates thus sailed away to Lacedaemon. Alcibiades had by now crossed back from Tissaphernes to Samos.

CHAPTER 86

1 The [ambassadors] from the Four Hundred, who had been sent at that time to reassure and instruct the men at Samos, now arrived from Delos while Alcibiades was present. An assembly was held, and they attempted to speak.

2 At first the soldiers refused to listen, shouting that those who had overthrown the democracy should be put to death. At last, however, they were with difficulty quieted and heard them out.

3 The envoys declared that the change of government had been made not to destroy the city but to save it, nor to surrender it to the enemy: they could have done that when the enemy invaded while they were already in power. All the Five Thousand would have their turn in governing; and their relatives were neither being mistreated, as Chaereas had slanderously reported, nor suffering any other harm, but each remained undisturbed in possession of his own property.

4 Though they said much else, the soldiers were no more inclined to listen. They grew angry and offered conflicting proposals, above all to sail for Piraeus. On this occasion, it seems to me, Alcibiades for the first time rendered the city a service second to none: when the Athenians at Samos were bent on sailing against their own people—an action which would most certainly have given the enemy immediate possession of Ionia and the Hellespont—he prevented them.

5 At that moment no one else could have restrained the multitude; but he both stopped the expedition and, by rebuking those who were venting their personal anger on the ambassadors, checked their attacks.

6 He himself gave the envoys his answer and sent them away. He had no objection to the Five Thousand governing, but demanded that they remove the Four Hundred and restore the Council of Five Hundred as it had been before. If they had curtailed expenditure for economy's sake so that the men on service might have better provision, he warmly approved.

7 In all else, too, he urged them to stand firm and yield nothing to the enemy. For if the city survived, there was ample hope that they could reconcile their differences; but if either side once fell, whether the force at Samos or those at home, there would no longer be anyone with whom to make peace.

8 Ambassadors from Argos were also present, offering assistance to the Athenian people at Samos. Alcibiades praised them and told them to come when summoned, then sent them away.

9 The Argives had come with the crew of the Paralus, who had at that time been assigned by the Four Hundred to sail round Euboea in the troopship. They were carrying to Lacedaemon Athenian ambassadors [sent] by the Four Hundred—Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias. [The sailors], when their voyage brought them off Argos, arrested the ambassadors and handed them over to the Argives as men who had been among the foremost in overthrowing the democracy. They themselves did not return to Athens, but came to Samos in the trireme they had, bringing the ambassadors from Argos.

CHAPTER 87

1 In the same summer, at this time when the Peloponnesians were most embittered against Tissaphernes for other reasons and especially because of Alcibiades' return, believing him now openly to favor Athens, Tissaphernes prepared to go to Aspendus for the Phoenician ships. His purpose, as it

appeared, was to clear himself of their suspicions. He asked Lichas to accompany him, and said that he would appoint his subordinate Tamos to provide maintenance for the army during his absence.

2 Accounts differ, and it is not easy to know with what intention he went to Aspendus and, after going there, failed to bring the ships.

3 That the hundred and forty-seven Phoenician ships reached Aspendus is certain; why they did not come on is variously conjectured. Some say he went away to wear down the Peloponnesian cause by delay, as indeed he intended: at any rate, Tamos, to whom the task had been entrusted, provided maintenance no better than before, but worse. Others say he brought the Phoenicians as far as Aspendus to exact money from them in return for their release, since he had no intention of employing them in any case. Others again say it was because of the outcry against him at Lacedaemon: he wished it to be said that he was doing no wrong, but had plainly gone to fetch ships which were in fact fully manned.

4 To me, however, it seems quite clear that he withheld the fleet to delay and hold Greek affairs in suspense: to wear them down while he traveled there and lingered, and to keep the balance even, making neither side stronger by joining it. Had he wished, his appearance would assuredly have brought the war to a decisive end. For by bringing the ships he would in all probability have given victory to the Lacedaemonians, whose fleet even as things stood confronted the Athenians on terms of equality rather than inferiority.

5 The excuse he gave for not bringing the ships is itself the clearest evidence against him. He said that there were fewer of them than the King had ordered to assemble. Yet surely in that case he would have earned even greater gratitude, achieving the same result with fewer ships and without spending so much of the King's money.

