

The World as Will and Representation, Volume I

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

Plain English Translation

MOUSEIA

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Translated by Michael Berardi

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THIS EDITION

Mouseia's complete machine-assisted Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same corrected German text of the 1859 third edition, then reviewed section by section against that German base and corrected, with the printed page consulted wherever a reading was in doubt. Footnote numbers are this edition's own, assigned in reading order, so note calls and the notes they point to can differ; a few notes the scan cut short end where the printed page ends.

TRANSLATOR

Michael Berardi

THE WORK

Written 1819; third edition 1859 · Philosophy

SOURCE

Original text from archive.org.

GAPS AND UNCERTAINTIES

The German follows the 1859 third edition, which Schopenhauer expanded by 136 pages over the second; the work's later volumes are not included. Head- and running titles, signatures, catchwords and printers' ornaments are omitted. Greek, Latin, French, Italian, Spanish and English quotations stand as Schopenhauer printed them. His notes keep the place the printed page gives them: their marks become bracketed numbers in reading order, counted once per unit, though the page restarts the series with *) on every page. A page's note therefore stands where its page breaks off, so a note can come down inside a sentence in all three editions, and a note call and the note it points to can carry different numbers. Where the page breaks a word to carry a note, the word is joined again and the note follows it. Six places merge two German paragraphs into one paragraph of English, all of them where a paragraph crosses a page break between reading units (Preface to the Second Edition, Book II paragraphs 24 and 29, Book III paragraphs 36, 50 and 51). Otherwise paragraphs follow the German one for one. The appendix keeps the printer's errata list and the Brockhaus colophon as printed in 1859. The printed figures are images copied from the page (public/images/): the four concept-sphere diagrams of Book I § 9, the plate of concept

spheres that § 9 refers to, the triangle of § 15, and the two formulas of page 90. The first formula reads seven plus nine, that sum times eight, minus two, all over three, equals forty-two; the second is a root sign over r minus a small raised letter that the print leaves unclear, so its image text says so rather than guess. A few leaves of the scan are damaged where the notes were trimmed, and those notes end without a mark: the English carries the printed fragment and picks the sentence up again. The German was transcribed leaf by leaf from the page images of a Fraktur scan; letters the scan left ambiguous were settled against the page or the Oxford witness where that was possible, and a residue remains, mostly in Books II and IV, together with the older tz spellings the 1859 page prints.

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Preface to the First Edition



I have set myself the task of explaining here how this book should be read if there is to be any chance of understanding it.—What the book is meant to communicate is a single thought. Yet in spite of every effort, I could find no shorter way to communicate it than this whole book.—I believe this thought is what people have been searching for, for a very long time, under the name of philosophy. That is exactly why people with a historical education consider it as impossible to find as the philosopher's stone, even though Pliny already told them: Quam multa fieri non posse, priusquam sint facta, judicantur? (Hist. nat., 7, 1.)

Depending on which side you look at this one thought from, it shows up as what people have called metaphysics, as what they have called ethics, and as what they have called aesthetics. And of course it would have to be all of these, if it is what I, as I have already admitted, take it to be.

A system of thoughts must always have an architectural structure. That means one in which each part supports another, but the other does not also support the first. The foundation stone finally supports all the rest without being supported by any of them, and the top is supported without supporting anything. A single thought, on the other hand, however wide-reaching it may be, must keep the most perfect unity. If it can still be broken into parts to make it communicable, then the connection between those parts must again be organic. That means each part sustains the whole just as much as the whole holds it up.

No part is first and none is last. The whole thought becomes clearer through every part, and even the smallest part cannot be fully understood unless the whole has been understood beforehand.—A book, however, has to have a first line and a last line. To that extent it will always remain very unlike an organism, however much its content may resemble one. So form and material are in conflict here.

It follows of itself that, in these circumstances, there is no way into the thought set out here except to read the book twice. The first time calls for a great deal of patience. That patience can only come from a freely given belief that the beginning presupposes the end almost as much as the end presupposes the beginning, and that every earlier part likewise presupposes the later ones almost as much as they presuppose it. I say "almost," because it is by no means entirely so. I have done honestly and conscientiously everything that could be done to put first whatever depends least on being explained by what follows. I have done the same for everything that could make the book as easy to grasp and as clear as possible. I might even have succeeded to some degree, if readers did not, quite naturally, think as they read not only about what is said at each point but also about what might follow from it. That adds so many anticipated and imaginary contradictions to the many real contradictions with the opinions of the time (and presumably with the reader's own) that what is still only a misunderstanding has to look like strong disapproval. The reader recognizes it as a misunderstanding all the less because the clear presentation and distinct expression I worked hard to achieve never leave the immediate meaning of what is said in doubt, yet cannot also state its relations to everything else at the same moment. So, as I said, the first reading calls for patience, drawn from the confidence that on the second reading you will see much, or everything, in a quite different light. Besides, the serious effort to be fully understandable, and even easily understandable, on a very difficult subject must justify a repetition here and there. The organic structure of the whole, which is not a chain, already made it necessary at times to touch the same passage twice. This same structure, and the very close connection of all the parts, also did not allow the division into chapters and sections, which I would otherwise value highly. It forced me to leave it

at four main divisions, four viewpoints, so to speak, of the one thought. In each of these four books one has to take special care not to lose sight of the main thought they belong to, or of the progress of the whole presentation, because of the details that have to be dealt with along the way.—This, then, is the first demand, and like the ones that follow it, it is indispensable. I make it of a reader who is ill disposed toward the philosopher, precisely because the reader is a philosopher too.

The second demand is this: that before reading the book you read its introduction. It is not in the book. It appeared five years earlier, under the title "On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Philosophical Essay."—Without knowing this introduction and preparatory study, a real understanding of the present work is quite impossible, and the content of that essay is presupposed everywhere here as if it were part of the book. In fact, if it had not already come out several years before this book, it would not really stand in front of it as an introduction. It would be built into the first book. That book now lacks what the essay says, and this lack already makes it incomplete in a certain way. It always has to fill the gaps by referring to the essay. But my reluctance to copy myself, or to laboriously say again in other words what had already been said well enough once, was so great that I chose this way. I chose it even though I could now present the content of that essay somewhat better, above all by cleaning it of certain concepts that come from my then excessive entanglement in Kant's philosophy: the categories, outer and inner sense, and the like. Even there, though, these concepts appear only as side matter, quite apart from the main point, because up to then I had never really gone deeply into them. So getting to know the present work will correct such passages of that essay in the reader's mind quite by itself.—But only if that essay has given you a complete grasp of what the principle of sufficient reason is and means, how far its validity reaches and where it does not, and that this principle is not first of all things, with the whole world following from it as its corollary; rather it is nothing more than the form in which the object (which is always conditioned by the subject, whatever kind of object it is) is known everywhere, inso-

far as the subject is a knowing individual: only then will it be possible to enter into the way of philosophizing that is attempted here for the first time and that departs completely from all earlier ones.

But the same reluctance to copy myself word for word, or else, after I had used up the better words, to say exactly the same thing a second time in other and worse ones, has caused a second gap in the first book of this work. I have left out everything that is in the first chapter of my essay "On Vision and Colors," which would otherwise have found its place here word for word. So familiarity with that earlier little work is also presupposed here.

The third demand I make of the reader could even be left unspoken. It is nothing other than familiarity with the most important event in philosophy in the last two thousand years, one that lies so close to us. I mean the main works of Kant. I find that the effect they have on a mind they really speak to is very much like a cataract operation on a blind person, as has been said before. If we carry the comparison further, my aim can be described like this: I wanted to put a pair of cataract glasses into the hands of those on whom the operation has succeeded. The operation itself is therefore the necessary condition for using the glasses.—Much as I start from what the great Kant accomplished, serious study of his writings has nevertheless shown me significant errors in them. I had to separate these out and present them as unacceptable, so that I could assume and apply what is true and excellent in his teaching, free of them and purified. But so as not to interrupt and confuse my own presentation with frequent polemic against Kant, I have put that polemic into a separate appendix. Just as my work, as I have said, presupposes familiarity with Kant's philosophy, it also presupposes familiarity with that appendix. In this respect it would be advisable to read the appendix first, all the more because its content is closely related to the first book of the present work. On the other hand, given the nature of the subject, it could not be avoided that the appendix itself should now and then refer to the work proper. The only conclusion from that is that the appendix, just like the main part of the work, has to be read twice.

Kant's philosophy, then, is the only one with which a thorough familiarity is directly presupposed for what is to be presented here.—If the reader has also spent time in the school of the divine Plato, the reader will be that much better prepared and more ready to listen to me. And if the reader has also come to share in the benefit of the Vedas, then better still. The access to them that the Upanishads have opened to us is, in my eyes, the greatest advantage this still young century has over earlier ones. I suspect that the influence of Sanskrit literature will cut no less deep than the revival of Greek literature did in the 15th century. So, I say, if the reader has also received the consecration of ancient Indian wisdom and taken it in with an open mind, then the reader is as well prepared as possible to hear what I have to say. It will not strike such a reader as strange, or even hostile, as it does some others. If it did not sound too proud, I would claim that each of the individual, disconnected sayings that make up the Upanishads could be derived as a consequence from the thought I have to communicate, although by no means can this thought, conversely, already be found there.

But most readers have already started up in impatience and burst out with the reproach they have held back with such effort for so long. How can I dare, they ask, to put a book before the public with demands and conditions, the first two of which are presumptuous and quite immodest? And at a time when there is such a general wealth of original thought that in Germany alone it is made common property by the printing press every year in three thousand substantial, original and entirely indispensable works, and besides that in countless periodicals and even daily papers? At a time when there is not the slightest shortage of original and deep philosophers, and more of them are alive at once in Germany alone than other times could show in several centuries one after another? How, the indignant reader asks, is anyone ever to finish reading, if one had to go to such lengths over a single book?

I have nothing at all to say against such reproaches. So I hope only for some thanks from these readers for warning them in good time, so that they do not lose an hour on a book that could do them no good to read without meeting the demands I made, and that should therefore be left alone altogether. There

are, besides, plenty of other reasons to bet that it cannot please them, and that it will always be only paucorum hominum and must therefore wait calmly and modestly for the few whose unusual way of thinking would find it enjoyable. For even leaving aside the length and the effort it demands of the reader, what educated person of this age, whose knowledge has come close to the glorious point where paradoxical and false are the same thing, could stand running into thoughts on almost every page that flatly contradict what that person has settled once and for all as true and certain? And then, how unpleasantly disappointed many people will be to find no mention here of what they feel they must look for here above all, because their way of speculating coincides with that of a great philosopher who is still alive [1]. He has written truly touching books, and his one small weakness is that he takes everything he learned and approved before his fifteenth year to be innate basic ideas of the human mind. Who could stand all this? So my advice is simply to put the book down again.

But I fear that even so I will not get rid of them. A reader who has got as far as the preface that turns him away has bought the book for cash and asks what will make up for his loss.—My last refuge is to remind him that a book can be put to use in various ways even without being read. Like many others, it can fill a gap in his library, where, neatly bound, it will certainly look good. Or he can lay it on the dressing table or the tea table of his learned lady friend. Or finally, he can review it. That is surely the best of all, and I especially recommend it.

[2] F. H. Jacobi.

And so, having allowed myself the joke (and in this thoroughly ambiguous life hardly any page is too serious to give a joke a place), I hand over the book in deep earnest. I am confident that sooner or later it will reach those to whom alone it can be addressed. For the rest, I calmly accept that it will meet in full measure the fate that has always fallen to truth in every kind of knowledge, and so all the more in the most important kind. Truth is granted only a short festival of victory, between the two long periods when it is condemned as paradoxical and then dismissed as trivial. The first fate usually strikes its author too.—But life is short, and truth works far and lives long: let us speak the truth.

(Written at Dresden in August 1818.)

Preface to the Second Edition

I hand over my now finished work not to my contemporaries and not to my countrymen—I hand it to humanity. I trust that it will not be without value to humanity, even if, as is the lot of anything good of any kind, that value is recognized only late. For it can only have been for humanity, not for the generation that rushes past, busy with its passing delusion, that my mind, almost against my will, has kept at its work without a break through a long life. During that time even the lack of interest could not shake my confidence in the value of the work. I kept seeing what is false and bad, and in the end what is absurd and nonsensical [1], held in general admiration and honor. And I reflected that if those who are able to recognize what is genuine and right were not so rare that one can look around for them in vain for some twenty years, then those who are able to produce it could not be so few that their works would later make an exception [2] Hegelian philosophy. to the transience of earthly things. If that happened, the refreshing prospect of posterity would be lost, and everyone who has set a high goal needs that prospect to keep up their strength.—Anyone who takes seriously, and pursues, something that brings no material benefit must not count on the interest of contemporaries. But what that person will mostly see is that in the meantime the mere appearance of such a thing makes itself felt in the world and enjoys its day. And that is as it should be. For the thing itself must be pursued for its own sake; otherwise it cannot succeed, because every private aim is a danger to insight. Accordingly, as the history of

literature everywhere shows, everything of value has needed a long time to come into its own, especially if it was of the instructive kind and not the entertaining kind. And meanwhile what was false shone. For it is hard, if not impossible, to unite the thing with the appearance of the thing. That, indeed, is the curse of this world of need and want, that everything must serve and wait on these. For that very reason it is not made so that any noble and lofty striving, like the striving for light and truth, could thrive unhindered and exist for its own sake. Rather, even if such a striving has once managed to make itself felt, and the idea of it has thereby been introduced, material interests and personal purposes will immediately take hold of it too, to make it their tool or their mask. Accordingly, after Kant had brought philosophy back into esteem, it too very soon had to become a tool of purposes: the purposes of the state from above, and personal purposes from below.—Strictly speaking, though, it was not philosophy itself that became the tool but its double, which passes for it. We should not even be surprised at this. For the incredibly large majority of people are by their nature capable of no purposes except material ones; indeed, they can grasp no other. So the striving for truth alone is far too high and eccentric for us to expect that all, or many, or even just a few should take a sincere part in it. Still, if you ever see, as just now in Germany for example, a striking liveliness, a general bustle of doing, writing and talking on philosophical matters, you can confidently assume that the real primum mobile, the hidden driving spring of such a movement, whatever the solemn faces and assurances, consists only of real purposes, not ideal ones. That is, what people have in view are personal, official, church and state interests—in short, material interests. So mere party purposes set the many pens of alleged philosophers in such brisk motion, and intentions, not insights, are the guiding star of these troublemakers, while truth is surely the last thing anyone thinks of. Truth finds no partisans. On the contrary, it can make its way through such a philosophical uproar as quietly and unnoticed as through the winter night of the darkest century, held fast in the most rigid church belief, when perhaps it was passed on only as a secret doctrine to a few initiates, or even entrusted to parchment alone. Indeed, I would say that no age can be less favorable to philosophy than one in

which it is shamefully misused, on one side as a tool of the state and on the other as a way of earning a living. Or does anyone suppose that with such aims and in such an uproar, truth will also come to light on the side, when it is not what anyone is after? Truth is no whore who throws herself at the neck of those who do not desire her. Rather she is such a coy beauty that even someone who sacrifices everything to her cannot be sure of her favor.

If governments make philosophy a tool for their state purposes, then scholars on the other side see a philosophy professorship as a trade that feeds its man, like any other. So they crowd after it, assuring everyone of their good attitude, that is, of their intention to serve those purposes. And they keep their word. It is not truth, not clarity, not Plato, not Aristotle but the purposes they were appointed to serve that are their guiding star, and these at once become the test of what is true, what is valuable, what deserves attention, and of their opposites. So whatever does not suit those purposes—even if it is the most important and extraordinary thing in their field—is either condemned or, where that seems risky, smothered by sullen silence. Just look at their unanimous zeal against pantheism: will any fool believe it comes from conviction?—And how could philosophy, once degraded to a bread-winning trade, fail to degenerate into sophistry? Precisely because this is unavoidable, and the rule "Whose bread I eat, his song I sing" has always held, earning money from philosophy was among the ancients the mark of the sophist.—And there is more. Since in this world nothing but mediocrity is to be expected, can be demanded, and can be had for money, we have to make do with it here too. So at every German university we see dear mediocrity struggling to produce, out of its own resources, a philosophy that does not yet exist at all, and to produce it by a prescribed measure and toward a prescribed goal. It is a spectacle that it would be almost cruel to mock.

While philosophy has long had to serve, throughout, as a means—on one side for public purposes and on the other for private ones—I have gone on following my train of thought, undisturbed by all that, for more than thirty years. I did it only because I had to and could not do otherwise, out of an instinctive drive. Yet that drive was supported by the confidence that whatever truth any-

one has thought and whatever hidden thing anyone has lit up will sooner or later be grasped by some other thinking mind, and will speak to it, please it and comfort it. One speaks to such a mind as those who resemble us spoke to us and thereby became our comfort in the bleakness of life. Meanwhile one pursues one's subject for its own sake and for oneself. Now, with philosophical meditations, oddly enough, it is only what one has thought through and investigated for oneself that afterward does others good too, and not what was meant for others from the start. You can recognize the first kind, to begin with, by its thoroughgoing honesty. One is not trying to deceive oneself or to hand oneself empty nuts. So all sophistry and all word-mongering fall away, and as a result every sentence written down immediately pays back the trouble of reading it. Accordingly my writings carry the stamp of honesty and openness so plainly on their foreheads that they already stand out sharply by this from those of the three famous sophists of the post-Kantian period. You will always find me on the ground of reflection, that is, of reasonable thought and honest communication, never on that of inspiration, called intellectual intuition or absolute thinking, which by its right name is humbug and charlatanry.—So, working in this spirit, and all the while seeing what is false and bad in general esteem, and humbug[3] and charlatanry[4] held in the highest honor, I gave up long ago on the applause of my contemporaries. It is impossible that a body of contemporaries[5] Fichte and Schelling.

6 Hegel. that has for twenty years proclaimed a Hegel, that mental Caliban, as the greatest of philosophers, and so loudly that it echoed through all of Europe, could make anyone who has seen this hungry for its applause. It has no more wreaths of honor to give. Its applause has been prostituted, and its blame means nothing. That I am in earnest about this is clear from the fact that if I had sought the applause of my contemporaries at all, I would have had to strike out twenty passages that flatly contradict all their views and in part must even offend them. But I would count it as a wrong to sacrifice even one syllable to that applause. My guiding star has been truth, in all seriousness. Following it, I could aim at first only at my own approval, turned completely away from an

age that has sunk deep in all higher strivings of the mind, and from a national literature, demoralized except for a few exceptions, in which the art of joining lofty words to low attitudes has reached its peak. The faults and weaknesses that necessarily cling to my nature, as to everyone's, I can of course never escape. But I will not add to them by unworthy accommodations.

As for this second edition, I am glad first of all that after twenty-five years I find nothing to take back. So my basic convictions have at least proved themselves in my own case. The changes in the first volume, which alone contains the text of the first edition, therefore touch nothing essential. They concern partly only minor matters, but mostly they consist of additions that are usually short, explanatory, and inserted here and there. Only the critique of Kant's philosophy has received significant corrections and detailed additions. These could not be put into a supplementary book here, as they were for the four books that present my own teaching, each of which has received one in the second volume. For those four books I chose that form of expansion and improvement because the twenty-five years since they were written have brought about so marked a change in my manner of presentation and my tone that it was not really possible to fuse the content of the second volume with that of the first into one whole. Both would have suffered from such a fusion. So I give the two works separately. In the earlier presentation I have often changed nothing even where I would now express myself quite differently, because I wanted to guard against spoiling the work of my younger years by the fault-finding of old age. Whatever may need correcting in this respect will set itself right in the reader's mind, with the help of the second volume. The two volumes stand to each other, in the full sense of the word, as supplements of each other, insofar as that relation rests on the fact that one stage of a person's life is, intellectually, the supplement of the other. So one will find not only that each volume contains what the other lacks, but also that the strengths of one lie precisely in what the other is missing. If the first half of my work has an advantage over the second in what only the fire of youth and the energy of first conception can give, then the second will surpass the first in the maturity and thorough working-out of the thoughts, which fall only to the fruits of a long life and its diligence. For when I had the strength

to grasp the basic thought of my system originally, to follow it at once into its four branches, to go back from them to the unity of their trunk, and then to present the whole clearly, I could not yet be in a position to work through all the parts of the system with the completeness, thoroughness and detail that come only from many years of meditating on it. That kind of meditation is needed to test the system against countless facts and illustrate it with them, to support it with the most varied evidence, to light it brightly from all sides, to set its different viewpoints boldly in contrast, and to separate the many kinds of material cleanly and set them out in good order. So the reader would no doubt find it more pleasant to have my whole work cast in one piece, instead of two halves that have to be brought together when it is used. But the reader should bear in mind that this would have required me to accomplish in one stage of life what is possible only in two, because I would have had to possess in one stage of life the qualities that nature has divided between two quite different ones. The necessity of delivering my work in two halves that complete each other is therefore like the necessity by which one makes an achromatic objective lens. Since it is impossible to make one from a single piece, one puts it together from a convex lens of flint glass and a concave lens of crown glass, and only their combined effect does what is wanted. On the other hand, the reader will find some compensation for the inconvenience of using two volumes at once in the variety and refreshment that come from treating the same subject, by the same mind, in the same spirit, but in very different years. Meanwhile, for anyone not yet familiar with my philosophy, it is absolutely advisable to read the first volume through first, without consulting the supplements, and to use them only on a second reading. Otherwise it would be too hard to grasp the system as a connected whole, which only the first volume sets out, while in the second the main teachings are given more detailed grounds one by one and are fully developed. Even someone who cannot decide on a second reading of the first volume will do better to read the second only after the first, and by itself, in the straight order of its chapters. These do stand in a connection with each other, though a looser one, and memory of the first volume, if it has been well grasped, will completely fill its gaps. Besides, the reader finds everywhere references back to

the relevant passages of the first volume. For that purpose I have given section numbers, in the second edition, to the divisions that were marked in the first edition by mere dividing lines.— I already said in the preface to the first edition that my philosophy starts from Kant's and so presupposes a thorough knowledge of it. I repeat that here. For Kant's teaching produces in every mind that has grasped it a fundamental change, so great that it can count as a spiritual rebirth. It alone can really remove the realism we are born with, which comes from the original purpose of the intellect. Neither Berkeley nor Malebranche is enough for that, because they stay too general, while Kant goes into particulars. He does this in a way that has no model before it and no copy after it, and it has a quite peculiar, one might say immediate, effect on the mind. As a result the mind suffers a thorough disillusionment and from then on sees all things in a different light. Only in this way does it become receptive to the more positive explanations I have to give. Anyone, on the other hand, who has not mastered Kant's philosophy, whatever else that person may have pursued, is still in a kind of state of innocence. Such a person has stayed caught in that natural, childlike realism in which we are all born and which fits us for everything possible except philosophy. Such a person therefore stands to the former as a minor stands to an adult. It sounds paradoxical today to say this, which would not have been so at all in the first thirty years after the Critique of Reason appeared. The reason is that a generation has since grown up that does not really know Kant. To know him takes more than a hasty, impatient reading or a secondhand report. And this in turn comes from the fact that this generation, badly guided, has wasted its time on the philosophical doctrines of ordinary minds, who had no calling for it, or even of humbugging sophists whom it was irresponsibly urged to admire. Hence the confusion in the first concepts, and in general the unspeakable crudeness and clumsiness that peeks out from under the cloak of preciousness and pretension in the philosophical efforts of a generation brought up like that. But anyone who imagines it possible to get to know Kant's philosophy from other people's accounts of it is caught in a hopeless error. Rather, I must seriously warn against such reports, especially recent ones. In these last few years in particular I have come across, in writings of the

Hegelians, accounts of Kant's philosophy that are really fantastic. And how could minds that were twisted and ruined in their fresh youth by the nonsense of Hegelry still be able to follow Kant's profound inquiries? They were trained early to take the emptiest word-mongering for philosophical thoughts, the most wretched sophisms for acuteness, and silly nonsense for dialectic. Their minds are disorganized by taking in raving combinations of words, over which the mind torments and exhausts itself in vain trying to think something. For them there is no place for a critique of reason, no place for philosophy. What they need is a medicina mentis, first, as a purgative, perhaps un petit cours de senscommunologie, and then we must see whether philosophy can ever be spoken of in their case at all.—So Kant's teaching will be sought in vain anywhere except in Kant's own works. These are instructive throughout, even where he errs, even where he fails. Because of his originality, what really holds of all genuine philosophers holds of him to the highest degree: you get to know them only from their own writings, not from other people's reports. For the thoughts of those extraordinary minds cannot stand being filtered through the ordinary head. Born behind broad, high, finely arched foreheads from under which radiant eyes shine out, they lose all their strength and life when moved into the cramped dwelling and low roof of narrow, pressed, thick-walled skulls, from which dull eyes, set on personal ends, peer out. They no longer look like themselves. One can even say that heads of this kind work like uneven mirrors, in which everything is twisted and distorted, loses the symmetry of its beauty and shows up as a grimace. One can receive philosophical thoughts only from their originators themselves. So anyone who feels driven toward philosophy should seek out its immortal teachers in the quiet sanctuary of their own works. The main chapters of any one of these genuine philosophers will give a hundred times more insight into their teachings than the dragging and squinting reports about them made by everyday minds, who are, besides, mostly deeply caught up in the fashionable philosophy of the moment, or in their own heart's opinion. Yet it is astonishing how decidedly the public prefers those secondhand accounts. Here the elective affinity really seems to be at work, by which common nature is drawn to its like, and therefore would rather hear

even what a great mind has said from its like. Perhaps this rests on the same principle as the system of mutual instruction, by which children learn best from their own kind.

Now one more word for the professors of philosophy.—I have always had to admire the shrewdness and the right, fine tact with which they recognized my philosophy, right when it appeared, as something quite foreign to their own endeavors, even dangerous, or, to put it popularly, something that does not suit their business. I have equally admired the sure and clever policy by which they at once found the only right way of dealing with it, the perfect unanimity with which they applied it, and finally the persistence with which they have stayed true to it. This way of dealing, which among other things recommends itself by being extremely easy to carry out, consists, as everyone knows, in total ignoring and thereby in secreting—in Goethe's malicious expression, which really means suppressing what is important and significant. The effectiveness of this quiet means is increased by the Corybantic din with which the birth of the intellectual children of those in the agreement is celebrated by one another. That din forces the public to look and to notice the important faces with which they greet each other about it. Who could fail to see how well suited this way is to its end? After all, there is nothing to object to in the principle primum vivere, deinde philosophari. These gentlemen want to live, and to live from philosophy. They are tied to it, with wife and children, and they have risked it despite Petrarch's povera e nuda vai filosofia. Now my philosophy is not set up at all so that anyone could live from it. It lacks the first requirements that a well-paid lecture-hall philosophy cannot do without. First of all it lacks entirely a speculative theology, which—in spite of the wretched Kant and his Critique of Reason—is supposed to be, and must be, the main theme of all philosophy, even though that gives philosophy the task of talking all the time about what it can absolutely know nothing of. Indeed, mine does not even lay down the fable, so cleverly devised by the professors of philosophy and become indispensable to them, of a reason that knows, intuits or perceives directly and absolutely. All you need to do is tie that on your readers right at the start, in order afterwards to drive into the territory beyond the possibility of all experience (which Kant

closed off completely and forever to our knowledge) in the most comfortable way in the world, as if with a four-horse carriage. There you then find the basic dogmas of modern, judaizing, optimistic Christianity directly revealed and beautifully laid out. What on earth, then, does my philosophy have to do with that alma mater, the good, nourishing university philosophy? Mine lacks these essential requirements. It is regardless of consequences, has no bread to offer, and is brooding. Its north star is truth alone, the naked, unrewarded, unfriended, often persecuted truth, and it steers straight toward it without looking right or left. The university philosophy comes tacking cautiously along its way, burdened with a hundred aims and a thousand considerations. It always keeps in view the fear of the Lord, the will of the ministry, the statutes of the established church, the wishes of the publisher, the approval of the students, the good friendship of colleagues, the course of the day's politics, the momentary direction of the public, and whatever else. Or what has my quiet, serious search for truth in common with the shrill school-squabbling of lecterns and benches, whose innermost driving springs are always personal ends? On the contrary, the two kinds of philosophy are foreign to each other from the ground up. That is also why there is no compromise or comradeship with me, and why nobody gets what they want from me, except perhaps one who sought nothing but truth. That excludes all the philosophical parties of the day: for they all pursue their intentions, while I have only insights to offer, which fit none of them, because they were not molded after any. For my philosophy itself to become fit for the lecture hall, quite different times would first have to arrive.—That would be a fine thing indeed, if a philosophy that one cannot live from at all should gain air and light, and even general notice! So this had to be prevented, and everyone had to stand together as one man. But disputing and refuting is not such easy play. It is also a risky means, because it draws the public's attention to the matter, and reading my writings might spoil the public's taste for the lucubrations of the philosophy professors. For whoever has tasted seriousness will no longer enjoy the fun, especially the boring kind. So the silent system, so unanimously adopted, is the only right one, and I can only advise them to stick to it and go on with it as long as it works. That is, until the day when

ignorance is inferred from the ignoring: then there will be just time enough to change course. Meanwhile it remains open to anyone to pluck a little feather here and there for their own use, since at home the abundance of thoughts is not usually very oppressive. So the system of ignoring and silence can hold out a good while longer, at least for the span of time I may still have to live, and that already gains a lot. Even if an indiscreet voice has now and then made itself heard in between, it is soon drowned out by the loud lectures of the professors, who know how to entertain the public with quite different things, with an air of importance. I advise them, however, to hold somewhat more strictly to unanimity in procedure and to watch the young people in particular, who are sometimes terribly indiscreet. For even so I cannot guarantee that the praised procedure will hold out forever, and I cannot vouch for the final outcome. For steering the public, which is on the whole good and obedient, is a peculiar matter. Even if at almost every time we see the Gorgiases and Hippiases on top, the absurd as a rule reaching its peak, and it seems impossible that the voice of a single person could ever break through the chorus of deceivers and deceived,—still genuine works always keep a quite peculiar, quiet, slow, powerful effect. And, as if by a miracle, one finally sees them rise out of the tumult, like a balloon that floats up from the thick atmosphere of this earthly space into purer regions. Once it has arrived there, it stays, and no one can pull it down again.
Written in Frankfurt am Main in February 1844.

Preface to the Third Edition



What is true and genuine would win its place in the world more easily if the people who cannot produce it were not also conspiring to keep it from rising. This has already held back and delayed, if not smothered, many things that were meant to benefit the world. For me the result is this: I was only thirty when the first edition of this work appeared, yet I live to see the third only in my seventy-second year. I find comfort in Petrarch's words, though: si quis, tota die currens, pervenit ad vesperam, satis est (de vera sapientia, p. 140). I have arrived in the end too, and I have the satisfaction of seeing, at the close of my career, the beginning of my influence. I hope that, by an old rule, it will last as long as it was late in starting.—

The reader will miss nothing in this third edition that the second contained, and will get a good deal more. Thanks to the additions, it has 136 more pages than the second, in the same type.

Seven years after the second edition appeared, I published two volumes, "Parerga and Paralipomena." What falls under the latter name consists of additions to the systematic presentation of my philosophy, and it would have found its proper place in these volumes. But at that time I had to put it wherever I could, because it was very doubtful that I would live to see this third edition. You will find it in the second volume of those Parerga, and you will easily recognize it by the chapter headings.

Frankfurt a. M., September 1859.

Book I



1 “The world is my representation”: this is a truth that holds for every living and knowing being, though only a human being can bring it into reflective, abstract consciousness. When a person really does this, philosophical thoughtfulness has begun in them. It then becomes clear and certain to them that they know no sun and no earth, only an eye that sees a sun and a hand that feels an earth. The world around them exists only as representation, that is, entirely in relation to something else, the one who represents, which is they themselves.—If any truth can be stated a priori, it is this one. It states the form of all possible and imaginable experience, a form more general than any other, more general than time, space and causality. All of these already presuppose it. We have recognized each of these forms as one particular shape of the principle of sufficient reason, and each holds only for a particular class of representations. The splitting into object and subject, by contrast, is the common form of all those classes. It is the one form under which any representation at all, of whatever kind, abstract or intuitive, pure or empirical, is possible and thinkable. So no truth is more certain, more independent of all the others, or in less need of proof than this one: that everything that exists for knowledge, and so this whole world, is object only in relation to the subject, the intuitive perception of someone who perceives; in a word, representation. Of course this holds of the present just as it holds of every past and every future, of what is farthest just as of what is near.

For it holds of time and space themselves, and only in them do all these things differ. Everything that belongs or can belong to the world carries this condition of depending on the subject, and cannot get rid of it. It exists only for the subject. The world is representation.

This truth is by no means new. It was already there in the skeptical reflections from which Descartes started. But Berkeley was the first to state it outright, and by doing so he earned an immortal merit in philosophy, even though the rest of his teaching cannot stand. Kant's first mistake was neglecting this proposition, as is set out in the Appendix.—How early, on the other hand, the sages of India recognized this basic truth is shown by the fact that it appears as the fundamental proposition of the Vedanta philosophy, which is credited to Vyasa. W. Jones attests this in the last of his essays: on the philosophy of the Asiatics; Asiatic researches, Vol. IV, p. 164: the fundamental tenet of the Vedanta school consisted not in denying the existence of matter, that is of solidity, impenetrability, and extended figure (to deny which would be lunacy), but in correcting the popular notion of it, and in contending that it has no essence independent of mental perception; that existence and perceptibility are convertible terms[1]. These words adequately express how empirical reality and transcendental ideality exist side by side.

So in this first book we consider the world only from the side I have indicated, only insofar as it is representation. That [2] The basic dogma of the Vedanta school was not a denial that matter exists, that is, solidity, impenetrability and extension (to deny which would be madness), but a correction of the usual concept of it, by the claim that it has no existence independent of the knowing mind's grasp of it, since existence and perceptibility are interchangeable concepts. this view, however, though it loses nothing of its truth, is one-sided, and so is produced by some arbitrary abstraction: this is announced to everyone by the inner resistance with which they accept the world as their mere representation, an acceptance they can never escape either. The next book will make up for the one-sidedness of this view with a truth that is not as immediately certain as the one we start from here. Only deeper inquiry, harder abstraction, and the

separating of what differs and uniting of what is identical can lead to it. It is a truth that must be very serious, and if not terrifying then at least troubling, to everyone: namely that they too can and must say, "the world is my will."—
Until then, that is, in this first book, we have to look steadily at the side of the world from which we start, the side of knowability. So we have to regard all objects that exist, and even our own body (as we will soon discuss more closely), only as representation, and call them mere representation, without resisting. What we leave out of account in doing so is, as I hope everyone will later be sure, always only the will, which alone makes up the other side of the world. For the world is through and through representation on one side, and through and through will on the other. A reality that was neither of these, but an object in itself (into which, unfortunately, even Kant's thing in itself degenerated in his hands), is a dreamed-up non-thing, and assuming it is a will-o'-the-wisp in philosophy.

2 What knows everything and is known by nothing is the subject. So it is what carries the world, the constant, always presupposed condition of everything that appears, of every object. For whatever exists, exists only for the subject. Everyone finds themselves to be this subject, but only insofar as they know, not insofar as they are an object of knowledge. Their body, however, is already an object, and so from this standpoint we call it representation too. For the body is an object among objects and is subject to the laws of objects, even though it is the immediate object [3]. Like all objects of intuition, it lies in the forms of all knowing, in time and space, through which multiplicity exists. But the subject, the knower that is never known, does not lie in these forms either. These forms always presuppose it. So neither multiplicity nor its opposite, unity, belongs to it. We never know it. It is precisely what knows wherever anything is known.
So the world as representation, the only aspect in which we consider it here, has two essential, necessary and inseparable halves. One is the object. Its form is space and time, and through them, multiplicity. The other half, the subject, does not lie in space and time. It is whole and undivided in every representing being. So a single one of these beings, together with the object, completes the

world as representation just as fully as the millions that exist do. And if that single one disappeared, the world as representation would be no more. The two halves are therefore inseparable, even in thought. Each has meaning and existence only through and for the other, is there with it and vanishes with it. They border directly on each other: where the object begins, the subject ends. That the border is shared shows in this: the essential, and therefore universal, forms of every object, which are time, space and causality, can be found and fully known starting from the subject, without knowing the object itself. In Kant's language, they lie a priori in our consciousness. Discovering this is Kant's main merit, and a very great one. I claim something further: that the principle of sufficient reason is the common expression of all these forms of the object that we know a priori. So everything we know purely a priori is nothing but the content of that principle and what follows from it, and our whole a priori certain knowledge is really stated in it. In my essay on the principle of sufficient reason I showed in detail how any [4] On the Principle of Sufficient Reason, 2nd ed., § 22. possible object is subject to it. That is, every object stands in a necessary relation to other objects, on one side as determined, on the other as determining. This goes so far that the whole existence of all objects, insofar as they are objects and representations and nothing else, runs entirely back to this necessary relation to one another. It consists only in that relation, and so is entirely relative. More on this soon. I showed further that, according to the classes into which objects divide by their possibility, this necessary relation, which the principle of sufficient reason expresses in general, appears in different forms. This in turn confirms that the division of the classes is right. I constantly assume here that everything said there is known and present to the reader. For if it had not been said there, it would necessarily have its place here.

3 The main difference among all our representations is that between the intuitive and the abstract. The abstract makes up only one class of representations, concepts. On earth these belong to human beings alone, and the ability to form them, which sets humans apart from all animals, has always been called reason [5]. Later we will look at these abstract representations by themselves, but first

we speak only of intuitive representation. It takes in the whole visible world, or all experience, together with the conditions that make experience possible. As I said, it is a very important discovery of Kant's that these very conditions, these forms of experience, can be not only thought in the abstract but also directly perceived by intuition, by themselves and apart from their content. These forms are the most general part of how experience is perceived, what belongs equally to all its appearances, namely time and space. And Kant's discovery is also that this intuition is not [6] Kant alone has muddled this concept of reason; on this point I refer to the Appendix, and also to my "Fundamental Problems of Ethics": Basis of Morals, § 6, pp. 148–154, of the first edition. a phantasm borrowed from experience by repetition. It is so independent of experience that, on the contrary, experience has to be thought of as dependent on it. For the properties of space and time, as intuition knows them a priori, hold for all possible experience as laws, and experience must always turn out according to them. For this reason, in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason I treated time and space, insofar as they are intuited purely and empty of content, as a special class of representations existing in its own right. Kant discovered something important about these general forms of intuition: they can be perceived by themselves, independent of experience, and known in all their lawfulness, and mathematics with its infallibility rests on this. Yet it is just as worth noting about them that the principle of sufficient reason, which governs experience as the law of causality and motivation, and governs thinking as the law of the grounding of judgments, appears here in a quite peculiar form. I have given this form the name ground of being. In time it is the succession of its moments, and in space it is the position of its parts, which determine one another reciprocally without end.

Anyone to whom the introductory essay has made clear that the principle of sufficient reason has exactly the same content in all its different forms will also be convinced how important it is, for seeing into its innermost nature, to know the simplest of its forms as such. For this simplest form we have identified time. In time, each moment exists only by having destroyed the one before it, its father, only to be destroyed itself just as quickly. Past and future (setting aside

the consequences of their content) are as empty as any dream, and the present is only the border between them, with no extension and no duration. We will recognize this same emptiness in all the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason as well. We will see that space is like time, and that everything that is in space and time together is like space. That means everything that comes from causes or motives has only a relative existence: it exists only through and for something else of its own kind, that is, something that again exists only in the same way. The core of this view is old. Heraclitus lamented in it the eternal flux of things. Plato dismissed its object as what is always becoming but never is. Spinoza called it mere accidents of the one substance that alone is and remains. Kant set what is known in this way, as mere appearance, against the thing in itself. And finally the ancient wisdom of the Indians says: "It is Maya, the veil of deception, which covers the eyes of mortals and makes them see a world of which one can say neither that it is nor that it is not. For it is like a dream, like the glare of the sun on sand, which a traveler from far off takes for water, or like a rope thrown down, which the traveler takes for a snake." (These comparisons are repeated in countless passages of the Vedas and Puranas.) But what all these thinkers meant and speak of is nothing other than what we are considering now: the world as representation, subject to the principle of sufficient reason.

4 Anyone who has recognized the form of the principle of sufficient reason that appears in pure time as such, and on which all counting and calculating rest, has thereby recognized the whole nature of time. Time is nothing more than that form of the principle, and has no other property. Succession is the form the principle takes in time; succession is the whole nature of time.—Likewise, anyone who has recognized the principle of sufficient reason as it rules in bare, purely intuited space has exhausted the whole nature of space. For space is through and through nothing other than the possibility of the reciprocal determinations of its parts by one another, which is called position. Examining this in detail, and putting the results into abstract concepts so they are easier to use, is the content of the whole of geometry.—In the same way, anyone who has recognized the form of the principle that governs the content of those forms (of

time and space), their perceptibility, that is, matter, so the law of causality, has thereby recognized the whole nature of matter as such. For matter is through and through nothing but causality, as anyone sees directly as soon as they stop to think. Its being is its acting: no other being of it can even be thought. Only as acting does it fill space, and only as acting does it fill time. Its action on the immediate object (which is itself matter) conditions the intuition in which alone matter exists. The effect of any other material object on another is known only insofar as the latter now acts on the immediate object differently than before, and consists only in this. So cause and effect is the whole nature of matter: its being is its acting. (More on this in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 21, p. 77.) It is therefore very fitting that in German the sum of everything material is called Wirklichkeit [7], a word that is much more telling than Realität. What matter acts on is always again matter. So its whole being and nature consists only in the lawful change that one part of it brings about in another. It is therefore entirely relative, by a relation that holds only within its own limits, just like time, just like space.

Time and space, each by itself, can be represented intuitively even without matter, but matter cannot be represented without them. Even its shape, which cannot be separated from it, presupposes space. And its acting, in which its whole existence consists, always concerns a change, and so a determination of time. But matter does not merely presuppose time and space, each taken separately. A union of the two makes up its nature, precisely because its nature, as shown, consists in acting, in causality. All the countless appearances and states that anyone could think of could lie side by side in infinite space without crowding one another, or follow one another in infinite time without disturbing one another. A necessary relation among them would then not be needed at all, and neither would a rule [8] Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quaedam efficacissimis notis signat. Seneca epist. 81. that determined them by that relation; such a rule would not even be applicable. So there would then be no causality yet, for all the side-by-side existence in space and all the change in time, as long as each of the two forms had its own duration and course by itself, unconnected with the other. And since causality

is the real nature of matter, there would be no matter either.—But the law of causality gets its meaning and its necessity only from this: the nature of change lies not in the bare alternation of states in itself, but rather in this—at the same place in space there is now one state and afterward another, and at one and the same definite time there is this state here and that state there. Only this mutual limiting of time and space by each other gives meaning, and necessity along with it, to a rule by which change must proceed. So what the law of causality determines is not the succession of states in bare time, but this succession with respect to a definite space. And it is not the existence of states at a definite place, but their existence at this place at a definite time. Change, that is, the alternation that takes place according to the causal law, therefore always concerns a definite part of space and a definite part of time at once and together. Accordingly, causality unites space with time. But we found that the whole nature of matter consists in acting, and so in causality. So space and time must be united in matter too. That is, matter must carry the properties of time and the properties of space together, however much the two conflict. What is impossible in either of them alone, matter must unite in itself: the unstable flight of time with the rigid, unchanging persistence of space. Infinite divisibility it has from both. Accordingly, we find that matter brings about, first of all, simultaneity, which could exist neither in bare time, which knows no side-by-side, nor in bare space, which knows no before, after or now. The simultaneity of many states, though, is really what makes up the nature of actuality. Only through simultaneity does duration first become possible, since duration can be known only by the change in what exists at the same time as the enduring thing. And conversely, only by means of what endures within change does that change take on the character of alteration, that is, of a change of quality and form while substance, that is, matter, persists[9]. In bare space the world would be rigid and motionless: no succession, no change, no acting. But with acting the representation of matter is also gone. In bare time, again, everything would be fleeting: no persistence, no side-by-side and so no simultaneity, and so no duration; and so again no matter. Only through the union of time and space does matter arise, that is, the possibility of simultaneity, and through that of

duration, and through duration again of the persistence of substance while states change [10]. Since matter has its nature in the union of time and space, it carries the stamp of both throughout. It shows its origin from space partly by its shape, which cannot be separated from it, but especially by its persistence (substance). Change belongs to time alone, and in time alone and by itself nothing remains; so the certainty of this persistence a priori has to be derived entirely from that of space [11]. But it shows its origin from time in its quality (accident), without which it never appears, and which is always, without exception, causality, acting on other matter, and so change (a concept of time). The lawfulness of this acting, however, always refers to space and time together, and has meaning only because of that. What state must occur at this time at this place is the one determination to which the legislation of causality extends, and to which it extends alone. It rests on this derivation of the basic determinations of matter from the forms of our knowledge that we know a priori, that we recognize certain properties in matter a priori, namely the filling of space, that is, impenetrability, that is, efficacy[12] Matter and substance are one and the same, as is set out in the Appendix.

13 This also shows the ground of Kant's definition of matter, "that it is the movable in space": for motion consists only in the union of space and time.

14 Not from the knowledge of time, as Kant would have it, as is set out in the Appendix. then extension, infinite divisibility, persistence, that is, indestructibility; and finally mobility. Weight, on the other hand, despite the fact that it has no exceptions, should probably be counted as knowledge a posteriori, although Kant, in the "Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science," p. 71 (Rosenkranz ed., p. 372), puts it forward as knowable a priori.

Just as the object exists at all only for the subject, as its representation, so every particular class of representations exists only for an equally particular determination in the subject, which is called a faculty of knowledge. The subjective correlate of time and space taken by themselves, as empty forms, Kant called pure sensibility. Since Kant broke the trail here, this term may be kept, although it does not fit well, because sensibility already presupposes matter.

The subjective correlate of matter or of causality—for the two are one—is the understanding, and it is nothing besides. Knowing causality is its only function, its sole power. It is a great power, covering much, with many kinds of use, yet all its expressions are plainly the same. Conversely, all causality, and so all matter, and so the whole of actuality, exists only for the understanding, through the understanding, in the understanding. The first, simplest and always present expression of the understanding is the intuitive perception of the actual world. This is entirely knowledge of the cause from the effect. That is why all intuitive perception is intellectual. It could still never come about unless some effect were known directly and so served as a starting point. This is the effect on animal bodies. To that extent these bodies are the immediate objects of the subject, and the intuitive perception of all other objects is mediated through them. The changes that any animal body undergoes are known directly, that is, felt. As soon as this effect is related to its cause, the intuitive perception of that cause as an object arises. This relating is not an inference in abstract concepts. It does not happen by reflection, or by choice, but directly, necessarily and with certainty. It is the mode of knowledge of the pure understanding, without which intuitive perception would never come about. All that would remain is a dull, plantlike consciousness of the changes of the immediate object, which would follow one another with no meaning at all, unless as pain or pleasure they happened to mean something for the will. But just as the visible world stands there when the sun rises, so the understanding, at a single stroke and by its one simple function, turns the dull, empty sensation into intuitive perception. What the eye, the ear and the hand feel is not intuitive perception. It is mere data. Only when the understanding passes from the effect to the cause does the world stand there: spread out in space as intuition, changing in shape, persisting through all time as to matter. For the understanding unites space and time in the representation of matter, that is, of activity. This world as representation exists only through the understanding, and so also only for the understanding. In the first chapter of my essay "On Vision and Colors" I have already set out how the understanding creates intuitive perception from the data that the senses supply. A child learns intuitive perception by comparing

the impressions that the different senses receive from the same object. This alone explains so many sensory phenomena: single vision with two eyes, double vision when the eyes squint or when objects stand one behind another at different distances and one takes them in at once, and every illusion produced by a sudden change in the sense organs. But I treated this important subject much more fully and thoroughly in the second edition of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 21. Everything said there would have its necessary place here, so it really ought to be said again here. But I dislike copying myself almost as much as copying others, and I am also unable to present it better than it was done there. So I refer to it instead of repeating it, and I now assume it as known.

The way children learn to see, and the way people born blind learn after an operation; the single vision of what is sensed double with two eyes; the double vision and double touch when the sense organs are moved out of their usual position; the upright appearance of objects while their image in the eye is inverted; the transfer of color, which is merely an inner function, a polar division of the activity of the eye, onto external objects; and finally the stereoscope too—all of this is firm and irrefutable proof that all intuitive perception is not merely sensory but intellectual, that is, pure knowledge by the understanding of the cause from the effect. So it presupposes the law of causality. All intuitive perception, and therefore all experience, in its first and whole possibility, depends on knowing that law. It is not the other way around, that knowledge of the causal law depends on experience; that was Hume's skepticism, and it is refuted only by this. For the independence of the knowledge of causality from all experience, that is, its a priori character, can be shown only from the dependence of all experience on it. And that can be done only by showing, in the way indicated here and carried out in the passages just named, that the knowledge of causality is already contained in intuitive perception in general, in whose domain all experience lies. So it exists completely a priori in relation to experience, is presupposed by experience as its condition, and does not presuppose it. The same cannot be shown in the way Kant tried, which I criticized in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 23.

5 But we must guard against a big misunderstanding: that because intuitive perception is mediated by the knowledge of causality, the relation of cause and effect therefore holds between object and subject. That relation holds only between the immediate and the mediated object, and so always only between objects. The foolish quarrel over the reality of the external world rests on exactly this false assumption. In that quarrel dogmatism and skepticism face each other, and dogmatism appears now as realism, now as idealism. Realism makes the object the cause, and puts its effect in the subject. Fichte's idealism makes the object the effect of the subject. But, and this cannot be stressed enough, no relation according to the principle of sufficient reason holds between subject and object at all. So neither of these two claims could ever be proved, and skepticism made victorious attacks on both.—The law of causality comes before intuitive perception and experience as their condition, and so cannot have been learned from them (as Hume thought). In the same way object and subject come before all knowledge as its first condition, and therefore before the principle of sufficient reason in general. For that principle is only the form of every object, the universal manner of its appearing, and the object always presupposes the subject already. So there can be no relation of ground and consequent between the two. My essay on the principle of sufficient reason is meant to do just this: to present the content of that principle as the essential form of every object, that is, as the general manner of all being an object, as something that belongs to the object as such. But as such, the object always presupposes the subject as its necessary correlate. So the subject always stays outside the domain in which the principle of sufficient reason is valid. The quarrel over the reality of the external world rests precisely on that false extension of the validity of the principle to the subject as well. Starting from this misunderstanding, the quarrel could never understand itself. On one side, realistic dogmatism regards the representation as an effect of the object. It wants to separate these two, representation and object, which are really one, and to assume a cause quite different from the representation, an object in itself, independent of the subject. That is something wholly unthinkable: for as an object it always presupposes the subject again, and so always remains only

the subject's representation. Against it, skepticism, on the same false assumption, objects that in the representation one always has only the effect, never the cause, and so never the being; one knows only the acting of objects. This acting, it says, may perhaps have no likeness at all to that being, and may even be assumed quite falsely overall, since the law of causality is supposed to have been taken from experience, whose reality in turn is supposed to rest on that law.—Both sides now need to be taught, first, that object and representation are the same thing; then, that the being of objects of intuitive perception is just their acting, that the thing's actuality consists precisely in this, and that the demand for the object to exist outside the representation of the subject, and also for a being of the actual thing different from its acting, has no sense at all and is a contradiction. Therefore knowing how an object that is perceived acts also exhausts that object itself, insofar as it is object, that is, representation, since otherwise nothing of it is left for knowledge. So far, then, the world perceived in space and time, which shows itself to be pure causality, is completely real, and is entirely what it claims to be. It presents itself wholly and without reserve as representation, connected by the law of causality. This is its empirical reality. On the other hand, all causality exists only in the understanding and for the understanding. That whole actual, that is, acting, world is therefore, as such, always conditioned by the understanding and nothing without it. But there is a further reason, and not only this one: no object at all can be thought without a subject without contradiction. So we must flatly deny to the dogmatist, who explains the reality of the external world as its independence from the subject, that the world has any such reality. The whole world of objects is and remains representation, and for just this reason is wholly and for all eternity conditioned by the subject. That is, it has transcendental ideality. But it is not, because of this, a lie or an illusion. It presents itself as what it is, as representation, indeed as a series of representations whose common bond is the principle of sufficient reason. As such it is intelligible to sound understanding, even in its innermost meaning, and speaks a language that is perfectly clear to it. Only a mind twisted by over-clever reasoning could think of disputing its reality. That always happens through wrong use of the principle of sufficient reason. The

principle connects all representations with one another, of whatever kind they may be, but by no means connects them with the subject, or with something that would be neither subject nor object but merely the ground of the object. That is a non-concept, since only objects can be grounds, and indeed always again of objects.—If one traces the origin of this question about the reality of the external world more exactly, one finds that besides that false use of the principle of sufficient reason on what lies outside its domain, there is a further confusion of its forms. The form it has only with regard to concepts or abstract representations is carried over to intuitive representations, the real objects, and a ground of knowing is demanded from objects that can have no ground but one of becoming. Over abstract representations, the concepts linked into judgments, the principle of sufficient reason does rule, in the sense that each of them has its value, its validity, its whole existence, here called truth, solely through the relation of the judgment to something outside it, its ground of knowledge, to which one must therefore always go back. Over real objects, the intuitive representations, the principle does not rule as the principle of the ground of knowing but of becoming, as the law of causality. Each of them has already paid its debt to the principle by having become, that is, by having come out of a cause as an effect. So the demand for a ground of knowledge has no validity or sense here; it belongs to a quite different class of objects. That is also why the world of intuitive perception, as long as one stays with it, arouses in the observer neither scruple nor doubt. Here there is neither error nor truth; these are banned to the domain of the abstract, of reflection. But here the world lies open to the senses and the understanding, and presents itself with naive truth as what it is, as intuitive representation, which unfolds in lawful order, tied together by causality.

As we have considered the question of the reality of the external world up to this point, it had always come from a straying of reason that went as far as misunderstanding itself, and to that extent the question could be answered only by clearing up its content. After the whole nature of the principle of sufficient reason, the relation between object and subject, and the real character of sensory intuition had been examined, the question had to cancel itself, because no

meaning at all remained for it. But that question has another origin, wholly different from the purely speculative one given so far, an origin that is really empirical, though even so it is still raised with a speculative aim. In this sense it has a much more understandable meaning than in the first, namely this: we have dreams; is not the whole of life perhaps a dream?—or, more precisely: is there a sure criterion between dream and actuality? between phantasms and real objects?—The claim that dreamed perception is less vivid and clear than real perception deserves no consideration at all, since no one has yet held the two side by side for comparison. One could only compare the memory of the dream with present actuality.—Kant solves the question like this: "The connection of representations among themselves according to the law of causality distinguishes life from dream."—But in a dream too, every single thing is connected according to the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms, and this connection breaks off only between life and the dream and between the individual dreams. So Kant's answer could only come out like this: the long dream (life) has thoroughgoing connection in itself according to the principle of sufficient reason, but not with the short dreams, although each of these has the same connection in itself. So the bridge between them and the long dream is broken, and that is how one tells them apart.—But to carry out an inquiry into whether something was dreamed or happened by this criterion would be very hard and often impossible. We are by no means able to trace the causal connection link by link between every event we have lived through and the present moment, and yet we do not for that reason declare those events dreamed. So in real life, to tell dream from actuality, people usually do not use this kind of inquiry. The only sure criterion for distinguishing dream from actuality is in fact nothing other than the wholly empirical one of waking up, by which the causal connection between the dreamed events and those of waking life is explicitly and palpably broken. An excellent proof of this is the remark Hobbes makes in the Leviathan, ch. 2: that we easily take dreams for actuality afterward too, when we have slept dressed without intending to, but especially when, in addition, some undertaking or plan occupies all our thoughts and keeps us busy in dream as in waking. In these cases waking is noticed almost as little as

falling asleep. Dream flows together with actuality and is mixed with it. Then only the application of the Kantian criterion remains. But if afterward, as often happens, the causal connection with the present, or its absence, simply cannot be worked out, then it must remain forever undecided whether an event was dreamed or happened.—Here the close kinship between life and dream does come very near us. And let us not be ashamed to admit it, since many great minds have recognized and spoken of it. The Vedas and Puranas know no better comparison for the whole knowledge of the actual world, which they call the web of Maya, and use none more often, than the dream. Plato often says that human beings live only in a dream, and the philosopher alone strives to be awake. Pindar says (II. η, 135): σκιας οναρ ανθρωπος (umbrae somnium homo) and Sophocles:

Ὁρω γαρ ἡμας ουδεν οντας αλλο, πλην Ειδωλ', οσοιπερ ζωμεν, η κουφην σκιαν.
Ajax 125.

(Nos enim, quicunque vivimus, nihil aliud esse comperio, quam simulacra et levem umbram.)

Next to which stands, most worthily, Shakespeare:

We are such stuff As dreams are made of, and our little life Is rounded with a sleep.—
Temp. A. 4, Sc. 1.[15]

16 We are of such stuff as that of which dreams are made, and our short life is enclosed by a sleep.

Finally Calderon was so deeply moved by this view that he tried to express it in a drama of a somewhat metaphysical kind, "Life Is a Dream."

After so many passages from the poets, may I too be allowed to express myself in a simile. Life and dreams are pages of one and the same book. Reading them in order is called real life. But when the daily reading hour (the day) is over and the time for rest has come, we often go on paging idly through the book. We open a page now here, now there, without order or connection. Sometimes it is a page we have already read, sometimes one still unknown, but always from the same book. A page read on its own like this is out of connection with the con-

sistent reading from start to end. Yet it does not rank so far below that reading, when you consider that the whole of the consistent reading likewise begins and ends on the spur of the moment, and so can be seen only as one larger single page.

So although individual dreams are separated from real life by the fact that they do not join in the connection of experience, which runs continuously through real life, and waking marks this difference, that very connection of experience already belongs to real life as its form, and the dream can likewise show a connection within itself in return. If one now takes a standpoint for judging outside both, one finds no definite difference in their nature, and one is forced to grant the poets that life is a long dream.

If we now return from this wholly separate, empirical origin of the question about the reality of the external world to its speculative one, we found that the latter lies first in the false use of the principle of sufficient reason, namely also between subject and object, and then in the confusion of its forms, since the principle of the ground of knowing was carried over to the domain where the principle of the ground of becoming holds. Still, that question could hardly have occupied philosophers for so long if it were quite without any true content, and if at its core there did not lie some correct thought and sense as its real origin. We would have to assume that only when this thought entered reflection and sought its expression did it slip into those perverse forms and questions that do not understand themselves. That is how it is, in my opinion. As the pure expression of that innermost sense of the question, which the question did not know how to hit, I put this: What is this intuitive world besides being my representation? Is it—it, of which I am conscious only once, and then as representation—just as my own body is, of which I am conscious twice over: representation on one side, will on the other?—The clearer explanation and the affirmative answer to this question will be the content of the second book, and the consequences that follow from it will take up the rest of this work.

6 For now, in this first book, we consider everything only as representation, as an object for the subject. And like all other real objects, we also look at our own body, from which the perceiving of the world starts out in each of us, only from the side of knowability. So for us it is only a representation. Everyone's consciousness, which already rebelled against declaring the other objects mere representations, resists even more when their own body is supposed to be only a representation. That comes from this: the thing in itself is known to each person directly insofar as it appears as their own body, but only indirectly insofar as it objectifies itself in the other objects of intuitive perception. But the course of our inquiry makes this abstraction, this one-sided way of looking, this violent separation of what essentially exists together, necessary. So that resistance must be suppressed and calmed for now by the expectation that the following reflections will make up for the one-sidedness of the present one, toward a complete knowledge of the nature of the world.

The body is therefore the immediate object for us here, that is, the representation that is the starting point of the subject's knowledge. It comes before the application of the law of causality, along with its directly known changes, and so supplies the first data for it. The whole nature of matter consists, as shown, in its acting. But effect and cause exist only for the understanding, which is nothing more than their subjective correlate. And the understanding could never come to be used if there were not something else from which it starts. That something is bare sensory sensation, the immediate consciousness of the changes of the body, which makes the body an immediate object. So we find that the possibility of knowing the intuitive world rests on two conditions. The first, put objectively, is the ability of bodies to act on one another and produce changes in one another. Without this general property of all bodies, no intuitive perception would be possible, even with the sensitivity of animal bodies. If we put this same first condition subjectively, we say: above all, the understanding makes intuitive perception possible. For the law of causality, the possibility of effect and cause, springs only from the understanding and holds only for it. So the intuitive world exists only for the understanding and through it. The second condition is the sensitivity of animal bodies, or the property of certain

bodies of being immediate objects of the subject. The mere changes that the sense organs undergo from outside action specifically suited to them can already be called representations, when such actions arouse neither pain nor pleasure, that is, have no immediate meaning for the will, and yet are perceived, and so exist only for knowledge. To that extent I say that the body is known immediately and is an immediate object. But even here the concept of object is not to be taken in its strictest sense. For through this immediate knowledge of the body, which comes before the use of the understanding and is mere sensory sensation, the body itself does not really stand there as an object. Only the bodies acting on it do. For all knowledge of a real object, that is, of a representation perceived in space, exists only through and for the understanding, and so not before its use but only after. Therefore the body, as a real object, that is, as intuitive representation in space, just like all other objects, is known only indirectly, by applying the law of causality to the action of one of its parts on another, as when the eye sees the body or the hand feels it. Consequently the mere general feeling of the body does not tell us the shape of our own body. Only through knowledge, only in the representation, that is, only in the brain, does our own body first present itself as something extended, jointed and organic. A person born blind gets this representation only gradually, from the data that touch gives. A blind person without hands would never learn their own shape, or at most would gradually infer and construct it from the action of other bodies on them. It is with this restriction, then, that we are to understand it when we call the body an immediate object.

Moreover, according to what has been said, all animal bodies are immediate objects, that is, starting points of the intuitive perception of the world, for the subject that knows everything and for just that reason is never known. Knowing, together with the moving on motives that it conditions, is therefore the real character of animality, just as moving on stimuli is the character of the plant. What is unorganized has no other motion than the one brought about by causes in the strictest sense. I have discussed all this more fully in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, 2nd ed., § 20, in the Ethics, first essay, III, and in "On Vision and Colors," § 1; I refer to those places.

From what has been said it follows that all animals have understanding, even the most imperfect: for they all know objects, and this knowledge determines their movements as a motive.—The understanding is the same in all animals and all humans. It has the same simple form everywhere: knowledge of causality, the move from effect to cause and from cause to effect, and nothing besides. But the degrees of its sharpness and the extent of its sphere of knowledge differ greatly, and are manifold and stepped in many ways. At the lowest degree it knows only the causal relation between the immediate object and the mediated ones. That just suffices, by the move from the action the body suffers to its cause, to perceive that cause as an object in space. At the higher degrees it knows the causal connection of the merely mediated objects with one another, and this goes as far as understanding the most complex chains of causes and effects in nature. For even this last still belongs to the understanding, not to reason, whose abstract concepts can only serve to take up, fix and link what the understanding has grasped directly, and never to produce the understanding itself. Every force of nature and every law of nature, and every case in which they show themselves, must first be known directly by the understanding, grasped intuitively, before it can enter reflective consciousness in abstracto for reason. R. Hooke's discovery of the law of gravitation, and his tracing of so many great appearances back to this one law, as Newton's calculations then confirmed it, was a direct, intuitive grasp by the understanding. So was Lavoisier's discovery of oxygen and its important role in nature. So was Goethe's discovery of how physical colors arise. All these discoveries are nothing other than a correct, direct going back from the effect to the cause. Soon after comes the knowledge of the identity of the force of nature that shows itself in all causes of the same kind. And this whole insight is an expression, differing only in degree, of the same single function of the understanding by which an animal too perceives the cause that acts on its body as an object in space. Therefore all those great discoveries too, like intuitive perception and every act of the understanding, are an immediate insight and as such the work of a moment, an apperçu, a sudden idea, not the product of long chains of inference in abstracto. These chains of inference serve instead to fix the direct

knowledge of the understanding for reason by setting it down in its abstract concepts. That is, they serve to make it clear; that is, to put oneself in a position to explain it to others, to give it meaning.—That sharpness of the understanding in grasping the causal relations of objects known indirectly is used not only in natural science (all of whose discoveries are owed to it) but also in practical life, where it is called shrewdness. In the former use it is better called acuteness, penetration and sagacity. Strictly speaking, shrewdness means only the understanding that stands in the service of the will. But the limits of these concepts can never be drawn sharply, since it is always one and the same function of the same understanding, which is already active in every animal when it perceives objects in space. In its greatest sharpness this function sometimes correctly traces, in the appearances of nature, the unknown cause from the given effect, and so gives reason the material for thinking general rules as laws of nature. Sometimes, by applying known causes to intended effects, it invents complicated, ingenious machines. Sometimes, applied to motivation, it either sees through and foils subtle intrigues and machinations, or itself arranges the motives, and the people who are receptive to each of them, properly, and sets them in motion at will, like machines by levers and wheels, and steers them to its ends.—Lack of understanding is properly called stupidity. It is precisely dullness in applying the law of causality, inability to grasp directly the chains of cause and effect, of motive and action. A stupid person does not see the connection of the appearances of nature, neither where they appear left to themselves nor where they are purposely steered, that is, made to serve in machines. For this reason such a person readily believes in magic and miracles. A stupid person does not notice that different people, apparently independent of one another, are in fact acting in an agreed connection. So they are easily mystified and intrigued against. They do not notice the hidden motives of advice given, of judgments expressed, and so on. But what is always missing in them is one thing only: sharpness, speed and ease in applying the law of causality, that is, power of the understanding.—The greatest example of stupidity I have ever come across, and an instructive one in the respect under discussion, was a completely feeble-minded boy of about eleven, in an asylum. He had reason, since

he spoke and understood speech, but in understanding he ranked below many an animal. Whenever I came, he looked at a spectacle lens that I wore around my neck, in which the windows of the room and treetops behind them appeared by reflection. Each time he was greatly amazed and delighted by this, and never tired of looking at it in wonder, because he did not understand this entirely direct causality of reflection.

Just as the degrees of sharpness of understanding differ greatly among humans, they probably differ even more among the different kinds of animals. In all of them, even those closest to the plant, there is as much understanding as is enough for the move from the effect in the immediate object to the mediated object as cause, and so for intuitive perception, for apprehending an object. This is precisely what makes them animals, because it gives them the possibility of moving on motives and so of seeking out, or at least seizing, their food. Plants, by contrast, have only movement on stimuli, whose direct action they must wait for or else waste away; they cannot go after stimuli or seize them. In the most perfect animals we admire their great sagacity: in the dog, the elephant, the ape, the fox, whose cleverness Buffon described so masterfully. In these cleverest animals we can measure fairly exactly how much the understanding can do without the help of reason, that is, of abstract knowledge in concepts. In ourselves we cannot see this so clearly, because understanding and reason always support each other there. So we often find the expressions of understanding in animals now above, now below our expectation. On one side we are surprised by the sagacity of that elephant who, after crossing many bridges on his journey through Europe, once refused to step on one, although he saw the rest of the procession of people and horses cross it as usual, because it seemed to him built too lightly for his weight. On the other side we wonder that the clever orangutans do not keep up a fire they have found, at which they warm themselves, by putting wood on it. That is proof that this already requires a reflection which does not come about without abstract concepts. That the knowledge of cause and effect, as the general form of the understanding, lives in animals a priori too, is already entirely certain from this: for them, as for us, it is the prior condition of all intuitive knowledge of the external world. But if one

wants a special proof, just look at how even a very young dog does not dare to jump from the table, much as it wants to, because it foresees the effect of the weight of its body, without knowing this particular case from experience. In judging the understanding of animals, though, we must be careful not to ascribe to it what is the expression of instinct. Instinct is a property wholly different from the understanding, as from reason, though it often works very much like the joint activity of those two. The discussion of instinct does not belong here. It will find its place when we consider the harmony or so-called teleology of nature in the second book, and chapter 27 of the Supplements is devoted to it.

Lack of understanding was called stupidity. Lack of applying reason to practical matters we will later recognize as folly; likewise lack of power of judgment as simple-mindedness; and finally piecemeal or even complete lack of memory as madness. But each in its place.—What is correctly known through reason is truth, namely an abstract judgment with a sufficient ground (essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 29 ff.). What is correctly known through the understanding is reality, namely a correct move from the effect in the immediate object to its cause. Opposed to truth stands error as deception of reason; opposed to reality stands illusion as deception of the understanding. The fuller discussion of all this can be read in the first chapter of my essay on vision and colors.—Illusion arises when one and the same effect can be brought about by two quite different causes, one of which acts very often and the other rarely. The understanding has no datum for telling which cause is at work here, since the effect is exactly the same, so it always presupposes the usual cause. And because its activity is not reflective and discursive but direct and immediate, this false cause stands before us as an object perceived, which is precisely the false illusion. How double vision and double touch arise in this way when the sense organs are brought into an unusual position I have shown in the place cited. By that I gave an irrefutable proof that intuitive perception exists only through the understanding and for the understanding. Further examples of such deception of the understanding, or illusion, are the stick dipped in water that looks broken, and the images in spherical mirrors, which appear somewhat

behind the surface if it is convex, and far in front of it if it is concave. The apparently greater size of the moon at the horizon than at the zenith also belongs here. This is not optical: for, as the micrometer proves, the eye takes in the moon at the zenith at even a slightly larger visual angle than at the horizon. It is the understanding that takes a greater distance as the cause of the weaker brightness of the moon and all the stars at the horizon, and judges them by aerial perspective as it judges earthly objects. So it takes the moon at the horizon to be much larger than at the zenith, and at the same time the vault of heaven to be more extended at the horizon, and so flattened. The same misapplied estimation by aerial perspective makes us take very high mountains, whose summit, the only part visible to us, lies in pure transparent air, to be nearer than they are, to the detriment of their height, for example Mont Blanc seen from Salenche.—And all such deceptive illusions stand before us in immediate intuitive perception, which no reasoning of reason can remove. Reasoning can only prevent error, that is, a judgment without sufficient ground, by an opposite true judgment, as for example by knowing in abstracto that not greater distance but the denser vapors at the horizon are the cause of the weaker brightness of moon and stars. But in all the cases cited the illusion stays immovably in place, in spite of any abstract knowledge. For the understanding is wholly and sharply separated from reason, which is a faculty of knowledge added only in humans, and in itself, even in humans, the understanding is indeed unreasoning. Reason can only ever know. Intuitive perception remains for the understanding alone, free of reason's influence.

7 Regarding our whole inquiry so far, the following should be noted. In it we started neither from the object nor from the subject, but from the representation, which already contains and presupposes both of them, since the splitting into object and subject is its first, most general and most essential form. So we considered this form as such first. Then (though here mostly referring to the introductory essay) we considered the other forms subordinate to it: time, space and causality, which belong only to the object. But these are essential to the object as such, and the object is again essential to the subject as such. So

they can also be found starting from the subject, that is, known a priori, and to that extent are to be seen as the common border of both. All of them, though, can be traced back to one common expression, the principle of sufficient reason, as is shown in detail in the introductory essay.

This procedure sets our way of looking entirely apart from all the philosophies ever attempted. All of those started either from the object or from the subject, and so tried to explain the one from the other, and did so by the principle of sufficient reason. We, by contrast, withdraw the relation between object and subject from the rule of that principle, and leave it only the object.—One might think that the identity philosophy, which arose in our days and has become generally known, is not covered by this contrast. It makes neither object nor subject its real first starting point, but a third thing, the Absolute, which can be known by intuition of reason, and which is neither object nor subject but the sameness of both. I am wholly without any intuition of reason, so I will not presume to speak about this venerable sameness and the Absolute. Still, I rely only on the records of those who intuit by reason, which lie open to everyone, even to us uninitiated, and I must remark that this philosophy is not to be exempted from the contrast of two errors set up above. For despite the identity of subject and object, which cannot be thought but only intuited intellectually, or experienced by one's own immersion in it, it still does not avoid those two opposite errors. Instead it merely unites both within itself, by itself splitting into two disciplines. One is transcendental idealism, which is Fichte's doctrine of the I, and which therefore, following the principle of sufficient reason, has the object produced by the subject or spun out of it. The other is the philosophy of nature, which likewise lets the subject gradually come out of the object, by using a method called construction. Of that method very little is clear to me, but this much is: it is a progression according to the principle of sufficient reason in various forms. I renounce the deep wisdom that this construction contains. To me, who am wholly without intuition of reason, all the lectures that presuppose it must be a book with seven seals. This is so true that,

strange to say, with those teachings of deep wisdom it always seems to me as though I were hearing nothing but dreadful and, on top of that, extremely boring bluster.

The systems that start from the object always had the whole intuitive world and its order as their problem. Still, the object they take as their starting point is not always this world, or its basic element, matter. Rather, a classification of these systems can be made by the four classes of possible objects set up in the introductory essay. So one can say that Thales and the Ionians, Democritus, Epicurus, Giordano Bruno and the French materialists started from the first of those classes, the real world. Spinoza started from the second, the abstract concept (namely the merely abstract concept of substance, which exists only in its definition), and earlier the Eleatics did. From the third class, namely time, and so numbers, started the Pythagoreans and the Chinese philosophy in the Y-king. Finally from the fourth class, namely the act of will motivated by knowledge, started the Scholastics, who teach a creation out of nothing by the act of will of a personal being outside the world.

The objective procedure can be carried through most consistently and furthest when it appears as materialism proper. Materialism takes matter, and time and space with it, as simply existing, and skips over the relation to the subject, in which all of this exists alone. It also seizes the law of causality as the thread to follow forward, taking it as an order of things existing in itself, veritas aeterna. So it skips over the understanding, in which and for which alone causality exists. Now it tries to find the first, simplest state of matter, and then to develop all the others from it, rising from mere mechanism to chemism, to polarity, vegetation, animality. And suppose this succeeded: the last link of the chain would be animal sensitivity, knowing. Knowing would then appear as a mere modification of matter, a state of it brought about by causality. If we had followed materialism this far with intuitive representations, then on reaching its summit with it we would feel a sudden fit of the inextinguishable laughter of the Olympians. As if waking from a dream, we would suddenly realize that its last result, knowing, so laboriously brought about, was already presupposed at the very first starting point, mere matter, as an unavoidable condition. We would

have imagined we were thinking matter with it, but in fact we would have been thinking of nothing other than the subject that represents matter, the eye that sees it, the hand that feels it, the understanding that knows it. So the enormous petitio principii would unexpectedly be uncovered. For suddenly the last link would show itself as the point of support on which the first already hung, and the chain would show itself as a circle. And the materialist would be like Baron Münchhausen, who, swimming in water on his horse, pulls the horse up with his legs and himself up by his pigtail thrown forward. So the basic absurdity of materialism is that it starts from the objective and takes something objective as the last ground of explanation. This may be matter in abstracto, as it is only thought, or matter already entered into form, given empirically, that is, stuff, for example the basic chemical substances along with their nearest compounds. Materialism takes such things as existing in themselves and absolutely, in order to have organic nature and finally the knowing subject come out of them and so explain these completely. In truth, though, everything objective, already as such, is conditioned in many ways by the knowing subject, with the forms of its knowing, and has them as a presupposition, and so disappears entirely if one thinks the subject away. So materialism is the attempt to explain what is given to us directly from what is given indirectly. Everything objective, extended, acting, so everything material, is taken by materialism for such a solid foundation of its explanations that a reduction to it (especially if it ended up in push and counterpush) could leave nothing to wish for. All this, I say, is given only very indirectly and conditionally, and so exists only relatively. For it has gone through the machinery and manufacture of the brain, and so has entered its forms, time, space and causality, by which alone it presents itself as extended in space and acting in time. From something given in this way, materialism wants even to explain what is given directly, the representation (in which all of that stands), and in the end even the will, from which instead all those basic forces that show themselves lawfully along the thread of causes are really to be explained.—The claim that knowing is a modification of matter is therefore always met, with equal right, by the reverse claim: that all matter is only a modification of the subject's knowing, as its representation. And yet at bottom the

aim and ideal of all natural science is a fully carried-out materialism. That we recognize this here as plainly impossible confirms another truth that will result from our further inquiry. It is that all science in the proper sense, by which I mean systematic knowledge along the thread of the principle of sufficient reason, can never reach a final goal or give a fully satisfying explanation. For it never touches the innermost nature of the world, can never get beyond the representation, and at bottom teaches nothing more than the relation of one representation to another.

Every science always starts from two main data. One is always the principle of sufficient reason, in some form, as its organon; the other is its particular object, as its problem. So, for example, geometry has space as its problem and the ground of being in space as its organon. Arithmetic has time as its problem, and the ground of being in time as its organon. Logic has the connections of concepts as such as its problem and the ground of knowing as its organon. History has the deeds that human beings have done, on the large scale and in mass, as its problem, and the law of motivation as its organon. Natural science has matter as its problem and the law of causality as its organon. Its aim and purpose is therefore, along the thread of causality, to trace all possible states of matter back to one another and finally to one, and again to derive them from one another and finally from one. Two states therefore face each other in it as extremes: the state of matter in which it is least, and the state in which it is most, an immediate object of the subject. That is, the deadest, crudest matter, the first basic substance, and then the human organism. Natural science looks for the first as chemistry, the second as physiology. But so far both extremes are unreached, and only between them has something been gained. The prospect is also quite hopeless. Chemists assume that the qualitative division of matter will not go on to infinity as the quantitative does, and they try to reduce the number of their basic substances, now still about 60, more and more. If they had come down to two, they would want to reduce these to one. For the law of homogeneity leads to the assumption of a first chemical state of matter, which preceded all the others, since they are not essential to matter as such but only accidental forms, qualities, and which alone belongs to matter as such. On the

other hand, it is not to be seen how this state, with no second one yet there to act on it, could ever undergo a chemical change. So the same embarrassment arises here in chemistry that Epicurus met in mechanics, when he had to say how one atom first came out of the original direction of its movement. Indeed, this contradiction, which develops entirely by itself and can neither be avoided nor resolved, could properly be set up as a chemical antinomy. As it is found here at the first of the two extremes sought by natural science, so a counterpart to it will show itself to us at the second.—There is just as little hope of reaching this other extreme of natural science, since people see more and more that a chemical thing can never be reduced to a mechanical one, nor an organic thing to a chemical or electrical one. But those who take up this old wrong road again today will soon, like all their predecessors, creep back along it quietly and ashamed. More on this will be said in the next book. The difficulties mentioned here only in passing confront natural science on its own territory. Taken as philosophy, it would moreover be materialism. But materialism, as we have seen, carries death in its heart from birth, because it skips over the subject and the forms of knowing. These are presupposed already in the crudest matter, from which it wants to begin, just as much as in the organism, which it wants to reach. For "no object without a subject" is the proposition that makes all materialism impossible forever. Suns and planets, without an eye that sees them and an understanding that knows them, can be said in words, but for the representation these words are a sideroxylon. Yet on the other hand the law of causality, and the examination and study of nature that follows it, lead us necessarily to the sure assumption that, in time, every more highly organized state of matter followed a cruder one. That is, animals existed before humans, fishes before land animals, plants before these, the inorganic before everything organic. So the original mass had to go through a long series of changes before the first eye could open. And yet the existence of that whole world remains dependent on this first eye that opened, even if it belonged to an insect. It depends on that eye as on the necessary mediator of knowledge, for which and in which alone the world is, and without which it cannot even be thought. For the world is simply representation, and as such needs the knowing subject as the bearer of its exis-

tence. Indeed, that long series of time itself, filled with countless changes through which matter rose from form to form until at last the first knowing animal came to be, this whole time itself is thinkable only in the identity of a consciousness, whose sequence of representations it is, whose form of knowing it is, and outside which it loses all meaning and is nothing at all. So on one side we necessarily see the existence of the whole world depending on the first knowing being, however imperfect this may be. On the other side we just as necessarily see this first knowing animal depending entirely on a long chain of causes and effects that preceded it, in which it appears itself as a small link. These two contradictory views, to each of which we are in fact led with equal necessity, one could indeed again call an antinomy in our faculty of knowledge, and set up as the counterpart of the one found at the first extreme of natural science. Meanwhile Kant's fourfold antinomy will be shown, in the critique of his philosophy appended to the present work, to be a groundless sham fight.—The contradiction that necessarily results here at last finds its resolution in this: to speak Kant's language, time, space and causality do not belong to the thing in itself but only to its appearance, whose form they are. In my language this goes: the objective world, the world as representation, is not the only side of the world but only one side, its outer side, so to speak. The world has a wholly different side, which is its innermost nature, its kernel, the thing in itself. We will look at this in the next book, naming it, after the most immediate of its objectifications, will. The world as representation, however, which alone we consider here, begins only with the opening of the first eye, without which medium of knowledge it cannot be, and so also was not before. But without that eye, that is, apart from knowledge, there was no before either, no time. Even so, time does not for this reason have a beginning; rather, all beginning is in time. But time is the most general form of knowability, into which all appearances fit by means of the bond of causality. So with the first knowing, time too (with its whole infinity in both directions) stands there. And the appearance that fills this first present must at the same time be known as causally linked with, and dependent on, a series of appearances that extends infinitely into the past. This past is itself just as much conditioned by this first present as, conversely, this

present is by that past. So, like the first present, the past it comes from too depends on the knowing subject and is nothing without it. Yet it brings with it the necessity that this first present not show itself as the first, that is, as having no past for its mother and as the beginning of time, but as a consequence of the past, according to the ground of being in time. In the same way the appearance that fills it shows itself as the effect of earlier states that fill that past, according to the law of causality.—Whoever likes mythological interpretations may take as a sign of the moment expressed here, the entry of time which nonetheless has no beginning, the birth of Kronos (χρονος), the youngest Titan, with whom, since he emasculates his father, the crude offspring of heaven and earth cease and the race of gods and humans now takes the stage.

This presentation, which we have reached by following the most consistent of the philosophical systems that start from the object, materialism, serves at the same time to make clear the inseparable mutual dependence of subject and object, with an opposition between them that cannot be removed. This knowledge leads us to look for the innermost nature of the world, the thing in itself, no longer in one of those two elements of the representation, but in something wholly different from the representation, something that is not burdened with such an original, essential and irresolvable opposition.

Opposed to the approach just discussed, which starts from the object so that the subject may arise out of it, is the approach that starts from the subject and wants to push the object out of it. Common and general as the first has been in all philosophy up to now, of the second there is really only a single example, and a very recent one, the sham philosophy of J. G. Fichte; he therefore has to be noted in this respect, however little real worth or inner substance his teaching had in itself, and indeed it was nothing but a sham fight, though one that could shine and seem to be something, since it was presented with an air of the deepest seriousness, in a measured tone and with lively zeal, and defended with eloquent polemic against weak opponents. But real seriousness, which is closed to all outside influences and keeps its goal, the truth, steadily in view, was completely missing in him, as in all similar philosophers who adapt themselves to circumstances. Of course, it could not have been otherwise. For a philosopher

always becomes one through a perplexity that he tries to free himself from, and this perplexity is Plato's θαυμαζειν, which Plato calls a μαλα φιλοσοφικον παθος. But here is what separates the false philosophers from the real ones: in the real ones this perplexity grows out of the sight of the world itself, in the false ones only out of a book, a system that lies before them; this was also Fichte's case, for he became a philosopher only through Kant's thing in itself, and without it would most probably have done quite different things with much better success, as he had considerable rhetorical talent. Had he, however, penetrated at all deeply into the meaning of the book that made him a philosopher, the Critique of Pure Reason, he would have understood that its main teaching, in spirit, is this: that the principle of sufficient reason is not, as all scholastic philosophy wants it, a veritas aeterna, that is, does not have an unconditional validity before, outside and above the whole world, but only a relative and conditioned one, holding solely in the appearance, whether it shows up as the necessary nexus of space or of time, or as the law of causality, or as the law of the ground of knowledge; that the inner nature of the world, the thing in itself, can therefore never be found by following it as a guide, but everything to which it leads is itself again dependent and relative, always only appearance, not thing in itself; that it further does not touch the subject at all but is only the form of objects, which for that very reason are not things in themselves; and that with the object the subject is there at once, and with the subject the object, so that neither can the object come to the subject, nor the subject to the object, as a consequence comes to its ground. But not the slightest part of all this stuck with Fichte: the only interesting thing in the matter, for him, was the starting from the subject, which Kant had chosen in order to show that the earlier starting from the object, which had thereby become the thing in itself, was false. Fichte, however, took this starting from the subject to be what the matter turned on; he imagined, as all imitators do, that if he outdid Kant in this he would also surpass him, and he now repeated, in this direction, the mistakes that the earlier dogmatism had made in the opposite one, and by that very fact had prompted Kant's Critique; so in the main nothing was changed, and the old basic mistake, the assumption of a relation of ground and consequence

between object and subject, stayed as it was; the principle of sufficient reason therefore kept an unconditional validity, exactly as before; the thing in itself was now moved into the knowing subject instead of, as formerly, into the object; and the complete relativity of the two, which shows that the thing in itself, or inner nature of the world, is to be sought not in them but outside them, as outside everything else that exists only in relation, stayed unrecognized as before. As if Kant had never lived, the principle of sufficient reason in Fichte is still what it was for all the scholastics, an aeterna veritas. For just as eternal fate still ruled over the gods of the ancients, so those aeternae veritates still ruled over the God of the scholastics, that is, the metaphysical, mathematical and metalogical truths, and with some of them also the validity of the moral law. These veritates alone depended on nothing; but through their necessity both God and the world existed. According to the principle of sufficient reason, taken as such a veritas aeterna, the I in Fichte is therefore the ground of the world, or of the not-I, the object, which is simply its consequence, its handiwork. He therefore took good care not to examine or check the principle of sufficient reason any further. But suppose I had to name the form of that principle along whose thread Fichte lets the not-I come forth from the I, like a web from a spider; I find that it is the principle of sufficient reason of being in space, for only in relation to that do those tormenting deductions of the way the I produces and manufactures the not-I out of itself, which make up the content of the most senseless book ever written, and the most boring for that reason alone, get any kind of sense and meaning.—This Fichtean philosophy, otherwise not even worth mentioning, is then of interest to us only as the late-appearing true opposite of the age-old materialism, which was the most consistent starting from the object, as that philosophy was the most consistent starting from the subject. Just as materialism overlooked that with the simplest object it had already posited the subject as well, so Fichte overlooked that with the subject (whatever title he chose to give it) he had not only already posited the object too, since no subject is thinkable without one, but also this: that all derivation a priori, indeed all proof whatsoever, rests on a necessity, and all necessity solely on the principle of sufficient reason, because being necessary and following

from a given ground are interchangeable concepts[17]; and that the principle of sufficient reason is nothing other than the general form of the object as such, and so already presupposes the object, and cannot, holding before and outside it, first bring it about and let it arise in accordance with the laws it lays down. In general, then, starting from the subject has the same fault as the starting from the object described above: it assumes in advance what it only claims to derive, namely the necessary correlate of its starting point.

Our procedure now differs toto genere from these two opposite mistakes, in that we start neither from the object nor from the subject, but from the representation, as the first fact of consciousness, whose first and most essential basic form is the splitting into object and subject, while the form of the object is in turn the principle of sufficient reason, in its different shapes, each of which so thoroughly governs its own class of representations that, as has been shown, knowing the shape also means knowing the nature of the whole class, since that class (as representation) is nothing other than that shape itself: so time is nothing other than the ground of being within it, that is, succession; space nothing other than the principle of sufficient reason within it, that is, position; matter nothing other than causality; the concept (as will be shown right away) nothing other than a relation to the ground of knowledge. This complete and thoroughgoing relativity of the world as representation, both in its most general form (subject and object) and in the form subordinate to that (the principle of sufficient reason), points us, as I said, to look for the innermost nature of the world in an entirely different side of it, one wholly distinct from representation, which the next book will show in a fact that is just as immediately certain to every living being.

[18] On this, see "The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason," 2nd ed., § 49.

But first we must still consider the class of representations that belongs to human beings alone, whose material is the concept and whose subjective correlate is reason, just as the subjective correlate of the representations considered

so far was understanding and sensibility, which must also be granted to every animal [19].

8 We move from the direct light of the sun to the borrowed reflection of the moon when we pass from the intuitive, immediate representation, which stands in for itself and vouches for itself, to reflection, to the abstract, discursive concepts of reason, which get all their content only from that intuitive knowledge and in relation to it. As long as we stay purely in intuition, everything is clear, firm and certain. There are no questions there, no doubts, no errors: one wants nothing further, can go no further, finds rest in intuiting and satisfaction in the present. Intuition is enough for itself; therefore what has sprung purely from it and stayed true to it, like the genuine work of art, can never be false and cannot be refuted by any time, for it gives no opinion but the thing itself. But with abstract knowledge, with reason, doubt and error have entered in theory, and worry and regret in practice. If in intuitive representation illusion can distort reality for a moment, in the abstract one error can rule for thousands of years, throw its iron yoke over whole nations, stifle the noblest impulses of humanity, and have even those whom it cannot deceive put in chains by its slaves, its deceived. It is the enemy against which the wisest minds of all ages carried on an unequal fight, and only what they won from it has become the property of humanity. So it is good to draw attention to it at once, as we step onto the ground where its territory lies. Although it has often been said that one should track down the truth even where no use can be foreseen from it, because the use may be indirect and may appear where one does not expect it, I find I must add here that one should be just as eager to uncover and root out every error, even where no harm can be foreseen from it, because this harm too may be very indirect and may one day appear where one does not expect it: for every error carries a poison inside. If it is the mind, if it is knowledge, that makes human beings masters of the earth, then there are no harmless errors, and even less any respectable, sacred errors. And as a comfort to those who devote strength and life to the noble and so hard fight against error, in any kind of matter or affair, I cannot refrain from adding here that error may indeed play

its game as long as the truth is not yet there, like owls and bats in the night; but one may sooner expect owls and bats to chase the sun back to the east than expect that the truth, once recognized and clearly and completely stated, will be pushed out again so that the old error can take its broad place once more, undisturbed. That is the power of truth: its victory is hard and laborious, but in return, once it is won, that victory can never be wrested from it again.

20 To these first seven paragraphs belong the first four chapters of the first book of the Supplements.

For besides the representations considered so far, which could be traced back in their composition to time and space and matter if we look at the object, or to pure sensibility and understanding (that is, knowledge of causality) if we look at the subject, another power of knowledge has appeared in human beings alone, among all the inhabitants of the earth. A completely new consciousness has dawned, and it has been called reflection, very fittingly and with an accuracy that seems to have sensed the truth in advance. That is because it really is a reflection, something derived from that intuitive knowledge. Yet it has taken on a nature and character entirely different from that knowledge. It does not know its forms, and even the principle of sufficient reason, which rules over every object, has a completely different shape here. It is this new consciousness, raised to a higher power, this abstract reflection of everything intuitive in the non-intuitive concept of reason, that alone gives human beings that deliberateness. This is what makes their consciousness so utterly different from that of animals, and why their whole way of life on earth is so different from that of their unreasoning brothers. Human beings surpass animals just as much in power as in suffering. Animals live in the present alone. Human beings live in it too, but at the same time in the future and the past. Animals satisfy the need of the moment. Human beings provide for their future through the most elaborate arrangements, even for times they cannot live to see. Animals are wholly given over to the impression of the moment, to the effect of the intuitive motive. Human beings are determined by abstract concepts that do not depend on the present. So they carry out deliberate plans, or act on maxims, without regard to

their surroundings and the chance impressions of the moment. They can, for example, calmly make the elaborate arrangements for their own deaths, can pretend to the point of being impossible to fathom, and can take their secret with them to the grave. Finally, they have a real choice between several motives. For only in abstracto can such motives, present side by side in consciousness, carry with them the knowledge that one excludes the other, and so measure their power over the will against each other. The one that prevails then settles the matter. It is the deliberate decision of the will, and as a sure sign it makes known the will's own nature. An animal, by contrast, is determined by the present impression. Only fear of present compulsion can tame its desire, until that fear finally becomes habit and from then on determines it as habit. That is training. Animals feel and perceive intuitively. Human beings also think and know. Both will. Animals communicate their feeling and mood by gesture and sound. Human beings communicate thoughts to others by language, or hide thoughts by language. Language is the first product and the necessary tool of reason. That is why Greek and Italian use the same word for language and reason: ὁ λογος, il discorso. Vernunft (reason) comes from Vernehmen, which is not a synonym of hearing but means becoming aware of thoughts communicated through words. Reason achieves its most important accomplishments only with the help of language. These are the concerted action of several individuals, the planned cooperation of many thousands, civilization, the state; further, science, the preserving of earlier experience, the gathering of what is common into one concept, the communicating of truth, the spreading of error, thinking and writing poetry, dogmas and superstitions. Animals get to know death only in dying. Human beings come closer to their death every hour, and know it, and this sometimes makes life seem questionable even to someone who has not already recognized, in life as a whole, this character of constant annihilation. This is mainly why human beings have philosophies and religions. But whether what we rightly value above everything else in human conduct, doing right voluntarily and nobility of disposition, has ever been the fruit of either of them is uncertain. On the other hand, the things that stand there as the sure products of both, belonging to them alone and made by reason along

this path, are the oddest, most fantastic opinions of the philosophers of the various schools and the strangest, sometimes also cruel, customs of the priests of the various religions.

All these varied and far-reaching activities spring from one shared principle. It is that special power of the mind which human beings have over animals, and which has been called reason, ὁ λογος, το λογιστικον, το λογιμον, ratio. All times and peoples agree on this. All people also know very well how to recognize the activities of this ability. They can say what is reasonable and what is unreasonable, where reason stands in contrast with other abilities and qualities of human beings, and finally what, for lack of reason, can never be expected even from the cleverest animal. The philosophers of all times, on the whole, speak in agreement with this common knowledge of reason. They also pick out some especially important activities of it, such as the control of emotions and passions, the ability to draw conclusions and to set up general principles, even ones that are certain before all experience, and so on. Even so, all their explanations of what reason really is are wavering and not sharply defined. They are long-winded, with no unity and no center, stressing now this activity, now that, and so they often differ from one another. On top of this, many of them start from the opposition between reason and revelation. That opposition is entirely foreign to philosophy and only adds to the confusion. It is very striking that no philosopher so far has strictly traced all these varied activities of reason back to one simple function. Such a function would have to be recognizable in all of them, would have to explain all of them, and would therefore make up the real inner nature of reason. It is true that the excellent Locke, in the "Essay on human understanding", Book 2, chapter 11, §§ 10 and 11, names abstract general concepts, quite rightly, as the mark that distinguishes animal from human being. And Leibniz repeats this in complete agreement, in the "Nouveaux essays sur l'entendement humain", Book 2, chapter 11, §§ 10 and 11. But when Locke comes to the actual explanation of reason, in Book 4, chapter 17, §§ 2 and 3, he loses sight of that simple main mark altogether. He, too, ends up with a wavering, vague, incomplete list of broken-up and derived activities of reason. Leibniz, in the matching passage of his work, does much the same overall, only

with more confusion and less clarity. How badly Kant confused and falsified the concept of the nature of reason, I have discussed at length in the Appendix. And anyone who takes the trouble to go through, in this respect, the mass of philosophical writings that have appeared since Kant will see this. Just as whole nations pay for the mistakes of their princes, the errors of great minds spread their harmful influence over whole generations, even over centuries. They grow and propagate, and in the end degenerate into monstrosities. All of this comes from the fact that, as Berkeley says: Few men think; yet all will have opinions [21].

Understanding has only one function: immediate knowledge of the relation of cause and effect. The intuition of the real world, and likewise all cleverness, sagacity and inventiveness, however varied their uses, are plainly nothing but expressions of that one simple function. In the same way reason too has one function: the forming of concepts. From this single function all the differences listed above, which set human life apart from animal life, are explained very easily and entirely by themselves. And everything that has ever and anywhere been called reasonable or unreasonable points, without exception, to the use or non-use of that function [22].

9 Concepts make up a class of their own, different toto genere from the intuitive representations considered so far, and found only in the human mind. We can therefore never gain an intuitive, properly evident knowledge of their nature, but only an [23] Few people think, but all want to have opinions.

24 Compare with this paragraph §§ 26 and 27 of the second edition of the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason. abstract and discursive one. It would therefore be absurd to demand that concepts be proved in experience, if by experience we mean the real external world, which is itself intuitive representation. It would be equally absurd to demand that they be put before our eyes or before our imagination, as intuitive objects can be. They can only be thought, not intuited. Only the effects that human beings produce through them are objects of real experience. These effects are language, deliberate planned action and science, and then whatever follows from all of these. Speech, as an object of

outer experience, is plainly nothing other than a very perfect telegraph, which passes on arbitrary signs with the greatest speed and the finest shades of meaning. But what do these signs mean? How are they interpreted? Do we, while the other person speaks, immediately translate the speech into images of the imagination, which fly past us in a flash, move, link up, change shape and fill in with color, following the words as they stream in and their grammatical endings? What an uproar there would be in our heads while listening to a speech or reading a book! That is not at all what happens. We take in the meaning of speech directly, grasp it exactly and definitely, and as a rule no phantasms mix in. It is reason speaking to reason, staying within its own territory. What it communicates and receives are abstract concepts, non-intuitive representations. They are formed once and for all, and are comparatively few in number, yet they cover, contain and stand for all the countless objects of the real world. This alone explains why no animal can ever speak or understand speech, although it shares with us the organs of speech and the intuitive representations too. The reason is that words name that wholly distinctive class of representations whose subjective correlate is reason, so for an animal they have no sense or meaning. So language, like every other phenomenon we ascribe to reason, and like everything that sets human beings apart from animals, is to be explained from this one simple source: concepts, the abstract, non-intuitive, general representations, which are not individual in time and space. Only in single cases do we pass from concepts to intuition and form phantasms for ourselves as intuitive stand-ins for concepts, though these are never adequate to them. I discussed these phantasms in particular in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, § 28, so I will not repeat it here. Compare what is said there with what Hume says in the twelfth of his "Philosophical essays", p. 244, and with what Herder says in the "Metakritik" (a bad book, incidentally), part 1, p. 274.—The Platonic Idea, which becomes possible through the union of imagination and reason, is the main subject of the third book of the present work.

Concepts are thus radically different from intuitive representations. Still, they stand in a necessary relation to them. Without it they would be nothing, and so this relation makes up their whole nature and existence. Reflection is necessar-


ily a copy, a repetition, of the original intuitive world. It is a copy of a quite special kind, though, made in an entirely different material. That is why concepts can fittingly be called representations of representations. The principle of sufficient reason has a shape of its own here too. The shape in which it rules over one class of representations always makes up and exhausts the whole nature of that class, insofar as its members are representations. As we have seen, time is through and through succession and nothing else, space is through and through position and nothing else, and matter is through and through causality and nothing else. In the same way the whole nature of concepts, or of the class of abstract representations, consists only in the relation which the principle of sufficient reason expresses in them. This relation is the relation to the ground of knowledge. So the abstract representation has its whole nature solely and entirely in its relation to another representation, which is its ground of knowledge. This other representation may itself first of all be a concept, or abstract representation, and even that one may again have only such an abstract ground of knowledge. But this cannot go on to infinity. In the end the series of grounds of knowledge must close with a concept that has its ground in intuitive knowledge. For the whole world of reflection rests on the intuitive world as its ground of knowing. So the class of abstract representations differs from the other classes in this: in the other classes the principle of sufficient reason always demands only a relation to another representation of the same class, but with abstract representations it demands, at the end, a relation to a representation from another class.

Some concepts, as just described, relate to intuitive knowledge not directly but only through one or even several other concepts. These have been called abstracta in the special sense. Those that have their ground directly in the intuitive world have been called concreta. This second name, however, fits the concepts it labels only very loosely, since these too are still abstracta and by no means intuitive representations. Both names came out of a very unclear awareness of the difference they were meant to mark. They can stay, though, with the interpretation given here. Examples of the first kind, abstracta in the highest sense, are concepts such as "relation, virtue, inquiry, beginning" and so on.

Examples of the second kind, the so-called concreta (loosely so called), are the concepts “human being, stone, horse” and so on. If the comparison were not a little too pictorial, and so slightly comic, one could very aptly call the second kind the ground floor and the first kind the upper stories of the building of reflection [25].


A concept comprehends many things under it. That is, many intuitive or even abstract representations stand to it in the relation of ground of knowledge, which means that they are thought through it. Most people state this as an essential property of the concept. It is not. It is only a derived, secondary property, and it does not even always have to exist in fact, though it must always exist as a possibility. This property comes from the fact that a concept is a representation of a representation, that is, has its whole nature only in its relation to another representation. But the concept is not that representation itself. That representation, in fact, mostly belongs to an entirely different class of representations [26] On this, chapters 5 and 6 of the second volume. namely the intuitive class. So it can have determinations of time, of space and others, and in general many relations that are not thought in the concept at all. For that reason several representations that differ in inessential respects can be thought through the same concept, that is, subsumed under it. But this applying to several things is not an essential property of the concept, only an accidental one. So there can be concepts through which only one single real object is thought, and which are nevertheless abstract and general, and in no way individual, intuitive representations. An example is the concept someone has of a particular city that he knows only from geography. Only this one city is thought through it. Yet several cities that differ in some respects would be possible, and the concept would fit all of them. A concept, then, does not have generality because it is abstracted from several objects. It is the other way round. Generality, that is, leaving the individual undetermined, is essential to the concept as an abstract representation of reason, and that is why different things can be thought through the same concept.

It follows from what has been said that every concept has what is called an extent or sphere. This is because it is an abstract representation, not an intuitive one, and therefore not thoroughly determined. It has a sphere even where only one single real object corresponds to it. Now we find throughout that the sphere of every concept has something in common with the spheres of others. That is, the concept partly thinks the same thing that those others think, and each of those others in turn partly thinks the same thing as the first, even though, if they are really different concepts, each of them, or at least one of the two, contains something the other does not. Every subject stands in this relation to its predicate. To recognize this relation is to judge. Showing those spheres by spatial figures is an extremely happy idea. Gottfried Plouquet probably had it first, and he used squares. Lambert, though after him, still used mere lines, which he placed one under another. Euler was the first to carry it out fully, with circles. What this very exact analogy between the relations of concepts and those of spatial figures finally rests on, I cannot say. Meanwhile it is a very favorable circumstance for logic that all relations of concepts, even as to their possibility, that is, a priori, can be shown intuitively by such figures, in this way:
1) The spheres of two concepts are exactly equal. For example, the concept of necessity and that of following from a given ground. Likewise that of Ruminantia and Bisulca (ruminants and animals with a cloven hoof), and also that of vertebrates and red-blooded animals (though there would be something to object to there because of the annelids). These are interchangeable concepts. A single circle shows them, standing for the one as well as the other.
2) The sphere of one concept includes that of another entirely:




Two circles, a big one labeled Thier (animal) with a smaller one labeled Pferd (horse) inside it against the lower rim.

3) One sphere includes two or more that exclude each other and together fill the sphere:




A circle divided from one point into three sectors labeled rechter W. (right angle), spitzer W. (acute angle) and stumpfer W. (obtuse angle); the circle itself is lettered Winkel (angle), printed Win- in the left sector and kel in the right.

4) Two spheres each include a part of the other:



Two equal overlapping circles, labeled Blume (flower) on the left and roth (red) on the right; the overlap carries no label.

5) Two spheres lie within a third, which they do not, however, fill:



A big circle labeled Materie (matter) with two small touching circles low inside it, Wasser (water) left and Erde (earth) right.

This last case holds for all concepts whose spheres have no direct community, since a third sphere, even if often a very wide one, will always include both.

All connections of concepts may be traced back to these cases, and the whole doctrine of judgments (their conversion, contraposition, reciprocation, and disjunction, this last according to the third figure) can be derived from them. So can the properties of judgments on which Kant based the supposed categories of the understanding. The exceptions are the hypothetical form, which is no longer a connection of mere concepts but of judgments, and modality. The Appendix gives a detailed account of modality, as of every property of judgments that has been laid at the base of the categories. About the possible con-

nections of concepts given here, only this remains to be noted: they can also be combined with one another in many ways, for example the fourth figure with the second. Only when one sphere that contains another wholly or in part is itself wholly enclosed by a third do these together represent the inference in the first figure. That is the connection of judgments by which it is known that a concept contained wholly or in part in another is likewise contained in a third that again contains this one. Or it is the reverse of this, the negation, whose pictorial representation can of course consist only in this: two connected spheres do not lie in a third. If many spheres enclose one another in this way, long chains of inferences arise.—This schematism of concepts, which is already carried out fairly well in several textbooks, can be laid at the base of the doctrine of judgments, as of the whole of syllogistics, and this makes the presentation of both very easy and simple. For all their rules can be seen, derived and explained from it in their origin. It is not necessary, though, to load the memory with these rules, since logic can never be of practical use, but only of theoretical interest for philosophy. For although one could say that logic is to rational thinking what thorough-bass is to music, and, if we take it less strictly, what ethics is to virtue or aesthetics to art, one must reflect on this: no artist has yet become one through the study of aesthetics, nor a noble character through the study of ethics; people composed correctly and beautifully long before Rameau; and one does not need to have thorough-bass in hand to notice discords. Just as little does one need to know logic to avoid being deceived by fallacies. Still, it must be granted that, if not for judging music, then for practicing musical composition, thorough-bass is of great use. Even aesthetics and ethics may, though in a much lesser degree, have some use for practice, though chiefly a negative one, so that not all practical value is to be denied them either. But of logic not even this much can be said. For it is merely the knowledge in abstracto of what everyone knows in concreto. So, just as one does not need it in order not to agree with a false piece of reasoning, one does not call on its rules to make a correct one, and even the most learned logician sets them wholly aside in his actual thinking. This is explained as follows. Every science consists of a system of general, and so abstract, truths, laws and rules about some kind of

objects. The individual case that afterward comes up among these objects is then always determined by that general knowledge, which holds once and for all. For such an application of the general is infinitely easier than examining the individual case that comes up by itself, from the beginning. Once obtained, the general abstract knowledge is always nearer to hand than the empirical examination of the individual. With logic, however, it is just the reverse. Logic is the general knowledge of the procedure of reason, known by reason's self-observation and by abstraction from all content, and expressed in the form of rules. But for reason that procedure is necessary and essential. So reason will never depart from it in any case, once it is left to itself. It is therefore easier and safer to let reason proceed according to its nature in each particular case than to hold up to it the knowledge of this procedure, abstracted from the procedure itself, in the form of a foreign law given from outside. It is easier: for although in all other sciences the general rule lies nearer to us than examining the individual case alone and by itself, in the use of reason it is the other way round. The procedure needed in the given case always lies nearer to us than the general rule abstracted from it, since what thinks in us is itself that very reason. It is safer: for an error can occur much more easily in such abstract knowledge, or in its application, than a procedure of reason can occur that would run against its essence, its nature. Hence the oddity that while in other sciences one tests the truth of the individual case against the rule, in logic the rule must always be tested against the individual case. And even the most practiced logician, when he notices that in an individual case he draws an inference differently from what a rule states, will always look for a mistake in the rule sooner than in the inference he actually made. To want to make practical use of logic would therefore mean wanting to derive, with unspeakable trouble from general rules, what is immediately known to us in the individual case with the greatest certainty. It would be exactly like consulting mechanics before moving one's limbs, or physiology before digesting. And whoever learns logic for practical purposes is like someone who wants to train a beaver to build its lodge.—So although it has no practical use, logic must nonetheless be kept, because it has philosophical interest, as special knowledge of the organization and action of

reason. As a closed discipline, standing on its own, complete in itself, rounded off and perfectly certain, it has the right to be treated scientifically by itself and independent of everything else, and likewise to be taught in universities. But it gets its real value only in the context of the whole of philosophy, in considering knowing, and in fact rational or abstract knowing. Accordingly, its presentation should not so much have the form of a science aimed at the practical, nor contain merely bare rules set out for correctly converting judgments, drawing inferences and so on. It should rather be aimed at making the nature of reason and of the concept known, and at considering the principle of the ground of knowing in detail. For logic is a mere paraphrase of that principle, and indeed really only for the case where the ground that gives judgments truth is not empirical or metaphysical but logical or metalogical. Beside the principle of the ground of knowing, the other three fundamental laws of thinking so closely related to it, or judgments of metalogical truth, are therefore to be set out. From these the whole technique of reason gradually grows. The nature of actual thinking, that is, of judging and inferring, is to be shown from the combination of the spheres of concepts, according to the spatial schema, in the way indicated above, and all the rules of judging and inferring are to be derived from it by construction. The only practical use that can be made of logic is, in disputes, to point out to the opponent not so much his real fallacies as his intentional sophisms, by naming them by their technical names. By thus pushing back the practical aim and bringing out the connection of logic with the whole of philosophy, as a chapter of it, knowledge of logic should nonetheless become no rarer than it is now. For nowadays everyone who does not want to stay crude in what matters most and be counted among the ignorant crowd, caught in dullness, must have studied speculative philosophy. This is so because this nineteenth century is a philosophical one. That is not meant to say so much that it possesses philosophy or that philosophy rules in it, as that it is ripe for philosophy and for just that reason is in thorough need of it. This is a sign of highly advanced education, indeed a fixed point on the scale of culture of the ages[27].

However little practical use logic can have, it can still hardly be denied that it was invented for a practical purpose. I explain its origin to myself as follows. Among the Eleatics, Megarians and Sophists, the pleasure in disputing developed more and more and gradually rose almost to a craze. The confusion into which almost every dispute fell soon made them feel the need for a methodical procedure, as guidance, for which a scientific dialectic had to be sought. The first thing that had to be noticed was that both disputing parties must always agree on some proposition, to which the points in dispute were to be traced back. The beginning of the methodical procedure consisted in stating these commonly acknowledged propositions formally as such and placing them at the head of the inquiry. At first, though, these propositions concerned only the material of the inquiry. People soon noticed that in the way they went back to the commonly acknowledged truth and tried to derive their claims from it, they also followed certain forms and laws, about which they never fell out, though without any prior agreement. From this they saw that these must be the peculiar course of reason itself, lying in its nature, the formal side of the inquiry. Now although this was not exposed to doubt and disagreement, some head, systematic to the point of pedantry, hit on the thought that it would look very fine, and would be the completion of methodical dialectic, if this formal side of all disputing, this always lawful procedure of reason itself, were also stated in abstract propositions. Like those commonly acknowledged propositions concerning the material of the inquiry, these too were to be placed at the head of the inquiry, as [28] On this see ch. 9 and 10 of the second volume. the fixed canon of disputing itself, which one would always have to look back to and appeal to. In this way, what they had so far followed as if by silent agreement, or practiced as if by instinct, they now wanted to recognize consciously as law and state formally. And so they gradually found more or less perfect expressions for logical principles, such as the principle of contradiction, of sufficient reason, of the excluded third, the dictum de omni et nullo, and then the more specific rules of syllogistics, such as ex meris particularibus aut negativis nihil sequitur, a rationato ad rationem non valet consequentia, and so on. That they reached this only slowly and with great effort, and that before Aristotle everything

remained very imperfect, we see partly from the clumsy and long-winded way in which logical truths are brought to light in some Platonic dialogues. We see it better still from what Sextus Empiricus reports about the disputes of the Megarians over the easiest and simplest logical laws and the laborious way in which they made them clear (Sext. Emp. adv. Math. L. 8. p. 112 seqq.). Aristotle, however, collected, ordered and corrected what he found, and brought it to an incomparably higher perfection. If one notes in this way how the course of Greek culture had prepared and brought about Aristotle's work, one will be little inclined to believe the claim of Persian writers, which Jones, very much in favor of it, passes on to us: that Callisthenes found a finished logic among the Indians and sent it to his uncle Aristotle (Asiatic researches, vol. 4, p. 163).—That in the sad Middle Ages the Aristotelian logic had to be most welcome to the quarrelsome spirit of the Scholastics, who, lacking all real knowledge, lived on formulas and words alone, that they seized on it eagerly even in its Arabic mutilation, and soon raised it to the center of all knowledge, is easy to understand. Though its prestige has fallen since then, it has still kept, down to our time, its credit as a science that stands on its own, is practical and is highly necessary. In our days the Kantian philosophy, which really took its cornerstone from logic, has even stirred up a new interest in it. It deserves that interest in this respect, that is, as a means to knowledge of the nature of reason.

Correct, strict inferences come about by considering the relation of the spheres of concepts exactly, and acknowledging that the first sphere is wholly contained in the third only when it is exactly contained in a second and that second is again wholly contained in a third. The art of persuasion, by contrast, rests on subjecting the relations of the concept spheres only to a superficial look, and then determining them one-sidedly to suit one's aims. It does this mainly as follows. When the sphere of a concept under consideration lies only partly in another sphere and partly in a quite different one, the speaker presents it as lying wholly in the first, or wholly in the second, according to his purpose. For example, when passion is being discussed, one can subsume it at will under the concept of the greatest force, the mightiest agent in the world, or under the concept of unreason, and this again under the concept of impotence, weakness.

The same procedure can be continued and applied afresh with each concept the speech leads to. Almost always, several other spheres divide up within the sphere of a concept. Each of them contains a part of the territory of the first on its own, but also takes in more besides. Of these latter concept spheres one lets only the one be lit, under which one wants to subsume the first concept, while the rest are left unnoticed or kept covered. All arts of persuasion, all the finer sophisms, really rest on this trick. For the logical ones, such as the mentiens, velatus, cornutus and so on, are clearly too clumsy for actual use. It is not known to me that anyone has yet traced the nature of all sophistry and persuasion back to this last ground of its possibility, and shown that ground in the peculiar character of concepts, that is, in the mode of knowledge of reason. Since my presentation has led me to it, I will explain the matter further, easy as it is to see, by a diagram on the accompanying table




Plate: a diagram of concept spheres, Peregrinari at the center together with Experientiae latissimus campus, ringed by branching chains of Latin-labeled advantages under Bonum and disadvantages under Malum, three chains ending at Bonum on the left and three at Malum on the right

which is meant to show how the concept spheres overlap in many ways and so leave room to pass at whim from any concept to this or that other. Only I do not want the table to lead anyone into attaching more importance to this small side discussion than it can have by its nature. As an illustrative example I chose the concept of traveling. Its sphere overlaps the territory of four others, and the persuader may pass to any of them at will. These again overlap other spheres, some of them two or more at once, through which the persuader takes his way at will, always as if it were the only one, and in the end, according to his purpose, arrives at good or evil. Only, in following the spheres, one must always keep the direction from the center (the main concept given) to the periphery, and not go backward. The dress of such a sophistry can be continuous speech, or the strict form of the syllogism, as the weak side of the listener suggests. At bottom most scientific proofs, especially philosophical ones, are not very differently made. How else would it be possible that so many things have, at different times, not only been mistakenly assumed (for error itself has another origin) but demonstrated and proved, and yet later been found utterly false? For example the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, Ptolemaic astronomy, Stahl's chemistry, Newton's theory of colors, and so on and so on[29].

10 Through all this the question comes ever closer to us: how is certainty to be obtained, how are judgments to be grounded, what do knowledge and science consist in? We praise knowledge and science, along with language and considered action, as the third great advantage given by reason.

Reason is feminine in nature: it can give only after it has received. By itself alone it has nothing but the contentless forms of its operating. Perfectly pure [30] On this see ch. 11 of the second volume.

cognition of reason there is, in fact, none other than the four propositions to which I assigned metalogical truth, that is, the propositions of identity, of contradiction, of the excluded third and of the sufficient ground of cognition. For even the rest of logic is no longer perfectly pure cognition of reason, because it presupposes the relations and combinations of the spheres of concepts. But concepts at all exist only after preceding intuitive representations, to which

their whole nature consists in referring, and which they therefore already presuppose. Since, however, this presupposition does not extend to the definite content of the concepts but only generally to their existence, logic, taken as a whole, can still count as a pure science of reason. In all the other sciences reason has received its content from intuitive representations. In mathematics it comes from the relations of space and time, which are known by intuition before all experience. In pure natural science, that is, in what we know before all experience about the course of nature, the content of the science comes from the pure understanding, that is, from a priori cognition of the law of causality and its connection with those pure intuitions of space and time. In all other sciences, everything that is not borrowed from those just named belongs to experience. To know in general means: to have in the power of one's mind, for reproduction at will, such judgments as have their sufficient ground of cognition in something outside them, that is, are true. Abstract cognition alone is therefore knowledge. Knowledge is thus conditioned by reason, and of animals we cannot, strictly speaking, say that they know anything, although they have intuitive cognition, and for it also memory, and for that very reason imagination, which their dreaming moreover proves. Consciousness we do ascribe to them. Its concept therefore, although the word is taken from knowing, coincides with that of representing in general, of whatever kind. For the same reason we ascribe life to the plant, but no consciousness.—Knowledge, then, is abstract consciousness: having fixed, in concepts of reason, whatever has been cognized in some other way.

11 In this respect, the real opposite of knowledge is feeling, and so we must insert a discussion of it here. The concept that the word feeling designates has only a negative content, namely this: that something present in consciousness is not a concept, not abstract cognition of reason. Otherwise it may be whatever it likes; it falls under the concept feeling. The immoderately wide sphere of this concept therefore takes in the most heterogeneous things, and one never sees how they belong together until one has recognized that they agree only in this negative respect, of not being abstract concepts. For the most different, even

the most hostile, elements lie peacefully side by side in that concept: for example religious feeling, feeling of sensual pleasure, moral feeling, bodily feeling as touch, as pain, as feeling for colors, for tones and their harmonies and discords, feeling of hatred, of disgust, of self-satisfaction, of honor, of shame, of right, of wrong, feeling of truth, aesthetic feeling, feeling of strength, of weakness, of health, of friendship, of love, and so on and so on. There is no common ground at all among them except the negative one, that they are not abstract cognition of reason. But this is most striking when even the a priori intuitive cognition of spatial relations, and above all that of the pure understanding, is brought under that concept. It is also striking when it is said, of any cognition or truth of which one is as yet only intuitively conscious and has not yet put into abstract concepts, that one feels it. To illustrate this I will bring forward some examples from newer books, because they are striking proofs of my explanation. I remember reading in the introduction to a German version of Euclid that beginners in geometry should first be made to draw all the figures before going on to demonstrate, because then they would feel the geometrical truth beforehand, before the demonstration brought them the complete cognition.—Likewise, in the "Critique of Moral Theory" by F. Schleiermacher there is talk of the logical and mathematical feeling (p. 339), and also of the feeling of the equality or difference of two formulas (p. 342). Further, in Tennemann's "History of Philosophy," vol. 1, p. 361, it says: "People felt that the fallacies were not correct, but still could not discover the mistake."—As long as this concept of feeling is not looked at from the right point of view and the one negative mark that alone is essential to it is not recognized, it must constantly give occasion for misunderstandings and quarrels. The reasons are the excessive width of its sphere and its merely negative, wholly one-sidedly determined and very slight content. Since German also has the nearly synonymous word Empfindung (sensation), it would be useful to take that over for bodily feelings, as a subspecies. The origin of that concept feeling, disproportionate to all others, is however without doubt the following. All concepts, and it is only concepts that words designate, exist only for reason and proceed from it. So with them one already stands on a one-sided standpoint. But from such a standpoint what is

nearer appears distinctly and is posited as positive, and what is farther flows together and soon is regarded only negatively. In the same way each nation calls all others foreigners, the Greek calls all others barbarians, the Englishman calls everything that is not England or English, continent and continental, the believer calls all others heretics or heathens, the nobility calls all others roturiers, the student calls all others philistines, and the like. Reason itself, strange as it sounds, can be charged with the same one-sidedness, one might say the same crude ignorance from pride. It includes under the one concept feeling every modification of consciousness that does not belong directly to its own way of representing, that is, is not an abstract concept. Because its own procedure had not become clear to it through thorough self-knowledge, it has had to pay for this so far by misunderstandings and errors in its own field. People have even set up a special faculty of feeling and now construct theories of it.

12 Knowledge, whose contradictory opposite I have just discussed as the concept feeling, is, as said, every abstract cognition, that is, cognition of reason. But reason only ever brings before cognition again what was received elsewhere. So it does not properly widen our cognizing; it only gives it another form. What was cognized intuitively, in concreto, it lets us cognize abstractly and generally. This is however far more important than it seems at first glance when put like this. For all safe keeping, all communicability and all safe and far-reaching application of cognition to practical matters depends on its having become knowledge, abstract cognition. Intuitive cognition always holds only of the individual case, goes only to what is nearest, and stops there, since sensibility and understanding can really take in only one object at a time. Every sustained, composite, planned activity must therefore start from principles, so from abstract knowledge, and be guided by it. For example, the cognition that the understanding has of the relation of cause and effect is in itself far more perfect, deeper and more exhaustive than anything of it that can be thought in abstracto. The understanding alone cognizes by intuition, directly and perfectly, how a lever, a pulley or a cogwheel works, how a vault rests on itself, and so on. But because of the property of intuitive cognition just touched on, that it goes only

to what is immediately present, the bare understanding is not enough for constructing machines and buildings. Reason must step in here, put abstract concepts in the place of intuitions, take them as the guide for acting, and if they were right, success will follow. Likewise we cognize in pure intuition the nature and lawfulness of a parabola, hyperbola, spiral perfectly. But to make a sure application of this cognition in actuality, it would first have to have become abstract knowledge. It certainly loses its intuitiveness in that, but gains in return the certainty and definiteness of abstract knowledge. So all differential calculus does not really widen our cognition of curves at all; it contains nothing more than the bare pure intuition of them already does. But it changes the kind of cognition, turns the intuitive into an abstract one, and this is of the greatest consequence for application. Here, however, a peculiarity of our faculty of cognition comes up that could probably not be noticed so long as the difference between intuitive and abstract cognition had not been made fully clear. It is this: the relations of space cannot be carried over directly and as such into abstract cognition. Only magnitudes of time, that is, numbers, are suited to this. Only numbers can be expressed in abstract concepts that exactly correspond to them, not magnitudes of space. The concept thousand differs from the concept ten exactly as the two magnitudes of time differ in intuition. With thousand we think a definite multiple of ten, into which we can resolve it at will for intuition in time, that is, count it. But between the abstract concept of a mile and that of a foot, without any intuitive representation of the two and without the help of number, there is no exact difference corresponding to those magnitudes themselves. In both only a magnitude of space is thought at all, and if the two are to be distinguished sufficiently, then either spatial intuition must be called to help, and so the domain of abstract cognition already left, or the difference must be thought in numbers. So if one wants abstract cognition of spatial relations, they must first be carried over into temporal relations, that is, into numbers. That is why only arithmetic, not geometry, is the general theory of magnitude, and geometry has to be translated into arithmetic if it is to have communicability, exact definiteness and applicability to practical matters. A spatial relation as such can indeed also be thought in abstracto, for example

"the sine increases in proportion to the angle." But if the size of this relation is to be stated, number is needed. This necessity that space, with its three dimensions, must be translated into time, which has only one dimension, if one wants an abstract cognition (that is, a knowledge, no mere intuiting) of its relations, this necessity is what makes mathematics so difficult. This becomes very clear when we compare the intuition of curves with the analytic calculation of them. It also becomes clear when we compare the tables of logarithms of trigonometric functions with the intuition of the changing relations of the parts of the triangle that those tables express. Intuition takes in at one glance, perfectly and with extreme exactness, how the cosine decreases as the sine increases, how the cosine of one angle is the sine of the other, the inverse relation of decrease and increase of both angles, and so on. What an enormous web of numbers, what laborious calculation was needed to express this in abstracto! How, one can say, time with its one dimension must torment itself to reproduce the three dimensions of space! But this was necessary if, for the sake of application, we wanted to have the relations of space set down in abstract concepts. They could not enter these directly, but only through the mediation of the purely temporal magnitude, number, which alone connects directly with abstract cognition. It is also noteworthy that space is so well suited to intuition and, by means of its three dimensions, lets even complicated relations be surveyed easily, yet escapes abstract cognition. Conversely, time enters abstract concepts easily but gives very little to intuition. Our intuition of numbers in their own element, bare time, without bringing in space, hardly goes beyond ten. Beyond that we have only abstract concepts, no longer intuitive cognition of the numbers. Yet we connect exactly determined abstract concepts with every number word and all algebraic signs.

In passing it should be noted here that some minds find full satisfaction only in what is cognized intuitively. What they seek is ground and consequent of being in space, set out intuitively. A Euclidean proof, or an arithmetical solution of spatial problems, does not appeal to them. Other minds, by contrast, demand the abstract concepts that alone are usable for application and communication. They have patience and memory for abstract propositions, formulas, proofs in

long chains of inferences, and calculations whose signs stand for the most complicated abstractions. These seek definiteness; those seek intuitiveness. The difference is characteristic.

Knowledge, abstract cognition, has its greatest value in communicability and in the possibility of being kept fixed. Only through this does it become so inestimably important for practical matters. Someone may have an immediate, intuitive cognition in the bare understanding of the causal connection of the changes and movements of natural bodies, and find complete satisfaction in it. But it becomes fit for communication only after he has fixed it in concepts. Even for practical matters a cognition of the first kind is sufficient, as long as he takes over the carrying out wholly alone, and in an action that can be carried out while the intuitive cognition is still alive. It is not sufficient when he needs others' help, or even just a series of his own actions at different times, and therefore a considered plan. So, for example, a practiced billiard player can have a complete knowledge of the laws of the impact of elastic bodies on one another, merely in the understanding, merely for immediate intuition, and he manages perfectly with it. By contrast, only the scientific mechanic has real knowledge of those laws, that is, a cognition of them in abstracto. Even for constructing machines that merely intuitive cognition of the understanding is enough, if the inventor of the machine also carries it out alone, as one often sees in talented craftsmen without any science. But as soon as several people and a composite activity of theirs, taking place at different points in time, are needed to carry out a mechanical operation, a machine or a building, the one who directs them must have drawn up the plan in abstracto, and only with the help of reason is such cooperating activity possible. It is remarkable, though, that in that first kind of activity, where one person alone is to carry something out in one uninterrupted action, knowledge, the use of reason, reflection can often even be a hindrance to him. Examples are billiards, fencing, tuning an instrument, singing. Here intuitive cognition must guide the activity directly. Passing through reflection makes it unsure, since it divides the attention and confuses the person. That is why savages and crude people, who are used to thinking very little, carry out many bodily exercises, fighting with animals, hitting with

an arrow and the like, with a certainty and speed that the reflecting European never reaches. His deliberation makes him waver and hesitate. For example, he tries to find the right place, or the right moment, at an equal distance from the two false extremes. The natural man hits it directly, without reflecting on the wrong paths. Likewise it does not help me if I know in abstracto, in degrees and minutes, the angle at which I have to set the razor, if I do not know it intuitively, that is, have it in my grip. In the same way, using reason is also disturbing in understanding physiognomy. This too must happen directly through the understanding. The expression, the meaning of the features, can only be felt, people say, that is, does not enter abstract concepts. Everyone has their own immediate intuitive physiognomics and pathognomics, yet one person recognizes that signatura rerum more clearly than another. But a physiognomics in abstracto, to teach and learn, cannot be brought about. For the nuances are so fine here that the concept cannot reach down to them. So abstract knowledge stands to them as a mosaic picture stands to a van der Werff or Denner. However fine the mosaic is, the borders of the stones always remain, and so no continuous transition of one tint into another is possible. In the same way concepts, with their rigidity and sharp limits, however finely one may split them by closer determination, are always unable to reach the fine modifications of the intuitive, which in physiognomics, taken here as the example, is just what matters[31].

32 For this reason I am of the opinion that physiognomy cannot go further with certainty than setting up a few quite general rules, for example this one: the intellectual is to be read in forehead and eye, the ethical, the expressions of will, in the mouth and the lower half of the face;—forehead and eye explain each other, and each of the two, seen without the other, is only half understandable;—a man of genius is never without a high, broad, finely arched forehead, but such a forehead is often without the man of genius;—from an intelligent look one may infer intelligence the more surely, the uglier the face is, and from a stupid look one may infer stupidity the more surely, the more beautiful the face is,

because beauty, as conformity to the type of humanity, already in and of itself bears also the expression of mental clarity, and ugliness behaves the opposite way, and so on.

This same character of concepts, which makes them like the stones of a mosaic picture, and by virtue of which intuition always remains their asymptote, is also the reason why nothing good is accomplished by them in art. If the singer, or virtuoso, wants to guide his performance by reflection, he stays dead. The same holds for the composer, the painter, indeed the poet: for art the concept always remains unfruitful. It may guide only the technical side in art; its domain is science. In the third book we will investigate more closely why all genuine art comes from intuitive cognition, never from the concept.—Even with regard to conduct, to personal agreeableness in company, the concept is good only negatively, to hold back the coarse outbursts of egoism and bestiality, as politeness is its praiseworthy work. But what is attractive, graceful and winning in conduct, what is loving and friendly, must not have come from the concept: otherwise "one feels intention and is out of sorts."—All dissimulation is the work of reflection. But it cannot be kept up for long and without interruption: nemo potest personam diu ferre fictam, says Seneca, in the book de clementia. It is also then mostly recognized and misses its effect. In the press of life, where quick decisions, bold action, swift and firm seizing are needed, reason is indeed necessary. But if it gains the upper hand, confusingly hinders the intuitive, immediate, purely understanding discovery and at the same time seizing of the right thing, and brings about indecision, it can easily spoil everything.

Finally, virtue and holiness too come not from reflection but from the inner depth of the will and its relation to knowing. This discussion belongs in a quite different place in this work. I may remark here only this much: the dogmas that relate to ethics can be the same in the reason of whole nations, yet the acting in each individual is different, and conversely too. Acting happens, as people say, according to feelings, that is, just not according to concepts, namely as to its ethical content. The dogmas occupy idle reason. Acting in the end goes its own way independent of them, mostly not by abstract maxims but by unspoken ones, whose expression is the whole person themself. Therefore, however differ-

ent the religious dogmas of peoples are, in all of them the good deed is accompanied by unspeakable satisfaction, the evil one by endless horror. No mockery shakes the former; no absolution by the father confessor frees anyone from the latter. Yet this is not meant to deny that using reason is necessary in carrying through a virtuous way of life. It is only not its source. Its function is a subordinate one, namely preserving resolutions once made, holding the maxims before one, for resisting the weakness of the moment and for consistency in acting. In the end it does the same in art, where it likewise can do nothing in the main thing but supports the execution, precisely because genius is not at one's command at every hour, and yet the work should be completed in all its parts and rounded into a whole[33].

13 All these remarks on the use and the harm of reason are meant to make one thing clear. Abstract knowledge is the reflection of the intuitive representation and is built on it. But it does not match it so closely that it could take [34] See chapter 7 of the second volume. the place of it everywhere. In fact it never corresponds to it quite exactly. So, as we have seen, many human activities can be done only with the help of reason and careful deliberation, while a few are done better without it.—This same incongruity between intuitive and abstract cognition, which lets abstract cognition come near the intuitive only as mosaic work comes near painting, is also the reason for a very remarkable phenomenon. Like reason, it belongs to human nature alone. All the explanations of it that have been tried so far are inadequate. I mean laughter. Because laughter comes from this source, we cannot avoid discussing it here, even though it holds up our progress once more. Laughter always arises from nothing other than the suddenly perceived incongruity between a concept and the real objects that were thought through it in some respect. It is itself only the expression of this incongruity. Often the incongruity comes out like this: two or more real objects are thought through one concept, and the identity of the concept is carried over to them. Then a complete difference between them in everything else shows that the concept fitted them only from one side. Just as often, though, it is a single real object whose incongruity with the concept suddenly becomes

noticeable, an object that was rightly subsumed under that concept in one respect. Now, the more correct the subsumption of such realities under the concept is, and the greater and more glaring their unsuitability to it, the stronger is the effect of the ridiculous that comes from this contrast. So every laugh arises on the occasion of a paradoxical and therefore unexpected subsumption. It makes no difference whether this shows itself in words or in deeds. That, in short, is the correct explanation of the ridiculous.

I will not stop here to tell anecdotes as examples to illustrate my explanation. It is so simple and easy to grasp that it does not need them, and any ridiculous thing the reader remembers will serve equally well as proof. But our explanation does gain confirmation and illustration together from showing the two kinds of the ridiculous into which it divides, which follow directly from the explanation. Either two or more very different real objects, intuitive representations, came first in cognition, and one arbitrarily identifies them through the unity of a concept that takes in both. This kind of the ridiculous is called wit. Or, the other way around, the concept comes first in cognition, and one then passes from it to reality and to acting on reality, that is, to action. Objects that are otherwise completely different, but are all thought in that concept, are now looked at and treated in the same way. At last their great difference in other respects comes out, to the surprise and astonishment of the person acting. This kind of the ridiculous is called *folly*. So every ridiculous thing is either a witty idea or a foolish action, depending on whether the movement went from the difference of the objects to the identity of the concept, or the other way around. The first is always voluntary, the second always involuntary and forced on one from outside. To reverse this starting point in appearance, and to disguise wit as folly, is the art of the court jester and the buffoon. Such a man is well aware of how different the objects are. With hidden wit he unites them under one concept. Starting from that concept, he then gets, from the difference he afterwards finds in the objects, the very surprise that he had prepared for himself.—From this short but sufficient theory of the ridiculous it follows that, setting aside this last case of the jester, wit must always show itself in

words. Folly shows itself mostly in actions, though it can also show itself in words: when it only announces its plan instead of really carrying it out, or when it appears in mere judgments and opinions.

Pedantry also belongs to folly. It comes from having little confidence in one's own understanding. So one does not want to leave it to recognize the right thing directly in the single case. One puts it entirely under the guardianship of reason and wants to use reason everywhere. That means always starting from general concepts, rules and maxims and keeping strictly to them, in life, in art, even in ethical conduct. Hence the clinging to form, to manner, to expression and to the word that is typical of pedantry. In pedantry these take the place of the essence of the matter. Soon the incongruity of the concept with reality shows itself. It shows that the concept never comes down to the particular, and that its generality and rigid definiteness can never fit exactly the fine shades and many variations of reality. So the pedant with his general maxims almost always falls short in life. He shows himself unwise, tasteless and useless. In art, for which the concept is barren, he produces lifeless, stiff, mannered, misbegotten works. Even in ethics, the resolve to act rightly or nobly cannot always be carried out by abstract maxims. In many cases the infinitely fine shading of the circumstances requires a choice of the right action that comes directly from character. Applying merely abstract maxims partly gives false results, because they fit only half. It also partly cannot be carried through, because the maxims are foreign to the individual character of the person acting, and that character can never be wholly denied. Inconsistencies then follow. We cannot quite clear Kant of the charge of having given occasion for moral pedantry, insofar as he makes it a condition of the moral worth of an action that it be done from purely rational, abstract maxims, without any inclination or momentary impulse. This charge is also the sense of Schiller's epigram titled "Scruples of Conscience."—When people talk, especially in political affairs, about doctrinaires, theorists, scholars and so on, pedants are meant: people who know things in abstracto but not in concreto. Abstraction consists in thinking away the closer determinations. But in practice a great deal depends on exactly these.

To complete the theory, one more bastard kind of wit must still be mentioned: the play on words, calembourg, pun. The double meaning, l'équivoque, can be counted with it, and its chief use is for the obscene (the dirty joke). Wit forces two very different real objects under one concept. The pun, by making use of chance, brings two different concepts under one word. The same contrast arises again, but much weaker and more superficial, because it comes not from the nature of things but from the accident of naming. In wit the identity is in the concept and the difference is in reality. In the pun the difference is in the concepts and the identity is in reality, since the sound of the word belongs to reality. It would be only a somewhat forced comparison to say that the pun is to wit as the parabola of the upper, inverted cone is to that of the lower. But the misunderstanding of a word, the quid pro quo, is the involuntary calembourg. It stands to the pun just as folly stands to wit. So a person who is hard of hearing, like a fool, must often supply material for laughter, and bad comedy writers use the one instead of the other to raise a laugh.

I have looked at laughter here only from the psychic side. For the physical side I refer to what is said about it in Parerga, vol. 2, ch. 6, § 96, p. 134 (first edition)[35].

14 I hope these many considerations have made completely clear the difference and the relation between two things. On one side is the mode of knowledge of reason, abstract knowledge, the concept. On the other is immediate cognition in purely sensuous, mathematical intuition and the grasping by the understanding. I have also given episodic discussions of feeling and of laughter, to which the study of this remarkable relation between our modes of knowledge led us almost unavoidably.—Now I return to the further discussion of science. Next to language and considered action, science is the third advantage that reason gives to man. The general account of science that we have to give here will concern partly its form, partly the grounding of its judgments, and finally also its content.

36 See chapter 8 of the second volume.

We have seen that, apart from the basis of pure logic, no knowledge has its origin in reason itself. It is won elsewhere as intuitive cognition and is deposited in reason, passing over in this way into a quite different mode of knowledge, the abstract one. All knowledge, that is, cognition raised to consciousness in abstracto, stands to real science as a fragment to the whole. Every person has gained knowledge of various things through experience, by looking at the particular things that present themselves. But only the person who sets themselves the task of getting complete cognition in abstracto of some kind of object strives for science. That kind can be picked out only through a concept. So at the head of every science stands a concept, through which is thought that part of the whole of all things of which the science promises complete cognition in abstracto. Examples are the concept of spatial relations, or of the action of inorganic bodies on each other, or of the nature of plants, or of animals, or of the successive changes of the earth's surface, or of the changes of the human race as a whole, or of the structure of a language, and so on. Suppose a science tried to get knowledge of its object by investigating one by one all the things thought through the concept, until it had gradually come to know the whole. Then no human memory would be enough, and no certainty of completeness could be reached. So the science uses the peculiarity of concept spheres discussed above, that they include one another. It goes mainly for the wider spheres that lie within the concept of its object as a whole. Once it has determined how these relate to one another, everything thought in them is thereby also determined in general, and can then be determined more and more exactly by picking out ever narrower concept spheres. This makes it possible for a science to take in its whole object. This route to cognition, from the general to the particular, distinguishes science from ordinary knowledge. So the systematic form is an essential and characteristic mark of science. The connection of the most general concept spheres of every science, that is, knowledge of its highest propositions, is an unavoidable condition of learning it. How far one wants to go from these to the more particular propositions is up to one, and does not increase thoroughness, only the extent of one's learning.—The number of highest propositions, to which all the rest are subordinate, differs greatly in the different sciences. In

some there is more subordination, in others more coordination. In this respect the former make more demand on the power of judgment, the latter on memory. The Scholastics already knew[37] that, since an inference needs two premises, no science can start from a single highest proposition that cannot be derived further. It must have several, at least two. The properly classifying sciences, zoology and botany, and also physics and chemistry insofar as these reduce all inorganic action to a few fundamental forces, have the most subordination. History, on the other hand, really has none at all. What is general in it is only the overview of the main periods, and the particular events cannot be derived from these. They are subordinate to them only in time, and coordinate with them as to the concept. So history, strictly speaking, is knowledge but not a science. In mathematics, in Euclid's treatment, the axioms are indeed the only highest propositions that cannot be demonstrated, and all the demonstrations are strictly subordinated to them step by step. But this treatment is not essential to mathematics. In fact every theorem begins a new spatial construction, which is in itself independent of the earlier ones. It can really also be known quite independently of them, from itself, in the pure intuition of space. In that intuition even the most complicated construction is really as immediately evident as the axiom. More on this in detail below. Meanwhile every mathematical proposition remains a general truth that holds for countless single cases. A stepwise progress from the simple propositions to the complicated ones that can be traced back to them is also essential to it. So mathematics is in every respect a science.—The [38] Suarez, Disput. metaphysicae, disp. III, sect. 3, tit. 3.
perfection of a science as such, that is, in its form, consists in having as much subordination and as little coordination of propositions as possible. So the general scientific talent is the ability to subordinate concept spheres according to their different determinations. The reason is that, as Plato recommends repeatedly, a science should not consist of one general thing with an unmanageable variety of things set side by side directly beneath it. Knowledge should instead come down gradually from the most general to the particular, through middle concepts and through divisions made according to ever closer determinations. In Kant's terms, this means satisfying equally the law of homogeneity and the

law of specification. But from the very fact that this makes up the real scientific perfection, it follows that the aim of science is not greater certainty. Even the most isolated single piece of cognition can have certainty just as well. The aim is instead to make knowledge easier through its form, and so to make completeness of knowledge possible. It is therefore a common but mistaken opinion that the scientific character of cognition consists in greater certainty. The claim that follows from this, that only mathematics and logic are sciences in the proper sense, is just as false. That claim rests on the idea that only in them, because they are wholly a priori, is there unshakable certainty of cognition. This advantage cannot be denied them. But it gives them no special claim to being scientific, since being scientific lies not in certainty but in the systematic form of cognition, which rests on descending step by step from the general to the particular.—This path of cognition, from the general to the particular, which is peculiar to the sciences, has the result that in them much is grounded by derivation from earlier propositions, that is, by proofs. This gave rise to the old error that only what is proved is perfectly true and that every truth needs a proof. In fact the opposite is the case: every proof needs an unproved truth that in the end supports it, or supports its proofs in turn. So a truth grounded directly is to be preferred to one grounded by a proof, as water from the spring is to water from the aqueduct. Intuition is the source of all truth and the foundation of all science. It is partly pure and a priori, as the intuition that grounds mathematics, and partly empirical and a posteriori, as the intuition that grounds all the other sciences. (The one exception is logic, which is founded on reason's non-intuitive but still immediate knowledge of its own laws.) In science, the judgments that are drawn directly from intuition and are founded on it in place of any proof are what the sun is in the universe. It is not the proved judgments, and not their proofs. All the light comes from those first judgments, and the other judgments shine by being lit from them. To ground the truth of such first judgments directly in intuition, and to lift such foundations of science out of the immense multitude of real things, is the work of the power of judgment. The power of judgment consists in the ability to transfer what is known intuitively, correctly and exactly, into abstract consciousness. It is there-

fore the mediator between understanding and reason. Only an outstanding strength of it in an individual, beyond the ordinary measure, can really carry the sciences further. But anyone with sound reason can deduce propositions from propositions, prove, and infer. What the power of judgment does is different. It takes what is known intuitively and sets it down and fixes it in suitable concepts for reflection. What many real objects have in common is thought through one concept, and what is different in them is thought through as many concepts. So the different, despite a partial agreement, is still known and thought as different, and the identical, despite a partial difference, is still known and thought as identical, all according to the purpose and the point of view that prevail in each case. The power of judgment does all this. Lack of it is simple-mindedness. The simpleton sometimes fails to see the partial or relative difference in things that are identical in one respect, and sometimes the identity in things that are relatively or partly different. Besides, Kant's division of the power of judgment into reflecting and subsuming can also be applied to this explanation of it. It depends on whether judgment passes from the intuitive objects to the concept, or from the concept to them. In both cases it always mediates between the intuitive cognition of the understanding and the reflective cognition of reason.—There can be no truth that could be brought out absolutely by inferences alone. The necessity of grounding a truth merely by inferences is always only relative, indeed subjective. All proofs are inferences. So for a new truth one should look first not for a proof but for immediate evidence, and one should set up the proof only for as long as that evidence is lacking, and only for the time being. No science can be provable through and through, any more than a building can stand in the air. All its proofs must lead back to something intuitive that therefore can no longer be proved. For the whole world of reflection rests and is rooted on the intuitive world. All final, that is, original, evidence is intuitive. The word itself reveals this. So this evidence is either empirical or founded on the a priori intuition of the conditions of possible experience. In both cases it supplies only immanent, not transcendent, cognition. Every concept has its worth and its existence only in its relation, however indirect, to an intuitive representation. What holds for concepts

also holds for the judgments composed from them and for whole sciences. So it must somehow be possible to know directly, without proofs and inferences, every truth that is found by inference and communicated by proofs. This is certainly hardest with some complicated mathematical propositions that we reach only through chains of inference, for example the calculation of the chords and tangents for all arcs, by inferences from the Pythagorean theorem. But even such a truth cannot rest essentially and solely on abstract propositions. The spatial relations at its base must also be capable of being brought out for pure a priori intuition in such a way that their abstract statement is directly grounded. But proof in mathematics will be discussed in detail very soon.

People often talk, and in a lofty tone, about sciences that rest throughout on correct inferences from certain premises and are therefore supposedly unshakably true. But by purely logical chains of inference, however true the premises, one never gets more than a clarification and elaboration of what already lies ready in the premises. One only sets out explicitly what was understood implicitly there. By those praised sciences, however, people mean especially the mathematical ones, above all astronomy. But the certainty of astronomy comes from the fact that it rests on the a priori given, and therefore infallible, intuition of space. All spatial relations follow one from another with a necessity (ground of being) that supplies a priori certainty, and so they can be derived from one another with certainty. To these mathematical determinations only a single force of nature is added here, gravity, which acts exactly in proportion to the masses and to the square of the distance. Besides that there is the law of inertia, which is secured a priori because it follows from the law of causality, together with the empirical datum of the motion impressed once and for all on each of these masses. This is the whole material of astronomy. Through both its simplicity and its certainty it leads to firm results, which, because of the size and importance of its objects, are very interesting. For example, if I know the mass of a planet and the distance of its satellite from it, I can infer the satellite's period of revolution with certainty, by Kepler's second law. The ground of this law, however, is that at this distance only this velocity both binds the satellite to the planet and keeps it from falling into it.—So only on such a geometrical

foundation, that is, by means of an intuition a priori, and moreover with application of a law of nature, can one get far with inferences. Here they are, so to speak, merely bridges from one intuitive grasp to another. It is not the same with mere, pure inferences on the exclusively logical path.—The origin of the first basic truths of astronomy, however, is really induction, that is, the gathering of what is given in many intuitions into one correct, directly grounded judgment. Hypotheses are formed from this afterward, and their confirmation by experience, as an induction approaching completeness, gives the proof of that first judgment. For example, the apparent motion of the planets is known empirically. After many false hypotheses about the spatial connection of this motion (the planetary orbit), the correct one was finally found. Then came the laws it follows (Kepler's), and last also their cause (universal gravitation). The empirically known agreement of all occurring cases with all these hypotheses and with the consequences drawn from them, that is, induction, gave all of them perfect certainty. Finding the hypothesis was the business of the power of judgment, which grasped the given fact correctly and expressed it accordingly. Induction, that is, manifold intuition, confirmed its truth. But this truth could even be grounded directly, by a single empirical intuition, as soon as we could travel freely through the spaces of the universe and had telescopic eyes. So here too inferences are not the essential and only source of cognition, but are always really only a makeshift.

Finally, to give a third and quite different example, let us note that even the so-called metaphysical truths, that is, those that Kant sets out in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, do not owe their evidence to proofs. What is certain a priori, we know directly. As the form of all cognition it is present in our consciousness with the greatest necessity. For example, that matter persists, that is, can neither come into being nor pass away, we know directly as a negative truth. Our pure intuition of space and time gives the possibility of motion. The understanding, in the law of causality, gives the possibility of change of form and quality. But for matter to come into being or vanish, we lack the forms of representability. So that truth has been evident at all times, everywhere and to everyone, and has never seriously been doubted. That could not be so if

its ground of cognition were nothing other than such a difficult Kantian proof, which walks along on needle points. Moreover, I have found Kant's proof false (as I set out in the Appendix), and I showed above that the persistence of matter is to be derived not from the share that time has in the possibility of experience but from the share that space has. The real grounding of all truths that are called metaphysical in this sense, that is, abstract expressions of the necessary and general forms of knowing, cannot again lie in abstract propositions. It can lie only in the immediate consciousness of the forms of representing, which makes itself known through a priori statements that are apodictic and fear no refutation. If one still wants to give a proof of them, it can only consist in showing that the truth to be proved is already contained, as a part or as a presupposition, in some truth that is not doubted. For example, I have shown that all empirical intuition already contains the application of the law of causality. Knowledge of that law is therefore a condition of all experience, and so cannot be first given and conditioned by experience, as Hume claimed.—Proofs are in general less for those who want to learn than for those who want to dispute. These stubbornly deny insight that is directly grounded. Only truth can be consistent on all sides. So one must show them that they admit, in one form and indirectly, what they deny in another form and directly. That is, one must show the logically necessary connection between what they deny and what they admit.

Besides this, the scientific form, namely the subordination of everything particular under something general, and so on continually upward, also has the result that the truth of many propositions is grounded only logically, namely by their dependence on other propositions, that is, by inferences that at the same time appear as proofs. But one should never forget that this whole form is only a means of making cognition easier, not a means to greater certainty. It is easier to know the nature of an animal from the species it belongs to, and so upward from the genus, the family, the order and the class, than to investigate each animal given on its own. But the truth of all propositions derived by inferences is always only conditional and in the end depends on some truth that rests not on inferences but on intuition. If this latter were always as close to us as derivation

by an inference, it would be altogether preferable. For all derivation from concepts is open to many deceptions, because of the many ways the spheres interlock, shown above, and the often wavering determination of their content. The many proofs of false doctrines and sophisms of every kind are examples of this. —Inferences are indeed completely certain in form. But they are very uncertain through their matter, the concepts. This is partly because the spheres of the concepts are often not sharply enough determined, and partly because they cross one another in so many ways that one sphere is partly contained in many others. So one can pass from it arbitrarily into one or another of these, and from there on again, as already shown. Or in other words: the terminus minor and also the medius can always be subordinated to different concepts, and from these one can choose the terminus major and the medius at will, and the inference then comes out differently.—So everywhere immediate evidence is far preferable to proved truth. Proof should be accepted only where evidence would have to be fetched from too far away, and not where it lies just as near or even nearer than the proof. So we saw above that in logic, where immediate cognition is nearer to us in every single case than the derived scientific kind, we always guide our thinking only by immediate knowledge of the laws of thought, and leave logic unused[39].

15 Here are our convictions. Intuition is the first source of all evidence. Absolute truth consists only in a direct or mediated relation to intuition. The nearest path to truth is always the surest, since every mediation through concepts exposes us to many deceptions.—With these convictions, I say, let us turn to mathematics, as Euclid set it up as a science and as it has remained on the whole to this day. We cannot help finding the path it takes strange, even perverse. We demand that every logical grounding be traced back to an intuitive one. Mathematics, by contrast, works hard to throw away, willfully, its own intuitive[40] See chapter 12 of the second volume. evidence, which is near at hand everywhere, in order to put a logical evidence in its place. We have to find that this is like someone cutting off their legs so as to walk on crutches, or like the prince in the "Triumph of Sensibility," who runs away from real, beautiful

nature to enjoy a stage set that imitates it.—I must recall here what I said in the sixth chapter of the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason. I assume it is fresh in the reader's mind and fully present, so that I can attach my remarks to it here without explaining again the difference between two things. One is the mere ground of cognition of a mathematical truth, which can be given logically. The other is the ground of being, which is the direct connection of the parts of space and of time, a connection that can be known only intuitively. Insight into the ground of being alone gives true satisfaction and thorough knowledge, while the mere ground of cognition always stays on the surface. It can give knowledge that something is so, but never why it is so. Euclid took this latter path, to the obvious harm of science. Take the very beginning, for example. There he should have shown once and for all how, in a triangle, angles and sides determine one another and are ground and consequence of one another. That follows the form that the principle of sufficient reason has in mere space, which there, as everywhere, gives the necessity that one thing is as it is because another, wholly different thing is as it is. Instead of giving thorough insight into the nature of the triangle in this way, he sets up a few disconnected propositions about the triangle, chosen at will, and gives a logical ground of cognition for them, by a laborious proof led logically according to the principle of contradiction. Instead of exhaustive cognition of these spatial relations, one therefore gets only a few results from them, handed over at will. One is in the position of someone who is shown the various effects of an ingenious machine but is kept from seeing its inner connection and mechanism. That everything Euclid demonstrates is so, one must admit, forced by the principle of contradiction. But why it is so, one does not learn. So one has almost the uneasy feeling that follows a conjuror's trick, and in fact most of Euclid's proofs are strikingly like one. Almost always the truth comes in by the back door, turning up per accidens from some side circumstance. Often an apagogic proof shuts all the doors one after another and leaves only one open, through which one must go for that reason alone. Often, as in the Pythagorean theorem, lines are drawn without one knowing why. Afterward it turns out they were nooses that suddenly draw tight and take the learner's assent captive. The learner must then admit in

amazement what remains completely unintelligible to them in its inner connection. So much so that they can study the whole of Euclid without gaining real insight into the laws of spatial relations, and learn by heart a few results from them instead. This kind of cognition, really empirical and unscientific, is like that of the doctor who knows the illness and the remedy for it but not the connection between the two. All this is the result of whimsically rejecting the mode of grounding and evidence that is peculiar to a kind of cognition and forcibly bringing in, in its place, one that is foreign to its nature. Still, the way Euclid carried this through deserves all the admiration it has received for so many centuries. The admiration went so far that his treatment of mathematics was declared the model of all scientific presentation, and people even tried to mold all the other sciences on it. Later they turned back from this without quite knowing why. In our eyes, however, that method of Euclid's in mathematics can only appear as a very brilliant perversity. Now, of every great error that is pursued deliberately and methodically and is moreover accompanied by general applause, whether it concerns life or science, the ground can always be traced to the philosophy that ruled at the time.—The Eleatics were the first to discover the difference, indeed the frequent conflict, between what is perceived, φαινομενον, and what is thought, νοουμενον[41], and had made much use of it [42] Kant's misuse of these Greek expressions, which is censured in the Appendix, must not be thought of here at all. in many ways for their philosophical doctrines and also for sophisms. Later the Megarians, Dialecticians, Sophists, New Academics and Skeptics followed them. These drew attention to illusion, that is, to the deception of the senses, or rather of the understanding that turns their data into intuition. This deception often lets us see things whose reality reason denies with certainty, for example the stick that looks broken in water, and the like. People recognized that sensuous intuition cannot be trusted without condition, and hastily concluded that only rational, logical thinking grounds truth. Yet Plato (in the Parmenides), the Megarians, Pyrrho and the New Academics showed through examples (in the way Sextus Empiricus did later) how, on the other side, inferences and concepts also lead astray. They even produce paralogisms and sophisms that arise much more eas-

ily and are much harder to resolve than illusion in sensuous intuition. Meanwhile this rationalism, which had arisen in opposition to empiricism, kept the upper hand. In accordance with it Euclid worked up mathematics, resting on intuitive evidence (φαινομενον) only the axioms, out of necessity, and everything else on inferences (νοουμενον). His method stayed dominant through all the centuries, and had to stay so as long as pure a priori intuition was not distinguished from the empirical. Euclid's commentator Proclus seems indeed to have recognized this difference fully, as is shown by the passage of that commentator that Kepler translated into Latin in his book de harmonia mundi. But Proclus did not put enough weight on the point, stated it too much in isolation, went unnoticed and did not break through. So only two thousand years later will the teaching of Kant, which is destined to bring such great changes in all the knowing, thinking and doing of the European peoples, bring about such a change in mathematics too. Only after we have learned from this great mind that the intuitions of space and time are wholly different from the empirical intuition, wholly independent of every impression on the senses, conditioning it and not conditioned by it, that is, a priori, and therefore not open to deception of the senses at all—only now can we see that Euclid's logical treatment of mathematics is a useless precaution, a crutch for healthy legs. It is like a traveler who at night takes a bright, firm road for water, is careful not to step on it, and keeps walking beside it on rough ground, content to bump from stretch to stretch against the imagined water. Only now can we say with certainty that what announces itself to us as necessary in the intuition of a figure does not come from the figure, which may be drawn very badly on paper. It does not come from the abstract concept we think in connection with it either. It comes directly from the form of all cognition that we are conscious of a priori. This form is everywhere the principle of sufficient reason. Here, as the form of intuition, that is, space, it is the principle of the ground of being. Its evidence and validity are as great and as direct as those of the principle of the ground of cognition, that is, logical certainty. So to trust the latter alone we neither need nor may leave the proper territory of mathematics, to vouch for mathematics on a ground wholly foreign to it, that of concepts. If we stay on

the ground that is proper to mathematics, we gain the great advantage that in it knowing that something is so becomes one with knowing why it is so. The Euclidean method, instead, separates the two completely and lets us know only the first, not the second. Aristotle, however, says this very well, in Analyt. post. I, 27: "Ακριβεστερα δ' επιστημη επιστημης και προτερα, ήτε του οτι και του διοτι ή αυτη, αλλα μη χωρις του οτι, της του διοτι." (Subtilior autem et praestantior ea est scientia, quâ quod aliquid sit, et cur sit una simulque intelligimus, non separatim quod, et cur sit.) In physics too we are satisfied only when the cognition that something is so is united with the cognition of why it is so. That the mercury in the Torricellian tube stands 28 inches high is poor knowledge unless we add that it is held there by the counterweight of the air. But in mathematics, are we to be content with the qualitas occulta of the circle, that the segments of any two chords intersecting in it always form equal rectangles? That it is so, Euclid proves in the 35th proposition of the third book. The why remains open. In the same way, the Pythagorean theorem teaches us a qualitas occulta of the right-angled triangle. Euclid's stilted, even sly proof abandons us when it comes to the why. The simple figure beside it, already familiar, gives at a glance far more than that proof does: insight into the matter and a firm inner conviction of that necessity and of the dependence of that property on the right angle.




Diagram for the Pythagorean theorem: a shaded right isosceles triangle at the top of a square that holds four of them, with two tilted squares on the sides holding two each

For unequal legs too, it must be possible to bring it to such an intuitive conviction, as with every possible geometrical truth. The reason is that the finding of a geometrical truth always started from such an intuited necessity and the proof was thought up only afterward. So one needs only an analysis of the train of thought at the first discovery of a geometrical truth in order to know its necessity intuitively. In general it is the analytic method that I wish for the teaching of mathematics, instead of the synthetic one that Euclid used. Admittedly, with complicated mathematical truths this will meet very great, though not insurmountable, difficulties. Here and there in Germany people are already beginning to change the teaching of mathematics and to go more along this analytic path. Herr Kosack, teacher of mathematics and physics at the Gymnasium in Nordhausen, has done this most decisively. He attached to the program for the school examination of April 6, 1852 a detailed attempt to treat geometry according to my principles.

To improve the method of mathematics, what is needed above all is to give up the prejudice that proved truth has any advantage over truth known intuitively, or that the logical truth, which rests on the principle of contradiction, has any

advantage over the metaphysical truth, which is immediately evident and to which the pure intuition of space also belongs.


The most certain thing, and the thing that can never be explained, is the content of the principle of sufficient reason. In its various forms it designates the general form of all our representations and cognitions. All explanation is a tracing back to it, a showing in the single case of the connection of representations that it expresses in general. It is therefore the principle of all explanation, and so is neither capable of explanation nor in need of it, since every explanation already presupposes it and gets its meaning only through it. Now none of its forms has an advantage over another. It is equally certain and unprovable as the principle of the ground of being, or of becoming, or of acting, or of knowing. The relation of ground to consequence is a necessary one, in every one of its forms. It is in fact the origin, and the only meaning, of the concept of necessity. There is no other necessity than that of the consequence when the ground is given, and there is no ground that would not bring with it the necessity of the consequence. So surely as the consequence stated in the conclusion flows from the ground of cognition given in the premises, just so surely does the ground of being in space condition its consequence in space. If I have known the relation of the two intuitively, this certainty is as great as any logical certainty. Every geometrical theorem, just like any of the twelve axioms, is the expression of such a relation. It is a metaphysical truth, and as such it is as immediately certain as the principle of contradiction itself, which is a metalogical truth and the general basis of all logical proof. Whoever denies the necessity, shown intuitively, of the spatial relations stated in any theorem can with equal right deny the axioms, and with equal right the consequence of the conclusion from the premises, even the principle of contradiction itself. For all these are equally unprovable, immediately evident relations that can be known a priori. So if one wants to derive the intuitively knowable necessity of spatial relations first by a logical proof from the principle of contradiction, it is just as if a second man wanted to grant as a fief a country to the man who already rules it directly. But this is what Euclid has done. Only his axioms, out of necessity, does he let rest on immediate evidence. All the following geometrical truths are proved logically.

That is, on the assumption of those axioms, they are proved from agreement with the assumptions made in the theorem, or with an earlier theorem, or else from the contradiction of the opposite of the theorem with the assumptions, the axioms, the earlier theorems, or even with itself. But the axioms themselves do not have more immediate evidence than any other geometrical theorem. They have only more simplicity, through lesser content.

When one questions an accused person, one takes down their statements in a record, in order to judge their truth from how well they agree. But this is a mere makeshift, and one does not stop at it if one can investigate directly the truth of each statement by itself, especially since the accused could have lied consistently from the start. That first method, however, is the one by which Euclid investigated space. He did start from the correct assumption that nature must be consistent everywhere, so also in its basic form, space. Because the parts of space stand to each other as ground and consequence, no single spatial determination can be other than it is without contradicting all the others. But this is a very troublesome and unsatisfying roundabout way. It prefers mediated cognition to the equally certain immediate cognition. It separates the cognition *that* something is from the cognition *why* it is, to the great harm of science. And in the end it completely withholds from the learner insight into the laws of space. It even weans the learner from really investigating the ground and the inner connection of things, and leads them instead to be satisfied with a historical knowledge that it is so. The exercise of sharpness of mind that is so ceaselessly praised in this method consists merely in the student practicing inference, that is, applying the principle of contradiction, and especially in straining their memory to hold all the data whose agreement has to be compared.

It is, by the way, remarkable that this method of proof has been applied only to geometry and not to arithmetic. In arithmetic one really lets the truth become clear by intuition alone, which here consists in mere counting. The intuition of numbers is in *time alone* and so cannot be represented by any sensuous schema, as the geometrical figure can. So the suspicion fell away here that the intuition is only empirical and therefore subject to illusion. That suspicion alone could bring the logical kind of proof into geometry. Because time has only one


dimension, counting is the only arithmetical operation to which all the others can be reduced. And this counting is nothing other than intuition a priori. Here people have no hesitation in appealing to it, and by it alone everything else, every calculation, every equation, is finally confirmed. For example, one does not prove that



$$\frac{7+9\times 8-2}{3}=42;$$

Formula printed on page 90: seven plus nine, that sum times eight, minus two, all over three, equals forty-two, then a semicolon

but one appeals to the pure intuition in time, to counting, and so makes every single proposition an axiom. Instead of the proofs that fill geometry, the whole content of arithmetic and algebra is therefore a mere method of shortening counting. Our immediate intuition of numbers in time reaches no further, as mentioned above, than about ten. Beyond that, an abstract concept of the number, fixed by a word, must take the place of intuition, which is then no longer really carried out but only designated quite definitely. Even so, though, through the important aid of the order of numbers, which lets larger numbers always be represented by the same small ones, an intuitive evidence of every calculation is made possible. This holds even where abstraction is called in so heavily that not only the numbers but indeterminate quantities and whole operations are thought only in abstracto and designated in that way, as in



$$\sqrt{r-{}^{b}},$$

Formula printed on page 90: a square-root sign over r minus a small raised letter the scan leaves unclear, then a comma

so that one no longer carries them out but only indicates them.

With the same right and the same certainty as in arithmetic, one could also let truth in geometry be grounded by pure intuition a priori alone. In fact it is always this necessity, known intuitively according to the principle of the ground of being, that gives geometry its great evidence, and on which the certainty of its propositions rests in everyone's consciousness. It is by no means the logical proof walking along on stilts. This proof is always foreign to the matter. It is mostly soon forgotten without harm to conviction, and it could drop out entirely without lessening the evidence of geometry, because that evidence is wholly independent of it. The proof always proves only what one already, by another mode of cognition, fully believes. In this respect it is like a cowardly soldier who inflicts one more wound on an enemy already killed by others, and then boasts of having killed the enemy[43].

From all this it will hopefully be open to no further doubt that the evidence of mathematics, which has become the model and symbol of all evidence, rests in its essence not on proofs but on immediate intuition, which here, as everywhere, is the last ground and the source of all truth. Yet the intuition that underlies mathematics has a great advantage over every other, that is, over the empirical. For since it is a priori, and therefore independent of experience, which is always given only partially and in succession, everything lies equally near to it, and one can start at will from the ground or from the consequence. This gives it complete infallibility, because in it the consequence is known from the ground, and only this knowledge has necessity. For example, the equality of the sides is known [44] Spinoza, who always boasts of proceeding more geometrico, has in fact done this even more than he himself knew. For what was certain and settled for him from an immediate, intuitive grasp of the essence of the world, he tries to demonstrate logically, independently of that cognition. He reaches the intended result, which was certain to him beforehand, only by taking as his starting point arbitrary concepts of his own making (substantia, causa sui, and so on), and by allowing himself in his proofs all those arbitrary

moves that the nature of wide concept spheres conveniently offers. So the true and most excellent part of his teaching is also quite independent of the proofs in his case, just as in geometry.

See chapter 13 of the second volume. as grounded in the equality of the angles. In all empirical intuition, and in the greatest part of all experience, by contrast, the movement goes only the other way, from the consequence to the ground. This mode of cognition is not infallible. Necessity belongs only to the consequence, insofar as the ground is given. It does not belong to the cognition of the ground from the consequence, because the same consequence can arise from different grounds. This latter kind of cognition is always only induction: that is, from many consequences that point to a ground, the ground is assumed as certain. But since the cases can never be all together, truth here is also never unconditionally certain. Yet only this kind of truth belongs to all cognition through sensuous intuition and to nearly all experience. The affection of a sense gives occasion to an inference of the understanding from the effect to the cause. But since the inference from the grounded to the ground is never safe, false illusion, as deception of the senses, is possible and often real, as set out above. Only when several or all five senses receive affections that point to the same cause does the possibility of illusion become extremely small. Even then it is still there. For in certain cases, for example with false coin, one deceives the whole of sensibility. All empirical cognition is in the same case, and so is the whole of natural science, setting aside its pure part (metaphysical, according to Kant). Here too the causes are known from the effects. So all natural science rests on hypotheses that are often false and then gradually make room for more correct ones. Only in experiments set up on purpose does cognition go from the cause to the effect, that is, the safe way. But these experiments are themselves undertaken only as a result of hypotheses. For this reason no branch of natural science, for example physics, or astronomy, or physiology, could be found all at once, as mathematics or logic could. It needed, and still needs, the collected and compared experiences of many centuries. Only manifold empirical confirmation brings the induction on which the hypothesis rests so near to completeness that for practice it takes the place of certainty. The origin of the

hypothesis is then considered as little harmful as the incommensurability of straight and curved lines is to the application of geometry, or the unattainable perfect exactness of the logarithm is to arithmetic. For the squaring of the circle and the logarithm are brought infinitely near to exactness by infinite fractions. In the same way, induction, that is, cognition of the ground from the consequences, is brought by manifold experience near to mathematical evidence, that is, cognition of the consequence from the ground. It is not brought infinitely near, but near enough that the possibility of deception becomes small enough to be neglected. It is still there, though. For example, the inference from countless cases to all cases, that is, really to the unknown ground on which all depend, is also an inductive inference. Now what inference of this kind seems surer than that all men have the heart on the left side? Yet there are men whose heart sits on the right side, as extremely rare, wholly isolated exceptions.—Sensuous intuition and empirical science therefore have the same kind of evidence. The advantage that mathematics, pure natural science and logic have over them as cognitions a priori rests only on this: the formal element of cognitions, on which all apriority is founded, is given whole and at once. So here one can always go from the ground to the consequence, there mostly only from the consequence to the ground. In itself, moreover, the law of causality, or the principle of the ground of becoming, which guides empirical cognition, is just as certain as the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason that the above sciences follow a priori.—Logical proofs from concepts, or inferences, have just as much as cognition through intuition a priori the advantage of going from ground to consequence, which makes them infallible in themselves, that is, in their form. This has contributed much to bringing proofs in general into such high repute. But their infallibility is relative. They only subsume under the upper propositions of the science. These upper propositions, however, are what contain the whole fund of truth of the science. They must not themselves be merely proved either, but must be founded on intuition. In those few sciences named, this intuition is pure and a priori. Otherwise it is always empirical and raised to the general only through induction. So even in the empirical sci-

ences, where the particular is proved from the general, the general has in turn received its truth only from the particular. It is only a storehouse of gathered supplies, not a self-producing soil.

So much for the grounding of truth.—On the origin and the possibility of error, many explanations have been tried since Plato's figurative solutions of it, from the dovecote where one seizes the wrong dove, and so on (Theaetet., p. 167 ff.). Kant's vague, indefinite explanation of the origin of error, by means of the image of diagonal motion, is found in the Critique of Pure Reason, p. 294 of the first and p. 350 of the fifth edition.—Since truth is the relation of a judgment to its ground of cognition, it is certainly a problem how a person who judges can really believe they have such a ground and yet have none, that is, how error, the deception of reason, is possible. I find this possibility entirely analogous to that of illusion, or deception of the understanding, which was explained above. My opinion, namely (and this is what gives this explanation its place here), is that every error is an inference from the consequence to the ground. Such an inference holds good where one knows that the consequence can have that ground and absolutely no other, but otherwise not. The person in error either assigns to the consequence a ground it cannot possibly have. In that case they show real lack of understanding, that is, of the capacity for immediate cognition of the connection between cause and effect. Or else, which is more often the case, they assign to the consequence a ground that is indeed possible, but add to the major premise of their inference from consequence to ground that the said consequence always arises only from the ground they have named. Only a complete induction could entitle them to this, but they presuppose it without having made it. That "always" is thus too wide a concept, and in its place only "sometimes" or "mostly" would be allowed to stand. Then the conclusion would turn out problematic and as such would not be erroneous. That the person in error proceeds in the way stated is due either to haste or to too limited a knowledge of the possibility, so that they do not know the necessity of the induction that has to be made. Error is thus quite analogous to illusion. Both are inferences from the consequence to the ground. Illusion is always carried out according to the law of causality and by the mere under-

standing, so directly in intuition itself. Error is carried out by reason, so in real thinking, according to all the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, though most often likewise according to the law of causality, as the following three examples show, which one may regard as types or representatives of three kinds of errors. 1) Illusion of the senses (deception of the understanding) gives occasion to error (deception of reason), for example when one takes a painting for a haut-relief and really believes it is one. This happens by an inference from the following major premise: "When dark gray passes in places through all shades into white, the cause is always light, which strikes raised and sunken parts unequally: ergo—." 2) "When money is missing from my cash box, the cause is always that my servant has a skeleton key: ergo—." 3) "When the image of the sun, refracted through the prism, that is, moved up or down, appears no longer round and white as before but elongated and colored, the cause is once and always that homogeneous rays of light of different color and at the same time of different refrangibility were contained in the light. These, spread apart by their different refrangibility, now show an elongated and at the same time many-colored image: ergo—bibamus!"—Every error must be traceable to an inference of this kind, from a major premise that is hypothetical, that arose from assuming a ground for the consequence, and that is often only falsely generalized. The one exception is perhaps errors of calculation, which are not really errors at all but mere mistakes: the operation that the concepts of the numbers indicated has not been carried out in pure intuition, in counting, but another operation in its place.

As for what the sciences contain, it is always, really, the relation of the world's appearances to one another. That relation follows the principle of sufficient reason and is traced along the thread of the "why," which has validity and meaning only through that principle. Showing such a relation is called explanation. So an explanation can never go further than showing two representations standing to each other in the relation set by the form of the principle of sufficient reason that governs the class they belong to. Once it has got that far, no further "why" can be asked. The relation it has shown is the one that simply cannot be represented in any other way; that is, it is the form of all knowledge.

That is why no one asks why 2 + 2 = 4, or why equal angles in a triangle fix equal sides, or why a given cause is followed by its effect, or why the truth of the conclusion is evident from the truth of the premises. Any explanation that does not lead back to a relation about which no further "why" can be demanded stops at an assumed qualitas occulta. Every original force of nature is of this kind. Every scientific explanation of nature must finally come to a stop at such a force, that is, at something wholly dark. So it must leave the inner nature of a stone just as unexplained as that of a human being. It can give no more account of the gravity, cohesion, chemical properties and so on that the stone shows than of the knowing and acting of the human being. Gravity, for example, is a qualitas occulta. You can think it away, so it does not follow as something necessary from the form of knowing. The law of inertia is different. It follows from the law of causality, so tracing something back to it is a fully sufficient explanation. For two things are absolutely inexplicable, that is, cannot be traced back to the relation that the principle of sufficient reason states. The first is the principle of sufficient reason itself, in all four of its forms, because it is the principle of all explanation, the one thing in relation to which explanation has any meaning at all. The second is what the principle does not reach, but from which the original element in all appearances comes: the thing in itself, whose knowledge is not of the kind that falls under the principle of sufficient reason. This second point has to stay entirely uncomprehended here. It can only become intelligible through the next book, where we will also take up again this look at what the sciences can possibly achieve. But natural science, and in fact every science, leaves things standing at a certain point, because not only its explanation of them but even the principle of that explanation, the principle of sufficient reason, leads no further. There philosophy takes the things up again and considers them in its own way, which is quite different from the way of the sciences.—In the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, §. 51, I showed how, in the various sciences, one or another form of that principle is the main guiding thread. In fact, the most fitting classification of the sciences could perhaps be made on that basis. But every explanation given along such a thread is, as I said, only relative. It explains things in relation to each other, but it always leaves something

unexplained, which it already presupposes. In mathematics this is space and time; in mechanics, physics and chemistry it is matter, qualities, original forces and the laws of nature; in botany and zoology it is the difference of species and life itself; in history it is the human race with all its peculiarities of thinking and willing;—and in all of them it is the principle of sufficient reason in whatever form applies in each case.—Philosophy is peculiar in that it presupposes nothing at all as known. Everything is equally strange to it and a problem: not only the relations of appearances but the appearances themselves, and even the principle of sufficient reason itself, which the other sciences are content to trace everything back to. Philosophy would gain nothing by such tracing back, since one link of the series is as strange to it as another. Further, that kind of connection is just as much a problem to it as the things connected by it, and these are just as much a problem after the connection has been shown as before. For, as I said, what the sciences presuppose, lay at the base of their explanations and set as their limit is precisely the real problem of philosophy. So philosophy begins where the sciences end. Proofs cannot be its foundation, for proofs derive unknown propositions from known ones, whereas for philosophy everything is equally unknown and strange. There can be no proposition as a result of which the world with all its appearances would first exist. So a philosophy cannot be derived by demonstration ex firmis principiis, as Spinoza wanted. Philosophy is also the most general knowledge, so its main propositions cannot be consequences of some other, still more general proposition. The principle of contradiction only establishes that concepts agree; it does not itself give concepts. The principle of sufficient reason explains connections between appearances, not the appearances themselves. So philosophy cannot set out to look for a causa efficiens or a causa finalis of the whole world. The present philosophy, at least, does not at all ask *from where* or *what for* the world exists, but only *what* the world is. The why is subordinate to the what here, for the why already belongs to the world. It arises only through the form of the world's appearance, the principle of sufficient reason, and has meaning and validity only so far. One might say, to be sure, that everyone knows what the world is without further help, since everyone is themselves the subject of knowing, whose representation

the world is. And that would be true as far as it goes. But that knowledge is intuitive; it is knowledge in concreto. Philosophy's task is to give the same knowledge in abstracto. It must lift the successive, changing intuiting, and in general all that the broad concept *feeling* takes in and designates only negatively, as not abstract, distinct knowing, into just such knowing, a lasting knowing. Philosophy must therefore be a statement in abstracto of the essence of the whole world, of the whole and of all its parts. But so as not to get lost in an endless number of single judgments, it must make use of abstraction. It must think everything single in the general, and its differences too in the general. So it will partly separate and partly unite, in order to hand over to knowledge the whole manifold of the world, in its essence, gathered into a few abstract concepts. Through those concepts, in which it fixes the essence of the world, the wholly particular must be known just as the general is, so that the knowledge of the two is joined in the closest way. So the ability for philosophy consists in just what Plato placed it in: knowing the one in the many and the many in the one. Philosophy will therefore be a sum of very general judgments. Their ground of knowledge is directly the world itself in its totality, with nothing excluded, so everything found in human consciousness. Philosophy will be *a complete repetition, as it were a mirroring, of the world in abstract concepts*. This is possible only by uniting what is essentially identical in *one* concept and setting apart what differs in another. Bacon of Verulam already set this task for philosophy when he said: ea demum vera est philosophia, quae mundi ipsius voces fidelissime reddit, et veluti dictante mundo conscripta est, et nihil aliud est, quam ejusdem simulacrum et reflectio, neque addit quidquam de proprio, sed tantum iterat et resonat. (de augm. scient., L. 2, c. 13). We take this, however, in a wider sense than Bacon could have had in mind then.

The agreement that all sides and parts of the world have with one another, just because they belong to one whole, must also show up again in that abstract image of the world. So in that sum of judgments, one could in a way be derived from another, and always reciprocally. But for that, first of all, the judgments have to exist. So they must be set up beforehand, as grounded directly in the knowledge of the world in concreto, all the more because every direct ground-

ing is more certain than an indirect one. Their harmony with one another is such that they even flow together into the unity of *one* thought. It arises from the harmony and unity of the intuitive world itself, which is their common ground of knowledge. So this harmony will not be used as the first thing to ground the judgments; it will only come in afterward, as a confirmation of their truth.—This task itself can become fully clear only through its solution [45].

16 Now that we have looked at the whole of reason as a special power of knowledge that belongs to human beings alone, and at the achievements and phenomena it brings about that are peculiar to human nature, what remains for me is to speak of [46] On this, see Chapter 17 of the second volume.
reason insofar as it guides human actions, and so in that respect can be called *practical*. But most of what has to be mentioned here has already found its place elsewhere, namely in the Appendix to this work. There I had to dispute the existence of what Kant calls practical reason, which he presents (very conveniently, to be sure) as the direct source of all virtue and the seat of an absolute Ought, that is, an Ought fallen from heaven. I delivered the detailed and thorough refutation of this Kantian principle of morals later, in the "Basic Problems of Ethics."—So here I have only a little to say about the real influence of reason, in the true sense of the word, on conduct. Right at the start of our look at reason we remarked in general how greatly the doing and living of a human being differ from those of an animal, and that this difference is to be seen solely as a consequence of abstract concepts being present in consciousness. The influence of these concepts on our whole existence is so thoroughgoing and important that it puts us, in a way, in the same relation to the animals that sighted animals have to eyeless ones (certain larvae, worms and zoophytes). The eyeless ones know by touch alone what is immediately present to them in space, what touches them. The sighted ones know a wide circle of near and far. In just the same way, the absence of reason confines animals to the intuitive representations immediately present to them in time, that is, to real objects. We, on the other hand, through knowledge in abstracto, take in the whole past and future and the wide realm of possibility, besides the narrow actual present.

We survey life freely on all sides, far beyond the present and the actual. So what the eye is in space and for sensory knowledge, reason is, in a way, in time and for inner knowledge. But the visibility of objects has its worth and meaning only because it announces their tangibility. In the same way, the whole worth of abstract knowledge always lies in its relation to intuitive knowledge. For this reason too the natural human being always puts much more value on what is known directly and intuitively than on abstract concepts, the merely thought. Such a person prefers empirical knowledge to logical. The opposite is the attitude of those who live more in words than in deeds, who have looked more into paper and books than into the real world, and who in their worst degeneration become pedants and slaves of the letter. Only from this can we understand how Leibniz, together with Wolf and all their followers, could stray so far, following Duns Scotus, as to declare intuitive knowledge to be merely confused abstract knowledge! To Spinoza's credit I must mention that his more correct sense declared the reverse, that all general concepts arise from the confusion of what is known intuitively. (Eth. II, prop. 40, Schol. 1.)—That same perverse attitude is also the source of several other errors. In mathematics, people rejected the evidence peculiar to it, so that only logical evidence would count. In general, all knowledge that is not abstract was grouped under the broad name feeling and held cheap. And finally the Kantian ethics declared the pure good will worthless and without merit, calling it mere feeling and impulse. That is the will which speaks directly on knowing the circumstances and leads to doing right and doing good. Kant wanted to grant moral worth only to action that comes from abstract maxims.

The overview of life as a whole from all sides, which a human being has over the animal through reason, can also be compared to a geometric, colorless, abstract, reduced ground plan of that human being's path through life. In this the human being stands to the animal as a navigator stands to an ignorant crew. The navigator, with chart, compass and quadrant, knows the voyage and the exact position at every moment on the sea. The crew sees only the waves and the sky. So it is worth reflecting on, even wonderful, how a human being, besides life in concreto, always leads a second life in abstracto. In the first life

the human being is handed over to all the storms of reality and to the influence of the present, and must strive, suffer and die, like the animal. But the life in abstracto, as it stands before rational reflection, is the quiet mirror image of the first life and of the world lived in. It is the reduced ground plan just mentioned. Here, in the realm of calm reflection, what possessed the person wholly and moved them violently there looks cold, colorless and, for the moment, alien. Here the person is a mere spectator and observer. In this withdrawal into reflection a person is like an actor who has played a scene and, until the next entrance, takes a seat among the audience. From there the actor calmly watches whatever may go on, even the preparation for the actor's own death (in the play), and then goes back on stage and acts and suffers as required. From this double life comes that human composure, so very different from animal thoughtlessness. With it a person, after deliberation, a firm resolve or a recognized necessity, coolly lets happen, or carries out, what is most important and often most terrible for them: suicide, execution, a duel, life-threatening ventures of every kind, and in general things against which the person's whole animal nature rebels. Then one sees to what degree reason masters the animal nature, and calls out to the strong person: σιδηρειον νυ τοι ἦτορ! (ferreum certe tibi cor!) Il. 24, 521. Here one can truly say that reason shows itself practically. So wherever conduct is guided by reason, wherever the motives are abstract concepts, wherever what decides is neither intuitive single representations nor the impression of the moment (which guide the animal), there practical reason shows itself. But this is wholly different from, and independent of, the ethical worth of the action. Acting rationally and acting virtuously are two quite different things. Reason is found together with great wickedness just as well as with great goodness, and it gives great effectiveness to either one only by joining it. It is equally ready and serviceable for the methodical, consistent carrying out of a noble purpose and a bad one, of a prudent maxim and a foolish one. This follows from its feminine nature, which receives and preserves but does not itself produce. All this I have set out at length in the Appendix and illustrated

with examples. What was said there would stand here in its proper place, but because of the polemic against Kant's supposed practical reason it had to be moved there. So I refer back there from here.

The most complete development of practical reason, in the true and genuine sense of the word, is shown as an ideal in the Stoic sage. It is the highest peak a human being can reach by the mere use of reason, and the point where the difference from the animal shows most clearly. For Stoic ethics is not originally or essentially a teaching of virtue at all. It is simply instruction for a rational life, whose aim and purpose is happiness through peace of mind. A virtuous way of life comes in along with this only per accidens, as a means, not as an end. So Stoic ethics, in its whole nature and point of view, is fundamentally different from the ethical systems that press directly for virtue, such as the teachings of the Vedas, of Plato, of Christianity and of Kant. The aim of Stoic ethics is happiness: τελος το ευδαιμονειν (virtutes omnes finem habere beatitudinem), it says in the account of the Stoa in Stobaeus. (Ecl., L. II, c. 7, p. 114, and likewise p. 138.) Still, Stoic ethics shows that happiness is to be found securely only in inner peace and calm of mind (αταραξια), and that this in turn can be reached only through virtue. That alone is what the statement means that virtue is the highest good. In time, though, the end is gradually forgotten for the sake of the means, and virtue comes to be recommended in a way that betrays a quite different interest from that of one's own happiness, because it contradicts that happiness too plainly. This is one of those inconsistencies by which, in every system, truth known directly, or, as people say, felt, leads back to the right path and does violence to the inferences. One sees this clearly, for example, in the ethics of Spinoza, which derives a pure teaching of virtue from the egoistic suum utile quaerere by means of obvious sophisms. As I have understood the spirit of Stoic ethics, its origin lies in this thought. Reason is the great privilege of the human being. Indirectly, through planned action and what comes of it, reason makes life and its burdens so much lighter. Might it not also be able to withdraw the human being directly, that is, by mere knowledge, from the sufferings and torments of every kind that fill life, all at once, either entirely or very nearly? It was thought unbecoming to the superiority of reason that a being

endowed with it should still be handed over to such violent pains, such great fear and suffering. Through reason this being takes in and surveys an infinity of things and states. Yet it was to be delivered up to the present, and to the events that the few years of so short, fleeting and uncertain a life can contain, and to the suffering that comes from the stormy urge of desiring and fleeing. The Stoics thought that the proper use of reason must be able to lift a person above all this and make them invulnerable. So Antisthenes said: Δει κτασθαι νουν, η βροχον (aut mentem parandam, aut laqueum. Plut. de stoic. repugn., c. 14), that is, life is so full of plagues and vexations that one must either set oneself above it by corrected thoughts or leave it. They saw that deprivation, suffering, did not come directly and necessarily from not having. It came only from wanting to have and yet not having. So this wanting to have is the necessary condition under which alone not having becomes deprivation and produces pain. Ου πενια λυπην εργαζεται, αλλα επιθυμια (non paupertas dolorem efficit, sed cupiditas), Epict. fragm. 25. They also recognized from experience that it is only hope, the claim, that gives birth to the wish and feeds it. So we are troubled and tormented neither by the many evils that are common to all and unavoidable, nor by the goods that cannot be reached. What troubles us is only the slight more or less in what a person can avoid and can reach. In fact, not only what is absolutely unattainable or unavoidable but even what is only relatively so leaves us quite calm. So the evils that are simply attached to our individuality, or the goods that must necessarily be denied to it, are regarded with indifference. And because of this human peculiarity, every wish soon dies away, and so can no longer produce pain, if no hope gives it food. From all this it followed that all happiness rests only on the relation between our claims and what we get. It does not matter how large or small the two terms of this relation are, and the relation can be produced as well by making the first smaller as by making the second larger. It also followed that all suffering really comes from a mismatch between what we demand and expect and what comes to us. But this mismatch plainly lies only in knowledge [47], and could be removed entirely by better insight. So Chrysippus said: δει ζην κατ' εμπειριαν των φυσει συμβαινοντων (Stob. Ecl., L. II, c. 7, p. 134), that is, one should live with proper knowledge of

how things go in the world. For whenever a person loses composure in any way, is knocked to the ground by misfortune, or becomes angry or despondent, that person shows by this very thing that they find things different from what they expected. So they were caught in an error. They did not know the world and life. They did not know how inanimate nature, by chance, and animate nature, by opposed purposes and even by malice, crosses the will of the individual at every step. Such a person has either not used reason to arrive at a general knowledge of this nature of life, or else lacks judgment, if what they know in general they do not recognize in the particular case, and so are surprised and thrown off balance by it [48]. In the same way every lively joy is an error, a delusion, because no wish once reached can satisfy lastingly. Also, every possession and every piece of good fortune is lent by chance only for an indefinite time, and so can be demanded back in the very next hour. Every pain, however, rests on the vanishing of such a delusion. So both arise [49] Omnes perturbationes judicio censent fieri et opinione. Cic. Tusc., 4, 6. Ταρασσει τους ανθρωπους ου τα πραγματα, αλλα τα περι των πραγματων δογματα. (Perturbant homines non res ipsae, sed de rebus opiniones.) Epictet., c. V.

50 Τουτο γαρ εστι το αιτιον τοις ανθρωποις παντων των κακων, το τας προληψεις τας κοινας μη δυνασθαι εφαρμοζειν ταις επι μερους. (Haec est causa mortalibus omnium malorum, non posse communes notiones aptare singularibus.) Epict. dissert., III, 26. from faulty knowledge. So jubilation and pain both stay always far from the sage, and no event disturbs the sage's αταραξια.

In keeping with this spirit and purpose of the Stoa, Epictetus begins with this, and keeps coming back to it as the core of his wisdom: one should think carefully about what depends on us and what does not, and tell the two apart, and so not count on the latter at all. In this way one will reliably stay free of all pain, suffering and fear. What depends on us, however, is the will alone. Here a gradual transition to the teaching of virtue takes place, in that it is observed that just as the outer world, which does not depend on us, determines good and bad fortune, so inner satisfaction or dissatisfaction with ourselves comes from the will. Afterward the question was asked whether the names bonum et malum should

be given to the first pair or to the second. That was really arbitrary and a matter of choice, and made no difference to the matter. Yet the Stoics argued over it endlessly with the Peripatetics and the Epicureans. They busied themselves with the unacceptable comparison of two wholly incommensurable quantities and with the opposed, paradoxical statements that came out of it, which they threw at one another. Cicero's Paradoxa give us an interesting collection of these from the Stoic side.