6 Whatever his intention, then, Tissaphernes reached Aspendus and met the Phoenicians. At his request the Peloponnesians sent Philippus, a Lacedaemonian, with two triremes to join the ships.

CHAPTER 88

1 When Alcibiades learned that Tissaphernes was on his way to Aspendus, he too sailed out, taking thirteen ships. He promised those at Samos a great and certain benefit: he would either bring the Phoenician ships himself to the Athenians or at least prevent their joining the Peloponnesians. In all likelihood he had long known Tissaphernes' intention not to bring them, and wished to make the Peloponnesians as suspicious as possible of Tissaphernes' friendship with himself and the Athenians, so that this very suspicion would compel him all the more to join their side. Alcibiades put out and sailed up toward Phaselis and Caunus.

CHAPTER 89

1 When the ambassadors sent by the Four Hundred returned from Samos to Athens, they reported Alcibiades' message: he urged them to stand firm and yield nothing to the enemy, and had high hopes both of reconciling the army with those at home and of overcoming the Peloponnesians. This greatly strengthened the resolve of the many participants in the oligarchy who were already dissatisfied and would gladly have found some safe means of withdrawing from the affair.

2 They now began to gather together and criticize the conduct of affairs, led by some of the foremost [generals] in the oligarchy and men in office, such as Theramenes son of Hagnon, Aristocrates son of Scellias, and others. These had been among the first to join the enterprise, but were now, they said, deeply afraid of the army at Samos and Alcibiades, and of the envoys to Lacedaemon [whom they were sending], lest they do the city some harm without consulting the larger body. They did not seek to abandon the concentration of government in a few hands, but insisted that the Five Thousand must be constituted in deed and not merely in name, and that the constitution must be made more equitable.

3 This was the political guise of their argument; most of them pursued such a course out of private ambition—the very thing that chiefly destroys an oligarchy established out of a democracy. For on the very first day all claim not merely to be equals, but each to stand far above the rest. Under a democracy, by contrast, when an election is held, a man more readily accepts the result, since he does not regard his defeat as inflicted by his equals.

4 What most plainly encouraged them was Alcibiades' strength at Samos and their belief that the oligarchy would not endure. Each therefore competed to be the first himself to become champion of the people.

CHAPTER 90

1 The leaders of the Four Hundred most opposed to this tendency were Phrynichus, who, when general at Samos, had [once] quarreled with Alcibiades; Aristarchus, one of the most bitter and long-standing enemies of the people; Pisander; Antiphon; and the other most powerful men. Already, as soon as they had established themselves and the force at Samos had broken away from them to democracy, they had sent their own ambassadors to Lacedaemon, pressed for an agreement, and begun building the wall at the place called Eetionea. They pursued these measures far more vigorously still when their ambassadors returned from Samos and they saw both the multitude and men of their own party whom they had previously thought reliable changing sides.

2 Alarmed both by events at home and by those at Samos, they hurriedly dispatched Antiphon, Phrynichus, and ten others, with instructions to reach an agreement with the Lacedaemonians by any means and on any terms that were at all tolerable.

3 They also pressed on more eagerly with the wall at Eetionea. The purpose of this wall, according to Theramenes and his party, was not to keep the force at Samos out of Piraeus if it sailed against them in force, but rather to admit the enemy whenever they wished, both by sea and by land.

4 For Eetionea is a projecting arm of Piraeus, with the entrance to the harbor running immediately beside it. They were fortifying it in conjunction with the existing wall on the landward side, so that a small body stationed within could command the entrance. Both the old landward wall and the new inner wall being built toward the sea ended at the same one of the two towers at the narrow mouth of the harbor.

5 They also walled off the largest portico in Piraeus, which lay immediately adjoining this wall, and took control of it themselves. They compelled everyone to deposit there all grain already in stock as well as all that came in by sea, and to draw it out from there for sale.

CHAPTER 91

1 Theramenes had therefore long been spreading these reports, and continued when the ambassadors returned from Lacedaemon without having secured any agreement acceptable to the whole body. This wall, he declared, threatened to bring the city itself to ruin.