Zeno, the founder, seems originally to have taken a somewhat different course. His starting point was this: to reach the highest good, that is, blessedness through peace of mind, one should live in agreement with oneself. (ὁμολογουμενως ζην· τουτο δ' εστι καθ' ενα λογον και συμφωνον ζην.— Consonanter vivere: hoc est secundum unam rationem et concordem sibi vivere. Stob. Ecl. eth., L. II, c. 7, p. 132. Likewise: αρετην διαθεσιν ειναι ψυχης συμφωνον έαυτη περι ολον τον βιον. Virtutem esse animi affectionem secum per totam vitam consentientem, ibid., p. 104.) Now this was possible only if a person determined their conduct wholly by reason, by concepts, and not by changing impressions and moods. But only the maxim of our action is in our power, not its result or the outward circumstances. So to stay always consistent, one had to make the maxim, not the result, one's aim. By this the teaching of virtue is introduced again.

But even Zeno's immediate successors found his moral principle, to live in agreement, too formal and empty of content. So they gave it material content by adding: "to live in agreement with nature" (ὁμολογουμενως τη φυσει ζην.). As Stobaeus reports in the passage cited, Cleanthes was the first to add this. It widened the matter enormously, because the concept covers so wide a sphere and the expression is so vague. For Cleanthes meant nature as a whole, universal nature, but Chrysippus meant human nature in particular (Diog. Laërt., 7, 89). What suits human nature alone was then to be virtue, just as for animal natures it is the satisfaction of animal drives. By this, ethics was again forced around toward the teaching of virtue, and ethics was to be founded on physics, whether it bent or broke. For the Stoics everywhere aimed at unity of principle, just as God and the world were by no means two things for them.

Taken as a whole, Stoic ethics is in fact a very valuable and respectable attempt to use the great privilege of the human being, reason, for an important and salutary purpose. The purpose is to lift a person above the sufferings and pains that every life falls prey to, by giving instruction "Qua ratione queas traducere leniter aevum: Ne te semper inops agitet vexetque cupido, Ne pavor et rerum mediocriter utilium spes." In this way it makes the person share in the highest degree of the dignity that belongs to a rational being, as opposed to the animal. In this sense one can certainly speak of such dignity, but not in any other.— This view of mine of Stoic ethics meant that it had to be mentioned here, in presenting what reason is and what it can accomplish. Yet that purpose can be reached to a certain degree by applying reason and a merely rational ethics. Experience also shows that those purely rational characters whom people commonly call practical philosophers are probably the happiest. They are rightly so called, because the real, that is the theoretical, philosopher carries life over into the concept, and they carry the concept over into life. Still, it is very far from true that something perfect of this kind could come about, or that reason rightly used could really withdraw us from all the burden and suffering of life and lead us to blessedness. There is rather a complete contradiction in wanting to live without suffering. The often-used phrase "blessed life" carries this contradiction in itself. This will certainly be clear to anyone who has grasped my account that follows through to the end. The contradiction already shows itself in that ethics of pure reason itself. The Stoic is forced to weave into the instruction for a blessed life (for that is all Stoic ethics ever remains) a recommendation of suicide, just as among the splendid ornaments and furnishings of oriental despots there is also a costly little flask of poison. This is for the case where the sufferings of the body, which no propositions and inferences can philosophize away, are overwhelming and incurable. Then the sole aim, blessedness, is defeated after all, and nothing is left to escape the suffering but death, which is then to be taken without concern, like any other medicine. Here a strong contrast shows itself between Stoic ethics and all those mentioned above. Those make virtue itself, and directly, the aim, even amid the heaviest sufferings, and do not want a person to end life in order to flee suffering. Yet none of them

knew how to state the true ground for rejecting suicide; they laboriously scrape together all sorts of apparent grounds. In the fourth book that ground will emerge in the course of our investigation. But the contrast above reveals and confirms the essential difference, lying in the basic principle, between the Stoa, which is really only a special eudaemonism, and the teachings mentioned, though both often agree in their results and have an apparent kinship. The inner contradiction mentioned above, with which Stoic ethics is burdened even in its basic idea, also shows itself in another way. Its ideal, the Stoic sage, could never gain life or inner poetic truth in the Stoics' own presentation. It remains a wooden, stiff jointed puppet, good for nothing, that does not itself know what to do with its wisdom. Its perfect calm, contentment and blessedness flatly contradict the nature of humanity and let us arrive at no intuitive representation of it. How different, placed beside this figure, are the world-conquerors and voluntary penitents that Indian wisdom sets before us and has really produced! How different, too, is the Savior of Christianity, that excellent figure, full of deep life, of the greatest poetic truth and highest significance, who nevertheless, in perfect virtue, holiness and sublimity, stands before us in a state of the highest suffering [51].

52 On this, see Chapter 16 of the second volume.

Book II



The First Consideration of the World as Will: The Objectification of the Will.
Nos habitat, non tartara, sed nec sidera coeli: Spiritus, in nobis qui viget, illa facit.

17 In the first book we looked at representation only as such, so only in its general form. As for abstract representation, the concept, we did come to know it in its content too, in that it gets all its content and meaning solely from its relation to intuitive representation. Without that relation it would be worthless and empty. So, pointed wholly toward intuitive representation, we will want to learn its content as well, its closer determinations and the shapes it presents to us. We will especially want information about its real meaning, the meaning that is otherwise only felt. Because of this meaning these images do not pass by us wholly strange and saying nothing, as they otherwise would have to. They speak to us directly, are understood, and take on an interest that claims our whole being.

We turn our gaze to mathematics, natural science and philosophy, each of which lets us hope that it will give part of the information we want.—But first of all we find philosophy to be a monster with many heads, each speaking a different language. They are not all in disagreement with each other on the point raised here, the meaning of that intuitive representation. For, with the exception of the skeptics and idealists, the others speak, in the main, fairly much alike

of an object that lies at the ground of the representation. This object is supposed to be different from the representation in its whole being and essence, and yet like it in every respect, as one egg is like another. That will not help us, however. We cannot tell such an object from the representation at all. We find that the two are one and the same, since every object always and forever presupposes a subject and so remains representation. We have also recognized that being an object belongs to the most general form of representation, which is just the split into object and subject. Moreover, the principle of sufficient reason, which people appeal to here, is also for us only a form of representation, namely the lawful connection of one representation with another. It is not the connection of the whole series of representations, finite or endless, with something that is not representation at all and so cannot be represented.—Of skeptics and idealists, however, we spoke above, in discussing the dispute over the reality of the external world.

Suppose we look to mathematics for the closer knowledge we want of this intuitive representation, which we have come to know only quite generally, in mere form. Mathematics will speak to us of those representations only so far as they fill time and space, that is, so far as they are magnitudes. It will state the how many and how large very exactly. But this is always only relative, that is, a comparison of one representation with others, and only in that one-sided respect of magnitude. So this too will not be the information we mainly seek.

Finally, if we look at the wide field of natural science, divided into many areas, we can first distinguish two main divisions of it. It is either description of shapes, which I call morphology, or explanation of changes, which I call etiology. The first considers the lasting forms, the second the changing matter, according to the laws of its passage from one form into another. The first is what is called natural history, in its whole extent, though the name is not strictly right. Especially as botany and zoology, it teaches us to know the various organic, and thereby firmly determined, shapes that persist through the unceasing change of individuals. These make up a large part of the content of intuitive representation. Natural history classifies them, separates them, unites them and orders them in natural and artificial systems. It brings them under concepts

that make an overview and knowledge of all of them possible. It also shows an analogy that runs through all of them, infinitely shaded, in the whole and in the parts (unité de plan), by which they are like very various variations on a theme that is not given. The passage of matter into those shapes, that is, the coming-to-be of individuals, is not a main part of the study, since each individual comes from one like itself through generation. Generation is equally mysterious everywhere, and so far it escapes clear knowledge. The little that is known about it finds its place in physiology, which already belongs to etiological natural science. Mineralogy, which belongs mainly to morphology, already leans toward etiological science too, especially where it becomes geology. Etiology proper includes all those branches of natural science in which the knowledge of cause and effect is the main thing. These teach how, by an unfailing rule, a certain other state of matter necessarily follows a given state; how a certain change necessarily conditions and brings about another, definite one. This showing is called explanation. Here we find mainly mechanics, physics, chemistry and physiology.

But when we give ourselves over to their teaching, we soon notice that the information we mainly seek comes to us as little from etiology as from morphology. Morphology puts before us countless shapes, infinitely varied and yet related by an unmistakable family likeness. For us they are representations that stay forever strange along this path and, looked at only so, stand before us like hieroglyphs not understood.—Etiology, on the other hand, teaches us that, by the law of cause and effect, this particular state of matter brings about that other one, and with that it has explained the state and done its part. In reality, though, it does nothing more than show the lawful order in which states occur in space and time, and teach, for all cases, what appearance must occur at this time in this place. So it fixes their place in time and space, according to a law whose definite content experience has taught, but whose general form and necessity we are aware of independently of experience. About the inner essence of any of those appearances, however, we get not the slightest information from this. That essence is called force of nature, and lies outside the territory of etiological explanation. Etiological explanation calls the unchanging constancy

with which the expression of such a force occurs, whenever the conditions known to it are present, a law of nature. This law of nature, these conditions, this occurrence at a definite place at a definite time, are all that etiology knows or ever can know. The force itself that expresses itself, the inner essence of the appearances that occur according to those laws, remains forever a mystery to it, something wholly strange and unknown, in the simplest appearance as in the most complicated. For although etiology has so far reached its aim most completely in mechanics and least completely in physiology, even so the force by which a stone falls to the earth or one body pushes another away is, in its inner essence, no less strange and mysterious to us than the force that produces the movements and growth of an animal. Mechanics presupposes matter, gravity, impenetrability, the communicability of motion by impact, rigidity and so on as unfathomable. It calls them forces of nature, and calls their necessary and regular appearing under certain conditions a law of nature. Only after that does it begin its explanation. That explanation consists in stating faithfully and with mathematical exactness how, where and when each force expresses itself, and in tracing every appearance that comes up back to one of those forces. Physics, chemistry and physiology do the same in their territory, except that they presuppose much more and accomplish less. Accordingly, even the most perfect etiological explanation of the whole of nature would never be more than a list of inexplicable forces, together with a sure statement of the rule by which their appearances occur in time and space, follow one another and give way to one another. But it would have to leave the inner essence of the forces that thus appear always unexplained, because the law it follows does not lead there, and stop at the appearance and its order. In this respect it could be compared to a cross-section of a piece of marble, which shows many kinds of veins side by side, but does not let us see the course of those veins through the inside of the marble up to that surface. Or, if I may allow myself a joking comparison because it is more striking: with the completed etiology of the whole of nature, the philosophical inquirer would still always feel like someone who, without knowing how, had ended up in a wholly unknown company. One member after another presents another to this person as their friend and cousin, and so

makes them sufficiently acquainted. But the person, while assuring each one presented of being glad to meet them, would constantly have the question on their lips: "But how the devil did I come to be in this whole company?"

So etiology too can never give us the desired information about those appearances, which we know only as our representations, information that would lead us beyond them. For after all its explanations they still stand before us as mere representations whose meaning we do not understand, wholly strange. The causal connection gives only the rule and relative order of their occurrence in space and time, but does not teach us to know more closely what thus occurs. Moreover, the law of causality itself is valid only for representations, for objects of a certain class, and only on the presupposition of those does it have any meaning. So it too, like these objects themselves, exists only in relation to the subject, that is, conditionally. That is why it is known just as well when one starts from the subject, that is, a priori, as when one starts from the object, that is, a posteriori, as Kant has taught us.

What drives us to inquire now, however, is just that it is not enough for us to know that we have representations, that they are such and such, and are connected according to these and those laws, whose general expression is always the principle of sufficient reason. We want to know the meaning of those representations. We ask whether this world is nothing more than representation. In that case it would have to pass by us like an insubstantial dream or a ghostly phantom of the air, not worth our attention. Or is it something else, something besides, and what then is that? This much is equally certain: that what is asked after must be something wholly and in its whole essence fundamentally different from representation. So its forms and laws must be wholly strange to it. So, starting from representation, one cannot reach it along the thread of those laws that only connect objects, representations, with one another; and those laws are the forms of the principle of sufficient reason.

We already see here that the essence of things can never be got at *from outside*. However one inquires, one gains nothing but images and names. One is like someone walking around a castle, looking in vain for an entrance and mean-

while sketching the fronts. And yet this is the path that all philosophers before me have taken.

18 In fact, the meaning of the world that stands before me only as my representation would never be found. Neither would the passage from that world, as mere representation of the knowing subject, to whatever else it may be. That would be so if the inquirer were nothing more than the purely knowing subject (a winged angel's head with no body). But the inquirer is rooted in that world himself. He finds himself in it as an *individual*. That is, his knowing, which is the conditioning bearer of the whole world as representation, still works entirely through a body. As I have shown, the affections of this body are the understanding's starting point for perceiving that world. To the purely knowing subject as such, this body is a representation like any other, an object among objects. Its movements and actions are known to him only the way the changes in all other perceptual objects are known. They would be just as strange and incomprehensible to him if their meaning were not solved for him in some entirely different way. Otherwise he would see his own acting follow on the motives presented to him with the constancy of a law of nature, just as the changes of other objects follow on causes, stimuli and motives. But he would understand the influence of motives no better than he understands how any other effect that appears to him is connected with its cause. He would then call the inner nature of these expressions and actions of his body a force, a quality or a character, as he liked, but he would have no further insight into it. None of this is so, however. Instead, the subject of knowing, who appears as an individual, has been given the word that solves the riddle. And this word is *will*. This, and this alone, gives him the key to his own appearance. It reveals the meaning to him and shows him the inner workings of his being, his doing and his movements. The subject of knowing appears as an individual through its identity with the body. This body is given to it in two entirely different ways. First, it is given as representation, in the understanding's perception, as an object among objects and subject to their laws. But at the same time it is given in a completely different way, as that which everyone knows directly and which

the word *will* names. Every true act of his will is at once and inevitably also a movement of his body. He cannot really will the act without at the same time perceiving that it appears as a movement of the body. The act of will and the action of the body are not two different states, known objectively and joined by the bond of causality. They do not stand in the relation of cause and effect. They are one and the same thing, given in two entirely different ways: once quite directly, and once in perception for the understanding. The action of the body is nothing other than the act of the will objectified, that is, passed into perception. Later it will be shown that this holds for every movement of the body. It holds not only for movements that follow motives but also for the involuntary movements that follow mere stimuli. In fact, the whole body is nothing other than the will objectified, that is, become representation. All this will come out and become clear as we go on. So here, from a different point of view, I will call the body the *objectivity of the will*. In the previous book and in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason I called it the *immediate object*. I took a standpoint there (that of representation) that was deliberately one-sided. For the same reason one can say, in a certain sense, that the will is the knowledge a priori of the body, and the body is the knowledge a posteriori of the will. —Decisions of the will that concern the future are mere deliberations of reason about what one will want someday. They are not real acts of will. Only the carrying out stamps the decision as one. Until then it is only a changeable intention, and it exists only in reason, in abstracto. Only in reflection are willing and doing different. In reality they are one. Every true, genuine, direct act of the will is at once and directly also an appearing act of the body. Correspondingly, every impact on the body is at once and directly also an impact on the will. As such it is called pain when it is against the will, and well-being or sensual pleasure when it agrees with the will. Both come in very different degrees. But it is quite wrong to call pain and sensual pleasure representations. They are not that at all. They are direct affections of the will in its appearance, the body: a forced, momentary willing or not-willing of the impression that the body undergoes. Only a few impressions on the body are to be taken directly as mere representations, and so are excepted from what I have just said. These are the impressions

that do not stir the will. Only through them is the body an immediate object of knowing, since as a perception in the understanding it is already a mediate object, like all the others. What I mean here are the affections of the purely objective senses: sight, hearing and touch. Even these count only when the organs are affected in the way that is specially proper to them, their specific and natural way. This way is so extremely weak a stimulation of the heightened and specifically modified sensibility of these parts that it does not affect the will. Undisturbed by any stirring of the will, it only supplies the understanding with the data from which perception arises. But any stronger or different affection of these sense organs is painful, that is, against the will. So they too belong to its objectivity.—Weak nerves show themselves in this: impressions that should have only the degree of strength needed to make them data for the understanding reach a higher degree, at which they move the will, that is, arouse pain or a feeling of well-being. Pain is the more frequent of the two, though it is partly dull and indistinct. This pain makes single tones and strong light feel painful. It also brings on, in general, a morbid, hypochondriac mood, without being clearly recognized as pain.—The identity of body and will also shows itself, among other ways, in this: every violent and excessive movement of the will, that is, every emotion, shakes the body and its inner workings directly and disturbs the course of its vital functions. This is worked out in detail in "On the Will in Nature," p. 27 of the second edition.

Finally, the knowledge I have of my will is direct, yet it cannot be separated from my knowledge of my body. I do not know my will as a whole, as a unity, or completely in its essence. I know it only in its single acts, and so in time, which is the form in which my body appears, like every object. So the body is a condition of my knowledge of my will. Strictly speaking, then, I cannot represent this will without my body. In the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, the will, or rather the subject of willing, is set up as a special class of representations or objects. But even there we saw this object coincide with the subject, that is, stop being an object. We called this coinciding the miracle κατ' εξοχην. In a way, this whole present work is the explanation of it.—Insofar as I really know my will as an object, I know it as body. But then I am back at the

first class of representations set up in that essay, that is, at real objects. As we go on we will see more and more that this first class of representations finds its explanation, the solution of its riddle, only in the fourth class set up there. That fourth class no longer really wanted to stand opposite the subject as an object. Accordingly, we must learn to understand the inner nature of the law of causality, which holds in the first class, and of what happens according to it, from the law of motivation, which governs the fourth class.

The identity of will and body, which I have now set out provisionally, can only be demonstrated. That is how it has been done here, for the first time, and how it is to be done more and more as we go on. To demonstrate it is to raise it from immediate consciousness, from knowledge in concreto, to knowledge of reason, or to carry it over into knowledge in abstracto. By its nature, though, it can never be proved, that is, derived as mediate knowledge from some other, more immediate knowledge. This is precisely because it is itself the most immediate knowledge. If we do not grasp it and hold to it as such, we will wait in vain to get it back in some mediate way, as derived knowledge. It is a knowledge of an entirely special kind. For that very reason its truth cannot even properly be placed under any of the four headings into which I divided all truth in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 29 ff.: logical, empirical, metaphysical and metalogical. For unlike all of those, it is not the relation of an abstract representation to another representation, or to the necessary form of intuitive or abstract representing. It is the relation of a judgment to the relationship that an intuitive representation, the body, has to something that is not representation at all but is toto genere different from it: will. So I would like to single out this truth above all others and call it philosophical truth κατ' εξοχην. One can put its expression in various ways. One can say: my body and my will are one. Or: what I call my body as an intuitive representation I call my will insofar as I am conscious of it in an entirely different way, comparable to no other. Or: my body is the objectivity of my will. Or: leaving aside that my body is my representation, it is only my will; and so on [1].

19 In the first book, with an inner reluctance, we declared our own body, like all other objects of this perceptual world, to be mere representation of the knowing subject. Now it has become clear what, in everyone's consciousness, sets the representation of one's own body apart from all the others, which are otherwise quite like it. It is this: the body also occurs in consciousness in an entirely different way, different toto genere, which the word will names. And it is this double knowledge we have of our own body that gives us information about the body itself: about its acting and moving on motives, and about its suffering from outside impact. In a word, it tells us what the body is not as representation but beyond that, and so in itself. We have no such direct information about the nature, acting and suffering of any other real objects.

The knowing subject is an individual precisely through this special relation to the one body, which, considered apart from that relation, is for it only a representation like all the rest. For that very reason, the relation by which the knowing subject is an individual holds only between it and a single one of all its representations. So it is conscious of this single one not merely as a representation but at the same time in an entirely different way, namely as a will. But suppose the subject sets aside that special relation, that double and wholly different knowledge of one and the same thing. Then that one thing, the body, is a representation like all the others. So, to get its bearings on this, the knowing individual must assume one of two things. Either it assumes that what distinguishes that one representation lies only in this: its knowledge stands in this double relation to that one representation alone, and only into this one perceptual object is insight open to it in two ways [2] On this see chapter 18 of the second volume. at once. But then this must be explained not by any difference of this object from all the others, but only by a difference between the relation its knowledge has to this one object and the relation it has to all the others. Or else it must assume that this one object is essentially different from all the others. It alone of all is at once will and representation, while the rest are mere representation, that is, mere phantoms. Then its body would be the only real individual in the world, that is, the only appearance of will and the only immediate object of the subject.—That the other objects, regarded as mere representations, are

like his body can indeed be proved with certainty. Like his body, they fill space (which itself may possibly exist only as representation), and like it they act in space. The proof comes from the law of causality, which is secure a priori for representations and allows no effect without a cause. But an effect only lets us infer some cause or other, not a cause of the same kind. And so we are still within the realm of mere representation, to which alone the law of causality applies and beyond which it can never lead. Now, whether the objects known to the individual only as representations are nonetheless, like his own body, appearances of a will: as already said in the previous book, this is the real meaning of the question about the reality of the external world. To deny it is the meaning of theoretical egoism, which for that reason takes all appearances other than its own individual to be phantoms. Practical egoism does exactly the same thing in practice. It regards and treats only its own person as truly a person, and all the others as mere phantoms. Theoretical egoism can never be refuted by proofs. Still, in philosophy it has surely never been used other than as a skeptical sophism, that is, for show. As a serious conviction it could be found only in a madhouse. As such, it would need a cure rather than a proof. So we will not engage with it any further here. We will regard it only as the last stronghold of skepticism, which is always polemical.

Our knowledge is always tied to individuality, and its limit lies precisely there. So it necessarily follows that each person can be only one thing, while he can know everything else. This limit is what actually creates the need for philosophy. For that very reason we try to widen the limits of our knowledge through philosophy. So we will regard this skeptical argument of theoretical egoism, which confronts us here, as a small border fortress. It can never be taken, but its garrison can never get out of it either. So we may walk past it and leave it behind us without danger.

Accordingly, from here on we shall use the double cognition, now raised to clarity, which we have of the essence and action of our own body, given in two wholly different ways, as a key to the essence of every appearance in nature. All objects that are not our own body, and so are given to our consciousness not in a double way but only as representations, we shall judge by analogy with that

body. We therefore assume that on one side they are, exactly like the body, representation, and in that respect of the same kind as it. On the other side, if one sets aside their existence as representation of the subject, then what still remains, in its inner essence, must be the same as what we call will in ourselves. For what other kind of existence or reality should we attribute to the rest of the bodily world? Where should we take the elements from, out of which to put such a thing together? Besides will and representation nothing at all is known to us or even thinkable. If we want to attribute to the bodily world, which directly exists only in our representation, the greatest reality known to us, then we give it the reality that each person's own body has. For to each person their own body is the most real thing. But if we now analyze the reality of this body and its actions, we find in it, besides that it is our representation, nothing but will. With that its reality is exhausted. So we can find nowhere any other reality to attribute to the bodily world. If, then, the bodily world is to be something more than merely our representation, we must say that outside representation, so in itself and according to its innermost essence, it is what we find in ourselves immediately as will. I say according to its innermost essence. But we must first get to know this essence of the will more closely, so that we can tell apart from it what does not belong to it itself but already to its appearance, which has many degrees. Such, for example, is being accompanied by cognition, and the being determined by motives that depends on that. As we shall see further on, this belongs not to the essence of the will but only to its distinct appearance as animal and man. So when I say that the force that drives the stone to the earth is, in its essence, in itself and apart from all representation, will, nobody will read into this proposition the mad opinion that the stone moves according to a known motive, because in man the will appears in that way[3].—But now we want to prove more fully and clearly what has been presented so far provisionally and in general, to ground it, and to develop it in its whole extent[4].

20 As the essence in itself of one's own body, as that which this body is besides being an object of intuition, a representation, the will, as said, first makes itself known in the voluntary movements of this body. These movements are noth-

ing other than the visibility of the single acts of will, with which they occur immediately and wholly at the same time, [5] We shall therefore by no means agree with Bacon of Verulam when he holds (de augm. scient. L. 4 in fine) that all mechanical and physical movements of bodies came about only after a preceding perception in these bodies. Yet a presentiment of the truth gave existence even to this false proposition. The same is true of Kepler's assertion, in his treatise de planeta Martis, that the planets must have cognition in order to hit their elliptical paths so correctly and to measure the speed of their motion so that the triangles of the area of their path always remain proportional to the time in which they run through its base.

[6] See chapter 19 of the second volume. as one and the same with them, distinguished from them only by the form of knowability into which they have passed, that is, have become representation.

These acts of will, however, still have a ground outside themselves, in the motives. But the motives never determine more than what I will at this time, in this place, under these circumstances. They do not determine that I will at all, nor what I will at all, that is, the maxim that characterizes my willing as a whole. So my willing cannot be explained in its whole essence from the motives. They determine only its expression at the given moment and are only the occasion on which my will shows itself. The will itself, by contrast, lies outside the territory of the law of motivation. Only its appearance at each moment is necessarily determined by that law. Only on the presupposition of my empirical character is the motive a sufficient explanatory ground of my action. But if I abstract from my character and then ask why I will this and not that at all, no answer is possible. For only the appearance of the will is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, not the will itself, which in that respect can be called groundless. Here I presuppose partly Kant's teaching on the empirical and intelligible character, and also my discussions of the matter in the "Fundamental Problems of Ethics," pp. 48–58 and again p. 178 ff. of the first edition. Partly we shall have to speak of it at greater length in the fourth book. For now I only have to point out that the grounding of one appearance by another, here of the deed by the

motive, in no way conflicts with the fact that its essence in itself is will, which itself has no ground. The principle of sufficient reason, in all its forms, is merely a form of cognition, so its validity extends only to the representation, the appearance, the visibility of the will, not to the will itself that becomes visible.

Now if every action of my body is the appearance of an act of will, in which, under given motives, my will itself in general and as a whole, that is, my character, expresses itself again, then the unavoidable condition and presupposition of that action must also be an appearance of the will. For its appearing cannot depend on something that does not come directly and solely through it, and that would therefore be only accidental for it. That would make its appearing itself only accidental. But that condition is the whole body itself. So this body itself must already be an appearance of the will. It must relate to my will as a whole, that is, to my intelligible character, whose appearance in time is my empirical character, as the single action of the body relates to the single act of will. So the whole body must be nothing other than my will become visible. It must be my will itself, insofar as this is an object of intuition, a representation of the first class.—As confirmation of this it has already been stated that every influence on my body at once and directly also affects my will, and in that respect is called pain or sensual pleasure, or, in a lower degree, agreeable or disagreeable sensation. It has also been stated that, conversely, every violent movement of the will, that is, emotion and passion, shakes the body and disturbs the course of its functions.—It is true that an account of the origin of my body, though a very imperfect one, and somewhat better of its development and preservation, can also be given etiologically. This is just physiology. But physiology explains its subject only in the way that motives explain acting. The grounding of the single action by the motive, and its necessary result from the motive, does not conflict with the fact that the action in general and in its essence is only the appearance of a will that is groundless in itself. In the same way, the physiological explanation of the functions of the body does not detract from the philosophical truth that the whole existence of this body and the whole series of its functions is only the objectification of that very will which

appears in the outward actions of the same body according to the motives. Physiology even tries to trace these outward actions themselves, the immediately voluntary movements, back to causes in the organism. For example, it tries to explain the movement of the muscle from an inflow of fluids ("like the contraction of a rope that gets wet," says Reil, in his Archiv für Physiologie, vol. 6, p. 153). But suppose one really came to a thorough explanation of this kind. It would still never cancel the immediately certain truth that every voluntary movement (functiones animales) is the appearance of an act of will. Just as little can the physiological explanation of vegetative life (functiones naturales, vitales), however far it may go, cancel the truth that this whole animal life, developing in this way, is itself appearance of the will. In general, as explained above, no etiological explanation can ever state more than the necessarily determined place in time and space of a single appearance, and its necessary entry there according to a fixed rule. On this path the inner essence of every appearance always remains unfathomable. Every etiological explanation presupposes it and only designates it by the names force, or law of nature, or, when actions are in question, character, will.—So although every single action, on the presupposition of the determinate character, follows necessarily when a motive is presented, and although growth, the process of nutrition and all the changes in the animal body go on according to necessarily acting causes (stimuli), still the whole series of actions, and therefore every single one, is nothing other than the appearance of the will, its becoming visible, its objectivity. The same holds for their condition, the whole body itself that carries them out, and so also for the process through which and in which it exists. On this rests the perfect fit of the human and animal body to the human and animal will in general. It is like the fit that a tool made on purpose has to the will of its maker, but far surpasses it, and for this reason appears as purposiveness, that is, as the body's being explicable teleologically. The parts of the body must therefore correspond perfectly to the principal desires through which the will manifests itself. They must be the visible expression of those desires. Teeth, throat and intestinal canal are objectified hunger. The genitals are objectified sexual drive. The grasping hands and the quick feet correspond to the already more indirect striving of the will which

they represent. As the general human form corresponds to the general human will, so the individual bodily constitution corresponds to the individually modified will, the character of the single person. That constitution is therefore characteristic and expressive throughout and in all its parts. It is very remarkable that Parmenides already said this, in the following verses cited by Aristotle (Metaph. III, 5):

Ως γαρ εκαστος εχει κρασιν μελεων πολυκαμπτων, Τως νοος ανθρωποισι παρεστηκεν· το γαρ αυτο Εστιν, οπερ φρονεει, μελεων φυσις ανθρωποισι, Και πασιν και παντι· το γαρ πλεον εστι νοημα.

(Ut enim cuique complexio membrorum flexibilium se habet, ita mens hominibus adest: idem namque est, quod sapit, membrorum natura hominibus, et omnibus et omni: quod enim plus est, intelligentia est.)[7]

21 Whoever has come, through all these considerations, to the knowledge in abstracto too, and so clearly and surely, which everyone possesses in concreto immediately, that is, as feeling, has come to this: the essence in itself of one's own appearance is one's will. This appearance presents itself as representation both through one's actions and through their lasting substrate, one's body. The will makes up the most immediate thing in consciousness, yet as such it has not fully entered into the form of representation, in which object and subject stand opposed. It makes itself known in an immediate way, in which subject and object are not quite clearly distinguished, and yet not as a whole either. It becomes recognizable to the individual only in its single acts.—Whoever, I say, has gained this conviction with me, to them it will become, quite of itself, the key to the cognition of the innermost essence of the whole of nature. For they will now carry it over also to all those appearances [8] See chapter 20 of the second volume; also, in my work "On the Will in Nature," the headings "Physiology" and "Comparative Anatomy," where what is only hinted at here has received its thorough development. that are given to them not, like their own, in immediate cognition beside the mediated one, but only in the latter, and so one-sidedly, as representation alone. Not only in those appearances that are quite like their own, in men and animals, will they recognize that same will as

the innermost essence. Continued reflection will lead them to see also the force that drives and vegetates in the plant, even the force by which the crystal shoots, the force that turns the magnet to the north pole, the force whose shock leaps at them from the contact of heterogeneous metals, the force that appears in the elective affinities of substances as fleeing and seeking, separating and uniting, and finally even gravity, which strives so powerfully in all matter and pulls the stone to the earth and the earth to the sun: all these are different only in appearance, and in their inner essence are the same, namely that which is known to them so immediately and intimately, and better than anything else, and which, where it comes out most clearly, is called will. This application of reflection alone no longer lets us stop at appearance but leads us across to the thing in itself. Appearance means representation, and nothing more. All representation, of whatever kind, every object, is appearance. The thing in itself, however, is the will alone. As such it is not representation at all but differs from it toto genere. It is that of which all representation, all objects, are the appearance, the visibility, the objectivity. It is the innermost part, the kernel of every single thing and likewise of the whole. It appears in every blindly acting force of nature. It also appears in the deliberate action of man. The great difference between these two concerns only the degree of the appearing, not the essence of what appears.

22 This thing in itself (let us keep Kant's expression as a standing formula) is never an object as such, precisely because every object is already again its mere appearance, not it itself. If it was nevertheless to be thought objectively, it had to borrow a name and a concept from an object, from something somehow given objectively, and therefore from one of its appearances. But to serve as a point of mutual understanding, this appearance could be no other than the most perfect of all its appearances, that is, the most distinct, the most developed, the one directly lit up by cognition. And that is precisely the will of man. One must note, however, that here we are only using a denominatio a potiori, through which, for that very reason, the concept of will gets a wider extent than it had before. Cognition of the identical in different appearances and of the different

in similar ones is, as Plato so often remarks, the very condition of philosophy. Until now, though, the identity of the essence of every force in nature that strives and acts, with the will, had not been recognized. So the many kinds of appearance, which are only different species of the same genus, were not regarded as that, but were considered heterogeneous. For this reason there could also be no word to designate the concept of this genus. I therefore name the genus after its best species, the nearer, immediate cognition of which leads to the mediated cognition of all the others. But anyone who was not able to carry out the extension of the concept demanded here would remain caught in permanent misunderstanding. Such a person would insist on understanding by the word will only the one species it has so far alone designated: the will guided by cognition, expressing itself exclusively according to motives, indeed perhaps even only according to abstract motives, that is, under the guidance of reason. This, as I said, is only the most distinct appearance of the will. We must now separate out in thought, purely, the innermost essence of this appearance, which is known to us immediately. Then we must transfer it to all the weaker, less distinct appearances of the same essence. In this way we carry out the demanded extension of the concept of will.—In the opposite way, however, I would be misunderstood by anyone who perhaps thought it makes no difference in the end whether one designates that essence in itself of all appearance by the word will or by some other. This would be so if that thing in itself were something whose existence we merely inferred, and so knew only indirectly and only in abstracto. Then one could indeed call it whatever one liked. The name would stand there as a mere sign of an unknown quantity. But the word will, which is supposed to unlock to us, like a magic word, the innermost essence of every thing in nature, designates by no means an unknown quantity, a something reached by inferences. It designates something wholly immediately known, and so well known that we know and understand what will is much better than anything else, whatever it may be.—Until now people subsumed the concept of will under the concept of force. I do exactly the reverse and want every force in nature to be thought as will. Do not suppose that this is a quarrel about words, or a matter of indifference. It is rather of the highest significance

and importance. For the concept of force, like all other concepts, rests in the end on the intuitive cognition of the objective world, that is, on appearance, on representation, and is drawn from it. It is abstracted from the territory where cause and effect rule, so from intuitive representation. It means precisely the very fact that a cause is a cause, at the point where this can in no way be explained further etiologically, but is just the necessary presupposition of all etiological explanation. The concept of will, by contrast, is the only one among all possible concepts that does not have its origin in appearance, in mere intuitive representation. It comes from within. It comes out of the most immediate consciousness of each person, in which each person knows their own individual, in its essence, immediately, without any form, even without that of subject and object, and at the same time is it, since here the knower and the known coincide. So if we trace the concept of force back to that of will, we have in fact traced something less known back to something infinitely better known, indeed to the one thing really, immediately and wholly known to us, and we have extended our knowledge very greatly. If, on the other hand, we subsume the concept of will under that of force, as has been done so far, we give up the one immediate cognition that we have of the inner essence of the world. We let it sink into a concept abstracted from appearance, with which we can therefore never get beyond appearance.

23 As thing in itself, the will is wholly different from its appearance and entirely free of all its forms. It enters into those forms only by appearing, so they concern only its objectivity and are foreign to it itself. Even the most general form of all representation, that of the object for a subject, does not touch it, still less the forms subordinate to this one, which all have their common expression in the principle of sufficient reason, to which, as is well known, time and space also belong, and therefore also the multiplicity that exists and becomes possible only through them. In this last respect I shall, using an expression borrowed from the old, real Scholasticism, call time and space the principium individuationis, which I ask the reader to note once and for all. For only time and space are the means by which what is the same and one in essence and concept still

appears as different, as multiplicity side by side and one after another. They are therefore the principium individuationis, the object of so many subtleties and disputes of the Scholastics, which can be found together in Suarez (Disp. 5, sect. 3).—According to what has been said, the will as thing in itself lies outside the territory of the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms, and is therefore absolutely groundless, although each of its appearances is wholly subject to the principle of sufficient reason. It is further free of all multiplicity, although its appearances in time and space are countless. It itself is one. But it is not one as an object is one, whose unity is known only by contrast with possible multiplicity. Nor is it one as a concept is one, which arose only by abstraction from multiplicity. It is one as that which lies outside time and space, the principium individuationis, that is, outside the possibility of multiplicity. Only when all this has become completely clear to us through the following study of the appearances and different manifestations of the will, shall we completely understand the sense of Kant's teaching that time, space and causality do not belong to the thing in itself but are only forms of knowing.

The groundlessness of the will was indeed recognized, where it manifests itself most distinctly, as the will of man, and this will was called free, independent. But people at once overlooked, because of the groundlessness of the will itself, the necessity to which its appearance is everywhere subject, and declared the deeds free, which they are not, since every single action follows with strict necessity from the effect of the motive on the character. All necessity is, as already said, the relation of consequence to ground and absolutely nothing more. The principle of sufficient reason is the general form of all appearance, and the human being in their doing must be subject to it, like every other appearance. But because in self-consciousness the will is known immediately and in itself, the consciousness of freedom lies in this consciousness too. What is overlooked is that the individual, the person, is not will as thing in itself, but already an appearance of the will, and as such already determined and entered into the form of appearance, the principle of sufficient reason. From this comes the strange fact that everyone holds themselves a priori to be wholly free, even in their single actions, and thinks they could begin a different way of life at any

moment, which would mean becoming a different person. But a posteriori, through experience, they find to their astonishment that they are not free but subject to necessity: that in spite of all resolutions and reflections they do not change their doing, and that from the beginning of life to its end they must carry out the same character that they themselves disapprove of, and as it were play to the end the role they have taken on. I cannot pursue this consideration further here, since as an ethical matter it belongs at another place in this work. For now I only wish to point out that the appearance of the will, groundless in itself, is still as such subject to the law of necessity, that is, the principle of sufficient reason. This is so that the necessity with which the appearances of nature follow does not keep us from recognizing in them the manifestations of the will.

Until now people considered as appearances of the will only those changes that have no other ground than a motive, that is, a representation. So in nature, will was attributed only to man, and at most to animals, since knowing, representing, is indeed, as I have already mentioned elsewhere, the genuine and exclusive mark of animality. But that the will also acts where no cognition guides it, we see first of all in the instinct and the constructive drives of animals[9]. That they have representations and cognition does not come into consideration here at all, since the purpose toward which they work, exactly as if it were a known motive, remains entirely unknown to them. So their acting here happens without motive, is not guided by representation, and shows us first and most distinctly how the will is active even without any cognition. The one-year-old bird has no representation of the eggs for which it builds a nest. The young spider has none of the prey for which it spins a web. Nor has the ant-lion any of the ant for which it digs a pit for the first time. The larva of the stag beetle bites the hole in the wood, where it intends to undergo its transformation, twice as large if it is going to become a male beetle as if it is going to become a female. In the first case it does so to have room for horns, of which it has as yet no representation. In such doing of these animals the will is evidently active, as in the rest of their doing. But it is in blind activity, which is accompanied by cognition indeed, but not guided by it. Once we have gained the insight that representa-

tion as motive is no necessary and essential condition of the activity of the will, we shall also find it easier to recognize the working of the will in cases where it is less obvious. For example, we shall then no more ascribe the snail's house to a will foreign to the snail itself but guided by cognition, than we suppose the house we build ourselves to come into existence through a will other than our own. Instead we shall recognize both houses as works of the will that objectifies itself in both appearances, which works in us according to motives, but in the snail still blindly, as a formative drive directed outward. In us too the same will works in many ways blindly: in all the functions of our body that no cognition guides, in all its vital and vegetative processes, [10] Chapter 27 of the second volume deals with these specially.

digestion, circulation of the blood, secretion, growth, reproduction. Not only the actions of the body, but the body itself wholly and entirely is, as shown above, appearance of the will, objectified will, concrete will. Everything that goes on in it must therefore go on through will, although here this will is not guided by cognition and is not determined according to motives, but, working blindly, according to causes, which in this case are called stimuli.

By cause, in the narrowest sense of the word, I mean that state of matter which, in necessarily bringing about another state, itself undergoes a change as great as the one it causes. This is expressed in the rule "action and reaction are equal." Further, with the cause proper, the effect grows exactly in the same proportion as the cause, and so the reaction does too. So once the kind of effect is known, the degree of the effect can be measured and calculated from the degree of the cause's intensity, and the other way around. Causes in this proper sense work in all the phenomena of mechanism, chemism and so on, in short, in all changes of inorganic bodies. Stimulus, by contrast, I call that cause which itself undergoes no reaction proportionate to its effect, and whose intensity in no way runs parallel in degree with the intensity of the effect, so that the effect cannot be measured by it. A small increase of the stimulus can bring about a very large increase in the effect, or can also, the other way around, cancel the previous effect entirely, and so on. Every effect on organic bodies as such is of this kind. All the properly organic and vegetative changes in the animal body therefore

take place on stimuli, not on mere causes. But the stimulus, like every cause in general, and likewise the motive, never determines more than the point of entry in time and space for the manifestation of each force. It does not determine the inner essence of the manifesting force itself, which, according to our earlier derivation, we recognize as will. We therefore ascribe to the will both the unconscious and the conscious changes of the body. The stimulus holds the middle position and makes the transition between the motive, which is causality that has passed through cognition, and the cause in the narrowest sense. In single cases it lies now nearer the motive, now nearer the cause, but is still always to be distinguished from both. For example, the rise of sap in plants happens on stimulus. It cannot be explained from mere causes, according to the laws of hydraulics or of capillary tubes. Yet it is probably helped by these, and altogether is already very near to purely causal change. By contrast, the movements of Hedysarum gyrans and Mimosa pudica, although still following mere stimuli, are already very similar to those that follow motives, and seem almost to want to make the transition. The narrowing of the pupil under increased light happens on stimulus but already passes over into movement on motive. It happens because too strong a light would painfully affect the retina, and we contract the pupil to avoid this.—The occasion of an erection is a motive, since it is a representation. Yet it works with the necessity of a stimulus. That is, it cannot be resisted, but must be removed to make it ineffective. It is the same with disgusting objects, which arouse the inclination to vomit. We have just considered the instinct of animals as a real middle link of quite a different kind between movement on stimulus and acting according to a known motive. One might be tempted to look on breathing as another middle link of this kind. For people have disputed whether it belongs to the voluntary or the involuntary movements, that is, really whether it happens on motive or on stimulus. According to that it might perhaps be declared an intermediate thing between the two. Marshall Hall ("On the diseases of the nervous system," § 293 sq.) declares it a mixed function, since it stands under the influence partly of the cerebral (voluntary) and partly of the spinal (involuntary) nerves. Still, in the end we must count it among the manifestations of will that follow motives. For other

motives, that is, mere representations, can determine the will to check or hasten it. Like every other voluntary action, it has the appearance that one could omit it altogether and freely suffocate. One really could do so, as soon as some other motive determined the will so strongly that it outweighed the urgent need for air. According to some, Diogenes really ended his life in this way (Diog. Laert. VI, 76). Negroes too are said to have done this (F. B. Osiander, "On Suicide" [1813], pp. 170–180). We would have in this a strong example of the influence of abstract motives, that is, of the superior power of properly rational willing over merely animal willing. The fact that prussic acid kills primarily by paralyzing the brain and so indirectly checking breathing shows that breathing is at least partly conditioned by cerebral activity. But if breathing is kept up artificially until that stupefaction of the brain has passed, no death occurs at all. At the same time breathing here gives us, in passing, the most striking example that motives work with just as great a necessity as stimuli and mere causes in the narrowest sense, and can be put out of action only by opposite motives, as pressure by counterpressure. For in breathing the appearance of being able to omit it is far weaker than in other movements that follow motives. This is because the motive there is very urgent and very near, its satisfaction is very easy because the muscles that carry it out never tire, nothing usually stands against it, and the whole is supported by the oldest habit of the individual. And yet really all motives work with the same necessity. Knowing that necessity is common to movements on motives and movements on stimuli will make it easier for us to see that what goes on in the organic body on stimuli and wholly according to law is also, in its inner essence, will, which is never in itself, but in all its appearances, subject to the principle of sufficient reason, that is, to necessity[11]. We shall therefore not stop at recognizing the animals as appearances of will, in their acting and equally in their whole existence, bodily constitution [12] This knowledge is fully established by my prize essay on the freedom of the will, where (pp. 30–44 of the "Fundamental Problems of Ethics") the relation between *cause, stimulus and motive* has also received its detailed discussion. and organization. We shall also transfer this immediate cognition of the essence in itself of things, which alone is given to us, to plants, all of whose movements

follow stimuli, since the absence of cognition and of the movement on motive conditioned by it alone makes up the essential difference between animal and plant. So what appears to representation as plant, as mere vegetation, as blindly driving force, we shall address as will according to its essence in itself, and recognize as the very thing that makes up the basis of our own appearance, as it expresses itself in our doing and already in the whole existence of our own body.

There remains only the last step to take: to extend our way of looking to all those forces that act in nature according to general, unchangeable laws, in accordance with which move all the bodies that, wholly without organs, have no receptivity for stimulus and no cognition for motive. So we must apply the key to understanding the essence in itself of things, which only immediate cognition of our own essence could give us, to these appearances of the inorganic world too, which stand at the widest distance from us of all.—Now look at them with a searching eye. We see the mighty, unstoppable urge with which the waters hurry to the deep. We see the persistence with which the magnet turns again and again to the north pole, the longing with which the iron flies to it, the violence with which the poles of electricity strive to reunite, which, just like that of human wishes, is increased by obstacles. We see the crystal shoot quickly and suddenly, with such regularity of formation, which is clearly only a quite decided and exactly determined striving in different directions, seized and held fast by solidification. We notice the choice with which bodies, set free by the state of fluidity and released from the bonds of rigidity, seek and flee each other, unite and separate. And finally we feel quite immediately how a weight, whose striving toward the mass of the earth our body checks, presses and pushes on this body unceasingly, pursuing its one striving. Then it will cost us no great effort of imagination to recognize our own essence even at so great a distance. It is the very same thing that in us pursues its aims by the light of cognition, but here, in the weakest of its appearances, strives only blindly, dully, one-sidedly and unchangeably. Yet, because it is everywhere one and the same—just as the

first dawn shares with the rays of full noon the name of sunlight—it must here as there bear the name *will*, which designates that which is the being in itself of every thing in the world and the sole kernel of every appearance.

The distance, however, indeed the appearance of a total difference, between the appearances of inorganic nature and the will that we perceive as the inside of our own essence arises chiefly from the contrast between the wholly determinate lawfulness in the one kind of appearance and the seemingly rule-less arbitrariness in the other. For in man individuality stands out strongly. Everyone has their own character. So the same motive does not have the same force on all, and a thousand side circumstances, which have room in the wide sphere of cognition of the individual but remain unknown to others, modify its effect. For that reason the action cannot be predetermined from the motive alone, because the other factor is missing, the exact knowledge of the individual character and of the cognition that goes with it. The appearances of the forces of nature show here the other extreme. They work according to general laws, without deviation, without individuality, according to openly visible circumstances, subject to the most exact predetermination, and the same force of nature manifests itself in the millions of its appearances in exactly the same way. To clear up this point, to prove the identity of the *one* and indivisible will in all its so different appearances, in the weakest as in the strongest, we must first consider the relation that the will as thing in itself has to its appearance, that is, that the world as will has to the world as representation. This will open to us the best way to a deeper investigation of the whole subject treated in this second book [13].

24 We have learned from the great Kant that time, space and causality, in all their lawfulness and in the possibility of all their forms, are present in our consciousness quite independently of the objects that appear in them and make up their content. Or in other words: they can be found just as well if one starts from the subject as if one starts from the object. So with equal right one can call them modes of intuition of the subject, or also properties of the object *insofar as it is object* (in Kant: appearance), that is, *representation*. One can also look on those forms as the indivisible boundary between object and subject. So all objects

must indeed appear in them, but the subject too, independently of the appearing object, possesses them completely and surveys them.—Now if the objects that appear in these forms are not to be empty phantoms but to have a meaning, they would have to point to something. They would have to be the expression of something that is not again, like themselves, object, representation, something existing only relatively, namely for a subject. It would have to exist without such dependence on something standing opposite it as an essential condition, and without its forms, that is, it would have to be precisely *no representation* but a *thing in itself*. So one could at least ask: are those representations, those objects, anything else besides, and apart from being representations, objects of the subject? And what would they then be in that sense? What is that other side of theirs, different toto genere from representation? What is the thing in itself?—*The will*: that has been our answer, which, however, I set aside for now.

14 See chapter 23 of the second volume; likewise, in my work "On the Will in Nature," the chapter "Plant Physiology" and the chapter "Physical Astronomy," which is extremely important for the core of my metaphysics.
Whatever the thing in itself may be, Kant concluded rightly that time, space and causality (which we have later recognized as forms of the principle of sufficient reason, and this principle as the general expression of the forms of appearance) are not determinations of it. They could belong to it only after and insofar as it has become representation, that is, they belonged only to its appearance, not to it itself. For since the subject knows and constructs them completely out of itself, independently of all objects, they must attach to *being a representation* as such, not to that which becomes representation. They must be the form of representation as such, not properties of that which has taken on this form. They must already be given with the mere opposition of subject and object (not in the concept, but in fact), and therefore be only the closer determination of the form of knowledge in general, whose most general determination is that opposition itself. Now consider what in the appearance, in the object, is in turn conditioned by time, space and causality, since it can be repre-

sented only by means of them: namely *multiplicity*, through the side-by-side and the one-after-another; *change* and *duration*, through the law of causality; matter, which can be represented only on the presupposition of causality; and finally everything that again can be represented only by means of this. All this together is essentially not proper to what appears, to what has entered into the form of representation, but attaches only to this form itself. Conversely, that in the appearance which is *not* conditioned by time, space and causality, nor can be traced back to them, nor explained according to them, will be precisely that in which what appears, the thing in itself, makes itself known immediately. According to this, the most perfect knowability, that is, the greatest clarity, distinctness and exhaustive fathomability, will necessarily belong to what is proper to knowledge *as such*, that is, the form of knowledge. It will not belong to what, in itself not representation and not object, became knowable, that is, representation, object, only by entering into these forms. So only that which depends solely on being known, on being a representation in general and as such (not on what is known and has become representation), which therefore belongs without distinction to everything that is known, and which for that reason is found just as well if one starts from the subject as if one starts from the object —this alone will be able to provide, without reservation, a sufficient, completely exhaustive knowledge, clear to the last ground. But this consists in nothing other than the forms of all appearance that we are conscious of a priori, which can be expressed jointly as the principle of sufficient reason. Its forms that relate to intuitive cognition (with which we are exclusively concerned here) are time, space and causality. On these alone is founded the whole of pure mathematics and of pure natural science a priori. Only in these sciences, therefore, does cognition find no darkness, and not run up against the unfathomable (the groundless, that is, will), against what cannot be derived further. In this respect Kant too, as said, wanted to call those cognitions, along with logic, preeminently, indeed exclusively, sciences. On the other hand, however, these cognitions show us nothing further than mere relations, relations of one representation to another, form, without any content. Every content they get, every appearance that fills those forms, already contains something no longer com-

pletely knowable in its whole essence, no longer wholly explainable through something else, therefore something groundless. At once cognition loses evidence by this and loses its perfect transparency. But this which withdraws from fathoming is precisely the thing in itself. It is that which is essentially not representation, not object of cognition, but has become knowable only by entering into that form. The form is originally foreign to it, and it can never become wholly one with it. It can never be traced back to the mere form, and, since this is the principle of sufficient reason, it can therefore not be completely *fathomed*. So even if all mathematics gives us exhaustive cognition of what in appearances is magnitude, position, number, in short, spatial and temporal relation, and if all etiology gives us completely the lawful conditions under which the appearances, with all their determinations, enter in time and space, yet with all this it teaches no more than why each determinate appearance must show itself just now here and just here now. So with their help we still never penetrate into the inner essence of things. There always remains something on which no explanation may venture, which it always presupposes: namely the forces of nature, the determinate way things act, the quality, the character of every appearance, the groundless, which does not depend on the form of appearance, the principle of sufficient reason, to which that form is foreign in itself, but which has entered into it and now comes forth according to its law. This law, however, determines only the coming forth, not *what* comes forth, only the How, not the What of the appearance, only the form, not the content. —Mechanics, physics and chemistry teach the rules and laws according to which the forces of impenetrability, gravity, rigidity, fluidity, cohesion, elasticity, heat, light, elective affinities, magnetism, electricity and so on act, that is, the law, the rule, which these forces observe in regard to their entry into time and space on each occasion. The forces themselves, however, remain, however one may carry on, qualitates occultae. For it is precisely the thing in itself which, in appearing, presents those phenomena. It is wholly different from them themselves. In its appearance it is indeed wholly subject to the principle of sufficient reason as the form of representation, but it can itself never be traced back to this form. It therefore cannot be explained etiologically to the last, nor ever

fully fathomed. It is completely comprehensible insofar as it has taken on that form, that is, insofar as it is appearance, but in its inner essence it is not in the least explained by that comprehensibility. So the more necessity a cognition carries with it, the more it contains of what cannot be thought and represented otherwise (as, for example, spatial relations), and so the clearer and more sufficient it is, the less purely objective content it has, or the less real reality is given in it. And conversely, the more in it must be grasped as purely accidental, the more presses itself on us as merely empirically given, the more properly objective and truly real there is in such cognition, but also at the same time the more unexplainable, that is, not further derivable from something else.

Of course, in all times an etiology that has misjudged its aim has striven to trace all organic life back to chemism, or electricity; all chemism, that is, quality, back again to mechanism (action through the shape of the atoms); and this again partly to the object of phoronomy, that is, time and space united to make movement possible, partly to that of mere geometry, that is, position in space (roughly as one rightly constructs purely geometrically the decrease of an effect according to the square of the distance and the theory of the lever). Geometry can finally be resolved into arithmetic, which, because of the unity of its dimension, is the most graspable, most surveyable form of the principle of sufficient reason, fathomable to the last. Examples of the method generally indicated here are: Democritus's atoms, Descartes's vortices, the mechanical physics of Lesage, who, toward the end of the last century, tried to explain both chemical affinities and gravitation mechanically, by impact and pressure, as can be seen more closely in the "Lucrèce Neutonien." Reil's form and mixture as the cause of animal life also tends that way. Finally, wholly of this kind is the crude materialism warmed over again just now, in the middle of the nineteenth century, which, from ignorance, thinks itself original. First, with a stupid denial of the vital force, it wants to explain the phenomena of life from physical and chemical forces, then to have these arise in turn from the mechanical action of matter, the position, shape and movement of dreamed-up atoms, and so to trace all forces of nature back to impact and counter-impact, which are its "thing in itself." According to this, even light is then supposed to be the mechanical

vibration, or even undulation, of an imaginary ether, postulated for this purpose, which when it arrives drums on the retina, where then, for example, 483 trillion drumbeats a second give red and 727 trillion violet, and so on. The color-blind would then presumably be those who cannot count the drumbeats. Is that not right? Such crass, mechanical, Democritean, clumsy and truly lumpish theories are quite worthy of the people who, fifty years after the appearance of Goethe's theory of colors, still believe in Newton's homogeneous lights and are not ashamed to say so. They will find out that what is overlooked in the child (Democritus) is not forgiven in the man. They might even come to a disgraceful end one day. But then everyone sneaks away and acts as if they had not been there. We shall soon speak again of this false tracing back of original forces of nature to one another. Here only this much. Suppose this worked. Then of course everything would be explained and fathomed, indeed in the end reduced to a calculation exercise, which would then be the holy of holies in the temple of wisdom, to which the principle of sufficient reason would in the end have happily led. But all content of appearance would have vanished and mere form would be left over. What appears would be traced back to how it appears, and this how would be also knowable a priori, so wholly dependent on the subject, so only for it, so in the end mere phantom, representation and form of representation through and through. No thing in itself could be asked about.—If this worked, then really the whole world would be derived from the subject, and what Fichte wanted to seem to achieve by his humbug would in fact be accomplished.—But it does not work. In that way people have brought about fantasies, sophistications, castles in the air, no science. It has succeeded, and every time it succeeded it gave a real advance, to trace the many and varied appearances in nature back to a few original forces. People have derived several forces and qualities, at first held to be different, one from another (for example magnetism from electricity) and so reduced their number. Etiology will be at its goal when it has recognized and set up all the original forces of nature as such, and has fixed their ways of acting, that is, the rule according to which, on the guiding thread of causality, their appearances enter in time and space and determine their place among one another. But original forces will always remain;

always there will remain, as an insoluble residue, a content of appearance that cannot be traced back to its form, and so cannot be explained from something else according to the principle of sufficient reason.—For in every thing in nature there is something of which no ground can ever be given, no explanation is possible, no further cause is to be sought. It is the specific way of its acting, that is, the way of its existence, its essence. Of every single effect of the thing a cause can indeed be shown, from which it follows that it had to act just now, just here. But that it acts at all, and just so, never. If it has no other properties, if it is a speck of dust in the sunbeam, it still shows that unfathomable something at least as gravity and impenetrability. This something, I say, is for it what the will is for the human being, and, like the will, it is in its inner essence not subject to explanation. Indeed it is in itself identical with the will. For each manifestation of the will, for each single act of it at this time, in this place, a motive can well be shown on which it had to follow necessarily, on the presupposition of the character of the person. But that the person has this character, that they will at all, that of several motives just this one and no other, indeed that any motive at all moves their will: of this no ground can ever be given. What the person's unfathomable character is, which is presupposed in every explanation of their deeds from motives, that very thing is for every inorganic body its essential quality, the way it acts. Its manifestations are called forth by influence from outside, while it itself is determined by nothing outside it, and so is not explainable either. Its single appearances, through which alone it becomes visible, are subject to the principle of sufficient reason. It itself is groundless. The Scholastics had already recognized this in essence correctly and designated it as forma substantialis. (On which see Suarez, Disput. metaph., disp. XV, sect. 1.)

It is an error as great as it is common that the most frequent, most general and simplest appearances are the ones we understand best. In fact they are only those whose sight, and our ignorance about them, we have grown most used to. It is just as inexplicable to us that a stone falls to the earth as that an animal moves. As mentioned above, people supposed that, starting from the most general forces of nature (for example gravitation, cohesion, impenetrability), they

could explain from these the forces that act more rarely and only under combined circumstances (for example chemical quality, electricity, magnetism), and finally understand from these in turn the organism and the life of animals, even the knowing and willing of man. People quietly accepted starting from nothing but qualitates occultae, whose clarification was wholly given up, since they intended to build on them, not to undermine them. Something of this kind, as said, cannot succeed. But apart from that, such a building would always stand in the air. What use are explanations that in the end lead back to something just as unknown as the first problem was? Does one in the end understand more about the inner essence of those general forces of nature than about the inner essence of an animal? Is not the one as unexplored as the other? It is unfathomable because it is groundless, because it is the content, the What of the appearance, which can never be traced back to its form, to the How, to the principle of sufficient reason. We, however, who here aim not at etiology but at philosophy, that is, not at relative but at unconditional knowledge of the essence of the world, take the opposite way. We start from what is known to us immediately, what is known to us most completely and is quite familiar, what lies nearest to us, in order to understand what is known to us only at a distance, one-sidedly and indirectly. And from the mightiest, most important, most distinct appearance we want to learn to understand the more imperfect, weaker one. Of all things, except my own body, I know only one side, that of representation. Their inner essence stays closed to me and a deep mystery, even if I know all the causes on which their changes follow. Only from comparison with what goes on in me when a motive moves me and my body performs an action —the inner essence of my own changes, determined by external grounds—can I get insight into the way those lifeless bodies change on causes, and so understand what their inner essence is, of whose appearing the knowledge of the cause gives me the mere rule of entry in time and space and nothing more. I can do this because my body is the only object of which I know not merely the one side, that of representation, but also the second, which is called will. So instead of believing that I would understand my own organization, then my knowing and willing and my movement on motives, better if I could only trace them

back to movement from causes, through electricity, through chemism, through mechanism, I must, insofar as I seek philosophy, not etiology, do the reverse. I must first learn to understand, according to their inner essence, even the simplest and commonest movements of the inorganic body, which I see follow on causes, from my own movement on motives. And I must recognize the unfathomable forces that manifest themselves in all bodies of nature as identical in kind with what is will in me, and as different from it only in degree. This means: the fourth class of representations, set up in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, must become for me the key to the cognition of the inner essence of the first class, and from the law of motivation I must learn to understand the law of causality in its inner meaning.

Spinoza says (epist. 62) that a stone flying through the air from a push, if it had consciousness, would believe it flew from its own will. I add only that the stone would be right. The push is for it what the motive is for me. And what in it appears as cohesion, gravity, persistence in the assumed state is, in its inner essence, the same as what I recognize in myself as will, and what it too would recognize as will if cognition were added in its case. Spinoza, in that passage, had directed his attention to the necessity with which the stone flies, and wants, rightly, to transfer it to the necessity of the single act of will of a person. I, by contrast, consider the inner essence which first gives meaning and validity to all real necessity (that is, effect from cause) as its presupposition. In man it is called character, in the stone quality. In both it is the same, called will where it is known immediately, and it has in the stone the weakest, in man the strongest degree of visibility, objectivity.—Even St. Augustine recognized, with a correct feeling, this element in the striving of all things that is identical with our willing, and I cannot refrain from setting down his naive expression of the matter: Si pecora essemus, carnalem vitam et quod secundum sensum ejusdem est amaremus, idque esset sufficiens bonum nostrum, et secundum hoc si esset nobis bene, nihil aliud quaereremus. Item, si arbores essemus, nihil quidem sentientes motu amare possemus: verumtamen id quasi appetere videremur, quo feracius essemus, uberiusque fructuosae. Si essemus lapides, aut fluctus, aut ventus, aut flamma, vel quid ejusmodi, sine ullo quidem sensu atque vita,

non tamen nobis deesset quasi quidam nostrorum locorum atque ordinis appetitus. Nam velut amores corporum momenta sunt ponderum, sive deorsum gravitate, sive sursum levitate nitantur: ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur quocunque fertur (de civ. Dei, XI, 28).

It also deserves notice that Euler already saw that the essence of gravitation must in the end be traced back to an "inclination and desire" (that is, will) peculiar to bodies (in the 68th letter to the Princess). In fact this very thing makes him averse to the concept of gravitation as it stands in Newton, and he is inclined to try a modification of it in accordance with the earlier Cartesian theory, that is, to derive gravitation from the impact of an ether on the bodies, which would be "more reasonable and more fitting for people who love clear and comprehensible principles." He wants to see attraction banished from physics as a qualitas occulta. This is merely in keeping with the dead view of nature that, as correlate of the immaterial soul, ruled in Euler's time. But it is worth noticing with respect to the fundamental truth I have set up. Even then this fine mind, seeing this truth shimmering through from afar, hurried to turn back in good time, and now, in his fear of seeing all the basic views of that time endangered, sought protection even in the old, already discarded absurdity.

25 We know that multiplicity in general is necessarily conditioned by time and space and can be thought only in them, which in this respect we call the principium individuationis. But time and space we have recognized as forms of the principle of sufficient reason, in which principle all our knowledge a priori is expressed. As explained above, as such they belong only to the knowability of things, not to things themselves. That is, they are only our form of cognition, not a property of the thing in itself. The thing in itself as such is free of every form of cognition, even the most general, that of being an object for the subject, that is, it is something wholly different from representation. Now if this thing in itself is, as I believe I have sufficiently proved and made evident, the will, then, taken as such and separate from its appearance, it lies outside time and space, and therefore knows no multiplicity. It is accordingly one. Yet, as already said, it is not one as an individual is one, nor as a concept is one, but as

something to which the condition of the possibility of multiplicity, the principium individuationis, is foreign. The multiplicity of things in space and time, which are all its objectivity, therefore does not touch it, and it remains, in spite of them, indivisible. It is not as if a smaller part of it were in the stone, a larger in man. The relation of part and whole belongs exclusively to space and has no meaning any more as soon as one has left this form of intuition. Even the more and less touches only the appearance, that is, the visibility, the objectification. Of this there is a higher degree in the plant than in the stone, in the animal a higher one than in the plant. Indeed its coming forth into visibility, its objectification, has as infinite gradations as there are between the faintest twilight and the brightest sunlight, between the strongest tone and the faintest echo. We shall come back below to the consideration of these degrees of visibility, which belong to its objectification, the likeness of its essence. Still less than the gradations of its objectification touch it itself directly, the multiplicity of appearances on these different stages touches it, that is, the number of individuals of each form, or of the single manifestations of each force. For this multiplicity is immediately conditioned by time and space, which it itself never enters.

It reveals itself just as wholly and just as much in one oak as in millions. Their number, their multiplication in space and time, has no meaning at all with regard to it. It has meaning only with regard to the multiplicity of the individuals that know in space and time and are themselves multiplied and scattered in it. And their multiplicity in turn concerns only its appearance, not it. So one could also assert that if, per impossibile, a single being, even the least, were wholly annihilated, the whole world would have to perish with it. Feeling this, the great mystic Angelus Silesius says:

"I know that without me God cannot live a moment: if I come to nothing, God must of necessity give up the ghost."

People have tried in many ways to bring the immeasurable size of the universe closer to everyone's grasp, and then taken occasion from this for edifying reflections, for example on the relative smallness of the earth and indeed of man. Then again, by contrast, they have reflected on the greatness of the mind in this so small man, who can work out, grasp, even measure that size of the world,

and the like. All very well! Meanwhile, for me, in considering the immensity of the world, the most important thing is this: that the essence in itself, whose appearance the world is—whatever it may be—cannot have drawn out and divided its true self in this way in boundless space. This infinite extension belongs wholly to its appearance alone, while it itself is present whole and undivided in every thing of nature, in every living thing. So one loses nothing by stopping at any single thing, and true wisdom is not to be gained by measuring the boundless world or, still more to the purpose, by flying in person through endless space. It is gained rather by thoroughly investigating some single thing, seeking to know and understand fully its true and proper essence.

Accordingly, what has already forced itself on every student of Plato will be the subject of a detailed discussion in the next book: namely that those different stages of the objectification of the will, which, expressed in countless individuals, stand there as the unreached models of these, or as the eternal forms of things, do not themselves enter into time and space, the medium of individuals, but stand fast, subject to no change, always being, never having become, while those arise and pass away, always become and never are; that, I say, these *stages of the objectification of the will* are nothing other than *Plato's Ideas*. I mention it here provisionally so as to be able from now on to use the word *Idea* in this sense. So with me it is always to be understood in its genuine and original meaning given to it by Plato, and one is not at all to think of those abstract products of the scholastically dogmatizing reason, to designate which Kant misused that word, already taken possession of by Plato and used by him most appropriately, as unsuitably as unlawfully. By *Idea*, then, I understand every determinate and fixed *stage of the objectification of the will*, insofar as it is thing in itself and therefore foreign to multiplicity. These stages relate to the single things as their eternal forms or models. The shortest and most compact expression of that famous Platonic dogma is given to us by Diogenes Laertius (III, 12): ὁ Πλατων φησι, εν τῃ φυσει τας ιδεας ἑσταναι, καθαπερ παραδειγματα· τα δ'αλλα ταυταις εοικεναι, τουτων ὁμοιωματα καθεστωτα. (Plato ideas in natura

velut exemplaria dixit subsistere; cetera his esse similia, ad istarum similitudinem consistentia.) I take no further notice of that Kantian misuse: what is necessary about it stands in the Appendix.

26 As the lowest stage of the objectification of the will, the most general *forces of nature* present themselves. Some of them appear in all matter without exception, such as gravity and impenetrability. Others have divided the matter that exists at all among themselves, so that some rule over this matter, others over that, and by this very fact over matter that is specifically different, such as rigidity, fluidity, elasticity, electricity, magnetism, chemical properties and qualities of every kind. In themselves they are immediate appearances of the will, just like the doing of man. As such they are groundless, like the character of man. Only their single appearances are subject to the principle of sufficient reason, like the actions of man. The forces themselves can never be called either effect or cause. They are the preceding and presupposed conditions of all causes and effects, through which their own essence unfolds and reveals itself. It is therefore senseless to ask for a cause of gravity or electricity. These are original forces, whose manifestations do go on according to cause and effect, so that every single appearance of them has a cause, which itself is again just such a single appearance, and which gives the determination that here that force had to manifest itself, to come forth in time and space. But by no means is the force itself the effect of a cause, nor the cause of an effect.—So it is also false to say: "gravity is the cause of the stone's falling." Rather the nearness of the earth is here the cause, since the earth pulls the stone. Take the earth away, and the stone will not fall, though gravity has remained. The force itself lies wholly outside the chain of causes and effects, which presupposes time, since it has meaning only in relation to time. The force, however, lies outside time too. The single change always has again an equally single change as its cause, not the force of which it is the manifestation. For that which always gives a cause its effectiveness, however countless times it may occur, is a force of nature. As such it is groundless, that is, lies wholly outside the chain of causes and altogether outside the territory of

the principle of sufficient reason. It is recognized philosophically as the immediate objectivity of the will, which is the in-itself of the whole of nature. In etiology, here physics, it is shown as an original force, that is, qualitas occulta.

On the higher levels of the will's objectivity, individuality stands out strongly. It does so most of all in human beings, as the great variety of individual characters, that is, as full personality, already expressed outwardly in a strongly marked individual physiognomy, which takes in the whole bodily build. No animal has individuality anywhere near this degree. Only the higher animals have a touch of it, and even in them the character of the species still entirely prevails, which is also why they have so little individual physiognomy. The further down we go, the more every trace of individual character is lost in the general character of the species, and the physiognomy of the species is all that remains. We know the psychological character of a species, and from it we know exactly what to expect of an individual. In the human species, by contrast, every individual has to be studied and fathomed separately. That is extremely hard if one wants to predict a person's conduct with any certainty, because the possibility of pretense, which came only with reason, now exists. This difference between the human species and all the others probably goes together with the following fact. The furrows and convolutions of the brain are completely absent in birds and still very faint in rodents. Even in the higher animals they are far more symmetrical on the two sides, and more constant from one individual to the next, than they are in human beings [15]. We should also take it as a sign of that true individual character, which sets human beings apart from all animals, that animals look for satisfaction of the sexual drive without any noticeable choice. In human beings this choice is pushed so far, in an instinctive way that has nothing to do with reflection, that it rises to violent passion. Every human being, then, is to be seen as a specially determined and characterized appearance of the will, and even, in a way, as a separate Idea. In animals this individual character is missing on the whole: only the species still has a distinctive meaning, and the trace of individuality vanishes more and more the further the animals are from human beings. Plants, finally, have no individual peculiarities at all except ones that can be fully explained by external

favorable [16] Wenzel, De structura cerebri hominis et brutorum 1812, ch. 3. —Cuvier, Leçons d'anat. comp. leçon 9, art. 4 and 5.—Vicq d'Azyr, Hist. de l'acad. d. sc. de Paris 1783, pp. 470 and 483. or unfavorable influences of soil and climate and other accidents. And so, in the inorganic realm of nature, all individuality finally vanishes completely. Only the crystal can still be seen, in a way, as an individual. It is a unity of striving in certain directions, seized by solidification, which makes the trace of that striving lasting. At the same time it is an aggregate of its core form, joined into a unity by an Idea. In just the same way a tree is an aggregate of the single shooting fiber, which shows itself, repeated, in every rib of the leaf, every leaf and every branch. In a way it lets each of these be seen as a plant of its own, feeding like a parasite on the larger one. So the tree, like the crystal, is a systematic aggregate of small plants, although only the whole is the complete presentation of an indivisible Idea, that is, of this particular level of the objectification of the will. Individual crystals of the same kind, however, can differ only in ways that outward accidents bring about. One can even make any kind form into large or small crystals at will. The individual as such, meaning one with traces of an individual character, is no longer found at all in inorganic nature. All its appearances are expressions of general natural forces, that is, of those levels of the will's objectification that do not objectify themselves at all, as they do in organic nature, by way of a variety of individualities that each express the whole of the Idea only in part. They show themselves only in the species, and the species shows itself whole, without any deviation, in every single appearance. Time, space, multiplicity and being conditioned by a cause do not belong to the will, or to the Idea (the level of the will's objectification), but only to the individual appearances of the Idea. So in all the millions of appearances of such a natural force, for example gravity or electricity, the force as such must show itself in exactly the same way, and only outward circumstances can modify the appearance. This unity of its nature in all its appearances, this unchanging constancy with which they occur whenever the conditions for them are present, following the thread of causality, is called a *law of nature*.

Once such a law is known from experience, the appearance of the natural force whose character is stated and recorded in the law can be determined in advance and calculated exactly. But it is exactly this lawfulness in the appearances of the lower levels of the will's objectification that makes them look so different from the appearances of the same will on the higher, that is, clearer levels of its objectification, in animals, in human beings and in what they do. There, individual character comes out more strongly or more weakly, and the beings are moved by motives, which lie in knowledge and so often stay hidden from the onlooker. Up to now this has kept people from recognizing at all that the inner nature of both kinds of appearance is the same.

The infallibility of the laws of nature has something surprising about it, and at times even something that nearly makes one shudder, if one starts from knowledge of the particular and not from knowledge of the Idea. One could be amazed that nature never forgets its laws, not even once. Suppose a law of nature says that when certain substances meet under certain conditions, a chemical combination, a release of gas, or burning takes place. Then whenever those conditions come together, whether we arrange it or it happens entirely by chance (where the exactness is all the more startling for being unexpected), the particular event occurs at once and without delay, today as surely as a thousand years ago. We feel this wonder most vividly in rare events that happen only under very complex circumstances, but are foretold to us for those circumstances. For example, when certain metals touch one another in turn, together with an acidified liquid, thin leaves of silver placed between the two ends of this chain must suddenly go up in green flames. Or under certain conditions hard diamond turns into carbon dioxide. What startles us then is the ghostlike omnipresence of natural forces. We notice here what no longer occurs to us with everyday events: that the connection between cause and effect is really as mysterious as the one that people imagine between a magic formula and the spirit that, summoned by it, must appear. But suppose we have worked our way into philosophical knowledge. Suppose we see that a natural force is a particular level of the objectification of the will, that is, of what we too know as our own innermost nature. Suppose we see that this will, in itself and distinct

from its appearance and the forms of that appearance, lies outside time and space. The multiplicity that time and space condition therefore does not belong to the will, or directly to the level of its objectification, the Idea, but only to the appearances of that Idea. And the law of causality has meaning only in relation to time and space, since within them it fixes the place of the multiplied appearances of the different Ideas in which the will shows itself, regulating the order in which they must occur. Suppose, I say, that in this knowledge the inner sense of Kant's great teaching has dawned on us: that space, time and causality belong not to the thing in itself but only to appearance, and are only forms of our knowledge, not properties of the thing in itself. Then we will see that our amazement at the lawfulness and exactness with which a natural force acts, at the perfect sameness of all its millions of appearances, and at the infallibility with which they occur, really is comparable to the amazement of a child or a savage. Such a person looks for the first time through a glass with many facets at, say, a flower, wonders at the perfect sameness of the countless flowers that he sees, and counts the petals of each one separately.

So every general, original natural force is, in its inner nature, nothing other than the objectification of the will at a low level. We call each such level an eternal *Idea*, in Plato's sense. The *law of nature*, however, is the relation of the Idea to the form of its appearance. This form is time, space and causality, which are necessarily and inseparably connected and related to one another. Through time and space the Idea multiplies into countless appearances. The order in which these enter those forms of manifoldness is firmly fixed by the law of causality. The law is, as it were, the standard for the boundary points between those appearances of different Ideas, by which space, time and matter are shared out among them. This standard therefore necessarily relates to the identity of all the matter that exists, which is the common substratum of all those different appearances. If the appearances were not all tied to that common matter, whose possession they have to share, there would be no need for such a law to settle their claims. They could all fill infinite space side by side, at the same time, through an infinite time. So it is only because all those appearances of the eternal Ideas are tied to one and the same matter that there had to be a rule for

their entering and leaving. Otherwise none would make room for another. In this way the law of causality is essentially bound up with the law of the permanence of substance. Each gets its meaning only from the other, and space and time stand in the same relation to them. For time is the bare possibility of opposite determinations in the same matter, and space is the bare possibility of the same matter persisting under all opposite determinations. That is why, in the previous book, we explained matter as the union of time and space. This union shows itself as a change of accidents while substance persists, and the general possibility of that is exactly causality, or becoming. That is also why we said that matter is causality through and through. We explained the understanding as the subjective correlate of causality. We said that matter (and so the whole world as representation) exists only for the understanding, which is its condition and its bearer, as its necessary correlate. I say all this here only as a passing reminder of what was worked out in the first book. To understand the two books fully, one has to pay attention to the inner agreement between them. In the real world, will and representation are its two sides, inseparably united, and these two books have torn them apart so that each can be known more clearly in isolation.

It may not be superfluous to make clearer, with an example, how the law of causality has meaning only in relation to time and space and to matter, which consists in the union of the two. The law fixes the boundaries by which the appearances of natural forces divide possession of matter between them. The original natural forces themselves are immediate objectifications of the will, which as thing in itself is not subject to the principle of sufficient reason. They lie outside those forms, within which alone any explanation by causes has validity and meaning, and for that very reason such an explanation can never lead to the inner essence of nature.—For this purpose, imagine a machine built according to the laws of mechanics. Iron weights start the motion through their gravity. Copper wheels resist through their rigidity, and push and lift one another and the levers by their impenetrability, and so on. Here gravity, rigidity and impenetrability are original, unexplained forces. Mechanics states only the conditions under which they show themselves and come forth, and the way they

do so, as they take control of particular matter, time and place. Now say a strong magnet acts on the iron of the weights and overpowers gravity. The motion of the machine stops, and the matter at once becomes the scene of a quite different natural force, magnetism, about which the explanation by causes likewise says nothing more than the conditions of its occurrence. Or else the copper disks of the machine are laid on zinc plates, with an acidified liquid let in between them. Immediately the same matter of the machine has fallen to a different original force, galvanism. Galvanism now governs it according to its own laws and reveals itself in it through its appearances, and about those appearances etiology can again state no more than the circumstances in which they show themselves and the laws they follow. Now we let the temperature rise and let pure oxygen in. The whole machine burns. That is, once again a completely different natural force, chemism, has at this time and in this place an undeniable claim on that matter, and reveals itself in it as an Idea, as a particular level of the objectification of the will.—Let the metal oxide produced in this way now combine with an acid. A salt forms, and crystals shoot out. They are the appearance of yet another Idea, which in turn is entirely unfathomable, while the occurrence of its appearance depended on those conditions that etiology knows how to state. The crystals weather away and mix with other substances, and vegetation rises out of them, a new appearance of the will.—And so one could follow the same persisting matter on into infinity, and watch how now this natural force, now that one, wins a right to it and unfailingly seizes it, in order to come forward and reveal its nature. The law of causality fixes this right, the point in time and space where it becomes valid, but the explanation based on that law goes no further. The force itself is an appearance of the will and as such is not subject to the forms of the principle of sufficient reason; that is, it is groundless. It lies outside all time and is everywhere present, and it seems to be waiting constantly for the circumstances in which it can come forward and take over that particular matter, displacing the forces that until then ruled it. All time exists only for its appearance and has no meaning for the force itself. For thousands of years chemical forces sleep in a piece of matter until contact with reagents sets them free. Then they appear. But time exists only for this

appearance, not for the forces themselves. For thousands of years galvanism sleeps in copper and zinc, and they lie quietly next to silver, which must go up in flames as soon as all three touch under the required conditions. Even in the organic realm we see a dry seed keep for three thousand years the sleeping force that, when favorable circumstances finally arrive, rises up as a plant [17].

18 On September 16, 1840, at the Literary and Scientific Institution of the City of London, during a lecture on Egyptian antiquities, Mr. Pettigrew showed grains of wheat that Sir G. Wilkinson had found in a tomb near Thebes, where they must have lain for thirty centuries. They were found in a hermetically sealed vase. He had sown twelve grains and gotten a plant from them, which had grown five feet high and whose seed was now perfectly ripe. From the Times of September 21, 1840.—Likewise, at the Medico-Botanical Society in London in 1830, Mr. Haulton produced a tuberous root that was found in the hand of an Egyptian mummy Once this reflection has made the difference clear to us between a natural force and all its appearances, and once we have seen that the force is the will itself at this particular level of its objectification, that multiplicity, through time and space, belongs to the appearances alone, and that the law of causality is nothing other than the fixing of the place in time and space for the individual appearances, we will also recognize the complete truth and deep meaning of the teaching of *Mallebranche* about occasional causes, causes occasionelles. It is well worth the trouble to compare this teaching of his, as he sets it out in the Recherches de la vérité, above all in the third chapter of the second part of the sixth book and in the éclaircissements appended at the back for that chapter, with my present account, and to see the perfect agreement between the two teachings, despite so great a difference in the line of thought. Indeed, I must admire how Mallebranche was completely caught up in the established dogmas that his age forced on him irresistibly, and yet, in such chains and under such a burden, hit upon the truth so happily and so correctly, and knew how to unite it with those very dogmas, at least with their language.

For the power of truth is unbelievably great, and its endurance is beyond words. We find its frequent traces again in all dogmas, even the most bizarre and indeed the most absurd ones, of who may have been given it for some religious reason, so that it was at least 2000 years old. He had planted it in a flowerpot, where it grew at once and turned green. This is cited from the Medical Journal of 1830 in the Journal of the Royal Institution of Great-Britain, October 1830, p. 196.—"In the garden of Mr. Grimstone, of the Herbarium, Highgate, in London, there now stands a pea plant in full fruit. It grew from a pea that Mr. Pettigrew and the officials of the British Museum took out of a vase found in an Egyptian sarcophagus, where it must have lain for 2844 years."—From the Times of August 16, 1844.—Indeed, the living toads found in limestone lead to the assumption that even animal life is capable of such a suspension for thousands of years, when it is brought on by hibernation and kept up by special circumstances. different times and countries. They are often in strange company and in odd mixtures, but they can still be recognized. Truth is then like a plant that sprouts under a heap of big stones but still climbs toward the light, working its way through with many detours and twists, misshapen, pale and stunted—but still toward the light.

Mallebranche is certainly right: every natural cause is only an occasional cause. It gives only the occasion, the prompt, for the appearance of that one indivisible will which is the in-itself of all things and whose step-by-step objectification is this whole visible world. Only the coming forth, the becoming visible, in this place and at this time, is brought about by the cause and is to that extent dependent on it. The whole of the appearance is not, and neither is its inner nature. That is the will itself, to which the principle of sufficient reason does not apply, and which is therefore groundless. No thing in the world has a cause of its existence simply and in general. It has only a cause because of which it is here, exactly here, and exactly now. Why a stone shows gravity at one moment, rigidity at another, electricity at another, chemical properties at another depends on causes, on outside influences, and can be explained from them. But those properties themselves—that is, its whole nature, which consists of them and therefore shows itself in all the ways just listed, so that it is in general the kind of

thing it is, and that it exists at all—have no ground. They are the becoming visible of the groundless will. So every cause is an occasional cause. That is what we found in nature without knowledge. It is exactly the same where it is no longer causes and stimuli but motives that fix the point at which appearances occur, that is, in the actions of animals and human beings. For here as there it is one and the same will that appears. It differs enormously in the degrees of its manifestation, is multiplied in the appearances of those degrees and, with regard to them, is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, but in itself is free from all this. Motives do not determine a person's character but only the appearance of that character, that is, the deeds, the outward shape of the course of their life and not its inner meaning and content. Those come from the character, which is the immediate appearance of the will and therefore groundless. Why one person is wicked and another good does not depend on motives and outside influence, such as teachings and sermons, and in this sense is simply inexplicable. But whether a wicked man shows his wickedness in petty injustices, cowardly intrigues and low villainies, carried out in the narrow circle of his surroundings, or whether as a conqueror he oppresses nations, plunges a world into misery and sheds the blood of millions—that is the outward form of his appearance, the unessential part of it, and depends on the circumstances fate put him in, on his surroundings, on outside influences, on motives. His decision in response to these motives can never be explained from them. It comes from the will, of which this man is the appearance. More on this in the fourth book. The way a character unfolds its qualities is entirely comparable to the way every body in nature without knowledge shows its own. Water stays water, with the properties that live in it. But whether it mirrors its banks as a still lake, or tumbles foaming over rocks, or, when made to by artificial means, shoots up as a long jet, depends on outside causes. One is as natural to it as the other. But according to the circumstances, it will show the one or the other, equally ready for everything, yet in every case true to its character and always revealing only that. In the same way every human character will reveal itself in all circumstances, but the appearances that result from it will be as the circumstances were.

27 All the reflections so far on the forces of nature and their appearances have made it clear to us how far explanation by causes can go and where it has to stop, if it does not want to fall into the foolish effort of tracing the content of all appearances back to their mere form, where in the end nothing but form would be left. So we can now also state in general what should be demanded of all etiology. It has to look for the causes of all appearances in nature, that is, the circumstances in which they always occur. Then it has to trace the appearances, which take many shapes under varied circumstances, back to what is at work in every appearance and is presupposed in the cause: the original forces of nature. It must tell correctly whether a difference in the appearance comes from a difference in the force or only from a difference in the circumstances in which the force expresses itself. And it must guard equally against two mistakes: taking for the appearance of different forces what is the expression of one and the same force under different circumstances, and, the other way round, taking for expressions of one force what originally belongs to different forces. This calls directly for judgment. That is why so few people are able to widen insight in physics, though all can widen experience. Laziness and ignorance make people inclined to appeal too early to original forces. This shows itself, with an exaggeration that resembles irony, in the entities and quiddities of the Scholastics. I would least of all want to have favored their reintroduction. Instead of giving a physical explanation, one may no more appeal to the objectification of the will than to the creative power of God. For physics demands causes, and the will is never a cause. Its relation to the appearance does not follow the principle of sufficient reason at all. Rather, what is will in itself exists, from the other side, as representation, that is, is appearance, and as such it obeys the laws that make up the form of appearance. So, for example, every motion, although it is always an appearance of the will, must still have a cause from which it can be explained in relation to a particular time and place, that is, not in general, according to its inner nature, but as an *individual* appearance. This cause is a mechanical one in the case of a stone and a motive in the case of a human being's motion, but it can never be missing. The general, on the other hand—the common nature of all appearances of a given kind, that without whose presupposition the explana-

tion from the cause would have neither sense nor meaning—is the general natural force. In physics it has to stay as a qualitas occulta, exactly because here the explanation by causes ends and the metaphysical explanation begins. But the chain of causes and effects is never broken off by an original force to which one would have to appeal. It does not run back to such a force as its first link. Rather, the nearest link in the chain, just as much as the most remote, already presupposes the original force, and otherwise could explain nothing. A series of causes and effects can be the appearance of the most different kinds of forces, whose successive entry into visibility is guided by that series, as I explained above with the example of a metal machine. But the difference between these original forces, which cannot be derived from one another, does not at all break the unity of that chain of causes or the connection between all its links. The etiology of nature and the philosophy of nature never harm each other. They go side by side, looking at the same object from different points of view. Etiology gives an account of the causes that necessarily brought about the individual appearance to be explained. As the basis of all its explanations, it points out the general forces that are active in all these causes and effects. It determines these forces exactly, their number and their differences, and then all the effects in which each force comes out differently according to the difference in circumstances, always in line with its own particular character, which it unfolds by an infallible rule called a *law of nature*. As soon as physics has done all this completely in every respect, it will have reached its completion. Then no force in inorganic nature will be unknown any more, and there will be no effect left that has not been shown to be the appearance of one of those forces under certain circumstances, in accordance with a law of nature. Even so, a law of nature remains merely the rule, noticed in nature, by which nature proceeds each time under certain circumstances, as soon as they occur. So one can certainly define a law of nature as a fact stated in general terms, un fait généralisé. By that definition a complete presentation of all laws of nature would be only a complete register of facts.—The study of nature as a whole is then completed by *morphology*, which lists, compares and orders all the lasting forms of organic nature. About the cause of the coming into being of individual creatures it has little to

say, since in all of them this cause is procreation, whose theory goes its own way, and in rare cases generatio aequivoca. Strictly speaking, though, the way all the low levels of the will's objectivity, the physical and chemical appearances, come forth in particular cases belongs to this last as well, and stating the conditions for this coming forth is exactly that task of etiology. Philosophy, by contrast, looks everywhere, nature included, only at the general. The original forces themselves are its object here, and in them it recognizes the different levels of the objectification of the will, which is the inner nature, the in-itself, of this world, a world that philosophy, when it leaves that will aside, declares to be the mere representation of the subject.—But suppose etiology, instead of preparing the way for philosophy and backing up its teachings with examples of their application, thinks its aim is to deny all original forces, except perhaps one, the most general, such as impenetrability, which it imagines it understands from the ground up, and so tries to trace all the others back to it by force. Then it removes its own foundation, and can give only error instead of truth. The content of nature is now pushed aside by form. Everything is credited to the circumstances that act on things, and nothing to the inner nature of things. If this route actually succeeded, then, as already said, a sum in arithmetic would in the end solve the riddle of the world. And one takes this route when, as already mentioned, all physiological effect is to be traced back to form and mixture, to electricity, say, and electricity in turn to chemism, and chemism to mechanism. The last of these was, for example, the mistake of Descartes and of all the atomists, who traced the motion of the heavenly bodies back to the impact of a fluid, and qualities back to the cohesion and shape of atoms, and worked toward declaring all the appearances of nature to be mere phenomena of impenetrability and cohesion. Although people have given this up, the electrical, chemical and mechanical physiologists of our own day do the same thing. They stubbornly want to explain the whole of life and all the functions of the organism from the "form and mixture" of its components. That the aim of physiological explanation is to trace organic life back to the general forces that physics studies can still be found stated in Meckel's Archiv für Physiologie, 1820, vol. 5, p. 185. —*Lamarck* too, in his Philosophie zoologique, vol. 2, ch. 3, declares life to be a

mere effect of heat and electricity: le calorique et la matière électrique suffisent parfaitement pour composer ensemble cette cause essentielle de la vie (p. 16). By that, heat and electricity would really be the thing in itself, and the animal and plant world its appearance. The absurdity of this view stands out glaringly on page 306 and the pages after it in that work. It is well known that in the most recent times all those views, so often exploded, have appeared again with renewed boldness. At bottom, if one looks at it closely, they rest on the assumption that the organism is only an aggregate of appearances of physical, chemical and mechanical forces, which came together here by chance and produced the organism, as a sport of nature with no further meaning. The organism of an animal or of a human being would then, philosophically considered, not be the presentation of an Idea of its own, that is, not itself the immediate objectivity of the will at a particular higher level. Rather, only those Ideas that objectify the will in electricity, in chemism and in mechanism would appear in it. The organism would therefore be blown together by chance out of the meeting of these forces, as the shapes of humans and animals are blown together out of clouds or stalactites, and so would be in itself of no further interest.—We will see shortly, however, how far applying physical and chemical kinds of explanation to the organism may still be allowed and useful within certain limits. I will show that the vital force does use and make use of the forces of inorganic nature, but by no means consists of them, any more than the smith consists of hammer and anvil. That is why even the extremely simple life of plants will never be explained from them, from capillary force and endosmosis, say, let alone animal life.

The following reflection prepares the way for us to that rather difficult discussion.

It is true, in light of everything said, that natural science goes astray when it tries to reduce the higher grades of the will's objectivity to lower ones. Failing to see and denying original forces of nature that exist in their own right is just as wrong as assuming, without grounds, special forces where there is only a particular way in which already known forces appear. Kant is therefore right to say that it is absurd to hope for a Newton of the blade of grass. That would mean

someone who could trace the blade of grass back to appearances of physical and chemical forces, of which it would then be only the chance lump, a mere freak of nature. In it no special Idea would appear. That is, the will would not reveal itself directly at a higher and special grade, but only as it does in the appearances of inorganic nature, and by chance in this form. The Scholastics would never have allowed anything of the kind. They would have been quite right to say that it would be a complete denial of the forma substantialis and a degrading of it to a forma accidentalis. For Aristotle's forma substantialis denotes exactly what I call the grade of the will's objectification in a thing.—On the other hand, we must not overlook that in all Ideas, that is, in all forces of inorganic nature and all forms of organic nature, it is *one and the same will* that reveals itself, that is, enters the form of representation, the *objectivity*. Its unity must therefore also make itself known through an inner kinship among all its appearances. This kinship shows itself at the higher grades of its objectivity, where the whole appearance is clearer. In the plant and animal kingdoms it shows itself through the analogy that runs through all forms, the basic type that turns up again in all appearances. For this reason that type has become the guiding principle of the excellent zoological systems that came from the French in this century. It is demonstrated most fully in comparative anatomy, as l'unité de plan, l'uniformité de l'élément anatomique. Finding it has also been the main business, or at least certainly the most praiseworthy effort, of the nature philosophers of Schelling's school. They even have some merit in this, although in many cases their hunt for analogies in nature degenerates into mere cheap wit. But they were right to show this general kinship and family likeness in the Ideas of inorganic nature too, for example between electricity and magnetism, whose identity was established later, between chemical attraction and gravity, and the like. They especially drew attention to this: polarity, that is, the splitting of one force into two activities that differ in kind, oppose each other and strive to reunite, which mostly shows itself in space too, as a moving apart in opposite directions, is a basic type of almost all appearances of nature, from the magnet and the crystal to man. In China, though, this knowledge has been current since the oldest times, in the doctrine of the opposition of *Yin* and *Yang*.

—Indeed, because all things of the world are the objectivity of one and the same will, and so are identical in their inner nature, that unmistakable analogy among them must exist. And in every less perfect thing there must already show the trace, hint and disposition of the nearest more perfect one. Moreover, since all those forms belong only to the world as *representation*, we can even assume that in the most general forms of representation, in this real framework of the appearing world, that is, in space and time, the basic type, the hint and disposition of everything that fills the forms can be found and demonstrated. A dim knowledge of this seems to have given rise to the Kabbala and to the whole mathematical philosophy of the Pythagoreans, and also of the Chinese in the Y-king. And in that school of Schelling too, among their many efforts to bring out the analogy between all appearances of nature, we find some attempts, though unlucky ones, to derive laws of nature from the mere laws of space and time. Still, one cannot know how far a mind of genius will someday carry out both efforts.

We must never lose sight of the difference between appearance and thing in itself. So the identity of the will objectified in all Ideas must never be twisted (since it has definite grades of its objectivity) into an identity of the single Ideas themselves in which it appears. For example, chemical or electrical attraction may never be traced back to attraction by gravity, even if their inner analogy is recognized and the former can be seen, so to speak, as higher powers of the latter. In the same way, the inner analogy in the structure of all animals gives no right to mix up and identify the species, or to declare the more perfect ones to be varieties of the less perfect. And finally, physiological functions can never be traced back to chemical or physical processes. Even so, to justify this procedure within certain limits, we can assume the following with much probability.

Suppose several appearances of the will, at the lower grades of its objectification, that is, in the inorganic, come into conflict with one another, each wanting to seize the available matter by following the thread of causality. Then from this struggle the appearance of a higher Idea arises. It overpowers all the less perfect ones that were there before, but in such a way that it lets their essence continue in a subordinate way, by taking an analogue of it into itself. This

process can be understood only from the identity of the appearing will in all Ideas and from its striving toward ever higher objectification. So, for example, in the hardening of bones we see an unmistakable analogue of crystallization, which originally governed the lime, although ossification can never be traced back to crystallization. The analogy shows more weakly in the hardening of flesh. Likewise the mixing of the fluids in the animal body and secretion are an analogue of chemical mixing and separation. The laws of chemistry even go on working in them, but in a subordinate way, much modified, overpowered by a higher Idea. So purely chemical forces outside the organism will never produce such fluids. Chemistry calls it Encheiresin naturae, mocks itself and doesn't know how.

The more perfect Idea that comes out of such a victory over several lower Ideas, or objectifications of the will, takes into itself from each one it has overpowered an analogue raised to a higher power. Precisely through this it gains a wholly new character. The will objectifies itself in a new, clearer way. There arises, originally by generatio aequivoca, later by assimilation to the germ already present, organic fluid, plant, animal, man. So out of the struggle of lower appearances comes the higher one, which swallows them all up but also fulfills the striving of them all to a higher degree.—So the law already rules here: serpens, nisi serpentem comederit, non fit draco.

I wish I had been able to overcome, by the clearness of my presentation, the obscurity that clings to the subject matter of these thoughts. But I see very well that the reader's own reflection must come a long way to help me if I am not to go either uncomprehended or misunderstood.—On the view given here, we can indeed show traces of chemical and physical ways of acting in the organism, but we can never explain it from them. It is by no means a phenomenon produced by the joint working of such forces, and so by chance. It is a higher Idea that has subjected those lower ones to itself by overpowering assimilation. For the one will that objectifies itself in all Ideas is striving for the highest possible objectification. Here it gives up the lower grades of its appearance, after a conflict among them, so as to appear all the more powerfully at a higher one. No victory without a fight. The higher Idea, or objectification of the will, can step

forth only by overpowering the lower ones, so it suffers their resistance. Though brought into servitude, they still strive to reach an independent and full expression of their essence. A magnet that has lifted a piece of iron keeps up a constant fight with gravity. Gravity, as the lowest objectification of the will, has a more original right to the matter of that iron. In this steady fight the magnet even grows stronger, since the resistance, so to speak, spurs it to greater effort. In the same way every appearance of the will, including the one that presents itself in the human organism, keeps up a lasting fight against the many physical and chemical forces which, as lower Ideas, have an earlier right to that matter. That is why the arm sinks after one has held it up for a while by overpowering gravity. That is why the comfortable feeling of health, which expresses the victory of the Idea of the self-aware organism over the physical and chemical laws that originally govern the fluids of the body, is so often interrupted. In fact it is always accompanied by some discomfort, greater or smaller, which comes from the resistance of those forces. Because of it, even the vegetative part of our life is constantly tied to a faint suffering. That is also why digestion depresses all animal functions: it claims the whole vital force to overpower chemical forces of nature by assimilation. That, then, is why physical life is a burden at all, why sleep is necessary and finally death. In the end, helped by circumstances, those subjugated forces of nature win back from the organism the matter that was taken from them, since the organism itself has been tired out by its constant victory. They then reach the unhindered presentation of their essence. So one can also say that every organism presents the Idea of which it is the image only after subtracting the part of its force that is spent on overpowering the lower Ideas that dispute the matter with it. This seems to have been in Jakob Böhm's mind when he says somewhere that all bodies of men and animals, indeed all plants, are really half dead. Now, depending on how far the organism succeeds in overpowering those forces of nature, which express the lower grades of the will's objectivity, it becomes a more perfect or less perfect expression of its Idea. That is, it stands nearer or farther from the ideal to which beauty belongs in its species.

So everywhere in nature we see strife, struggle and the swing of victory. In this we will also come to see more clearly the will's essential division against itself. Every grade of the will's objectification disputes matter, space and time with the others. Matter that lasts must keep changing its form. Following the thread of causality, mechanical, physical, chemical and organic appearances greedily press forward to show themselves. They tear the matter away from each other, since each wants to reveal its Idea. This strife can be traced through the whole of nature. Indeed, nature exists only through it: ει γαρ μη ην το νεικος εν τοις πραγμασιν, εν αν ην απαντα, ως φησιν Εμπεδοκλης· (nam si non inesset in rebus contentio, unum omnia essent, ut ait Empedocles. Arist. Metaph. B., 5). And this strife is itself only the revelation of the will's essential division against itself. This universal struggle becomes most plainly visible in the animal world. The animal world has the plant world as its food, and within it each animal in turn becomes the prey and food of another. That is, the matter in which its Idea presented itself must be given up to present another. Each animal can keep its existence only by constantly canceling out some other's. So the will to life everywhere feeds on itself and, in different shapes, is its own food. In the end the human race, because it overpowers all the others, looks on nature as a product made for its use. Yet this same race, as we will find in the fourth book, also shows that struggle, that self-division of the will, in itself with the most fearful clarity, and becomes homo homini lupus. Meanwhile we will recognize the same strife and the same overpowering at the low grades of the will's objectivity too. Many insects (especially the ichneumon flies) lay their eggs on the skin, even inside the body, of other insects' larvae. Slowly destroying the larva is the first work of the brood when it crawls out. The young polyp grows out of the old one like a branch and later separates from it. While it is still attached, it already fights with the old one over the prey that offers itself, so that each tears it from the other's mouth (Trembley, Polypod. II, p. 110, and III, p. 165). The most glaring example of this kind is the bulldog ant in Australia. If you cut one in two, a fight begins between the head part and the tail part. The head attacks the tail with its jaws, and the tail defends itself bravely by stinging the head. The fight usually lasts half an hour, until they die or other ants drag them away.

This happens every time. (From a letter of Howitt, in the W. Journal, printed in Galignani's Messenger, 17 Nov. 1855.) On the banks of the Missouri one sometimes sees a mighty oak wound round, bound and laced, trunk and all branches, by a gigantic wild vine, so that it must wither as if choked. The same shows itself even at the lowest grades. For example, it shows itself where water and carbon are changed into plant sap by organic assimilation, or where plant or bread is changed into blood. It shows itself everywhere that animal secretion goes on, with the chemical forces held down to a subordinate way of acting. It also shows itself in inorganic nature, as when crystals shooting out meet, cross and disturb one another so that they cannot show the purely crystallized form. Nearly every geode is the image of such a struggle of the will at that very low grade of its objectification. Or it shows itself when a magnet forces magnetism on iron, in order to present its Idea there too. Or when galvanism overpowers the elective affinities, breaks down the firmest compounds and cancels the chemical laws so completely that the acid of a salt split at the negative pole must go to the positive pole. It cannot combine with the alkalis it passes through on the way, nor even redden the litmus it meets. On the large scale the struggle shows in the relation between a central body and its planet. The planet, though definitely dependent, still resists, just as the chemical forces do in the organism. From this comes the constant tension between centripetal and centrifugal force, which keeps the structure of the universe in motion. That tension is itself already an expression of the universal struggle, essential to the will's appearance, which we are now looking at. For every body must be regarded as the appearance of a will, and will necessarily presents itself as a striving. So the original state of every world body balled into a sphere cannot be rest. It must be motion, a striving forward into infinite space, without rest and without goal. Neither the law of inertia nor the law of causality stands against this. According to the law of inertia, matter as such is indifferent to rest and motion. So motion can be its original state just as well as rest can. Hence if we find it in motion, we have no more right to assume that a state of rest came before and to ask for the cause of the start of motion than we would have, if we found it at rest, to assume a motion before it and ask for the cause of its being canceled. So there is

no first push to look for to explain the centrifugal force. In the planets, on Kant's and Laplace's hypothesis, it is a leftover of the original rotation of the central body, from which they separated when it contracted. Motion is essential to the central body itself. It still rotates and at the same time flies on through endless space, or perhaps circles around a larger central body that we cannot see. This view agrees entirely with the astronomers' guess of a central sun. It also agrees with the observed advance of our whole solar system, and perhaps of the whole star cluster to which our sun belongs. From this we can finally infer a general advance of all fixed stars, together with the central sun. In infinite space this loses all meaning (since motion in absolute space does not differ from rest). Just by that, as already by the striving and flying without goal, it becomes the expression of that nothingness, that lack of any final purpose, which at the end of this book we will have to ascribe to the will's striving in all its appearances. That is also why endless space and endless time had to be the most general and essential forms of its whole appearance, since the appearance exists to express its whole nature.—Finally, we can recognize the struggle of all appearances of the will against each other, which we are considering, even in mere matter as such. That holds insofar as Kant has correctly stated the essence of its appearance as repulsive force and attractive force. So matter too exists only in a struggle of forces working against each other. Suppose we set aside all chemical difference in matter. Or suppose we think back so far in the chain of causes and effects that there is as yet no chemical difference. Then what is left is mere matter, the world balled into a sphere. Its life, that is, its objectification of the will, is then that struggle between the force of attraction and the force of repulsion. Attraction is gravity, pressing from all sides to the center. Repulsion is impenetrability, whether through rigidity or elasticity, resisting it. This steady pressure and resistance can be regarded as the objectivity of the will at the very lowest grade, and it already expresses the will's character there.

So here, at the lowest grade, we would see the will present itself as a blind urge, a dark, dull drive, far from anything that can be directly known. This is the simplest and weakest way it objectifies itself. As such a blind urge and striving without knowledge it still appears in the whole of inorganic nature. It appears

in all the original forces that physics and chemistry are busy seeking out and learning the laws of. Each of these forces shows itself to us in millions of appearances that are all alike and lawful, and that give no sign of an individual character. They are only multiplied by time and space, that is, by the principium individuationis, as an image is multiplied by the facets of a glass.

Objectifying itself more clearly from grade to grade, the will still works with no knowledge in the plant kingdom, as a dark driving force. Here it is no longer causes in the proper sense but stimuli that are the link of its appearances. So it does finally even in the vegetative part of the animal's appearance, in the production and development of each animal and the upkeep of its inner economy. There mere stimuli still necessarily determine its appearance. The ever higher grades of the will's objectivity finally lead to the point where the individual that presents the Idea could no longer get the food it must assimilate by mere movement on stimuli. Such a stimulus has to be waited for, but here the food is more specifically determined. And with the ever-growing variety of appearances, the crowding and confusion have become so great that they disturb one another, and the chance on which an individual moved only by stimuli must depend for its food would be too unfavorable. So from the point where the animal has torn itself free from the egg or the mother's womb, where it lived a vegetating life without knowledge, its food must be sought out and chosen. Because of this, movement on motives becomes necessary here, and because of the motives, knowledge. Knowledge therefore enters as an aid, μηχανη, required at this grade of the will's objectification for keeping the individual alive and propagating the species. It comes forward represented by the brain or a larger ganglion, just as every other striving or determination of the objectifying will is represented by an organ, that is, presents itself to representation as an organ [19].—But with this aid, this μηχανη, the world as representation stands there at one stroke, with all its forms, object and subject, time, space, plurality and causality. The world now shows its second side. Until now merely will, it is now at the same time representation, object of the knowing subject. Up to this point the will followed its drive in the dark, with the highest certainty and without error. At this grade it has lit a light for itself. That was needed as a means to

cancel a disadvantage that would arise for the most perfect appearances from the crowding and the complicated makeup of its appearances. Up to now its unerring certainty and lawfulness in inorganic and merely vegetative nature rested on this: it worked alone in its original essence, as blind urge, will. It had no help, but also no disturbance, from a second, wholly different world, the world as representation. This second world is only the image of the will's own essence, yet of an entirely different nature, and it now cuts into the connection of its appearances. With that, their unerring certainty ceases. Animals are already exposed to illusion and deception. [20] On this see chapter 22 of the second volume; also my work "On the Will in Nature," p. 54 ff. and pp. 70–79 of the first edition, or p. 46 ff. and pp. 63–72 of the second. They have only perceptual representations, however, no concepts and no reflection. So they are tied to the present and cannot take the future into account.—It seems that this knowledge without reason was not enough for its purpose in every case, and sometimes needed, so to speak, a helping hand. For there is a very remarkable phenomenon: the blind working of the will and the working lit by knowledge each reach over into the other's territory, in two kinds of appearances, in a most surprising way. First, in the midst of the animals' doing, which is guided by perceptual knowledge and its motives, we find a doing carried out without them, and so with the necessity of the blindly working will. This is in the building instincts. Guided by no motive or knowledge, they look as if they produced their works even on abstract, rational motives. The other case, the opposite of this one, is where the light of knowledge, the other way round, penetrates into the workshop of the blindly working will and lights up the vegetative functions of the human organism: in magnetic clairvoyance.—Finally, where the will has reached the highest grade of its objectification, the knowledge of the understanding that dawned in animals is no longer enough. The senses supply the understanding with data, from which comes mere perception, tied to the present. Man is a complicated, many-sided, adaptable being, very needy and exposed to countless injuries. To be able to survive, he had to be lit by a double knowledge. A higher power of perceptual knowledge, so to speak, had to be added to it, a reflection of it: reason, as the faculty of abstract concepts. With

reason came reflective awareness, which holds an overview of future and past. As a result came deliberation, care, the ability to act with forethought and independently of the present. Finally came fully clear awareness of one's own decisions of the will as such. Already with merely perceptual knowledge, the possibility of illusion and deception entered. That did away with the earlier unerring certainty in the will's driving without knowledge. So instinct and the building instinct, as expressions of will without knowledge, had to come to its help in the midst of those guided by knowledge. With the arrival of reason, however, that certainty and unfailing reliability of the will's expressions is almost entirely lost. (At the other extreme, in inorganic nature, it even appears as strict lawfulness.) Instinct withdraws completely. Deliberation, which must now replace everything, gives birth, as set out in the first book, to wavering and uncertainty. Error becomes possible, and in many cases it prevents the adequate objectification of the will in deeds. For the will has already taken its definite and unchangeable direction in the character, and willing itself comes about unfailingly in line with that character, on the occasion of the motives. Even so, error can falsify its expressions, because then delusory motives flow in like real ones and cancel them out [21]: for example, superstition may slip in imagined motives that force a man to a way of acting exactly opposite to how his will would otherwise express itself in the circumstances at hand. Agamemnon slaughters his daughter. A miser gives alms out of pure egoism, hoping to be paid back a hundredfold someday. And so on.

Knowledge in general, rational as well as merely perceptual, thus comes originally out of the will itself. It belongs to the essence of the higher grades of the will's objectification, as a mere μηχανη, a means for keeping the individual and the species alive, like any organ of the body. Originally, then, it is meant to serve the will and to carry out its purposes, and it stays almost always completely in its service: in all animals and in nearly all men. Yet in the third book we will see how, in single men, knowledge can escape this servitude, throw off its yoke and exist purely for itself, free of all purposes of willing, as a mere clear mirror of the world. From this art comes. Finally, in the fourth book, we will see how, when this kind of knowledge acts back on the will, the self- [22] The Scholastics

therefore said quite rightly: Causa finalis movet non secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum esse cognitum. See Suarez, Disp. metaph. disp. XXIII, sect. 7 et 8. cancellation of the will can come about. This is resignation, which is the final goal, indeed the innermost essence, of all virtue and holiness, and the redemption from the world.

28 We have looked at the great variety and difference of the appearances in which the will objectifies itself. Indeed, we have seen their endless and unreconcilable struggle against one another. Even so, as our whole account up to now shows, the will itself, as thing in itself, is by no means included in that plurality and that change. The difference among the (Platonic) Ideas, that is, the grades of objectification; the multitude of individuals in which each of these presents itself; the struggle of forms over matter: none of this touches the will. It is only the way the will is objectified. Only through that does it have an indirect relation to the will, by which it belongs to the expression of the will's essence for representation. A magic lantern shows many different pictures, yet it is one and the same flame that makes them all visible. In the same way, in all the various appearances that fill the world side by side, or crowd each other out one after another as events, it is still only the one will that appears. All of it is that will's visibility and objectivity, and the will itself stays unmoved in the midst of all that change. It alone is the thing in itself. All objects, however, are appearance, phenomenon, to speak in Kant's language.—In man, as a (Platonic) Idea, the will finds its clearest and most perfect objectification. Even so, this alone could not express its essence. The Idea of man, to appear with its proper meaning, could not present itself alone and cut off. It had to be accompanied by the series of grades going down through all the forms of animals, through the plant kingdom, to the inorganic. Only all of them together complete the full objectification of the will. The Idea of man presupposes them, as the blossoms of a tree presuppose leaves, branches, trunk and root. They form a pyramid whose peak is man. If one likes comparisons, one can also say: their appearance goes with man's as necessarily as full light goes with the gradual shades of all the half-shadows through which it fades into darkness. Or one can call them the

echo of man and say: animal and plant are the descending fifth and third of man, and the inorganic kingdom is the lower octave. The full truth of this last comparison will only become clear when, in the next book, we try to get to the bottom of the deep significance of music. There it will be shown how the melody, moving on connectedly in high, light, quick tones, is in a certain sense to be seen as representing the life and striving of man, which has coherence through reflection. The unconnected ripieno voices and the heavy, slow-moving bass, out of which comes the harmony needed to complete music, then portray the rest of animal and knowledgeless nature. But that belongs in its own place, where it will no longer sound so paradoxical.—But we also find that inner necessity of the series of grades of its appearances, which cannot be separated from the adequate objectivity of the will, expressed in the whole of the appearances by an outer necessity. This is the necessity by which man needs animals to stay alive, these in turn, step by step, need one another, and then also plants, which again need the soil, the water, the chemical elements and their mixtures, the planet, the sun, the rotation and the orbit around it, the tilt of the ecliptic, and so on.—At bottom this springs from the fact that the will has to feed on itself, because there is nothing besides it and it is a hungry will. That is why there is the hunt, the anxiety and the suffering.

Knowing the unity of the will, as thing in itself, in the endless difference and variety of appearances is the only thing that truly explains the wonderful, unmistakable analogy among all productions of nature. It also explains the family likeness that lets us see them as variations on the same theme, a theme that is not itself given. In the same way, a clear and deep grasp of the harmony, the essential connection of all parts of the world and the necessity of their gradation that we have just considered will open to us a true and sufficient insight into the inner nature and meaning of the undeniable purposiveness of all organic products of nature, which we even presuppose a priori when we observe and judge them.

This purposiveness is of two kinds. One is inner: all the parts of a single organism agree with one another in such an ordered way that the preservation of that organism and of its species follows from it, and so appears as the purpose of

that arrangement. The other is outer: a relation of inorganic nature to organic nature in general, or of single parts of organic nature to one another, which makes possible the preservation of the whole of organic nature, or of single animal species, and so confronts our judgment as a means to this end.

Inner purposiveness now enters the course of our inquiry as follows. By what we have said so far, all the differences of forms in nature and all the plurality of individuals belong not to the will but only to its objectivity and the form of that. It follows necessarily that the will is indivisible and wholly present in every appearance, although the grades of its objectification, the (Platonic) Ideas, are very different. To make this easier to grasp, we can regard these different Ideas as single acts of will, simple in themselves, in which its essence expresses itself more or less. The individuals are in turn appearances of the Ideas, that is, of those acts, in time, space and plurality.—Now at the lowest grades of objectivity, such an act (or an Idea) keeps its unity in the appearance too. At the higher grades, to appear, it needs a whole series of states and developments in time, which taken all together first complete the expression of its essence. For example, the Idea that reveals itself in some general force of nature always has only one simple expression, although this shows itself differently according to the outer circumstances. Otherwise its identity could not be demonstrated at all, which is done precisely by separating out the difference that springs merely from outer circumstances. In the same way the crystal has only one expression of life, its shooting into form, which afterward has its fully sufficient and exhaustive expression in the solidified form, the corpse of that momentary life. The plant, though, already does not express the Idea whose appearance it is all at once and through a simple expression. It does so in a succession of developments of its organs, in time. The animal not only develops its organism in the same way, in a succession of often very different shapes (metamorphosis); but the shape itself, although it is already the will's objectivity at this grade, is still not enough for the full presentation of its Idea. That is completed only by the animal's actions. In them its empirical character, which is the same in the whole species, expresses itself, and this is the full revelation of the Idea, which presupposes the definite organism as its basic condition. In man, the empirical charac-

ter is already peculiar to each individual (indeed, as we will see in the fourth book, to the point of completely canceling the character of the species, namely through the self-cancellation of all willing). What is known as empirical character, through the necessary development in time and the breaking up into single actions that this conditions, is, when we leave out this temporal form of appearance, the intelligible character, in Kant's term. Kant shows his immortal merit especially splendidly in pointing out this distinction and presenting the relation between freedom and necessity, that is, really between the will as thing in itself and its appearance in time [23]. The intelligible character therefore coincides with the Idea, or more properly with the original act of will that reveals itself in it. [24] See "Critique of Pure Reason, Resolution of the Cosmological Ideas of the Totality of the Derivation of Cosmic Events," pp. 560–586 of the fifth and p. 532 ff. of the first edition, and "Critique of Practical Reason," fourth edition, pp. 169–179; Rosenkranz's edition, p. 224 ff. Compare my essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 43. In this respect, then, not only the empirical character of every man, but also that of every animal species, indeed every plant species, and even every original force of inorganic nature, is to be seen as the appearance of an intelligible character, that is, of an indivisible act of will outside time.—In passing, I would like to point out the naivety with which every plant states its whole character and lays it open through its mere shape, revealing its whole being and willing. That is what makes the physiognomies of plants so interesting. An animal, to be known by its Idea, has to be watched in its doings and goings-on, and man has to be thoroughly investigated and put to the test, since reason makes him capable of pretense to a high degree. The animal is more naive than man by exactly as much as the plant is more naive than the animal. In the animal we see the will to life, so to speak, more naked than in man. In man it is clothed over with so much knowledge, and veiled besides by the ability to pretend, that its true nature comes to light almost only by chance and here and there. In the plant it shows itself quite naked, but also much weaker, as a mere blind urge to exist, without purpose or goal. For the plant reveals its whole nature to the first glance, and

with perfect innocence, which does not suffer from the fact that it carries its genitals, which in all animals have been given the most hidden place, on display at its top.

This innocence of the plant rests on its lack of knowledge. The guilt lies not in willing but in willing with knowledge. First of all, every plant tells of its home, its climate and the nature of the soil it sprang from. So even someone with little practice easily knows whether an exotic plant belongs to the tropical or the temperate zone, and whether it grows in water, in a swamp, on mountains or on heath. Beyond that, every plant also expresses the special will of its species and says something that can be expressed in no other language.—But now to apply what has been said to the teleological view of organisms, so far as it concerns their inner purposiveness. In inorganic nature the Idea, which is everywhere to be regarded as a single act of will, also reveals itself in only a single and always identical expression. So one can say that here the empirical character shares directly in the unity of the intelligible one, and so to speak coincides with it. That is why no inner purposiveness can show itself here. In organisms, on the other hand, every organism presents its Idea through a succession of developments one after another, which is conditioned by a variety of different parts side by side. So the sum of the expressions of its empirical character is the expression of the intelligible one only when taken together. Yet this necessary side-by-side of the parts and one-after-another of the development does not cancel the unity of the appearing Idea, of the act of will that expresses itself. Rather, this unity now finds its expression in the necessary relation and linking of those parts and developments to one another, according to the law of causality. It is the single, indivisible will, and for that very reason wholly in agreement with itself, that reveals itself in the whole Idea as in one act. So its appearance, although it spreads out into a difference of parts and states, must still show that unity again in a thoroughgoing agreement among them. This happens through a necessary relation and dependence of all the parts on one another, by which the unity of the Idea is restored in the appearance too. Accordingly we now know those different parts and functions of the organism as means and purpose of one another reciprocally, and the organism itself as the final purpose of

them all. Consequently, two things belong and are essential not to the appearing will as such, the thing in itself, but only to its appearance in space, time and causality (all of them shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, the form of appearance). One is the spreading out of the Idea, simple in itself, into the plurality of the parts and states of the organism. The other is the restoring of its unity by the necessary linking of those parts and functions, through their being cause and effect, and so means and purpose, of one another. They belong to the world as representation, not to the world as will. They belong to the way the will becomes object, that is, representation, at this grade of its objectivity. Anyone who has got to the sense of this discussion, which is perhaps somewhat difficult, will now really understand Kant's doctrine. It is that both the purposiveness of the organic and the lawfulness of the inorganic are first brought into nature by our understanding, so that both belong only to the appearance, not to the thing in itself. The wonder mentioned above at the unfailing constancy of the lawfulness of inorganic nature is essentially the same as the wonder at the purposiveness of organic nature. For in both cases it is only the sight of the original unity of the Idea, which for the appearance had taken on the form of plurality and difference, that surprises us[25].

Now take the second kind of purposiveness, by the division made above, the outer kind. It shows itself not in the inner economy of organisms but in the support and help they get from outside, both from inorganic nature and from one another. In general, this too finds its explanation in the discussion just set out. For the whole world, with all its appearances, is the objectivity of the one, indivisible will, the Idea which stands to all other Ideas as the harmony to the single voices. So that unity of the will must also show itself in the agreement of all its appearances with one another. But we can raise this insight to much greater clearness if we go a little more closely into the phenomena of that outer purposiveness and agreement of the different parts of nature with one another. That discussion will at the same time throw light back on the previous one. We will get there best by considering the following analogy.

The character of each single man, insofar as it is thoroughly individual and not wholly contained in that of the species, can be seen as a special Idea, corresponding to a particular act of objectification of the will. This act itself would then be his intelligible character, and his empirical character would be [26] Compare "On the Will in Nature," at the end of the section "Comparative Anatomy." the appearance of it. The empirical character is wholly determined by the intelligible one, which is groundless will, that is, will that as thing in itself is not subject to the principle of sufficient reason (the form of appearance). The empirical character must deliver the image of the intelligible one in a course of life, and cannot turn out other than the nature of the intelligible one requires. But this determination reaches only the essential, not the inessential, part of the course of life that appears in this way. To this inessential part belongs the closer determination of the events and actions, which are the material in which the empirical character shows itself. These are determined by outer circumstances, which supply the motives to which the character reacts according to its nature. Since they can be very different, the outer shape of the appearance of the empirical character, that is, the definite factual or historical shape of the course of life, must follow their influence. That shape can turn out very different even though the essential part of this appearance, its content, stays the same. For example, it is inessential whether one plays for nuts or for crowns. But whether one cheats at the game or goes about it honestly is the essential thing. That is determined by the intelligible character, the other by outer influence. As the same theme can present itself in a hundred variations, so the same character can in a hundred very different courses of life. But however different the outer influence may be, the empirical character expressed in the course of life, however that turns out, must still objectify the intelligible one exactly, by fitting its objectification to the material of factual circumstances it finds.—We now have to assume something analogous to that influence of outer circumstances on the course of life, which is essentially determined by the character, if we want to imagine how the will, in the original act of its objectification, determines the different Ideas in which it objectifies itself. These are the different forms of natural beings of every kind, among which it divides its

objectification, and which for that reason must necessarily have a relation to one another in the appearance. We must assume that among all those appearances of the one will there took place a general mutual adapting and accommodating to one another. As we will soon see more clearly, though, all determination of time has to be left out here, since the Idea lies outside time. So every appearance had to adapt to the surroundings it entered. And the surroundings in turn had to adapt to it, even if it takes a much later place in time. Everywhere we see this consensus naturae. So every plant is suited to its soil and climate. Every animal is suited to its element and to the prey that is to be its food, and it is also somehow, to some extent, protected against its natural pursuer. The eye is suited to light and its refrangibility, the lungs and blood to the air, the swim bladder to the water, the seal's eye to the change of its medium, the water-holding cells in the camel's stomach to the drought of African deserts, the nautilus's sail to the wind that is to drive its little ship. And so it goes down to the most special and astonishing outer purposivenesses[27]. Here, though, we must leave out all relations of time, since they can concern only the appearance of the Idea, not the Idea itself. Accordingly this way of explaining must also be used backward. We must assume not only that every species accommodated itself to the circumstances it found, but also that those circumstances, which came earlier in time, themselves took account in the same way of the beings that were still to come. For it is the one and same will that objectifies itself in the whole world. It knows no time, since this shape of the principle of sufficient reason belongs neither to the will nor to its original objectivity, the Ideas. It belongs only to the way the Ideas are known by individuals that are themselves perishable, that is, to the appearance of the Ideas. So in our present look at the way the objectification of the will divides itself into the Ideas, the order in time has no meaning at all. The Ideas whose appearances entered the order of time earlier, in line with the law of causality to which they are subject as appearances, have thereby [28] See "On the Will in Nature," the section "Comparative Anatomy." no precedence over those whose appearance comes later. Those later ones are in fact the most perfect objectifications of the will, to which the earlier ones had to adapt just as much as these did to them. So the course of the planets, the tilt of the

ecliptic, the rotation of the earth, the distribution of land and sea, the atmosphere, light, warmth and all similar appearances, which in nature are what the ground bass is in harmony, accommodated themselves with a kind of foreboding to the coming species of living beings, whose bearers and preservers they were to become. In the same way the soil accommodated itself to the nourishment of plants, plants to the nourishment of animals, these to the nourishment of other animals, just as, the other way round, all these accommodated themselves to the others again. All parts of nature meet one another halfway, because it is one will that appears in all of them, while the order in time is wholly foreign to its original and only adequate objectivity, the Ideas (the next book explains this expression). Even now, when the species only have to keep themselves going and no longer to come into being, we see here and there such a foresight of nature reaching into the future, which really, so to speak, leaves the order in time out of account, an accommodating of what is there to what is still to come. So the bird builds the nest for young it does not yet know. The beaver builds a lodge whose purpose is unknown to it. The ant, the hamster and the bee gather supplies for the winter, which they do not know. The spider and the ant lion set traps, as if with deliberate cunning, for future prey that is unknown to them. Insects lay their eggs where the future brood will find food in the future. At the time of flowering, the female flower of the dioecious Valisneria unwinds the spiral coils of its stalk, by which it has until then been held at the bottom of the water, and so rises to the surface. At exactly that moment the male flower, which grows on a short stalk at the bottom of the water, tears itself off from the stalk. Sacrificing its life, it reaches the surface, where it swims about looking for the female flower. After fertilization the female flower then draws back down to the bottom by contracting its spiral again, and there the fruit develops[29]. Here too I must mention again the larva of the male stag beetle, which bites the hole in the wood for its metamorphosis twice as big as the female does, to gain room for the future horns. On the whole, then, the instinct of animals gives us the best illustration of the rest of the teleology of nature. Instinct is an acting like acting from a concept of purpose, and yet wholly without one. In the same way, all the forming of nature is

like forming from a concept of purpose, and yet wholly without one. For in the outer as in the inner teleology of nature, what we have to think of as means and purpose is everywhere only the appearance, spread apart in space and time for our mode of knowledge, of the unity of the one will, which so far agrees with itself.

Meanwhile the mutual adapting and accommodating of the appearances, which springs from this unity, still cannot wipe out the inner conflict set out above, which is essential to the will and appears in the general struggle of nature. That harmony goes only so far as to make possible the continued existence of the world and its beings, which without it would long since have perished. So it reaches only to the survival of the species and the general conditions of life, not to that of individuals. So by virtue of that harmony and accommodation, the species in the organic world and the general forces of nature in the inorganic world exist side by side and even support one another. But the inner conflict of the will, objectified through all those Ideas, shows itself in the unceasing war of extermination among the individuals of those species and in the constant wrestling of the appearances of those natural forces with one another, as set out above. The arena and the object of this struggle is matter, which they try to tear from each other, and also space and time, whose union through the form of causality is really matter, as shown in the first book[30].

31 Chatin, sur la Valisneria spiralis, in the Comptes rendus de l'acad. d. sc., No. 13, 1855.

32 On this see chapters 26 and 27 of the second volume.

29 I end here the second main part of my account. I hope that, as far as is possible in the very first communication of a thought never thought before—which therefore cannot be wholly free of the traces of the individuality in which it first arose—I have succeeded in conveying the clear certainty of this: that this world in which we live and are, in its whole nature, is through and through will and at the same time through and through representation; that this representation already as such presupposes a form, namely object and subject, and so is

relative; and that if we ask what remains after taking away this form and all the forms subordinate to it, which the principle of sufficient reason expresses, this remainder, as something different toto genere from representation, can be nothing other than will, which is therefore the real thing in itself. Everyone finds himself to be this will, in which the inner nature of the world consists, just as he also finds himself to be the knowing subject, whose representation is the whole world. To that extent the world has existence only in relation to his consciousness, as its necessary bearer. Everyone is therefore, in this double regard, the whole world itself, the microcosm, and finds both sides of it whole and complete in himself. And what he thus knows as his own nature also exhausts the nature of the whole world, the macrocosm. So it too, like himself, is through and through will and through and through representation, and nothing more is left over. Here we see the philosophy of Thales, which looked at the macrocosm, and that of Socrates, which looked at the microcosm, coincide, since the object of both shows itself to be the same.—The whole knowledge communicated in the first two books will gain greater completeness, and with it greater certainty, from the two books still to follow. In them, I hope, many a question that our inquiry so far may have raised, clearly or dimly, will also find a sufficient answer.

For now, one such question may be taken up separately. It can really only be raised as long as one has not yet fully got to the sense of the account so far, and for just that reason it can serve to clarify it. It is this. Every will is will for something; it has an object, a goal of its willing. So what does that will finally want, or what does it strive for, the will that is presented to us as the essence in itself of the world?—This question rests, like so many others, on confusing the thing in itself with the appearance. The principle of sufficient reason, one of whose shapes is the law of motivation, extends to the appearance alone, not to the thing in itself. A ground can only ever be given for appearances as such, for single things, never for the will itself, nor for the Idea in which it objectifies itself adequately. So for every single movement, or any change in nature, a cause is to be sought, that is, a state that brought it about necessarily. But never for the force of nature itself, which reveals itself in that change and in countless similar

appearances. So it is real lack of understanding, springing from lack of reflective awareness, to ask for a cause of gravity, of electricity, and so on. Only if one had shown that gravity and electricity were not original, special forces of nature but merely modes of appearance of a more general, already known force of nature could one ask for the cause that makes this force of nature produce the appearance of gravity or electricity here. All this was set out at length above. In the same way, every single act of will of a knowing individual (who is himself only appearance of the will as thing in itself) necessarily has a motive, without which that act would never occur. But the material cause only contains the determination that at this time, in this place, in this matter, an expression of this or that force of nature must occur. In the same way the motive determines only the act of will of a knowing being, at this time, in this place, under these circumstances, as something wholly single. It by no means determines that this being wills at all, or wills in this way. That is the expression of its intelligible character, which, as the will itself, the thing in itself, is groundless, since it lies outside the domain of the principle of sufficient reason. That is why every man also constantly has purposes and motives by which he guides his actions, and can always give an account of what he does in each single case. But if you asked him why he wills at all, or why he wants to exist at all, he would have no answer. The question would instead seem absurd to him. And in this the awareness would really speak out that he himself is nothing but will, whose willing in general therefore goes without saying and needs closer determination by motives only in its single acts, for each point of time.

In fact, the absence of every goal and every limit belongs to the nature of the will in itself, which is an endless striving. This was already touched on above, in mentioning centrifugal force. It also shows itself most simply at the very lowest grade of the will's objectivity, namely in gravity, whose constant striving lies before our eyes, with the evident impossibility of any final goal. Even if all existing matter were united in one lump, as gravity wills, then inside that lump gravity, still striving toward the center, would go on fighting impenetrability, as rigidity or elasticity. The striving of matter can therefore only ever be checked, never fulfilled or satisfied. That is exactly how it is with all striving of all appear-

ances of the will. Every goal reached is again the start of a new course, and so on without end. The plant raises its appearance from the seed through stem and leaf to blossom and fruit, which again is only the start of a new seed, of a new individual that again runs the old course, and so through endless time. The animal's course of life is the same: procreation is its peak. After it is reached, the life of the first individual sinks, quickly or slowly, while a new one guarantees nature the preservation of the species and repeats the same appearance. Indeed, the constant renewal of the matter of every organism is also to be seen as the mere appearance of this constant urge and change. Physiologists are now ceasing to hold it to be a necessary replacement of the material used up in movement, since the possible wear of the machine can in no way be an equivalent for the constant inflow through nourishment: eternal becoming, endless flux, belongs to the revelation of the will's essence. Finally, the same shows itself in human strivings and wishes. They always hold out their fulfillment to us as the final goal of willing, like a mirage. But as soon as they are reached, they no longer look like themselves, so they are soon forgotten, made obsolete, and really always put aside, though without admitting it, as vanished illusions. We are lucky enough if something is still left to wish for and strive for, so that the game of the steady passage from wish to satisfaction, and from this to a new wish, can be kept up. Its quick course is called happiness, its slow course suffering. Otherwise it falls into that standstill that shows itself as fearful, life-numbing boredom, a languid longing with no definite object, a deadening languor.—It follows from all this that where knowledge lights it up, the will always knows what it wants now, what it wants here. But it never knows what it wants in general. Every single act has a purpose; willing as a whole has none. In just the same way, every single appearance of nature is determined to occur at this place, at this time, by a sufficient cause, but the force that manifests itself in it has no cause at all, since that is a grade of appearance of the thing in itself, the groundless will.—The will's only self-knowledge as a whole, however, is representation as a whole, the entire perceptual world. It is its objectivity, its revelation, its mirror. What it says in this capacity will be the subject of our further inquiry [33].

[34] On this see chapter 28 of the second volume.

Book III

The World as Representation, Second Consideration: Representation Independent of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: The Platonic Idea: The Object of Art.

Τί τὸ ὂν μὲν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον; καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν; ΠΛΑΤΩΝ.

30 In the first book we presented the world as mere representation, object for a subject. In the second book we looked at it from its other side and found that this side is will, which alone turned out to be what that world is besides representation. In keeping with this knowledge, we called the world as representation, both as a whole and in its parts, the objectivity of the will. That means: the will that has become object, that is, representation. We also remember that this objectification of the will had many grades, but definite ones. On them the essence of the will entered representation, that is, presented itself as object, with gradually rising clearness and completeness. In these grades we already recognized Plato's Ideas there, insofar as those grades are the definite species, or the original, unchanging forms and properties of all natural bodies, both inorganic and organic, as well as the general forces that reveal themselves according to laws of nature. All these Ideas together present themselves in countless individuals and single things. They stand to these as their pattern to their copies. The plurality of such individuals can be represented only through time and space,

and their coming to be and passing away only through causality. In all these forms we recognize only the different shapes of the principle of sufficient reason. That principle is the last principle of all finitude and all individuation, and the general form of representation as it falls within the knowledge of the individual as such. The Idea, on the other hand, does not enter that principle. So neither plurality nor change belongs to it. The individuals in which it presents itself are countless and ceaselessly come to be and pass away, but the Idea stays unchanged as the one and same, and the principle of sufficient reason has no meaning for it. But this principle is the form under which all knowledge of the subject stands, insofar as the subject knows as an individual. So the Ideas will lie wholly outside the sphere of knowledge of the subject as such. If the Ideas are to become objects of knowledge, then, this can happen only by the cancellation of individuality in the knowing subject. The closer and more detailed explanations of this are what will occupy us next.

31 First, though, one more very essential remark. In the previous book I hope I managed to bring about a conviction about what is called the thing in itself in Kant's philosophy. There it appears as such an important but dark and paradoxical doctrine, and it was found to be a stumbling block, indeed the weak side of his philosophy, especially because of the way Kant introduced it, namely by the inference from the grounded to the ground. The conviction is this: if one arrives at it by the quite different path we have taken, it is nothing other than the will, in the sphere of this concept as widened and defined in the way I have stated. I hope further that, after what I have presented, no one will hesitate to recognize, in the definite grades of objectification of that will which makes up the in-itself of the world, what Plato called the eternal Ideas, or the unchangeable forms (ειδη). They are acknowledged as the main but also darkest and most paradoxical dogma of his teaching, and over a series of centuries they have been an object of reflection, dispute, mockery and reverence for so many minds of such different outlook.

Now if the will is the thing in itself for us, and the Idea is the immediate objectivity of that will at a definite grade, then we find Kant's thing in itself and Plato's Idea, which alone is οντως ον for him, these two great dark paradoxes of the two greatest philosophers of the West, to be not identical but still very closely related and distinguished by only a single determination. Indeed, for all their inner harmony and kinship, the two great paradoxes sound extremely different, because of the extraordinarily different individualities of their authors. For that very reason they are the best commentary on one another. They are like two quite different roads that lead to one goal.—

This can be made clear in a few words. What Kant says is, in essence, this: "Time, space and causality are not determinations of the thing in itself. They belong only to its appearance, since they are nothing but forms of our knowledge. But since all plurality and all coming to be and passing away are possible only through time, space and causality, it follows that these too attach only to the appearance and by no means to the thing in itself. Our knowledge, however, is conditioned by those forms. So all experience is only knowledge of the appearance, not of the thing in itself. Therefore its laws cannot be made to hold for the thing in itself either. What has been said extends even to our own self, and we know it only as appearance, not as what it may be in itself." This is, in the important respect under consideration, the sense and content of Kant's doctrine.—Plato, however, says: "The things of this world that our senses perceive have no true being at all. They are always becoming, but never are. They have only a relative being; they all exist only in and through their relation to one another. So one can just as well call their whole existence a non-being. Consequently they are not objects of real knowledge (επιστημη) either, for there can be such knowledge only of what is in and for itself and always in the same way. They are only the object of an opinion prompted by sensation (δοξα μετ' αισθησεως αλογου). As long as we are limited to perceiving them, we are like people sitting in a dark cave, bound so tightly that they cannot even turn their heads. They would see nothing but the shadow images of real things, carried past between them and a fire burning behind them, cast by its light on the wall opposite. Even of one another, and each of himself, they would see only the

shadows on that wall. Their wisdom would be to predict the order of those shadows, learned from experience. What alone can be called truly existing (οντως ον), because it always is but never comes to be or passes away, are the real original patterns of those shadow images. They are the eternal Ideas, the primal forms of all things. No plurality belongs to them. By its nature each is only one, since it is the original pattern itself, whose copies or shadows are all the single, perishable things of the same kind that share its name. Nor does coming to be or passing away belong to them, for they truly are, but are never becoming or perishing, like their vanishing copies. (These two negative determinations necessarily contain the presupposition that time, space and causality have no meaning or validity for them, and that they do not exist in these.) Only of them, therefore, is there real knowledge, since the object of such knowledge can be only what always and in every respect (and so in itself) is, not what is, but then again is not, depending on how one looks at it."—That is Plato's doctrine. It is obvious, and needs no further proof, that the inner sense of the two doctrines is quite the same. Both declare the visible world to be an appearance that is nothing in itself and has meaning and borrowed reality only through what expresses itself in it (for the one the thing in itself, for the other the Idea). According to both doctrines, all the forms of that appearance, even the most general and essential ones, are wholly foreign to this latter, truly existing thing. To deny these forms, Kant took them up directly in abstract terms and flatly denied time, space and causality, as mere forms of appearance, to the thing in itself. Plato, by contrast, did not reach the highest expression. He denied those forms to his Ideas only indirectly, by denying of the Ideas what is possible only through those forms, namely plurality of what is of one kind, and coming to be and passing away. For good measure, though, I want to make that remarkable and important agreement vivid by an example. Let an animal stand before us, in the full activity of life. Plato will say: "This animal has no true existence, only an apparent one, a constant becoming, a relative existence, which can just as well be called a non-being as a being. What truly is, is only the Idea that is pictured in that animal, or the animal in itself (αυτο το θηριον), which depends on nothing but is in and for itself (καθ' εαυτο, αει ώς αυτως), has not come to be,

does not end, but is always in the same way (αει ον, και μηδεποτε ουτε γιγνομενον, ουτε απολλυμενον). Insofar as we know its Idea in this animal, it is quite the same and without significance whether we have this animal before us now or its ancestor who lived a thousand years ago; or whether it is here or in a far land; whether it presents itself in this or that way, posture, action; or finally whether it is this or any other individual of its kind. All this is nothing and concerns only the appearance. The Idea of the animal alone has true being and is the object of real knowledge."—So Plato. Kant would perhaps say: "This animal is an appearance in time, space and causality, which are all conditions a priori, lying in our faculty of knowledge, of the possibility of experience, and not determinations of the thing in itself. So this animal, as we perceive it at this particular time and this given place, as an individual that has come to be within the connection of experience, that is, along the chain of causes and effects, and is just as necessarily perishable, is not a thing in itself but an appearance valid only in relation to our knowledge. To know it as what it may be in itself, and so independently of all determinations lying in time, space and causality, a different mode of knowledge would be needed from the only one possible to us, through senses and understanding."

To bring Kant's expression still closer to Plato's, one could also say: time, space and causality are that arrangement of our intellect by which the one being of each kind, which is really the only one present, presents itself to us as a plurality of beings of the same kind, ever coming to be and passing away anew, in endless succession. The grasp of things by means of and in accordance with this arrangement is the immanent one. The one that becomes aware of how things stand with this arrangement is the transcendental one. We get the latter in abstracto through the Critique of Pure Reason. But as an exception it can also come about intuitively. That last point is my addition, and I am trying to explain it in this present third book.

If people had ever really understood and grasped Kant's doctrine, if since Kant they had really understood and grasped Plato, if they had faithfully and seriously thought through the inner sense and content of the doctrines of both great masters, instead of throwing around the technical terms of the one and

parodying the style of the other, they could not have failed to find long ago how much the two great sages agree, and that the pure meaning, the goal of both doctrines, is entirely the same. Then people would not only have stopped constantly comparing Plato with Leibniz, on whom his spirit did not rest at all, or even with a well-known gentleman still living [1], as if they wanted to mock the shade of the great thinker of antiquity. They would also have got much further than they have. Or rather, they would not have fallen back so shamefully, as they have in these last forty years. They would not have let themselves be led by the nose today by one windbag and tomorrow by another. And they would not have opened the nineteenth century in Germany, which announced itself so grandly, with philosophical farces staged over Kant's grave (as the ancients sometimes did at the funeral rites of their own), to the just mockery of other nations. Nothing suits the serious and even stiff Germans less. But the real public of true philosophers is so small that even pupils who understand are brought to them by the centuries only sparingly.—Εισι δη ναρθηκοφοροι μεν πολλοι, βακχοι [2] F. H. Jacobi. δε γε παυροι. (Thyrsigeri quidem multi, Bacchi vero pauci.) Ἡ ατιμια φιλοσοφιᾳ δια ταυτα προσπεπτωκεν, ὅτι ου κατ' αξιαν αυτης ἁπτονται· ου γαρ νοθους εδει ἁπτεσθαι, αλλα γνησιους. (Eam ob rem philosophia in infamiam incidit, quod non pro dignitate ipsam attingunt: neque enim a spuriis, sed a legitimis erat attrectanda.) Plat.

People went by the words, the words: "representations a priori, forms of intuiting and thinking that are conscious independently of experience, primal concepts of the pure understanding," and so on. And then they asked whether Plato's Ideas, which are supposed to be primal concepts too, and also memories from an intuition of truly existing things that came before this life, might be the same as Kant's forms of intuiting and thinking, which lie a priori in our consciousness. These two wholly heterogeneous doctrines, Kant's doctrine of the forms, which limit the individual's knowledge to appearance, and Plato's doctrine of the Ideas, whose knowledge expressly denies those very forms—these doctrines, which in that respect are diametrically opposed—because they resemble each other a little in their wording, people compared attentively,

deliberated and argued over their sameness, then finally found that they were not the same after all, and concluded that Plato's doctrine of Ideas and Kant's critique of reason have no agreement at all [3]. But enough of that.

32 As a result of our inquiries so far, then, for all the inner agreement between Kant and Plato and the identity of the goal that hovered before both, or of the view of the world that stirred them to philosophize and guided them, Idea and thing in itself are still not simply one and the same for us. Instead, for us the Idea is only the immediate and therefore adequate objectivity of the thing in itself, which itself, however, is the [4] See, for example, "Immanuel Kant, a Monument by Fr. Bouterweck," p. 49, and Buhle's "History of Philosophy," vol. 6, pp. 802–815 and 823.
will, the will insofar as it has not yet been objectified, has not yet become representation. For the thing in itself, according to Kant himself, is to be free of all the forms that cling to knowing as such. And it is only a mistake of Kant's (as is shown in the Appendix) that he did not count among these forms, above all others, being-an-object-for-a-subject, since this is the first and most general form of all appearance, that is, of representation. He should therefore have expressly denied his thing in itself the being of an object, which would have saved him from that great inconsistency, discovered early. The Platonic Idea, by contrast, is necessarily an object, something known, a representation, and just by that, but only by that, different from the thing in itself. It has only laid aside the subordinate forms of appearance, all of which we include under the principle of sufficient reason, or rather has not yet entered them. But it has kept the first and most general form, that of representation in general, of being an object for a subject. It is the forms subordinate to this one (whose general expression is the principle of sufficient reason) that multiply the Idea into single, perishable individuals, whose number is entirely indifferent in relation to the Idea. So the principle of sufficient reason is again the form the Idea enters when it falls within the knowledge of the subject as an individual. The single thing that appears in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason is therefore only a mediate objectification of the thing in itself (which is the will). Between the

thing in itself and the single thing stands the Idea, as the only immediate objectivity of the will, since it has taken on no other form belonging to knowing as such than that of representation in general, that is, of being an object for a subject. So the Idea alone is the most adequate objectivity possible of the will or thing in itself. It is the whole thing in itself, only under the form of representation. Herein lies the reason for the great agreement between Plato and Kant, although, in the strictest sense, what both speak of is not the same. The single things, though, are not a fully adequate objectivity of the will. Here it is already clouded by those forms, whose common expression is the principle of sufficient reason, but which are the condition of knowledge as it is possible to the individual as such.—If it is allowed to draw a conclusion from an impossible supposition, we would in fact no longer know single things, or events, or change, or plurality. We would grasp only Ideas, only the ladder of grades of objectification of that one will, the true thing in itself, in pure, unclouded knowledge. Our world would consequently be a Nunc stans, if we were not, as subject of knowing, at the same time individuals, that is, if our perception were not mediated by a body from whose affections it starts. This body is itself only concrete willing, objectivity of the will, and so an object among objects. As such, when it comes into the knowing consciousness, it can do so only in the forms of the principle of sufficient reason. So it already presupposes, and thereby brings in, time and all the other forms that principle expresses. Time is only the divided and broken-up view that an individual being has of the Ideas, which are outside time and therefore eternal. That is why Plato says time is the moving image of eternity: αιωνος εικων κινητη ὁ χρονος [5].

33 As individuals, then, we have no knowledge other than that which is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, and this form excludes knowledge of the Ideas. So it is certain that if it is possible for us to rise from knowledge of single things to knowledge of the Ideas, this can happen only through a change in the subject. The change must correspond and be analogous to that great change in the whole kind of the object, and by it the subject, insofar as it knows an Idea, is no longer an individual.

We remember from the previous book that knowing in general itself belongs to the will's objectification at its higher grades. Sensibility, nerves and brain are just, like the other parts of the organic being, expression [6] On this see chapter 29 of the second volume. of the will at this grade of its objectivity. So the representation that arises through them is likewise meant to serve it, as a means (μηχανη) for reaching its now more complicated (πολυτελεστερα) purposes, for keeping alive a being with many needs. Originally, then, and by its nature, knowledge is wholly in the service of the will. Just as the immediate object, which becomes its starting point through applying the law of causality, is only objectified will, so all knowledge that follows the principle of sufficient reason stays in a nearer or more distant relation to the will. For the individual finds its body as an object among objects. The body has many kinds of connections and relations to all of them according to the principle of sufficient reason, so looking at them always leads back, by a nearer or longer route, to its body and so to its will. Since it is the principle of sufficient reason that puts objects in this relation to the body and so to the will, the knowledge that serves the will must also strive solely to learn about objects just those relations that the principle of sufficient reason sets. That is, it follows their many relations in space, time and causality. For only through these is the object interesting to the individual, that is, does it have a relation to the will. So knowledge that serves the will really knows nothing of objects but their relations. It knows objects only insofar as they exist at this time, in this place, under these circumstances, from these causes, with these effects; in a word, as single things. If one took away all these relations, the objects would also have vanished for it, precisely because it knew nothing else in them.—We must also not conceal that what the sciences look at in things is in essence likewise nothing other than all of that, namely their relations: the relations of time and space, the causes of natural changes, the comparison of forms, the motives of events. That is, nothing but relations. What sets them apart from common knowledge is only their form: their being systematic, and the easing of knowledge by gathering everything single into the general by subordinating concepts, and the completeness that this gains. All relation itself has only a relative existence. For example, all being in time is also

again a non-being, for time is just that through which opposite determinations can belong to the same thing. So every appearance in time also is not, once more. For what separates its beginning from its end is only time, something essentially vanishing, without stability and relative, which is here called duration. Time, though, is the most general form of all objects of knowledge that stands in the service of the will, and the archetype of its other forms.

As a rule, then, knowledge always stays subject to the service of the will. It came forth for this service, and has, so to speak, sprouted from the will as the head from the trunk. In animals this servitude of knowledge to the will can never be done away with. In men such doing away occurs only as an exception, as we will soon look at more closely. This difference between man and animal is expressed outwardly by the difference in the relation of head to trunk. In the lower animals the two are still wholly grown together. In all animals the head is turned toward the earth, where the objects of the will lie. Even in the higher animals head and trunk are still much more one than in man, whose head appears set freely on the body, only carried by it, not serving it. The Apollo Belvedere presents this human advantage to the highest degree. The head of the god of the Muses, looking far around, stands so freely on the shoulders that it seems wholly wrested from the body and no longer subject to the care for it.

34 The passage from common knowledge of single things to knowledge of the Idea is, as I said, possible, but is to be regarded only as an exception. It happens suddenly. Knowledge tears itself loose from the service of the will, and just by that the subject stops being a merely individual one and is now the pure, willless subject of knowledge. It no longer follows relations according to the principle of sufficient reason. Instead it rests in steady contemplation of the object presented, apart from its connection with any others, and is absorbed in it.

To become clear, this necessarily needs a detailed discussion. For the time being one must get past what seems strange in it, until, once the whole thought to be communicated in this work has been gathered together, the strangeness disappears of itself.

Suppose a person, lifted by the power of the mind, lets go of the usual way of looking at things. He stops following only their relations to one another along the thread of the shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, relations whose final aim is always the relation to his own will. So he no longer looks at the where, the when, the why and the what-for of things, but only and solely at the what. He also does not let abstract thinking, the concepts of reason, take over his consciousness. Instead, in place of all this, he gives the whole power of his mind to perception, sinks himself wholly into it, and lets his whole consciousness be filled by the quiet contemplation of the natural object that happens to be present, be it a landscape, a tree, a rock, a building or whatever it may be. In a meaningful German phrase, he loses himself entirely in this object. That is, he forgets his individuality, his will, and continues to exist only as pure subject, as clear mirror of the object. It is as if the object were there alone, with no one to perceive it. One can no longer separate the one who perceives from the perception, but the two have become one, since the whole consciousness is completely filled and taken up by a single perceptual image. When in this way the object has stepped out of all relation to anything outside it, and the subject out of all relation to the will, then what is known is no longer the single thing as such. It is the Idea, the eternal form, the immediate objectivity of the will at this grade. And just by that, the one caught up in this perception is at the same time no longer an individual, for the individual has lost itself in such perception. He is pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge. This, striking as it is by itself now (and I know very well that it confirms the saying that comes from Thomas Paine, du sublime au ridicule il n'y a qu'un pas), will become gradually clearer and less strange through what follows. This is also what hovered before Spinoza when he wrote: mens aeterna est, quatenus res sub aeternitatis specie concipit (Eth. V, pr. 31, schol.)[7]. In such contemplation, then, at one stroke the single thing becomes the Idea of its species, and the perceiving individual becomes the pure subject of knowing. The individual as such knows only single things; the pure subject of knowing knows only Ideas. For the individual is the subject of knowing in its relation to one definite single appearance of the will, and in its service. This single appearance of the will is as such subject to the

principle of sufficient reason, in all its shapes. So all knowledge that relates to it also follows the principle of sufficient reason, and for the purposes of the will no other knowledge will do than this, which always has only relations to the object. The knowing individual as such and the single thing it knows are always somewhere and sometime, and members in the chain of causes and effects. The pure subject of knowledge and its correlate, the Idea, have stepped out of all those forms of the principle of sufficient reason. Time, place, the individual who knows and the individual who is known have no meaning for them. Only when, in the way described, a knowing individual raises itself to pure subject of knowing, and with that the object contemplated to Idea, does the world as representation step forth fully and purely, and the perfect objectification of the will take place, since the Idea alone is its adequate objectivity. This includes object and subject in the same way, since these [8] I also recommend reading what he says in the same place, L. II, prop. 40, schol. 2, likewise L. V, prop. 25 to 38, about the cognitio tertii generis, sive intuitiva, to clarify the mode of knowledge under discussion here, and very especially prop. 29, schol.; prop. 36, schol. and prop. 38 demonstr. et schol. are its only form. In it, though, the two perfectly balance each other. And as the object here too is nothing but the subject's representation, so the subject, by being wholly absorbed in the object perceived, has itself become this object, since the whole consciousness is nothing more than its clearest image. This consciousness, if one thinks of all the Ideas, or grades of the will's objectivity, passing through it one after another, really makes up the whole world as representation. The single things of all times and spaces are nothing but the Ideas, multiplied by the principle of sufficient reason (the form of knowledge of individuals as such) and thereby clouded in their pure objectivity. When the Idea steps forth, subject and object can no longer be told apart in it, because the Idea, the adequate objectivity of the will, the real world as representation, arises only when they completely fill and interpenetrate each other. In just the same way, the individual that knows in this and the individual that is known are, as things in themselves, not different. For if we set aside that real world as representation entirely, nothing is left but the world as will. The will is the in-itself of the Idea, which objectifies it perfectly. It is also

the in-itself of the single thing and of the individual who knows it, which objectify it imperfectly. As will, outside representation and all its forms, it is one and the same in the object contemplated and in the individual who, swinging upward in this contemplation, becomes conscious of itself as pure subject. So those two are not different in themselves. For in themselves they are the will, which here knows itself. Plurality and difference exist only as the way this knowledge comes to it, that is, only in the appearance, by virtue of its form, the principle of sufficient reason. Just as I am not a knowing subject without the object, without the representation, but mere blind will, so the thing known is not an object without me, as subject of knowing, but mere will, blind urge. This will is in itself, that is, outside representation, one and the same as mine. Only in the world as representation, whose form is always at least subject and object, do we step apart as known and knowing individual. As soon as knowing, the world as representation, is taken away, nothing at all is left but mere will, blind urge. That the will gets objectivity, becomes representation, posits both subject and object at one stroke. But that this objectivity be pure, perfect, adequate objectivity of the will posits the object as Idea, free of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, and the subject as pure subject of knowledge, free of individuality and servitude to the will.

Now whoever, in the way described, has so deeply immersed and lost himself in the perception of nature that he exists only as purely knowing subject becomes directly aware, just by that, that as such he is the condition, and so the bearer, of the world and of all objective existence, since this now presents itself as dependent on his own. He draws nature into himself, so that he feels it only as an accident of his being. In this sense Byron says:

Are not the mountains, waves and skies, a part Of me and of my soul, as I of them? [9]

But how could anyone who feels this consider himself absolutely perishable, in contrast to imperishable nature? Rather, the consciousness of what the Upanishad of the Veda declares will seize him: Hae omnes creaturae in totum ego sum, et praeter me aliud ens non est. (Oupnekhat, I, 122.)[10]

35 To gain a deeper insight into the nature of the world, it is absolutely necessary to learn to distinguish the will as thing in itself from its adequate objectivity. It is also necessary to distinguish the different grades at which this objectivity steps forth more clearly and more perfectly, that is, the Ideas themselves, from the mere appearance of the Ideas in the shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, the limited mode of knowledge of individuals. Then one will [11] Are mountains, waves, sky not a part of me and of my soul, I of them?

12 On this see chapter 30 of the second volume. agree with Plato when he attributes real being only to the Ideas, while to things in space and time, this world that is real for the individual, he grants only an apparent, dreamlike existence. Then one will see how the one and same Idea reveals itself in so many appearances and offers its essence to knowing individuals only piece by piece, one side after another. One will then also distinguish the Idea itself from the way its appearance falls into the individual's observation, and recognize the former as essential, the latter as inessential. Let us look at this by way of example, first in the smallest thing, and then in the greatest.—When clouds drift, the figures they form are not essential to them; they are indifferent to them. But that, as elastic vapor, they are pressed together by the push of the wind, driven away, spread out, torn apart: this is their nature, this is the essence of the forces that objectify themselves in them, this is the Idea. The figures of the moment exist only for the individual observer.—To the brook that rolls downward over stones, the eddies, waves and foam shapes it shows are indifferent and inessential. That it follows gravity, and behaves as an inelastic, fully displaceable, formless, transparent fluid: this is its essence, this is the Idea when it is known perceptually. Those shapes exist only for us, as long as we know as individuals.—The ice on the windowpane shoots into form according to the laws of crystallization, which reveal the essence of the force of nature stepping forth here and present the Idea. But the trees and flowers it forms in doing so are inessential and exist only for us.—What appears in clouds, brook and crystal is the weakest echo of that will, which steps forth more perfectly in the plant, still more perfectly in the animal, and most perfectly in man. But only the essential part of all

those grades of its objectification makes up the Idea. Its unfolding, on the other hand, as it is drawn apart in the shapes of the principle of sufficient reason into manifold and many-sided appearances, is inessential to the Idea. It lies merely in the individual's mode of knowledge and has reality only for the individual. The same necessarily holds also of the unfolding of the Idea that is the most perfect objectivity of the will. So the history of the human race, the throng of events, the change of the ages, the many-shaped forms of human life in different countries and centuries—all this is only the accidental form of the appearance of the Idea. It does not belong to the Idea itself, in which alone the adequate objectivity of the will lies, but only to the appearance that falls within the individual's knowledge. And it is as foreign, inessential and indifferent to the Idea itself as the figures that clouds form are to the clouds, the shape of its eddies and foam to the brook, and its trees and flowers to the ice.

For anyone who has grasped this well, and knows how to distinguish the will from the Idea, and the Idea from its appearance, world events will have meaning only insofar as they are the letters from which the Idea of man can be read, and not in and for themselves. He will not believe with the people that time brings forth anything really new and significant, that through it or in it anything absolutely real comes into existence, or even that time itself as a whole has beginning and end, plan and development, and perhaps as its final goal the highest perfection (by their concepts) of the last generation, which lives thirty years. So he will no more, with Homer, install a whole Olympus full of gods to steer those events of time than, with Ossian, take the figures of the clouds for individual beings, since, as said, both have equal significance in relation to the Idea appearing in them. In the manifold shapes of human life and the ceaseless change of events, he will regard as the lasting and essential thing only the Idea in which the will to life has its most perfect objectivity. It shows its different sides in the qualities, passions, errors and merits of the human race: in self-interest, hatred, love, fear, boldness, frivolity, dullness, cunning, wit, genius, and so on. All of these run together and congeal into thousandfold shapes (individuals) and keep staging the great and the small history of the world, and in itself it makes no difference whether what sets them in motion is nuts or

crowns. Finally he will find that the world is like the dramas of Gozzi, in all of which the same persons always appear, with the same intention and the same fate. The motives and events, of course, are different in each play, but the spirit of the events is the same. The persons of one play also know nothing of the doings in another, in which they themselves acted. So after all the experiences of the earlier plays, Pantalone has still not become nimbler or more generous, Tartaglia more conscientious, Brighella bolder or Columbine more modest.—

Suppose we were once allowed a clear look into the realm of possibility, over all the chains of causes and effects. Suppose the Earth Spirit stepped forth and showed us in a picture the most excellent individuals, enlighteners of the world and heroes, whom chance destroyed before the time of their effectiveness. Suppose it then showed us the great events that would have changed world history and brought on periods of the highest culture and enlightenment, but which the blindest happenstance, the most insignificant accident, stopped at their birth. Suppose it finally showed us the glorious powers of great individuals that would have made whole ages fruitful, but which, led astray by error or passion, or forced by necessity, they wasted uselessly on unworthy and barren objects, or even squandered in play. If we saw all this, we would shudder and lament over the lost treasures of whole ages. But the Earth Spirit would smile and say: "The source from which the individuals and their powers flow is inexhaustible and infinite, like time and space. For they, just like these forms of all appearance, are also only appearance, visibility of the will. No finite measure can exhaust that infinite source. So for every event or work stifled in the germ, the undiminished infinity is still open for its return. In this world of appearance neither true loss nor true gain is possible. The will alone is: it, the thing in itself, it, the source of all those appearances. Its self-knowledge, and the affirmation or denial that is decided on that basis, is the only event in itself."—[13]

14 This last sentence cannot be understood without acquaintance with the following book.

36 History follows the thread of events. It is pragmatic insofar as it derives them according to the law of motivation, the law that determines the appearing will where it is lit up by knowledge. At the lower grades of its objectivity, where it still works without knowledge, natural science looks at the laws of the changes of its appearances as etiology, and at what lasts in them as morphology. Morphology eases its nearly endless theme with the help of concepts, gathering up the general in order to derive the particular from it. Finally, mathematics looks at the mere forms in which the Ideas appear drawn apart into plurality for the knowledge of the subject as individual, that is, time and space. All of these, whose common name is science, follow the principle of sufficient reason in its different shapes. Their theme remains the appearance, its laws, connection and the relations that arise from them.—But what kind of knowledge looks at the one thing that exists outside and independent of all relation, the only thing in the world that is really essential, the true content of its appearances, what is subject to no change and therefore known with equal truth for all time; in a word, the *Ideas*, which are the immediate and adequate objectivity of the thing in itself, the will?—It is *art*, the work of the man of genius. It repeats the eternal Ideas grasped through pure contemplation, the essential and lasting part of all appearances of the world. Depending on the material in which it repeats them, it is visual art, poetry or music. Its only origin is the knowledge of the Ideas; its only goal is to communicate this knowledge.—Science follows the restless, unstable stream of grounds and consequences in their fourfold shape. At every goal reached it is sent on again, and it can never find a final goal or full satisfaction, any more than by running one reaches the point where the clouds touch the horizon. Art, by contrast, is at its goal everywhere. For it tears the object of its contemplation out of the stream of the world's course and has it isolated before it. This single thing, which was a vanishingly small part in that stream, becomes for art a representative of the whole, an equivalent of the infinitely many in space and time. So art stays with this single thing. It stops the wheel of time. The relations vanish for it. Only the essential, the Idea, is its object.—We can therefore describe it outright as *the way of looking at things independently of the principle of sufficient reason*, in contrast to the way of look-

ing that follows this principle, which is the road of experience and science. This latter way of looking can be compared to an endless line running horizontally. The former can be compared to the vertical line that cuts it at any point you like. The way that follows the principle of sufficient reason is the rational way of looking, which alone counts and helps in practical life and in science. The way that looks away from the content of that principle is the way of looking of genius, which alone counts and helps in art. The first is Aristotle's way of looking; the second is on the whole Plato's. The first is like the mighty storm that rushes on without beginning or goal, bending everything, moving everything, sweeping it along. The second is like the quiet sunbeam that cuts across the path of this storm, wholly unmoved by it. The first is like the countless, violently moving drops of the waterfall, which keep changing and rest not for a moment. The second is like the rainbow that rests quietly on this raging turmoil.—Ideas are grasped only through the pure contemplation described above, which is wholly absorbed in the object. And the nature of *genius* consists precisely in the outstanding capacity for such contemplation. Since this demands a complete forgetting of one's own person and its relations, genius is nothing other than the most perfect *objectivity*, that is, the objective direction of the mind, opposed to the subjective direction that goes to one's own person, that is, the will. So genius is the capacity to behave in a purely perceiving way, to lose oneself in perception, and to withdraw knowledge, which originally exists only to serve the will, from that service. That is, it is the capacity to lose sight entirely of one's interest, one's willing and one's purposes, and so to give up one's personality fully for a time, in order to remain as *pure knowing subject*, clear eye of the world. And not for moments only, but for as long, and with as much reflective awareness, as is needed to repeat what was grasped by deliberate art, and "to fix in lasting thoughts what hovers in wavering appearance."—It is as if, for the man of genius to emerge in an individual, that individual must have been given a measure of power of knowledge far exceeding what is needed for the service of an individual will. This surplus of knowledge, which has become free, becomes the subject purified of will, the bright mirror of the world's essence.—This explains the liveliness, up to restlessness, in individuals

of genius. The present can seldom be enough for them, because it does not fill their consciousness. This gives them that restless striving, that unceasing search for new objects worth contemplating, and also that almost never satisfied longing for beings like themselves, their equals, to whom they could communicate themselves. The ordinary child of earth, by contrast, is wholly filled and satisfied by the ordinary present and absorbed in it. Finding his equals everywhere, he also has that special comfort in everyday life that is denied to the man of genius.—Imagination has been recognized as an essential component of genius, and has even sometimes been held to be identical with it. The first is right; the second is wrong. The objects of the man of genius as such are the eternal Ideas, the lasting essential forms of the world and all its appearances. But knowledge of the Idea is necessarily perceptual, not abstract. So the knowledge of the man of genius would be limited to the Ideas of the objects actually present to his person, and dependent on the chain of circumstances that brought them to him, if imagination did not extend his horizon far beyond the reality of his personal experience. Imagination puts him in a position to construct everything else out of the little that has come into his actual apperception, and so to let almost all possible pictures of life pass before him. Besides, real objects are almost always only very defective specimens of the Idea that presents itself in them. So the man of genius needs imagination in order to see in things not what nature has actually formed, but what it tried to form and, because of the struggle of its forms with one another mentioned in the previous book, did not bring about. We will come back to this below, when we consider sculpture. So imagination widens the horizon of the man of genius beyond the objects that offer themselves to his person in reality, both in quality and in quantity. For this reason, unusual strength of imagination is the companion, indeed the condition, of genius. But the reverse is not true. Imagination does not show genius. Even people entirely without genius can have a lot of imagination. For one can look at a real object in two opposite ways: purely objectively, in the way of genius, grasping its Idea; or commonly, merely in its relations to other objects and to one's own will, according to the principle of sufficient reason. In the same way one can look at a fancy in both ways. Looked at in the first way, it is a

means to knowledge of the Idea, the communication of which is the work of art. In the second case, the fancy is used to build castles in the air that suit selfishness and one's own whim, and deceive and amuse for the moment. In that case, of the fancies thus linked, really only their relations are ever known. Whoever plays this game is a daydreamer. He will easily mix the pictures with which he amuses himself alone into reality, and so become unfit for it. He may write down the conjuring tricks of his imagination, and then they give the ordinary novels of every kind that entertain his equals and the great public, as the readers dream themselves into the hero's place and then find the presentation very "cozy."

The ordinary man is a factory product of nature, the kind she turns out by the thousands every day. As I said, he is at least quite unable to keep up any contemplation that is disinterested in every sense, and that is what real contemplation is. He can turn his attention to things only so far as they have some relation to his will, even if only a very indirect one. For that purpose, which only ever calls for knowledge of relations, the abstract concept of a thing is enough, and mostly even better suited. So the ordinary man does not stay long with mere intuition. He does not keep his eye long on one object. For everything that comes before him he quickly looks for the concept to put it under, as a lazy person looks for a chair, and then it interests him no further. That is why he is so quickly done with everything: works of art, beautiful objects of nature, and the sight of life in all its scenes, which is really full of meaning everywhere. He does not linger. He looks only for his own way in life, and perhaps for anything that could someday become his way. These are topographical notes in the widest sense. He wastes no time on the contemplation of life itself as such. The man of genius is different. His power of knowledge is in excess, so for part of his time it withdraws from the service of his will. He dwells on the contemplation of life itself and strives to grasp the Idea of each thing, not its relations to other things. In doing so he often neglects to look to his own way in life, and so for the most part he goes along it clumsily enough. For the ordinary man the faculty of knowledge is a lantern that lights his path. For the man of genius it is the sun that makes the world plain. This very different way of looking into life soon

shows even in the outward appearance of the two. The look of a person in whom genius lives and works marks him out easily. It is lively and steady at once, and it has the character of contemplation, as we can see in the portraits of the few men of genius that nature has produced now and then among the countless millions. In the look of the others, unless it is dull or sober, as it mostly is, the true opposite of contemplation easily shows: scouting. So the "expression of genius" in a head consists in this: a decided predominance of knowing over willing is visible in it, and so a knowing with no relation at all to a willing, that is, a *pure knowing*, expresses itself in it. In heads as they usually are, on the other hand, the expression of willing prevails, and one sees that knowing is set going only at the urging of willing, so that it is directed merely at motives.

The knowledge of genius, or knowledge of the Idea, is the knowledge that does not follow the principle of sufficient reason. The knowledge that does follow it gives shrewdness and reasonableness in life and produces the sciences. So individuals of genius will have the faults that come from neglecting this second mode of knowledge. But note one limit. What I am going to say about this applies to them only so far as, and while, they are actually engaged in the mode of knowledge of genius. That is by no means the case in every moment of their lives. The great effort needed to grasp Ideas free of the will is spontaneous, but it necessarily relaxes again, and it has long gaps. In those gaps these people are much like ordinary men, in their merits as well as their faults. For this reason the working of genius has always been seen as an inspiration. Indeed, as the name itself indicates, it has been seen as the working of a superhuman being, different from the individual himself, who takes possession of him only from time to time. The dislike that individuals of genius have for directing their attention to the content of the principle of sufficient reason will show itself first with regard to the ground of being, as a dislike of mathematics. Mathematics looks at the most general forms of appearance, space and time, which are themselves only shapes of the principle of sufficient reason. So it is the exact opposite of the contemplation that looks only for the content of the appearance, the Idea expressing itself in it, and ignores all relations. Besides this, the logical treatment of mathematics will also go against genius. It shuts out

real insight and does not satisfy. It offers only a chain of inferences according to the principle of the ground of knowing, and of all the powers of the mind it puts the heaviest demand on memory, since one must always keep in mind all the earlier propositions one appeals to. Experience also confirms that great men of genius in art have no ability for mathematics. No one was ever very distinguished in both at once. Alfieri tells us that he could never understand even the fourth theorem of Euclid. Goethe has been reproached more than enough for his lack of mathematical knowledge by the unintelligent opponents of his theory of colors. But here the question was not one of calculating and measuring from hypothetical data. It was one of direct knowledge of cause and effect by the understanding. So the reproach was completely perverse and out of place, and by it these opponents showed their total lack of judgment, just as much as they did by their other Midas-like pronouncements. Even today, almost half a century after Goethe's theory of colors appeared, and even in Germany, the Newtonian nonsense stays undisturbed in possession of the professorial chairs, and people go on talking in all seriousness about the seven homogeneous lights and their different refrangibility. This will one day be counted among the great intellectual traits of mankind in general and of the Germans in particular.—The same reason, given above, explains the equally well-known fact that, conversely, outstanding mathematicians have little receptiveness for works of fine art. This shows itself most naively in the well-known anecdote of the French mathematician who read Racine's Iphigenia and then asked with a shrug: Qu'est-ce que cela prouve?—Next, shrewdness really consists in a sharp grasp of relations according to the law of causality and motivation, but the knowledge of genius is not directed at relations. So a shrewd man, so far as and while he is shrewd, will not be a man of genius, and a man of genius, so far as and while he is one, will not be shrewd.—Finally, intuitive knowledge, in whose domain the Idea lies entirely, stands in general directly opposed to rational or abstract knowledge, which the principle of the ground of knowing guides. As is well known, one seldom finds great genius paired with a prevailing reasonableness. On the contrary, individuals of genius are often subject to violent emotions and unreasonable passions. Yet the cause of this is not a weakness of rea-

son. It is partly an unusual energy of the whole appearance of will that the individual of genius is, an energy that shows itself in the violence of all his acts of will. It is partly the predominance of intuitive knowledge, through the senses and the understanding, over abstract knowledge, and so a decided turn toward the intuitive. In them the impression of the intuitive is so extremely energetic that it outshines the colorless concepts. These no longer guide their action, the impression does, and for that very reason their action becomes unreasonable. So the impression of the present is very powerful on them. It sweeps them into thoughtlessness, emotion and passion. For this reason too, and in general because their knowledge has partly withdrawn from the service of the will, in conversation they think less of the person they are speaking to than of the matter they are speaking about, which hovers vividly before them. So they judge or tell things too objectively for their own interest, and they do not keep quiet about what would be wiser left unsaid, and so on. Finally, for the same reason they are inclined to monologues, and in general they can show several weaknesses that really come close to madness. It has often been noticed that genius and madness have a side where they border on each other, and even pass into each other. Poetic inspiration has even been called a kind of madness. Horace calls it amabilis insania (Od. III, 4), and Wieland, at the opening of "Oberon," calls it "sweet madness." Even Aristotle, according to Seneca's quotation (de tranq. animi, 15, 16), is said to have said: Nullum magnum ingenium sine mixtura dementiae fuit. Plato expresses it in the myth of the dark cave quoted above (de Rep. 7). He says that those who have seen outside the cave the true sunlight and the things that really exist (the Ideas) can afterward no longer see in the cave, because their eyes have lost the habit of the dark. They can no longer properly make out the shadow images down there, and so, when they blunder, they are mocked by the others, who never got out of this cave or away from these shadow images. He also says outright in the Phaedrus (p. 317) that without a certain madness there can be no true poet, and indeed (p. 327) that everyone who recognizes the eternal Ideas in perishable things appears mad.

Cicero also cites: Negat enim, sine furore, Democritus, quemquam poëtam magnum esse posse; quod idem dicit Plato (de divin. I, 37). And finally Pope says:

Great wits to madness sure are near allied, And thin partitions do their bounds divide[15].

Especially instructive in this respect is Goethe's "Torquato Tasso." In it he sets before our eyes not only the suffering, the essential martyrdom of genius as such, but also its steady passage into madness. Finally, the fact that genius and madness touch directly is confirmed by the biographies of men of great genius, for example Rousseau, Byron and Alfieri, and by anecdotes from the lives of others. And on the other side I must mention that on frequent visits to madhouses I have found individual patients of unmistakably great gifts, whose genius showed clearly through their madness, which in them, however, had completely gained the upper hand. This cannot be put down to chance. On the one hand, the number of the mad is comparatively very small. On the other hand, an individual of genius is an appearance rarer than any ordinary estimate and shows up in nature only as the greatest exception. One can convince oneself of this only by counting the really great men of genius that the whole of civilized Europe has produced in all ancient and modern times, counting only those who delivered works that have kept a lasting value for mankind through all ages, and comparing their number with the 250 million who live in Europe at any one time, renewing themselves every thirty years. Indeed, I will not leave unmentioned that I have known some people of mental superiority that was not great but still decided, and who at the same time showed a slight touch of craziness. From this it might seem that every raising of the intellect above the ordinary measure, as an abnormality, already predisposes to madness. Meanwhile I will state my opinion, as briefly as I can, on the purely intellectual ground of this kinship between genius and madness. This discussion will certainly contribute to the [16] Great minds are related to madness, and only a thin wall separates the two. explanation of the real nature of genius, that is, of the quality of mind that alone can create true works of art. But this makes a short discussion of madness itself necessary [17].

A clear and complete insight into the nature of madness, a correct and distinct concept of what really distinguishes the madman from the healthy person, has still not been found, as far as I know.—Neither reason nor understanding can be denied to the mad. They speak and understand, they often reason quite correctly, and as a rule they also perceive what is present quite correctly and see the connection between cause and effect. Visions, like the fantasies of fever, are not a usual symptom of madness: delirium falsifies intuition, madness falsifies thoughts. For the most part the mad are not at all mistaken in their knowledge of what is immediately *present*. Their raving always concerns what is *absent* and *past*, and only through that its connection with the present. So their illness seems to me to strike the *memory* in particular. I do not mean that memory is wholly missing, for many know many things by heart and sometimes recognize people they have not seen for a long time. I mean that the thread of memory is broken, its continuous connection removed, and no evenly connected recollection of the past is possible. Single scenes of the past stand correctly, like the single present. But in their recollection there are gaps, which they then fill with fictions. These fictions are either always the same, and become fixed ideas, and then it is fixed delusion, melancholy. Or they are different every time, momentary notions, and then it is called folly, fatuitas. For this reason it is so hard to question a madman about his earlier course of life when he enters the madhouse. More and more, true and false mix in his memory. The immediate present is known correctly, but it is falsified by an invented connection with a [18] On this see chapter 31 of the second volume. supposed past. So the mad take themselves and others for the same as persons who exist only in their invented past, do not recognize some acquaintances at all, and thus, with a correct representation of the single present thing, have only false relations of it to what is absent. If madness reaches a high degree, complete loss of memory results. The madman is then quite incapable of any regard for anything absent or past, and is determined wholly by the mood of the moment, together with the fictions that fill the past in his head. Then, unless one constantly keeps one's superior force before his eyes, one is not safe from ill-treatment or murder for a single moment.—The knowledge of the madman has this in common

with that of the animal: both are limited to the present. But what distinguishes them is this. The animal really has no representation of the past as such, although the past works on the animal through the medium of habit. That is why a dog, for example, recognizes its former master even after years, that is, it gets the usual impression from the sight of him. But it has no recollection of the time that has passed since. The madman, on the other hand, always carries around in his reason a past too, in abstracto, but a false one, which exists only for him, and does so either all the time or only just now. The influence of this false past now also prevents him from using the present he knows correctly, a use which the animal does make. I explain to myself as follows why violent mental suffering and unexpected terrible events often cause madness. Every such suffering, as an actual event, is always limited to the present, so it is only passing, and to that extent not yet excessively heavy. It becomes immensely great only so far as it is lasting pain. But as such it is again only a thought, and therefore lies in the *memory*. Now suppose such a grief, such painful knowledge or remembrance, is so agonizing that it is simply unbearable, and the individual would succumb to it. Then nature, so tormented, takes refuge in *madness* as the last means of saving life. The mind, so greatly tortured, tears the thread of its memory, as it were, fills the gaps with fictions, and so flees from a mental pain that exceeds its strength into madness. It is like cutting off a limb attacked by gangrene and replacing it with a wooden one.—As an example consider the raging Ajax, King Lear and Ophelia. The creatures of true genius, the only ones one can appeal to here as generally known, are to be put on a level with real persons in truth. Besides, frequent real experience shows quite the same thing here. A weak analogue of this kind of passage from pain to madness is this: all of us often try, as if mechanically, to drive away a tormenting recollection that suddenly comes to us, by some loud utterance or movement, to divert ourselves from it, to distract ourselves by force.— As we have explained, the madman knows the single present correctly, and even some single things of the past, but he misjudges the connection and the relations, and so he errs and talks wildly. This is exactly the point where he touches the individual of genius. For the individual of genius also leaves behind knowledge of relations, which is

knowledge according to the principle of sufficient reason. He does so in order to see and seek in things only their Ideas, and to grasp their real nature, which expresses itself to intuition. In regard to that nature a thing represents its whole species, and so, as Goethe says, one case stands for thousands. In doing this the man of genius too loses sight of the connection of things. The single object of his contemplation, or the present moment, which he grasps with excessive vividness, appears in such a bright light that the other links of the chain they belong to fall back into darkness, as it were. This gives exactly the phenomena that have a long-recognized resemblance to those of madness. What exists in the single thing only imperfectly, and weakened by modifications, the way of seeing of genius raises to the Idea of it, to the perfect. So he sees extremes everywhere, and for that very reason his actions run to extremes. He does not know how to hit the right measure. He lacks sobriety, and the result is what I have said. He knows the Ideas perfectly, but not the individuals. That is why, as has been noticed, a poet can know man deeply and thoroughly but know men very badly. He is easily deceived and is a plaything in the hand of the cunning [19].

37 Our account says that genius consists in the ability to know, independently of the principle of sufficient reason, the Ideas of things instead of the single things, which have their being only in relation. It also consists in being, in the face of these Ideas, the correlate of the Idea itself, that is, no longer an individual but the pure subject of knowing. Still, this ability must also dwell in all men, to a lesser and varying degree. Otherwise they would be as unable to enjoy works of art as to produce them, and would have no receptiveness at all for the beautiful and the sublime. Indeed these words could have no meaning for them. So we must assume that this power is present in all men, unless perhaps there are some who are quite incapable of any aesthetic pleasure. It is the power to know the Ideas in things, and by that very act to shed one's personality for a moment. Genius has over other men only a much higher degree, and a longer duration, of this mode of knowledge. This lets him keep, during it, the presence of mind that is needed to repeat what he has known in this way in a deliberate work. That repetition is the work of art. Through it he communicates the

Idea he has grasped to others. The Idea therefore stays unchanged and the same. So aesthetic pleasure is essentially one and the same, whether a work of art calls it up or the direct look at nature and life. The work of art is merely a means of making easier the knowledge in which that pleasure consists. The Idea meets us more easily out of the work of art than directly out of nature and reality. This is because the artist, who [20] On this see chapter 32 of the second volume. knew only the Idea, no longer reality, has also repeated in his work only the Idea, purely. He has set it apart from reality, leaving out all disturbing accidents. The artist lets us look into the world through his eyes. That he has these eyes, that he knows the essential in things, which lies outside all relations, is exactly the gift of genius, the inborn part. But that he is able also to lend us this gift, to put his eyes on us, is the acquired part, the technique of art. For this reason, now that I have set out, in what precedes, the inner nature of the aesthetic mode of knowledge in its most general outlines, the closer philosophical study of the beautiful and the sublime that follows will deal with both in nature and in art together, without separating them further. We will consider first what goes on in a person when the beautiful moves him, and when the sublime moves him. Whether he draws this emotion directly from nature and life, or shares in it only through the mediation of art, makes no essential difference, only an outward one.

38 In the aesthetic way of seeing we have found *two inseparable components*. One is the knowledge of the object, not as a single thing but as a Platonic Idea, that is, as the enduring form of this whole species of things. The other is the self-consciousness of the knower, not as an individual but as the *pure, will-less subject of knowledge*. The condition under which both components always enter together was the leaving behind of the mode of knowledge bound to the principle of sufficient reason. That mode of knowledge, on the other hand, is the only one suited to the service of the will, as well as to science.—The *pleasure* that contemplation of the beautiful arouses we will also see arise from those two components, now more from the one, now more from the other, depending on what the object of the aesthetic contemplation is.

All *willing* springs from need, so from lack, so from suffering. Fulfillment puts an end to this. But for every wish that is fulfilled, at least ten stay denied. Further, desire lasts long, its demands go on without limit, and fulfillment is short and sparingly measured. Even the final satisfaction itself is only apparent. The fulfilled wish at once makes room for a new one. The first is a recognized error, the second a not yet recognized one. No attained object of willing can give a lasting satisfaction that no longer gives way. It is always like the alms thrown to a beggar, which keeps him alive today so as to prolong his torment until tomorrow.—So as long as our consciousness is filled by our will, as long as we are given over to the pressure of wishes with their constant hoping and fearing, as long as we are the subject of willing, we will never have lasting happiness or peace. Whether we hunt or flee, fear misfortune or strive for enjoyment, is essentially all the same. Care for the always demanding will, in whatever form, constantly fills and moves consciousness. And without peace no true well-being is possible at all. So the subject of willing lies constantly on the turning wheel of Ixion, draws always in the sieve of the Danaids, and is the eternally languishing Tantalus.

But sometimes an outward occasion or an inner mood suddenly lifts us out of the endless stream of willing and tears knowledge away from its slave service to the will. Attention is then no longer directed at the motives of willing. It grasps things free of their relation to the will. That is, it looks at them without interest, without subjectivity, purely objectively, wholly given over to them so far as they are merely representations, not so far as they are motives. Then the peace that we always seek on that first road of willing, and that always flees us, has all at once come of itself, and we are completely well. It is the painless state that Epicurus praised as the highest good and as the state of the gods. For that moment we are freed from the base pressure of the will. We keep the Sabbath from the penal labor of willing. The wheel of Ixion stands still.

This state is exactly the one I described above as needed for knowledge of the Idea: pure contemplation, being absorbed in intuition, losing oneself in the object, forgetting all individuality, and suspending the mode of knowledge that follows the principle of sufficient reason and grasps only relations. At the same

time, and inseparably, the single thing looked at rises to the Idea of its species, and the knowing individual rises to the pure subject of will-less knowing. Both, as such, no longer stand in the stream of time and all other relations. It is then all the same whether one sees the sun set from a prison or from a palace.

An inner mood, a predominance of knowing over willing, can call up this state in any surroundings. The excellent Dutch painters show this. They directed such purely objective intuition at the most insignificant objects, and in *still life* they set up a lasting monument to their objectivity and calm of mind. The aesthetic viewer does not look at it without being moved. It makes present to him the calm, quiet, will-free state of mind of the artist, which was needed to look at such insignificant things so objectively, to observe them so attentively, and to repeat this intuition with such presence of mind. The picture also invites the viewer to share in such a state. His emotion is then often increased still more by the contrast with his own restless state of mind, clouded by violent willing, in which he happens to be. In the same spirit landscape painters, especially Ruisdael, have often painted very insignificant objects of landscape, and in this way they have produced the same effect in an even more pleasing form.

So much is done by the inner power of an artistic mind alone. But that purely objective state of mind is made easier, and furthered from outside, by objects that meet it halfway: by the fullness of beautiful nature, which invites us, even presses us, to look. Whenever nature opens up before our eyes all at once, it almost always succeeds in tearing us, if only for moments, from subjectivity, from the slave service of the will, and in putting us into the state of pure knowing. That is why a person tormented by passions, or by want and care, is so suddenly refreshed, cheered and lifted up by a single free look at nature. The storm of passions, the pressure of wish and fear, and all the torment of willing are at once quieted in a marvelous way. For at the moment when, torn loose from willing, we have given ourselves up to pure will-less knowing, we have stepped, as it were, into another world, where everything that moves our will and so shakes us so violently no longer exists. This freeing of knowledge lifts us out of all of it just as much and just as completely as sleep and dream do. Happiness and unhappiness have vanished. We are no longer the individual, which is for-

gotten, but only pure subject of knowledge. We are there only as the *one* eye of the world, which looks out from all knowing beings but can become wholly free of the service of the will in man alone. So all difference of individuality disappears so completely that it is then all the same whether the seeing eye belongs to a mighty king or to a tormented beggar. For neither happiness nor misery is carried across that border. So near to us lies always a region in which we have entirely escaped all our misery. But who has the strength to stay in it long? As soon as any relation of those purely contemplated objects to our will, to our person, comes back into consciousness, the spell is over. We fall back into the knowledge that the principle of sufficient reason governs. We now know no longer the Idea but the single thing, the link in a chain to which we also belong, and we are given over again to all our misery.—Most people stand almost always at this standpoint, because objectivity, that is, genius, is wholly lacking in them. So they do not like to be alone with nature. They need company, at least a book. For their knowing stays in service to the will. So in objects they look only for whatever relation to their will there may be. With everything that has no such relation, a constant, hopeless "It is no use to me" sounds in their inner being, like a ground bass. Because of this, even the most beautiful surroundings take on for them, in solitude, a bleak, dark, strange, hostile look.

Finally, it is also that blessedness of will-less intuition which spreads such a wonderful charm over the past and over distance and shows them to us in a very beautifying light, through a self-deception. For when we call up long-past days spent in a distant place, it is only the objects that our imagination calls back, not the subject of will, who carried his incurable sufferings around with him then just as he does now. But those sufferings are forgotten, because since then they have often given way to others. Now objective intuition in memory works just as the present one would work if we could bring ourselves to give ourselves up to it free of will. That is why, especially when some distress presses on us more than usual, the sudden memory of scenes of the past and of distance flies by us like a lost paradise. Imagination calls back only the objective, not the individual-subjective, and we imagine that this objective part stood before us then just as purely, unclouded by any relation to the will, as its image

does now in imagination. In fact the relation of the objects to our willing caused us torment then just as much as now. We can withdraw from all suffering through present objects just as well as through distant ones, as soon as we raise ourselves to a purely objective contemplation of them and so can bring about the illusion that only those objects, not we ourselves, are present. Then, freed of the wretched self, as pure subject of knowing we become entirely one with those objects. And as foreign as our distress is to them, so foreign is it, at such moments, to ourselves. The world as representation alone is then left, and the world as will has vanished.