2 For at this very time forty-two ships from the Peloponnese, summoned by the Euboeans, were already lying at Las in Laconia and preparing for the voyage to Euboea. Among them were Italian ships from Tarentum and Locri, and some from Sicily; their commander was Agesandridas son of Agesander, a Spartan. Theramenes said that they were sailing to support not Euboea so much as the men fortifying Eetionea, and that unless someone took precautions immediately, the city would be destroyed before they knew it.

3 There was indeed some such intention on the part of the accused, and the charge was not altogether a slander. Their first wish was to retain oligarchical rule and govern the allies as well; failing that, to preserve their independence while keeping their ships and walls. But if they were excluded from this too, they were determined not to be the first and chief victims of a restored democ-

racy. They would rather admit the enemy, come to terms at the cost of walls and ships, and let the city's affairs take any course whatever, provided their own persons were safe.

CHAPTER 92

1 For this reason they eagerly built this wall, with its postern gates, entrances, and means of admitting the enemy, and wished to finish it before they could be forestalled.

2 At first these matters were discussed chiefly in small groups and in secret. But after returning from his embassy to Lacedaemon, Phrynichus was struck by one of the patrolmen in a premeditated attack in the crowded marketplace; he went only a little way from the council chamber and died at once. The assailant escaped, but his accomplice, an Argive, was caught and tortured by the Four Hundred. He named no one as having ordered the attack, and said nothing beyond that he knew of many men gathering at the patrol commander's house and at other private houses. No further disturbance followed from the incident, and Theramenes, Aristocrates, and all who shared their views, both within the Four Hundred themselves and outside, now moved more boldly against the government.

3 For by this time the ships from Las had sailed round, anchored at Epidaurus, and made a raid on Aegina. Theramenes said it was improbable that, if bound for Euboea, they would have turned into the gulf toward Aegina and then anchored again at Epidaurus, unless they had come by invitation for the very purpose he had continually alleged. It was therefore no longer possible to remain inactive.

4 At last, after much inflammatory talk and an accumulation of suspicions, they began to act. The hoplites building the wall at Eetionea in Piraeus, among whom was Aristocrates commanding the contingent of his own tribe, arrested Alexicles, a general of the oligarchy especially devoted to the political clubs, took him into a house, and confined him there.

5 Others joined them, including a certain Hermon, commander of the patrolmen stationed at Munychia; and, most important, the mass of the hoplites supported the action.

6 When the news reached the Four Hundred, who happened to be sitting together in the council chamber, they were immediately ready to take up arms, apart from those unwilling to do so, and threatened Theramenes and his party. Theramenes defended himself, saying that he was ready to go at once and help secure the prisoner's release. Taking with him one of the generals who shared his views, he set out for Piraeus. Aristarchus too went to the rescue, along with some young men of the cavalry.

7 There was great and terrifying confusion. Those in the city already believed that Piraeus had been seized and the prisoner killed, while those in Piraeus thought that the men from the city would be upon them at any moment.

8 The older men barely managed to restrain those who were running about the city and rushing to arms. Thucydides of Pharsalus, the city's proxenus, was also present, vigorously putting himself in the way of each group and calling on them not to destroy their country with the enemy lying close at hand. At last they grew quiet and refrained from attacking one another.

9 On reaching Piraeus, Theramenes, who was himself also a general, made a show of shouting angrily at the hoplites; Aristarchus and the opponents of Theramenes, however, were angry in earnest.

10 Most of the hoplites stood by their action and showed no repentance. They asked Theramenes whether he thought the wall was being built for any good purpose and whether it would not be better demolished. He answered that, if they thought it should be demolished, he agreed. The hoplites and many of the inhabitants of Piraeus immediately climbed onto the fortification and began to tear it down.

11 The call to the crowd was that anyone who wished the Five Thousand to govern instead of the Four Hundred should join in the work. For they still sheltered behind the name of the Five Thousand, rather than openly calling on those who wished the people to rule: they feared that the Five Thousand might really exist, and that a man might come to harm by speaking to someone without knowing who he was. For this reason the Four Hundred neither wished the Five Thousand to exist nor wished their nonexistence to become apparent. They considered that admitting so many to a share in government would amount to outright democracy, while uncertainty would make men afraid of one another.

CHAPTER 93

1 On the following day the Four Hundred assembled in the council chamber, despite their alarm. The hoplites in Piraeus released Alexicles, whom they had arrested, demolished the fortification, and went to the theater of Dionysus near Munychia. There they stacked their arms and held an assembly; then, in accordance with their decision, they immediately marched into the city and again stacked their arms, this time in the Anaceum.