By all these considerations I hope to have made clear what kind and how great a share in aesthetic pleasure the subjective condition of it has. This condition is the freeing of knowing from the service of the will, the forgetting of oneself as an individual, and the raising of consciousness to the pure, will-less, timeless subject of knowing, independent of all relations. With this subjective side of aesthetic contemplation there always enters at the same time, as its necessary correlate, the objective side, the intuitive grasp of the Platonic Idea. But before we turn to the closer study of this, and to what art achieves in relation to it, it is more suitable to stay a little longer with the subjective side of aesthetic pleasure. I want to complete the study of that side by discussing the impression of the *sublime*, which depends on it alone and arises through a modification of it. After that, our investigation of aesthetic pleasure will be complete, once we have considered its objective side.

But some remarks still belong to what I have said so far. Light is the most pleasing of things. It has become the symbol of everything good and salutary. In all religions it stands for eternal salvation, and darkness for damnation. Ormuzd lives in the purest light, Ahriman in eternal night. In Dante's Paradise it looks about like Vauxhall in London, since all the blessed spirits there appear as points of light that arrange themselves into regular figures. The absence of light makes us sad at once, and its return makes us happy. Colors arouse a lively delight at once, which reaches its highest degree when they are transparent. All this comes only from the fact that light is the correlate and the condition of the most perfect mode of intuitive knowledge, the only one that does not affect the

will directly at all. For seeing, unlike the affection of the other senses, is not capable, in itself, directly and by its sensory effect, of any pleasantness or unpleasantness of *sensation* in the organ. That is, it has no immediate connection with the will. Only the intuition that arises in the understanding can have such a connection, and then it lies in the relation of the object to the will. Hearing is already different. Tones can cause pain directly, and can also be directly pleasant to the senses, without any reference to harmony or melody. Touch, being one with the feeling of the whole body, is still more subject to this direct influence on the will. Yet there is still a touching that is free of pain and of pleasure. Smells, though, are always pleasant or unpleasant, and tastes still more so. These last two senses are therefore the most tainted with the will. That is why they are always the least noble, and why Kant called them the subjective senses. So the joy in light is in fact only joy in the objective possibility of the purest and most perfect mode of intuitive knowledge. As such it is to be derived from this: pure knowing, freed and rid of all willing, is highly pleasing, and already as such has a large share in aesthetic enjoyment.—From this view of light we can again derive the incredibly great beauty that we grant to the reflection of objects in water. That lightest, quickest, finest kind of action of bodies on one another, to which we also owe by far the most perfect and purest of our perceptions, the action by means of reflected rays of light, is brought before our eyes here quite clearly, in full view and complete, in cause and effect, and on a large scale. Hence our aesthetic joy in it. In the main it is rooted wholly in the subjective ground of aesthetic pleasure, and it is joy in pure knowing and its ways [21].

39 To all these considerations, which are meant to bring out the subjective part of aesthetic pleasure, that is, this pleasure so far as it is joy in mere intuitive knowing as such, as opposed to the will, there attaches itself, as directly connected with them, the following explanation of the mood that has been called the feeling of the *sublime*.

It has already been noted above that being put into the state of pure intuition happens most easily when the objects meet it halfway. That is, they easily become representatives of their Ideas through their varied and at the same time definite and distinct form, and in this beauty, in the [22] On this see chapter 33 of the second volume. objective sense, consists. Beautiful nature above all has this quality, and through it wins even from the most insensitive person at least a fleeting aesthetic pleasure. Indeed it is so striking how the plant world in particular invites aesthetic contemplation and presses itself on it, as it were, that one might say this meeting halfway is connected with the fact that these organic beings, unlike animal bodies, are not themselves immediate objects of knowledge. So they need a foreign understanding individual in order to step from the world of blind willing into that of representation. They would therefore, as it were, long for this step, so as to obtain at least indirectly what is denied them directly. For the rest, I leave this bold thought, which perhaps borders on enthusiasm, entirely undecided, since only a very intimate and devoted contemplation of nature can arouse or justify it [23]. So long as it is this meeting halfway of nature, the significance and distinctness of its forms, from which the Ideas individualized in them speak to us readily, that puts us from the knowledge of mere relations, which serves the will, into aesthetic contemplation, and so raises us to the will-free subject of knowing, so long it is merely the *beautiful* that acts on us, and the feeling of beauty that is aroused. But suppose those very objects, whose significant forms invite us to pure contemplation of them, stand in a hostile relation to the human will in general, as it presents itself in its objectivity, the human body. Suppose they are opposed to it, threaten it by an overwhelming power that cancels all resistance, or shrink it to nothing before their immeasurable size. And suppose the observer still does not direct his attention to this hostile relation to his will, which presses [24] All the more it pleases and surprises me now, 40 years after I wrote down the above thought so shyly and hesitantly, to discover that Saint Augustine had already expressed it: Arbusta formas suas varias, quibus mundi hujus visibilis structura formosa est, sentiendas sensibus praebent; ut, pro eo quod *nosse* non possunt, quasi *innotescere* velle videantur. (De civ. Dei, XI, 27.) itself on him. Instead, though

he perceives and acknowledges it, he consciously turns away from it. He tears himself violently loose from his will and its relations, gives himself up to knowledge alone, and calmly contemplates those very objects that are fearful to the will as pure will-less subject of knowing, grasping only their Idea, which is foreign to every relation. So he gladly lingers in contemplating them, and by this very fact is lifted above himself, his person, his willing and all willing. Then the feeling of the *sublime* fills him. He is in the state of elevation, and that is why the object that causes such a state is also called *sublime*. What distinguishes the feeling of the sublime from that of the beautiful is this. In the beautiful, pure knowing has won the upper hand without a struggle. The beauty of the object, that is, its quality of making knowledge of its Idea easier, removed the will, and the knowledge of relations that does service to it, from consciousness without resistance, and so unnoticeably, and left consciousness behind as pure subject of knowing, so that not even a memory of the will stays behind. In the sublime, on the other hand, that state of pure knowing is first won by a conscious and violent tearing loose from the relations of the same object to the will, which are known to be unfavorable. It is won by a free rising above the will and the knowledge that relates to it, accompanied by consciousness. This elevation must not only be won with consciousness but also kept up, and so it is accompanied by a constant memory of the will. It is not a memory of a single, individual willing, such as fear or wish, but of human willing in general, so far as it is expressed universally by its objectivity, the human body. If a real single act of will came into consciousness, through actual personal distress and danger from the object, the individual will, truly moved in this way, would soon gain the upper hand. The calm of contemplation would become impossible, and the impression of the sublime would be lost, because it would give way to anxiety, in which the individual's effort to save himself pushed out every other thought. —A few examples will do a great deal to make this theory of the aesthetically sublime clear and put it beyond doubt. At the same time they will show the different degrees of that feeling of the sublime. The feeling is one with that of the beautiful in its main determination, pure, will-free knowing, and the knowledge, necessarily entering with it, of the Ideas that stand outside every relation

determined by the principle of sufficient reason. It differs from the feeling of the beautiful only through an addition: the rising above the known hostile relation of the very object contemplated to the will in general. So, depending on whether this addition is strong, loud, urgent, near, or only weak, distant, merely hinted at, there arise several degrees of the sublime, and indeed transitions from the beautiful to the sublime. I think it better suits the presentation to bring these transitions, and in general the weaker degrees of the impression of the sublime, before the eye first in examples. Those whose aesthetic receptiveness is not very great, and whose imagination is not lively, will understand only the later examples of the higher, clearer degrees of that impression. They should therefore hold to those alone and leave the first examples, of the very weak degrees of the impression, aside.

Man is at once a violent and dark pressure of willing (marked by the pole of the genitals as its focal point) and an eternal, free, serene subject of pure knowing (marked by the pole of the brain). In correspondence with this opposition, the sun is at once the source of *light*, the condition for the most perfect mode of knowledge and thereby the most pleasing of things, and the source of *warmth*, the first condition of all life, that is, of all appearance of the will on its higher levels. What warmth is for the will, light is therefore for knowledge. For this reason light is the greatest diamond in the crown of beauty, and has the most decided influence on the knowledge of every beautiful object. Its presence at all is an indispensable condition, and its favorable position raises the beauty even of the most beautiful. Above all else, though, the beautiful in architecture is raised by its favor, and through it even the most insignificant thing becomes a most beautiful object.—Now in a hard winter, when nature is all stiff, we see the rays of the low sun thrown back from masses of stone. There they illuminate without warming, and so favor only the purest mode of knowledge, not the will. The sight of the beautiful effect of light on these masses puts us, like all beauty, into the state of pure knowing. But here the faint memory that those very rays do not warm, and so lack the principle that gives life, already requires a certain rising above the interest of the will. It contains a faint call to hold on to pure knowing, turning away from all willing. For this very reason it is a tran-

sition from the feeling of the beautiful to that of the sublime. It is the faintest breath of the sublime in the beautiful, and the beautiful itself shows up here in only a slight degree. An almost equally weak example follows.

Let us put ourselves in a very lonely region, with an unbounded horizon, under a completely cloudless sky, trees and plants in quite still air, no animals, no people, no moving water, the deepest silence. Such surroundings are like a call to seriousness, to contemplation, tearing us loose from all willing and its poverty. But this alone already gives such merely lonely and deeply quiet surroundings a touch of the sublime. For they offer no objects, neither favorable nor unfavorable, to the will, which needs constant striving and attaining. So only the state of pure contemplation is left. And whoever is not capable of it is given up, with shameful humiliation, to the emptiness of the unoccupied will, the torment of boredom. To that extent the surroundings give a measure of our own intellectual worth, for which the degree of our ability to bear, or love, solitude is in general a good yardstick. So the surroundings described give an example of the sublime in a low degree. For in them a memory of the dependence and wretchedness of the will, which needs constant drive, is mixed in, as contrast, with the state of pure knowing in its calm and complete sufficiency.—This is the kind of the sublime that is praised in the sight of the endless prairies in the interior of North America.

But now let such a region also be stripped of plants and show only bare rocks. Then, by the complete absence of the organic, which is necessary for our subsistence, the will is already directly alarmed. The desolation takes on a fearful character. Our mood becomes more tragic. The rising to pure knowing takes place with a more decided tearing loose from the interest of the will, and as we stay in the state of pure knowing, the feeling of the sublime comes out clearly.

The following surroundings can cause it in a still higher degree. Nature in stormy motion; half-light from threatening black thunderclouds; huge, bare, overhanging rocks that close off the view by interlocking; rushing, foaming waters; complete desolation; the wail of the air passing through the gorges. Our dependence, our struggle with hostile nature, our will broken in it, now stands before our eyes. But so long as personal distress does not gain the upper hand

and we stay in aesthetic contemplation, the pure subject of knowing looks through that struggle of nature, through that image of the broken will. Calm, unshaken, not touched (unconcerned), it grasps the Ideas in the very objects that are threatening and fearful to the will. In this very contrast lies the feeling of the sublime.

But the impression becomes still more powerful if we have the struggle of the raging forces of nature before us on a large scale. Take surroundings where a falling stream, with its roar, takes from us the possibility of hearing our own voice. Or take the wide sea, raging in a storm. Waves as high as houses rise and sink. Dashed with violence against steep cliffs on the shore, they spray the foam high into the air. The storm howls, the sea roars, lightning flashes from black clouds, and thunderclaps drown out storm and sea. Then, in the unshaken spectator of this scene, the doubleness of his consciousness reaches its highest distinctness. He feels himself at once as an individual, as a frail appearance of will, which the slightest blow of those forces can shatter, helpless against mighty nature, dependent, abandoned to chance, a vanishing nothing before enormous powers. And at the same time he feels himself as the eternal, calm subject of knowing, which, as the condition of the object, is the bearer of this whole world, and to which the fearful struggle of nature is only its own representation. He feels himself in calm grasp of the Ideas, free and foreign to all willing and all needs. This is the full impression of the sublime. Here the sight of a power that threatens the individual with destruction, and is beyond all comparison superior to him, causes it.

In a quite different way it can arise from the presence before us of mere size in space and time, whose immensity shrinks the individual to nothing. We can call the first kind the dynamically sublime and the second the mathematically sublime, keeping Kant's names and his correct division. But in explaining the inner nature of that impression we differ from him completely, and we grant no share in it to moral reflections or to hypostases from scholastic philosophy.

We may lose ourselves in contemplating the infinite size of the world in space and time, and think over the thousands of years gone by and those to come. Or the night sky may actually put countless worlds before our eyes, so that the

immensity of the world presses in on consciousness. Then we feel ourselves shrunk to nothing. We feel ourselves, as individual, as living body, as passing appearance of will, dwindling away like a drop in the ocean, dissolving into nothing. But at the same time, against this specter of our own nothingness, against this lying impossibility, there rises the immediate consciousness that all these worlds exist only in our representation. They exist only as modifications of the eternal subject of pure knowing, which we find ourselves to be as soon as we forget individuality, and which is the necessary, conditioning bearer of all worlds and all times. The size of the world, which disturbed us before, now rests in us. Our dependence on it is canceled by its dependence on us.—None of this comes at once into reflection. It shows itself as only a felt consciousness that in some sense (which philosophy alone makes clear) one is one with the world, and so is not pressed down by its immensity but lifted up. It is the felt consciousness of what the Upanishads of the Vedas express again and again in so many turns, above all in the saying already quoted above: Illae omnes creaturae in totum ego sum, et praeter me aliud ens non est. (Oupnek'hat, vol. 1, p. 122). It is elevation above one's own individual, the feeling of the sublime.

We get this impression of the mathematically sublime in a quite direct way from a space which is small compared with the structure of the universe, but which has become wholly perceptible to us at once, and so acts on us in all three dimensions with its whole size. That size is enough to make the measure of our own body almost infinitely small. An empty space can never do this for perception, and so never an open one. It must be a space made directly perceptible in all dimensions by its boundary, that is, a very high and large vault, like that of St. Peter's in Rome or St. Paul's in London. The feeling of the sublime arises here from becoming aware of the vanishing nothingness of our own body before a size that, for its part, lies again only in our representation, and whose bearer we are as knowing subject. So here, as everywhere, it arises through the contrast between the insignificance and dependence of our self as individual, as appearance of will, and the consciousness of ourselves as pure subject of knowing. Even the vault of the starry sky, when it is looked at without reflection, acts only like that stone vault, and not with its true size but only its apparent one.—

Some objects of our intuition arouse the impression of the sublime because we feel ourselves shrunk to nothing before them, by their size in space as well as by their great age, that is, their duration in time, and yet we revel in the enjoyment of the sight. Of this kind are very high mountains, the Egyptian pyramids, and colossal ruins of great antiquity.

Indeed our explanation of the sublime can be carried over to the ethical too, namely to what is called the sublime character. This also arises from the will not being aroused by objects that are quite suited to arouse it, because knowing keeps the upper hand even then. Such a character will therefore look at men purely objectively, not according to the relations they could have to his will. For example, he will notice their faults, even their hatred and injustice toward himself, without being aroused to hatred on his side. He will look at their good fortune without feeling envy. He will recognize their good qualities without wishing for closer ties with them. He will perceive the beauty of women without desiring them. His personal happiness or unhappiness will not affect him strongly. Rather he will be as Hamlet describes Horatio: for thou hast been As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing; A man, that fortune's buffets and rewards Hast ta'en with equal thanks. etc. (A. 3. sc. 2.) [25]

For in his own course of life and its misfortunes he will see less his own individual lot than the lot of mankind in general, and so will behave in them more as one who knows than as one who suffers.

40 Since opposites throw light on each other, this is the place for the remark that the true opposite of the sublime is something that at first glance one might not recognize as such: the *charming*. By this I mean that [26] For you were always as if, though everything struck you, you suffered nothing; the blows and the gifts of fate you took with equal thanks, etc. which arouses the will by holding grant and fulfillment directly before it.—The feeling of the sublime arose because an object directly unfavorable to the will becomes the object of pure contemplation. This contemplation is then kept up only by a constant turning away from the will and a rising above its interest, and that is just what makes up the sublimity of the mood. The charming, on the other hand, pulls the viewer

down from the pure contemplation that is needed for every grasp of the beautiful. It necessarily stirs up his will through objects that directly appeal to it, and so the viewer no longer stays pure subject of knowing but becomes the needy, dependent subject of willing.—That people usually call every beautiful thing of the cheerful kind charming is a concept taken too wide, through lack of proper distinction. I must set it entirely aside, indeed disapprove of it.—In the sense stated and explained, I find in the realm of art only two kinds of the charming, and both are unworthy of it. One, quite low, is in the still life of the Dutch, when it goes astray so that the objects shown are things to eat. By their deceptive rendering they necessarily arouse the appetite for them, which is exactly an arousal of the will that ends every aesthetic contemplation of the object. Painted fruit is still allowable, since it offers itself as a further development of the flower and, by form and color, as a beautiful natural product, without our being directly forced to think of its being edible. But unfortunately we often find, with deceptive naturalness, meals set out and prepared: oysters, herrings, lobsters, bread and butter, beer, wine and so on. That is wholly objectionable. —In history painting and sculpture the charming consists in nude figures whose pose, half clothing and whole manner of treatment aim at arousing lust in the viewer. This at once cancels the purely aesthetic contemplation, and so it works against the purpose of art. This fault corresponds exactly to the one just censured in the Dutch. The ancient works, with all the beauty and complete nakedness of their figures, are almost always free of it. The artist himself made them in a purely objective spirit filled with ideal beauty, not in the spirit of subjective, base desire.—The charming is therefore to be avoided everywhere in art. There is also a negative charming, which is even more objectionable than the positive charming just discussed. This is the disgusting. Just like the properly charming, it wakes the viewer's will and so destroys purely aesthetic contemplation. But what it stirs up is a violent not-willing, a resistance. It wakes the will by holding before it objects of its loathing. Therefore it has always been recognized as quite inadmissible in art, where even the ugly, as long as it is not disgusting, can be tolerated in the right place, as we will see further below.

41 The course of our inquiry has made it necessary to insert the discussion of the sublime here, where the discussion of the beautiful was only half finished, complete on only one of its sides, the subjective. For it was just a particular modification of this subjective side that distinguished the sublime from the beautiful. The difference between the beautiful and the sublime is this. In the one case, the state of pure will-less knowing, which every aesthetic contemplation presupposes and requires, came about as if of itself, without resistance, by the mere vanishing of the will from consciousness, because the object invited and drew us to it. In the other case, this state was first won by a free, conscious rising above the will, to which the contemplated object itself stands in an unfavorable, hostile relation, and to dwell on which would cancel the contemplation. —In the object the two are not essentially different. For in every case the object of aesthetic contemplation is not the single thing but the Idea striving to reveal itself in it, that is, the adequate objectivity of the will at a determinate level. Its necessary correlate, which like the Idea itself is withdrawn from the principle of sufficient reason, is the pure subject of knowing. The correlate of the single thing is the knowing individual, and both of these lie in the domain of the principle of sufficient reason.

When we call an object *beautiful*, we are saying that it is an object of our aesthetic contemplation. This includes two things. First, that the sight of it makes us *objective*, that is, in contemplating it we are conscious of ourselves no longer as individuals but as pure will-less subject of knowing. Second, that in the object we know not the single thing but an Idea. This can happen only so far as our contemplation of the object is not given over to the principle of sufficient reason, does not follow its relation to anything outside it (which in the end is always connected with relations to our willing), but rests on the object itself. For the Idea and the pure subject of knowing, as necessary correlates, always enter consciousness at the same time. With this entry all difference of time vanishes at once, since both are wholly foreign to the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms and lie outside the relations it sets up. They can be compared to the rainbow and the sun, which have no part in the constant motion and succession of the falling drops. So, for example, when I look at a tree aesthetically,

that is, with the eyes of an artist, and thus know not it but its Idea, it at once does not matter whether it is this tree or its ancestor that flowered a thousand years ago. It is just as indifferent whether the observer is this individual or any other, living at any time and any place. With the principle of sufficient reason the single thing and the knowing individual are canceled, and nothing is left but the Idea and the pure subject of knowing, which together make up the adequate objectivity of the will at this level. And the Idea is lifted out not only of time but also of space. For it is not the spatial shape that hovers before me. What is really the Idea is the expression, the pure meaning of that shape, its innermost nature, which opens itself to me and speaks to me. This can be quite the same despite a great difference in the spatial relations of the shape.

First, every existing thing can be looked at purely objectively and outside all relation. Second, in every thing the will appears at some level of its objectivity, so that the thing is the expression of an Idea. So every thing is also *beautiful*.—That even the most insignificant thing allows pure, will-less, objective contemplation, and so proves itself beautiful, is shown by the still life of the Dutch, which I mentioned above in this connection (§. 38). But one thing is more beautiful than another because it makes that purely objective contemplation easier, meets it halfway, and even, as it were, forces it. Then we call it very beautiful. This is so partly because the single thing, through the very distinct, purely determinate and thoroughly significant relation of its parts, expresses the Idea of its species purely. By the completeness, united in it, of all the expressions possible to its species, it reveals the Idea of that species perfectly. Thus it makes it very easy for the viewer to pass from the single thing to the Idea, and thereby into the state of pure contemplation. And partly the special beauty of an object lies in the fact that the Idea itself that speaks to us out of it is a high level of the objectivity of the will, and so is thoroughly significant and expressive. That is why man is beautiful above all else, and why the revelation of his nature is the highest aim of art. Human form and human expression are the most significant object of the visual arts, just as human action is the most significant object of poetry.—Yet every thing still has its own peculiar beauty: not only everything organic and presenting itself in the unity of an individuality, but also every-

thing inorganic and formless, even every artifact. For all these reveal the Ideas through which the will objectifies itself on the lowest levels. They give out, so to speak, the deepest, fading bass notes of nature. Gravity, rigidity, fluidity, light and so on are the Ideas that express themselves in rocks, buildings, waters. Beautiful gardening and architecture can do nothing more than help them unfold those qualities clearly, many-sidedly and completely. They give them an opportunity to express themselves purely, and so invite aesthetic contemplation and make it easier. Bad buildings, and regions that nature neglected or art spoiled, do this little or not at all. Yet even in them those general basic Ideas of nature cannot wholly vanish. They speak even here to the viewer who looks for them, and even bad buildings and the like are still capable of aesthetic contemplation: the Ideas of the most general properties of their material can still be recognized in them. Only the form artificially given them is no aid, indeed rather an obstacle, that makes aesthetic contemplation harder. Artifacts too, then, serve to express Ideas. But it is not the Idea of the artifact that speaks from them, but the Idea of the material to which this artificial form was given. In the language of the scholastics this can be said very conveniently in two words: in the artifact the Idea of its forma substantialis expresses itself, not that of its forma accidentalis. The latter leads to no Idea, but only to a human concept from which it proceeded. It is understood that by artifact here no work of the visual arts is meant, expressly. For the rest, the scholastics really did understand by forma substantialis what I call the degree of objectification of the will in a thing. We will come back at once, in considering beautiful architecture, to the expression of the Idea of the material.—By our view, though, we cannot agree with Plato when he claims (De Rep., X, p. 284–285, et Parmen., p. 79, ed. Bip.) that table and chair express the Ideas table and chair. We say instead that they express the Ideas that already express themselves in their mere material as such. According to Aristotle (Metaph., XI, chap. 3), however, Plato himself established Ideas only for natural beings: ὁ Πλατων εφη, ὁτι ειδη εστιν ὁποσα φυσει. (Plato dixit, quod ideae eorum sunt, quae natura sunt) And in chapter 5 it is said that, according to the Platonists, there are no Ideas of house and ring. In any case, Plato's nearest pupils, as Alcinous tells us (introductio in

Platonicam philosophiam, chap. 9), already denied that there are Ideas of artifacts. He says: Ὁριζονται δε την ιδεαν, παραδειγμα των κατα φυσιν αἰωνιον. Ουτε γαρ τοις πλειστοις των απο Πλατωνος αρεσκει, των τεχνικων ειναι ιδεας, οἱον ασπιδος η λυρας, ουτε μην των παρα φυσιν, οἱον πυρετου και χολερας, ουτε των κατα μερος, οἱον Σωκρατους και Πλατωνος, αλλ' ουτε των ευτελων τινος, οἱον ρυπου και καρφους, ουτε των προς τι, οἱον μειζονος και ὑπερεχοντος· ειναι γαρ τας ιδεας νοησεις θεου αιωνιους τε και αυτοτελεις.—(Definiunt autem ideam exemplar aeternum eorum, quae secundum naturam existunt. Nam plurimis ex iis, qui Platonem secuti sunt, minime placuit, arte factorum ideas esse, ut clypei atque lyrae; neque rursus eorum, quae praeter naturam, ut febris et cholerae; neque particularium, ceu Socratis et Platonis; neque etiam rerum vilium, veluti sordium et festucae; neque relationum, ut majoris et excedentis: esse namque ideas intellectiones dei aeternas, ac seipsis perfectas.)—On this occasion another point may be mentioned in which our doctrine of Ideas differs very greatly from Plato's. He teaches (De Rep., X, p. 288) that the object that fine art aims to present, the model for painting and poetry, is not the Idea but the single thing. Our whole account so far claims exactly the opposite. And Plato's opinion will not confuse us in this, all the less since it is the source of one of the greatest and acknowledged faults of that great man, namely his low estimate and rejection of art, especially poetry. He connects his false judgment of it directly with the passage cited.

42 I return to our account of the aesthetic impression. Knowledge of the beautiful always presupposes, at once and inseparably, a purely knowing subject and a known Idea as object. Yet the source of aesthetic enjoyment will lie sometimes more in grasping the known Idea, sometimes more in the blessedness and peace of mind of pure knowing, freed from all willing and so from all individuality and the pain that comes from it. And which of the two components of aesthetic enjoyment prevails will depend on whether the Idea grasped intuitively is a higher or lower level of the objectivity of the will. So when beautiful nature in the inorganic and vegetable realm, and works of beautiful architecture, are looked at aesthetically (in reality, or through the medium of art), the enjoyment

of pure will-less knowing will predominate. For the Ideas grasped here are only low levels of the objectivity of the will, and so not appearances of deep significance and rich content. When animals and men are the object of aesthetic contemplation or presentation, on the other hand, the enjoyment will consist more in the objective grasp of these Ideas, which are the clearest revelations of the will. For these show the greatest variety of forms, richness and deep significance of appearances, and reveal to us most completely the nature of the will, whether in its violence, its terribleness, its satisfaction, or in its breaking (the last in tragic presentations), and finally even in its turning or self-cancellation, which is especially the theme of Christian painting. In general, history painting and drama have as their object the Idea of the will lit by full knowledge.—We will now go through the arts one by one, and in this way the theory of the beautiful we have set out will gain completeness and clarity.

43 Matter as such cannot be the presentation of an Idea. For, as we found in the first book, it is through and through causality: its being is pure acting. But causality is a form of the principle of sufficient reason, whereas knowledge of the Idea essentially excludes the content of that principle. We also found in the second book that matter is the common substratum of all single appearances of the Ideas, and so the link between the Idea and the appearance or single thing. For one reason as for the other, then, matter cannot present an Idea by itself. A posteriori this is confirmed by the fact that of matter as such no intuitive representation is possible, only an abstract concept. In intuition only the forms and qualities present themselves, of which matter is the bearer and in all of which Ideas are revealed. This also corresponds to the fact that causality (the whole nature of matter) cannot be presented intuitively by itself, but only a determinate causal connection.—On the other hand, every *appearance* of an Idea, since as such it has entered into the form of the principle of sufficient reason, or the principium individuationis, must present itself in matter, as a quality of it. To that extent, then, matter is, as I said, the link between the Idea and the principium individuationis, which is the form of the knowledge of the individual, or the principle of sufficient reason.—So Plato was quite right to set up, besides

the Idea and its appearance, the single thing (which two otherwise include all things in the world), only matter as a third, different from both (Timaeus, p. 345). The individual, as appearance of the Idea, is always matter. Every quality of matter is also always an appearance of an Idea, and as such is capable of aesthetic contemplation, that is, of knowledge of the Idea that presents itself in it. This holds even for the most general qualities of matter, without which it never is, and whose Ideas are the weakest objectivity of the will. These are: gravity, cohesion, rigidity, fluidity, reaction to light, and so on.

Now consider *architecture* merely as a fine art, leaving aside its serving useful purposes, in which it serves the will, not pure knowledge, and so is no longer art in our sense. Then we can attribute to it no other aim than to bring some of those Ideas, which are the lowest levels of the objectivity of the will, to clear intuitiveness: namely gravity, cohesion, rigidity, hardness, these general properties of stone, these first, simplest, dullest visibilities of the will, ground-bass notes of nature; and next to them light, which in many respects is the opposite of those. Even on this low level of the objectivity of the will we already see its nature reveal itself in discord. For the struggle between gravity and rigidity is really the only aesthetic material of beautiful architecture. Its task is to make this struggle show itself perfectly clearly in many ways. It solves this by taking from those indestructible forces the shortest way to their satisfaction and holding them off by a detour. In this way the struggle is prolonged and the inexhaustible striving of both forces becomes visible in many ways.—The whole mass of the building, left to its original inclination, would be a mere lump, bound as firmly as possible to the body of the earth. Gravity, in which the will appears here, presses toward the earth without ceasing, while rigidity, likewise objectivity of the will, resists. But architecture keeps exactly this inclination, this striving, from direct satisfaction and allows it only an indirect one, by detours. So, for example, the entablature can press on the earth only by means of the column. The vault must carry itself, and only through the mediation of the piers can it satisfy its striving toward the mass of the earth, and so on. But it is exactly on these forced detours, exactly through these checks, that those forces dwelling in the rough mass of stone unfold themselves most clearly and

in the most manifold way. The purely aesthetic aim of architecture can go no further. So the beauty of a building does lie in the evident fitness of each part, not for the outward, arbitrary purpose of man (to that extent the work belongs to useful architecture) but directly for the standing of the whole. The place, size and form of each part must have such a necessary relation to the whole that, if possible, were any part taken away, the whole would have to fall in. For only when each part carries as much as it properly can, and each is supported exactly where and exactly as much as it must be, does that interplay unfold in its most perfect visibility: that struggle between rigidity and gravity which makes up the life, the expressions of will, of the stone. And only then do these deepest levels of the objectivity of the will reveal themselves clearly. In the same way the shape of each part must also be determined by its purpose and its relation to the whole, not by caprice. The column is the simplest of all forms of support, determined merely by its purpose. The twisted column is in bad taste. The square pier is in fact less simple than the round column, though it happens to be easier to make. In the same way the forms of frieze, beam, arch and dome are wholly determined by their direct purpose, and in this way explain themselves. The ornaments of capitals and so on belong to sculpture, not to architecture, which merely allows them as added decoration, and which could do without them.—From what has been said it is absolutely necessary, for understanding and aesthetic enjoyment of a work of architecture, to have a direct, intuitive knowledge of its matter, in its weight, rigidity and cohesion. Our pleasure in such a work would suddenly be much reduced by the news that pumice stone was the building material, for then it would strike us as a kind of sham building. The news would work almost the same if we learned it was only wood when we had supposed stone. This is because it now changes and shifts the relation between rigidity and gravity, and with it the meaning and necessity of all the parts, since those forces of nature reveal themselves much more weakly in a wooden building. That is why a work of beautiful architecture can never really be made of wood, however much it takes on all the forms. This is explained by our theory alone. And if we were even told that the building whose sight pleases us consists of quite different materials, of very unequal

weight and consistency, which the eye cannot tell apart, the whole building would become as unenjoyable to us as a poem in a language unknown to us. All this proves that architecture works not merely mathematically but dynamically, and that what speaks to us through it is not mere form and symmetry but rather those basic forces of nature, those first Ideas, those lowest levels of the objectivity of the will.—The regularity of the building and its parts is partly brought about by the direct fitness of each member for the standing of the whole. Partly it serves to make the whole easier to survey and understand. And partly the regular figures contribute to beauty by revealing the lawfulness of space as such. But all this is only of subordinate worth and necessity and by no means the main thing, since even symmetry is not absolutely required: ruins too are still beautiful.

Works of architecture also have a quite special relation to light. They gain double beauty in full sunshine, with the blue sky as background, and show again a quite different effect in moonlight. That is why, when a beautiful work of architecture is put up, special regard is always paid to the effects of light and to the points of the compass. All this has its ground largely in the fact that bright and sharp lighting first makes all parts and their relations really visible. But beyond that I am of the opinion that architecture is meant, together with gravity and rigidity, to reveal at the same time the quite opposite nature of light. For when light is caught, checked and thrown back by large, opaque, sharply bounded and variously shaped masses, it unfolds its nature and properties most purely and clearly, to the great enjoyment of the viewer. This is because light is the most pleasing of things, as the condition and the objective correlate of the most perfect mode of intuitive knowledge.

The Ideas that architecture brings to clear intuition are the lowest levels of the objectivity of the will, and so the objective significance of what architecture reveals to us is comparatively slight. So the aesthetic enjoyment at the sight of a beautiful and favorably lit building will lie not so much in grasping the Idea as in the subjective correlate that goes with that grasp. It will consist mainly in this: at that sight the viewer is torn loose from the mode of knowledge of the individual, which serves the will and follows the principle of sufficient reason,

and is lifted up to that of the pure will-free subject of knowing. That is, it consists in the pure contemplation itself, freed from all the suffering of willing and of individuality.—In this respect the opposite of architecture, the other extreme in the series of the fine arts, is drama, which brings the most significant Ideas to knowledge, and in whose aesthetic enjoyment the objective side therefore clearly outweighs the other.

What distinguishes architecture from the visual arts and poetry is that it gives not a copy but the thing itself. It does not repeat the known Idea, as those do, by which the artist lends the viewer his eyes. Here the artist merely sets the object in the right position for the viewer, and makes the grasp of the Idea easier for him by bringing the real, individual object to a clear and complete expression of its nature.

Works of architecture are very seldom built, as other works of fine art are, for purely aesthetic purposes. Rather these are subordinated to other, useful purposes foreign to art itself. And so the great merit of the architect lies in nevertheless carrying through and achieving the purely aesthetic purposes, in spite of their subordination to foreign ones. He does this by skillfully adapting them in many ways to the arbitrary purpose of each case, and by judging correctly which aesthetic-architectural beauty goes with a temple, which with a palace, which with an arsenal, and so on. The more a harsh climate increases those demands of need and usefulness, fixes them more firmly and prescribes them more strictly, the less room there is for the beautiful in architecture. In the mild climate of India, Egypt, Greece and Rome, where the demands of necessity were smaller and more loosely fixed, architecture could pursue its aesthetic purposes most freely. Under northern skies these were much stunted. Here, where boxes, pointed roofs and towers were the demand, architecture was allowed to unfold its own beauty only within very narrow limits. As compensation it had to adorn itself all the more with decoration borrowed from sculpture, as can be seen in Gothic beautiful architecture.

If architecture must suffer great limits in this way from the demands of necessity and usefulness, it has on the other hand a strong support in these same demands. Given the scale and cost of its works and the narrow sphere of its aes-

thetic way of acting, it could not maintain itself at all as a merely fine art, if it did not at the same time have, as a useful and necessary trade, a firm and honorable place among human occupations. The lack of exactly this keeps another art from standing beside it as a sister, although in aesthetic respect it is really to be paired with it as a counterpart. I mean the art of beautiful water-works. For what architecture does for the Idea of gravity, where it appears joined with rigidity, that art does for the same Idea where fluidity is joined with it, that is, formlessness, the easiest displacement, transparency. Waterfalls foaming and roaring over rocks, cataracts quietly dissolving into spray, fountains driving up as high columns of water, and clear mirroring lakes reveal the Ideas of fluid heavy matter just as the works of architecture unfold the Ideas of rigid matter. Beautiful water-works finds no support in useful water-works, since the purposes of the latter, as a rule, cannot be combined with its own. This happens only by exception, for example in the Cascata di Trevi at Rome [27].

44 What the two arts just mentioned do for those lowest levels of the objectivity of the will, beautiful gardening does in a certain way for the higher level of vegetable nature. The scenic beauty of a spot rests largely on the variety of the natural objects found together on it, and then on their standing out purely from one another, showing clearly, and yet appearing in fitting connection and variation. These are the two conditions that beautiful gardening helps along. But it is not nearly so much master of its material as architecture is of its own, and so its effect is limited. The beauty it shows belongs almost entirely to nature, and it has done little toward it. And on the other hand it can do very little against the unfavorable side of nature, and where nature does not work for it but against it, its achievements are small.

So far, then, as the plant world, which offers itself everywhere for aesthetic enjoyment without the mediation of art, is the object of [28] On this see chapter 35 of the second volume.

art, it belongs chiefly to landscape painting. In the domain of that art lies also all the rest of nature that lacks knowledge.—In still life and in painted mere architecture, ruins, church interiors and the like, the subjective side of aesthetic

enjoyment is the preponderant one. That is, our joy in them lies not mainly in the direct grasp of the Ideas presented, but more in the subjective correlate of that grasp, in pure will-less knowing. For as the painter lets us see things through his eyes, we get here at the same time a fellow-feeling and an after-feeling of the deep peace of mind and the complete silence of the will which were needed to sink knowledge so wholly into those lifeless objects and to grasp them with such love, that is, here with such a degree of objectivity.—The effect of landscape painting proper is, on the whole, still of this kind. But because the Ideas presented, as higher levels of the objectivity of the will, are already more significant and expressive, the objective side of aesthetic pleasure comes out more and balances the subjective. Pure knowing as such is no longer wholly the main thing. With equal power the known Idea works, the world as representation at a significant level of the objectification of the will.

But animal painting and animal sculpture reveal a much higher level. Of the latter we have significant ancient remains: for example horses, in Venice, on Monte cavallo, on the Elgin reliefs, also at Florence, in bronze and marble; in the same place the ancient boar and the howling wolves; further the lions at the arsenal in Venice; and also in the Vatican a whole hall full of animals, mostly ancient, and so on. In these presentations the objective side of aesthetic pleasure gets a decided predominance over the subjective. The peace of the subject that knows these Ideas, and has quieted its own will, is present, as in all aesthetic contemplation. But its effect is not felt, for the restlessness and violence of the will presented occupy us. It is that willing which also makes up our own nature that comes before our eyes here. It is in forms in which its appearance is not, as in us, ruled and softened by presence of mind, but presents itself in stronger features and with a clearness that borders on the grotesque and the monstrous. In return it is without disguise, naive and open, lying free in the light of day, and on this our interest in animals rests. The characteristic of the species already came out in the presentation of plants, but showed itself only in the forms. Here it becomes much more significant, and expresses itself not only in shape but in action, posture and gesture, though still always only as the character of the species, not of the individual.—This knowledge of Ideas of higher

levels, which we receive in painting through another's mediation, we can also share directly, by purely contemplative intuition of plants and by watching animals, in their free, natural and comfortable state. The objective contemplation of their varied, wonderful shapes and of their doings and goings is an instructive lesson from the great book of nature. It is a deciphering of the true signatura rerum [29]. In it we see the many degrees and ways of manifestation of the will, which, being one and the same in all beings, everywhere wills the same thing, namely what objectifies itself as life, as existence, in such endless variety and so many different shapes. These are all accommodations to the different outward conditions, and are like many variations on the same theme. But if we wanted to give the observer the key to their inner nature, for reflection too and in one word, we could best use [30] Jakob Böhm, in his book De Signatura rerum, chap. 1, §. 15, 16, 17, says: "And there is nothing in nature that does not also reveal its inner form outwardly; for the inward is always working toward revelation.———Every thing has its mouth for revelation.———And that is the language of nature, in which every thing speaks out of its own property and always reveals and presents itself.———For every thing reveals its mother, who thus gives the *essence and the will* to the form." for this that Sanskrit formula which occurs so often in the holy books of the Hindus and is called Mahavakya, that is, the great word: "Tat twam asi," that is, "this living being are you."

45 Finally, to present intuitively and directly the Idea in which the will reaches the highest degree of its objectification is the great task of history painting and sculpture. The objective side of the joy in the beautiful is here clearly predominant, and the subjective has stepped into the background. It should also be noted that on the next level below this, in animal painting, the characteristic is wholly one with the beautiful: the most characteristic lion, wolf, horse, sheep, bull was always also the most beautiful. The reason is that animals have only the character of the species, no individual character. In the presentation of man, however, the character of the species separates from the character of the

individual. The former is now called beauty (wholly in the objective sense), but the latter keeps the name character or expression. And the new difficulty arises of presenting both perfectly at once in the same individual.

Human beauty is an objective expression that marks the most perfect objectification of the will at the highest level of its knowability: the Idea of man in general, completely expressed in the intuited form. However much the objective side of the beautiful comes out here, the subjective remains its constant companion. No object carries us away so quickly to purely aesthetic looking as the most beautiful human face and figure. At the sight of them an inexpressible pleasure seizes us at once and lifts us above ourselves and everything that torments us. This is possible only because this clearest and purest knowability of the will puts us also most easily and quickly into the state of pure knowing. In that state our personality, our willing with its constant pain, disappears for as long as the purely aesthetic joy lasts. That is why Goethe says: "Whoever sees human beauty, no evil can touch him: he feels himself in harmony with himself and with the world."—That nature succeeds in producing a beautiful human figure we must explain as follows. The will, in objectifying itself in an individual on this highest level, completely overcomes, through happy circumstances and its own power, all the obstacles and resistance that the appearances of the will on lower levels set against it. Such are the forces of nature, from which it must always first win and wrest the matter that belongs to all of them. Further, the appearance of the will on the upper levels always has multiplicity in its form. The tree is already only a systematic aggregate of countless repeated sprouting fibers. This composition increases more and more as one goes higher, and the human body is a highly combined system of quite different parts, each of which has a life subordinate to the whole yet also its own, vita propria. That all these parts should be subordinated to the whole in exactly the right way and coordinated with one another, should work together in harmony to present the whole, and that nothing should be excessive and nothing stunted—all these are the rare conditions whose result is beauty, the perfectly stamped character of the species.—So it is with nature. But how with art?—People think, by imitating nature.—But by what is the artist to recognize its successful work, the one

to imitate, and pick it out among the failures, unless he anticipates the beautiful before *experience*? Besides, has nature ever produced a man perfectly beautiful in all parts?—Then people have thought that the artist must collect the beautiful parts distributed singly among many men and put together a beautiful whole from them: a perverse and thoughtless opinion. For the question again is, by what is he to recognize that exactly these forms are beautiful and those are not?—We can also see how far the old German painters got in beauty by imitating nature. Look at their nude figures.—Purely a posteriori and from mere experience, no knowledge of the beautiful is possible at all. It is always, at least in part, a priori, though of a quite different kind from the forms of the principle of sufficient reason that we are conscious of a priori.

These concern the general form of appearance as such, as it grounds the possibility of knowledge in general, the general how of appearing without exception. From this knowledge mathematics and pure natural science come. That other kind of a priori knowledge, which makes the presentation of the beautiful possible, concerns instead the content of the appearances, not the form; the what of appearing, not the how. We all recognize human beauty when we see it. But in the true artist this happens with such clearness that he shows it as he never saw it, and surpasses nature in his presentation. This is possible only because the will, whose adequate objectification at its highest level is here to be judged and found, is we *ourselves*. Only through this do we really have an anticipation of what nature (which is the will that makes up our own nature) is trying to present. In the true man of genius this anticipation is accompanied by such a degree of presence of mind that, in knowing the Idea in the single thing, he as it were *understands nature at half a word*, and now speaks out purely what she only stammers. He stamps the beauty of form, which she fails at in a thousand tries, on the hard marble. He sets it up against nature, calling out to her, as it were: "That was what you wanted to say!" And "Yes, that was it!" echoes back from the connoisseur.—Only so could the Greek of genius find the original type of the human figure and set it up as the canon of the school of sculpture. And only by virtue of such an anticipation is it possible for all of us to recognize the beautiful where nature has really succeeded in the single case. This

anticipation is the *ideal*. It is the Idea so far as it is known, at least half a priori, and, as such, coming to meet what is given a posteriori by nature to complete it, becomes practical for art. The possibility of such an anticipation of the beautiful a priori in the artist, and of its recognition a posteriori in the connoisseur, lies in the fact that artist and connoisseur are themselves the in-itself of nature, the will objectifying itself. For only like, as Empedocles said, is known by like: only nature can understand itself, only nature will fathom itself. But also only by spirit is spirit perceived [31].

The perverse opinion that the Greeks found the ideal of human beauty they set up entirely empirically, by gathering single beautiful parts, noting a knee here and uncovering an arm there, has an exact analogue in regard to poetry. This is the assumption that Shakespeare, for example, noted in his own experience of the world the countless, many-sided characters in his dramas, so true, so consistently held, so worked out from the depths, and then reproduced them. The impossibility and absurdity of such an assumption needs no discussion. It is clear that genius produces works of poetry only through an anticipation of the characteristic, just as it produces works of the visual arts only through a divining anticipation of the beautiful. Both need experience, though, as a pattern, which alone calls forth to full clearness what is obscurely known to them a priori, and only then makes deliberate presentation possible.

Human beauty was explained above as the most perfect objectification of the will at the highest level of its knowability. It expresses itself through form. Form lies in space alone and has no necessary relation to time, as motion, for example, has. To that extent we can say: the adequate objectification of the will through a merely spatial appearance is beauty, in the objective sense. The plant is nothing other than such a merely spatial appearance of the will. No motion, and so no relation to time (apart from its development), belongs to the expression of its nature. Its mere shape expresses its whole nature and lays it open. Animal and man [32] The last sentence is the German rendering of Helvetius's il n'y a que l'esprit qui sente l'esprit, which I did not need to note in the first edition. But since then, through the stupefying influence of Hegelian sham wisdom, the age has become so degraded and so coarse that many a person might even

suppose that an allusion is made here to the contrast between "spirit and nature." I am therefore obliged to guard myself expressly against having such vulgar philosophemes imputed to me. however need, for the complete revelation of the will appearing in them, a further series of actions, through which that appearance in them gets a direct relation to time. All this has already been discussed in the previous book. It connects to our present inquiry as follows. The merely spatial appearance of the will can objectify it on any given level perfectly or imperfectly, and that is what makes beauty or ugliness. In the same way the objectification of the will in time, that is, action, and indeed the immediate kind, so motion, can correspond purely and perfectly to the will objectified in it. It can do so without foreign admixture, without anything superfluous, without anything lacking, expressing just the particular act of will in each case. Or all this can be the other way round. In the first case the motion is done with *grace*; in the other, without it. So just as beauty is the corresponding presentation of the will in general through its merely spatial appearance, grace is the corresponding presentation of the will through its appearance in time. That is, it is the perfectly right and fitting expression of each act of will, through the motion and posture that objectify it. Since motion and posture already presuppose the body, Winckelmann's expression is very right and apt when he says: "Grace is the peculiar relation of the acting person to the action." (Works, vol. 1, p. 258.) It follows of itself that beauty can be attributed to plants, but not grace, except in a figurative sense; to animals and men both, beauty and grace. According to what has been said, grace consists in this: every motion and posture is carried out in the easiest, fittest and most comfortable way, and so is the purely corresponding expression of its aim, or of the act of will. It has nothing superfluous, which would show as purposeless, meaningless fumbling or a twisted posture, and nothing lacking, which would show as wooden stiffness. Grace presupposes as its condition a right proportion of all the limbs, a regular, harmonious build of the body. For only by this are perfect ease and evident fitness possible in all postures and motions. So grace is never without a certain degree of beauty of the body. Both, perfect and together, are the clearest appearance of the will on the highest level of its objectification.

As mentioned above, it is part of what distinguishes mankind that in it the character of the species and that of the individual come apart, so that, as said in the previous book, each man in a way presents a quite peculiar Idea. The arts whose aim is the presentation of the Idea of mankind therefore have, besides beauty as the character of the species, also the character of the individual as a task. This is mainly what is called *character*. Yet even this only so far as it is not to be seen as something accidental, entirely peculiar to the individual in his singleness, but as a side of the Idea of mankind that comes out especially in this individual, and whose presentation therefore serves the revelation of that Idea. So the character, though individual as such, must still be grasped and presented ideally, that is, with its significance for the Idea of mankind in general brought out (to whose objectification it contributes in its own way). Otherwise the presentation is a portrait, a repetition of the single thing as such, with all its accidents. And even the portrait should, as Winckelmann says, be the ideal of the individual.

That character, to be grasped ideally, which is the bringing out of a peculiar side of the Idea of mankind, now shows itself visibly. It does so partly through the lasting physiognomy and bodily build, partly through passing emotion and passion, the modification of knowing and willing by each other, all of which expresses itself in mien and motion. The individual always belongs to mankind, and mankind in turn always reveals itself in the individual, and even with an ideal significance peculiar to him. So neither beauty may be canceled by character, nor character by beauty. For canceling the character of the species by that of the individual would give caricature, and canceling the individual by the character of the species would give meaninglessness. Therefore a presentation aiming at beauty, which is mainly what sculpture does, will still always modify this (that is, the character of the species) somewhat by the individual character. It will always express the Idea of mankind in a determinate, individual way, bringing out a particular side of it. For the human individual as such has in a way the dignity of an Idea of his own, and it is essential to the Idea of mankind that it present itself in individuals of peculiar significance. So in the works of the ancients we find the beauty they clearly grasped expressed not through a

single figure but through many, bearing different character, as if always taken from another side. Accordingly it is presented differently in Apollo, differently in Bacchus, differently in Hercules, differently in Antinous. Indeed the characteristic can limit the beautiful, and finally even come out as far as ugliness, in the drunken Silenus, in the Faun and so on. But when the characteristic goes as far as an actual canceling of the character of the species, that is, to the unnatural, it becomes caricature.—Still less than beauty may grace be impaired by the characteristic. Whatever posture and motion the expression of character requires, it must still be carried out in the way that suits the person best, is fittest and easiest. Not only the sculptor and painter will observe this, but also every good actor. Otherwise caricature arises here too, as distortion, dislocation.

In sculpture, beauty and grace remain the main thing. The real character of the spirit, coming out in emotion, passion, the interplay of knowing and willing, and presentable only through expression of the face and gesture, is chiefly the property of painting. For although eyes and color, which lie outside the domain of sculpture, contribute much to beauty, they are far more essential still for character. Further, beauty unfolds itself more completely to contemplation from several standpoints, while expression, character, can be grasped perfectly from *one* standpoint also.

Since beauty is evidently the main aim of sculpture, *Lessing* tried to explain the fact that *Laocoön* does not cry out by saying that crying out cannot be combined with beauty. For Lessing this subject became the theme, or at least the starting point, of a book of its own, and much has been written about it before and after him. So I may be allowed to give my opinion on it here as an aside, although so special a discussion does not really belong in the course of our inquiry, which is directed throughout at the general.

46 That Laocoön, in the famous group, does not cry out is evident. The general, ever-recurring surprise at it must come from the fact that in his situation we would all cry out. Nature also demands it. In the most violent physical pain and the greatest bodily fear suddenly come on, all reflection that might bring about

a silent endurance is wholly driven out of consciousness, and nature relieves herself by crying out. In this she expresses pain and fear at once, calls the rescuer and frightens the attacker. Winckelmann already missed the expression of crying out. But in seeking to justify the artist he really made Laocoön into a Stoic, who thinks it not in keeping with his dignity to cry out secundum naturam, but puts on his pain the further useless constraint of gritting his teeth against its expression. Winckelmann therefore sees in him "the tried spirit of a great man, who wrestles with torments and seeks to suppress the expression of feeling and shut it up within himself. He does not break out into loud cries, as in Virgil, but only anxious sighs rise from him," and so on. (Works, vol. 7, p. 98.—The same at more length in vol. 6, p. 104 ff.) Lessing criticized this opinion of Winckelmann's in his Laocoön and improved on it in the way stated above. In place of the psychological ground he put the purely aesthetic one: that beauty, the principle of ancient art, does not allow the expression of crying out. Another argument he adds, that a wholly passing state, incapable of duration, may not be shown in the motionless work of art, has a hundred examples against it, of excellent figures held in quite fleeting motions: dancing, wrestling, catching and so on. Indeed Goethe, in the essay on Laocoön that opens the Propyläen (p. 8), holds the choice of just such a wholly passing moment to be absolutely necessary.—In our own days *Hirt* (Horen, 1797, tenth issue), tracing everything back to the highest truth of expression, decided the matter this way: Laocoön does not cry out because, being already about to die of choking, he can no longer cry out. Last, *Fernow* (Römische Studien, vol. 1, p. 426 ff.) discussed and weighed all three of those opinions, but added no new one himself, instead mediating and uniting the three.

I cannot help wondering that such thoughtful and sharp-sighted men laboriously fetch inadequate grounds from far off, and seize on psychological and even physiological arguments to explain a matter whose ground lies quite near and is at once evident to the unprejudiced. And I wonder especially that Lessing, who came so near the right explanation, still did not hit the real point.

Before any psychological or physiological inquiry whether Laocoön would cry out in his situation or not (which, for the rest, I would answer quite in the affirmative), it must be settled, in regard to the group, that crying out could not be shown in it, for the one reason that showing it lies wholly outside the domain of sculpture. One could not produce in marble a crying Laocoön, but only one tearing his mouth open and trying fruitlessly to cry out, a Laocoön whose voice has stuck in his throat, vox faucibus haesit. The nature of crying out, and so also its effect on the spectator, lies wholly in the sound, not in the gaping of the mouth. This latter phenomenon, which necessarily goes with crying out, must first be motivated and justified by the sound it produces. Then, as characteristic of the action, it is allowable, indeed necessary, even though it detracts from beauty. But in the visual arts, to which the presentation of the cry itself is wholly foreign and impossible, to present the violent means of crying out, the gaping of the mouth, which disturbs all the features and the rest of the expression, would really be foolish. For one would then bring before the eyes the means, which otherwise demands many sacrifices, while its purpose, the cry itself and its effect on the mind, would be missing. Indeed, what is more, one would produce the always ridiculous sight of an effort that has no effect. It is really comparable to the one a joker got for himself by stopping the watchman's horn tight with wax while he slept, then waking him with a cry of fire and enjoying his fruitless efforts to blow.—Where, on the other hand, the presentation of crying out lies within the domain of the presenting art, it is quite allowable, because it serves truth, that is, the complete presentation of the Idea. So in poetry, which calls on the imagination of the reader for the intuitive presentation. That is why in Virgil Laocoön cries like a bull that has torn loose after the ax has struck him. That is why Homer (Il., XX, 48–53) lets Mars and Minerva cry out quite terribly, without harm to their divine dignity or divine beauty. So too in the actor's art: Laocoön on the stage had to cry out. Sophocles also has Philoctetes cry out, and on the ancient stage he will really have cried out. As a quite similar case, I remember seeing in London the famous actor *Kemble*, in a play translated from the German, Pizarro, represent the American Rolla, a half-savage but of very noble character. Yet when he was

wounded he cried out loudly and violently, which had a great and excellent effect, since, as highly characteristic, it contributed much to the truth.—A silent crier, painted or in stone, on the other hand, would be far more ridiculous than painted music, which is already censured in Goethe's Propyläen. For crying out detracts far more from the rest of the expression and from beauty than music does. Music mostly occupies only hands and arms and is to be seen as an action characterizing the person, and so can quite properly be painted, as long as it requires no violent motion of the body or distortion of the mouth. Examples are Saint Cecilia at the organ, Raphael's violin player in the Sciarra Gallery at Rome, and others.—Because, then, owing to the limits of art, the pain of Laocoön could not be expressed by crying out, the artist had to put every other expression of it into motion. He did this in the highest perfection, as Winckelmann (Works, vol. 6, p. 104 ff.) describes so masterfully. His excellent description therefore keeps its full worth and truth, as soon as one leaves aside the Stoic frame of mind attributed to him [33].

47 Since beauty together with grace is the main subject of sculpture, it loves the nude, and tolerates clothing only so far as it does not hide the forms. It uses drapery not as a covering but as an indirect presentation of the form. This way of presenting occupies the understanding a great deal, since it reaches the intuition of the cause, namely the form of the body, only through the effect, the fall of the folds, which alone is directly given. So in sculpture drapery is in a way what foreshortening is in painting. Both are hints, but not symbolic ones. They are hints which, when they succeed, directly force the understanding to see the thing hinted at just as if it were really given.

Let me insert here, in passing, a comparison that concerns the speaking arts. A beautiful body is most advantageously visible with the lightest clothing, or none at all. So a very beautiful person, if he also had taste and were allowed to follow it, would most gladly go almost naked, dressed only in the manner of the ancients.—In the same way every beautiful mind, rich in thoughts, will always express itself in the most natural, most unreserved and simplest way,[34] This episode too has received its supplement in chapter 36 of the second volume.

striving, wherever it is possible, to communicate its thoughts to others, so as to ease the loneliness he must feel in a world like this. Conversely, poverty of mind, confusion and crookedness will clothe themselves in the most far-fetched expressions and the darkest phrases. In this way they wrap small, tiny, sober or everyday thoughts in difficult and pompous phrases. They are like the person who, because the majesty of beauty is lacking in him, wants to make up for this lack by clothing, and tries to hide the pettiness or ugliness of his person under barbarous finery, tinsel, feathers, ruffs, puffs and cloak. As embarrassed as such a person would be if he had to go naked, so would many an author be if he were forced to translate his so pompous, dark book into its small, clear content.

48 Besides beauty and grace, *history painting* has character as its main subject. By character is meant here the presentation of the will at the highest level of its objectification, where the individual, as the bringing out of a particular side of the Idea of mankind, has a peculiar significance, and makes this known not by shape alone but by action of every kind and by the modifications of knowing and willing that cause and accompany it, visible in mien and gesture. If the Idea of mankind is to be presented in this scope, the unfolding of its many-sidedness in significant individuals must be brought before the eyes. And these in turn can be made visible in their significance only through varied scenes, events and actions. History painting solves this infinite task by bringing before the eyes scenes of life of every kind, of great and slight significance. No individual and no action can be without meaning: in all of them and through all of them the Idea of mankind unfolds more and more. So no event of human life is to be excluded from painting. It is therefore a great wrong to the excellent painters of the Netherlandish school if one values only their technical skill, but otherwise looks down on them with contempt because they mostly presented objects from common life, while one holds only the incidents from world history or Bible history to be significant. One should first consider that the inner significance of an action is quite different from its outer significance, and that the two often go separately. The outer significance is the importance of an action with regard to its consequences for and in the real world, that is, according to the

principle of sufficient reason. The inner significance is the depth of insight into the Idea of mankind that the action opens up, by drawing into the light the more rarely appearing sides of that Idea. It does so by letting individualities that express themselves clearly and decidedly unfold their peculiarities, by means of aptly placed circumstances. Only inner significance counts in art; outer significance counts in history. The two are wholly independent of each other. They can occur together, but each can also appear alone. An action of the highest importance for history can be, in inner significance, a very ordinary and common one. And conversely a scene from everyday life can be of great inner significance, if in it human individuals, and human doing and willing, down to the most hidden folds, appear in a bright and clear light. Also, with very different outer significance, the inner can be the same. For example, it is all one to the inner whether ministers quarrel over the map about lands and peoples, or peasants in the tavern want to prove their right to each other over playing cards and dice. It is as much the same whether one plays chess with golden figures or with wooden ones. Besides, the scenes and events that make up the life of so many millions of people, their doings and goings, their need and their joy, are already for that reason important enough to be an object of art, and by their rich variety must give material enough for the unfolding of the many-sided Idea of mankind. Even the fleetingness of the moment that art has fixed in such a picture (today called a genre picture) arouses a faint, peculiar emotion. To hold the fleeting world, which ceaselessly changes its shape, in lasting pictures of single events that still stand for the whole, is an achievement of the painter's art. Through it painting seems to bring time itself to a standstill, by raising the single thing to the Idea of its species. Finally, the historical subjects of painting, with outward significance, often have the disadvantage that just what is significant in them cannot be presented intuitively, but has to be added in thought. In this respect the nominal meaning of the picture must in general be distinguished from the real one. The nominal one is the outer meaning, which only comes in as a concept. The real one is the side of the Idea of mankind that the picture reveals to intuition. For example, let the nominal one be Moses found by the Egyptian princess, a moment of the highest importance for history. The

real meaning, on the other hand, what is actually given to intuition, is a foundling rescued from his floating cradle by a distinguished woman, an incident which may have happened often. The costume alone can make that determinate historical case recognizable to the scholar. But costume counts only for the nominal meaning and is indifferent for the real one, for the latter knows only man as such, not arbitrary forms. Subjects taken from history have no advantage over those taken from mere possibility, which therefore are to be named not individually but only generally. For what is really significant in the former is not the individual, not the single event as such, but the general in it, the side of the Idea of mankind that expresses itself through it. On the other hand, determinate historical subjects are by no means to be rejected for that reason. Only, the really artistic view of them, in the painter as in the viewer, never goes to the individually single in them, which is what really makes up the historical, but to the general that expresses itself in them, to the Idea. Also, only such historical subjects are to be chosen where the main thing can really be presented and need not merely be added in thought. Otherwise the nominal meaning gets too far from the real one: what is merely thought in the picture becomes the most important and detracts from what is seen. Even on the stage it is no good for the main thing to happen behind the scene (as in French tragedy); in a picture it is obviously a still much greater fault. Historical subjects have a decidedly harmful effect only when they limit the painter to a field chosen arbitrarily, and not by the aims of art but by others. This is worst when the field is poor in picturesque and significant objects. An example is when it is the history of a small, isolated, stubborn people of a backwater, ruled hierarchically, that is, by delusion, and despised by the great contemporary peoples of the East and West, like the Jews.—Since the migration of peoples lies between us and all ancient peoples just as the former change of the sea bed lies between the present surface of the earth and that earlier one, whose organisms show themselves to us only fossilized, it is in general to be seen as a great misfortune that the people whose past culture was supposed to serve mainly as the base of ours were not, say, the Indians, or the Greeks, or even only the Romans, but precisely these Jews. It was especially an ill star for the painters of genius in Italy

in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that, in the narrow circle to which they were directed arbitrarily for the choice of subjects, they had to take up miseries of every kind. For the New Testament, in its historical part, is almost still less favorable to painting than the Old, and the history of martyrs and church teachers that follows it is quite an unlucky subject. Still, among the pictures whose subject is the historical or mythological side of Judaism and Christianity, we must distinguish greatly those in which the real, that is, the ethical spirit of Christianity is revealed to intuition by presenting men who are full of this spirit. These presentations are in fact the highest and most admirable achievements of the painter's art. Only the greatest masters of this art have succeeded in them, especially Raphael and Correggio, the latter above all in his earlier pictures. Paintings of this kind are really not to be counted among the historical ones at all. For mostly they show no event, no action. They are mere groupings of saints, of the Redeemer himself, often still as a child, with his mother, angels and so on. In their mien, especially the eyes, we see the expression, the reflection, of the most perfect knowledge, namely that which is not directed at single things but has grasped the Ideas perfectly, and so the whole nature of the world and of life. In them this knowledge, acting back on the will, does not, like that other knowledge, supply *motives* for it. On the contrary it has become a *quietive* of all willing. From it has come perfect resignation, which is the innermost spirit of Christianity as of Indian wisdom: the giving up of all willing, the turning back, the cancellation of the will and with it of the whole nature of this world, that is, redemption. So those masters of art, forever worthy of praise, expressed the highest wisdom intuitively through their works. And here is the summit of all art. Art has followed the will, in its adequate objectivity, the Ideas, through all levels, from the lowest, where causes move it, then where stimuli move it, and finally where motives move it in such varied ways and unfold its nature. Now it ends with the presentation of its free self-cancellation through the one great quietive that dawns on it from the most perfect knowledge of its own nature [35].

49 Everything we have said so far about art rests on the truth that the object of art, whose presentation is the artist's aim, and whose knowledge must therefore precede his work as its seed and origin, is an *Idea*, in Plato's sense, and absolutely nothing else. It is not the single thing, the object of ordinary grasp. Nor is it the concept, the object of rational thinking and science. Idea and concept have something in common, in that both, as unities, stand for a multiplicity of real things. Yet the great difference between the two will have become clear and evident enough from what was said about the concept in the first book and about the Idea in the [36] This passage presupposes the following book entirely for its understanding. present one. I do not claim at all that Plato too already grasped this difference purely. Rather, many of his examples of Ideas and his discussions of them apply only to concepts. We leave this aside, however, and go our own way, glad whenever we step on the track of a great and noble mind, but following not his footsteps but our own goal.—The *concept* is abstract, discursive, wholly indeterminate within its sphere and determinate only in its boundary. It is reachable and graspable by anyone who has only reason, communicable by words without further mediation, and can be exhausted entirely by its definition. The *Idea*, on the other hand, which can at most be defined as the adequate representative of the concept, is thoroughly intuitive and, though it stands for an infinite number of single things, is nevertheless thoroughly determinate. The individual as such never knows it, but only the one who has raised himself above all willing and all individuality to the pure subject of knowing. So it is reachable only by the man of genius, and then by one who is, through a heightening of his pure power of knowledge (mostly caused by the works of genius), in a mood of genius. It is therefore not communicable absolutely, but only conditionally. For the Idea, grasped and repeated in the work of art, speaks to each person only in proportion to his own intellectual worth. That is why the most excellent works of every art, the noblest products of genius, must forever remain books closed to the dull majority of men and inaccessible to it, separated from it by a wide gulf, just as the company of princes is inaccessible to the mob. The shallowest, it is true, also let the acknowledged great works pass on authority, so as not to betray their own weakness. But in

silence they stay ready to pronounce their sentence of condemnation on them, as soon as they are allowed to hope that they can do so without exposing themselves. Then their long-suppressed hatred of everything great and beautiful, which never spoke to them and so humbled them, and of its authors, joyfully vents itself. For in general, to recognize and honor another's worth willingly and freely, one must have worth of one's own. On this is founded the necessity of modesty in all merit, and also the disproportionately loud fame of this virtue. Alone among all its sisters, it is added to his praise every time by anyone who dares to praise a man distinguished in any way, in order to reconcile and quiet the anger of worthlessness. What else is modesty but feigned humility, by which, in a world bristling with base envy, one wants to beg from those who have none the forgiveness for one's merits and excellences? For whoever claims none for himself, because he really has none, is not modest but only honest.

The *Idea* is the unity that has fallen apart into multiplicity by the form of time and space of our intuitive apprehension. The *concept*, on the other hand, is the unity restored out of multiplicity by the abstraction of our reason. It can be called unitas post rem, and the Idea unitas ante rem. Finally, the difference between concept and Idea can also be expressed by a comparison. The concept is like a dead container in which what one has put in really lies side by side, but from which no more can be taken out (by analytic judgments) than one has put in (by synthetic reflection). The Idea, on the other hand, develops in the one who has grasped it representations that are new in relation to the concept of the same name. It is like a living organism, developing, endowed with the power of generation, which brings forth what was not packed into it.

By all that has been said, the concept, however useful it is for life, and however usable, necessary and productive for science, is forever unfruitful for art. The Idea grasped, on the other hand, is the true and only source of every genuine work of art. In its strong originality it is drawn only from life itself, from nature, from the world, and only by the true man of genius, or by one who is for the moment inspired up to genius. Only from such direct conception do genuine works arise, which carry immortal life in them. Just because the Idea is and stays intuitive, the artist is not conscious in abstracto of the intention and

aim of his work. Not a concept but an Idea hovers before him. So he cannot give an account of what he does. He works, as people put it, from mere feeling and unconsciously, even by instinct. Imitators, mannerists, imitatores, servum pecus, on the other hand, start in art from the concept. They note what pleases and works in genuine works, make it clear to themselves, grasp it in the concept, that is, abstractly, and then imitate it, openly or covertly, with clever deliberateness. Like parasitic plants they suck their nourishment from the works of others, and like polyps they take on the color of their food. Indeed, going further in comparison, one could claim that they are like machines which chop up very fine what is put into them and mix it together, but can never digest it, so that the foreign components can still be found again and picked out and separated from the mixture. The man of genius alone, by contrast, is like the organic body that assimilates, transforms and produces. For he is, indeed, trained and formed by his predecessors and their works, but he is made fruitful only by life and the world itself, directly, through the impression of the intuitive. So even the highest education never harms his originality. All imitators, all mannerists grasp the nature of the exemplary achievements of others in the concept. But concepts can never give a work inner life. The age, that is, the dull crowd of each time, itself knows only concepts and sticks to them. It therefore receives mannered works with quick and loud applause. But the same works are already unenjoyable after a few years, because the spirit of the age, that is, the ruling concepts, on which alone they could be rooted, has changed. Only the genuine works, drawn directly from nature and life, stay, like these themselves, forever young and always strongly original. For they belong to no age, but to mankind. And just as, for this very reason, they were received coolly by their own age, whose fashions they scorned to cling to, and were recognized late and unwillingly, because they uncovered indirectly and negatively that age's particular error, so for the same reason they cannot grow old. They speak, even in the latest time, still fresh and always new. Then they are also no longer exposed to being overlooked and misjudged. They stand crowned and sanctioned by the applause of the few minds capable of judging, who appear singly and sparsely through the centuries [37] and cast their votes. The slowly growing sum of

these votes founds the authority which alone is that judgment seat one means when one appeals to posterity. It is those successively appearing individuals alone. For the mass and multitude of posterity will always be as perverse and dull as the mass and multitude of contemporaries always was and always is.—Read the complaints of great minds, from every century, about their contemporaries. They always sound as if from today, because the human race is always the same. At every time and in every art, mannerism takes the place of spirit, which is always the property of individuals only. And mannerism is the old, cast-off dress of the last appearance of spirit that existed and was recognized. By all this, as a rule, the applause of posterity is won only at the cost of the applause of contemporaries, and conversely [38].

50 If the aim of all art is the communication of the Idea grasped, which, in just such mediation through the spirit of the artist, where it appears cleaned of everything foreign and isolated, now becomes comprehensible even to one who has weaker receptiveness and no productivity; and if, further, starting from the concept is objectionable in art, then we cannot approve when a work of art is deliberately and avowedly meant to express a concept. This is the case in *allegory*. An allegory is a work of art that means something other than what it presents. But the intuitive, and so the Idea too, speaks itself directly and wholly perfectly, and needs no mediation of something else to hint at it. What, then, in [39] Apparent rari, nantes in gurgite vasto.

40 On this see chapter 34 of the second volume. this way, by something quite different, is hinted at and represented, because it cannot itself be brought before intuition, is always a concept. By allegory, therefore, a concept is always to be designated, and so the spirit of the viewer is to be led away from the intuitive representation presented to a quite different, abstract, non-intuitive one, which lies wholly outside the work of art. Here, then, picture or statue is supposed to do what writing does, only much more perfectly. What we declare to be the aim of art, the presentation of the Idea, which can be grasped only intuitively, is not the aim here. For what is intended here no great perfection of the work of art is required at all. It is enough that one sees what the thing is meant to be, since as

soon as that is found the purpose is reached, and the spirit is now led to a quite different kind of representation, an abstract concept, which was the aim set. Allegories in the visual arts are therefore nothing other than hieroglyphs. The artistic worth they may otherwise have as intuitive presentations does not come to them as allegories but from elsewhere. That the Night by Correggio, the Genius of Fame by Hannibal Caracci, the Hours by Poussin are very beautiful pictures is quite to be separated from their being allegories. As allegories they do no more than an inscription, indeed rather less. We are reminded here again of the distinction made above between the real and the nominal meaning of a picture. The nominal one here is just the allegorical as such, for example the Genius of Fame. The real is what is actually presented: here a beautiful winged youth, with beautiful boys flying around him. This expresses an Idea. But this real meaning works only as long as one forgets the nominal, allegorical one. If one thinks of this, one leaves intuition, and an abstract concept occupies the spirit. And the passage from the Idea to the concept is always a fall. Indeed that nominal meaning, that allegorical intention, often does harm to the real meaning, the intuitive truth. So, for example, the unnatural lighting in the Night by Correggio, which, however beautifully executed, is motivated merely allegorically and is impossible in reality. So if an allegorical picture also has artistic worth, this is quite separate and independent of what it does as allegory. Such a work of art serves two purposes at once, namely the expression of a concept and the expression of an Idea. Only the latter can be an aim of art. The other is a foreign aim, the playful amusement of making a picture at the same time do the service of an inscription, as a hieroglyph, invented for the sake of those whom the real nature of art can never speak to. It is the same as when a work of art is at the same time a useful tool, where it also serves two purposes: for example a statue that is at the same time a candelabrum or a caryatid, or a bas-relief that is at the same time the shield of Achilles. Pure friends of art will approve neither the one nor the other. An allegorical picture can, it is true, make a lively impression on the mind precisely in this character. But under the same circumstances an inscription would work the same. For example, suppose the wish for fame is lastingly and firmly rooted in a man's mind, and he even looks on fame as his

rightful property, which is withheld from him only so long as he has not yet produced the documents of his possession. And suppose he now steps before the Genius of Fame with his laurel crowns. Then his whole mind is stirred by it, and his strength is called to activity. But the same would happen if he suddenly saw the word "Fame" large and clear on the wall. Or suppose a man has made known a truth that is important either as a statement for practical life or as an insight for science, but has found no belief. Then an allegorical picture showing Time lifting the veil and letting naked Truth be seen will work powerfully on him. But the motto "Le tems découvre la vérité" would do the same. For what really works here is always only the abstract thought, not what is seen.

If, then, as said, allegory in the visual arts is a faulty effort, serving a purpose wholly foreign to art, it becomes quite intolerable when it leads so far that the presentation falls into silliness through forced and violently dragged-in interpretations. Examples are a tortoise to hint at feminine reserve; Nemesis looking down into the bosom of her garment, hinting that she also sees into what is hidden; and Bellori's interpretation that Hannibal Caracci clothed Voluptuousness in a yellow garment because he meant to hint that her joys soon wither and turn yellow as straw.—Now when there is no connection at all, founded on subsumption under the concept or on association of ideas, between what is presented and the concept hinted at, but sign and thing signified are linked wholly by convention, by a positive rule that arose by chance, then I call this variety of allegory *symbol*. So the rose is a symbol of secrecy, the laurel a symbol of fame, the palm a symbol of victory, the shell a symbol of pilgrimage, the cross a symbol of the Christian religion. To this belong also all hints directly by mere colors, such as yellow as the color of falseness and blue as the color of fidelity. Such symbols may often be useful in life, but their worth is foreign to art. They are to be regarded quite as hieroglyphs, or even as Chinese writing by words, and really stand in one class with coats of arms, with the bush that indicates an inn, with the key by which one recognizes chamberlains, or the leather by which one recognizes miners.—Finally, when certain historical or mythical persons, or personified concepts, are made recognizable by symbols fixed once for all, these would properly be called *emblems*. Such are the animals

of the Evangelists, the owl of Minerva, the apple of Paris, the anchor of hope and so on. Meanwhile by emblems people mostly mean those pictorial, simple presentations explained by a motto, which are supposed to illustrate a moral truth, and of which there are large collections by J. Camerarius, Alciatus and others. They make the transition to poetic allegory, which will be discussed further below.—Greek sculpture appeals to intuition, therefore it is *aesthetic*. Hindostanee sculpture appeals to the concept, therefore it is merely *symbolic*.

This judgment on allegory, founded on our considerations so far about the inner nature of art and closely connected with them, is directly opposed to the view of Winckelmann. Far from declaring allegory, as we do, to be something wholly foreign to the aim of art and often disturbing it, he speaks for it everywhere. He even (Works, vol. 1, p. 55 ff.) puts the highest aim of art in the "presentation of general concepts and non-sensory things." It may be left to everyone to join one view or the other. Only, in these and similar views of Winckelmann's, touching the real metaphysics of the beautiful, the truth became very clear to me that one can have the greatest receptiveness and the most correct judgment about the beauty of art, and yet not be able to give an abstract and properly philosophical account of the nature of the beautiful and of art. In just the same way one can be very noble and virtuous, and have a very delicate conscience that decides single cases with the accuracy of a gold balance, and yet not be able for that reason to fathom philosophically the ethical significance of actions and set it out in abstracto.

Allegory has quite a different relation to *poetry* than to the visual arts. Though objectionable in the latter, in poetry it is quite allowable and serves its purpose. For in the visual arts it leads from the given intuitive, the real object of all art, to abstract thoughts. In poetry the relation is the other way round. Here what is directly given in words is the concept, and the nearest aim is always to lead from this to the intuitive, whose presentation the imagination of the hearer must take over. If in the visual arts one is led from what is directly given to something else, this must always be a concept, because here only the abstract cannot be directly given. But a concept may never be the origin of a work of art, nor its communication the aim. In poetry, on the other hand, the concept is the mate-

rial, what is directly given, which can therefore very well be left in order to call up a wholly different intuitive thing in which the goal is reached. In the context of a poem some concept or abstract thought may be indispensable which nevertheless in itself and directly is capable of no intuitiveness. It is then often brought to intuitiveness by some example to be subsumed under it. This already happens in every figurative expression, and in every metaphor, simile, parable and allegory, which differ only in the length and fullness of their presentation. In the speaking arts, similes and allegories are therefore of excellent effect. How beautifully Cervantes says of sleep, to express that it withdraws us from all mental and bodily suffering, "it is a cloak that covers the whole man." How beautifully Kleist expresses allegorically the thought that philosophers and researchers enlighten the human race, in the verse:

"Those whose nightly lamp lights up the whole globe." How strongly and vividly Homer describes Ate, the bringer of ruin, when he says: "She has tender feet, for she does not step on the hard ground, but only walks on the heads of men" (Il., XIX, 91). How powerfully the fable of Menenius Agrippa about the stomach and the limbs worked on the Roman people who had walked out of the city. How beautifully Plato's allegory of the cave, which I mentioned earlier, at the beginning of the seventh book of the Republic, expresses a highly abstract philosophical doctrine. The fable of Persephone should likewise be seen as a profound allegory with a philosophical point: by tasting a pomegranate in the underworld she falls into its power. This becomes especially clear in the treatment of the fable that Goethe worked into the Triumph of Sensibility as an episode, a treatment beyond all praise. I know of three extended allegorical works. One is open and avowed: the incomparable Criticon of Balthasar Gracian, a large, rich web of linked and highly ingenious allegories. Here they serve as a cheerful dress for moral truths, and by that very means he gives those truths the greatest intuitiveness, and the richness of his inventions amazes us. The other two are hidden: Don Quixote and Gulliver in Lilliput. Don Quixote is an allegory of the life of every person who does not, like others, care only about his personal welfare, but pursues an objective, ideal aim that has taken hold of his thinking and willing. Of course this makes him

look odd in this world. With Gulliver you only need to take everything physical as spiritual, and you will see what the satirical rogue, as Hamlet would call him, meant by it.—In poetic allegory, then, the concept is always what is given, and the allegory wants to make it intuitive by means of a picture. Sometimes a painted picture may express it or support it. Even so, that picture is not regarded as a work of the visual arts, but only as a meaningful hieroglyph. It makes no claim to pictorial value, only to poetic value. Lavater's fine allegorical vignette is of this kind, and it must hearten every noble champion of truth: a hand holding a light is stung by a wasp, while above, gnats burn themselves in the flame. Underneath is the motto:

"And though it singes the gnat's wing, and bursts its skull and all its little brain, light stays light; and even if the fiercest wasp stings me, I still will not let it go."

The gravestone with the snuffed-out, smoking candle and the inscription also belongs here:

"When it's all over, it will show whether it was a tallow candle or a wax candle."—

Finally, an old German family tree is of this kind. On it, the last offshoot of a family with a long line of ancestors expressed his decision to end his life in complete abstinence and chastity, and so let his line die out. He did it by having himself drawn at the root of the many-branched tree, cutting off the tree above him with a pair of scissors. In general, the symbolic pictures I mentioned above, usually called emblems, belong here. One could also describe them as short painted fables with the moral stated.—Allegories of this kind always count as poetic, not pictorial, and that is exactly what justifies them. Here too the execution of the picture always stays secondary, and nothing more is asked of it than that it show the subject recognizably. But in poetry, just as in the visual arts, allegory turns into symbol when the only link between what is shown to the senses and the abstract thing it stands for is an arbitrary one. Basically everything symbolic rests on agreement. So the symbol has this drawback, among others: its meaning is forgotten over time, and then it falls completely silent. Who would guess, if he did not know it, why the fish is a symbol of Christianity? Only a Champollion could, because it is a phonetic hieroglyph

through and through. So today the Revelation of John, as a poetic allegory, stands about where the reliefs with magnus Deus sol Mithra stand, which people still go on interpreting [41].

51 Now, in our study of art in general, we turn from the visual arts to *poetry*. We cannot doubt that poetry too aims to reveal the Ideas, the grades of the objectification of the will, and to pass them on to the listener with the clearness and liveliness with which the poet's mind grasped them. Ideas are essentially intuitive. In poetry, what words pass on directly is only abstract concepts. But the aim is plainly that the listener should perceive the Ideas of life in the representatives of these concepts, and this can happen only with the help of his own imagination. To set the imagination moving as this aim requires, the abstract concepts, which are the direct material of poetry as well as of the driest prose, must be put together so that their spheres cut across one another. Then none of them can stay in its abstract universality. Instead, an intuitive representative appears before the imagination, and the poet's words keep modifying it further, as he intends. A chemist mixes perfectly clear and transparent liquids and gets solid precipitates. In the same way the poet knows how to precipitate, so to speak, the concrete, the individual, the intuitive representation, out of the abstract, transparent universality of concepts,[42] See Chap. 36 of the second volume. by the way he combines them. For the Idea is known only intuitively, and knowledge of the Idea is the aim of all art. Mastery in poetry, as in chemistry, makes one able to get exactly the precipitate one intends, every time. The many epithets in poetry serve this purpose. They narrow the universality of each concept more and more, until it becomes intuitive. Homer adds an adjective to almost every noun. The concept of the adjective cuts across the sphere of the first concept and at once makes it considerably smaller, so that it comes much closer to intuition. For example:

Εν δ' επεσ' Ωκεανῳ λαμπρον φαος ἠελιοιο, Ἑλκον νυκτα μελαιναν επι ζειδωρον αρουραν.

(Occidit vero in Oceanum splendidum lumen solis, Trahens noctem nigram super almam terram.)

And the lines "A gentle wind blows from the blue sky, the myrtle stands quiet and the laurel tall," precipitate the whole delight of the southern climate before the imagination out of a few concepts.

Rhythm and rhyme are a quite special aid of poetry. I can give no other explanation of their incredibly strong effect than this: our powers of imagination are essentially bound to time, and this has given us a peculiarity by which we inwardly follow every regularly repeating sound and, as it were, join in with it. So rhythm and rhyme do two things. First, they bind our attention, since we follow the recital more willingly. Second, they produce in us a blind agreement with what is recited, which comes before any judgment. This gives the recited material a certain emphatic power of conviction, independent of any reasons.

Poetry uses concepts to pass on the Ideas, and concepts are general. Because its material is so general, the field of poetry is very large. The whole of nature, the Ideas of every grade, can be presented through it. It proceeds according to the Idea to be passed on: sometimes by describing, sometimes by narrating, sometimes by presenting directly as drama. In presenting the lower grades of the objectivity of the will, the visual arts mostly do better than poetry, because nature without knowledge, and even merely animal nature, shows almost its whole being in a single well-chosen moment. Man is different. He expresses himself not just through his bare shape and the look on his face, but through a chain of actions and the thoughts and emotions that go with them. In this respect man is the main subject of poetry, and no other art equals poetry there, because it has the advantage of progression, which the visual arts lack.

So the great subject of poetry is to reveal the Idea that is the highest grade of the objectivity of the will, and to present man in the connected series of his strivings and actions.—It is true that experience and history also teach us to know man. But they more often teach us to know men than man. That is, they give more empirical information about how people behave toward one another, from which rules for one's own conduct follow, than they give deep looks into the inner being of man. Still, this deeper insight is by no means shut out from them. But whenever it is the being of humanity itself that opens up to us in history or in our own experience, then we, in the one case, and the historian, in

the other, have already grasped it with an artist's eyes, already poetically—that is, according to the Idea, not the appearance, according to the inner being, not the relations. Our own experience is an unavoidable condition for understanding poetry, and history as well. For it is, so to speak, the dictionary of the language that both speak. History stands to poetry as portrait painting stands to history painting. History gives what is true in the particular, poetry what is true in the universal. History has the truth of the appearance, and can document it from the appearance itself. Poetry has the truth of the Idea, which is found in no single appearance and yet speaks out of all of them. The poet chooses, and purposely presents, significant characters in significant situations. The historian takes both as they come. Indeed, he must not look at events and persons, or choose them, by their inner, genuine significance, which expresses the Idea. He must go by their outer, apparent, relative significance, the importance they have for the connection of events and for their consequences. He may consider nothing in and for itself, by its essential character and expression. He has to consider everything by its relation, in the chain of events, in its influence on what follows, and above all on his own age. So he will not pass over an action of a king that is of little significance, even common in itself, because it has consequences and influence. On the other hand, actions of individuals that are in themselves highly significant, and even very distinguished individuals, are not for him to mention if they have no consequences and no influence. For his way of looking follows the principle of sufficient reason, and takes hold of the appearance, whose form this principle is. But the poet grasps the Idea, the being of humanity, outside all relation and outside all time: the adequate objectivity of the thing in itself at its highest grade. Now, even in the way of looking that the historian needs, the inner being, the significance of the appearances, the kernel of all those shells, can never be wholly lost. At least someone who looks for it can still find and recognize it. Still, what is significant in itself and not in relation, the real unfolding of the Idea, will be found far more correctly and clearly in poetry than in history. So, paradoxical as it sounds, we must credit poetry with much more real, genuine, inner truth than history. For the historian is supposed to follow the individual event exactly as it is in life, as it

develops in time along the many tangled chains of grounds and consequences. But he cannot possibly have all the data for this, or have seen everything or found out everything. Every moment the original of his picture leaves him, or a false one is slipped in for it. This happens so often that I think I may assume there is more falsehood than truth in all history. The poet, on the other hand, has grasped the Idea of humanity from some particular side, the one he is just about to present. What objectifies itself to him in that Idea is the being of his own self. His knowledge, as I explained above when discussing sculpture, is half a priori. His model stands before his mind, firm, clear, brightly lit, and cannot leave him. So in the mirror of his mind he shows us the Idea pure and clear, and his portrayal is true to life itself, down to the smallest detail [43]. The great historians of antiquity are therefore poets in particular points where the data leave them, for example in the speeches of their heroes. Indeed, their whole way of handling the material comes close to the epic. This gives their accounts unity, and lets them keep inner truth even where outer truth was not open to them or was even falsified. A moment ago we compared history to portrait painting, as opposed to poetry, which would correspond to history painting. In that comparison we find that the ancient historians also follow Winckelmann's saying that a portrait should be the ideal of the individual. They present the particular in such a way that the side of the Idea of humanity that speaks in it comes forward. The modern historians, with few exceptions, mostly give only "a rubbish barrel and a lumber room, and at most a grand drama of state".—So whoever wants to know [44] It goes without saying that throughout I speak only of the rare, great, genuine poet, and that I mean nobody less than that stale crowd of mediocre poets, rhyme-smiths and inventors of fairy tales, which flourishes so rankly, especially in Germany today, and into whose ears people should shout without ceasing from every side:

Mediocribus esse poëtis Non homines, non Di, non concessere columnae.

It deserves serious thought how much of their own and other people's time and paper this swarm of mediocre poets wastes, and how harmful their influence is. The public always grabs for what is new, and it also has a natural liking for what is perverse and flat, because that is more like itself. So the works of the mediocre

pull the public away from the genuine masterpieces and from its own education through them, and hold it back. They thus work directly against the good influence of men of genius, spoil taste more and more, and so slow the progress of the age. So criticism and satire should whip the mediocre poets without any indulgence or pity, until, for their own good, they are brought to spend their leisure reading good things rather than writing bad ones.—For if the botching of the unqualified could throw even the gentle god of the Muses into such a rage that he could flay Marsyas, I do not see what mediocre poetry can base its claim to toleration on.

humanity, its inner being, which is the same in all appearances and developments, according to its Idea, will find that the works of the great, immortal poets hold up a much truer and clearer picture than historians ever can. Even the best historians are far from being the first as poets, and they do not have a free hand either. The relation between the two in this respect can also be shown by the following comparison. The mere, pure historian, who works from the data alone, is like a man with no knowledge of mathematics who comes across some figures by chance and finds out the proportions in them by measuring. What he finds out empirically is therefore burdened with all the flaws of the drawn figure. The poet, by contrast, is like the mathematician, who constructs those proportions a priori, in pure intuition, and states them not as the drawn figure actually has them, but as they are in the Idea that the drawing is supposed to make perceptible.—That is why Schiller says:

"What never and nowhere happened, that alone never grows old." When it comes to knowing the nature of humanity, I must even grant greater value to biographies, above all autobiographies, than to history proper, at least as history is usually written. For one thing, the data can be gathered more accurately and completely for biographies than for history. For another, in history proper it is not so much individual people who act as nations and armies. The few individuals who do appear are seen from such a distance, with so much around them and such a large retinue, and wrapped besides in stiff state robes or heavy, unbending armor, that it is truly hard to make out the human movement through all this. By contrast, a faithfully told life of one person, in a narrow cir-

cle, shows how people act in all their shades and forms: the excellence, virtue and even holiness of some individuals, the perversity, wretchedness and malice of most, the wickedness of a few. And in the respect we are looking at here, namely the inner meaning of what appears, it does not matter at all whether the things the action turns on, viewed relatively, are trifles or matters of weight, farms or kingdoms. All these things are without meaning in themselves, and they get meaning only through the fact, and only to the extent, that the will is moved by them. A motive has significance only through its relation to the will. The relation it has as a thing to other such things does not count at all. A circle one inch across and a circle 40 million miles across have exactly the same geometrical properties. In the same way the events and history of a village and those of a kingdom are essentially the same, and we can study humanity and come to know it in the one as in the other. It is also a mistake to think that autobiographies are full of deceit and pretense. Quite the opposite: lying (though possible anywhere) is perhaps harder there than anywhere. Pretense is easiest in mere conversation. Indeed, paradoxical as it sounds, it is already harder in a letter. There the person is left to himself, looks inward and not outward, finds it hard to bring what is foreign and far away close, and does not have before his eyes the measure of the impression he makes on the other. The other person, on the other hand, calm and in a mood different from the writer's, looks the letter over, reads it several times at different times, and so easily finds the hidden intention. We also come to know an author as a person most easily from his book, because all those conditions work even more strongly and lastingly there. And pretending in an autobiography is so hard that there is perhaps not a single one that is not, on the whole, truer than any other written history. A man who writes down his life surveys it as a whole and in its large lines. The particular becomes small, what was near moves away, what was far comes near again, and his regard for other considerations shrinks. He is sitting at confession with himself, and sat down to it of his own free will. The spirit of lying does not grip him so easily here. For in every person there is also a leaning toward truth, which has to be overcome first with every lie, and here it has taken up an unusually strong position. The relation between biography and

the history of nations can be made clear by the following comparison. History shows us humanity as a view from a high mountain shows us nature: we see much at once, wide stretches, great masses, but nothing becomes distinct, or recognizable in its whole real nature. A life of one person, told, shows us man as we know nature when we walk among its trees, plants, rocks and waters. Now landscape painting, in which the artist lets us look at nature through his eyes, makes it much easier for us to know nature's Ideas and to reach the state of pure, will-less knowing that this requires. In the same way, for presenting the Ideas that we can look for in history and biography, poetry has a great deal in its favor over both. For here too the man of genius holds up to us a clarifying mirror, in which everything essential and significant is brought together and set in the brightest light, while the accidental and foreign is left out [45].

The poet's task is to present the Idea of humanity. He can do this in one of two ways. In the first, the person presented is also the person presenting. This happens in lyric poetry, in the song proper, where the poet vividly perceives and describes only his own state. Because of its subject, a certain subjectivity is therefore essential to this kind of poetry.—In the other way, the person presented is quite different from the one presenting, as in all other kinds, where the presenter hides more or less behind what is presented and finally disappears entirely. In the romance, the presenter still expresses his own state somewhat through the tone and bearing of the whole. So the romance, though much more objective than the song, still has something subjective. This fades further in the idyll, much further in the novel, almost entirely in the epic proper, and in the drama it is gone down to the last trace. The drama is the most objective kind of poetry, in more than one respect the most perfect, and also the most difficult. For that very reason the lyric kind is the easiest. Art otherwise belongs only to the rare, genuine man of genius. But even a person who is not eminent on the whole can write a beautiful song, if, in fact, through [46] See Chap. 38 of the second volume. strong stimulation from outside, some enthusiasm raises his mental powers. For all it takes is a vivid perception of his own state in an excited moment. Many single songs, by individuals who otherwise stayed unknown, prove this. The German folk songs prove it especially, and in the

"Wunderhorn" we have an excellent collection of them. So do the countless love songs and other songs of the people in all languages. For catching the mood of the moment and embodying it in a song is the whole achievement of this kind of poetry. Even so, in the lyric poetry of genuine poets the inner life of all humanity is mirrored. Everything that millions of people, past, present and future, have felt and will feel in the same situations, because those situations keep recurring, finds its fitting expression there. Because those situations, by constant recurrence, stand there as lasting, just like humanity itself, and always call forth the same feelings, the lyric works of genuine poets stay true, effective and fresh through thousands of years. In general, the poet is the universal man. Everything that has ever moved any person's heart, everything that human nature, in any situation, brings forth out of itself, everything that dwells and broods somewhere in a human breast—that is his theme and his material, and so is all the rest of nature as well. So the poet can sing of sensual pleasure as well as of mysticism. He can be Anacreon or Angelus Silesius, write tragedies or comedies, portray the sublime or the base attitude, as his mood and calling lead him. So nobody may prescribe to the poet that he should be noble and sublime, moral, pious, Christian, or this or that, still less reproach him for being this and not that. He is the mirror of humanity, and he brings to its consciousness what it feels and does.

Let us now look more closely at the nature of the song proper. Let us take excellent and at the same time pure models as examples, not ones that already approach another kind in some way, such as the romance, elegy, hymn, epigram and so on. Then we will find that the particular nature of the song, in the narrowest sense, is this.—It is the subject of willing, that is, one's own willing, that fills the consciousness of the singer: often as a released, satisfied willing (joy), probably even more often as a held-back willing (sorrow), always as an emotion, a passion, a stirred state of mind. Alongside this, however, and at the same time, the sight of the surrounding nature makes the singer conscious of himself as the subject of pure, will-less knowing. The unshakable, blessed calm of this subject now stands in contrast to the pressure of willing, which is always restricted, always still needy. The feeling of this contrast, this interplay, is really

what the song as a whole expresses, and what makes up the lyric state in general. In this state, pure knowing comes toward us, as it were, to free us from willing and its pressure. We follow, but only for moments. Again and again willing, the memory of our personal aims, tears us away from calm contemplation. But again and again the next beautiful surrounding, in which pure will-less knowledge offers itself to us, draws us out of willing. So in the song and in the lyric mood, willing (the personal interest in aims) and the pure perception of the surroundings that present themselves are mixed together in a strange way. Connections between the two are sought and imagined. The subjective mood, the affection of the will, gives its color to the surroundings we perceive, and they in turn give theirs back to it as a reflection. The genuine song is the imprint of this whole state of mind, mixed and divided in this way.—To make this abstract analysis of a state very far from all abstraction easier to grasp through examples, one can take up any of Goethe's immortal songs. As especially clear for this purpose I will recommend only a few: "Shepherd's Lament," "Welcome and Farewell," "To the Moon," "On the Lake," "Autumn Feeling." The songs proper in the "Wunderhorn" are also excellent examples, quite especially the one that begins: "O Bremen, I must leave you now."—A comic and accurately aimed parody of the lyric character is a song by Voss that I find remarkable. In it he describes the feelings of a drunken lead roofer falling from a tower. As he falls past, he makes a remark that is quite foreign to his state, and so belongs to will-free knowledge: that the tower clock shows half past eleven. —Anyone who shares with me the view of the lyric state set out here will also grant that it is really the intuitive and poetic knowledge of the proposition I put forward in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason, and already mentioned in this work: that the identity of the subject of knowing with the subject of willing can be called the miracle κατ' ἐξοχην. So the poetic effect of the song in the end really rests on the truth of that proposition. As life goes on, those two subjects, or, to put it popularly, head and heart, move further and further apart. People increasingly separate their subjective feeling from their objective knowledge. In the child, both are still completely fused. It can hardly tell itself

apart from its surroundings, and blurs into them. In the youth, all perception first produces feeling and mood, and even mixes with it, as *Byron* puts it very beautifully:

I live not in myself, but I become Portion of that around me; and to me High mountains are a feeling [47].

That is precisely why the youth clings so much to the intuitive outer side of things. That is why he is fit only for lyric poetry, and only the man for dramatic. The old man can at most be imagined as an epic poet, like Ossian and Homer, because telling stories belongs to the character of old age.

In the more objective kinds of poetry, especially the novel, epic and drama, the aim, the revelation of the Idea of humanity, is reached mainly by two means: by a true and deeply conceived presentation of significant characters, and by inventing significant situations in which they unfold. For just as a chemist's job is not only to present the simple substances and their main compounds pure and genuine, but also to expose them to the influence of such reagents that make their peculiarities clearly and strikingly visible; [48] I do not live in myself alone; I become a part of what surrounds me, and to me high mountains are a feeling. in the same way the poet's job is not only to put significant characters before us, true and faithful as nature itself, but he must, so that we can recognize them, bring them into situations in which their peculiarities unfold completely and they present themselves distinctly, in sharp outlines. Such situations are therefore called significant situations. In real life and in history, chance only rarely brings about situations of this quality, and there they stand alone, lost and covered up by the mass of what is insignificant. What should set the novel, epic and drama apart from real life is the significance of the situations throughout, just as much as the grouping and choice of significant characters. In both, the strictest truth is an indispensable condition of their effect. A lack of unity in the characters, a contradiction in them with themselves or with the nature of humanity in general, and also impossibility, or improbability close to it, in the events, even if only in side circumstances, offend in poetry just as much as badly drawn figures, false perspective or faulty lighting do in painting. For there as here we demand the faithful mirror of life, of humanity, of the world, only

made clearer by the presentation and made significant by the grouping. The aim of all the arts is one: the presentation of the Ideas. Their essential difference lies only in which grade of the objectification of the will the Idea to be presented is, and this in turn decides the material of the presentation. So even the arts that are furthest apart can be explained by comparing them with each other. For example, to grasp fully the Ideas that express themselves in water, it is not enough to see it in a calm pond or an evenly flowing stream. Those Ideas unfold completely only when the water appears under all the circumstances and obstacles that act on it and make it show all its properties fully. That is why we find it beautiful when it plunges down, roars, foams, leaps up again, or breaks into spray as it falls, or finally, forced by artifice, shoots up as a jet. Showing itself differently under different circumstances, it still always faithfully keeps its character. It is just as natural for it to spurt upward as to lie at rest, mirroring. It is equally ready for the one as for the other, as soon as the circumstances occur. What the fountain-maker achieves with fluid matter, the architect achieves with rigid matter, and the epic or dramatic poet achieves exactly the same with the Idea of humanity. To unfold and make clear the Idea that expresses itself in the object of each art, the will objectifying itself at each grade, is the common aim of all the arts. The life of man, as it mostly shows itself in reality, is like water as it mostly shows itself, in pond and river. But in the epic, novel and tragedy, chosen characters are placed in circumstances in which all their peculiarities unfold, the depths of the human mind open up, and become visible in extraordinary and significant actions. This is how poetry objectifies the Idea of man, whose peculiarity is to present itself in highly individual characters.

Tragedy is to be seen as the peak of poetry, both for the greatness of its effect and for the difficulty of the achievement, and it is recognized as such. It is very significant for our whole inquiry, and well worth noting, that the aim of this highest poetic achievement is to present the terrible side of life. The nameless pain, the misery of humanity, the triumph of wickedness, the mocking rule of chance, and the hopeless fall of the just and the innocent are all put before us here. For in this lies a significant hint about the nature of the world and of exis-

tence. It is the conflict of the will with itself, which here, at the highest grade of its objectivity, unfolds most completely and comes forward terribly. It becomes visible in the suffering of humanity. This suffering is brought about partly by chance and error. They appear as rulers of the world, and because of a malice that goes as far as the look of intention, they are personified as fate. Partly it comes from humanity itself, through the crossing of individuals' strivings of will, through the wickedness and perversity of most. It is one and the same will that lives and appears in all of them, but its appearances fight against each other and tear each other to pieces. In one individual it comes forward powerfully, in another more weakly. Here it is brought to reflection more, there less, and softened by the light of knowledge. At last, in an individual, this knowledge, purified and raised by suffering itself, reaches the point where the appearance, the veil of Maya, no longer deceives him. He sees through the form of appearance, the principium individuationis. The egoism that rests on it dies away in that very act. Then the *motives*, so powerful until now, lose their power. In their place, the perfect knowledge of the nature of the world, acting as a *quietive* of the will, brings about resignation: giving up not just life, but the whole will to life itself. So in tragedy we see in the end the noblest, after long struggle and suffering, give up forever the aims they pursued so violently until then, and all the pleasures of life. Or they give up life itself, willingly and joyfully. The Constant Prince of Calderon is one; Gretchen in "Faust" is another; so is Hamlet, whom his Horatio would gladly follow, but who tells Horatio to stay and to draw breath, in pain, a while longer in this rough world, to clear up Hamlet's fate and to cleanse his memory. So too the Maid of Orleans and the Bride of Messina. They all die purified by suffering, that is, after the will to live in them has already died. In Voltaire's "Mohammed" this is even said in so many words in the closing words that the dying Palmira calls out to Mohammed: "The world is for tyrants: live, you!"—On the other hand, the demand for so-called poetic justice rests on a complete misunderstanding of the nature of tragedy, indeed of the nature of the world itself. It appears with boldness in all its flatness in the critiques that Dr. Samuel Johnson wrote on Shakespeare's individual plays, where he complains quite naively about the

constant neglect of it. Neglect there is, certainly. For what have the Ophelias, the Desdemonas, the Cordelias done to deserve their fates?—But only the flat, optimistic, Protestant-rationalist, or really Jewish view of the world will make the demand for poetic justice and find its own satisfaction in having it met. The true meaning of tragedy is the deeper insight that what the hero atones for is not his own particular sins, but original sin, that is, the guilt of existence itself:

Pues el delito mayor Del hombre es haber nacido.

(For the greatest guilt of man is that he was born.)

As Calderon puts it directly.

On the way tragedy is handled, I will allow myself only one remark. Presenting a great misfortune is the only thing essential to tragedy. But the many different ways in which the poet brings it about can be put under three kinds. It can happen through the extraordinary wickedness of a character, a wickedness that touches the farthest limits of what is possible, and this character becomes the author of the misfortune. Examples of this kind are Richard III, Iago in "Othello," Shylock in "The Merchant of Venice," Franz Moor, Euripides' Phaedra, Creon in "Antigone," and the like. It can also happen through blind fate, that is, chance and error. A true model of this kind is Sophocles' King Oedipus, and also the Women of Trachis, and in general most of the tragedies of the ancients belong here. Among the moderns, examples are "Romeo and Juliet," Voltaire's "Tancred," and "The Bride of Messina." Finally, the misfortune can also be brought about by the mere position of the persons toward one another, by their relationships. Then there is no need for a monstrous error, or an unheard-of accident, or a character that reaches the limits of humanity in wickedness. Instead, characters of the usual kind in moral terms, in circumstances that often occur, are set against each other so that their situation forces them, knowing and seeing, to cause each other the greatest harm, without the wrong lying wholly on any one side. This last kind seems to me far preferable to the other two. For it shows us the greatest misfortune not as an exception, not as something brought about by rare circumstances or monstrous characters, but as something that comes easily and of itself, almost as something essential, out of what people do and what they are like. In this way it brings the misfortune ter-

ribly close to us. In the other two kinds we see monstrous fate and horrible wickedness as terrible powers, but ones that threaten us only from a great distance, and which we might well escape without taking refuge in renunciation. The last kind shows us those powers that destroy happiness and life as ones whose road to us too is open at every moment. It shows the greatest suffering brought about by entanglements whose essentials our own fate could also take on, and by actions that we too might perhaps be capable of committing, and so could not complain of injustice. Then we feel with a shudder that we are already in the middle of hell. Carrying out a play of this last kind also has the greatest difficulty. In it you have to produce the greatest effect with the smallest outlay of means and moving causes, merely through their position and distribution. So in many of the best tragedies this difficulty is avoided. A perfect model of this kind is a play that in other respects is far surpassed by several others of the same great master: it is "Clavigo." "Hamlet" belongs here to some extent, if one looks only at his relation to Laertes and Ophelia. "Wallenstein" has this advantage too. "Faust" is wholly of this kind if one takes only the affair with Gretchen and her brother as the main action. So is Corneille's "Cid," except that it lacks the tragic ending, which the analogous relation of Max to Thekla does have [49].

52 We have now looked at all the fine arts, in the generality that suits our standpoint. We began with fine architecture, whose aim as such is to make clear the objectification of the will at the lowest grade of its visibility, where it shows itself as [50] See Chap. 37 of the second volume. a dull, knowledge-less, law-governed striving of mass, and yet already reveals self-division and conflict, namely between gravity and rigidity.—And we end our inquiry with tragedy, which at the highest grade of the objectification of the will brings before our eyes that very division of the will against itself, in terrible greatness and clarity. —Even so, we find that one fine art has remained outside our inquiry, and had to, since in the systematic order of our presentation there was no fitting place for it: it is *music*. It stands entirely apart from all the others. We do not recognize in it the copying, the repetition, of any Idea of the beings of the world. Yet

it is such a great and exceedingly glorious art, it works so powerfully on the innermost part of man, and it is understood there so completely and so deeply, as a quite universal language, whose clarity even surpasses that of the perceptual world itself, that we surely have more to look for in it than an exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi, which is what Leibniz declared it to be [51]. And yet he was quite right, as far as he looked only at its immediate and outer meaning, its shell. But if it were nothing more, then the satisfaction it gives would have to be like what we feel when a sum comes out right, and it could not be that deep joy with which we see the innermost part of our being brought to speech. So on our standpoint, where the aesthetic effect is what we are watching, we must grant music a much more serious and deeper meaning, one that relates to the innermost nature of the world and of our own self. In the light of this meaning, the numerical relations into which music can be resolved do not stand as what is signified, but themselves first as the sign. That music must stand to the world, in some sense, as a presentation to what is presented, as a copy to its model, we can conclude from the analogy with the other arts. All of them have this character, and the effect of music on us is on the whole of the same kind as theirs, only stronger, quicker, more necessary, more infallible.

52 Leibnitii epistolae, collectio Kortholti: ep. 154.

Also, the relation that music has to the world as a copy of it must be a very intimate one, infinitely true and accurately aimed, because everyone understands it at once, and it shows a certain infallibility in that its form can be traced back to quite definite rules, expressible in numbers, from which it cannot depart at all without ceasing to be music altogether.—Even so, the point of comparison between music and the world, the respect in which music stands to the world in a relation of imitation or repetition, lies very deeply hidden. People have practiced music in all ages without being able to give an account of this. Content to understand it immediately, they give up on understanding this immediate understanding itself in the abstract.

I gave my mind completely to the impression of music in its many forms. Then I came back to reflection and to the course of my thoughts as set out in this work. An insight came to me into music's inner nature, and into the kind of copy-relation to the world that, by analogy, we must necessarily presuppose for it. This insight is entirely sufficient for me myself and satisfies my inquiry. It will probably be just as clear to anyone who has followed me so far and agreed with my view of the world. But I recognize that proving it is essentially impossible. For it assumes and sets up a relation of music, as a representation, to what can essentially never be a representation, and it wants music to be regarded as a copy of a model that itself can never be directly represented. So all I can do is set out here, at the end of this third book, which is devoted mainly to the study of the arts, that insight into the wonderful art of tones which satisfies me. I must leave agreement or rejection of my view to the effect that music, on the one hand, and the whole single thought I have set out in this work, on the other, have on each reader. Besides, in order to give approval with real conviction to the account of the meaning of music that is to be given here, I think it necessary to listen to music often, with sustained reflection on it. And for this it is again required that one already be very familiar with the whole thought I have set out.

The adequate objectification of the will is the (Platonic) Ideas. The aim of all the other arts is to stir up the knowledge of these Ideas by presenting individual things (for works of art themselves are always such), which is possible only with a corresponding change in the knowing subject. So all of them objectify the will only indirectly, namely by means of the Ideas. And our world is nothing but the appearance of the Ideas in plurality, by entering into the principium individuationis (the form of the knowledge possible to the individual as such). Music, since it passes over the Ideas, is also quite independent of the appearing world, simply ignores it, and could in a way exist even if the world did not exist at all. That cannot be said of the other arts. For music is as *direct* an objectification and image of the whole *will* as the world itself is, indeed as the Ideas are, whose multiplied appearance makes up the world of individual things. So music is by no means, like the other arts, the image of the Ideas, but an *image of*

the will itself, whose objectivity the Ideas are too. That is precisely why the effect of music is so much more powerful and penetrating than that of the other arts: they speak only of shadows, but music speaks of the essence. Since it is the same will that objectifies itself both in the Ideas and in music, only in each of the two in a quite different way, there must be, though by no means any direct likeness, still a parallelism, an analogy, between music and the Ideas, whose appearance in plurality and imperfection is the visible world. Pointing out this analogy will serve as an illustration and make this explanation easier to understand, since the obscurity of the subject makes it difficult.

In the deepest notes of harmony, in the bass, I recognize again the lowest grades of the objectification of the will: inorganic nature, the mass of the planet. As is well known, all the high notes, which move easily and die away faster, are to be seen as arising from the side vibrations of the deep fundamental tone. When it sounds, they always ring softly along with it. It is a law of harmony that only those high notes may go with a bass note which really already sound together with it of themselves (its sons harmoniques) through the side vibrations. This is analogous to the fact that all bodies and organisms of nature must be seen as arising by gradual development out of the mass of the planet. This mass is their support and also their source, and the high notes stand in the same relation to the bass.—Depth has a limit, beyond which no tone can be heard any more. This corresponds to the fact that no matter can be perceived without form and quality, that is, without showing a force that cannot be explained any further, in which an Idea expresses itself. More generally, it corresponds to the fact that no matter can be wholly without will. So, just as a certain degree of pitch is inseparable from a tone as such, a certain degree of expression of will is inseparable from matter.—So for us the bass in harmony is what inorganic nature is in the world: the crudest mass, on which everything rests and out of which everything rises and develops.—Then, in all the supporting voices that produce the harmony, between the bass and the leading voice that sings the melody, I recognize the whole series of grades of the Ideas in which the will objectifies itself. The voices closer to the bass are the lower of those grades, the bodies that are still inorganic but already show themselves in many ways. The higher ones

represent to me the plant and animal worlds.—The definite intervals of the scale are parallel to the definite grades of the objectification of the will, to the definite species in nature. A departure from the arithmetical correctness of the intervals, by some temperament, or brought about by the chosen key, is analogous to the departure of the individual from the type of the species. Indeed, the impure discords that give no definite interval can be compared to monstrous freaks of birth between two animal species, or between man and animal.—Now all these bass and supporting voices that make up the *harmony* lack the coherence in progression that only the upper voice, the one singing the melody, has. It alone also moves quickly and lightly in modulations and runs, while all the others have only a slower motion, without a coherence existing in each of them on its own. The deep bass, the representative of the crudest mass, moves most heavily. Its rising and falling goes only in large steps, in thirds, fourths and fifths, never by one tone, unless it is a bass transposed by double counterpoint. This slow motion is also physically essential to it: a quick run or trill in the depths cannot even be imagined. The higher supporting voices, which run parallel to the animal world, move faster, but still without melodic coherence or meaningful progression. The disconnected course and the law-bound determination of all the supporting voices is analogous to the fact that in the whole unreasoning world, from the crystal to the most perfect animal, no being has a really connected consciousness that would make its life a meaningful whole. None experiences a succession of mental developments, none perfects itself through education. Everything stands there equally at every time as it is by its kind, determined by fixed law.—Finally, in the *melody*, in the high, singing main voice that leads the whole and, with unbound freedom, advances in an unbroken, meaningful coherence of *one* thought from beginning to end, presenting a whole, I recognize the highest grade of the objectification of the will: the deliberate life and striving of man. He alone, because he is gifted with reason, always looks forward and backward, at the path of his actuality and of the countless possibilities, and so completes a deliberate course of life that holds together as a whole. Corresponding to this, the *melody* alone has meaningful, purposeful coherence from beginning to end. So it tells the history of the will

lit by deliberation, whose imprint in actuality is the series of its deeds. But it says more: it tells the will's most secret history. It paints every stirring, every striving, every movement of the will, everything that reason gathers under the wide and negative concept of feeling and cannot take any further into its abstractions. That is why it has always been said that music is the language of feeling and passion, as words are the language of reason. Plato already defines it as ἡ των μελων κινησις μεμιμημενη, εν τοις παθημασιν ὁταν ψυχη γινηται (melodiarum motus, animi affectus imitans), De leg. VII, and Aristotle also says: δια τι οἱ ρυθμοι και τα μελη, φωνη ουσα, ηθεσιν εοικε; (cur numeri musici et modi, qui voces sunt, moribus similes sese exhibent?), Probl. c. 19.

The nature of man consists in this: his will strives, is satisfied, and strives anew, and so on without end. Indeed his happiness and well-being are only this: that the passage from wish to satisfaction, and from that to a new wish, goes forward quickly. For the failure of satisfaction is suffering, and the failure of a new wish is empty longing, languor, boredom. Corresponding to this, the nature of melody is a constant departure, a straying from the fundamental tone, by a thousand ways. It goes not only to the harmonic steps, to the third and the dominant, but to every tone, to the dissonant seventh and to the augmented intervals. But a final return to the fundamental tone always follows. On all those ways melody expresses the many-formed striving of the will, but also always, by finally finding a harmonic step again, and still more the fundamental tone, it expresses satisfaction. Inventing melody, and uncovering in it all the deepest secrets of human willing and feeling, is the work of the man of genius. His working here lies, more evidently than anywhere, far from all reflection and conscious intention, and could be called an inspiration. The concept is unfruitful here, as everywhere in art. The composer reveals the innermost being of the world and says the deepest wisdom, in a language that his reason does not understand. In the same way a magnetic somnambulist gives disclosures about things of which she has no concept when awake. So in a composer, more than in any other artist, the man is wholly separate from and different from the artist. Even in explaining this wonderful art the concept shows its poverty and its limits. Still, I will try to carry through our analogy.—Quick passage from

wish to satisfaction, and from that to a new wish, is happiness and well-being. So quick melodies, without large departures, are cheerful. Slow ones that fall into painful dissonances and find their way back to the fundamental tone only after many measures are sad, as analogous to delayed, hindered satisfaction. A delay of a new stirring of will, the languor, could have no other expression than the held fundamental tone, whose effect would soon be unbearable. Very monotonous, empty melodies already approach this. The short, easily grasped phrases of quick dance music seem to speak only of easily reached, common happiness. The Allegro maestoso, on the other hand, with its large phrases, long passages and wide departures, signifies a greater, nobler striving toward a distant goal, and its final attainment. The Adagio speaks of the suffering of a great and noble striving that scorns all petty happiness. But how wonderful is the effect of minor and major! How astonishing that the change of a half tone, the entry of the minor third in place of the major, at once and inevitably forces on us an anxious, painful feeling, from which the major then frees us just as instantly. In the minor the Adagio reaches the expression of the highest pain and becomes the most shattering lament. Dance music in the minor seems to signify missing a petty happiness that one should rather scorn, and seems to speak of reaching a low aim through toil and drudgery.—The inexhaustibility of possible melodies corresponds to the inexhaustibility of nature in the variety of individuals, faces and courses of life. The passage from one key into a quite different one, since it wholly cancels the connection with what went before, is like death, in that the individual ends in it. But the will that appeared in that individual lives on as before, appearing in other individuals, whose consciousness, however, has no connection with that of the first.

Yet in pointing out all these analogies we must never forget that music has no direct relation to them, only an indirect one. For it never expresses the appearance, but only the inner essence, the in-itself of all appearance, the will itself. So it does not express this or that single, definite joy, this or that sorrow, pain, horror, jubilation, merriment or peace of mind. It expresses *joy, sorrow, pain, horror, jubilation, merriment, peace of mind themselves*, in a way in the abstract, their essential part, without any extras, and so without the motives for them

too. Even so, we understand them completely in this extracted quintessence. This is why our imagination is so easily stirred by music, and tries to shape that invisible and yet so vividly moved spirit world which speaks to us quite directly, and to clothe it with flesh and bone, that is, to embody it in an analogous example. This is the origin of song with words and finally of opera.—For that very reason song with words and opera should never leave this subordinate place, to make themselves the main thing and music the mere means of their expression. That is a great mistake and a bad perversity. For everywhere music expresses only the quintessence of life and its events, never these themselves, whose differences therefore do not always enter into music. Just this universality, which belongs to it alone, together with the most exact definiteness, gives it the high value it has as the panacea of all our sufferings. So when music tries too much to tie itself to the words and to shape itself after the events, it is trying to speak a language that is not its own. No one has kept so clear of this fault as *Rossini*. That is why his music speaks its *own* language so clearly and purely that it does not need the words at all, and has its full effect even when played by instruments alone.

From all this we can see the appearing world, or nature, and music as two different expressions of the same thing. That thing is therefore the sole mediator of the analogy between the two, and we need to know it in order to see that analogy. So music, regarded as an expression of the world, is a language of the highest degree of generality. It even stands to the generality of concepts about as these stand to individual things. But its generality is by no means that empty generality of abstraction. It is of a quite different kind, and it is joined with a thoroughgoing, clear definiteness. In this it is like geometrical figures and numbers. These are the general forms of all possible objects of experience, applicable to all of them a priori, and yet they are not abstract but intuitive and thoroughly definite. All possible strivings, stirrings and expressions of the will, all those processes within man that reason throws into the wide negative concept of feeling, can be expressed by the infinitely many possible melodies. But always in the generality of mere form, without the content, always only according to the in-itself, not according to the appearance, as it were their innermost soul, without

body. From this intimate relation that music has to the true nature of all things we can also explain this: when fitting music sounds with any scene, action, event or surroundings, it seems to open up their most secret meaning to us and to appear as the most correct and clearest commentary on it. We can also explain why, for someone who gives himself up completely to the impression of a symphony, it is as if he saw all possible events of life and the world pass by him. Yet if he reflects, he can name no likeness between that play of tones and the things that hover before him. For music, as I said, differs from all the other arts in that it is not an image of the appearance, or more correctly of the adequate objectivity of the will, but directly an image of the will itself. So it presents the metaphysical to everything physical in the world, and the thing in itself to every appearance. One could therefore call the world embodied music just as well as embodied will. That explains why music makes every painting, indeed every scene of real life and of the world, at once stand out with heightened significance—the more so, of course, the more closely its melody is analogous to the inner spirit of the given appearance. On this rests the fact that a poem can be set to music as a song, or a perceptual presentation as a pantomime, or both as an opera. Such single pictures of human life, set under the general language of music, are never joined to it or matched with it by thoroughgoing necessity. They stand to it only in the relation of an arbitrary example to a general concept. In the definiteness of actuality they present what music says in the generality of mere form. For melodies are in a way, like general concepts, an abstraction from actuality. Actuality, that is, the world of individual things, supplies what is perceptual, the particular and individual, the single case, both to the generality of concepts and to the generality of melodies. But these two generalities are in a certain respect opposed to each other. Concepts contain only the forms first abstracted from intuition, the drawn-off outer shell of things, as it were, so they are really abstracts. Music, on the other hand, gives the innermost kernel that comes before all shaping, the heart of things. This relation could be put very well in the language of the Scholastics by saying: concepts are the universalia post rem, music gives the universalia ante rem, and actuality the universalia in re. Other examples, chosen just as arbitrarily, of the

general thing expressed in it could match the general meaning of a melody that goes with a poem to the same degree. That is why the same composition suits many verses, and also why there is the vaudeville. But that a relation between a composition and a perceptual presentation is possible at all rests, as I said, on the fact that both are only quite different expressions of the same inner nature of the world. When such a relation really is present in the single case, that is, when the composer has known how to say the stirrings of will that make up the kernel of an event in the general language of music, then the melody of the song, the music of the opera, is expressive. But the analogy the composer has found between those two must have come out of his direct knowledge of the nature of the world, unknown to his reason. It must not be an imitation mediated by concepts, made with conscious intention. Otherwise music does not express the inner nature, the will itself, but only imitates its appearance inadequately. All music that really imitates does this, for example Haydn's "The Seasons," and his "Creation" too in many places where appearances of the perceptual world are directly imitated. So do all battle pieces, which are to be wholly rejected.

The inexpressible inwardness of all music, which makes it pass before us as a paradise so utterly familiar and yet forever far away, so completely understandable and yet so inexplicable, rests on this: it reproduces all the stirrings of our innermost being, but entirely without the reality and far from its torment. In the same way, the seriousness that is essential to music, and that shuts the ridiculous out entirely from its own immediate territory, is to be explained by the fact that its object is not the representation, with regard to which deception and ridiculousness alone are possible. Its object is directly the will, and the will is essentially the most serious thing of all, since everything depends on it.—How rich in content and meaning its language is shows even in the repeat signs, together with the Da capo. In works in word-language these would be unbearable, but in music they are very fitting and pleasant. For to take it in fully, one must hear it twice.

In this whole account of music I have worked to make clear that in a language of the highest generality, in a uniform material, namely mere tones, and with the greatest definiteness and truth, music expresses the inner essence, the in-itself of the world, which, at its clearest expression, we think under the concept of will. Further, by my view and my aim, philosophy is nothing other than a complete and correct repetition and statement of the essence of the world, in very general concepts, since only in such concepts is an overview of that whole essence possible that is sufficient and applicable everywhere. So anyone who has followed me and entered into my way of thinking will not find it so very paradoxical when I say the following. Suppose one succeeded in giving a perfectly correct, complete explanation of music that went into the details, that is, a full repetition in concepts of what it expresses. That would at once also be a sufficient repetition and explanation of the world in concepts, or one exactly equivalent to it, and so would be true philosophy. And so we can parody the saying of Leibniz quoted above, which is quite correct from a lower standpoint, in the sense of our higher view of music, as follows: Musica est exercitium metaphysices occultum nescientis se philosophari animi. For scire, to know, everywhere means to have set down in abstract concepts. Now, by the many-times confirmed truth of Leibniz's saying, music, apart from its aesthetic or inner meaning, and considered merely outwardly and purely empirically, is nothing other than the means of grasping directly and in concreto larger numbers and more complex numerical relations that we can otherwise know only indirectly, by grasping them in concepts. So by uniting those two views of music, so different and yet both right, we can form a concept of the possibility of a philosophy of numbers, such as that of Pythagoras and also that of the Chinese in the Y-king. And then, in this sense, we can interpret that saying of the Pythagoreans which Sextus Empiricus (adv. Math., L. VII) quotes: τῳ αριθμῳ δε τα παντ' επεοικεν (numero cuncta assimilantur). And if we finally bring this view to our interpretation of harmony and melody above, we will find a mere moral philosophy without an explanation of nature, as Socrates wanted to introduce it, quite analogous to a melody without harmony, which Rousseau wanted exclusively. By contrast, a mere physics and metaphysics without ethics will corre-

spond to a mere harmony without melody.—Let me be allowed to attach to these incidental thoughts a few more remarks on the analogy of music with the appearing world. In the previous book we found that the highest grade of the objectification of the will, man, could not appear alone and torn away, but that the grades below him, and these in turn the lower ones, were presupposed. In the same way music, which objectifies the will directly just as the world does, is complete only in full harmony. To make its whole impression, the high, leading voice of the melody needs the accompaniment of all the other voices, down to the deepest bass, which is to be seen as the origin of them all. The melody itself enters into the harmony as an integral part, as the harmony does into it. And just as only in this way, in the full-voiced whole, music says what it aims to say, so the one will outside time finds its perfect objectification only in the full union of all the grades, which reveal its essence in countless degrees of heightened clarity.—The following analogy is also very remarkable. We saw in the previous book that, in spite of how all appearances of will adapt to each other with regard to the species, which gives rise to the teleological way of looking, there still remains between those appearances, as individuals, a conflict that cannot be canceled. It is visible at all grades of them, and makes the world a constant battlefield of all those appearances of the one and same will, whose inner contradiction with itself becomes visible in this way. Even for this there is something corresponding in music. A perfectly pure harmonic system of tones is impossible, not just physically but already arithmetically. The numbers themselves, by which the tones can be expressed, have irrationalities that cannot be resolved. No scale can even be worked out within which every fifth would stand to the fundamental tone as 2 to 3, every major third as 4 to 5, every minor third as 5 to 6, and so on. For if the tones are right to the fundamental tone, they are no longer right to each other. For example, the fifth would have to be the minor third of the third, and so on. The tones of the scale are like actors who have to play now this role, now that. So a perfectly correct music cannot even be thought, let alone carried out. Because of this, every possible music departs from perfect purity. It can only hide the dissonances that are essential

to it, by distributing them over all the tones, that is, by temperament. On this see Chladni's "Acoustics," § 30, and his "Short Survey of the Theory of Sound and Tone," p. 12 [53].

I could add much more about the way music is perceived: namely solely and entirely in and through time, with space wholly excluded, and also without the influence of knowledge of causality, that is, of the understanding. For [54] See Chap. 39 of the second volume. tones make the aesthetic impression already as an effect, without our going back to their cause, as we do in intuition.—I will not lengthen these considerations any further, though, since perhaps I have already been too detailed for some readers in this third book, or have gone too far into particulars. My aim, though, made it necessary, and people will disapprove of it all the less if they keep in mind the importance and high value of art, which is seldom recognized enough. Consider this. By our view, the whole visible world is only the objectification, the mirror of the will, accompanying it to its self-knowledge, and indeed, as we will soon see, to the possibility of its redemption. At the same time, the world as representation, when one considers it separately, tearing oneself loose from willing and letting it alone fill consciousness, is the most delightful and the only innocent side of life. So we have to see art as the higher heightening, the more perfect development, of all this. For art does essentially the very same thing as the visible world itself, only more concentrated, more completed, with intention and deliberation, and so it may, in the full sense of the word, be called the flower of life. If the whole world as representation is only the visibility of the will, then art is the making clear of this visibility. It is the camera obscura, which shows objects more purely and lets one see them and take them together better. It is the play within the play, the stage on the stage in "Hamlet."

The enjoyment of everything beautiful, the comfort that art gives, the enthusiasm of the artist that lets him forget the troubles of life, this one advantage of the man of genius over others, which alone makes up to him for the suffering that grows in equal measure with clarity of consciousness, and for the bleak loneliness among a race unlike himself—all this rests on the following, as will show itself further on: the in-itself of life, the will, existence itself, is a constant

suffering, and is partly wretched, partly terrible. The same thing, however, as representation alone, looked at purely, or repeated by art, free of torment, offers a significant spectacle. This purely knowable side of the world, and its repetition in some art, is the artist's element. He is held fast by the contemplation of the spectacle of the objectification of the will. He stays with it, does not tire of looking at it and repeating it in his work, and meanwhile pays the costs of staging this spectacle himself. That is, he himself is the will that objectifies itself in this way and remains in constant suffering. That pure, true and deep knowledge of the nature of the world now becomes an end in itself for him: he stays with it. So it does not become for him, as we will see in the next book with the saint who has reached resignation, a quietive of the will. It does not redeem him forever from life, but only for moments, and so is not yet for him the way out of life, but for now only a comfort in it—until his strength, heightened by it, grows tired of the play at last and takes hold of seriousness. As a symbol of this transition one can look at Raphael's St. Cecilia. So let us too turn to seriousness in the next book.

Book IV



Second consideration of *the world as will*:
Affirmation and denial of the will to life, once self-knowledge has been reached.
Tempore quo cognitio simul advenit, amor e medio supersurrexit. *Oupnek'hat*, studio Anquetil Duperron, vol. II, p. 216.

53 The last part of our inquiry announces itself as the most serious, because it concerns the actions of men. This is the subject that concerns everyone directly, that can be foreign or indifferent to nobody. It is so natural to man to relate everything else to it that in any connected inquiry he will always regard the part that bears on doing as the result of its whole content, at least so far as the content interests him. So he will give serious attention to this part, even if to no other.—In this respect, in the usual way of speaking, the part of our inquiry that now follows would be called practical philosophy, as opposed to the theoretical philosophy treated so far. In my opinion, however, all philosophy is always theoretical. It is essential to it, whatever the immediate object of the inquiry, to remain purely contemplative and to investigate, not to prescribe. To become practical, to guide conduct, to remake character, are old claims that philosophy should at last give up, now that its insight has matured. For here, where the value or worthlessness of an existence is at stake, where salvation or damnation is at stake, what decides is not philosophy's dead concepts but the innermost nature of man himself. It is the daimon that guides him, and that

did not choose him but is the one he himself has chosen, as Plato says. It is his intelligible character, as Kant puts it. Virtue is not taught, any more than genius is. Indeed, for virtue the concept is as unfruitful as it is for art, and can be used only as a tool. We would therefore be just as foolish to expect that our systems of morals and ethics would produce virtuous, noble and holy people, as to expect that our aesthetics would produce poets, sculptors and musicians.

Philosophy can nowhere do more than interpret and explain what is there. It can bring the essence of the world, which expresses itself in concreto, that is, as feeling, in a way everyone understands, into the clear, abstract knowledge of reason. But it must do this in every possible relation and from every point of view. In the three earlier books this was sought, in the generality that is proper to philosophy, from other points of view. In the same way, this book will look at the actions of man. This side of the world may well be found the most important of all, not only by subjective judgment, as I remarked a moment ago, but also by objective judgment. I will stay fully true to our approach so far. I will rely on what has been presented as a presupposition. And really, I will only develop the one thought that is the content of this whole work, as I have done so far with all other subjects, now in the same way with the actions of man. In that way I do the last thing I can to communicate it as completely as possible.

The point of view given and the way of treating it that I have announced already show that in this ethical book one should expect no precepts and no doctrine of duties. Still less will a general moral principle be given, a universal recipe, as it were, for producing all the virtues. We will also not talk of an "*unconditional ought*," because that, as explained in the Appendix, contains a contradiction. Nor will we talk of a "law for freedom," which is in the same case. In general we will not talk of the ought at all. That is how one talks to children and to peoples in their childhood, but not to those who have taken in the whole education of an age that has come of age. It is surely a palpable contradiction to call the will free and yet prescribe laws to it by which it ought to will—"ought to will!"—wooden iron! By our whole view, however, the will is not only free but even almighty. Its action comes from it, and so does its world. As it is, so its action appears, and so its world appears. They are its self-knowl-

edge, both, and nothing else. It determines itself, and with that determines both. For outside it there is nothing, and they are itself. Only so is it truly autonomous; by every other view it is heteronomous. Our philosophical effort can only aim at interpreting and explaining the actions of man, and the very different, even opposite maxims of which his actions are the living expression, according to their innermost nature and content. It does this in connection with our inquiry so far, and exactly as we have so far tried to interpret the other appearances of the world and to bring their innermost nature to clear, abstract knowledge. In doing so our philosophy will maintain the same *immanence* as in the whole inquiry so far. It will not, against Kant's great teaching, use the forms of appearance, whose general expression is the principle of sufficient reason, as a vaulting pole to leap over appearance itself, which alone gives them meaning, and land in the boundless territory of empty fictions. Rather, this actual world of knowability, in which we are and which is in us, stays both the material and the boundary of our inquiry. It is so rich in content that even the deepest research of which the human mind would be capable could not exhaust it. So the actual, knowable world will never fail our ethical inquiries any more than the earlier ones in material and reality. We will therefore have no need at all to take refuge in empty, negative concepts, and then perhaps even make ourselves believe we are saying something when we talk, with raised eyebrows, of the "Absolute," the "Infinite," the "Supersensible," and whatever other mere negations of that sort there are (ουδεν εστι, η το της στερησεως ονομα, μετα αμυδρας επινοιας.—nihil est, nisi negationis nomen, cum obscura notione. Jul. or. 5), for which one could say more briefly Cloud-cuckoo-land (νεφελοκοκκυγια). We will not need to serve up covered, empty dishes of this kind.—Finally, here as before, we will not tell stories and pass them off as philosophy. For we hold that anyone is still worlds away from a philosophical knowledge of the world who thinks he can grasp its essence in any way *historically*, however finely disguised. This is the case as soon as, in his view of the essence in itself of the world, there is any *becoming*, or having become, or going to become, or any earlier or later has the least significance. And so, openly or hidden, a starting point and an end point of the world, along with the road between the two, are sought and found,

and the philosophizing individual perhaps even recognizes his own place on this road. Such *historical philosophizing* in most cases supplies a cosmogony, which allows many varieties. Otherwise it supplies a system of emanation, or a doctrine of a falling away. Or finally, if in despair over fruitless attempts on those paths one is driven to the last path, it supplies the reverse: a doctrine of constant becoming, sprouting, arising, stepping into the light out of the dark, the gloomy ground, primal ground, groundless, and whatever more such babbling there is. One can dispose of it most briefly with the remark that an entire eternity, that is, an infinite time, has already run out up to the present moment, so that everything that can and should become must already have become. For all such historical philosophy, however superior an air it puts on, takes *time* for a determination of things in themselves, as if Kant had never existed. So it stays with what Kant calls appearance, in contrast to the thing in itself, and what Plato calls the becoming, never being, in contrast to the being, never becoming, or finally what among the Indians is called the web of Maya. It is just the knowledge given over to the principle of sufficient reason, with which one never reaches the inner essence of things, but only follows appearances into the infinite, moving without end or goal, like a squirrel in a wheel, until perhaps at last one tires, and stops at some arbitrary point, above or below, and now wants to force others to respect it too. The true philosophical way of looking at the world, that is, the one that teaches us to know its inner essence and so leads beyond appearance, is just the one that does not ask from where, to where and why, but always and everywhere only what the world is. That is, it does not consider things by any relation, not as becoming and passing away; in short, not by any of the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason. On the contrary, its object is exactly what remains once this whole way of looking, which follows that principle, is set aside: the essence of the world, always the same, which appears in all relations but is not itself subject to them, the Ideas of the world. Art starts from such knowledge, and so does philosophy. And, as we will find in this book, so does that mood of mind which alone leads to true holiness and to redemption from the world.

54 I hope the first three books have brought about the clear and certain knowledge that in the world as representation a mirror has opened up for the will, in which it knows itself, with growing degrees of clarity and completeness. The highest of these is man. But his nature gets its finished expression only through the connected series of his actions, and reason, which lets him survey the whole in abstracto, makes the self-conscious connection of these actions possible.

Considered purely in itself, the will is without knowledge and is only a blind, irresistible drive. We still see it appear in this form in inorganic and vegetable nature and its laws, and also in the vegetative part of our own life. Through the world of representation that has been added and developed to serve it, the will gets knowledge of its willing and of what it is that it wills: that this is nothing other than this world, life, just as it stands there. That is why we called the appearing world its mirror, its objectivity. And since what the will wills is always life, precisely because life is nothing more than the presentation of that willing for the representation, it is all one, and only a pleonasm, when, instead of saying simply "the will," we say "the will to life."

Since the will is the thing in itself, the inner content, the essential part of the world, and life, the visible world, the appearance, is only the mirror of the will, the appearance will accompany the will as inseparably as a body is accompanied by its shadow. If will exists, life and the world will exist too. So life is certain for the will to life, and as long as we are filled with the will to life we need not worry about our existence, not even at the sight of death. We do see the individual come into being and pass away. But the individual is only appearance. It exists only for knowledge caught in the principle of sufficient reason, the principium individuationis. For that knowledge, to be sure, it receives its life like a gift, comes forth from nothing, then through death suffers the loss of that gift and goes back into nothing. But we want to consider life philosophically, that is, according to its Ideas, and there we will find that neither the will, the thing in itself in all appearances, nor the subject of knowing, the spectator of all appearances, is touched by birth and death in any way. Birth and death belong to the appearance of the will, and so to life. It is essential to life to present itself in individuals who come into being and pass away. They are fleeting appear-

ances, arising in the form of time, of what in itself knows no time but has to present itself in just this way to objectify its real nature. Birth and death belong to life in the same way and balance each other as the mutual conditions of one another, or, if one likes the expression, as poles of the whole appearance of life. The wisest of all mythologies, the Indian, expresses this in the following way. The god who symbolizes destruction, death, is Shiva. (Brahma, the most sinful and lowest god of the Trimurti, symbolizes procreation, coming into being, and Vishnu preservation.) To Shiva, I say, along with the necklace of skulls, it gives the lingam as an attribute, this symbol of procreation. Procreation appears here as the counterbalance of death, which shows that procreation and death are essential correlates that neutralize and cancel each other.—It was exactly the same attitude that drove the Greeks and Romans to decorate their costly sarcophagi just as we still see them, with feasts, dances, weddings, hunts, animal fights, bacchanals. That is, they show the mightiest drive of life, and show it not only in such pleasures but even in sensual groups, going as far as intercourse between satyrs and goats. The aim was plainly to point away from the death of the individual who was mourned, with the greatest emphasis, to the immortal life of nature, and so to suggest, though without abstract knowledge, that the whole of nature is the appearance and also the fulfillment of the will to life. The form of this appearance is time, space and causality, and by means of these, individuation. Individuation brings with it that the individual must come into being and pass away. But this troubles the will to life as little as the whole of nature is hurt by the death of one individual. The individual is only, as it were, a single example or specimen of the appearance of the will to life. For nature cares not about the individual but only about the species, and it presses with all earnestness for the species' preservation. It provides for it so lavishly through the huge excess of germs and the great power of the drive to fertilize. The individual, on the other hand, has no value for nature and cannot have, since infinite time, infinite space, and in them an infinite number of possible individuals are its realm. So nature is always ready to let the individual fall. The individual is therefore exposed to destruction in a thousand ways, by the most insignificant accidents, but beyond that it is destined to it from the start, and

nature itself leads it toward it, from the moment it has served the preservation of the species. In this, nature itself quite naively states the great truth that only the Ideas, not the individuals, have true reality, that is, are the perfect objectivity of the will. Now man is nature itself, and in fact nature at the highest degree of its self-consciousness, and nature is only the objectified will to life. So when man has grasped this point of view and stays with it, he may indeed, and rightly, comfort himself about his own death and that of his friends by looking back at the immortal life of nature, which he himself is. In this way, then, Shiva with the lingam is to be understood, and those ancient sarcophagi that cry out to the mourning onlooker, with their pictures of the most glowing life: Natura non contristatur.

That procreation and death are to be regarded as belonging to life, and as essential to this appearance of the will, also follows from the fact that both present themselves to us as only heightened expressions of that of which all the rest of life consists. For life is through and through nothing other than a constant change of matter, under the firm persistence of form. And that is just the perishing of individuals, with the imperishability of the species. Constant nourishment and reproduction differ from procreation only in degree, and constant excretion differs from death only in degree. The first shows itself most simply and clearly in the plant. The plant is through and through only the constant repetition of the same drive, of its simplest fiber, which groups itself into leaf and twig. It is a systematic aggregate of plants of the same kind, carrying one another, whose constant reproduction is their one drive. To satisfy this drive more completely, the plant raises itself, by the steps of metamorphosis, finally to blossom and fruit, that compendium of its existence and striving. In it the plant gets by a shorter road what is its one goal, and now achieves in one stroke, a thousandfold, what it had so far worked at in single parts: the repetition of itself. Its growth up to the fruit stands to the fruit as handwriting stands to printing. Plainly it is quite the same with the animal. The process of nourishment is a constant begetting, and the process of begetting is a heightened kind of nourishing. The sensual pleasure in procreation is the heightened comfort of the feeling of life. On the other hand, excretion, the constant breathing out and

throwing off of matter, is the same thing that death, the opposite of procreation, is in heightened degree. In the case of excretion we are always content to keep the form without mourning the matter thrown off. So we should behave in the same way when in death the same thing happens in heightened degree and as a whole, which goes on every day and every hour in single parts in excretion. As we are indifferent to the first, we should not shrink back from the other. From this standpoint it therefore seems just as perverse to demand the continuation of one's individuality, which is replaced by other individuals, as to demand the continued existence of the matter of one's body, which is always replaced by new matter. It seems just as foolish to embalm corpses as it would be to keep one's excrement carefully. As for individual consciousness, which is bound to the individual body, it is wholly interrupted every day by sleep. Deep sleep is no different from death, into which it often passes quite steadily, for example in freezing, so far as the present of its duration goes. It differs only for the future, namely with regard to waking. Death is a sleep in which individuality is forgotten. Everything else wakes up again, or rather has stayed awake [1].
Above all we must recognize clearly that the form of the appearance of the will, that is, the form of life or of reality, is really only the *present*, not future, nor [2]
The following consideration, too, can serve anyone to whom it is not too subtle, to make clear to himself that the individual is only appearance, not the thing in itself. Every individual is, on the one hand, the subject of knowing, that is, the completing condition of the possibility of the whole objective world, and on the other hand a single appearance of the will, of the same will that objectifies itself in every thing. But this duplicity of our being does not rest in a unity that exists by itself. Otherwise we would be able to become conscious of ourselves *in ourselves and independently of the objects of knowing and willing*. But this we simply cannot do. As soon as, to try it, we go into ourselves and, turning our knowing inward, want to collect ourselves completely for once, we lose ourselves in a bottomless emptiness. We find ourselves like the hollow glass sphere, out of whose emptiness a voice speaks, whose cause cannot be found in it. And in wanting to grasp ourselves in this way, we catch, with a shudder, nothing but a ghost with no lasting being.

past. These exist only in the concept, only in the context of knowledge, so far as it follows the principle of sufficient reason. No man has lived in the past, and none will ever live in the future. The *present* alone is the form of all life, but it is also life's sure possession, which can never be taken from it. The present is always there, together with its content. Both stand firm, without wavering, like the rainbow on the waterfall. For life is sure and certain for the will, and the present for life. To be sure, when we think back over the thousands of years that have passed, over the millions of people who lived in them, we ask: What were they? What has become of them? But we need only call back the past of our own life and renew its scenes vividly in imagination, and then ask again: What was all this? What has become of it? As with it, so it is with the life of those millions. Or should we think the past gets a new existence by being sealed by death? Our own past, even the nearest, even yesterday, is only an empty dream of imagination now, and the past of all those millions is the same. What was? What is? The will, whose mirror life is, and the will-free knowing that sees the will clearly in that mirror. Anyone who has not yet recognized this, or does not want to, must add to that question above about the fate of past generations this one too: why is he, the one asking, so lucky as to hold this precious, fleeting, only real present, while those hundreds of generations of men, even the heroes and wise men of those times, have sunk into the night of the past and so become nothing, but he, his unimportant I, is really here? Or more briefly, though it sounds odd: why is this now, his now, just now, and was not long ago? In asking so strangely he regards his existence and his time as independent of each other, and the former as thrown into the latter. He really assumes two nows, one belonging to the object and the other to the subject, and he wonders at the lucky accident of their coinciding. In truth, however (as is shown in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason), only the point of contact of the object, whose form is time, with the subject, which has no shape of the principle of sufficient reason as its form, makes up the present. Now every object is the will, in so far as it has become representation, and the subject is the necessary correlate of the object. Real objects exist only in the present. Past and future hold mere concepts and phantasms. So the present is the essential form

of the appearance of the will and inseparable from it. The present alone is what is always there and stands immovably firm. Grasped empirically, it is the most fleeting of all things. To the metaphysical glance, which sees past the forms of empirical intuition, it presents itself as the one thing that persists, the Nunc stans of the Scholastics. The source and bearer of its content is the will to life, or the thing in itself, which we are. What constantly comes to be and passes away, in that it has either already been or is still to come, belongs to appearance as such, by virtue of its forms, which make coming to be and passing away possible. So think: Quid fuit?—Quod est.—Quid erit?—Quod fuit; and take it in the strict sense of the words. For life is certain to the will, and the present to life. So everyone can say: "I am master of the present once and for all, and through all eternity it will accompany me like my shadow. So I do not wonder where it came from, or how it comes about that it is just now." We can compare time to an endlessly turning circle. The half that is always sinking would be the past, the half that is always rising the future. At the top, though, the indivisible point that touches the tangent would be the present without extension. As the tangent does not roll on with the circle, neither does the present, the point of contact of the object, whose form is time, with the subject, which has no form, because it does not belong to the knowable but is the condition of everything knowable. Or time is like an unstoppable stream, and the present like a rock against which the stream breaks, but which it does not sweep away. The will as thing in itself is no more subject to the principle of sufficient reason than the subject of knowledge is, which in the end, in a certain respect, is the will itself or its expression. And as life, the will's own appearance, is certain for the will, so is the present, the one form of real life. So we have no need to inquire into the past before life, nor into the future after death. Rather we have to recognize the present, the one form in which the will appears to itself [3]. The present will not escape the will, but the will, truly, will not escape it either. So whoever is satisfied with life as it is, whoever affirms it in every way, can regard it with confidence as endless, and can banish the fear of death as a deception. This deception puts into him the absurd fear that he could ever lose the present, and shows him a time with no present in it. With respect to time this deception is

what, with respect to space, is that other deception by which everyone in his imagination takes the place on the globe that he happens to occupy as the "up" and all the rest as the "down." In the same way everyone ties the present to his individuality and thinks that with it all present would go out, and past and future would then be without it. But as on the globe everywhere is up, so too the form of all life is present, and to fear death because it tears the present from us is no wiser than to fear that one could slide off the round globe on which one happens, luckily, to be standing at the top. The form of the present is essential to the objectification of the will. As a point without extension it cuts the time that is infinite on both sides, and stands immovably firm, like an everlasting noon without a cooling evening. In the same way the real sun burns without pause, while it only seems to sink into the lap of night. So if a man fears death as his annihilation, it is no different from supposing the sun could lament at [4] Scholastici docuerunt, quod aeternitas non sit temporis sine fine aut principio successio, sed Nunc stans; i. e. idem nobis Nunc esse, quod erat Nunc Adamo: i. e. inter nunc et tunc nullam esse differentiam. Hobbes, Leviathan, c. 46.

evening: "Woe is me! I am going down into eternal night." [5] On the other hand, the reverse also holds: whoever is weighed down by the burdens of life, who does want life and affirms it, but loathes its torments, and especially can no longer bear the hard lot that has fallen to him in particular—such a person cannot hope that death will set him free and cannot save himself by suicide. Only with a false appearance does the dark, cool Orcus lure him as a harbor of rest. The earth rolls from day into night; the individual dies; but the sun itself burns without pause in eternal noon. For the will to life, life is certain: the form of life is present without end, no matter how the individuals, appearances of the Idea, come into being and pass away in time, like fleeting dreams.—Suicide thus already appears to us here as a futile and therefore foolish act. When we have gone further in our inquiry, it will present itself to us in a still less favorable light.

Dogmas change and our knowledge is deceptive, but nature does not err. Its course is sure and it does not hide it. Each thing is wholly in nature, and nature is wholly in each. In every animal it has its center. The animal has found its way safely into existence, as it will find its way safely out. Meanwhile it lives fearless of annihilation and without worry, carried by the awareness that it is nature itself and [6] In Eckermann's "Conversations with Goethe" (second edition, vol. 1, p. 154) Goethe says: "Our spirit is a being of wholly indestructible nature: it is something that goes on working from eternity to eternity. It is like the sun, which only seems to set to our earthly eyes, but really never sets, and shines on without ceasing."—Goethe has the simile from me; I do not have it from him. No doubt he uses it, in this conversation held in 1824, as a result of a perhaps unconscious recollection of the above passage. For it stands, in the same words as here, in the first edition, p. 401, and it also recurs in the same edition, p. 528, as here at the end of § 65. That first edition had been sent to him in December 1818. In March 1819 he had his approval reported to me by letter, through my sister, in Naples, where I was at the time. He had enclosed a slip on which he had noted the numbers of some pages that pleased him especially. So he had read my book. as imperishable as nature. Man alone carries about with him in abstract concepts the certainty of his death. Strangely enough, this can frighten him only for single moments, when something brings it before his imagination. Against the mighty voice of nature, reflection can do little. In him too, as in the animal that does not think, that security rules as a lasting condition, a security that springs from the innermost consciousness that he is nature, the world itself. Because of it, the thought of certain and never-distant death does not noticeably disturb any man, but everyone goes on living as if he had to live forever. This goes so far that one could say nobody has a really living conviction of the certainty of his death. Otherwise there could not be such a great difference between his mood and that of the condemned criminal. Rather, everyone recognizes that certainty in abstracto and theoretically, but sets it aside, like other theoretical truths that cannot be applied in practice, without taking it into his living consciousness at all. Whoever takes good note of this peculiarity of the human mind will see that the psychological explana-

tions of it, from habit and from resigning oneself to the unavoidable, are by no means enough. The reason for it is the one given, which lies deeper. From the same reason we can also explain why, at all times and among all peoples, dogmas of some kind of continuation of the individual after death are found and held in esteem, although the proofs for it had to be always highly inadequate, and those for the opposite are strong and many. Indeed, the opposite really needs no proof, but is recognized by sound understanding as a fact, and confirmed as such by the confidence that nature as little lies as errs, but lays out its doing and being openly, even says it naively, while only we ourselves darken it with delusion, to read into it what just suits our limited view.

What we have now brought to clear awareness is this. The single appearance of the will begins and ends in time, but the will itself, as thing in itself, is not touched by that. Neither is the correlate of every object, the knowing subject, which is never itself known. And life is always certain for the will to life. None of this belongs with those doctrines of continued existence. The will considered as thing in itself, and likewise the pure subject of knowing, the eternal eye of the world, can no more be said to last than to pass away. Those are terms that hold only in time, and these two lie outside time. So the egoism of the individual (this one appearance of the will, lit up by the subject of knowing) wants to hold its own through endless time. But it can draw no more food or comfort for that wish from our view than it could from knowing that after its death the rest of the outer world will go on in time. That knowledge is only the same view stated objectively, and so in terms of time. Each of us is perishable only as an appearance. As thing in itself each of us is timeless, and so endless. But it is also only as an appearance that anyone differs from the other things in the world. As thing in itself he is the will that appears in everything, and death removes the illusion that separates his consciousness from the consciousness of the others. That is the continued existence. That death does not touch him, which is true of him only as thing in itself, coincides, for the appearance, with the continued existence of the rest of the outer world[7]. This is also why the deep and merely felt consciousness of what we have just raised to clear knowledge does, as I said, keep the thought of death from poisoning life even for a

rational being. That consciousness is the basis of the courage to live that keeps every living thing upright and lets it go on cheerfully as if there were no death, as long as it keeps its eye on life and is turned toward it. But it does not stop the individual from being seized by the fear of death and trying every way to escape, when death comes up to him in the particular case[8] In the Veda this is expressed by saying that when a man dies, his power of sight becomes one with the sun, his sense of smell with the earth, his taste with water, his hearing with the air, his speech with fire, and so on. (Oupnek'hat, vol. 1, p. 249 ff.) It is also expressed by a special ceremony in which the dying man hands over his senses and all his faculties one by one to his son, in whom they are now to go on living. (Same work, vol. 2, p. 82 ff.) and in reality, or even only in imagination, and he has to look it in the face. For as long as his knowledge was directed on life as such, he had to recognize imperishability in life too. In the same way, when death stands before his eyes, he has to recognize it for what it is: the end in time of the single appearance in time. What we fear in death is by no means pain. For pain plainly lies this side of death. Also, we often flee from pain into death, just as, the other way round, we sometimes take on the most terrible pain only to escape death a little longer, although death would be quick and easy. So we distinguish pain and death as two quite different evils. What we fear in death is in fact the destruction of the individual, which announces itself quite openly as such. And because the individual is the will to life itself in one single objectification, its whole being struggles against death.—Where feeling thus leaves us helpless, reason can step in and for the most part overcome its unpleasant impressions. It does this by putting us at a higher standpoint, where we have the whole in view instead of the single thing. For this reason a philosophical knowledge of the nature of the world, if it had come as far as the point we have now reached in our inquiry but gone no further, could already at this standpoint overcome the terrors of death, to the degree that reflection in the given individual had power over immediate feeling. Take a man who had firmly taken the truths set out so far into his own way of thinking, but had not at the same time come, by his own experience or by deeper insight, to see lasting suffering as essential to all life. Instead he finds satisfaction in life and is perfectly

well in it. On calm reflection he would want his course of life, as he has known it so far, to last endlessly or to come back again and again. His courage to live is so great that, for the pleasures of life, he would willingly and gladly take on all the hardship and pain it is subject to. Such a man would stand "with firm, sturdy bones on the well-founded, lasting earth," and would have nothing to fear. Armed with the knowledge we attribute to him, he would face death with indifference as it hurried toward him on the wings of time. He would regard it as a false appearance, a powerless ghost that frightens the weak but has no power over the man who knows that he himself is that will whose objectification or image is the whole world. For such a man life always stays certain, and so does the present, which is the true and only form in which the will appears. No endless past or future in which he would not be can frighten him, because he regards these as the empty illusion and web of Maya. So he would have no more reason to fear death than the sun has to fear the night.—In the Bhagavad Gita, Krishna puts his young pupil Arjuna at this standpoint. Arjuna, at the sight of the armies ready for battle (in a way somewhat like Xerxes), is seized by sadness, loses heart, and wants to give up the fight in order to prevent the destruction of so many thousands. Krishna puts him at that standpoint, and the death of those thousands can no longer hold him back: he gives the signal for battle.—Goethe's Prometheus also marks this standpoint, especially where he says:

"Here I sit, forming men After my image, A race that shall be like me, To suffer, to weep, To enjoy and to be glad, And to pay no heed to you, Like me!"

Bruno's philosophy and Spinoza's could also lead to this standpoint anyone whose conviction was not disturbed or weakened by their faults and imperfections. Bruno's philosophy has no real ethics. The ethics in Spinoza's philosophy does not come out of the essence of his teaching at all. It is praiseworthy and fine in itself, but it is attached to the teaching only by weak and obvious sophisms.—Finally, many people would probably stand at the standpoint described if their knowledge kept pace with their willing, that is, if they were able to become clear and distinct to themselves, free of every delusion. For this, for knowledge, is the standpoint of the complete affirmation of the will to life.

To say that the will affirms itself means this. Its own nature is given to it completely and distinctly as representation, in its objectivity, that is, in the world and in life. This knowledge does not check its willing in the least. Instead, this very life, known in this way, is also willed by it as such. Until then it was willed without knowledge, as a blind urge; now it is willed with knowledge, consciously and deliberately.—The opposite of this, the denial of the will to life, shows itself when willing ends upon that knowledge. Then the single known appearances no longer work as motives of willing. Instead the whole knowledge of the nature of the world, which mirrors the will and has grown out of the grasp of the Ideas, becomes a quietive of the will, and so the will freely cancels itself. These concepts are completely unknown and hardly intelligible in this general statement. I hope they will become clear through the account that follows soon, an account of the phenomena, here ways of acting, in which affirmation, in its various degrees, and denial express themselves. Both do proceed from knowledge, but not from abstract knowledge, which expresses itself in words. They proceed from living knowledge, which expresses itself only in deed and conduct, and stays independent of the dogmas that occupy reason, as abstract knowledge, in this connection. My purpose can only be to present both and to bring them to the clear knowledge of reason. It cannot be to prescribe or recommend one or the other. That would be as foolish as it would be pointless, since the will in itself is absolutely free, determines itself entirely alone, and there is no law for it.—We must, however, first discuss this freedom and its relation to necessity and define it more exactly, before we go on to the account just mentioned. After that we also have to make some general reflections, relating to the will and its objects, on life, whose affirmation and denial are our problem. By all this we shall make it easier for ourselves to reach the knowledge we intend, the knowledge of the ethical significance of ways of acting, in their innermost nature.

As I have said, this whole work is only the unfolding of a single thought. It follows that all its parts are most closely connected with one another. It is not merely that each part stands in a necessary relation to the one just before it, and so presupposes only that one as remembered by the reader, as happens in all

philosophies that consist merely of a series of inferences. Every part of the whole work is related to every other and presupposes it. So the reader is required to remember not only what came just before but everything earlier, so that he can tie it to whatever is present, however much else stands between. Plato also made this demand on his reader, through the many tangled windings of his dialogues, which take up the main thought again only after long digressions, and then take it up better clarified for that very reason. In our case the demand is necessary, because the splitting of our one and only thought into many considerations is indeed the only means of communication, but for the thought itself it is not an essential form, only an artificial one.—To make the account and the grasp of it easier, there is the separation of four main points of view in four books, and the most careful linking of what is related and of the same kind. Even so, the material does not allow a progress in a straight line, such as the historical kind, at all. It makes a more tangled presentation necessary, and this in turn makes repeated study of the book necessary. Only by such study does the connection of each part with every other become clear, and only then do all the parts throw light on one another and become perfectly bright[9].

55 That the will as such is free already follows from the fact that, in our view, it is the thing in itself, the content of every[10] On this, see chapters 41–44 of the second volume. appearance. Appearance, on the other hand, we know to be subject throughout to the principle of sufficient reason in its four forms. And we know that necessity is completely identical with following from a given ground, and that the two are interchangeable concepts. So everything that belongs to appearance, that is, everything that is an object for the subject knowing as an individual, is on one side a ground and on the other a consequence. In this second capacity it is determined with necessity throughout, and so it cannot in any respect be other than it is. The whole content of nature, all its appearances, is therefore completely necessary. The necessity of every part, every appearance, every event can always be shown, because there must be a ground to be found on which it depends as a consequence. This admits of no exception. It follows from the unlimited validity of the principle of sufficient reason. On the other

hand, this same world, in all its appearances, is for us the objectivity of the will. The will is not itself an appearance, not a representation or object, but thing in itself. So it is not subject to the principle of sufficient reason, the form of every object. It is not determined as a consequence by a ground, so it knows no necessity, that is, it is free. The concept of freedom is therefore really a negative one, since its content is only the denial of necessity, that is, of the relation of consequence to ground in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason.—Here, then, lies before us most clearly the point where that great opposition becomes one, the union of freedom with necessity. In recent times this has often been spoken of but, as far as I know, never clearly and properly. Every thing, as appearance, as object, is necessary throughout. The same thing is, in itself, will, and this is perfectly free for all eternity. The appearance, the object, is determined necessarily and unalterably in the chain of grounds and consequences, which can have no break. But the existence of this object at all, and the kind of its existence, that is, the Idea that reveals itself in it, or in other words its character, is the direct appearance of the will. Given the freedom of this will, the object might therefore not exist at all, or it might originally and essentially be something quite different. In that case the whole chain of which it is a link, which is itself an appearance of the same will, would also be quite different. But once the object is there and exists, it has entered the series of grounds and consequences. In that series it is always determined with necessity, and so it can neither become something else, that is, change, nor step out of the series, that is, vanish. Man, like every other part of nature, is the objectivity of the will. So everything said holds of him too. Every thing in nature has its forces and qualities, which react in a definite way to a definite influence and make up its character. In the same way man has his character, from which motives call forth his actions with necessity. In this way of acting his empirical character reveals itself, and in that again his intelligible character, the will in itself, of which he is the determined appearance. But man is the most perfect appearance of the will. As shown in the second book, to survive it had to be lit up by so high a degree of knowledge that in this knowledge a fully adequate repetition of the nature of the world, in the form of representation, became possible. This is the grasp of

the Ideas, the pure mirror of the world, which we got to know in the third book. So in man the will can reach full self-consciousness, a clear and exhaustive knowing of its own nature as it is mirrored in the whole world. As we saw in the previous book, art arises from the actual presence of this degree of knowledge. But at the end of our whole inquiry it will also appear that this same knowledge, when the will turns it on itself, makes possible a cancellation and self-denial of the will in its most perfect appearance. Freedom otherwise belongs only to the thing in itself and can never show itself in the appearance. In such a case it comes forward in the appearance too. There it cancels the being that underlies the appearance, while the appearance itself still goes on in time. That produces a contradiction of the appearance with itself, and exactly in this way it presents the phenomena of holiness and self-denial. All this, however, can become fully intelligible only at the end of this book.—For now this only indicates in a general way how man differs from all other appearances of the will. Freedom, that is, independence of the principle of sufficient reason, belongs only to the will as thing in itself and contradicts appearance. Yet in man it can possibly enter even in the appearance, where it then necessarily presents itself as a contradiction of the appearance with itself. In this sense not only the will in itself but even man can indeed be called free, and so be distinguished from all other beings. How this is to be understood can become clear only through everything that follows, and for now we must leave it entirely aside. For first we must prevent the error that the action of the single, definite man is not subject to necessity, that is, that the force of the motive is less sure than the force of the cause, or than the consequence of the conclusion from the premises. The freedom of the will as thing in itself does not pass directly over to its appearance, so long as we leave aside, as I said, the case mentioned above, which concerns only an exception. It does not pass over even where the appearance reaches the highest level of visibility, that is, to the rational animal with individual character, the person. The person is never free, even though the person is the appearance of a free will. For the person is the already determined appearance of that will's free willing. When this appearance enters the form of every object, the principle of sufficient reason, it does unfold the unity of that will

into a multiplicity of actions. But because of the timeless unity of that willing in itself, these actions present themselves with the lawfulness of a force of nature. Still, it is that free willing which becomes visible in the person and in the person's whole conduct, and it relates to that conduct as the concept relates to the definition. So every single deed of the person too is to be ascribed to the free will, and announces itself to consciousness directly as such. That is why, as said in the second book, everyone a priori (that is, here, according to his original feeling) takes himself to be free even in single actions, in the sense that, in every given case, every action would be possible for him. Only a posteriori, from experience and reflection on experience, does he recognize that his acting follows with complete necessity from the meeting of character and motives. That is why even the crudest person, following his feeling, defends complete freedom in single actions most vehemently, while the great thinkers of all times, and even the more profound religious doctrines, have denied it. But for anyone who has seen clearly that the whole being of man is will and that he himself is only the appearance of this will, and that such an appearance has the principle of sufficient reason as its necessary form (a form that can be known already from the side of the subject and that in this case takes shape as the law of motivation), a doubt that the deed must follow, given the character and the motive at hand, will seem like a doubt that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.—Priestley has shown the necessity of single actions quite sufficiently in his "Doctrine of philosophical necessity." But how this necessity can exist together with the freedom of the will in itself, that is, apart from appearance, was first shown by Kant, whose merit here is especially great[11]. He showed it by setting up the difference between the intelligible and the empirical character. I keep this difference entirely. The intelligible character is the will as thing in itself, so far as it appears in a definite individual at a definite degree. The empirical character is this appearance itself, as it presents itself in time in the way of acting and, already in space, in the bodily organization. To make the relation of the two understandable, the best expression is the one already used in the introductory treatise. The intelligible character of each man is to be regarded as an act of will outside time, and so indivisible and unchangeable.

The appearance of this act, developed and drawn out in time and space and all the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, is the empirical character, as it presents itself in experience in this man's whole way of acting and in the course of his life. The whole tree is only the constantly repeated appearance of one and the same impulse. It shows itself most simply in the fiber and repeats itself in the composition[12] "Critique of Pure Reason," first edition, pp. 532–558; fifth edition, pp. 560–586; and "Critique of Practical Reason," fourth edition, pp. 169–179.—Rosenkranz edition, pp. 224–231. of leaf, stalk, branch and trunk, where it is easy to recognize. In the same way all the deeds of man are only the constantly repeated expression of his intelligible character, varying somewhat in form, and the induction that comes from the sum of them gives his empirical character.—I will not repeat Kant's masterly account here in my own rewording. I take it as known.

In 1840 I dealt with the important topic of freedom of the will thoroughly and in detail, in my prize essay on it, which was crowned. In particular I exposed the ground of the illusion by which people suppose they find in self-consciousness, as a fact of it, an empirically given absolute freedom of the will, that is, a liberum arbitrium indifferentiae. For the prize question, very perceptively, was aimed exactly at this point. So I refer the reader to that essay, and also to § 10 of the prize essay on the foundation of morals, which was published together with it under the title "The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics." I now leave out the account of the necessity of acts of will that was given at this place in the first edition, which was still imperfect. In its place I want to illustrate the illusion mentioned above with a short discussion. That discussion presupposes the nineteenth chapter of our second volume, and so could not be given in the prize essay mentioned.

The will, as the true thing in itself, is something really original and independent. So in self-consciousness too, quite apart from anything else, the feeling of originality and self-rule must accompany its acts, though here they are already determined. Beyond that, the illusion of an empirical freedom of the will (instead of the transcendental freedom, which alone is to be ascribed to it), that is, a freedom of the single deeds, arises from the separate and subordinate position

of the intellect toward the will, which is set out in the nineteenth chapter of the second volume, especially under no. 3. The intellect learns the will's decisions only a posteriori and empirically. So when a choice is at hand, it has no datum about how the will is going to decide. For the intelligible character, by virtue of which only one decision is possible given the motives, and that decision is therefore a necessary one, does not fall within the intellect's knowledge. Only the empirical character becomes known to it, bit by bit, through its single acts. So it seems to the knowing consciousness (the intellect) that in a given case two opposite decisions are equally possible for the will. But this is exactly like saying of a pole standing upright, thrown out of balance and wobbling, "it can tip to the right or to the left." That "can" has only a subjective meaning, and really says "as far as the data known to us go." For objectively the direction of the fall is already necessarily determined as soon as the wobble begins. In the same way the decision of one's own will is undetermined only for its spectator, one's own intellect. So it is undetermined only relatively and subjectively, that is, for the subject of knowing. In itself and objectively, by contrast, the decision is, with every choice put before it, immediately determined and necessary. This determination, however, comes into consciousness only through the decision that follows. We even get an empirical proof of this when some difficult and important choice lies before us, but only under a condition that has not yet occurred and is only to be hoped for. So for the time being we can do nothing in the matter and must stay passive. Now we consider what we will decide on when the circumstances have come that allow us free activity and decision. Mostly, far-seeing, rational reflection speaks more for one of the resolutions, and immediate inclination more for the other. As long as we are forced to stay passive, the side of reason seems likely to keep the upper hand. But we foresee how strongly the other side will pull when the opportunity to act is there. Until then we work hard, by cool meditation on the pro et contra, to put the motives on both sides in the brightest light. We do this so that each can act on the will with its whole force when the moment comes, and so that no mistake on the intellect's part may lead the will to decide otherwise than it would if everything acted equally. This clear unfolding of the opposing motives is all, however, that the

intellect can do in the choice. The actual decision it waits for as passively, and with the same tense curiosity, as it would wait for the decision of a stranger's will. So from its standpoint both decisions must seem equally possible. This is exactly the illusion of the empirical freedom of the will. The decision does enter the sphere of the intellect quite empirically, as the final outcome of the matter. Yet it has come out of the inner constitution, the intelligible character, of the individual will, in its conflict with the given motives, and so with complete necessity. All the intellect can do here is to light up the nature of the motives sharply from every side. It cannot determine the will itself, since the will is wholly inaccessible to it, and even, as we have seen, unfathomable.

Suppose a man could act one way one time and another way another time under the same circumstances. Then his will itself would have had to change in between, and so would lie in time, since change is possible only in time. But then either the will would have to be a mere appearance, or time would have to be a determination of the thing in itself. So that dispute about the freedom of the single act, about the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae, really turns on the question whether the will lies in time or not. The will is, as both Kant's teaching and my whole account make necessary, the thing in itself, outside time and every form of the principle of sufficient reason. If so, then not only must the individual in the same situation always act in the same way, and not only must every evil deed be the sure guarantee of countless others that he must commit and cannot leave undone. It would also be possible, as Kant says, if only the empirical character and the motives were completely given, to calculate a man's future conduct like a solar or lunar eclipse. As nature is consistent, so is character. Every single action must turn out in accordance with it, as every phenomenon turns out in accordance with the law of nature. The cause in the latter case and the motive in the former are only occasional causes, as was shown in the second book. The will, whose appearance is the whole being and life of man, cannot deny itself in the single case, and what a man wills on the whole he will always will in each particular. The claim of an empirical freedom of the will, of a liberum arbitrium indifferentiae, is most closely connected with this: people put the essence of man in a soul that was originally a knowing being,

indeed really an abstractly thinking one, and only as a result of this a willing one as well. So they made the will secondary in nature, whereas in truth knowledge is. The will was even regarded as an act of thought and identified with judgment, notably by Descartes and Spinoza. According to that, every man would have become what he is only as a result of his knowledge. He would come into the world as a moral zero, would know the things in it, and would then decide to be this or that man and to act in this or that way. He could also, as a result of new knowledge, take up a new way of acting, and so become another man again. Further, according to that he would first know a thing to be good and as a result will it, instead of first willing it and as a result calling it good. According to my whole fundamental view, all that is an inversion of the true relation. The will is the first and original thing. Knowledge is merely added on, and belongs to the appearance of the will as an instrument of it. Every man is therefore what he is through his will, and his character is original, since willing is the basis of his being. Through the knowledge that is added he learns, in the course of experience, what he is, that is, he gets to know his character. So he knows himself as a result of the nature of his will and in accordance with it, instead of, as in the old view, willing as a result of his knowing and in accordance with it. According to the old view he need only consider how he would most like to be, and he would be so. That is its freedom of the will. It consists, then, really in this: that man is his own work, by the light of knowledge. I say, on the contrary: he is his own work before all knowledge, and knowledge is merely added to light it up. So he cannot decide to be this kind of man or that, nor can he become another man. He is, once for all, and knows successively what he is. In their view he wills what he knows; in mine he knows what he wills.

The Greeks called character ηθος and its expressions, that is, customs, ηθη. But this word comes from εθος, habit. They chose it in order to express the constancy of character figuratively by the constancy of habit. Το γαρ ηθος απο του εθους εχει την επωνυμιαν. ηθικη γαρ καλειται δια το εθιζεσθαι (a voce εθος, i. e. consuetudo, ηθος est appellatum: ethica ergo dicta est απο του εθιζεσθαι, sive ab assuescendo), says Aristotle. (Eth. magna, I, 6, p. 1186, and Eth. Eud., p. 1220,

and Eth. Nic., p. 1103, ed. Ber.) Stobaeus cites: οι δε κατα Ζηνωνα τροπικως· ηθος εστι πηγη βιου, αφ' ης αι κατα μερος πραξεις ρεουσι (Stoici autem, Zenonis castra sequentes, metaphorice ethos definiunt vitae fontem, e quo singulae manant actiones.) II, ch. 7.—In the Christian doctrine of faith we find the dogma of predestination, which follows from the choice of some for grace and of others for rejection (Rom. 9, 11–24). It plainly sprang from the insight that man does not change. His life and conduct, that is, his empirical character, is only the unfolding of the intelligible one, the development of definite, unchangeable dispositions already recognizable in the child. So his conduct is, as it were, firmly fixed already at his birth and stays essentially the same to the end. We agree with this too. But I do not undertake to defend the consequences that came from combining this quite correct insight with the dogmas found in the Jewish doctrine of faith. These consequences made the greatest difficulty of all, the eternally unsolvable Gordian knot on which most of the Church's quarrels turn. Even the Apostle Paul himself hardly succeeded in this with the parable of the potter that he set up for the purpose. For the result there would in the end be no other than: "Let mankind fear the gods!

"They hold the rule In eternal hands: And can use it As it pleases them."—

Such reflections, however, are really foreign to our subject. Rather, a few discussions will now be useful on the relation between character and knowing, in which all its motives lie.

Motives, which determine the appearance of character, that is, acting, work on it through the medium of knowledge. But knowledge is changeable. It often swings back and forth between error and truth, though as a rule it is corrected more and more as life goes on, in very different degrees. So a man's way of acting can be noticeably changed without our having the right to conclude from it that his character has changed. What a man really and in general wills, the striving of his innermost being and the goal he pursues in accordance with it—this we can never change by outside influence on him, by instruction. Otherwise we could remake him. Seneca says excellently: velle non discitur. In this he prefers the truth to his Stoics, who taught διδακτην ειναι την αρετην (doceri posse virtutem). From outside, the will can be acted on only by motives. But these can

never change the will itself. For they themselves have power over it only on the assumption that it is exactly such as it is. All they can do, then, is change the direction of its striving, that is, make it seek what it unchangeably seeks by a different path than before. So instruction, improved knowledge, that is, influence from outside, can teach him that he erred in the means. It can thus make him pursue the goal that his inner nature has set him, by a quite different path, even in a quite different object than before. But it can never make him will something really different from what he has willed so far. That stays unchangeable, for he is nothing but this willing itself, which otherwise would have to be canceled. The first point, however, the modifiability of knowledge and through it of doing, goes so far that he may seek to reach his unchangeable aim, say Mohammed's paradise, once in the real world and another time in an imaginary world. He measures the means accordingly, and so the first time uses cleverness, violence and deceit, the other time abstinence, justice, alms, a pilgrimage to Mecca. But his striving itself has not changed on that account, still less he himself. So even if his acting does present itself very differently at different times, his willing has stayed quite the same. Velle non discitur.

For motives to be effective, it is required not merely that they exist but that they be known. For, in a very good expression of the Scholastics that I mentioned once before: causa finalis movet non secundum suum esse reale; sed secundum esse cognitum. For example, for the relation that egoism and compassion have to each other in a given man to come out, it is not enough that he happens to have wealth and sees another's misery. He must also know what can be done with wealth, both for himself and for others. And not only must another's suffering present itself to him, he must also know what suffering is, and also what enjoyment is. Perhaps on a first occasion he did not know all this as well as on a second. And if he now acts differently on the same occasion, this is only because the circumstances were really different—namely in the part that depends on his knowing them—though they seem to be the same.—Just as not knowing circumstances that really exist takes away their effectiveness, so on the other hand quite imaginary circumstances can work like real ones, not only in a single deception but also as a whole and for the long run. If, for example, a man

is firmly persuaded that every good deed will be repaid to him a hundredfold in the future life, such a conviction counts and works just like a sure bill of exchange payable at a very long date. He can give from egoism, as with another insight he would take from egoism. He has not changed: velle non discitur. By virtue of this great influence of knowledge on acting, with an unchangeable will, character develops only gradually and its various traits come out. So it shows itself differently in every period of life, and a violent, wild youth can be followed by a settled, moderate, manly age. Especially the evil of the character will come out more and more powerfully with time. But sometimes also passions that one gave in to in youth are later curbed voluntarily, merely because the opposite motives have only now entered knowledge. So also we are all at first innocent, which means merely that neither we nor others know the evil of our own nature. It comes out only in the motives, and the motives enter knowledge only with time. In the end we get to know ourselves as quite different from what we took ourselves to be a priori, and often we are then frightened at ourselves.

Repentance never arises from the will having changed (which is impossible), but from knowledge having changed. The essential and real part of what I ever willed I must still will, for I myself am this will, which lies outside time and change. So I can never repent of what I willed, but I can repent of what I did. For, led by false concepts, I did something other than was in accordance with my will. The insight into this, with more correct knowledge, is repentance. This does not extend merely to prudence in living, to the choice of means and the judgment whether the end suits my real will. It also extends to the ethical proper. For example, I may have acted more egoistically than my character calls for, misled by exaggerated ideas of the need I was in myself, or of the cunning, falseness, or malice of others. Or I may have acted hastily, that is, without reflection, determined not by motives clearly known in abstracto but merely by perceptual ones, by the impression of the present and by the emotion it aroused, which was so strong that I did not really have the use of my reason. The return of reflection is then here too only corrected knowledge, from which repentance can arise, and this always makes itself known by making good what was done,

as far as possible. Still, we should note that, to deceive ourselves, we prepare apparent rashnesses that are really secretly deliberated actions. For we deceive and flatter no one by such fine tricks as ourselves.—The reverse of the case given can also occur. Too good a trust in others, or ignorance of the relative value of the goods of life, or some abstract dogma that I have since lost faith in, can lead me to act less egoistically than my character calls for, and so prepare repentance of another kind for me. Repentance, then, is always corrected knowledge of the relation of the deed to the real intention.—The will, so far as it reveals its Ideas in space alone, that is, through mere shape, meets resistance from matter already ruled by other Ideas, here forces of nature. Matter rarely lets the shape that was striving here to become visible come out perfectly pure and distinct, that is, beautiful. In the same way the will that reveals itself in time alone, that is, through actions, meets an analogous obstacle in knowledge, which rarely gives it the data quite correctly. The deed then does not turn out quite exactly in accordance with the will, and so repentance is prepared. Repentance thus always comes from corrected knowledge, not from a change of the will, which is impossible. Anguish of conscience over what was done is anything but repentance. It is pain at knowing oneself in oneself, that is, as will. It rests precisely on the certainty that one still has the same will. If it had changed, and the anguish of conscience were therefore mere repentance, the anguish would cancel itself. For then the past could cause no further anguish, since it would present the expressions of a will that was no longer that of the repentant man. We shall discuss the meaning of anguish of conscience in detail further below.

Knowledge is the medium of motives. Its influence is not on the will itself but on how the will comes out in actions. This influence also establishes the main difference between what men do and what animals do, because the mode of knowledge of the two is different. An animal has only intuitive representations. A man, through reason, also has abstract representations, concepts. Animals and men are both determined by motives with the same necessity. Still, man has over the animal a complete power of choice, which has often been taken for a freedom of the will in single deeds. It is nothing but the possibility of a conflict

between several motives that is fought out to the end, in which the stronger then determines him with necessity. For this, the motives must have taken the form of abstract thoughts, because only by means of these is real deliberation possible, that is, weighing opposing grounds for acting. In an animal the choice can take place only between motives that lie before it perceptually. So the choice is limited to the narrow sphere of its present, intuitive apprehension. For this reason the necessity with which a motive determines the will, which is like that of an effect by its cause, can be shown perceptibly and directly only in animals. Here the onlooker has the motives as directly before his eyes as their effect. In man the motives are almost always abstract representations that the onlooker does not share. Even for the agent himself the necessity of their working is hidden behind their conflict. For only in abstracto can several representations, as judgments and chains of inferences, lie side by side in consciousness and then, free of all determination of time, work against each other, until the stronger overcomes the rest and determines the will. This is the complete power of choice, or capacity for deliberation, which man has over the animal. Because of it, people have ascribed freedom of the will to him. They supposed that his willing is a mere result of the operations of the intellect, without any definite drive serving it as basis. In truth, motivation works only on the ground of his definite drive, and on the assumption of it, and in him this drive is individual, that is, a character. A fuller account of that capacity for deliberation, and of the difference it produces between human and animal choice, can be found in "The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics" (first edition, p. 35 ff.), to which I refer here. Moreover, this capacity for deliberation is also one of the things that make man's existence so much more tormented than the animal's. In general our greatest pains do not lie in the present, as perceptual representations or immediate feeling. They lie in reason, as abstract concepts, tormenting thoughts. The animal, which lives only in the present and so in an enviable freedom from care, is entirely free of these.

The dependence just shown of the human capacity for deliberation on the faculty of thinking in abstracto, and so also of judging and inferring, seems to have led both Descartes and Spinoza to identify the decisions of the will with the

faculty of affirming and denying (the power of judgment). From this Descartes derived that the will, which for him is indifferently free, bears the blame for all theoretical error too. Spinoza, on the other hand, derived that the will is necessarily determined by motives as the judgment is by grounds[13]. The latter, by the way, is correct, but it appears as a true conclusion from false premises.—

The difference shown between the way an animal is moved by motives and the way a man is extends its influence very far into the nature of both, and contributes most to the thoroughgoing and striking difference between their existences. An animal is always motivated only by a perceptual representation. Man strives to exclude this kind of motivation entirely and to let himself be determined only by abstract representations. In this way he uses his privilege of reason to the greatest possible advantage. Independent of the present, he does not choose or flee the passing enjoyment or pain, but considers the consequences of both. In most cases, apart from quite unimportant actions, abstract, thought motives determine us, not present impressions. So any single privation is fairly easy for us for the moment, but any renunciation is terribly hard. For the former touches only the fleeting present, but the latter touches the future and so includes [14] Cart. medit. 4.—Spin. Eth., P. II, prop. 48 et 49, caet. countless privations, of which it is the equivalent. The cause of our pain, as of our joy, therefore lies mostly not in the real present but merely in abstract thoughts. These are what often become unbearable to us and make torments against which all the sufferings of the animal world are very small. Over them even our own physical pain is often not felt at all. Indeed, in violent mental suffering we cause ourselves physical suffering, merely to turn our attention from the former to the latter. So in the greatest mental pain a man tears his hair, beats his breast, mangles his face, rolls on the ground. All of this is really only a violent means of distraction from a thought that has become unbearable. Precisely because mental pain, being much greater, makes us insensible to physical pain, suicide becomes very easy for a man in despair, or consumed by morbid gloom, even if earlier, in a comfortable state, he shrank back from the thought of it. Likewise care and passion, that is, the play of thoughts, wear down the body more often and more than physical hardships do. Accordingly Epictetus rightly says:

Ταρασσει τους ανθρωπους ου τα πραγματα, αλλα τα περι των πραγματων δογματα (Perturbant homines non res ipsae, sed de rebus decreta) (V.) and Seneca: Plura sunt, quae nos terrent, quam quae premunt, et saepius opinione quam re laboramus. (Ep. 5). Eulenspiegel too mocked human nature most excellently, by laughing when he went uphill but weeping when he went downhill. Indeed, children who have hurt themselves often do not weep over the pain, but only when one pities them, over the thought of the pain that this arouses. So great are the differences in acting and in life that flow from the difference between animal and human modes of knowledge. Further, the coming out of a distinct and decided individual character, which chiefly distinguishes man from the animal, which has hardly more than a character of the species, is likewise conditioned by the choice between several motives, which is possible only by means of abstract concepts. For only after a choice has gone before are the resolutions, which turn out differently in different individuals, a sign of their individual character, which is different in each one. The doing of the animal, in contrast, depends only on the presence or absence of the impression, provided that it is a motive at all for its species. So, finally, in man alone the resolution, not the mere wish, is a valid sign of his character, for himself and for others. But the resolution becomes certain only through the deed, for himself as for others. The wish is merely the necessary consequence of the present impression, whether of the outer stimulus or of the inner passing mood. It is therefore as immediately necessary and as without reflection as the doing of animals. So, just like that, it expresses only the character of the species, not the individual one. That is, it indicates only what man in general, not what the individual who feels the wish, would be capable of doing. The deed alone, because as a human action it already always needs a certain reflection, and because man as a rule has command of his reason and so is deliberate, that is, decides according to thought, abstract motives—the deed alone is the expression of the intelligible maxim of his acting, the result of his innermost willing. It stands as a letter in the word that denotes his empirical character, which itself is only the expression in time of his intelligible character. For this reason, in a healthy mind, only deeds weigh on the conscience, not wishes and thoughts. For only our deeds hold up to us

the mirror of our will. The deed already mentioned above, committed quite without reflection and really in blind emotion, is in a way a middle thing between mere wish and resolution. So it can be wiped out of the picture of our will, which is the course of our life, like a wrongly drawn stroke, by true repentance, which shows itself as a deed too.—Incidentally, as a curious comparison, the remark may find a place here that the relation between wish and deed has a quite accidental but exact analogy with that between electrical distribution and electrical communication.

From this whole consideration of the freedom of the will and what relates to it, we find the following. The will in itself and apart from appearance is to be called free, indeed omnipotent. But in its single appearances, lit up by knowledge, that is, in men and animals, we find it determined by motives, to which the character in each case always reacts in the same way, lawfully and with necessity. Through the added abstract or rational knowledge man, we see, has a power of choice beyond that of the animal. But this only makes him the battleground for the conflict of motives, without removing him from their rule. It therefore makes possible the complete expression of individual character, but is in no way to be regarded as freedom of the single willing, that is, independence of the law of causality, whose necessity extends over man as over every other appearance. Up to the point stated, then, and no further, goes the difference that reason, or knowledge by means of concepts, brings about between human and animal willing. There is, however, a quite different phenomenon of the human will, impossible in the animal world. It can emerge when man gives up the whole knowledge of single things as such, which is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, and by knowledge of the Ideas sees through the principium individuationis. Then a real coming forth of the true freedom of the will as thing in itself becomes possible. Through it the appearance comes into a certain contradiction with itself, which the word self-denial names, and in the end the in-itself of its being cancels itself. This real and only direct expression of the freedom of the will in itself, even in the appearance, cannot yet be clearly presented here. It will be the subject of our consideration quite at the end. Now the present discussions have made clear the unchangeability of the empirical

character, which is the mere unfolding of the intelligible character outside time, and also the necessity with which actions come from its meeting with the motives. So we first have to set aside a conclusion that could very easily be drawn from this in favor of contemptible inclinations. Our character is to be regarded as the unfolding in time of an act of will outside time, and therefore indivisible and unchangeable, or an intelligible character. By this everything essential, that is, the ethical content of our conduct of life, is unchangeably determined, and must express itself accordingly in its appearance, the empirical character. Only the inessential part of this appearance, the outward shape of our course of life, depends on the shapes in which the motives present themselves. So one could conclude that it would be vain trouble to work at improving one's character, or to resist the power of evil inclinations. It would therefore be more advisable to submit to the unalterable and to give in at once to every inclination, even an evil one.—But this is in every respect the same case as the theory of inescapable fate and the conclusion drawn from it, which is called αργος λογος, in recent times the Turkish faith. The correct refutation of this, as Chrysippus is said to have given it, Cicero presents in the book de fato, ch. 12, 13.

Everything can be regarded as irrevocably predetermined by fate, but it is so only by means of the chain of causes. So in no case can it be determined that an effect should occur without its cause. It is not the event as such, then, that is predetermined, but the event as the result of preceding causes. So fate has decreed not the result alone but also the means whose result it is destined to be. If the means do not occur, then surely the result does not either. Both are always according to the determination of fate, which we, however, always learn only afterwards.