2 Delegates chosen by the Four Hundred came to them and spoke with them individually, urging any men they saw who seemed reasonable to remain quiet themselves and restrain the others. They said that they would publish the names of the Five Thousand, and that from this body the Four Hundred would be drawn in rotation, in whatever manner the Five Thousand decided. Meanwhile they must do nothing to destroy the city or drive it into the hands of the enemy.

3 As many men spoke to many others, the whole body of hoplites grew calmer than before; their chief fear was for the survival of the state as a whole. They agreed to hold an assembly in the sanctuary of Dionysus on an appointed day to discuss reconciliation.

CHAPTER 94

1 When the day of the assembly [in the sanctuary of Dionysus] arrived and they were almost gathered, news came that the forty-two ships under Agesandridas were sailing from Megara along the coast of Salamis. Every man [among the mass of hoplites] believed that this was precisely what Theramenes and his associates had long been saying: the ships were sailing to the fortification. Its demolition, they thought, had been timely.

2 Agesandridas may indeed have been cruising about Epidaurus and that neighborhood under some prior agreement; but it is also likely that he was waiting there with an eye to the civil strife then dividing the Athenians, in the hope that he might arrive at an opportune moment.

3 When the news reached them, the Athenians in their turn immediately rushed down to Piraeus, the entire population running: the war threatened by the enemy, greater [than] their own internal conflict, was no longer distant but at the harbor itself. Some boarded the ships that were ready, others launched more, and others hurried to defend the walls and the harbor mouth.

CHAPTER 95

1 The Peloponnesian ships sailed past, rounded Sunium, and anchored between Thoricus and Prasiae; later they reached Oropus.

2 The Athenians, compelled by their haste to use crews that had not trained together—the city was torn by civil strife, yet they wanted to bring swift help where the stakes were greatest, since Euboea was everything to them now that Attica was closed off—sent the general Thymochares with ships to Eretria.

3 On their arrival, together with those already in Euboea, the ships numbered thirty-six. They were immediately forced to fight at sea: Agesandridas had given his men their morning meal and put out from Oropus, which lies some sixty stades by sea from the city of the Eretrians.

4 As he approached, the Athenians at once began manning their ships, expecting their men to be beside the ships. But the men happened to be getting their morning provisions not from the marketplace—the Eretrians had deliberately arranged that nothing should be for sale there—but from houses on the outskirts of the city. The intention was that, while the ships were slowly being manned, the enemy should strike before they were ready and compel the Athenians to put out in whatever condition they happened to be. A signal had been raised from Eretria to tell them at Oropus when to sail.

5 Putting out in this state of preparation, the Athenians fought off the harbor of Eretria and nevertheless held their own for a little while; then they turned and fled, and were pursued to the shore.

6 Those who took refuge in the city of Eretria, believing it friendly, met the harshest fate: the Eretrians killed them. Those who reached the fort in Eretrian territory, which the Athenians themselves held, survived, as did the ships that made it to Chalcis.

7 The Peloponnesians captured twenty-two Athenian ships, killed some of the men and took others alive, and set up a trophy. Not long afterward they brought all Euboea into revolt except Oreus, which the Athenians held themselves, and settled the other affairs of the island.

CHAPTER 96

1 When the Athenians learned what had happened in Euboea, they were overcome by a consternation greater than any they had known. Neither the disaster in Sicily, great though it had seemed at the time, nor anything else had ever frightened them so much.

2 The army at Samos had broken with them; they had no other ships, nor men to embark in them; they were themselves divided by civil strife, and no one knew when they might fall upon one another. Now, on top of all this, had come so

great a calamity, in which they had lost ships and, most serious of all, Euboea, from which they drew more benefit than from Attica. How could their despondency not be justified?

3 Their most acute and immediate alarm was that the enemy, emboldened by victory, might dare to sail straight against Piraeus, now empty of ships. They imagined them all but there already.

4 Had the enemy been more daring, they could easily have done so. By taking up a station off the city they would either have deepened its divisions still further, or, by remaining to blockade it, would have compelled even the fleet in Ionia, hostile though it was to the oligarchy, to come to the aid of its own families and the city as a whole. Meanwhile the Hellespont, Ionia, the islands, and the territory as far as Euboea—virtually the whole Athenian empire—would have been theirs.