Events always turn out according to fate, that is, the endless chain of causes. In the same way our deeds will always turn out according to our intelligible character. But as we do not know the former beforehand, so no insight into the latter is given to us a priori either. Only a posteriori, through experience, do we get to know ourselves, as we do others. Suppose our intelligible character brought it about that we could form a good resolution only after a long fight

against an evil inclination. Then this fight must come first and be waited out. Reflection on the unchangeability of character, on the unity of the source from which all our deeds flow, must not tempt us to run ahead of the decision of our character, in favor of the one side or the other. From the resolution that follows we shall see what kind we are, and mirror ourselves in our deeds. This is exactly what explains the satisfaction, or the anguish of soul, with which we look back on the road of life we have traveled. Both come not from those past deeds still having an existence. They are past, they have been, and are now nothing. But their great importance for us comes from their meaning. It comes from the fact that these deeds are the imprint of the character, the mirror of the will, in which, looking, we recognize our innermost self, the core of our will. Because we learn this not beforehand but only afterwards, it falls to us to strive and fight in time. The point is that the picture we produce by our deeds should turn out so that the sight of it calms us as much as possible and does not frighten us. The meaning of such calm, or anguish of soul, will, as I said, be examined further below. At this point, however, another consideration belongs, one that stands on its own. Besides the intelligible and the empirical character, a third, different from both, must be mentioned, the acquired character. One gets it only in life, through dealing with the world. It is what is meant when someone is praised as a man who has character, or blamed as characterless.—One might think that, since the empirical character, as appearance of the intelligible one, is unchangeable and, like every natural appearance, consistent in itself, man too would for that very reason always have to appear the same as himself and consistent. He would then have no need to acquire a character artificially through experience and reflection. But it is otherwise. Although one is always the same, one does not always understand oneself, and often misjudges oneself, until one has acquired real self-knowledge to a certain degree. The empirical character, as a mere natural drive, is in itself unreasonable. Indeed its expressions are even disturbed by reason, and the more so the more reflection and power of thought the man has. For these always hold before him what belongs to man in general, as character of the species, and what is possible to man, in willing as in achieving. This makes it harder for him

to see which of all this he alone, by virtue of his individuality, wills and is able to do. He finds in himself the dispositions for all human strivings and powers, however different. But the different degree of them in his individuality does not become clear to him without experience. And when he does take up the strivings that alone suit his character, he still feels, especially in single moments and moods, the urge toward exactly opposite ones that cannot be reconciled with them. These must be entirely suppressed if he wants to follow the former undisturbed. For our physical path on earth is always only a line, not a surface. So in life, if we want to grasp and possess one thing, we must renounce and leave lying innumerable other things, to the right and to the left. If we cannot decide to do this, but grab, like children at a fair, at everything that tempts us as we pass, then this is the perverse effort to turn the line of our path into a surface. We then run in zigzags, flit this way and that like will-o'-the-wisps, and arrive at nothing.—Or, to use another comparison: according to Hobbes's theory of right, everyone originally has a right to every thing, but an exclusive right to none. He can gain the latter for single things by giving up his right to all the rest, while the others in turn do the same as regards what he has chosen. Life is exactly so. We can pursue any definite striving, whether for enjoyment, honor, wealth, science, art, or virtue, with real seriousness and success only when we give up all claims foreign to it and renounce everything else. For this reason mere willing, and also mere ability, is not enough in itself. A man must also know what he wills, and know what he can do. Only so will he show character, and only then can he accomplish anything right. Before he gets there, in spite of the natural consistency of the empirical character, he is characterless. He must, on the whole, remain true to himself and run his course, drawn by his daemon. Yet he will not trace a straight line but a trembling, uneven one. He will waver, deviate, turn back, and prepare repentance and pain for himself. All this is because, in great things and small, he sees before him so much that is possible and attainable to man, and yet does not know which of it alone suits him and is doable by him, indeed even enjoyable by him. He will therefore envy many a person for a situation and conditions that suit only that person's character, not his own, and in which he would feel unhappy, perhaps not even be able to bear

it. For as the fish is well only in water, the bird only in air, the mole only under the earth, so each man is well only in the atmosphere suited to him. The air of a court, for example, is not breathable for everyone. For want of sufficient insight into all this, many a man will make all kinds of unsuccessful attempts. He will do violence to his character in single points, and on the whole have to give way to it again. And what he so gains with effort, against his nature, will give him no enjoyment. What he so learns will stay dead. Even in an ethical respect, a deed that did not spring from pure, immediate impulse but from a concept, a dogma, and is too noble for his character, will lose all merit through the egoistic repentance that follows, even in his own eyes. Velle non discitur. We learn the inflexibility of other characters only through experience, and until then we childishly believe that by reasonable representations, by begging and pleading, by example and nobility we could bring anyone to give up his nature, change his way of acting, depart from his way of thinking, or even widen his abilities. The same happens to us with ourselves. We must first learn from experience what we will and what we can do. Until then we do not know it, are characterless, and must often be thrown back onto our own path by hard blows from outside.—But when we have finally learned it, we have gained what in the world is called character, the acquired character. This, then, is nothing other than the most complete possible knowledge of one's own individuality. It is abstract and therefore distinct knowledge of the unchangeable properties of one's own empirical character, and of the measure and direction of one's mental and bodily powers, that is, of all the strengths and weaknesses of one's own individuality. This puts us in a position to carry out the role of our own person, which is unchangeable once for all and which until now we simply lived out like nature, without rule, now deliberately and methodically, and to fill the gaps that moods or weaknesses cause in it, under the guidance of firm concepts. The way of acting that our individual nature makes necessary anyway we have now brought under distinctly conscious maxims, always present to us. By these we carry it out as deliberately as if it were something learned. We never go astray through the passing influence of mood or of the impression of the present. We are not held back by the bitterness or sweetness of some particular thing met on

the way. We do not hesitate, waver, or fall into inconsistencies. We will no longer, like beginners, wait, try, and grope about to see what we really will and what we can do. We know it once for all. In every choice we have only to apply general propositions to single cases, and we come at once to a resolution. We know our will in general, and do not let mood or outside invitation lead us to resolve in the single case what is contrary to it on the whole. We likewise know the kind and measure of our powers and our weaknesses, and will thereby spare ourselves much pain. For there really is no enjoyment except in the use and feeling of one's own powers, and the greatest pain is a perceived lack of powers where one needs them. Now suppose we have found out where our strengths and where our weaknesses lie. Then we shall develop our prominent natural dispositions, use them, and try to take advantage of them in every way, and always turn to where they are fit and count. But we shall thoroughly and with self-mastery avoid the strivings for which we have little natural disposition. We shall be careful not to try what we shall not succeed in anyway. Only the man who has got there will always be himself with full deliberation, and will never be left in the lurch by himself, because he always knew what he could ask of himself. He will then often share the joy of feeling his strengths, and seldom feel the pain of being reminded of his weaknesses. That latter is humiliation, which perhaps causes the greatest mental pain. So one can bear much better to look his ill luck in the face than his clumsiness.—Now if we are fully acquainted with our strengths and weaknesses, we shall not try to show powers we do not have, and shall not play with false coin, because such sham fencing misses its aim in the end. The whole man is only the appearance of his will, so nothing can be more perverse than to start from reflection and want to be something other than one is. That is a direct contradiction of the will with itself. Imitating the qualities and peculiarities of others is much more shameful than wearing other people's clothes. For it is the judgment of one's own worthlessness, pronounced by oneself. Knowledge of one's own disposition and of one's abilities of every kind and their unalterable limits is in this respect the surest way to reach the greatest possible contentment with oneself. For what holds of outer circumstances holds of inner ones: for us there is no more effec-

tive comfort than the full certainty of unalterable necessity. An evil that has befallen us torments us not so much as the thought of the circumstances by which it could have been averted. So nothing is more effective for our calm than to consider what has happened from the standpoint of necessity, from which all accidents show themselves as instruments of a ruling fate. We then recognize the evil that has come as unavoidably brought on by the conflict of inner and outer circumstances. That is fatalism. We also really lament and rage only as long as we hope thereby either to act on others, or to rouse ourselves to unheard-of effort. But children and adults alike know very well how to be content as soon as they see clearly that it cannot be otherwise: θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλον δαμάσαντες ἀνάγκῃ.

(Animo in pectoribus nostro domito necessitate.)

We are like captured elephants, which rage and struggle terribly for many days until they see that it is fruitless, and then suddenly offer their necks calmly to the yoke, tamed forever. We are like King David, who, as long as his son still lived, besieged Jehovah unceasingly with entreaties and behaved in despair, but as soon as the son was dead, thought no more about it. That is why countless lasting evils, such as being crippled, poverty, low rank, ugliness, an unpleasant place to live, are borne quite indifferently by countless people and no longer felt at all, like healed wounds, merely because these people know that inner or outer necessity leaves nothing to change here. Happier people do not see how it can be borne. As with outer necessity, so with inner: nothing reconciles one so firmly as a clear knowledge of it. Suppose we have clearly recognized once for all our faults and weaknesses as well as our good qualities and strengths, set our goal accordingly, and made our peace with what is unattainable. Then, so far as our individuality allows, we most surely escape the bitterest of all sufferings, dissatisfaction with ourselves. It is the unavoidable result of ignorance of one's own individuality, of false conceit and the presumption that comes from it. To the bitter chapters of the self-knowledge recommended here, Ovid's verse applies excellently:

Optimus ille animi vindex laedentia pectus Vincula qui rupit, dedoluitque semel.

So much for the acquired character. It is important not so much for ethics proper as for life in the world. Still, its discussion was placed alongside that of the intelligible and the empirical character as the third kind. We had to go into a somewhat detailed consideration of those first two, in order to make clear to ourselves how the will in all its appearances is subject to necessity, while in itself it can nevertheless be called free, indeed omnipotent.

56 This freedom, this omnipotence, of which the whole visible world, its appearance, stands as expression and image, and develops progressively according to the laws that the form of knowledge brings with it—this can express itself anew too. It does so where, in its most perfect appearance, the fully adequate knowledge of its own nature has dawned on it. It can do this in either of two ways. In the first, here too, at the summit of reflection and self-consciousness, it wills the same thing that it willed blindly and without knowing itself. Knowledge then remains a motive for it, in the whole as in the single case. In the second, the other way round, this knowledge becomes for it a quietive that calms and cancels all willing. This is the affirmation and denial of the will to life, already stated above in general. As a general willing in respect of the individual's conduct, not a single one, it does not disturb the development of the character by modifying it, nor does it find its expression in single actions. Instead, either through an ever stronger coming out of the whole former way of acting, or conversely through its cancellation, it expresses in living form the maxim that the will, after the knowledge now received, has freely taken up.—The clearer unfolding of all this is the main subject of this last book. It has already been made somewhat easier and prepared for by the reflections on freedom, necessity and character that have come between. It will become still easier once we have first, putting that off yet again, turned our consideration to life itself, whose willing or not-willing is the great question. We shall do so in such a way that we try to recognize in general what the will itself, which is everywhere the innermost essence of this life, really gets by its affirmation, in what way and how far

it satisfies it, indeed can satisfy it. In short, we shall try to see what, in general and in essentials, is to be regarded as its condition in this world that is its own and belongs to it in every respect.

First of all I would like the reader to call back the reflection with which we ended the second book. It was prompted by the question raised there, about the goal and purpose of the will. Instead of an answer, what came before our eyes was this: on all levels of its appearance, from the lowest to the highest, the will entirely lacks any final goal and purpose. It always strives, because striving is its only nature. No goal that is reached puts an end to it. It is therefore capable of no final satisfaction, but can only be held up by obstruction, and in itself goes on to infinity. We saw this in the simplest of all natural appearances, gravity. It does not stop striving and pressing toward a center without extension, the reaching of which would be the destruction of gravity and of matter. It would not stop even if the whole universe were already balled together. We see it in the other simple natural appearances. The solid strives, whether by melting or by dissolving, toward fluidity, where alone its chemical forces become free. Rigidity is their imprisonment, in which cold holds them. The fluid strives toward the form of vapor, into which it passes at once as soon as it is freed from all pressure. No body is without affinity, that is, without striving, or without craving and desire, as Jakob Böhm would say. Electricity carries its inner self-division on to infinity, even though the mass of the globe swallows the effect. Galvanism too, as long as the pile is alive, is a purposeless, unceasingly renewed act of self-division and reconciliation. Just such a restless, never satisfied striving is the existence of the plant, an unceasing driving through ever higher forms, until the end point, the seed, becomes the starting point again. This is repeated to infinity. Nowhere is there a goal, nowhere final satisfaction, nowhere a resting point. At the same time we shall remember from the second book that everywhere the manifold forces of nature and organic forms dispute with each other the matter in which they want to appear. Each possesses only what it has snatched from another, and so a constant fight for life and death is kept up. It is mainly from this fight that the resistance arises by which that striving, which makes up the innermost essence of every thing, is everywhere

obstructed. It presses in vain, yet cannot give up its nature, and struggles on, until this appearance perishes, and then others seize its place and its matter greedily.

Long ago we recognized this striving, which makes up the core and the in-itself of every thing, as the very same thing that in us, where it shows itself most distinctly in the light of fullest consciousness, is called will. Its obstruction by an obstacle that stands between it and its momentary goal we then call suffering. Its reaching of the goal we call satisfaction, well-being, happiness. We can also carry these names over to those appearances of the world without knowledge, which are weaker in degree but identical in essence. We then see these caught in constant suffering and without lasting happiness. For all striving springs from lack, from dissatisfaction with one's state, and so is suffering as long as it is not satisfied. No satisfaction, however, lasts. Rather it is always only the starting point of a new striving. We see striving everywhere obstructed in many ways, everywhere fighting, and so always as suffering, as long as it lasts. There is no last goal of striving, so no measure and end of suffering.

What we discover in nature without knowledge only with sharpened attention and effort stands out plainly before us in nature with knowledge, in the life of the animal world, whose constant suffering is easy to prove. But let us not linger at this middle level, and turn to where, lit up by the clearest knowledge, everything stands out most distinctly, in the life of man. For as the appearance of the will becomes more perfect, suffering too becomes more and more evident. In the plant there is as yet no sensibility, and so no pain. A certainly very small degree of suffering dwells in the lowest animals, the infusoria and radiata. Even in insects the capacity to feel and suffer is still limited. Only with the perfect nervous system of vertebrates does it come in to a high degree, and to a higher and higher one the more intelligence develops. In the same measure, then, as knowledge reaches distinctness and consciousness rises, torment too grows. So it reaches its highest degree in man, and there again the more, the more clearly he knows and the more intelligent he is. The man in whom genius lives suffers most. In this sense, namely in relation to the degree of knowledge in general, not to mere abstract knowing, I understand and use here that saying

of Koheleth: Qui auget scientiam, auget et dolorem.—This exact relation between the degree of consciousness and that of suffering has been expressed most beautifully, in a vivid and striking presentation, in a drawing by that philosophical painter, or painting philosopher, Tischbein. The upper half of his sheet shows women whose children are being carried off. In different groups and postures they express in many ways deep motherly pain, fear, despair. The lower half of the sheet shows, in exactly the same arrangement and grouping, sheep from which the lambs are being taken away. So every human head and every human posture in the upper half has an animal analogue below. One now sees clearly how the pain possible in dull animal consciousness stands to the mighty torment that became possible only through the distinctness of knowledge, the clarity of consciousness.

For this reason let us consider the inner and essential fate of the will in human existence. Anyone can easily find the same thing again in the life of the animal, only weaker, expressed in different degrees, and can convince himself enough, also from the suffering animal world, how essentially all life is suffering.

57 On every level that knowledge lights up, the will appears to itself as an individual. In infinite space and infinite time the human individual finds himself finite, and so a quantity that vanishes against them. He is thrown into them, and because of their boundlessness he has only ever a relative, never an absolute when and where of his existence. For his place and his duration are finite parts of an infinite and boundless whole.—His real existence is only in the present. Its unchecked flight into the past is a constant passing into death, a constant dying. For his past life, setting aside its possible consequences for the present and also the testimony about his will that is stamped in it, is already completely done with, dead, and nothing any more. So it must reasonably be a matter of indifference to him whether the content of that past was torments or enjoyments. But the present constantly becomes the past under his hands. The future is wholly uncertain and always short. So his existence, considered from the formal side alone, is a constant plunging of the present into the dead past, a constant dying. But now look at it from the physical side. It is evident that, as

our walking is, as is well known, only a constantly checked falling, the life of our body is only a continually checked dying, an ever postponed death. Finally, in the same way, the activity of our mind is a continually pushed-back boredom. Every breath wards off the death that is constantly pressing in. In this way we fight it in every second, and then again, at longer intervals, through every meal, every sleep, every warming, and so on. In the end it must win. For we have fallen to it already by birth, and it only plays for a while with its prey before it devours it. Meanwhile we go on with our life with great interest and much care, as long as possible, as one blows a soap bubble as long and as big as possible, though with the firm certainty that it will burst.

We already saw in nature without knowledge that its inner essence is a constant striving, without goal and without rest. This stands out much more distinctly when we consider the animal and man. Willing and striving is his whole essence, quite comparable to an unquenchable thirst. The basis of all willing, however, is need, lack, and so pain, to which he therefore falls prey originally and by his nature. If, on the other hand, he lacks objects of willing, because too easy satisfaction at once takes them away again, then terrible emptiness and boredom befall him. That is, his essence and his very existence become an unbearable burden to him. His life swings, then, like a pendulum, to and fro between pain and boredom, which are in fact its last two constituents. This has had to express itself very strangely too in the fact that, after man had put all sufferings and torments into hell, nothing was left for heaven but boredom.

The constant striving, however, which makes up the essence of every appearance of the will, gets at the higher levels of objectification its first and most general foundation from this: here the will appears to itself as a living body, with the iron command to feed it. And what gives this command its force is just that this body is nothing other than the objectified will to life itself. Man, as the most perfect objectification of that will, is accordingly also the neediest of all beings. He is concrete willing and needing through and through, a concretion of a thousand needs. With these he stands on the earth, left to himself, in uncertainty about everything except his neediness and his want. Accordingly the care for maintaining that existence, under such heavy demands that

announce themselves anew every day, fills as a rule the whole of human life. Directly tied to it is the second demand, that of propagating the species. At the same time the most varied kinds of dangers threaten him from all sides, and to escape them needs constant watchfulness. He follows his path with cautious steps and anxious looking around, for a thousand accidents and a thousand enemies lie in wait for him. So he went in the wilderness, and so he goes in civilized life. For him there is no safety:

Qualibus in tenebris vitae, quantisque periclis Degitur hocce aevi, quodcunque est! Lucr., II, 15.

The life of the great majority, too, is only a constant fight for this very existence, with the certainty of losing it in the end. What makes them hold out in such a wearisome fight is not so much the love of life as the fear of death. Death, however, stands unavoidably in the background and can step up at any moment.—Life itself is a sea full of rocks and whirlpools, which man avoids with the greatest caution and care. He knows, though, that even if he succeeds, with all effort and skill, in winding his way through, he comes by that very fact closer with every step to the greatest, the total, the unavoidable and incurable shipwreck. Indeed he steers straight for it: death. This is the final goal of the toilsome voyage, and for him worse than all the rocks he dodged.

Now it is at once very remarkable that, on the one hand, the sufferings and torments of life can easily grow so great that even death, in flight from which all of life consists, becomes desirable and one hurries to it voluntarily. And on the other hand, that as soon as want and suffering grant man a rest, boredom is at once so near that he necessarily needs a pastime. What occupies and keeps in motion all living things is the striving for existence. But with existence, once it is secured to them, they do not know what to do. So the second thing that sets them in motion is the striving to get rid of the burden of existence, to make it unfelt, "to kill time," that is, to escape boredom. Accordingly we see that almost all men who are safe from want and cares, now that they have finally shaken off all other burdens, are a burden to themselves. They count every hour got through as a gain, that is, every subtraction from that very life whose preservation as long as possible they had until then put all their strength into.

Boredom, however, is anything but an evil to be made light of. In the end it paints real despair on the face. It makes beings who love one another as little as men do seek each other out so much, and so it becomes the source of sociability. Public measures are also taken against it everywhere, as against other general calamities, from reasons of statecraft alone. For this evil, as much as its opposite extreme, famine, can drive men to the greatest excesses: panem et Circenses is what the people need. The strict Philadelphian penitentiary system makes mere boredom the instrument of punishment, by means of solitude and inactivity. And it is so frightful that it has already driven convicts to suicide. As want is the constant scourge of the people, so boredom is that of high society. In civil life it is represented by Sunday, as want is by the six weekdays. Between willing and reaching every human life flows on throughout. The wish is, by its nature, pain. Reaching it quickly breeds satiety. The goal was only apparent. Possession takes away the charm. Under a new shape the wish, the need, comes back. If not, then desolation, emptiness, boredom follow, and the fight against these is as tormenting as against want.—That wish and satisfaction follow each other without too short and without too long intervals reduces the suffering that both give to its least measure, and makes up the happiest course of life. For what one might otherwise call the finest part, the purest joys of life, are called so only because they lift us out of real existence and turn us into onlookers who take no part in it. This is pure knowing, to which all willing stays foreign, the enjoyment of the beautiful, the true joy in art. Because it already requires rare gifts, it is granted only to very few, and even to these only as a passing dream. And then these few are made by their higher intellectual power receptive to much greater sufferings than duller people can ever feel, and are besides placed in solitude among beings noticeably different from them. So this too evens out. But the great majority of men have no access to purely intellectual enjoyments. They are almost wholly incapable of the joy that lies in pure knowing. They are thrown back entirely on willing. So if anything is to win their interest, to be interesting to them, it must (this lies already in the meaning of the word) in some way stir their will, even if only by a distant relation to it that lies merely in possibility. The will must never stay wholly out of play, because their existence

lies far more in willing than in knowing. Action and reaction is their only element. The naive expressions of this nature can be gathered from trifles and everyday phenomena. For example, at places worth seeing that they visit they write their names, in order thus to react, to act on the place, since it did not act on them. Further, they cannot easily merely look at a strange, rare animal, but must provoke it, tease it, play with it, just to feel action and reaction. But that need for the stirring of the will shows itself especially in the invention and maintenance of the card game, which is quite properly the expression of the pitiable side of mankind.

But whatever nature, whatever fortune may have done; whoever one may be, and whatever one may own, the pain that belongs essentially to life cannot be shaken off:

Πηλειδης δ' ωμωξεν, ιδων εις ουρανον ευρυν.

(Pelides autem ejulavit, intuitus in coelum latum.) And again: Ζηνος μεν παις ηα Κρονιονος, αυταρ οιζυν Ειχον απειρεσιην.

(Jovis quidem filius eram Saturnii; verum aerumnam Habebam infinitam.) The unceasing efforts to banish suffering accomplish nothing more than that it changes its shape. Originally this is lack, want, care for the preservation of life. If one has succeeded, which is very hard, in driving pain out in this shape, it at once appears in a thousand others, varying with age and circumstances: as sexual drive, passionate love, jealousy, envy, hatred, fear, ambition, avarice, illness, and so on and so on. If it can finally find entry in no other shape, it comes in the sad, gray garment of weariness and boredom, against which then all sorts of things are tried. If one finally succeeds in driving this away, it will hardly happen without letting pain in again in one of the former shapes, and so beginning the dance anew. For between pain and boredom every human life is tossed to and fro. Depressing as this reflection is, I still want to draw attention in passing to one side of it from which comfort can be drawn, and perhaps even a Stoic indifference to one's own present evil. For our impatience over this evil arises largely from our recognizing it as accidental, as brought about by a chain of causes that could easily be otherwise. For we are not in the habit of grieving over the directly necessary and quite general evils, such as the necessity of old

age and death and of many daily inconveniences. It is rather the thought of the accidental character of the circumstances that brought a suffering precisely on us that gives it its sting. But suppose we have recognized that pain as such is essential to life and unavoidable, and that nothing more than its mere shape, the form in which it presents itself, depends on chance. Then our present suffering fills a place into which, without it, another would at once step that is now shut out by it. So in essentials fate can do little to us. Such a reflection, if it became a living conviction, could bring about a considerable degree of Stoic evenness of mind and greatly reduce anxious concern for one's own welfare. In fact, though, so powerful a rule of reason over directly felt suffering may seldom or never be found.

Moreover, that reflection on the unavoidability of pain, on the driving out of one pain by another, and the drawing in of the new by the exit of the previous one, could even lead to a paradoxical but not absurd hypothesis. It is that in each individual the measure of the pain essential to him is fixed once for all by his nature. This measure could neither stay empty nor be overfilled, however much the form of suffering may change. His suffering and well-being would then not be determined from outside at all, but only by that measure, that disposition. This might indeed undergo some decrease and increase at different times through physical condition, but on the whole would stay the same, and would be nothing other than what is called his temperament. More exactly, it would be the degree to which he is, as Plato puts it in the first book of the Republic, ευκολος or δυσκολος, that is, of easy or hard temper.—This hypothesis is supported not only by the familiar experience that great sufferings make all smaller ones entirely unfelt, and conversely, in the absence of great sufferings, even the smallest unpleasantnesses torment us and put us in a bad mood. Experience also teaches that when a great misfortune, at the mere thought of which we shuddered, has actually come, our mood, once we have got over the first pain, stands on the whole quite unchanged. And conversely, that after the arrival of a long-wished-for happiness we do not on the whole and lastingly feel noticeably better and more comfortable than before. Only the moment of the occurrence of those changes moves us unusually strongly, as deep lamentation

or loud rejoicing. But both soon vanish, because they rested on illusion. For they arise not over the directly present enjoyment or pain, but only over the opening of a new future that is anticipated in it. Only because pain or joy borrowed from the future could they be raised so abnormally, and so not for long. —As further evidence for the hypothesis put forward, according to which, as in knowing, so in the feeling of suffering or well-being a very large part is determined subjectively and a priori, we can cite these remarks. Human cheerfulness or gloom is evidently not determined by outer circumstances, by wealth or rank, since we meet at least as many cheerful faces among the poor as among the rich. Further, the motives on which suicide follows are so extremely various. We can name no misfortune great enough to bring it about, with much probability, in every character, and few so small that equally weighty ones had not already caused it. Now if the degree of our cheerfulness or sadness is not the same at all times, then according to this view we shall ascribe it not to the change of outer circumstances but to that of the inner state, of physical condition. For when a real increase of our cheerfulness occurs, though always only a temporary one, even up to joyfulness, it usually arrives without any outer occasion. True, we often see our pain come only from a definite outer relation, and are visibly weighed down and saddened only by it. We then believe that if only this were removed the greatest contentment would have to come. But this is illusion. The measure of our pain and well-being as a whole is, by our hypothesis, determined subjectively for every point of time, and in relation to it that outer motive for sadness is only what a blister plaster is for the body, to which all the bad humors otherwise spread about draw. The pain that is founded in our nature for this period of time, and therefore cannot be shaken off, would be, without that definite outer cause of suffering, spread over a hundred points and would appear in the form of a hundred small vexations and whims about things we now overlook entirely, because our capacity for pain is already filled by that main evil, which has concentrated all the otherwise scattered suffering on one point. The observation corresponds to this: when a great worry that oppresses us is at last lifted from our breast by a happy outcome, another at once takes its place. All of its material was already there before, but could not

come into consciousness as worry, because consciousness had no capacity left for it. So this material of worry stayed only as a dark unnoticed shape of mist at the farthest edge of its horizon. Now, however, there is room, and this ready material at once steps forward and takes the throne of the ruling (πρυτανευουσα) worry of the day. Even if it is, in its matter, much lighter than the material of the vanished worry, it still knows how to puff itself up so that it equals it in apparent size, and so as the main worry of the day fills the throne completely.

Immoderate joy and very violent pain are always found only in the same person. For the two condition each other, and are also jointly conditioned by great liveliness of mind. Both, as we just found, are produced not by what is purely present but by anticipation of the future. But pain is essential to life and is also determined in degree by the nature of the subject, so sudden changes, which are always outer, cannot really change its degree. So an error and delusion always lies at the bottom of excessive rejoicing or pain. Consequently both of those overstrainings of the mind could be avoided through insight. Every immoderate rejoicing (exultatio, insolens laetitia) always rests on the delusion of having found something in life that is not to be met with in it at all, namely lasting satisfaction of the tormenting wishes or cares that are always born anew. From each single delusion of this kind one must later inevitably be brought back, and then, when it vanishes, pay for it with pains as bitter as the joy its coming caused. In this respect it is exactly like a height from which one can come down again only by a fall. So one should avoid it. And every sudden, excessive pain is just the fall from such a height, the vanishing of such a delusion, and so conditioned by it. One could therefore avoid both if one could bring oneself to survey things always as a whole and in their connection quite clearly, and to guard steadfastly against lending them the color one wished they had. Stoic ethics aimed chiefly at freeing the mind from all such delusion and its consequences, and at giving it instead unshakable evenness of temper. Horace is filled with this insight in the well-known ode:

Aequam memento rebus in arduis Servare mentem, non secus in bonis Ab insolenti temperatam Laetitia.—

Mostly, though, we shut ourselves off from the knowledge, comparable to a bitter medicine, that suffering is essential to life and so does not flow in on us from outside, but everyone carries its unfailing source around in his own inner self. We rather always look for an outer, single cause of the pain that never leaves us, as it were a pretext, as the free man makes himself an idol in order to have a master. For we strive tirelessly from wish to wish. And although every satisfaction obtained, however much it promised, does not satisfy us but mostly soon stands there as a shaming error, we still do not see that we are drawing water with the barrel of the Danaids. Instead we hurry on to ever new wishes:

Sed, dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur Caetera; post aliud, quum contigit illud, avemus; Et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hiantes. (Lucr., III, 1095.)

So it goes on either to infinity or, which is rarer and already presupposes a certain strength of character, until we meet a wish that cannot be fulfilled and yet cannot be given up. Then we have, as it were, what we were looking for: something that at every moment, instead of our own nature, we can accuse as the source of our sufferings. This sets us at odds with our fate, but reconciles us with our existence, since the knowledge recedes again that suffering is essential to this existence itself and true satisfaction impossible. The result of this last way of development is a somewhat melancholy mood, the constant bearing of a single great pain, and a resulting low esteem for all smaller sufferings or joys. It is consequently an appearance already more dignified than the constant grasping after ever other deceptive shapes, which is much more common.

58 All satisfaction, or what is commonly called happiness, is really and essentially always only negative and never positive. It is not a happiness that comes to us originally and of itself, but must always be the satisfaction of a wish. For wish, that is, lack, is the preceding condition of every enjoyment. With satisfaction, however, the wish ceases and so the enjoyment too. So satisfaction or happiness can never be more than release from a pain, from a want. For to this belong not

only every real, evident suffering but also every wish whose importunity disturbs our peace, indeed even the deadening boredom that makes existence a burden to us.—

Now it is so hard to achieve and carry through anything. Difficulties and efforts without end stand against every undertaking, and at every step the obstacles pile up. But when everything is at last overcome and obtained, nothing else can ever be gained than that one is freed from some suffering or some wish, and so is merely in the same state as before it came on.—What is directly given to us is always only lack, that is, pain. Satisfaction and enjoyment we can know only indirectly, by remembering the suffering and privation that went before, which ceased when it came. That is why we do not really become aware of the goods and advantages we actually possess, nor value them, but think nothing else than that it must be so. For they make us happy always only negatively, by holding off suffering. Only after we have lost them do we feel their worth. For lack, privation, suffering is the positive thing, announcing itself directly. That is also why the memory of want, illness, privation and the like that we have got through gives us joy, because it is the only means of enjoying the goods we have now. It also cannot be denied that in this respect, and at this standpoint of egoism, which is the form of the will to life, the sight or description of the suffering of others gives us satisfaction and enjoyment by just that path, as Lucretius puts it beautifully and frankly at the beginning of the second book:

Suave, mari magno, turbantibus aequora ventis, E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem: Non, quia vexari quemquam est jucunda voluptas; Sed, quibus ipse malis careas, quia cernere suave est.

Further on, however, it will be shown to us that this kind of joy, through a knowledge of one's own well-being mediated in this way, lies very close to the source of real positive malice.

That all happiness is of negative, not positive, nature, that for this very reason it cannot be lasting satisfaction and felicity, but only redeems us from a pain or lack, which must be followed either by a new pain, or by languor, empty longing and boredom—this finds proof also in that faithful mirror of the nature of the world and of life, in art, especially in poetry. Every epic or dramatic poem

can only ever present a wrestling, striving and fighting for happiness, never lasting and perfected happiness itself. It leads its hero through a thousand difficulties and dangers to the goal. As soon as it is reached, it quickly lets the curtain fall. For nothing would now be left for it but to show that the bright goal in which the hero thought to find happiness had also only mocked him, and that after reaching it he was no better off than before. Because genuine, lasting happiness is not possible, it cannot be a subject of art. The purpose of the idyll is indeed really the description of such happiness. But one also sees that the idyll as such cannot hold its ground. It always turns under the poet's hands either epic, and then it is only a very insignificant epic, composed of small sufferings, small joys and small strivings (this is the most frequent case), or else it becomes merely descriptive poetry, which depicts the beauty of nature, that is, really pure knowing free of will. This, admittedly, is indeed the only pure happiness, which is neither preceded by suffering or need, nor necessarily followed by repentance, suffering, emptiness or weariness. Only this happiness cannot fill the whole of life, but merely moments of it.—What we see in poetry we find again in music. In its melody we have indeed recognized the innermost history of the self-conscious will expressed in general terms, the most secret life, longing, suffering and rejoicing, the ebb and flow of the human heart. Melody is always a departing from the keynote through a thousand strange windings, up to the most painful dissonance, after which it finally finds the keynote again, which expresses the satisfaction and calming of the will. But nothing more can be done with it afterwards, and any longer holding of it would be only tiresome and meaningless monotony, corresponding to boredom.

Everything these reflections were meant to make clear, that lasting satisfaction cannot be reached and that all happiness is negative, is explained by what was shown at the end of the second book. The will, whose objectification human life is, like every appearance, is a striving with no goal and no end. We find the mark of this endlessness stamped on every part of its whole appearance. It is there in the most general form of appearance, time and space without end, and it is there in the most perfect of all appearances, the life and striving of human beings.—In theory we can assume three extremes of human life and treat them

as elements of real human life. First, powerful willing and the great passions (Radscha-Guna). This shows itself in great historical characters, and epic and drama portray it. But it can also show itself in a small sphere, because the size of the objects is measured here only by how strongly they move the will, not by their outward circumstances. Second, pure knowing, the grasping of the Ideas. This depends on knowledge being freed from the service of the will. It is the life of genius (Satwa-Guna). Third, the greatest lethargy of the will, and with it of the knowledge tied to the will: empty longing and life-numbing boredom (Tama-Guna). The life of an individual is far from staying in any one of these extremes. It touches them only rarely. Most of the time it is just a weak, wavering move toward one side or the other, a meager wanting of petty objects, always coming back, and in this way escaping boredom.—It is truly unbelievable how empty of meaning and significance the life of most people looks from outside, and how dull and unthinking it feels from inside. It is a faint longing and tormenting, a dreamy stumbling through the four ages of life to death, with a string of trivial thoughts for company. People are like clockworks that are wound up and run without knowing why. Every time a human being is begotten and born, the clock of human life is wound up again, to play once more its hurdy-gurdy tune, already played countless times, phrase after phrase and beat after beat, with unimportant variations.—Every individual, every human face and the course of its life, is only one more short dream of the endless spirit of nature, of the persistent will to life. It is only one more fleeting figure that the will sketches playfully on its endless sheet, space and time. It lets the figure last for a while that is vanishingly small compared with that sheet, and then wipes it out to make room for new ones. Yet each of these fleeting figures, these stale whims, has to be paid for by the whole will to life, in all its violence, with many deep pains and finally with a bitter death that was long dreaded and comes at last. This is the troubling side of life. That is why the sight of a corpse makes us suddenly serious.

If we survey anyone's life as a whole, in general terms, picking out only the most significant features, it is really always a tragedy. But when we go through it in detail, it has the character of a comedy. The bustle and trouble of the day, the

restless teasing of the moment, the wishing and fearing of the week, the mishaps of each hour, all arranged by chance, which is always bent on some mischief, are pure comic scenes. But the wishes that are never fulfilled, the striving that comes to nothing, the hopes that fate tramples on without mercy, the disastrous mistakes of a whole life, with growing suffering and death at the end, always make a tragedy. So it is as if fate wanted to add mockery to the misery of our existence. Our life has to contain all the pains of tragedy, and yet we cannot even keep the dignity of tragic persons. In the broad detail of life we are bound to be silly comic characters.

Great and small troubles fill every human life and keep it in constant unrest and motion. Still, they cannot hide how inadequate life is to fill the spirit, or the emptiness and staleness of existence. They cannot keep out boredom either, which is always ready to fill any pause that worry leaves. This is why the human spirit is not content with the cares, anxieties and occupations that the real world lays on it. It also creates an imaginary world, in the form of a thousand different superstitions. It then busies itself with this world in every way and wastes time and energy on it, as soon as the real world is willing to give it the rest that it is not receptive to at all. This was originally most the case among peoples for whom the mild climate and soil make life easy: above all the Hindus, then the Greeks and Romans, and later the Italians, Spaniards and so on.—People make demons, gods and saints in their own image. Then sacrifices, prayers, temple decorations, vows and the fulfilling of vows, pilgrimages, greetings, the adorning of images and so on must be offered to these beings without pause. Their service is woven into reality everywhere, and even darkens it. Every event of life is then taken as a counter-action by those beings. Dealing with them fills half of life's time, keeps hope constantly alive, and, through the charm of illusion, is often more interesting than dealing with real beings. It is the expression and symptom of a twofold need in human beings: partly for help and support, partly for occupation and pastime. It often works directly against the first need, since when accidents and dangers come, precious time and energy are wasted on prayers and sacrifices instead of on averting them. But it

serves the second need all the better, through that fantastic conversation with a dreamed-up world of spirits. This is the gain of all superstitions, and it is not to be despised.

59 Through the most general reflections, by examining the first elementary features of human life, we have now convinced ourselves a priori of this much: by its whole design, life is incapable of true happiness. It is essentially a many-shaped suffering and a thoroughly unhappy condition. We could bring this conviction to life in us much more vividly if we proceeded more a posteriori. We could go into more specific cases, put pictures before the imagination, and describe in examples the nameless misery that experience and history offer, wherever one looks and in whatever respect one inquires. But this chapter would never end, and it would take us away from the standpoint of generality, which is essential to philosophy. Besides, such a description could easily be taken for mere declamation about human misery, of which there has been plenty before, and be accused of one-sidedness because it started from single facts. Our demonstration of the unavoidable suffering that is grounded in the essence of life is free of that reproach and suspicion. It is wholly cold and philosophical, it starts from the general, and it is carried out a priori. The confirmation a posteriori, however, is easy to find anywhere. Take anyone who has awakened from the first dreams of youth, who pays attention to their own experience and that of others, and who has looked around in life, in the history of the past and of their own age, and finally in the works of the great poets. Unless some indelibly impressed prejudice paralyzes their judgment, they will surely recognize this result: this human world is the realm of chance and error. These rule in it without mercy, in great things and small, and beside them folly and malice swing the whip. That is why everything better forces its way through only with effort. The noble and wise very rarely come to appearance or find effect or a hearing. But the absurd and perverse in the realm of thought, the flat and tasteless in the realm of art, and the wicked and sly in the realm of deeds really hold the rule, disturbed only by short interruptions. The excellent of every kind, on the other hand, is always only an exception, one case in millions.

So when it has made itself known in a lasting work, that work, having outlived the resentment of its contemporaries, stands afterward isolated and preserved, like a meteorite that has sprung from a different order of things than the one that rules here.—As for the life of the individual, every life story is a story of suffering. As a rule, every course of life is a continued series of great and small misfortunes. Each person hides them as much as possible, because they know that others seldom feel sympathy or pity at them, and almost always feel satisfaction at the thought of the troubles they happen to be spared just now.—But perhaps no one, at the end of life, if they are sensible and at the same time honest, will ever wish to go through it again. Rather than that, they would much prefer to choose total non-existence. The essential content of the world-famous monologue in "Hamlet" is, in summary, this: our condition is so wretched that total non-existence would decidedly be preferable. If suicide really offered us that, so that the alternative "to be or not to be" lay before us in the full sense of the words, then it would be unconditionally the thing to choose, as a most desirable completion (a consummation devoutly to be wish'd). But there is something in us that tells us it is not so: that this is not the end, and that death is not absolute annihilation.—Likewise, what the father of history reports [15], and what has probably not been refuted since, is that no one has existed who did not wish more than once not to live to see the next day. By that reckoning, the shortness of life, which is so often lamented, may perhaps be the best thing about it.—Suppose one finally wanted to put before everyone's eyes the terrible pains and torments to which their life is constantly open. They would be seized with horror. Suppose one wanted to lead the most hardened optimist through the hospitals, infirmaries and surgeons' torture rooms, through prisons, torture chambers and slave pens, over battlefields and places of execution. Suppose one then opened to him all the dark dwellings of misery, where it creeps away from the glances of cold curiosity, and finally let him look into the hunger tower of Ugolino. Then surely even he would at last see what kind of thing this meilleur des mondes possibles is. Where else did Dante get the material for his hell but from this real world of ours? And yet it turned out to be a quite proper hell. But when he came to the task of describing heaven and its joys, he faced an

insurmountable difficulty, because our world offers no materials at all for such a thing. So nothing was left for him but to give us, in place of the joys of paradise, the instruction given to him there by his ancestor, by his Beatrice and by various saints. This shows well enough what kind of world this is. Admittedly, human life, like every bad ware, is covered on the outside [16] Herodotus, VII, 46. with a false shine. Whatever suffers always hides itself. On the other hand, whatever pomp and glitter anyone can afford, they put on show. The more inner contentment they lack, the more they want to stand in the opinion of others as a happy person. Folly goes that far, and the opinion of others is a chief goal of everyone's striving. Yet the complete emptiness of that goal is already shown by the fact that in almost all languages vanity, vanitas, originally means emptiness and nothingness.—But even under all this show, the torments of life can easily grow so great, and it happens every day, that death, otherwise feared above everything, is seized with eagerness. Indeed, if fate wants to show all its malice, even this refuge can be barred to the sufferer. He can be left in the hands of enraged enemies, given up without rescue to cruel, slow tortures. The tormented man then calls in vain on his gods for help. He remains abandoned to his fate without mercy. But this helplessness is only the mirror of the invincibility of his will, whose objectivity is his person.—No outside power can change or cancel this will. Just as little can any foreign power free him from the torments that come from life, which is the appearance of that will. In the main thing, as in every other, a human being is always thrown back on himself. In vain he makes gods, to beg and flatter from them what only his own power of will can bring about. The Old Testament made the world and man the work of a God. The New Testament wanted to teach that salvation and redemption from the misery of this world can come only from the world itself, and so it saw itself forced to let that God become man. It is man's will on which everything depends for him, and always will be. Sannyasis, martyrs, and saints of every faith and name have willingly and gladly endured every torture, because in them the will to life had canceled itself. Then even the slow destruction of its appearance was welcome to them. But I do not want to anticipate the further exposition.—Besides, I cannot hold back here the declaration that *optimism*

seems to me not only absurd but truly *wicked* as a way of thinking, a bitter mockery of the nameless sufferings of mankind. I make an exception only where optimism is merely the thoughtless talk of people under whose flat foreheads nothing lodges but words.—Let no one think that Christian doctrine favors optimism. On the contrary, in the Gospels world and evil are used almost as synonymous expressions [17].

60 We have now finished the two discussions whose interposition was necessary. The first was on the freedom of the will in itself, together with the necessity of its appearance. The second was on the will's lot in the world that mirrors its essence, on whose knowledge it has to affirm or deny itself. So we can now raise this affirmation and denial themselves to greater clarity. Above, we only stated and explained them in general terms. We do this by presenting the kinds of action in which alone they find expression, and by considering these in their inner meaning.

The affirmation of the will is the constant willing itself, undisturbed by any knowledge, as it fills human life in general. The human body is already the objectivity of the will, as it appears at this stage and in this individual. So the person's willing, which develops in time, is as it were the paraphrase of the body, the explanation of the meaning of the whole and of its parts. It is another way of presenting the same thing in itself whose appearance the body also is. So instead of affirmation of the will we can also say affirmation of the body. The basic theme of all the many acts of will is the satisfaction of the needs that cannot be separated from the body's existence in health, that already have their expression in it, and that can be traced back to the preservation of the individual and the propagation of the species. But indirectly, through this, the most varied [18] On this see chapter 46 of the second volume. motives gain power over the will and bring forth the most varied acts of will. Each of these is only a sample, an example, of the will that appears here in general. What kind of sample it is, what shape the motive has and gives to it, is not essential. What matters here is only that there is willing at all, and with what degree of intensity. The will can become visible only in motives, as the eye shows its power of sight only

in light. The motive in general stands before the will like a many-shaped Proteus. It always promises complete satisfaction, the quenching of the will's thirst. But once it is reached, it stands there at once in another shape and moves the will again in that shape. This always goes according to the will's degree of intensity and its relation to knowledge, and these two are exactly what these samples and examples reveal as the empirical character.

From the moment consciousness begins, a person finds themselves willing, and as a rule their knowledge stays in constant relation to their will. First they try to get to know fully the objects of their willing, and then the means to reach them. Now they know what they have to do, and as a rule they do not strive for any other knowledge. They act and drive on. The awareness that they are always working toward the goal of their willing keeps them upright and active. Their thinking is about the choice of means. This is the life of almost all people. They will. They know what they will. They strive for it with enough success to keep them from despair, and with enough failure to protect them from boredom and its consequences. From this comes a certain cheerfulness, or at least calm, which wealth or poverty really do not change. The rich and the poor do not enjoy what they have, since that works only negatively, as has been shown. They enjoy what they hope to gain by their busy pursuit. They push forward with great seriousness, even with an air of importance. Children play their games in the same way.—It is always an exception when such a course of life is disturbed. This happens when a kind of knowing that is independent of the service of the will, and is directed at the essence of the world as a whole, brings either the aesthetic call to contemplation or the ethical call to renunciation. Need chases most people through life without letting them come to reflection. On the other hand, the will often flares up to a degree far beyond the affirmation of the body. Violent emotions and powerful passions show this degree. In them the individual not only affirms their own existence but denies that of others, and tries to cancel it where it stands in their way.

The preservation of the body by its own powers is so slight a degree of affirmation of the will that, if it stopped there of its own accord, we could assume that with the death of this body the will that appeared in it was extinguished too.

But the satisfaction of the sexual drive already goes beyond the affirmation of one's own existence, which fills only so short a time. It affirms life beyond the individual's death, into an unlimited time. Nature, always true and consistent, and here even naive, lays out the inner meaning of the act of procreation openly before us. Our own consciousness, the violence of the drive, teaches us that in this act the most decided *affirmation of the will to life* expresses itself, pure and with no further addition (such as the denial of other individuals). And now, in time and the causal series, that is, in nature, a new life appears as the consequence of the act. The begotten one stands before the begetter. In appearance it is different from the begetter, but in itself, or according to the Idea, it is identical with the begetter. So it is this act through which the species of living things each join together into a whole and perpetuate themselves as such. In relation to the begetter, procreation is only the expression, the symptom, of their decided affirmation of the will to life. In relation to the begotten, it is not the ground of the will that appears in them, since the will in itself knows neither ground nor consequence. Like every cause, it is only the occasional cause of the appearance of this will at this time in this place. As thing in itself, the will of the begetter and that of the begotten are not different, since only the appearance, not the thing in itself, is subject to the principium individuationis. This affirmation goes beyond one's own body, as far as the production of a new one. With it, suffering and death, as belonging to the appearance of life, are affirmed anew as well. And the possibility of redemption, brought about by the most perfect capacity for knowledge, is this time declared fruitless. Here lies the deep ground of the shame about the business of procreation.—This view is presented in myth in the dogma of the Christian faith that we all share in Adam's Fall (which is obviously only the satisfaction of sexual desire), and are guilty of suffering and death through it. In this, that doctrine goes beyond the way of looking at things by the principle of sufficient reason and recognizes the Idea of man. The unity of this Idea, broken up into countless individuals, is restored by the bond of procreation that holds all of them together. Accordingly the doctrine sees each individual, on the one hand, as identical with Adam, the representative of the affirmation of life, and to that

extent as fallen to sin (original sin), suffering and death. On the other hand, knowledge of the Idea shows it each individual also as identical with the Redeemer, the representative of the denial of the will to life. To that extent each shares in his self-sacrifice, is redeemed by his merit, and is rescued from the bonds of sin and death, that is, of the world (Rom. 5, 12–21).

Another mythical presentation of our view of sexual satisfaction is the Greek myth of Proserpina. On our view, sexual satisfaction is the affirmation of the will to life beyond the individual life. It is a surrender to life that is only thereby completed, or as it were a renewed binding to life. Proserpina could still return from the underworld as long as she had not tasted the fruits of the underworld. But by eating the pomegranate she falls wholly into its power. Goethe's incomparable presentation of this myth makes its meaning very clear, especially when, right after the eating of the pomegranate, the unseen chorus of the Fates suddenly breaks in:

"You are ours! You were to return fasting. And the bite of the apple makes you ours!"

It is worth noting that *Clement of Alexandria* (Strom., III, ch. 15) describes the matter with the same image and the same expression: Οἱ μεν ευνουχισαντες ἑαυτους απο πασης ἁμαρτιας, δια την βασιλειαν των ουρανων, μακαριοι οὑτοι εισιν, *οἱ του κοσμου νηστευοντες*. (Qui se castrarunt ab omni peccato, propter regnum coelorum, ii sunt beati, *a mundo jejunantes*.)

The sexual drive also confirms itself as the decided, strongest affirmation of life by being, for the natural human being as for the animal, the final purpose, the highest goal of life. Self-preservation is the first thing they strive for, and as soon as they have seen to that, they strive only for the propagation of the species. As a merely natural being, they cannot strive for more. Nature too, whose inner essence is the will to life itself, drives human beings, like animals, with all its force to propagate. Once this is done, it has reached its purpose with the individual and is wholly indifferent to the individual's destruction. For nature, as the will to life, cares only about preserving the species, and the individual is nothing to it.—Because the inner essence of nature, the will to life, expresses itself most strongly in the sexual drive, the old poets and philosophers, Hesiod

and Parmenides, said very meaningfully that *Eros* was the first thing, the creator, the principle from which all things came forth. (See Aristot. Metaph., I, 4.) Pherecydes said: Εις ερωτα μεταβεβλησθαι τον Δια, μελλοντα δημιουργειν. (Jovem, cum mundum fabricare vellet, in cupidinem sese transformasse.) Proclus ad Plat. Tim., l. III.—We have recently received a detailed treatment of this subject from *G. F. Schoemann*, "De cupidine cosmogonico", 1852. The Indians' Maya, whose work and web is the whole world of illusion, is also paraphrased by amor.

More than any other outer part of the body, the genitals are subject only to the will and not at all to knowledge. Indeed, the will shows itself here almost as independent of knowledge as it is in the parts that serve vegetative life and reproduction, which act on mere stimuli and in which the will works blindly, as in nature without knowledge. For procreation is only reproduction passing over to a new individual, reproduction as it were to the second power, just as death is only excretion to the second power.—Accordingly, the genitals are the real *focal point* of the will, and so the opposite pole to the brain, the representative of knowledge, that is, of the other side of the world, the world as representation. The genitals are the life-preserving principle, which assures time of endless life. In this capacity they were worshiped by the Greeks in the phallus and by the Hindus in the lingam, which are therefore the symbol of the affirmation of the will. Knowledge, on the other hand, gives the possibility of the cancellation of willing, of redemption through freedom, of the overcoming and annihilation of the world.

At the beginning of this fourth book we already considered in detail how the will to life, in its affirmation, has to regard its relation to death. Death does not trouble it, because death stands there as something already included in life and belonging to it. Its opposite, procreation, fully balances it, and secures and guarantees life to the will to life for all time, despite the death of the individual. To express this, the Indians gave the god of death, Shiva, the lingam as his attribute. We also explained there how a person who stands on the standpoint of decided affirmation of life, and does so with full reflection, faces death without fear. So there is nothing more to say about that here. Most people stand on

this standpoint without clear reflection, and keep on affirming life. As the mirror of this affirmation the world stands there, with countless individuals, in endless time and endless space and endless suffering, between procreation and death without end.—Yet no complaint is to be raised about this from any side. The will puts on the great tragedy and comedy at its own expense, and is also its own spectator. The world is exactly such as it is because the will, whose appearance it is, is such, because it so wills. The justification for the sufferings is that the will affirms itself on this appearance too. This affirmation is justified and balanced by the fact that the will bears the sufferings. Already here a view opens to us of *eternal justice*, as a whole. We shall recognize it later more closely and more clearly in particular cases too. But first we shall have to speak of temporal or human justice [19].

61 We remember from the second book that throughout nature, at all stages of the objectification of the will, there was of necessity a constant struggle between the individuals of all species. In this way an inner conflict of the will to life with itself expressed itself. At the highest stage of objectification, this phenomenon, like everything else, will present itself with heightened clarity, and so it can be deciphered further. For this purpose we want first to trace *egoism*, as the starting point of all struggle, to its source.

We have called time and space the principium individuationis, because only through them and in them is a multiplicity of like things possible. They are the essential forms of natural knowledge, that is, of knowledge sprung from the will. So the will must appear everywhere in a multiplicity of individuals. But this multiplicity does not touch the will as thing in itself. It touches only its appearances. The will is present whole and undivided in each of these, and sees around itself the countlessly repeated image of its own essence. But this essence itself, the really real, it finds directly only in its own inner being. That is why each individual wants everything for itself, wants to possess everything, or at least to rule everything, and would like to destroy whatever opposes it. In beings that know there is a further point. The individual is the bearer of the knowing subject, and the knowing subject is the bearer of the world. That is,

the whole of nature outside the individual, and so all other individuals too, exist only in its representation. It is aware of them always only as its representation, so only indirectly and as something dependent on its own being and existence. For with its consciousness the world necessarily perishes for it too, that is, the world's being and not-being become equivalent and indistinguishable. Every knowing individual[20] On this see chapter 45 of the second volume. is therefore in truth, and finds itself as, the whole will to life, or the in-itself of the world, and also as the complementary condition of the world as representation. Consequently it is a microcosm, to be valued equal to the macrocosm. Nature itself, which is always and everywhere truthful, gives it this knowledge, simply and with immediate certainty, originally and independently of all reflection. These two necessary determinations explain why every individual, vanishing entirely in the boundless world and reduced to nothing, nevertheless makes itself the center of the world. It considers its own existence and well-being before everything else. On the natural standpoint it is ready to sacrifice everything else to this. It is ready to destroy the world, just to keep its own self, this drop in the ocean, a little longer. This attitude is *egoism*, which is essential to every thing in nature. But it is exactly egoism through which the inner conflict of the will with itself comes to terrible manifestation. For this egoism has its subsistence and essence in that opposition of microcosm and macrocosm. That is, the objectification of the will has the principium individuationis as its form, and so the will appears in the same way in countless individuals, and in each of them entire and complete on both sides (will and representation). So while each is given to itself directly as the whole will and the whole representing subject, the others are given to it at first only as its representations. That is why its own essence and its preservation come before all others together. Everyone looks on their own death as the end of the world, while they hear of the death of their acquaintances as a rather indifferent matter, unless they happen to be personally involved. In consciousness raised to its highest degree, the human, egoism too, like knowledge, pain and joy, must have reached the highest degree. The conflict of individuals that it conditions must show itself in the most dreadful way. And we do see this everywhere before our eyes, in small things

and in great. Sometimes we see it from its terrible side, in the lives of great tyrants and villains and in world-devastating wars. Sometimes we see it from its ridiculous side, where it is the theme of comedy and shows especially in self-conceit and vanity. No one has grasped these like Rochefoucauld, who presented them in abstracto. We see it in world history and in our own experience. But it shows most clearly as soon as any crowd of people is freed from all law and order. Then the bellum omnium contra omnes at once appears most plainly, which Hobbes described admirably in the first chapter of de cive. It shows how not only does each try to snatch from the other what they want themselves, but how one often destroys the whole happiness or life of another, just to increase their own well-being by an insignificant gain. This is the highest expression of egoism. Its appearances, in this respect, are surpassed only by those of real malice, which seeks, quite disinterestedly, the harm and pain of others without any advantage to itself. This will be discussed soon.—Compare this uncovering of the source of egoism with the account of it in my prize essay on the foundation of morals, § 14.

A main source of the suffering that we found above to be essential and unavoidable in all life, as soon as it actually comes and takes definite shape, is that *Eris*, the struggle of all individuals. It is the expression of the contradiction with which the will to life is afflicted inwardly, and it comes into visibility through the principium individuationis. Animal fights are the cruel means to show it directly and glaringly. In this original discord lies an inexhaustible source of suffering, despite the precautions that have been taken against it, which we shall consider more closely at once.

62 It has already been explained that the first and simple affirmation of the will to life is only the affirmation of one's own body. That is, it is the presentation of the will through acts in time, in so far as the body already presents the same will in space, in its form and fitness for purpose, and no further. This affirmation shows itself as the preservation of the body by using the body's own powers. The satisfaction of the sexual drive attaches directly to it, and even belongs to it, since the genitals belong to the body. Therefore *voluntary* renunciation of

that satisfaction, with no *motive* behind it, is already denial of the will to life. It is a voluntary self-cancellation of the will, following on knowledge that has set in and acts as a *quietive*. Accordingly, such denial of one's own body already presents itself as a contradiction of the will against its own appearance. For although here too the body objectifies the will to propagation in the genitals, this propagation is nonetheless not willed. For this very reason, namely because it is denial or cancellation of the will to life, such renunciation is a hard and painful self-overcoming. But more of this below.—Now the will presents this *self-affirmation* of one's own body in countless individuals side by side. Because of the egoism that belongs to all of them, the will very easily goes beyond this affirmation in one individual, as far as the *denial* of the same will appearing in another individual. The will of the first breaks into the boundary of the other's affirmation of will. It does so when the individual either destroys or injures the other body itself, or else forces the powers of that other body to serve *its own* will, instead of the will that appears in that other body itself. That is, it takes the powers of that body away from the will that appears as that other body, and so increases the power that serves *its own* will beyond that of its own body. Consequently it affirms its own will beyond its own body, by denying the will appearing in another body.—This break-in into the boundary of another's affirmation of will has always been clearly recognized, and the concept of it has been designated by the word *wrong*. For both parties recognize the thing immediately, not in distinct abstraction as we do here, but as a feeling. The person who suffers wrong feels the intrusion into the sphere where they affirm their own body, through its denial by another individual, as an immediate, mental pain. This pain is wholly separate and different from the physical suffering felt alongside it from the deed, or from the annoyance at the loss. The doer of wrong, on the other hand, gets the knowledge that in themselves they are the same will that also appears in that other body. They know that this will affirms itself in one appearance with such vehemence that it crosses the boundary of its own body and its powers, and becomes the denial of this very will in the other appearance. So the doer, considered as will in itself, fights against themselves through this very vehemence and tears themselves to pieces.—To the doer too, I

say, this knowledge presents itself immediately, not in abstracto, but as a dark feeling. This is what is called pangs of conscience, or, more exactly for this case, the feeling of *wrong done*.

Wrong, whose concept we have just analyzed in the most general abstraction, expresses itself in concrete cases most completely, most properly and most tangibly in cannibalism. This is its clearest, most evident type, the dreadful picture of the greatest conflict of the will with itself, at the highest stage of its objectification, which is the human being. Next to this comes murder. When murder is committed, the pang of conscience, whose meaning we have just stated abstractly and dryly, follows at once with terrible clarity, and strikes a wound in peace of mind that cannot be healed for the rest of life. Our shudder at a murder committed, and our shrinking back from a murder to be committed, correspond to the boundless attachment to life with which everything living, precisely as appearance of the will to life, is permeated. (Later, by the way, we shall dissect more fully that feeling that goes with the doing of wrong and evil, or the anguish of conscience, and raise it to distinctness of concept.) Deliberate maiming, or mere injury to another body, even any blow, is to be regarded as the same in essence as murder and different from it only in degree.—Further, wrong presents itself in the subjugation of another individual, in forcing them into slavery. Finally it presents itself in the attack on another's property. In so far as property is regarded as the fruit of a person's labor, this attack is essentially of the same kind as that subjugation, and is related to it as mere injury is to murder.

For *property*, which cannot be taken from a person *without wrong*, can, by our explanation of wrong, be only what has been worked on by that person's powers. By taking such a thing away, one therefore takes the powers of their body from the will objectified in it, to let them serve the will objectified in another body. For only so does the doer of wrong break into the sphere of another's affirmation of will, by attacking not the other's body but a lifeless thing quite different from it. The powers, the labor of the other body have as it were grown into this thing and become identified with it. From this it follows that every genuine, that is moral, right of property originally rests solely and entirely on

working a thing. This was also quite generally assumed before Kant. Indeed the oldest of all law books says it clearly and beautifully: "Wise men who know the ancient times declare that a cultivated field is the property of him who cut down the wood, cleared it and plowed it, just as an antelope belongs to the first hunter who wounded it mortally."—Laws of Manu, IX, 44.—I can explain Kant's whole doctrine of right, a strange tangle of errors that draw each other in, only by his weakness of old age. The same goes for this: that he wants to ground the right of property on first taking possession. For how could the mere declaration of my will to exclude others from the use of a thing immediately give by itself a *right* to this? Obviously it needs a ground of right itself, instead of being one, as Kant assumes. And how could someone who did not respect such claims to sole possession of a thing, claims grounded on nothing but the claimants' own declaration, do wrong in themselves, that is, morally? How could their conscience trouble them about it? It is so clear and easy to see that there can be no *rightful taking of possession* at all, but only a rightful appropriation, an acquiring of possession of the thing by applying to it powers that are originally one's own. For wherever a thing has been worked, improved, protected from accidents or kept safe by some other person's effort, however small, even if the effort was only plucking a wild-grown fruit or picking it up from the ground, the one who attacks such a thing clearly takes from the other the result of the power spent on it. The attacker thus makes the other's body serve *their own* will instead of its own. They affirm their own will beyond its appearance, as far as denial of the other's will. That is, they do wrong [21].—On the other hand, mere enjoyment of a thing, without any working on it or securing it against destruction, gives just as little right to it as does the declaration of one's will to sole possession. So suppose a family has hunted alone in a district for a century without doing anything to improve it. Then it cannot, without moral wrong, keep out a stranger who arrives and now wants to hunt there. The so-called right of prior occupation, then, by which one demands, for mere enjoyment already had of a thing, a reward on top of that, namely an exclusive right to further enjoyment, is morally quite groundless. The new arrival could answer anyone relying only on this right with much better right: "Just because

you have enjoyed it for so long, it is right that now others should enjoy it too." Of any thing that is quite incapable of being worked on, by improvement or by securing it against accidents, there is no morally grounded sole possession. The only exception is voluntary cession by all others, perhaps as a reward for other services. But that already presupposes a community regulated by convention, the state.—The morally grounded right of property, as derived above, gives the owner, by its nature, a power over the thing just as unrestricted as the power he has over his own body. From this it follows that he can transfer his property to others, by exchange or gift, [22] So the grounding of the natural right of property does not need the assumption of two grounds of right side by side, one based on *detention* beside one based on *formation*. The latter suffices everywhere. Only the name *formation* is not quite fitting, since applying some effort to a thing does not always have to be giving it a form. and they then possess the thing with the same moral right as he did.

As for the *doing* of wrong in general, it happens either by *force* or by *cunning*. In what is morally essential, these are the same. First, in murder it makes no moral difference whether I use the dagger or poison. The same goes for any bodily injury. The other cases of wrong can always be traced back to this: as the doer of wrong, I force the other individual to serve my will instead of theirs, to act by my will instead of by theirs. By force I reach this through physical causality. By cunning I reach it by means of motivation, that is, causality that has passed through knowing. So I push *seeming motives* before their will. Believing they follow their own will, they follow *mine*. The medium in which motives lie is knowledge. So I can do this only by falsifying their knowledge, and this is the *lie*. A lie always aims to act on the other's will, not on their knowledge alone, by itself and as such, but on knowledge only as a means, that is, in so far as it determines their will. For my lying itself, since it proceeds from my will, needs a motive. Only the other's will can be such a motive, not the other's knowledge in and for itself. As such, their knowledge can never have any influence on *my* will, and so can never move it or be a motive of its ends. Only the other's willing and doing can be that, and through it, and so only indirectly, the other's knowledge. This holds not only for all lies that spring from obvious self-inter-

est, but also for those that spring from pure malice, which wants to feast on the painful consequences of the error it has caused in another. Even mere boasting aims, by means of the higher esteem or improved opinion it wins from others, at greater or easier influence on their willing and doing. Merely refusing a truth, that is, refusing to make a statement at all, is in itself no wrong. But every foisting of a lie on someone is. Someone who refuses to show a lost traveler the right way does them no wrong. But someone who points them to the wrong one does.—From what has been said it follows that every *lie*, just like every act of violence, is as such a *wrong*. For as such it already has the aim of extending the rule of my will to other individuals, and so of affirming my will by denying theirs, just as force does.—But the most perfect lie is the *broken contract*, because here all the determinations listed come together completely and clearly. When I enter into a contract, the other's promised performance is, directly and by admission, the motive for mine, which then follows. The promises are exchanged deliberately and formally. By assumption, the truth of what each says in it is in their own power. If the other breaks the contract, they have deceived me. By pushing mere seeming motives into my knowledge, they have steered my will according to their intention. They have extended the rule of their will over another individual, and so have committed a perfect wrong. The moral legitimacy and validity of *contracts* rests on this.

Wrong by force is not as shameful for the doer as wrong by cunning. Force shows physical strength, which impresses the human race under all circumstances. Cunning, by using the roundabout way, betrays weakness, and so lowers the doer as a physical and moral being at once. Besides, lying and deceit can succeed only if the one who practices them at the same time shows disgust and contempt for them, in order to win trust. Their victory rests on people's crediting them with the honesty they do not have.—The deep disgust that cunning, faithlessness and treachery arouse everywhere rests on this. Faithfulness and honesty are the bond that, from outside, ties back into unity the will that is split up into the multiplicity of individuals, and so sets limits on the conse-

quences of the egoism that has come from that split. Faithlessness and treachery tear this last, outer bond, and so give the consequences of egoism boundless room.

In the course of our way of looking at things, we have found the content of the concept of *wrong* to be this: the nature of an individual's action in which it extends the affirmation of the will appearing in its own body so far that this becomes the denial of the will appearing in other bodies. We have also shown, with quite general examples, the boundary where the territory of wrong begins, while at the same time defining its steps from the highest degree to the lower ones by a few main concepts. Accordingly, the concept of *wrong* is the original and positive one. The opposite concept of *right* is derived and negative. For we must hold not to words but to concepts. In fact, there would never have been talk of *right* if there were no wrong. The concept of *right* contains only the negation of wrong. Under it falls every action that is not a crossing of the boundary set out above, that is, not a denial of another's will for the stronger affirmation of one's own. In regard to a purely and simply *moral* determination, that boundary therefore divides the whole territory of possible actions into those that are wrong and those that are right. As soon as an action does not intrude, in the manner explained above, into the sphere of another's affirmation of will by denying it, it is not wrong. So, for example, refusing help in another's urgent need, or calmly watching another die of hunger while having plenty oneself, is cruel and devilish, but not wrong. But one can say with complete certainty that anyone capable of pushing heartlessness and hardness to such a degree will also quite surely do any wrong as soon as their wishes demand it and no compulsion prevents it.

The concept of *right*, as the negation of wrong, has found its main application, and without doubt also its first origin, in the cases where attempted wrong is fended off by force. This fending off cannot itself be wrong again, and so it is right. Yet the violence used in it, considered merely in itself and cut off from its context, would be wrong. Here it is justified only by its motive, that is, it becomes right. Suppose an individual goes so far in affirming their own will that they intrude into the sphere of the affirmation of will that is essential to

my person as such, and thereby deny it. Then my fending off of that intrusion is only the denial of that denial. To that extent it is nothing more, on my side, than the affirmation of the will that appears essentially and originally in my body and is already expressed implicitly by its mere appearance. Consequently it is not wrong, and so it is right. That means: I then have a right to deny that other denial with the force needed to cancel it. As is easy to see, this can go as far as killing the other individual. Their encroachment, as an intruding outer force, can be fended off with a counter-force slightly greater than it, without any wrong, and so rightly. For everything that happens on my side lies always only within the sphere of the affirmation of will that is essential to my person as such and already expressed by it (this sphere is the scene of the struggle). It does not intrude into the other's sphere. So it is only the negation of a negation, and thus an affirmation, not itself a negation. I can therefore, *without wrong*, force another's will to stop denying my will. My will appears in my body and in the use of its powers to preserve it, and it does so without denying any foreign will that keeps to the same limits. In this sense I have a *right of compulsion*.

In all cases where I have a right of compulsion, a perfect right, to use *force* against others, I can, as circumstances allow, just as well oppose the other's force with cunning, without doing wrong. So I have a *real right to lie, exactly as far as I have the right to use compulsion*. Therefore someone acts perfectly rightly who assures a highway robber searching them that they have nothing more on them. The same holds for someone who, by a lie, lures a robber who has broken in at night into a cellar, where they lock the robber in. Anyone carried off captive by robbers, for example by Barbary pirates, has the right to kill them for their liberation, not only by open force but also by stealth.—For the same reason a promise extorted by direct physical violence is not binding at all. The person who suffers such compulsion can, with full right, free themselves from the violent men by killing them, let alone by deceiving them. Someone who cannot take back by force their property that was stolen from them does no wrong if they get it back by cunning. Indeed, if someone gambles away my money that was stolen from me, I have the right to use false dice against them, because everything I win from them already belongs to me. Anyone who

wanted to deny this would have to deny still more the lawfulness of the stratagem in war, which is even an active lie and bears out the saying of Queen Christina of Sweden: "Men's words are to be counted as nothing; one can hardly trust even their deeds."—So closely does the boundary of right touch that of wrong. For the rest, I think it unnecessary to show that all this agrees fully with what was said above about the wrongfulness of lying, as of violence. It can also serve to clarify the strange theories about the lie of necessity [23].

By everything so far, then, wrong and right are merely *moral* determinations. That is, they are valid when we consider human action as such, and in relation to *the inner meaning of this action in itself*. This meaning announces itself immediately in consciousness. On the one side, doing wrong is accompanied by an inner pain. This pain is the merely felt consciousness, in the doer of wrong, of the excessive strength of the affirmation of will in themselves, which goes to the degree of denying the foreign appearance of will. It is also the consciousness that, although as appearance they are different from the person who suffers the wrong, in themselves they are identical with that person. The further explanation of this inner meaning of all anguish of conscience can follow only below. On the other side, the person who suffers wrong is painfully aware of the denial of their will, as that will is already expressed by their body and its natural needs, for whose satisfaction nature refers them to the powers of that body. [24] For a further account of the doctrine of right set out here, see my prize essay "On the Foundation of Morals", §. 17, pp. 221–230 of the first edition. They are also aware, at the same time, that they could fend off that denial in every way without doing wrong, if only they did not lack the power. This purely moral meaning is the only one that right and wrong have for the human being as a human being, not as a citizen. So it would remain even in the state of nature, without any positive law. It makes up the foundation and content of everything that has therefore been called *natural right*, but would better be called moral right. Its validity does not extend to suffering, to outer reality, but only to doing, and to the self-knowledge of their individual will that grows out of it for the human being, which is called *conscience*. In the state of nature, however, moral right cannot always make itself felt outwardly, toward other individuals, and cannot

prevent force from ruling instead of right. In the state of nature it depends on each person only to *do* no wrong in any case, but by no means to *suffer* no wrong in any case, which depends on their chance outer power. So the concepts of right and wrong are indeed valid for the state of nature too, and are by no means conventional. But there they hold only as *moral* concepts, for the self-knowledge of each person's own will. On the scale of the highly different degrees of strength with which the will to life affirms itself in human individuals, they are a fixed point, like the freezing point on the thermometer. It is the point where the affirmation of one's own will becomes the denial of another's. That is, it is the point that, through the doing of wrong, indicates the degree of the will's vehemence combined with the degree to which knowledge is caught in the principium individuationis (which is the form of knowledge standing wholly in the service of the will). Now, someone who wants to set aside or deny the purely moral way of looking at human action, and to consider action only by its outer effect and its result, can indeed, with *Hobbes*, declare right and wrong to be conventional determinations, arbitrarily adopted and therefore not present at all apart from positive law. We can never bring home to such a person by outer experience what does not belong to outer experience. In just the same way we cannot bring home to that same *Hobbes* the a priori character of mathematics, any more than the a priori character of right. He characterizes his thoroughly empirical way of thinking very remarkably in his book "De principiis Geometrarum". There he denies all really pure mathematics and stubbornly asserts that the point has extension and the line breadth, though we can never show him a point without extension or a line without breadth. We cannot succeed with him, because he has simply closed himself off from every non-empirical knowledge.

The pure *doctrine of right* is therefore a chapter of *morals*, and refers directly only to *doing*, not to *suffering*. For only doing is an expression of the will, and morals considers the will alone. Suffering is a mere event. Morals can take suffering into account only indirectly, solely in order to show that what is done merely so as not to suffer wrong is not a doing of wrong.—The working out of that chapter of morals would have as its content the exact determination of the

boundary up to which an individual can go in affirming the will already objectified in their body, without this becoming the denial of that very will as it appears in another individual. It would then also determine the actions that cross this boundary, which are therefore wrong and so in turn can be fended off without wrong. So one's own *doing* would always remain the object of attention.

In outer experience, as an event, *suffering wrong* appears. In it, as I said, the appearance of the conflict of the will to life with itself shows itself more clearly than anywhere. It comes from the multiplicity of individuals and from egoism, both of which are conditioned by the principium individuationis, the form of the world as representation for the individual's knowledge. We also saw above that a very large part of the suffering essential to human life has its ever-flowing source in that conflict between individuals.

Reason, which all these individuals have in common, lets them know abstractly not only the single case, as animals do, but also the whole in its connection. Reason soon taught them to see the source of that suffering, and made them think of a means to reduce it or, if possible, cancel it. The means is a common sacrifice, which however is outweighed by the common advantage that comes of it. However pleasant the doing of wrong may be, in particular cases, to the egoism of the single person, it has a necessary correlate in the suffering of wrong by another individual, for whom this is a great pain. Reason, which thinks over the whole, stepped out of the one-sided standpoint of the individual to which it belongs, and for the moment freed itself from attachment to it. It then saw that the enjoyment of doing wrong in one individual is always outweighed by a proportionally greater pain in the suffering of wrong in the other. It also found that, since everything was left to chance here, each person would have to fear that the enjoyment of the occasional doing of wrong would fall to them much more rarely than the pain of suffering wrong. From this reason recognized that the best and only means, both to lessen the suffering spread over all and to distribute it as evenly as possible, was to spare everyone the pain of suffering wrong. This could be done by everyone's also giving up the enjoyment to be gained by doing wrong.—This means was thus easily devised by

egoism, which proceeds methodically through the use of reason and leaves its one-sided standpoint, and was gradually perfected. It is the *social contract* or the *law*. I give its origin here as Plato already presents it in the Republic. In fact that origin is essentially the only one, set by the nature of the thing. The state also cannot have had any other in any country, because it is precisely this way of arising, this purpose, that makes it a state. It makes no difference whether the condition that preceded it in any particular people was that of a crowd of independent savages (anarchy), or of a crowd of slaves whom the stronger rules at will (despotism). In both cases there was no state yet. It arises only through that common agreement. According to whether this agreement is more or less unmixed with anarchy or despotism, the state is also more perfect or less perfect.

Republics tend toward anarchy, monarchies toward despotism. The middle way of constitutional monarchy, devised for this reason, tends toward rule by factions. To found a perfect state, one must begin by creating beings whose nature allows them to sacrifice their own good throughout to the public good. Until then, something can already be achieved by having a family whose welfare is wholly inseparable from that of the country, so that, at least in main matters, it can never promote the one without the other. The strength and advantage of hereditary monarchy rests on this.

Morals is concerned only with the *doing* of right or wrong. It can mark out exactly the boundary of their actions for anyone who might be resolved to do no wrong. The doctrine of the state, the doctrine of legislation, is concerned, the other way around, solely with the *suffering* of wrong. It would never concern itself with the *doing* of wrong, were it not for the correlate that always goes with it, the suffering of wrong. That suffering is the enemy the doctrine of the state works against, and so it is its object. Indeed, if a doing of wrong could be thought with which no suffering of wrong on another side was bound up, the state, to be consistent, would by no means forbid it.—Further, in *morals* the will, the disposition, is the object of consideration and alone real. So for morals a firm will to do a wrong, which only outer power holds back and makes ineffective, counts quite the same as wrong actually done. Morals condemns the

person who wills so as unjust before its judgment seat. The state, by contrast, does not care at all about will and disposition merely as such. It cares only about the *deed* (whether merely attempted or carried out) because of its correlate, the suffering on the other side. For the state, then, the deed, the event, is alone real. Disposition and intention are investigated only in so far as they make the meaning of the deed recognizable. So the state will forbid no one to carry murder and poison against another constantly in thought, as long as it knows for certain that fear of sword and wheel will constantly check the effects of that willing. Nor does the state have the foolish plan of rooting out the inclination to do wrong, the evil disposition. It aims only to set beside every possible motive for doing a wrong a stronger motive for refraining from it, in the sure punishment. Accordingly the criminal code is as complete a register as possible of counter-motives to all criminal actions presumed possible. Both are in abstracto, so that in cases that occur the application can be made in concreto. For this purpose the doctrine of the state, or legislation, will borrow from morals that chapter which is the doctrine of right, and which, alongside the inner meaning of right and wrong, determines the exact boundary between the two. But it borrows it solely to use its reverse side. It looks at all the boundaries that morals gives as not to be crossed if one does not want to *do* wrong, from the other side. For the state they are the boundaries whose crossing by another one must not tolerate if one does not want to *suffer* wrong, and from which one therefore has a *right* to drive others back. So these boundaries are now fortified by laws, from the side that may be passive. It turns out that the teacher of law is the moralist turned around, just as the historian has been called, quite wittily, a prophet turned around. Likewise the doctrine of right in the proper sense, that is, the doctrine of the *rights* one may assert, is morals turned around, in that chapter where morals teaches the rights one must not violate. The concept of wrong, and of its negation, right, is originally *moral*. It becomes *juridical* by shifting the starting point from the active to the passive side, that is, by turning around. This, along with Kant's doctrine of right, which derives the setting up of the state, very falsely, from his categorical imperative as a moral duty, has also led in the most recent times, here and there, to the very strange

error that the state is an institution for promoting morality, arises from the striving for it, and is accordingly directed against egoism. As if the inner disposition, to which alone morality or immorality belongs, the eternally free will, could be modified from outside and changed by influence! More perverse still is the theorem that the state is the condition of freedom in the moral sense and thereby of morality. For freedom lies beyond appearance, let alone beyond human institutions. The state, as I said, is so little directed against egoism in general and as such that, on the contrary, it has sprung precisely from egoism that understands itself well, proceeds methodically, steps from the one-sided to the general standpoint, and thus by adding up becomes the common egoism of all. It exists only to serve this egoism. It was set up under the correct assumption that pure morality, that is, right action from moral grounds, is not to be expected; otherwise it would itself be superfluous. So the state is by no means directed against egoism. It is directed only against the harmful consequences of egoism, which arise for all of the multitude of egoistic individuals from one another and disturb their well-being. The state aims at that well-being. So *Aristotle* already says (De Rep., III): Τέλος μεν ουν πολεως το ευ ζην· τουτο δε εστιν το ζην ευδαιμονως και καλως. (Finis civitatis est bene vivere, hoc autem est beate et pulchre vivere.) *Hobbes* too has set out this origin and purpose of the state quite correctly and excellently, as indeed the old principle of all political order, salus publica prima lex esto, also indicates the same.—If the state fully reaches its purpose, it will bring forth the same appearance as if perfect justice of disposition prevailed universally. But the inner essence and origin of the two appearances will be the reverse. In the latter case it would be this: that no one wanted to *do* wrong. In the former it would be this: that no one wanted to *suffer* wrong, and the proper means for this purpose were applied perfectly. So the same line can be drawn from opposite directions, and a beast of prey with a muzzle is as harmless as a grass-eating animal.—But the state cannot take it further than this point. It cannot show an appearance like the one that would spring from universal mutual benevolence and love. For we have just found that the state, by its nature, would not forbid a doing of wrong to which no suffering of wrong on another side corresponded, and that only because this is

impossible does it forbid every doing of wrong. Conversely, by its tendency aimed at the well-being of all, it would gladly see to it that everyone *experienced* benevolence and works of human love of every kind. But these too have an unavoidable correlate in the giving of benefits and works of love. In this every citizen of the state would be willing to take the passive role and none the active one, and there would be no ground for expecting the active role of one rather than another. So only the negative, which is precisely *right*, can be *enforced*, not the positive, which has been understood under the name of duties of love, or imperfect duties.

Legislation borrows, as I said, the pure doctrine of right, or the doctrine of the essence and boundaries of right and wrong, from morals. It applies this from the reverse side to its own purposes, which are foreign to morals. On that basis it sets up positive legislation and the means to uphold it, that is, the state. Positive legislation is therefore the purely moral doctrine of right applied from the reverse side. This application can take account of the particular conditions and circumstances of a specific people. But only if positive legislation is determined, throughout and in essentials, under the guidance of the pure doctrine of right, and a ground in the pure doctrine of right can be shown for each of its statutes, is the resulting legislation really a *positive right* and the state a *lawful* association, a *state* in the proper sense of the word, a morally admissible institution and not an immoral one. Otherwise positive legislation is the founding of a *positive wrong*, and is itself a publicly admitted, enforced wrong. Every despotism is of this kind, as is the constitution of most Mohammedan empires. Even some parts of many constitutions belong here, for example serfdom, forced labor and the like.—The pure doctrine of right, or natural right, better called moral right, underlies every lawful positive legislation, though always by inversion, as pure mathematics underlies every branch of applied mathematics. The most important points of the pure doctrine of right, as philosophy has to hand them over to legislation for this purpose, are the following: 1) Explanation of the inner and proper meaning and origin of the concepts of wrong and right, and of their application and place in morals. 2) The derivation of the right of property. 3) The derivation of the moral validity of contracts, since this is the

moral basis of the social contract. 4) The explanation of the origin and purpose of the state, of the relation of this purpose to morals, and of the transfer, made fitting to the purpose by this relation, of the moral doctrine of right to legislation by inversion. 5) The derivation of the right to punish.—The remaining content of the doctrine of right is mere application of those principles, a closer determination of the boundaries of right and wrong for all possible relations of life, which are therefore united and divided under certain points of view and headings. In these particular teachings the textbooks of pure right all agree fairly closely. Only in the principles do they sound very different, because these are always connected with some philosophical system. We have now discussed the first four of those main points, in accordance with our own system, briefly and generally but definitely and clearly. We still have to speak in the same way about the right to punish.

Kant makes the quite false claim that outside the state there is no perfect right of property. By our derivation above, there is property in the state of nature too, with a perfect natural, that is moral, right. It cannot be violated without wrong, but it can be defended to the utmost without wrong. On the other hand, it is certain that outside the state there is no *right to punish*. All right to punish is grounded solely on the positive law, which before the offense has set a punishment for it. The threat of this punishment, as a counter-motive, was meant to outweigh any motives for that offense. This positive law is to be regarded as sanctioned and recognized by all citizens of the state. It is therefore founded on a common contract. The members of the state are bound to fulfill it under all circumstances, that is, to carry out the punishment on one side and to put up with it on the other. So putting up with it can rightly be enforced. Consequently the immediate *purpose of punishment* in the single case is the *fulfillment of the law as a*

contract. The only purpose of the law, however, is *deterrence* from infringing the rights of others. For it is in order that everyone be protected from suffering wrong that people united in the state, gave up doing wrong and took on the burdens of maintaining the state. The law, then, and its execution, punishment, are essentially directed to the *future*, not to the *past*. This distinguishes

punishment from *revenge*, which is motivated purely by what has happened, that is, by the past as such. All repayment of wrong by inflicting pain, without a purpose for the future, is revenge. It can have no other purpose than to console oneself for the suffering one has endured, by the sight of the other's suffering that one has caused oneself. That is malice and cruelty, and cannot be justified ethically. Wrong that someone has done me gives me no right whatever to do wrong to them. Repaying evil with evil, with no further intention, cannot be justified morally or otherwise by any rational ground. The jus talionis, set up as an independent, final principle of the right to punish, is meaningless. So Kant's theory of punishment as mere retribution, for the sake of retribution, is a wholly groundless and perverse view. Yet it still haunts the writings of many teachers of law, under all sorts of high-sounding phrases that come down to empty verbiage, such as: punishment atones for the crime, or neutralizes and cancels it, and the like. But no human being has the authority to set himself up as a purely moral avenger and repayer, and to visit another's misdeeds on him by pains he inflicts, thus imposing penance on him for them. This would rather be a most presumptuous arrogance. That is the reason for the biblical "Vengeance is mine, says the Lord, and I will repay." But a human being does have the right to provide for the safety of society. This can happen only by prohibiting under penalty all the actions that the word "criminal" designates, to prevent them by counter-motives, which are the punishments threatened. This threat can be effective only by execution in the case that nonetheless occurs. That the purpose of punishment, or more exactly of the penal law, is deterrence from crime is so generally recognized, indeed so self-evident a truth, that in England it is even stated in the very old formula of accusation (indictment) which the crown advocate still uses in criminal cases, since it ends: if this be proved, you, the said N. N., ought to be punished with pains of law, to deter others from the like crimes, in all time coming [25].—A purpose for the future distinguishes punishment from revenge. Punishment has this only when it is carried out for the *fulfillment of a law*. By just this it announces itself as unfailing for every future case as well, and so keeps up the law's power to deter, in which its purpose consists.

—Here a Kantian would unfailingly object that, on this view, the punished criminal would be used "merely as a means." But this principle, so tirelessly repeated by all Kantians, "one should always treat the human being only as an end, never as a means," sounds significant. It is therefore an extremely suitable principle for all who like a formula that relieves them of all further thinking. But when looked at in the light, it is a highly vague, indefinite pronouncement that reaches its aim quite indirectly. For each case of its application it first needs special explanation, determination and modification. Taken so generally, it is inadequate, says little, and is moreover problematic. The murderer who has incurred the death penalty under the law must now indeed, and with full right, be used as a mere *means*. For public safety, the chief purpose of the state, is disturbed by him. Indeed it is canceled if the law stays unfulfilled. He, his life, his person, must now be the means for fulfilling the law and thereby for restoring public safety. And he is made such with every right, in execution of the social contract, which he too entered into, in so far as he was a citizen of the state. By that contract, in order to enjoy security for his life, [26] If this is proved, then you, the said N. N., must suffer the legal penalty, in order to deter others from similar crimes in all future time. his freedom and his property, he had also put up his life, his freedom and his property as a pledge for the security of all, and this pledge is now forfeited.

This theory of punishment set out here, immediately evident to sound reason, is admittedly in the main no new thought. It is only one almost pushed aside by new errors, so that its clearest presentation was needed. In essence it is already contained in what Pufendorf says about it in "De officio hominis et civis", Book 2, ch. 13. Hobbes agrees with it too: "Leviathan", chs. 15 and 28. In our day, as is well known, *Feuerbach* has defended it. Indeed it is found already in the sayings of the philosophers of antiquity. Plato sets it out clearly in the Protagoras (p. 114, edit. Bip.), also in the Gorgias (p. 168), and finally in the eleventh book of the Laws (p. 165). Seneca expresses Plato's opinion and the theory of all punishment perfectly, in the short words: Nemo prudens punit, quia peccatum est; Sed ne peccetur (De Ira, I, 16).

In the state, then, we have come to know the means by which egoism, equipped with reason, tries to avoid its own bad consequences, which turn against itself. Now everyone promotes the good of all, because they see their own included in it. If the state reached its purpose perfectly, then, in a way, something approaching the land of Cockaigne could finally come about. The state, through the human powers united in it, also manages to make the rest of nature more and more serviceable, and so it could remove all kinds of evil. But in part the state has remained very far from this goal still. In part, countless evils quite essential to life would still remain, and these would keep life in suffering as before. Even if they were all removed, boredom would at once occupy every place the others had left. In part, too, the quarrel of individuals can never be wholly canceled by the state, since it teases in small matters where it is forbidden in great ones. And finally Eris, happily driven out from within, turns at last to the outside. Banished by the state's institution as strife between individuals, she comes back from outside as war between peoples. Then, in the large and all at once, as an accumulated debt, she demands the bloody sacrifices which clever precautions in individual cases had withheld from her. Suppose even all this were at last overcome and removed by a prudence supported by the experience of thousands of years. Then the result in the end would be real overpopulation of the whole planet, whose dreadful evils only a bold imagination can now picture to itself [27].

63 We have come to know *temporal justice*, which has its seat in the state, as retributive or punishing. We have seen that it becomes justice only through regard for the future. Without such regard, all punishing and repaying of a crime would remain without justification. It would even be a mere adding of a second evil to what has happened, without sense or meaning. It is quite different with *eternal justice*, which was mentioned earlier, and which rules not the state but the world. It does not depend on human institutions, is not subject to chance and deception, and is not uncertain, wavering and erring, but infallible, firm and sure.—The concept of retribution already includes time. So eternal justice cannot be retributive. It cannot, like retributive justice, allow delay and a

period of grace, balancing the bad deed with the bad consequence only by means of time, and needing time to exist. Here the punishment must be so bound up with the offense that the two are one.

Δοκειτε πηδαν τ' αδικηματ' εις θεους Πτεροισι, κἄπειτ' εν Διος δελτου πτυχαις Γραφειν τιν' αυτα, Ζηνα δ' εισορωντα νιν Θνητοις δικαζειν; Ουδ' ὁ πας ουρανος, Διος γραφοντος τας βροτων ἁμαρτιας, Εξαρκεσειεν, ουδ' εκεινος αν σκοπων Πεμπειν ἑκαστῳ ζημιαν· αλλ' ἡ Δικη Ενταυθα που 'στιν εγγυς, ει βουλεσθ' ὁραν.
Eurip., ap. Stob. Ecl., I, c. 4.

28 On this see chapter 47 of the second volume.

(Volare pennis scelera ad aetherias domus Putatis, illic in Jovis tabularia Scripto referri; tum Jovem lectis super Sententiam proferre?—sed mortalium Facinora coeli, quantaquanta est, regia Nequit tenere: nec legendis Juppiter Et puniendis par est. Est tamen ultio, Et, si intuemur, illa nos habitat prope.)

That such an eternal justice really lies in the essence of the world will soon become fully clear, from our whole thought developed so far, to anyone who has grasped that thought.

The appearance, the objectivity, of the one will to life is the world, in all the multiplicity of its parts and shapes. Existence itself and the kind of existence, in the whole as in every part, comes from the will alone. The will is free, it is almighty. In each thing the will appears exactly as it determines itself in itself and outside time. The world is only the mirror of this willing. All finitude, all sufferings, all torments that the world contains belong to the expression of what the will wills. They are as they are because the will so wills. With the strictest right, then, each being bears existence in general, then the existence of its kind and its own individuality, just as it is and in surroundings as they are, in a world as it is, ruled by chance and error, temporal, perishable, always suffering. And in everything that happens to it, indeed can happen to it, it always gets what it deserves. For the will is its own, and as the will is, so is the world. Only the world itself can bear the responsibility for the existence and nature of this world, no one else. For how could anyone else have taken it on?—If you want to know what human beings, considered morally, are worth in the whole

and in general, look at their fate in the whole and in general. This is want, misery, wretchedness, torment and death. Eternal justice rules. If they were not, taken as a whole, worthless, their fate, taken as a whole, would not be so sad. In this sense we can say: the world itself is the world's court of judgment.

If all the misery of the world could be put in one pan of a scale and all the guilt of the world in the other, the scale would surely come to rest level.

Of course, as knowledge comes to the individual as such, having sprung from the will to serve it, the world does not present itself in the way it finally unveils itself to the investigator: as the objectivity of the one and only will to life, which the investigator is. Instead, as the Indians say, the veil of Maya clouds the gaze of the crude individual. Instead of the thing in itself, only the appearance shows itself to him, in time and space, the principium individuationis, and in the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason. In this form of his limited knowledge he does not see the essence of things, which is one, but its appearances, as separate, divided, countless, very different, even opposed. Then pleasure appears to him as one thing and torment as quite another, this man as tormentor and murderer, that one as sufferer and victim, evil as one thing and ill as another. He sees one person living in joy, abundance and pleasures, while at the door of that person another dies in torment of want and cold. Then he asks: where is the retribution? And he himself, in the violent urge of will that is his origin and his essence, seizes the pleasures and enjoyments of life and clings tightly to them. He does not know that by this very act of his will he seizes and presses tight to himself all the pains and torments of life, at the sight of which he shudders. He sees the ill, he sees the evil in the world. But he is far from recognizing that the two are only different sides of the appearance of the one will to life. He takes them to be very different, indeed quite opposed. Often he seeks, through evil, that is, through causing another's suffering, to escape ill, the suffering of his own individual, caught in the principium individuationis, deceived by the veil of Maya.—For as on the raging sea, which is unbounded on all sides and raises and lowers mountains of water with a howl, a sailor sits in a boat, trusting the frail craft, so in the midst of a world full of torments the single human being sits calm, supported by and trusting in the principium indi-

viduationis, or the way the individual knows things as appearance. The unbounded world, full of suffering everywhere, in infinite past and infinite future, is foreign to him, even a fairy tale to him. His vanishing person, his present without extension, his momentary comfort, this alone has reality for him. To keep this he does everything, as long as better knowledge does not open his eyes. Until then there lives only in the innermost depth of his consciousness the quite dark intimation that all that is really not so foreign to him after all, but has a connection with him, from which the principium individuationis cannot protect him. From this intimation comes that *horror*, so indelible and common to all human beings (perhaps even to the cleverer animals), which suddenly seizes them when, by some chance, they become confused about the principium individuationis, because the principle of sufficient reason seems to suffer an exception in one of its forms. This happens, for example, when it seems that some change is going on without a cause, or a dead person is there again, or in some other way the past or the future is present, or the distant is near. The immense terror at such a thing is based on their suddenly becoming confused about the forms of knowledge of appearance, which alone keep their own individual separate from the rest of the world. But this separation lies only in the appearance and not in the thing in itself. Eternal justice rests on exactly this. In fact all temporal happiness stands, and all prudence walks, on undermined ground. They protect the person from accidents and provide enjoyments. But the person is mere appearance, and their difference from other individuals, and their freedom from the sufferings those others bear, rests on the form of appearance, the principium individuationis. According to the true essence of things, each of us has to regard all the sufferings of the world as our own, indeed all possible ones as real for us, as long as we are the firm will to life, that is, affirm life with all our strength. For knowledge that sees through the principium individuationis, a happy life in time, given by chance or won from chance by prudence, in the midst of the sufferings of countless others, is only a beggar's dream in which he is a king. He must wake from it and learn that only a fleeting delusion had separated him from the suffering of his life.

To the gaze caught in the principium individuationis, in the knowledge that follows the principle of sufficient reason, eternal justice is hidden. Such a gaze misses it entirely, unless it saves that justice by fictions. It sees the wicked man, after misdeeds and cruelties of every kind, live in joy and leave the world unmolested. It sees the oppressed drag his life full of suffering to the end, without an avenger, a repayer, showing up. But eternal justice will be understood and grasped only by someone who rises above that knowledge, which advances along the thread of the principle of sufficient reason and is bound to single things. That person knows the Ideas, sees through the principium individuationis, and becomes aware that the forms of appearance do not belong to the thing in itself. Only this person, by the same knowledge, can understand the true essence of virtue, as it will soon unfold for us in connection with the present reflection—although this knowledge in abstracto is by no means required for the practice of virtue. For anyone who has reached the knowledge just described, it becomes clear that the will is the in-itself of all appearance. So the torment inflicted on others and the torment experienced oneself, the evil and the ill, always strike only that one and the same being. This holds even though the appearances in which the one and the other present themselves stand there as quite different individuals and are even separated by distant times and spaces. He sees that the difference between the one who inflicts the suffering and the one who must bear it is only an appearance and does not touch the thing in itself, which is the will living in both. This will, deceived here by the knowledge bound to its service, mistakes itself. In one of its appearances it seeks heightened well-being, in the other it brings about great suffering. So in its violent urge it sinks its teeth into its own flesh, not knowing that it always only wounds itself. In this way, through the medium of individuation, it reveals the conflict with itself that it bears within. The tormentor and the tormented are one. The first errs in believing he has no share in the torment, the second in believing he has no share in the guilt. If the eyes of both were opened, the one who inflicts the suffering would recognize that he lives in everything that suffers torment in the wide world. Each such being, if it is endowed with reason, ponders in vain why it was called into existence for such great suffering, whose guilt it does not

see. And the tormented would see that all the evil that is done in the world, or ever was, flows from that will which also makes up his essence and appears in him too. He would see that through this appearance and its affirmation he has taken on all the sufferings that come from such a will, and that he bears them rightly, as long as he is this will.—From this knowledge the poet Calderon, full of intimations, speaks in "Life is a Dream":

Pues el delito mayor Del hombre es haber nacido.