5 Yet this was not the only occasion, but one of many, on which the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient enemies the Athenians could have had. Their characters differed as widely as possible: the Athenians were quick, the Lacedaemonians slow; the one enterprising, the other lacking in daring. These differences served the Athenians particularly well in a maritime empire. The Syracusans demonstrated the point: being most like them in character, they also fought them most effectively.

CHAPTER 97

1 Nevertheless, on receiving the news, the Athenians manned twenty ships and called an assembly. The first they held at once, on the hill called the Pnyx, where they had customarily met before. There they deposed the Four Hundred and voted to entrust affairs to the Five Thousand, whose membership was to include all who provided their own hoplite equipment. No pay was to be received for any office, and they laid a curse on any breach of this rule.

2 Other assemblies followed in close succession, at which they voted to appoint lawgivers and enacted the other measures required for the constitution. At least in this first period, the Athenians seem to have governed themselves as well as at any time in my lifetime. There was a temperate blending of the few and the many, and this was what first raised the city from the wretched condition into which it had fallen.

3 They also voted for the return of Alcibiades and others with him, and sent messages to him and to the army at Samos, urging them to take affairs vigorously in hand.

CHAPTER 98

1 As soon as this change came about, Pisander, Alexicles, and their associates, together with the most committed supporters of the oligarchy, slipped away to Decelea. Aristarchus alone took another course. He happened to be a general, and hastily gathered some of the most barbarous archers and marched toward Oenoe.

2 This was an Athenian fort on the Boeotian border. A volunteer force of Corinthians, who had called in the Boeotians to assist them, was besieging it in revenge for a loss inflicted on them from Oenoe: some of their men had been killed while returning from Decelea.

3 After conferring with the besiegers, Aristarchus deceived the men in Oenoe. He told them that their fellow citizens at Athens had reached a settlement with the Lacedaemonians on all other matters, and that they too must hand over their position to the Boeotians: these were the terms agreed. Trusting him as a general, and knowing nothing of events because they were under siege, they marched out under a truce.

4 In this way Oenoe was captured and occupied by the Boeotians; and the oligarchy and civil strife at Athens came to an end.

CHAPTER 99

1 At about the same time in this summer, the Peloponnesians at Miletus were receiving no maintenance from any of the men whom Tissaphernes had put in charge [when he went off to Aspendus], and neither the Phoenician ships nor Tissaphernes himself had yet arrived. Philip, who had been sent with him, and another man, Hippocrates, a Spartan then at Phaselis, had written to Mindarus, the admiral, that the ships would not come and that Tissaphernes was wronging them in every respect. Pharnabazus, meanwhile, was summoning them, eager to obtain the fleet and, like Tissaphernes, to bring the remaining cities in his own province into revolt from Athens. Mindarus, hoping to gain more from him, therefore set sail from Miletus for the Hellespont with seventy-three ships, in excellent order and on a sudden command, so as to escape the notice of those at Samos. Earlier in this same summer sixteen ships had already sailed into the Hellespont and had ravaged part of the Chersonese. But a storm drove him to put in at Icarus, where weather that prevented sailing kept him for five or six days; he then reached Chios.

CHAPTER 100

1 When Thrasyllus learned at Samos that Mindarus had sailed from Miletus, he too immediately put to sea with fifty-five ships, making haste lest Mindarus enter the Hellespont before him.

2 Learning that he was at Chios, and supposing that he would stay there, Thrasyllus posted lookouts both on Lesbos and on the opposite mainland, to ensure that any movement of the fleet should not pass unnoticed. He himself sailed along the coast to Methymna and ordered barley meal and other provisions to be made ready, intending, if the delay proved long, to use Lesbos as his base for attacks on Chios.

3 At the same time, since Eresus in Lesbos had revolted, he wanted to sail against it and, if possible, capture it. Some exiles from Methymna, men of considerable influence, had brought over about fifty hoplites from Cyme who had joined

their cause, and had hired others from the mainland, making about three hundred in all. Under the command of Anaxander, a Theban linked to them by common ancestry, they first attacked Methymna. The Athenian garrison from Mytilene came out and thwarted the attempt; driven back again in a battle outside the city, the exiles crossed the mountains and brought Eresus into revolt.

4 Thrasyllus therefore sailed against it with his whole fleet, intending to make an assault. Thrasybulus was already there: on receiving news at Samos that the exiles had crossed over, he had sailed with five ships, but had arrived too late to stop them and had come to take up a station off Eresus.

5 They were joined by two ships returning home from the Hellespont and five from Methymna. The fleet now numbered sixty-seven ships in all, and with the troops drawn from them they prepared to take Eresus by storm, if they could, with siege engines and every other means.

CHAPTER 101

1 Meanwhile Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios took provisions for two days, and each man received three Chian fortieth-coins from the Chians. On the third day they put out from Chios at speed, not by the open sea, for fear of encountering the ships at Eresus, but toward the mainland, keeping Lesbos on their left.

2 They put in at the harbor of Carterii in Phocaean territory and took their morning meal; then, sailing along the coast of Cyme, they had their evening meal at Arginusae on the mainland, opposite Mytilene.

3 From there they sailed on while much of the night remained and reached Harmatus on the mainland, directly opposite Methymna. After their morning meal they hurried past Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus, and the neighboring places, reaching Rhoeteum, already within the Hellespont, before midnight. Some of the ships put in at Sigeum and other places in the neighborhood.

CHAPTER 102

1 The Athenians at Sestos, with eighteen ships, knew that the Peloponnesians were entering the strait when their beacon watchers signaled and they saw many fires suddenly appear in enemy territory. That very night they sailed as fast as they could along the Chersonese, hugging its shore, toward Elaeus, intending to get past the enemy ships and out into open water.

2 They slipped past the sixteen ships at Abydos, although a watch had been ordered in connection with the approach of the friendly fleet, to keep close guard on the Athenians if they sailed out. At dawn, however, they sighted the ships with Mindarus, which immediately gave chase. Not all escaped in time: most got away toward Imbros and Lemnos, but the four ships sailing last were overtaken near Elaeus.

3 One, which had run aground by the sanctuary of Protesilaus, they captured with its crew; two others they took without their crews, and the remaining one they burned near Imbros after its men had left it.

CHAPTER 103

1 After this, joined by the ships from Abydos, they besieged Elaeus for that day with their entire fleet of eighty-six ships. When it would not submit, they sailed back to Abydos.

2 The Athenians had been deceived by their lookouts: never imagining that the enemy fleet could sail past unnoticed, they had been attacking the walls at their leisure. When they learned what had happened, they immediately abandoned Eresus and hurried to the defense of the Hellespont.

3 They captured two Peloponnesian ships which, venturing too boldly out to sea during the pursuit, had fallen in with them. The next day they reached Elaeus and anchored there; they brought over the ships that had escaped to Imbros and spent five days preparing for battle at sea.

CHAPTER 104

1 After this they fought a naval battle in the following manner. The Athenians were sailing in column close along the coast toward Sestos, and the Peloponnesians, seeing them, also put out from Abydos to meet them.

2 When it became clear that they would fight, they extended their lines: the Athenians, with seventy-six ships, along the Chersonese from Idacus to Arriani; the Peloponnesians, with eighty-six, from Abydos to Dardanus.

3 On the Peloponnesian side the Syracusans held the right wing, and Mindarus himself, with the fastest ships, the other. On the Athenian side Thrasyllus held the left and Thrasybulus the right; the other generals held their respective stations.

4 The Peloponnesians were eager to make the first attack. They intended, if possible, to outflank the Athenian right with their own left and cut off its escape into open water, while driving the center onto the shore, which was close by. The Athenians perceived this, and on the side where the enemy meant to block them they extended their own line in response, keeping ahead of them as they sailed.

5 Their left wing had already passed the headland called Cynossema. As a result their ships in the center were left weak and scattered, especially since they were also fewer in number; moreover, the coast around Cynossema formed a sharp angle, so that what was happening on its farther side could not be seen.

CHAPTER 105

1 The Peloponnesians therefore struck the center, drove the Athenian ships onto dry land, and disembarked to pursue the fight ashore, gaining a decisive advantage in the action.

2 Neither Thrasybulus and his men on the right, beset by a mass of ships, nor Thrasyllus and his men on the left could help the center. The latter could not see it because of the headland of Cynossema, and the Syracusans and the other ships drawn up against them, no fewer than their own, also held them in check. This continued until the Peloponnesians, emboldened by their victory, began pursuing individual ships without fear, and part of their fleet fell into disorder.

3 Thrasybulus and his men saw that the ships facing them were holding back; they stopped extending their wing, turned about, and immediately attacked and routed them. They then caught the scattered ships of the victorious Peloponnesian division, battered them, and threw most into panic without a fight. The Syracusans, too, had already begun to give way before Thrasyllus and his men, and fled still more readily when they saw what was happening to the others.

CHAPTER 106

1 The Peloponnesians were routed and fled, most of them first to the river Midius and later to Abydos. The Athenians captured few ships, since the narrowness of the Hellespont gave their opponents only a short distance to cover in escaping; nevertheless, this naval victory came at a most critical moment for them.

2 Until then they had feared the Peloponnesian fleet because of their successive minor reverses and the disaster in Sicily. Now they were freed from their habit of reproaching themselves, and no longer thought their enemies of any account at sea.

3 The enemy ships they captured were eight Chian, five Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Boeotian, and one each from the Leucadians, Lacedaemonians, Syracusans, and Pellenians. They themselves lost fifteen ships.

4 They set up a trophy on the headland at Cynossema, collected the wrecks, returned the enemy dead under a truce, and sent a trireme to Athens with news of the victory.

5 When the ship arrived and the Athenians heard of this unexpected success, coming after the recent disasters in Euboea and those brought on by civil strife, they took great heart. They believed that their cause could still prevail, if they pursued it with determination.

CHAPTER 107

1 On the fourth day after the naval battle, the Athenians at Sestos, having hurriedly repaired their ships, sailed against Cyzicus, which had revolted. Sighting the eight ships from Byzantium at anchor near Harpagium and Priapus, they sailed against them, defeated the men on shore in battle, and captured the ships. They then reached Cyzicus, which had no walls, brought it back into allegiance, and exacted money.

2 Meanwhile the Peloponnesians sailed from Abydos to Elaeus and recovered as many of their captured ships as were still sound; the people of Elaeus had burned the rest. They also sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea to bring back the ships from there.

CHAPTER 108

1 At about this same time Alcibiades returned from Caunus and Phaselis to Samos with his thirteen ships, reporting that he had turned the Phoenician fleet away from coming to the Peloponnesians and had made Tissaphernes a greater friend to the Athenians than before.

2 Manning nine ships in addition to those he already had, he exacted a large sum of money from the Halicarnassians and fortified Cos. After doing this and appointing a governor in Cos, he sailed back to Samos as autumn was approaching.

3 When Tissaphernes learned at Aspendus that the Peloponnesian fleet had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, he broke camp and set off for Ionia.

4 While the Peloponnesians were in the Hellespont, the people of Antandrus, who are Aeolians, brought hoplites overland from Abydos across Mount Ida and admitted them into the city. They were being mistreated by Arsaces, the Persian deputy of Tissaphernes. It was he who had massacred the Delians settled at Adramyttium after the Athenians expelled them from Delos for its purification. Pretending to have a quarrel whose object he did not disclose, he had summoned their leading men for military service and led them out on a footing of friendship and alliance; then, waiting until they were taking their morning meal, he surrounded them with his own men and had them shot down with javelins.

5 Fearing, after this deed, that he might someday commit some outrage against them too, and also suffering other burdens he imposed which they could not bear, the people of Antandrus expelled his garrison from the citadel.

CHAPTER 109

1 When Tissaphernes learned of this further action by the Peloponnesians, beyond what they had done at Miletus and Cnidus—for his garrisons had been expelled there too—he concluded that they had become deeply hostile to him and feared that they might do him still more harm. He also resented the prospect that Pharnabazus, after entertaining them for less time and at less expense, might achieve greater success against the Athenians. He therefore resolved to go to them in the Hellespont, to complain of what had happened at Antandrus and to offer the most plausible defense he could against their accusations concerning the Phoenician fleet and the other matters. On reaching Ephesus first, he offered sacrifice to Artemis.

2 [When the winter following this summer comes to an end, the twenty-first year will be complete.]