(For the greatest guilt of man is that he was born.)

How should it not be a guilt, when by an eternal law death is the penalty for it? Calderon has also only expressed the Christian dogma of original sin in that verse.

Living knowledge of eternal justice, of the beam of the scale that binds the malum culpae and the malum poenae inseparably together, requires a complete rising above individuality and above the principle of its possibility. So, like the pure and clear knowledge of the essence of all virtue, which is related to it and will be discussed at once, it will always stay out of reach for most people.—The wise forefathers of the Indian people therefore did state it directly in the Vedas, which only the three twice-born castes are allowed to have, or in the esoteric doctrine of wisdom, to the extent that concept and language can hold it and their manner of presentation, still figurative and even rhapsodic, allows. But in the popular religion, or exoteric doctrine, they communicated it only in myth. We find the direct presentation in the Vedas, the fruit of the highest human knowledge and wisdom, whose kernel has finally come to us in the Upanishads, as the greatest gift of this century. It is expressed in various ways, but especially by this: all beings of the world, living and lifeless, are led one after another before the eyes of the pupil, and over each of them is spoken that word which has become a formula and as such is called the Mahavakya: Tatoumes, more correctly tat twam asi, which means "this you are" [29].—To the people, however, that great truth was translated, as far as they could grasp it in their limitation, into the mode of knowledge that follows the principle of sufficient reason. By its nature this mode of knowledge cannot take up that truth pure and in itself at all, and even stands in direct contradiction to it. Yet in the form of myth

it received a substitute for the truth, which sufficed as a rule for action. For the myth makes the ethical meaning of action graspable by figurative presentation, although this mode of knowledge, in keeping with the principle of sufficient reason, is eternally foreign to that meaning itself. This is the purpose of all articles of faith, which are all mythical dress for the truth that is inaccessible to the crude human mind. In this sense that myth could also be called, in Kant's language, a postulate of practical reason. Regarded as such, it has the great advantage of containing no elements except those that lie before our eyes in the realm of reality, and so of being able to support all its concepts with intuitions. What is meant here is the myth of the transmigration of souls. It teaches that all sufferings which one inflicts on other beings in life must be atoned for in a following life in this same world, by exactly the same sufferings. This goes so far that anyone who kills even one animal will, in the infinity of time, be born as just such an animal and suffer the same death. It teaches that evil conduct draws after it a future life, in this world, in suffering and despised beings. Accordingly one is then born again in lower castes, or as a woman, or as an animal, as a Pariah or Chandala, as a leper, as a crocodile, and so on. All the torments that the myth threatens it supports [30] Oupnek'hat, Vol. 1, p. 60 and following pages. with intuitions from the real world, through suffering beings who also do not know how they incurred their torment. It needs no other hell to help it. As a reward, on the other hand, it promises rebirth in better, nobler shapes, as a Brahman, as a wise man, as a saint. The highest reward awaits the noblest deeds and complete resignation. It also comes to the woman who died voluntarily on her husband's funeral pyre in seven lives one after another, and no less to the man whose pure mouth never spoke a single lie. This reward the myth can express in the language of this world only negatively, through the promise, so often found, of not being born again at all: non adsumes iterum existentiam apparentem. Or the Buddhists, who accept neither Veda nor castes, put it this way: "You shall attain Nirvana, that is, a state in which there are four things that do not exist: birth, age, sickness and death."

No myth has ever drawn closer, and none ever will, to the philosophical truth, which so few can reach, than this ancient teaching of the noblest and oldest people. Degenerate as that people now is in many respects, this teaching still rules among them as a general popular belief and has a decided influence on life, today just as it did four thousand years ago. Pythagoras and Plato therefore took in with admiration that non plus ultra of mythical presentation. They took it over from India or Egypt, revered it, applied it, and, we do not know how far, even believed it themselves.—We, on the other hand, now send the Brahmans English clergymen and Moravian linen weavers, to teach them better out of pity and to tell them that they were made out of nothing and should be thankful and glad about it. But what happens to us is what happens to someone who fires a bullet at a rock. In India our religions will never, never take root. The primeval wisdom of the human race will not be pushed aside by the events in Galilee. On the contrary, Indian wisdom flows back to Europe and will bring about a fundamental change in our knowing and thinking.

64 But from our presentation of eternal justice, which is philosophical and not mythical, we now want to go on to the related reflections on the ethical significance of action and of conscience, which is the merely felt knowledge of eternal justice.—Only here, first, I want to draw attention to two peculiarities of human nature. They can help to make clear how the essence of that eternal justice, and the unity and identity of the will in all its appearances, on which that justice rests, is known to everyone, at least as a dark feeling.

Quite independent of the purpose of the state in punishment, which I have shown and which grounds the right to punish, after an evil deed has been done it gives satisfaction to see that the one who caused another pain suffers exactly the same measure of pain in return. This satisfies not only the injured party, who is mostly driven by a desire for revenge, but also the wholly uninvolved spectator. It seems to me that nothing other than the consciousness of that eternal justice expresses itself in this. But the unrefined mind at once misunderstands and falsifies this consciousness. Caught in the principium individuationis, it commits an amphiboly of concepts. It demands of the appearance what

belongs only to the thing in itself. It does not see how, in themselves, the offender and the offended are one, and how it is the same essence that, not recognizing itself in its own appearance, bears both the torment and the guilt. It demands instead to see the torment again in the very individual who bears the guilt. For this reason most people would also demand that a human being with a very high degree of malice (it may well be found in many, only not paired with other qualities as in him), who is far superior to others by unusual strength of mind and who therefore brought unspeakable suffering on millions of others, for example as a world conqueror, atone for all those sufferings sometime and somewhere by an equal measure of pain. I say they would demand this because they do not recognize how, in themselves, the tormentor and the tormented are one. It is the same will through which the tormented exist and live that appears in the tormentor too and reaches in him the clearest revelation of its essence. This will suffers likewise in the oppressor as in the oppressed, and in the oppressor all the more, the higher the clarity and distinctness of consciousness and the greater the vehemence of the will.—The deeper knowledge, no longer caught in the principium individuationis, from which all virtue and nobility of mind proceed, no longer harbors that retribution-demanding disposition. Christian ethics already testifies to this. It forbids all repayment of evil with evil absolutely, and lets eternal justice rule in the realm of the thing in itself, which is different from appearance. ("Vengeance is mine, I will repay, says the Lord." Rom. 12, 19.)

A much more striking, but also much rarer, trait in human nature expresses that desire to draw eternal justice into the realm of experience, that is, of individuation. At the same time it points to a felt consciousness of two things: that, as I put it above, the will to life puts on the great tragedy and comedy at its own expense, and that the same one will lives in all appearances. Such a trait, I say, is the following. We sometimes see a person so deeply outraged by a great injury that they have suffered, or perhaps only witnessed, that they deliberately stake their own life on it, past rescue, to take revenge on the doer of that outrage. We may see them hunt a powerful oppressor for years, finally murder him, and then die on the scaffold themselves, as they foresaw. Often they did not even try

to avoid it, since their life had kept value for them only as a means of revenge.—Examples of this are found especially among the Spaniards [31]. If we now examine the spirit of that thirst for retribution [32] That Spanish bishop who in the last war poisoned himself and the French generals together at his table belongs here, as do several facts from that war. Examples are also found in Montaigne, Book 2, ch. 12. closely, we find it very different from common revenge, which wants to soften the suffering endured by the sight of the suffering caused. Indeed, we find that what it aims at deserves to be called punishment rather than revenge. For in it lies really the intention of an effect on the future, by example. And here it has no selfish purpose at all, neither for the avenging individual, who perishes in it, nor for a society that gains security by laws. For that punishment is carried out by the single person, not by the state, and not in fulfillment of a law. Rather it always strikes a deed which the state did not want or was not able to punish, and whose punishment the state disapproves. It seems to me that the indignation which drives such a person so far beyond the limits of all self-love springs from the deepest consciousness that he is himself the whole will to life, which appears in all beings through all times. To this will the most distant future therefore belongs just as the present does, and cannot be a matter of indifference. Affirming this will, he nevertheless demands that in the spectacle which presents his essence no such monstrous injury ever appear again. By the example of a revenge against which there is no defensive wall, since fear of death does not deter the avenger, he wants to frighten every future offender. The will to life, though still affirming itself, here no longer clings to the single appearance, the individual. It embraces the Idea of man and wants to keep its appearance pure of such monstrous, outrageous injury. It is a rare, significant, even sublime trait of character, by which the individual sacrifices himself in striving to make himself the arm of eternal justice, whose real essence he still fails to recognize.

65 By all the reflections so far on human action we have prepared the last one and made our task much easier. The task is to raise the real ethical significance of action to abstract and philosophical clarity, and to show it as a link in our main

thought. In life this significance is designated by the words *good* and *evil*, and people understand one another perfectly by them.

But first I will trace those concepts *good* and *evil* back to their real meaning. The philosophical writers of our day, most strangely, treat them as simple concepts, that is, as incapable of analysis. I do this so that no one stays caught in an unclear delusion that they contain more than is really the case, and that in and for themselves they already say everything needed here. I can do this because I am as little inclined to look for a hiding place behind the word *Good* in ethics as I earlier was to look for one behind the words *beautiful* or *true*. I do not want to tack on an ending, "-ness", which nowadays is supposed to have a special σεμνοτης and so help out in several cases, and then, with a solemn air, make people believe that by pronouncing those three words I had done more than designate three very wide and abstract, and therefore not at all rich in content, concepts, which have very different origin and meaning. For who that has made acquaintance with the writings of our day has not finally come to feel disgust at those three words, however excellent the things they originally point to, after seeing a thousand times how anyone least able to think believes he may bring out those three words, with a wide-open mouth and the look of an inspired sheep, to have spoken great wisdom?

The concept *true* was already explained in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, chapter 4, §29 and following. The content of the concept *beautiful* found its proper explanation for the first time in our whole third book. Now we want to trace the concept *good* back to its meaning, and that takes very little. This concept is essentially relative. It names *how well an object suits some particular striving of the will*. So anything that agrees with the will in any of its expressions, anything that serves the will's purpose, is thought of through the concept good, however different such things may otherwise be. That is why we say good food, good roads, good weather, good weapons, a good omen, and so on. In short, we call good whatever is just the way we happen to want it. So what is good for one person can be exactly the opposite for another. The concept of the good splits into two kinds. One is satisfaction of the will that is present right now. The other is satisfaction that is only indirect and looks to the

future. That is, the agreeable and the useful. As long as we are talking about beings that do not know, the opposite concept is expressed by the word *bad*, or, less often and more abstractly, by *ill*. This names everything that does not suit the will's striving at the time. People, like all other beings that can come into a relation to the will, have also been called *good* when they were favorable, helpful or friendly to the purposes someone happened to be pursuing. This is the same meaning, and the relative element is always kept. It shows in a saying such as: "This man is good to me, but not to you." But some people had a character that led them, as a rule, not to hinder other people's strivings of will but to further them. They were helpful, kind, friendly and generous all the way through. Because of this relation of their way of acting to the will of others in general, they were called *good* people. For the opposite concept, when it is applied to beings that know (animals and humans), German uses a different word from the one it uses for beings without knowledge, and so has French for about a hundred years: *böse* in German, méchant in French. In almost all other languages there is no such distinction. κακος, malus, cattivo, bad are used both of people and of lifeless things that run against the purposes of a particular individual will. So the discussion started entirely from the passive side of the good. Only later could it move on to the active side. Then it began to examine the way of acting of the person called *good*, no longer in relation to others but in relation to himself. It set itself above all to explain two things. One was the pure, objective respect that such conduct produced in other people. The other was the peculiar contentment with himself that it plainly produced in him, since he bought it even at the cost of sacrifices of another kind. In the same way, on the other side, it set out to explain the inner pain that went with an evil disposition, however many outward advantages it brought to the person who held it. From this the ethical systems arose, both the philosophical ones and those resting on religious doctrines. Both always try to connect happiness with virtue somehow. The philosophical ones do it either through the principle of contradiction or through the principle of sufficient reason, so that happiness is made either identical with virtue or a consequence of it, and always by sophistry. The religious ones do it by asserting other worlds than the one experience could

possibly know [33]. Our own discussion, on the other hand, will show the inner nature of virtue to be a striving in a direction completely opposite to the striving for happiness, that is, for well-being and life. By what was said above, the *good* is, by its concept, των προς τι. So every good is essentially relative, because it has its being only in its relation to a desiring will. *Absolute good* is therefore a contradiction. Highest good, summum bonum, means the same thing. It means really a final satisfaction of the will, after which no new willing [34] By the way, let me remark that what gives every positive religious doctrine its great strength, the hold by which it takes firm possession of people's minds, is entirely its ethical side. It does not do this directly as ethics, however. It does it because the ethics is firmly tied and woven together with the rest of the mythical dogma that is peculiar to each doctrine, and so seems explainable only through that dogma. So much so that, although the ethical meaning of actions cannot be explained at all by the principle of sufficient reason, while every myth follows that principle, believers still hold the ethical meaning of acting and their myth to be quite inseparable, in fact simply one and the same thing, and so they regard every attack on the myth as an attack on right and virtue. It goes so far that among the monotheistic peoples atheism, or godlessness, has become a synonym for the absence of all morality. Priests welcome such confusions of concepts. Only as a result of them could that fearful monster, fanaticism, arise and rule not just single people of outstanding perversity and evil but whole nations. And finally, in this Western world, it took bodily form as the Inquisition, which stands in history only once, to the honor of humanity. According to the latest reports, at last authentic, the Inquisition in Madrid alone (while in the rest of Spain there were still many such spiritual dens of murderers) put 300,000 people to a death of agony at the stake over 300 years, for the sake of matters of belief. Every zealot should be reminded of that at once, whenever he wants to raise his voice. would follow, a last motive, whose attainment would give the will an indestructible satisfaction. By our discussion so far in this fourth book, nothing of the kind can be thought. The will can no more stop willing again and again after any satisfaction than time can end or begin. For the will there is no lasting fulfillment that would satisfy its striving

completely and forever. It is the barrel of the Danaids. There is no highest good for it, no absolute good, but always only a temporary one. Still, there is an old expression that we do not quite want to drop, out of habit. If we like to give it an honorary post, as if it were retired, then we may use it figuratively, as a picture. We may call the complete self-cancellation and denial of the will, true willlessness, the absolute good, the summum bonum. This alone stills and soothes the will's urge forever. This alone gives that contentment which cannot be disturbed again. This alone redeems the world. And we shall soon deal with it, at the end of our whole discussion. We may look on it as the one radical cure for the disease, against which all other goods are only palliatives, only anodynes. In this sense the Greek τελος, like finis bonorum, fits the matter even better. So much for the words *good* and *evil*. Now to the matter itself.

If a person is always inclined to do *wrong* whenever there is an occasion and no outside power holds him back, we call him *evil*. By our explanation of wrong, this means that such a person does not merely affirm the will to life as it appears in his own body. He goes so far in this affirmation that he denies the will appearing in other individuals. This shows in his demanding their powers for the service of his own will, and in his trying to wipe out their existence if they stand in the way of his will's strivings. The final source of this is a high degree of egoism, whose nature was set out above. Two things are clear here at once. First, that in such a person an extremely violent will to life speaks out, one that goes far beyond affirming his own body. Second, that his knowledge is wholly given over to the principle of sufficient reason and caught in the principium individuationis. It stays fixed at the complete difference that this principle sets between his own person and all others. So he seeks only his own well-being, completely indifferent to the well-being of everyone else. Their nature is quite foreign to him, separated from his own by a wide gulf. In fact he really regards them only as masks, without any reality. And these two qualities are the basic elements of the evil character.

That great violence of willing is, in and of itself and directly, a constant source of suffering. First, because all willing, as such, springs from lack, and so from suffering. (That is why, as you will remember from the third book, the momen-

tary silence of all willing is already a main part of the joy in the beautiful. This silence sets in as soon as we give ourselves up to aesthetic contemplation as the pure, will-less subject of knowing, the correlate of the Idea.) Second, because of the causal connection of things, most desires have to stay unfulfilled, and the will is crossed far more often than satisfied. So for this reason too, violent and abundant willing always brings violent and abundant suffering. For all suffering is nothing other than unfulfilled and crossed willing. Even the pain of the body, when the body is injured or destroyed, is possible as such only because the body is nothing other than the will itself, become object. So, because much and violent suffering cannot be separated from much and violent willing, the very facial expression of very evil people bears the stamp of inner suffering. Even when they have gained every outward happiness, they always look unhappy, unless they are caught up in a moment of jubilation or are pretending. From this inner torment, which is directly essential to them, there finally comes even the pleasure in other people's suffering that does not spring from mere egoism but is disinterested. This is *malice* proper, and it climbs to *cruelty*. For this, another's suffering is no longer a means to the purposes of one's own will but an end in itself. The closer explanation of this phenomenon is as follows. A human being is an appearance of the will, lit by the clearest knowledge. So he always measures the actual, felt satisfaction of his will against the merely possible satisfaction that knowledge holds up before him. From this comes envy. Every deprivation is made infinitely worse by another's enjoyment and eased by knowing that others suffer the same deprivation. The ills that are common to everyone and cannot be separated from human life trouble us little. So do those that belong to the climate, to the whole country. The memory of greater sufferings than ours quiets the pain of ours. The sight of others' sufferings eases our own. Now suppose a person is filled with an extremely violent urge of will. He would like to grab everything, with burning greed, to cool the thirst of his egoism. And at the same time he has to learn, as he must, that all satisfaction is only apparent. What he gains never delivers what the thing he wanted promised, namely a final quieting of the savage urge of will. Through fulfillment the wish only changes its shape and now torments him under another.

Finally, when all wishes are used up, the urge of will itself stays, even without a known motive, and announces itself as a feeling of dreadful desolation and emptiness, with the most hopeless torment. At ordinary degrees of willing, all this is felt only in a lesser measure and produces only the ordinary degree of a gloomy mood. But in the one who is the appearance of a will carried to outstanding malice, it necessarily grows into excessive inner torment, endless unrest, incurable pain. Suppose all that. Then he looks indirectly for the relief he cannot get directly. That is, he tries to soothe his own suffering by looking at the suffering of others, which he at the same time recognizes as an expression of his power. Another's suffering now becomes an end in itself for him. It is a sight he feasts on. And so there arises the phenomenon of real cruelty, of thirst for blood, which history shows so often, in the Neros and Domitians, in the African Deys, in Robespierre, and so on.

Related to malice is the thirst for revenge. It repays evil with evil, not out of regard for the future, which is the mark of punishment, but only because of what happened, the past as such. So it is disinterested. It is not a means but an end, so that one can feast on the torment of the offender, a torment one has caused oneself. What separates revenge from pure malice, and excuses it somewhat, is a semblance of right. That is, the very same act that is revenge now would be punishment, and therefore right, if it were ordered lawfully. That means: by a rule fixed and known beforehand, and in an association that had sanctioned it.

Besides the suffering just described, which grows from one root with malice, the very violent will, and so cannot be separated from it, there is joined to malice another pain, quite different and special. It becomes felt at every evil act, whether the act is mere injustice out of egoism or pure malice. According to how long it lasts, it is called *remorse* or *anguish of conscience*.—Suppose you remember and keep in mind what this fourth book has said so far. Above all, remember the truth set out at its beginning, that life is always certain for the will to life, as its mere image or mirror. Remember also the account of eternal justice. Then you will find that, according to those discussions, remorse can

have no meaning other than the following. That is, its content, expressed abstractly, is the following. In it two parts can be told apart, but they again coincide completely and must be thought of as wholly united.

The veil of Maya may wrap the mind of the evil person ever so thickly; that is, he may be ever so firmly caught in the principium individuationis. He sees his own person as absolutely different from every other and separated from them by a wide gulf. He clings to this knowledge with all his strength, because it alone suits his egoism and props it up. (Knowledge is almost always bribed by the will.) Still, in the innermost part of his consciousness a secret suspicion stirs. This order of things is only appearance, and in itself things are quite different. Time and space separate him from other individuals and from the countless torments they suffer, even suffer through him. They show these individuals to him as wholly foreign. Yet in itself, apart from representation and its forms, it is the one will to life that appears in all of them. Here it fails to recognize itself and turns its weapons against itself. By looking for greater well-being in one of its appearances, it lays the greatest suffering on another. And he, the evil person, is this whole will. So he is not only the tormentor but also the tormented. Only a deceiving dream, whose form is space and time, separates him from the suffering and keeps him free of it. But the dream will fade, and in truth he will have to pay for his pleasure with torment. All the suffering he knows only as possible really strikes him, as the will to life. For only to the knowledge of the individual, only by means of the principium individuationis, are possibility and actuality, nearness and distance in time and space, different. In themselves they are not. This truth is what the transmigration of souls expresses in mythical form, that is, adapted to the principle of sufficient reason and so translated into the form of appearance. But the purest expression of it, free of all admixture, is that darkly felt but comfortless torment called anguish of conscience.—This anguish comes, besides, from a second immediate knowledge that is closely tied to the first. It is knowledge of the strength with which the will to life affirms itself in the evil individual. This strength reaches far beyond his individual appearance, all the way to the complete denial of the same will as it appears in other individuals. So the evil person's inner horror at

his own deed, which he tries to hide from himself, holds two things. One is that suspicion of the nullity and mere seeming of the principium individuationis, and of the difference it sets between him and others. The other, at the same time, is knowledge of how violent his own will is, of the force with which he has seized life and sucked himself fast to it. This is the very life whose terrible side he sees before him in the torment of those he has oppressed. Yet he has grown so firmly together with it that the most dreadful things come from himself, as means to the complete affirmation of his own will. He recognizes himself as a concentrated appearance of the will to life. He feels how far he has fallen prey to life, and so to the countless sufferings that are essential to it. For life has endless time and endless space in which to cancel the difference between possibility and actuality, and to turn all the torments he for now merely *knows* into ones he *feels*. The millions of years of constant rebirth exist, to be sure, only in the concept, just as all past and future exist only in the concept. The filled time, the form in which the will appears, is only the present. And for the individual, time is always new: he always finds himself newly arisen. For life cannot be separated from the will to life, and its only form is the Now. Death (forgive me for repeating the comparison) is like the setting of the sun. The sun is swallowed up by night only in appearance. In reality it is itself the source of all light, burns without pause, brings new days to new worlds, always rising and always setting. Beginning and end touch only the individual, by means of time, the form of this appearance for representation. Outside time lies only the will, Kant's thing in itself, and its adequate objectivity, Plato's Idea. That is why suicide offers no rescue. What each person wills in his innermost self, that he has to be. And what each one is, that is just what he *wills*.—So there are two things that give conscience its sting. One is the merely felt knowledge that the forms of representation that separate individuals are seeming and nothing. The other is self-knowledge of one's own will and its degree. The course of a life weaves the picture of the empirical character, whose original is the intelligible character, and the evil person is frightened by this picture. It makes no difference whether it is woven in broad strokes, so that the world shares his horror, or in strokes so small that he alone sees it. For it concerns only him directly. The past, as mere

appearance, would be indifferent and could not alarm the conscience, if the character did not feel itself free of all time and unchangeable by it, as long as it does not deny itself. That is why things done long ago still weigh on the conscience. The prayer "Lead me not into temptation" says: "Do not let me see who I am."—The evil person affirms life with a certain force, and that force shows itself to him in the suffering he lays on others. By it he can measure how far away from him lies the giving up and denial of that very will. This is the one possible redemption from the world and its torment. He sees how far he belongs to the world and how firmly he is bound to it. The *known* suffering of others could not move him. He falls prey to life and to *felt* suffering. It remains an open question whether this will ever break and overcome the violence of his will.

This account of the meaning and inner nature of evil is, as mere feeling (that is, not as clear, abstract knowledge), the content of the *anguish of conscience*. It will gain more clearness and completeness through an equally thorough look at the *good*, as a quality of the human will. And at the end it will gain it through a look at complete resignation and holiness, which come out of the good once it has reached its highest degree. For opposites always explain each other, and the day shows itself and the night at once, as Spinoza said so well.

66 A morality without grounding, that is, mere moralizing, cannot have any effect, because it gives no motive. But a morality that does give a motive can do so only by working on self-love. What springs from self-love has no moral worth. From this it follows that no genuine virtue can be produced by morality, or by abstract knowledge in general. Virtue must spring from intuitive knowledge, which recognizes in another individual the same being as in oneself.

True, virtue comes out of knowledge. But it does not come out of abstract knowledge, which can be passed on in words. If it did, it could be taught. By stating its nature here, and the knowledge underlying it, in abstract terms, we would have made everyone who grasps this better ethically. But that is not so at all. One can no more produce a virtuous person by ethical lectures or sermons than all the systems of aesthetics, from Aristotle's on, have ever made a poet.

For the concept is barren for the real and inner nature of virtue, just as it is for art. It can only serve in a wholly subordinate way, as a tool, in carrying out and preserving what has been recognized and decided in another way. Velle non discitur. Abstract dogmas have in fact no influence on virtue, that is, on goodness of disposition. The false ones do not disturb it, and the true ones hardly promote it. It would indeed be very bad if the main thing in human life, its ethical worth, valid for eternity, depended on something whose acquisition is so much a matter of chance as dogmas, religious doctrines and philosophical systems are. For morality, dogmas have only this value. A person who is already virtuous from another knowledge, to be discussed soon, has in them a scheme, a formula. By it he gives his own reason an account of his non-egoistic doing. Reason, that is, he himself, does not *comprehend* the nature of that doing. So the account is mostly only made up, and he has accustomed his reason to be satisfied with it.

On *acting*, the outward doing, dogmas can indeed have a strong influence. So can habit and example. (Habit and example work because the ordinary person does not trust his own judgment, whose weakness he knows, and follows only his own or others' experience.) But that does not change the disposition [35]. All abstract knowledge gives only motives. And motives, as shown above, can change only the direction of the will, never the will itself. All communicable knowledge can work on the will only as a motive. So however dogmas steer the will, what a person really and in general wills stays the same. He has only got different thoughts about the ways to reach it, and imaginary motives guide him just as real ones do. So, for example, as far as his ethical worth goes, it is all the same whether he makes large gifts to the helpless, firmly convinced that he will get everything back tenfold in a future life, or whether he spends the same sum improving an estate that, late but all the more surely and amply, [36] These are mere opera operata, the Church would say, which help nothing unless grace gives the faith that leads to rebirth. More on that below. will bring in interest. A murderer is just as much the man who, in true belief, hands the heretic over to the flames as the bandit who earns a reward by killing. And, depending on the inner circumstances, the same goes for the man who slaughters Turks in the

Holy Land, if he does it, like the others, really because he thinks he is earning himself a place in heaven. For these people too look after only themselves, their egoism, just like that bandit, from whom they differ only by the absurdity of their means.—From outside, as I have said, the will can be reached only through motives. But motives change only the way the will expresses itself, never the will itself. Velle non discitur.

When someone does good deeds and appeals to dogmas, one must always ask whether the dogmas really are the motive for the deeds. Or are they, as I said above, nothing more than a seeming account? By it that person tries to satisfy his own reason about a good deed that flows from quite another source. He does it because he is *good*, but he does not know how to explain it properly, since he is not a philosopher, and he still wants to think something about it. The difference is very hard to find, because it lies in the inner depths of the mind. That is why we can almost never judge the doings of others in the right way morally, and seldom our own.—The deeds and ways of acting of an individual and of a whole people can be changed a great deal by dogmas, example and habit. But in themselves all deeds (opera operata) are merely empty pictures. Only the disposition that leads to them gives them moral significance. And this can really be exactly the same with a very different outward appearance. With an equal degree of wickedness, one man may die on the wheel and another quietly in the bosom of his family. The same degree of wickedness may show itself coarsely in one people, in murder and cannibalism, and in another finely and softly, in miniature, in court intrigues, oppressions and subtle plots of every sort. The essence stays the same. One can imagine that a perfect state, or perhaps even a dogma of rewards and punishments after death that was believed with perfect firmness, would prevent every crime. Much would be gained politically and nothing morally. All that would happen is that the portrayal of the will through life would be held back.

Genuine goodness of disposition, disinterested virtue and pure nobility of mind thus do not come from abstract knowledge. But they do come from knowledge. It is an immediate, intuitive knowledge that cannot be argued away or argued into a person. Because it is not abstract, it cannot be passed on either.

It has to dawn on each person for himself. So it finds its proper, adequate expression not in words but only in deeds, in action, in the course of a person's life. We are giving a theory of virtue here, and so we have to express the nature of the knowledge underlying it in abstract terms. Even so, we cannot deliver that knowledge itself in this expression, only the concept of it. In doing so we always start from action, in which alone it becomes visible, and point to action as its only adequate expression. We only interpret and explain action, that is, we say abstractly what is really going on in it.

Before we speak of real *goodness*, as the opposite of the *evil* described, we must touch on the mere negation of evil as an intermediate step. This is *justice*. What right and wrong are was explained fully enough above. So we can say briefly here: the person who freely acknowledges that purely moral boundary between wrong and right, and lets it hold even where no state or other power guards it, is *just*. By our explanation, such a person never goes, in affirming his own will, as far as denying the will that presents itself in another individual. So he will not bring suffering on others to increase his own well-being. That is, he will commit no crime, and he will respect everyone's rights and property.—We see now that for such a just person the principium individuationis is no longer an absolute dividing wall, as it is for the evil person. He does not, like the evil person, affirm only his own appearance of will and deny all the others. Others are not mere masks to him, with a nature completely different from his own. By his way of acting he shows that he *recognizes* his own nature, the will to life as thing in itself, also in the foreign appearance, which is given to him only as representation. So he finds himself again in it, up to a certain degree, namely the degree of not doing wrong, that is, of not injuring. To exactly this degree he sees through the principium individuationis, the veil of Maya. To this extent he sets the being outside himself equal to his own. He does not injure it.

Look at this justice in its innermost part, and it already holds the resolve not to go so far in affirming one's own will that it denies the appearances of will in others by forcing them to serve one's own. So a person will want to do for others as much as he gets from them. The highest degree of this justice of disposition is always already paired with real goodness, whose character is no longer

merely negative. It goes so far that a person doubts his right to inherited property, wants to keep his body alive only by his own powers, mental or physical, feels every service from others and every luxury as a reproach, and finally turns to voluntary poverty. So we see *Pascal*, when he took the ascetic turn, no longer willing to put up with any attendance, although he had servants enough. In spite of his constant ill health, he made his own bed, fetched his own food from the kitchen, and so on. (Vie de Pascal par sa soeur, p. 19.) Quite in agreement with this, it is reported that many Hindus, even Rajahs, with great wealth, use it only to keep their families, their court and their servants. They follow with strict scruple the maxim of eating nothing except what they have sown and reaped with their own hands. Yet a certain misunderstanding lies at the bottom of this. The individual, just because he is rich and powerful, can do such considerable services to human society as a whole that they weigh as much as the inherited wealth, whose protection he owes to society. Really, the excessive justice of such Hindus is already more than justice. It is real renunciation, denial of the will to life, asceticism, of which we shall speak last. On the other hand, pure idleness and living off the powers of others, on inherited property, without doing anything, can already be regarded as morally wrong, even if under positive laws it has to stay right.

We have found that voluntary justice has its innermost origin in a certain degree of seeing through the principium individuationis. The unjust person stays wholly caught in this. The seeing-through can occur not only in the degree needed for justice but also in a higher degree. This drives a person to positive kindness and beneficence, to love of humanity. And this can happen however strong and energetic in itself the will appearing in such an individual may be. Knowledge can always hold the balance against it, teach it to resist the temptation to wrong, and even produce any degree of goodness, indeed of resignation. So the good person is by no means to be taken for an originally weaker appearance of will than the evil one. It is knowledge that masters the blind urge of will in him. There are indeed individuals who only seem good-natured, because of

the weakness of the will appearing in them. But what they are soon shows in that they are incapable of any considerable self-overcoming to carry out a just or good deed.

Now suppose we meet a person, as a rare exception, who has, say, a considerable income, but uses little of it for himself and gives all the rest to the needy, while he himself does without many pleasures and comforts. And suppose we try to make this person's doing clear to ourselves. We set entirely aside the dogmas by which he may himself try to make his doing understandable to his reason. Then we will find, as the simplest, most general expression and the essential character of his way of acting, that he *makes less of a difference than usual* between himself and others. In the eyes of many others this very difference is so great that another's suffering is direct joy to the malicious and a welcome means to their own well-being for the unjust. The merely just person stops at not causing it. Most people in general know of countless sufferings of others near them, and see them, but do not decide to ease them, because they would have to take on some deprivation themselves. So to every one of these people there seems to be a mighty difference between their own I and another's. But for that noble person we are imagining, this difference is not so important. The principium individuationis, the form of appearance, no longer holds him so firmly. The suffering he sees in the other touches him almost as closely as his own. So he tries to set up a balance between the two, denies himself pleasures, and takes on deprivations, to ease the suffering of others. He becomes aware that the difference between him and others, which for the evil person is such a great gulf, belongs only to a passing, deceiving appearance. He recognizes, directly and without inferences, that the in-itself of his own appearance is also the in-itself of the other appearance. It is that will to life which makes up the nature of every thing and lives in all. He recognizes that this reaches even to animals and the whole of nature. That is why he will not torment any animal either [37].

He is now as little able to let others go hungry, while he himself has things he does not need and could do without, as anyone is able to go hungry for a day so as to have more than he can enjoy on the next. For the man who performs the works [38] Man's right over the life and the powers of animals rests on this. As

consciousness grows clearer, suffering grows in equal measure. The pain an animal suffers from death or from work is not yet as great as the pain a human would suffer from simply going without meat or without the animal's powers. So the human can go, in affirming his own existence, as far as denying the existence of the animal, and the will to life as a whole bears less suffering this way than if it were the other way around. This also fixes the degree of use that a human may make of animals' powers without wrong. But this degree is often exceeded, especially with beasts of burden and hunting dogs. The work of societies for the protection of animals is aimed especially against this. In my view, that right also does not reach to vivisection, especially of the higher animals. On the other hand, the insect does not yet suffer as much through its death as the human does through its sting.—The Hindus do not see this. of love, the veil of Maya has become transparent, and the deception of the principium individuationis has left him. He recognizes himself, his own self, his will, in every being, and so also in the one who suffers. The perversity has left him with which the will to life, failing to recognize itself, here in one individual enjoys fleeting, illusory pleasures, and for them there in an *other* suffers and starves. In this way it inflicts torment and endures torment. It does not see that, like Thyestes, it is greedily eating its own flesh. Then it laments here over undeserved sorrow, and there commits outrage without fear of Nemesis. It does this always and only because it fails to recognize itself in the foreign appearance, and so does not see eternal justice. It is caught in the principium individuationis, that is, in that kind of knowledge which the principle of sufficient reason rules. To be cured of this delusion and sleight of hand of Maya, and to perform works of love, are one and the same. The latter, however, is the unfailing symptom of that knowledge.

The opposite of the pang of conscience, whose origin and meaning were explained above, is the *good conscience*, the satisfaction we feel after every disinterested act. It comes from this. Such an act springs from the direct recognition of our own being in itself also in the foreign appearance. So it in turn gives us the confirmation of this knowledge, the knowledge that our true self is there not only in our own person, this single appearance, but in everything that lives.

This makes the heart feel widened, as egoism makes it feel drawn together. For egoism concentrates our concern on the single appearance of our own individual, and knowledge always holds up to us the countless dangers that constantly threaten this appearance. So anxiety and worry become the keynote of our mood. But the knowledge that everything living is our own being in itself just as much as our own person spreads our concern over everything living. This is how the heart is widened. Our concern for our own self is thus reduced, and the anxious care for it is attacked at its root and limited. From this come the calm, confident cheerfulness that a virtuous disposition and a good conscience give, and the clearer appearance of this cheerfulness with every good act, since the act confirms to ourselves the ground of that mood. The egoist feels himself surrounded by foreign and hostile appearances, and all his hope rests on his own welfare. The good person lives in a world of friendly appearances: the welfare of each of them is his own. So even if knowledge of the lot of humankind in general does not make his mood a cheerful one, the lasting knowledge of his own being in everything living still gives him a certain evenness and even cheerfulness of mood. For concern spread over countless appearances cannot burden as much as concern concentrated on *one*. The accidents that strike the whole body of individuals even out, while those that meet the single one bring luck or misfortune.

Other people have set up moral principles, which they handed out as prescriptions for virtue and laws that must be followed. I, as I have already said, cannot do anything like that, since I have no "ought" and no law to hold up before the eternally free will. In the context of my discussion, what corresponds to that enterprise to some extent, and is analogous to it, is the purely theoretical truth that the will is the in-itself of every appearance, but is itself, as such, free of the forms of appearance and so of plurality. My whole presentation can be regarded as nothing but the working out of this truth. In regard to action, I do not know how to express this truth more worthily than by the formula of the Veda already mentioned: "Tat twam asi!" ("This you are!"). Whoever can say this to

himself, with clear knowledge and firm inner conviction, about every being he comes into contact with, is thereby sure of all virtue and bliss, and on the straight road to redemption.

As the last point of my presentation, I am going to show how love leads to redemption. We recognize the seeing-through of the principium individuationis as love's origin and nature. Redemption means the complete giving up of the will to life, that is, of all willing. I also want to show how another road, less gentle but more frequent, brings people to the same place. First, though, I have to state and explain a paradoxical proposition here. I do so not because it is paradoxical but because it is true and belongs to the completeness of the thought I am setting out. It is this: "All love (αγαπη, caritas) is compassion."

67 We have seen how seeing through the principium individuationis produced justice in a lower degree and real goodness of disposition in a higher one, which showed itself as pure, that is, disinterested, love toward others. Where this love becomes complete, it sets the other individual and his fate wholly equal to one's own. It can never go further, since there is no reason to prefer the other individual to oneself. But the greater number of other individuals, whose whole well-being or life is in danger, can outweigh regard for the single person's own welfare. In such a case the character that has reached the highest goodness and perfect nobility will give up his welfare and his life entirely for the welfare of many others. So died Codrus, so Leonidas, so Regulus, so Decius Mus, so Arnold von Winkelried, so everyone who goes to certain death willingly and knowingly for his own people, for his country. Also on this level stands everyone who willingly takes on suffering and death to uphold something that serves the welfare of all humankind and rightfully belongs to it, that is, for general, important truths and for the wiping out of great errors. So died Socrates, so Giordano Bruno, so many a hero of truth found death at the stake, at the hands of priests. Now, with regard to the paradox stated above, I have to recall that earlier we found suffering essential to life as a whole and inseparable from it. We saw that every wish springs from a need, a lack, a suffering, so that every satisfaction is only a pain taken away, not a positive happiness brought. The joys do lie to the

wish that they are a positive good, but in truth they are negative in nature and are only the end of an ill. So whatever goodness, love and nobility do for others is always only easing their sufferings. And so what can move them to good deeds and works of love is always only knowledge of another's suffering, directly understood from one's own and set equal to it. From this it follows that pure love (αγαπη, caritas) is by its nature compassion. The suffering it eases may be great or small, and every unsatisfied wish counts among the small ones. So we will not hesitate to say the following, in straight contradiction to Kant. Kant wants to recognize everything truly good and all virtue only if it has come from abstract reflection, namely from the concept of duty and the categorical imperative, and he declares felt compassion a weakness, by no means a virtue. In straight contradiction to Kant we say: the mere concept is as barren for genuine virtue as for genuine art. All true and pure love is compassion, and any love that is not compassion is selfishness. Selfishness is ερως; compassion is αγαπη. Mixtures of the two are frequent. Even genuine friendship is always a mixture of selfishness and compassion. The first lies in the pleasure in the friend's presence, whose individuality fits our own, and it almost always makes up the largest part. Compassion shows in the sincere sharing in his weal and woe and the disinterested sacrifices one makes for him. Even Spinoza says: Benevolentia nihil aliud est, quam cupiditas ex commiseratione orta. (Eth. III, pr. 27, cor. 3, schol.) As a confirmation of our paradoxical proposition, one may notice that the tone and words of language, and the caresses of pure love, coincide wholly with the tone of compassion. One may also notice, in passing, that in Italian compassion and pure love are called by the same word, pietà.

This is also the place to discuss one of the most striking peculiarities of human nature, weeping. Like laughing, it is among the expressions that set man apart from the animal. Weeping is by no means simply an expression of pain, for people weep at very few pains.

In my view, one never weeps directly over the pain one feels, but always only over its repetition in reflection. That is, one moves from the pain one feels, even when it is bodily, to a mere representation of it. Then one finds one's own state so pitiable that, if someone else were the sufferer, one would be firmly and sin-

cerely convinced that one would help him, full of compassion and love. But now one is oneself the object of one's own sincere compassion. With the most helpful disposition, one is oneself the one who needs help. One feels that one suffers more than one could bear to see another suffer. In this strangely tangled mood, the suffering felt directly comes to perception again only by a double detour. First it is presented as someone else's, then felt along with as such, and then suddenly perceived again as directly one's own. In this mood nature gives itself relief through that strange bodily spasm.—Weeping is therefore compassion with oneself, or compassion thrown back to its starting point. So it depends on the capacity for love and compassion, and on imagination. That is why neither hard-hearted people nor people without imagination weep easily. Weeping is even always taken as a sign of a certain degree of goodness of character, and it disarms anger. One feels that whoever can still weep must necessarily be capable of love, that is, of compassion toward others, just because compassion, in the way described, enters into that mood which leads to weeping.—The description that Petrarch gives of how his own tears arise, speaking his feeling naively and truly, agrees entirely with the explanation put forward:

I vo pensando: e nel pensar m' assale Una pietà si forte di me stesso, Che mi conduce spesso, Ad alto lagrimar, ch' i non soleva [39].

40 As I walk along full of thought, so strong a pity for myself comes over me that I often have to weep aloud, which I did not use to do.

What I have said is also confirmed by the fact that children who have suffered a pain mostly weep only when someone feels sorry for them, so not over the pain but over the representation of it.—Sometimes we are moved to weep not by our own sufferings but by those of others. This happens because in imagination we vividly put ourselves in the place of the sufferer. Or else we see in his fate the lot of all humankind, and so above all our own. And so, by a wide detour, we again weep over ourselves and feel compassion for ourselves. This also seems to be a chief reason for the universal, and so natural, weeping at deaths. It is not his own loss that the mourner weeps for. He would be ashamed of such egoistic tears, whereas he is sometimes ashamed not to weep. To be

sure, he weeps first for the lot of the dead person. But he weeps even when, after long, heavy and incurable suffering, death was a desirable release for the dead. So what mainly seizes him is compassion over the lot of all humankind, which has fallen prey to finitude. Because of it every life, however striving, often so full of deeds, has to go out and come to nothing. But in this lot of humankind he sees above all his own, and the more so the closer the dead person stood to him, so most of all when it was his father. Even if life had become a torment to this father through age and illness, and a heavy burden to his son through his helplessness, the son still weeps violently over the father's death, for the reason given [41].

68 After this digression on the identity of pure love with compassion, whose turning back on one's own individual has the phenomenon of weeping as its symptom, [42] On this see chapter 47 of the second volume. It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that the ethics outlined in §§61–67 has received a fuller and more finished presentation in my prize essay on the foundation of morals. I take up again the thread of our interpretation of the ethical meaning of action. I want to show now how from the same source from which all goodness, love, virtue and nobility spring, there comes in the end also what I call the denial of the will to life.

Earlier we saw hatred and malice conditioned by egoism, and egoism resting on knowledge being caught in the principium individuationis. In the same way we found, as the origin and nature of justice, and then, when it goes further, of love and nobility up to the highest degrees, the seeing-through of that principium individuationis. This alone, by canceling the difference between one's own individual and foreign ones, makes possible and explains perfect goodness of disposition, up to the most unselfish love and the most generous self-sacrifice for others.

Suppose now that this seeing-through of the principium individuationis, this immediate knowledge of the identity of the will in all its appearances, is present in a high degree of clearness. Then it will show an even further-reaching influence on the will. Suppose the veil of Maya, the principium individuationis, is

lifted so far before a person's eyes that he no longer makes the egoistic difference between his own person and a foreign one. Instead he takes as much part in the sufferings of other individuals as in his own. He is thereby not only helpful to the highest degree, but even ready to sacrifice his own individual as soon as several others can be saved by it. Then it follows of itself that such a person, who recognizes himself, his innermost and true self, in all beings, must also regard the endless sufferings of everything living as his own, and so take on the pain of the whole world. No suffering is foreign to him any more. All the torments of others that he sees and so rarely can ease, all the torments he knows of indirectly, even those he only knows as possible, work on his mind like his own. It is no longer the changing weal and woe of his own person that he has in view, as is the case with the person still caught in egoism. Rather, since he sees through the principium individuationis, everything lies equally near to him. He knows the whole, grasps its nature, and finds it caught in constant passing away, vain striving, inner conflict and unceasing suffering. Wherever he looks, he sees suffering humankind and suffering animals, and a world melting away. But all this lies as near to him now as only his own person does to the egoist. With such knowledge of the world, how could he still affirm this very life by constant acts of will, and thereby tie himself ever more firmly to it, press it ever more firmly to himself? So the person who is still caught in the principium individuationis, in egoism, knows only single things and their relation to his own person, and these keep becoming new motives of his willing. In contrast, that described knowledge of the whole, of the nature of things in themselves, becomes the quietive of all willing without exception. The will now turns away from life. It shudders now at its pleasures, in which it recognizes the affirmation of life. The person reaches the state of voluntary renunciation, of resignation, of true calm and complete will-lessness.—For the rest of us, whom the veil of Maya still wraps, knowledge of the nothingness and bitterness of life also comes near at times, in heavily felt suffering of our own, or in vividly known suffering of others. We would like to break the sting of the desires by complete and final renunciation, shut the door on all suffering, purify and sanctify ourselves. But soon the deception of appearance ensnares us again, and its motives set the will

in motion anew. We cannot tear ourselves free. The lures of hope, the flattery of the present, the sweetness of pleasures, the well-being that falls to our person in the midst of the misery of a suffering world, under the rule of chance and error, draw us back to it and fasten the bonds anew. That is why Jesus says: "It is easier for an anchor cable to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God."

Let us compare life to a circular track of glowing coals with a few cool places, a track we would have to run around without rest. Then the person caught in the delusion is comforted by the cool place where he is standing now, or sees close before him, and he keeps running the track. But the person who sees through the principium individuationis, and so knows the nature of things in themselves and thereby the whole, can no longer take such comfort. He sees himself at all the places at once, and steps out.—His will turns. It no longer affirms its own nature mirrored in the appearance, but denies it. The outward sign by which this shows itself is the transition from virtue to asceticism. That is, it is no longer enough for him to love others as himself and to do as much for them as for himself. A loathing arises in him for the being whose expression is his own appearance, the will to life, the core and nature of that world he has come to know as wretched. So he disowns this very being that appears in him and is already expressed by his body. His doing now gives his appearance the lie and stands in open contradiction to it. Essentially nothing other than appearance of the will, he stops willing anything, takes care not to attach his will to anything, and tries to make the greatest indifference to all things firm in himself.—His body, healthy and strong, expresses the sexual drive through the genitals. But he denies the will and gives the body the lie: he wants no sexual satisfaction, on any condition. Voluntary, perfect chastity is the first step in asceticism, or the denial of the will to life. It thereby denies the affirmation of the will that reaches beyond the individual life, and so gives notice that with the life of this body the will, whose appearance it is, also cancels itself. Nature, always true and naive, says that if this maxim became general, the human race would die out. And from what was said in the second book about the connection of all appearances of will, I believe I can assume that with the highest appearance of

the will, its weaker reflection, the animal world, would drop away too, as the half-shadows vanish with the full light. With complete cancellation of knowledge, the rest of the world would also vanish into nothing by itself, since without subject there is no object. I would even like to relate to this a passage in the Veda, where it says: "As hungry children in this world crowd around their mother, so all beings wait for the holy sacrifice." (Asiatic researches, vol. 8. Colebrooke, On the Vedas; the extract from the Sama-Veda is also in Colebrooke's Miscellaneous essays, vol. 1, p. 88.) Sacrifice means resignation in general, and the rest of nature has to expect its redemption from the human being, who is priest and sacrifice at once. Indeed, it deserves to be cited as highly remarkable that this thought has also been expressed by the admirable and unfathomably deep Angelus Silesius, in a little verse headed "Man brings everything to God". It reads:

"Man! Everything loves you; around you is a great crowd: Everything runs to you, so that it may reach God."

But a still greater mystic, Meister Eckhard, whose wonderful writings have at last become accessible (1857) through Franz Pfeiffer's edition, says there, p. 459, entirely in the sense discussed here: "I prove this with Christ, who says: when I am lifted up from the earth, I will draw all things to me (John 12, 32). So the good man shall carry all things up to God, into their first origin. The masters prove to us that all creatures are made for man's sake. Test this on all creatures: one creature uses another. The cow uses the grass, the fish the water, the bird the air, the animal the forest. So all creatures come to the good man's use: a good man carries one creature in the other to God." He means to say that the reason a man uses the animals in this life is that he redeems them too, in and with himself.—Even the difficult Bible passage Romans 8, 21–24 seems to me to call for interpretation in this sense.

Buddhism, too, does not lack expressions of the matter. For example, when the Buddha, still a Bodhisatwa, has his horse saddled for the last time, namely for his flight from his father's residence into the wilderness, he speaks to the horse this verse: "For a long time you have been there in life and in death. But now

you shall stop carrying and dragging. Only this once more, O Kantakana, carry me away from here, and when I have obtained the Law (become a Buddha), I will not forget you." (Foe Koue Ki, trad. p. Abel Rémusat, p. 233.)

Asceticism then shows itself further in voluntary and deliberate poverty. This does not arise merely per accidens, by giving one's property away to ease the suffering of others. Here it is already an end in itself. It is meant to serve as a constant mortification of the will, so that the satisfaction of wishes, the sweetness of life, does not stir up again the will against which self-knowledge has conceived a loathing. The person who has come to this point still feels, as a living body, as a concrete appearance of the will, the disposition to every kind of willing. But he deliberately suppresses it. He forces himself to do nothing of all that he would like to do, and to do everything he would not like to do, even if it has no further purpose than to serve for the mortification of the will. He himself denies the will that appears in his person. So he will not resist when someone else does the same, that is, does him wrong. For this reason every suffering that comes on him from outside, by chance or by another's malice, is welcome to him: every harm, every disgrace, every insult. He receives it gladly, as the chance to give himself the certainty that he no longer affirms the will, but gladly takes the side of every enemy of the appearance of will that is his own person. So he bears such disgrace and suffering with inexhaustible patience and gentleness, repays evil with good without show, and lets the fire of anger, like that of desire, never wake in him again.—As he mortifies the will itself, so he mortifies its visibility, its objectivity, the body. He feeds it sparingly, so that its lush blooming and thriving do not give the will, whose mere expression and mirror the body is, new life and stir it up more strongly. So he takes to fasting, and he even takes to mortification of the flesh and self-torture, in order to break and kill the will more and more by constant deprivation and suffering. He knows this will as the source of his own existence and the world's, which are suffering, and he loathes it.—At last comes death, which dissolves this appearance of that will. Its nature had already died away long before, by the free denial of itself, except for the weak remainder that appeared as the animation of this body. Death is then highly welcome and received with joy, as a longed-for

release. With death, here, it is not as with others, where merely the appearance ends. Rather, the nature itself is canceled, which here had only a weak existence in the appearance and through it [43]. This last brittle bond now breaks as well. For the one who ends in this way, the world has ended at the same time.

And what I have described here with a weak tongue and only in general terms is not some philosophical fairy tale of my own invention, and only of today. No, it was the enviable life of very many saints and beautiful souls among the Christians, and still more among the Hindus and Buddhists, and among believers of other faiths as well. Very different dogmas were stamped on their reason, yet the inner, immediate, intuitive knowledge, from which alone all virtue and holiness can come, expressed itself in just the same way through their conduct of life. For here too we see the great difference between intuitive and abstract knowledge. It is so important and runs through all our discussion, and it has so far been too little noticed. Between the two lies a wide gulf, and only philosophy leads across it, as regards knowledge of the nature of the world. Intuitively, that is, in concreto, every person is really aware of all philosophical truths. But to bring them into his abstract knowledge, into reflection, is the business of the philosopher, who neither should nor can do anything more.

Perhaps, then, here for the first time, abstractly and pure of everything mythical, the inner nature of holiness, self-denial,[44] This thought is expressed by a beautiful simile in the ancient philosophical Sanskrit writing "Sankhya Karika": "Yet the soul stays clothed with the body for a while, as the potter's wheel, after the vessel is finished, goes on whirling because of the push it got earlier. Only when the enlightened soul separates from the body and nature ceases for it, does its complete redemption come." Colebrooke, "On the philosophy of the Hindus: Miscellaneous essays", vol. 1, p. 259. Likewise in the "Sankhya Carica by Horace Wilson", §67, p. 184. mortification of one's own will, asceticism, is expressed as denial of the will to life. This denial sets in after the complete knowledge of its own nature has become the quietive of all willing. By contrast, all those saints and ascetics knew it immediately and expressed it by deed. Their inner knowledge was the same, but they spoke very different languages. This depended on the dogmas they had once taken into their reason. According to

these dogmas an Indian saint, a Christian one and a Lamaist each has to give a very different account of his own doing. But that is quite indifferent for the matter. A saint may be full of the most absurd superstition, or he may on the contrary be a philosopher: both count the same. His doing alone shows him to be a saint. For in moral terms it comes not from abstract knowledge but from intuitively grasped, immediate knowledge of the world and its nature, and he only interprets it by some dogma to satisfy his reason. It is therefore no more necessary for the saint to be a philosopher than for the philosopher to be a saint. In the same way it is not necessary for a perfectly beautiful man to be a great sculptor, or for a great sculptor to be a beautiful man himself. In general it is a strange demand to make on a moralist that he should recommend no other virtue than the one he has himself. To repeat the whole nature of the world abstractly, in general and clearly in concepts, and so to lay it down as a reflected image in lasting concepts of reason that are always ready at hand: this and nothing else is philosophy. I recall the passage from Bacon of Verulam quoted in the first book.

But what I have said above about the denial of the will to life, or the conduct of a beautiful soul, of a resigned saint who does penance of his own free will, is likewise only abstract and general, and therefore cold. The knowledge from which denial of the will comes is intuitive and not abstract. So it finds its perfect expression too not in abstract concepts but only in deed and conduct. To understand more fully, then, what we express philosophically as denial of the will to life, one has to get to know examples from experience and reality. Of course one will not meet them in everyday experience: nam omnia praeclara tam difficilia quam rara sunt, as Spinoza says so well. So, unless a particularly favorable fate makes one an eyewitness, one will have to be content with the biographies of such people. Indian literature is very rich in descriptions of the lives of saints, penitents, Samanaeans, Saniassis, and so on. We can already see this from the little we know so far through translations. Even the well-known "Mythologie des Indous par Mad. de Polier", though by no means praiseworthy in every respect, contains many excellent examples of this kind. (Especially in chapter 13 of the second volume.) Among Christians too there is no lack of

examples for the explanation I am after. Read the biographies, mostly badly written, of those people who are called now holy souls, now Pietists, Quietists, pious enthusiasts, and so on. Collections of such biographies have been made at various times, such as Tersteegen's "Lives of Holy Souls" and Reiz's "History of the Reborn". In our day there is a collection by Kanne which, among much that is bad, also contains some good, and I count especially the "Life of Beata Sturmin" among it. The life of Saint Francis of Assisi belongs here entirely, this true personification of asceticism and model of all begging monks. His life was described by his younger contemporary Saint Bonaventura, who is also famous as a scholastic, and has recently been published again: "Vita S. Francisci a S. Bonaventura concinnata" (Soest 1847). Shortly before, a careful, detailed biography of him that used all the sources had appeared in France: "Histoire de S. François d'Assise, par Chavin de Mallan" (1845).—As an Oriental parallel to these monastic writings we have the highly readable book by Spence Hardy: "Eastern monachism, an account of the order of mendicants founded by Gotama Budha" (1850). It shows us the same thing in another dress. One also sees how indifferent it is to the thing whether it starts from a theistic or an atheistic religion.—

Above all, as a special and very detailed example and factual illustration of the concepts I have set up, I can recommend the autobiography of Madame de Guion. Her memory always fills me with reverence. She was a beautiful and great soul. Every person of a better sort must be glad to get to know her and to do justice to the excellence of her disposition, while being lenient to the superstition of her reason. The common-minded, that is, the majority, will always hold that book in bad repute. For everywhere and in every case each person can value only what is somehow analogous to himself and for which he has at least a weak disposition. This holds for the ethical as well as for the intellectual. In a way one could even regard as an example belonging here the well-known French biography of Spinoza, if one uses as a key to it that splendid opening of his very inadequate treatise "De emendatione intellectus". That passage I can at the same time recommend as the most effective remedy I know for calming the storm of the passions. Finally even the great Goethe, much as he is a Greek, did

not think it beneath him to show us this finest side of humanity in the clarifying mirror of poetry. In the "Confessions of a Beautiful Soul" he presented the life of Fräulein Klettenberg in idealized form, and later, in his own biography, he also gave historical information about it. He has also told us the life of Saint Philippo Neri, even twice.—World history will of course always be silent, and has to be, about the people whose conduct is the best and only sufficient illustration of this important point of our discussion. For the matter of world history is quite another, indeed the opposite: not the denial and giving up of the will to life, but its affirmation and appearance in countless individuals. In this affirmation the will's conflict with itself, at the highest peak of its objectification, comes forward with perfect clearness. It shows us now the superiority of the single person through his cleverness, now the might of the crowd through its mass, now the power of chance personified as fate, and always the vanity and nothingness of the whole striving. But we are not following the thread of appearances in time here. As philosophers we are trying to investigate the ethical meaning of actions, and we take this here as the only measure of what is significant and important to us. No fear of the ever-standing majority vote of baseness and shallowness will keep us from confessing that the greatest, most important and most significant appearance the world can show is not the conqueror of the world but the overcomer of the world. In fact it is nothing other than the quiet and unnoticed conduct of life of a person to whom that knowledge has dawned. As a result of it he gives up and denies the will to life that fills everything and drives and strives in everything. Its freedom comes forward only here, in him alone, and so his doing becomes exactly the opposite of the ordinary. So for the philosopher, in this respect, those biographies of holy, self-denying people, however badly they are mostly written, even presented with a mixture of superstition and nonsense, are, through the significance of their subject, incomparably more instructive and important than even Plutarch and Livy.

To know more closely and fully what we express, in the abstraction and generality of our way of presenting, as denial of the will to life, it will also help a great deal to consider the ethical precepts given in this sense by people who were full

of this spirit. These precepts will at the same time show how old our view is, however new its purely philosophical expression may be. What lies closest to us is Christianity. Its ethics are wholly in the spirit described and lead not only to the highest degrees of love of humankind but also to renunciation. This last side is already very clearly present as a germ in the writings of the Apostles, but only later does it develop fully and get expressed explicitly. We find prescribed by the Apostles: love of one's neighbor, equal to self-love; beneficence; repaying hate with love and kindness; patience; gentleness; bearing every possible insult without resistance; abstinence in food, to suppress desire; and resistance to the sexual drive, entirely if one can. Here we already see the first steps of asceticism, or real denial of the will. This last expression says just what the Gospels call denying oneself and taking up the cross. (Matt. 16, 24. 25; Mark 8, 34. 35; Luke 9, 23. 24; 14, 26. 27. 33.) This tendency soon developed more and more, and gave rise to penitents, anchorites and monasticism. In itself this was pure and holy, but for that very reason quite unsuited to most people. So what developed from it could only be hypocrisy and abomination: for abusus optimi pessimus. In more developed Christianity we see that ascetic germ unfold into full flower in the writings of the Christian saints and mystics. Besides the purest love, these preach complete resignation, voluntary total poverty, true calm, perfect indifference to all worldly things, dying to one's own will and rebirth in God, complete forgetting of one's own person and sinking into the contemplation of God. A full presentation of this can be found in Fénelon's "Explication des maximes des Saints sur la vie intérieure". But nowhere, I think, is the spirit of Christianity in this development expressed so perfectly and powerfully as in the writings of the German mystics, that is, of Meister Eckhard and in the justly famous book "The German Theology". Of this Luther says, in the preface he wrote for it, that from no book except the Bible and Augustine did he learn more of what God, Christ and man are than from this one. We got its genuine, unfalsified text, however, only in 1851, in Pfeiffer's Stuttgart edition. The precepts and teachings given there are the most complete presentation, springing from deepest inner conviction, of what I have set out as the denial of the will to life. There, then, one should get to know it more closely, before one pro-

nounces on it with Jewish-Protestant confidence. Written in the same excellent spirit, though not to be valued quite equally with that work, is Tauler's "Imitation of the Poor Life of Christ", together with his "Medulla animae". In my view the teachings of these genuine Christian mystics stand to those of the New Testament as spirit of wine to wine. Or: what shows to us in the New Testament as if through veils and fog, comes toward us in the works of the mystics without covering, in full clearness and distinctness. Finally, one could also regard the New Testament as the first consecration, the mystics as the second. —σμικρα και μεγαλα μυστηρια.

Now, what we have called denial of the will to life is developed still further, expressed on more sides and presented more vividly in the ancient works in the Sanskrit language than could happen in the Christian Church and the Western world. That this important ethical view of life could reach a still further development and a more decided expression here is perhaps due mainly to this: here it was not limited by an element wholly foreign to it, as the Jewish doctrine of faith is in Christianity. The sublime founder of Christianity necessarily had to accommodate himself to that doctrine and attach his teaching to it, partly consciously and partly perhaps even unconsciously. This is why Christianity is made up of two very different components. Of these I would like to call the purely ethical one the Christian one, in a special and indeed exclusive sense, and distinguish it from the Jewish dogmatism it found already there. Suppose that this excellent and saving religion could one day fall into complete decay, as has been feared more than once, and especially in our time. Then I would look for the reason for it only in this: that it consists not of a simple element but of two elements that were originally different and were brought together only by the course of the world. In such a case dissolution would have had to follow from their break-up, which would arise from their unequal relation to the advancing spirit of the age and their reaction to it. After this dissolution, however, the purely ethical part would still have to stay unharmed, because it is indestructible.—In the ethics of the Hindus we find it expressed in the most varied and powerful ways, even now, however imperfect our knowledge of their literature still is. It is in the Vedas, Puranas, poetic works, myths, legends of their saints,

maxims and rules of life [45]. There we see prescribed: love of one's neighbor with complete denial of all self-love; love in general not limited to the human race but embracing everything that lives; beneficence to the point of giving away what one has earned each day with toil; limitless patience toward all offenders; repaying all evil, however bad, with good and love; voluntary and joyful bearing of every disgrace; abstaining from all animal food; perfect chastity and renunciation of all sensual pleasure for whoever strives for real holiness; throwing away all property, leaving every dwelling place, all relatives; deep and complete solitude, spent in silent contemplation, with voluntary penance and terrible, slow self-torture, for the complete mortification of the will. In the end this goes as far as voluntary death: by hunger, or by walking to meet crocodiles, or by throwing oneself off the holy summit of a rock in the Himalayas, or by being buried alive, or by throwing oneself under the wheels of the huge cart that carries the images of the gods around amid the singing, rejoicing and dancing of the temple dancers. And these precepts, whose origin reaches back more than four thousand years, are still lived by even now, however degenerate that people is in many ways, and by individuals even to the farthest extremes. [46] What has been kept in practice so long among a people of so many millions, [47] See, for example, "Oupnek'hat, studio Anquetil du Perron", vol. 2, nos. 138, 144, 145, 146.—"Mythologie des Indous par Mad. de Polier", vol. 2, chapters 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.—"Asiatic Magazine", by Klaproth, in the first volume: On the Fo religion; and in the same place the "Bhaguat-Geeta" or "Conversations between Kreeshna and Arjoon"; in the second volume: "Moha-Mudgava".—Then "Institutes of Hindu-Law, or the ordinances of Menu, from the Sanskrit by Wm. Jones", in German by Hüttner (1797); especially the sixth and twelfth chapters.—Finally many passages in the "Asiatic researches". (In the last forty years Indian literature in Europe has grown so much that if I wanted to complete this note from the first edition now, it would fill a couple of pages.)

[48] At the procession of Jaggernaut in June 1840, eleven Hindus threw themselves under the car and were killed at once. (Letter of an East Indian landowner, in the "Times" of 30 December 1840.) while it demands the heaviest sacrifices, cannot be a whim invented at will, but must have its ground in the nature of humankind. But there is more: one cannot wonder enough at the agreement one finds when one reads the life of a Christian penitent or saint and that of an Indian one. With dogmas, customs and surroundings so utterly different, the striving and inner life of both are quite the same. So too in the precepts for both. For example, Tauler speaks of complete poverty, which one should seek, and which consists in giving up and emptying oneself entirely of everything from which one could draw any comfort or worldly satisfaction. Obviously this is because all that always gives new food to the will, whose complete dying away is the aim. And as an Indian counterpart we see in the precepts of Fo that the Saniassi, who is to be without dwelling and wholly without property, is finally ordered not to lie down more than once under the same tree, so that he does not conceive any preference or inclination even for this tree. The Christian mystics and the teachers of the Vedanta philosophy also agree in this: for the one who has reached perfection, they consider all outward works and religious exercises superfluous.—So much agreement, among such different times and peoples, is a factual proof that here it is not, as optimistic shallowness likes to claim, a twistedness and madness of disposition that speaks. It is an essential side of human nature, which only seldom shows itself because of its excellence.

I have now named the sources from which one can learn, directly and drawn from life, the phenomena in which the denial of the will to life presents itself. In a way this is the most important point of our whole discussion. Yet I have set it out only quite in general. It is better to refer the reader to those who speak from direct experience than to swell this book needlessly still more by a weaker repetition of what they have said.

I want to add only a little more, as a general description of their state. Above we saw the evil person suffer constant, consuming inner torment, through the violence of his willing. We saw that in the end, when all objects of willing are used up, he cools the savage thirst of his self-will at the sight of others' pain. In con-

trast, the person in whom the denial of the will to life has dawned is full of inner joy and true heavenly calm, however poor, joyless and full of deprivations his state looks from outside. It is not the restless urge for life, nor the jubilant joy that has violent suffering as its condition before or after, such as makes up the conduct of the person who loves life. It is an unshakable peace, a deep calm and inward cheerfulness. When this state is brought before our eyes or our imagination, we cannot look at it without the greatest longing. At once we recognize it as the one thing that is right and that outweighs everything else infinitely. Our better spirit calls out to us toward it the great sapere aude. Then we feel that every fulfillment of our wishes won from the world is like the alms that keep the beggar alive today so that he will be hungry again tomorrow. Resignation, by contrast, is like an inherited estate: it frees its owner of all worries for good.

We remember from the third book that aesthetic joy in the beautiful consists, for a large part, in this: as we enter the state of pure contemplation, we are relieved for the moment of all willing, that is, of all wishes and worries, and as it were get rid of ourselves. We are no longer the individual who knows for the sake of his constant willing, the correlate of the single thing, for whom the objects become motives. We are the will-less, eternal subject of knowing, the correlate of the Idea. And we know that these moments, in which, freed from the savage urge of will, we as it were rise out of the heavy air of earth, are the most blessed we know. From this we can judge how blessed the life of a person must be whose will is stilled not for moments, as in the enjoyment of the beautiful, but for ever. His will is even wholly extinguished, except for that last glimmering spark that keeps the body alive and will go out with it. Such a person has, after many bitter struggles against his own nature, finally overcome completely. He is left only as a purely knowing being, an untroubled mirror of the world. Nothing can frighten him any more, nothing move him. For he has cut off all the thousand threads of willing which hold us bound to the world, and which pull us to and fro as desire, fear, envy, anger, in constant pain. He now looks back calmly and smiling on the phantoms of this world, which once could also move and torment his mind, but which now stand before him as

indifferent as chess pieces after the game is over, or as the masquerade clothes thrown off in the morning, whose figures teased and troubled us in the night of carnival. Life and its figures hover before him only like a fleeting appearance, like a light morning dream to a half-awake person, through which reality already shimmers and which can no longer deceive. And like such a dream they too vanish in the end, with no violent transition. From these considerations we can learn to understand in what sense Madame de Guion, near the end of her biography, so often speaks like this: "Everything is indifferent to me: I cannot will anything any more: often I do not know whether I am here or not."—Let me also be allowed to set down that holy penitent's own words, to express how, after the dying of the will, the death of the body can have nothing bitter any more but is very welcome. (The body is only the appearance of the will, and so loses all meaning when the will is canceled.) The words are not elegantly turned: "Midi de la gloire; jour où il n'y a plus de nuit; vie qui ne craint plus la mort, dans la mort même: parceque la mort a vaincu la mort, et que celui qui a souffert la première mort, ne goutera plus la seconde mort." (Vie de Mad. de Guion, vol. 2, p. 13.)

Yet we should not think that, once the denial of the will to life has set in through knowledge that has become a quietive, it no longer wavers, and that one can rest on it as on an acquired possession. Rather, it has to be won anew again and again by constant struggle. For the body is the will itself, only in the form of objectivity, or as appearance in the world as representation. So as long as the body lives, the whole will to life also exists in possibility, and constantly strives to enter actuality and to flare up again with all its glow. That is why in the lives of holy people we find that described calm and blessedness only as the blossom that comes from constant overcoming of the will. As the soil from which it grows we see the constant struggle with the will to life. For no one on earth can have lasting calm. So we see the histories of the inner life of the saints full of struggles of soul, temptations, and abandonment by grace. Grace is that mode of knowledge which makes all motives ineffective and, as a general quietive, stills all willing, gives the deepest peace and opens the gate of freedom. So too we see those who have once reached the denial of the will keep themselves

on this road with all their effort. They do it by renunciations of every kind wrung out of themselves, by a hard life of penance, and by seeking out what is disagreeable to them. All of it is to subdue the will that keeps striving up again. And so, finally, because they already know the worth of redemption, they show their anxious carefulness to keep the salvation they have won. They show their scruples of conscience at every innocent enjoyment or at every small stir of their vanity, which here too dies last, the most indestructible, most active and most foolish of all human inclinations.—By the term asceticism, which I have already used often, I understand in the narrower sense this deliberate breaking of the will by refusing the agreeable and seeking the disagreeable, the self-chosen life of penance and self-mortification, for lasting mortification of the will.

When we see those who have already reached the denial of the will practice this to keep themselves in it, then suffering in general, as fate imposes it, is also a second way (δευτερος πλους) to reach that denial. In fact we can assume that most people reach it only by this way, and that it is suffering one has felt oneself, not merely known, that most often brings about complete resignation, often only when death is near. For only in few is mere knowledge enough. That knowledge, seeing through the principium individuationis, first produces the most perfect goodness of disposition and universal love of humankind, and finally lets them recognize all the sufferings of the world as their own, and so brings about the denial of the will. Even in the person who approaches this point, nearly always the bearable state of his own person, the flattery of the moment, the lure of hope, and the satisfaction of the will, that is, of pleasure, which keeps offering itself again, are a constant obstacle to the denial of the will and a constant temptation to affirm it anew. That is why people have personified all those lures as devils in this respect. So mostly the will has to be broken by the greatest suffering of one's own before its self-denial sets in. Then we see the person, after he has been brought through all stages of growing distress, with the fiercest resistance, to the brink of despair, suddenly turn in on himself, know himself and the world, change his whole nature, rise above himself and all suffering, and, as if purified and made holy by that suffering, in unassailable calm, blessedness and sublimity willingly renounce everything he wanted before with

the greatest violence, and gladly welcome death. It is the silver flash of the denial of the will to life, that is, of redemption, which suddenly comes out of the purifying flame of suffering. Even those who were very evil we sometimes see purified by the deepest pains to this degree. They have become other persons and are completely transformed. Their earlier misdeeds no longer trouble their conscience now. Yet they gladly atone for them with death, and willingly see the appearance of that will end which is now foreign to them and an abhorrence. Of this denial of the will, brought about by great misfortune and despair of all rescue, the great Goethe has given us a clear and vivid presentation, such as I know of in no other poetry. It is in his immortal masterpiece "Faust", in the story of Gretchen's suffering. This is a perfect model of the second way that leads to the denial of the will. It does not come, like the first, through mere knowledge of the suffering of a whole world, which one takes on freely. It comes through one's own overwhelming pain, felt in oneself. True, very many tragedies lead their violently willing hero in the end to this point of complete resignation, where then usually the will to life and its appearance end together. But no presentation I know brings the essence of that transformation before our eyes so clearly and so free of everything incidental as the one mentioned in "Faust".

In real life we very often see those unfortunates who have to drain the greatest measure of suffering transformed in this way. All hope has been completely taken from them, and in full strength of mind they go toward a shameful, violent, often agonizing death on the scaffold. We must not assume that there is as great a difference between their character and that of most people as their fate suggests; we have to ascribe the latter mostly to circumstances. They are nevertheless guilty and, to a considerable degree, evil. Yet we see many of them transformed in the way described, once complete hopelessness has set in. They now show real goodness and purity of disposition, and true abhorrence of committing any act that is in the least evil or unloving. They forgive their enemies, even those through whom they suffer innocently. They do it not just in words and perhaps from hypocritical fear of the judges of the underworld, but in deed and with deep earnestness, and they want no revenge at all. In fact their suffering

and dying become dear to them in the end. For the denial of the will to life has set in. They often refuse the rescue offered to them, and die gladly, calmly, blessedly. In the excess of pain, the last secret of life has been revealed to them: that ill and evil, suffering and hatred, the tormented and the tormentor, however different they look to the knowledge that follows the principle of sufficient reason, are in themselves one. They are the appearance of that one will to life, which objectifies its conflict with itself by means of the principium individuationis. They have come to know both sides, evil and ill, in full measure. And as they see in the end that the two are identical, they now reject both at once and deny the will to life. In what myths and dogmas they give their reason an account of this intuitive and immediate knowledge and of their transformation is, as I said, quite indifferent.

Mathias Claudius was without doubt a witness of a change of mind of this kind when he wrote the remarkable essay that stands in the "Wandsbeck Messenger" (part 1, p. 115) under the title "Story of the conversion of * * *" and ends as follows: "A person's way of thinking can pass from one point of the circumference to the opposite one, and back again to the former point, if circumstances mark out the arc for it. And these changes are nothing great or interesting in a person. But that remarkable, catholic, transcendental change, where the whole circle is torn apart beyond repair and all the laws of psychology become vain and empty, where the coat of skins is taken off, or at least turned inside out, and scales fall from a person's eyes—that is such a thing that everyone who is at all aware of the breath in his nostrils will leave father and mother, if he can hear and learn something certain about it."

Nearness of death and hopelessness are not absolutely necessary for such a purification through suffering, by the way. Without them too, through great misfortune and pain, the knowledge of the contradiction of the will to life with itself can force itself on a person, and the nothingness of all striving can be seen. So people have often seen those who had led a very stirring life in the press of the passions—kings, heroes, adventurers—suddenly change, turn to resignation and penance, and become hermits and monks. All genuine stories of conversion belong here, for example also that of Raymond Lully. A beauty he had

courted for a long time finally summoned him to her room. He saw the fulfillment of all his wishes ahead, when she opened her bodice and showed him her breast, dreadfully eaten away by cancer. From that moment, as if he had looked into hell, he was converted, left the court of the King of Majorca and went into the desert to do penance [49]. Very similar to this story of conversion is that of the Abbé Rancé, which I have told briefly in chapter 48 of the second volume. When we consider how in both the transition from pleasure to the horrors of life was the occasion, it explains for us a striking fact. The most life-loving, cheerful, sensual and frivolous nation in Europe, the French, is the one among whom by far the strictest of all monastic orders, the Trappist, arose. After its decay it was restored by Rancé, and in spite of revolutions, changes in the Church and widespread unbelief, it keeps itself to this day in its purity and fearful strictness.

A knowledge of the kind mentioned above, of the nature of this existence, can however also go away again together with its occasion, and the will to life, and with it the former character, can return. So we see the passionate Benvenuto Cellini, once in prison and another time in a severe illness, transformed in this way, but falling back into the old state after the suffering had gone. In general the denial of the will does not come out of suffering with the necessity of an effect from its cause. The will stays free. For this is just the one point where its freedom enters directly into appearance. That is why Asmus expresses so strongly his astonishment at the "transcendental change". With every suffering a will can be imagined that is superior to it in violence and so not overcome. That is why Plato in the "Phaedo" tells of those who feast, drink, enjoy the pleasures of Aphrodite right up to the moment of their execution, affirming life up to death. In Cardinal Beaufort [50] Shakespeare puts before our eyes the fearful end of a villain who dies in despair, since no suffering and no death can break a will that is violent to the extreme of malice.

51 Bruckeri hist. philos., tomi IV, pars I, p. 10.

52 Henry VI, part 2, Act 3, Sc. 3.

The more violent the will, the more glaring the appearance of its conflict, and so the greater the suffering. A world that was the appearance of a will to life far more violent than the present one would show that much greater suffering. It would be a *hell*.

Because all suffering, being a mortification and a call to resignation, has in possibility a sanctifying power, this explains why great misfortune and deep pain already in themselves inspire a certain reverence. But the sufferer becomes entirely worthy of reverence for us only when he looks back over the course of his life as a chain of sufferings, or mourns a great and incurable pain, and yet does not really look at the chain of circumstances that plunged his life into mourning, and does not stop at the single great misfortune that struck him.—For up to then his knowledge still follows the principle of sufficient reason and clings to the single appearance. He still wants life, only not under the conditions that have fallen to him.—Rather, he stands truly worthy of reverence only when his gaze has risen from the particular to the universal. He then regards his own suffering only as an example of the whole, and, since in ethical terms he becomes a man of genius, one case counts for him for thousands. Then the whole of life, grasped as essential suffering, brings him to resignation. This is why it is worthy of reverence when, in Goethe's "Torquato Tasso", the Princess speaks about how her own life and that of her family has always been sad and joyless, and in doing so looks wholly at the universal.

We always imagine a very noble character with a certain tinge of quiet sadness. This is anything but constant vexation at the daily adversities (that would be an ignoble trait and would make one fear an evil disposition). It is an awareness, which has come out of knowledge, of the nothingness of all goods and of the suffering of all life, not only one's own. Yet such knowledge may first have been awakened by suffering one has experienced oneself, especially by a single great one. In the same way a single unfulfillable wish brought Petrarch to that resigned sadness over the whole of life which speaks to us so touchingly from his works. For the Daphne whom he pursued had to slip from his hands, to leave him, in her place, the immortal laurel. If, by such a great and irrevocable refusal from fate, the will is broken to a certain degree, then in all else almost

nothing is willed any more, and the character shows itself gentle, sad, noble, resigned. When finally the grief has no particular object any more but spreads over the whole of life, then it is in a way a going into oneself, a withdrawing, a gradual vanishing of the will. It even undermines the will's visibility, the body, softly but in its innermost part. In this the person feels a certain loosening of his bonds, a gentle foretaste of death, which announces itself as dissolution of the body and of the will at once. That is why a secret joy goes with this grief. I believe it is this that the most melancholy of all peoples has called the joy of grief. Here too, however, lies the rock of *sentimentality*, in life itself as well as in its presentation in poetry. If there is always mourning and always lamenting, without rising and bracing oneself to resignation, then one has lost earth and heaven at once and kept watery sentimentality. Only when suffering takes the form of mere pure knowledge, and this then as *quietive of the will* brings about true resignation, is it the way to redemption and so worthy of reverence. In this respect, at the sight of any person who is very unfortunate, we feel a certain respect that is related to the respect virtue and nobility force from us, and at the same time our own happy state seems like a reproach. We cannot help regarding every suffering, our own as well as another's, as at least a possible approach to virtue and holiness, and pleasures and worldly satisfactions as a distance from it. This goes so far that any person who bears a great bodily suffering or a heavy mental one, indeed even anyone who does bodily work that demands the greatest effort, in the sweat of his face and with visible exhaustion, but does it all with patience and without grumbling—that, I say, every such person, if we look at him with close attention, seems to us like a sick man who is applying a painful cure. He bears the pain it causes willingly, even with satisfaction, since he knows that the more he suffers, the more of the disease matter is destroyed, so that the present pain is the measure of his cure.

From all that has been said so far, the denial of the will to life, which is what is called complete resignation or holiness, always comes out of the quietive of the will. This is knowledge of its inner conflict and its essential nothingness, which express themselves in the suffering of everything living. The difference that we have presented as two ways is whether the merely and purely *known* suffering

produces that knowledge, by being taken on freely through seeing through the principium individuationis, or whether suffering *felt* directly by oneself does. True salvation, redemption from life and suffering, cannot be thought of without complete denial of the will. Until then each person is nothing other than this will itself. Its appearance is a vanishing existence, a striving always vain and always thwarted, and the world full of suffering which we have described, and to which all belong irrevocably in the same way. For we found above that life is always certain for the will to life, and that its one real form is the present. Whatever birth and death may do in appearance, those who belong to the will never escape the present. The Indian myth expresses this by saying: "they will be reborn". The great ethical difference of characters has this meaning: the evil person is infinitely far from reaching the knowledge from which denial of the will comes. So, in truth, he is handed over *actually* to all the torments that appear in life as *possible*. Even his possibly present happy state is only an appearance mediated by the principium individuationis and a delusion of Maya, the happy dream of the beggar. The sufferings which he lays on others, in the violence and fury of his urge of will, are the measure of the sufferings whose experience of his own cannot break his will and lead to final denial. All true and pure love, by contrast, indeed all free justice, already comes out of seeing through the principium individuationis. When this seeing-through occurs in full force, it brings about complete sanctification and redemption. The phenomenon of this is the state of resignation described above, the unshakable peace that goes with it, and the highest joyfulness in death [53].

69 We have now described the denial of the will to life as fully as our way of looking at things allows. It is the only act of the will's freedom that shows itself in appearance, and so, as Asmus calls it, it is the transcendental change. Nothing differs from it more than the actual abolition of the will's individual appearance, which is *suicide*. Far from being a denial of the will, suicide is an instance of strong affirmation of the will. For denial does not consist in hating the sufferings of life. It consists in hating its pleasures. The person who commits suicide wants life. He is only unhappy with the conditions under which life has

come to him. So he does not give up the will to life at all. He gives up only the life, by destroying the single appearance. He wants life, he wants the body to exist unhindered and to be affirmed. But the tangle of circumstances will not allow it, and great suffering comes to him. The will to life itself finds itself so blocked in this one appearance that it cannot unfold its striving. So it decides according to its being in itself. That being lies outside the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, and so every single appearance is a matter of indifference to it, since it stays untouched by all coming to be and passing away and is the inner core of the life of all things. For the same firm inner certainty that lets all of us live without constant dread of death is also what supports the act in suicide. This is the certainty that the will can never lack its appearance. So the will to life appears just as much [54] See Chapter 48 of the second volume. in this killing of oneself (Shiva) as in the comfort of self-preservation (Vishnu) and in the pleasure of procreation (Brahma). This is the inner meaning of the *unity of the Trimurti*. Every human being is the whole of it, although in time it brings forward now one, now another of the three heads.—The suicide stands to the denial of the will as the single thing stands to the Idea: he denies only the individual, not the species. We found above that life is always certain for the will to life, and that suffering is essential to life. Suicide is the voluntary destruction of one single appearance, while the thing in itself stays undisturbed, just as the rainbow stays fixed however quickly the drops that carry it for a moment change. So we found that suicide is an entirely pointless and foolish act. But it is also the masterpiece of Maya, the most glaring expression of the will to life's contradiction with itself. We recognized this contradiction already in the lowest appearances of the will, in the constant struggle of all manifestations of natural forces and all organic individuals over matter, time and space. As the will's objectification climbed through its levels, we saw this conflict come out more and more, with terrible clarity. At last, at the highest level, which is the Idea of the human being, it reaches a degree where not only do the individuals that present the same Idea destroy one another, but even one and the same individual declares war on itself. The violence with which it wants life, and pushes against what hinders life, namely suffering, drives it to destroy itself. So the

individual will abolishes the body, which is only its own becoming visible, by an act of will, rather than let suffering break the will. Just because the suicide cannot stop willing, he stops living. The will affirms itself here precisely by abolishing its appearance, because it can no longer affirm itself in any other way. But it was exactly the suffering he escapes in this way that could have led him, as a mortification of the will, to deny himself and to be redeemed. In this respect the suicide is like a sick man who has started a painful operation that could cure him thoroughly, but who will not let it be finished and would rather keep the illness. Suffering draws near and, as suffering, opens the possibility of denying the will. But he pushes it away by destroying the will's appearance, the body, so that the will stays unbroken.—This is why almost all ethical systems, philosophical and religious alike, condemn suicide, although they themselves can give no reasons for it except strange sophistical ones. But suppose a person ever held back from suicide from a purely moral motive. Then the innermost meaning of this self-conquest, whatever concepts his reason dressed it in, was this: "I will not escape suffering. I want it to help abolish the will to life, whose appearance is so wretched. It can do that by strengthening the knowledge of the real nature of the world that is already dawning in me, until this knowledge becomes the final quietive of my will and redeems me for ever."

As is well known, cases keep occurring from time to time in which suicide extends to the children. A father kills the children he loves dearly, and then himself. Consider that conscience, religion and all the concepts handed down to him show him that murder is the gravest crime, and yet he commits it in the hour of his own death, and without being able to have any selfish motive in it. The act can then be explained only like this. Here the individual's will directly recognizes itself in the children. But the man is caught in the delusion that takes the appearance for the thing in itself, and he is deeply moved by the knowledge of the misery of all life. So he now believes that by abolishing the appearance he is abolishing the being itself, and he wants to rescue himself and the children, in whom he sees himself living again directly, from existence and its misery.—A wrong path entirely parallel to this would be to imagine that one could achieve what voluntary chastity achieves by frustrating nature's aims in

conception. It would be the same wrong path to promote the death of the newborn, in view of the unavoidable sufferings of life, instead of doing everything to secure life for every being that presses into life. For if the will to life is present, then no force can break it, since it alone is the metaphysical, the thing in itself. A force can only destroy its appearance in this place at this time. The will itself can be abolished by nothing but *knowledge*. So the only path to salvation is this: the will must appear unhindered, so that in this appearance it can *know* its own nature. Only as a result of this knowledge can the will abolish itself, and so end the suffering that cannot be separated from its appearance. This is not possible by physical force, such as destroying the germ, or killing the newborn, or suicide. Nature leads the will into the light precisely because only in the light can it find its redemption. So nature's aims are to be furthered in every way, once the will to life, which is nature's inner being, has made its decision.—

A particular kind of suicide seems to be completely different from ordinary suicide, although perhaps it has not yet been sufficiently established. It is voluntary death by starvation, chosen out of the highest degree of asceticism. Cases of it, however, have always been accompanied by much religious fanaticism and even superstition, and this has made them unclear. It seems, though, that the complete denial of the will can reach a degree where even the will needed to keep the body's vegetative life going by taking in food falls away. Far from this kind of suicide arising from the will to life, such a fully resigned ascetic stops living only because he has stopped willing altogether. No other kind of death than by hunger is really conceivable here (unless it came from some special superstition), because the intention to shorten the torment would itself already be a degree of affirmation of the will. The dogmas that fill the reason of such a penitent also give him the illusion that a being of a higher kind has ordered him to fast, which his inner inclination drives him to do. Earlier examples of this can be found in the "Breslauer Sammlung von Natur- und Medicin-Geschichten", September 1799, p. 363 ff.; in Bayle's "Nouvelles de la république des lettres", February 1685, p. 189 ff.; in Zimmermann, "Ueber die Einsamkeit", vol. 1, p. 182; and in the "Histoire de l'académie des sciences" of 1764, where there is a

report by Houttuyn. The same report is repeated in the "Sammlung für praktische Aerzte", vol. 1, p. 69. Later reports can be found in Hufeland's "Journal für praktische Heilkunde", vol. 10, p. 181, and vol. 48, p. 95; also in Nasse's "Zeitschrift für psychische Aerzte", 1819, part 3, p. 460; and in the "Edinburgh medical and surgical Journal", 1809, vol. 5, p. 319. In 1833 all the newspapers reported that the English historian Dr. Lingard had died of voluntary starvation at Dover in January. According to later news it was not he himself but a relative. In most of these reports, though, the individuals are presented as insane, and it can no longer be found out how far that may have been so. But I want to set down here a more recent report of this kind, if only to preserve more securely one of the rare examples of the striking and extraordinary phenomenon of human nature that I have touched on. At least in appearance it belongs where I would like to place it, and it would otherwise hardly be explicable. The recent report in question stands in the "Nürnberger Korrespondent" of July 29, 1813, in the following words:

"From Bern it is reported that near Thurnen, in a dense forest, a little hut was found. In it lay a man's corpse that had been decomposing for about a month, in clothes that could give little information about the rank of their owner. Two very fine shirts lay beside it. The most important item was a Bible with white pages bound in, which the dead man had partly written on. In it he records the day he left home (the home is not named). Then he says that he was driven by the Spirit of God into a wilderness, to pray and to fast. On his journey here he had already fasted seven days, and then he had eaten again. After that, once settled here, he had begun to fast again, and for this many days. Each day is marked with a stroke, and there are five of them, after which the pilgrim presumably died. There was also a letter to a pastor about a sermon the dead man had heard from him. But here too the address was missing."—Between this voluntary death out of the extreme of asceticism and the ordinary one that springs from despair, there may be many intermediate stages and mixtures. That is hard to explain. But the human mind has depths, obscurities and entanglements that are extremely hard to illuminate and unfold.

70 Someone might perhaps think that our whole account of what I call the denial of the will, now finished, cannot be reconciled with the earlier discussion of necessity. Necessity belongs to motivation just as much as to any other form of the principle of sufficient reason. According to that discussion, motives, like all causes, are only occasional causes, on which the character unfolds its nature and reveals it with the necessity of a natural law. For that reason we flatly denied freedom there, as a liberum arbitrium indifferentiae. Far from abolishing that here, however, I am recalling it. In truth, real freedom, that is, independence from the principle of sufficient reason, belongs only to the will as thing in itself, not to its appearance. The essential form of the appearance is everywhere the principle of sufficient reason, the element of necessity. But the only case where that freedom can also become directly visible in the appearance is the one where it puts an end to what appears. The bare appearance, the living body, is a link in the chain of causes, and it goes on in time, which contains only appearances. So the will that manifests itself through this appearance then stands in contradiction with it, since it denies what the appearance expresses. In such a case, for example, the genitals are there and healthy, as the visibility of the sexual drive. Yet even in the innermost being no sexual satisfaction is wanted. The whole body is only the visible expression of the will to life, and yet the motives that correspond to this will no longer work. Indeed, the dissolution of the body, the end of the individual, and with it the greatest check on the natural will, is welcome and desired. This *real* contradiction arises when the freedom of the will in itself, which knows no necessity, directly breaks into the necessity of its appearance. The contradiction between our claims is only the repetition of it in the reflection of philosophy. On one side we claim that the will is necessarily determined by motives, according to the character. On the other we claim that the will can be entirely abolished, so that motives become powerless. The key to reconciling these contradictions lies in this: the state in which the character is withdrawn from the power of motives does not proceed directly from the will, but from a changed mode of knowledge. As long as knowledge is only the kind caught in the principium individuationis, simply following the principle of sufficient reason, the force of motives is irresistible. But when the princip-

ium individuationis is seen through, and the Ideas, indeed the essence of things in themselves, as the same will in everything, are known directly, and a universal quietive of willing arises from this knowledge, then the individual motives become ineffective. The mode of knowledge that corresponds to them has been darkened by a completely different one and has stepped back. So the character can never change in part. It must carry out in each particular, with the consistency of a natural law, the will whose appearance it is as a whole. But this whole, the character itself, can be entirely abolished by the change in knowledge described above. This abolition is what Asmus, as quoted above, calls the "catholic, transcendental change" and marvels at. It is also what the Christian Church very aptly called *rebirth*, and the knowledge from which it comes is what was called the *effect of grace*.—Because what is at issue is not a change but a complete abolition of the character, the following happens. However different the characters it affected were before the abolition, after it they show a great sameness in their way of acting, although each of them still speaks very differently, according to his own concepts and dogmas.

In this sense, then, the old philosophical doctrine of the freedom of the will, always disputed and always asserted, is not groundless. The church's dogma of the effect of grace and of rebirth is not without sense and meaning either. But now, unexpectedly, we see the two fall together into one. We can also understand in what sense the excellent Malebranche could say "La liberté est un mystère", and was right. For what the Christian mystics call the *effect of grace* and *rebirth* is, for us, the one direct expression of the *freedom of the will*. It sets in only when the will has come to know its nature in itself, and gets from this knowledge a *quietive*. By that very fact it is withdrawn from the working of *motives*, which belongs to the realm of another mode of knowledge, one whose objects are only appearances.—The possibility of freedom showing itself in this way is the greatest advantage of the human being, and the animal lacks it for ever. Its condition is the reflective awareness of reason, which lets us survey the whole of life independently of the impression of the present moment. The animal has no possibility of freedom. It does not even have the possibility of a real, that is, deliberate, choice after a complete conflict of motives, for which the

motives would have to be abstract representations. So the hungry wolf sinks its teeth into the flesh of its prey with the same necessity with which a stone falls to the earth. It has no possibility of knowing that it is the one torn apart as much as the one tearing. *Necessity is the realm of nature; freedom is the realm of grace.*

Now, as we have seen, that *self-abolition of the will* proceeds from knowledge. But all knowledge and insight as such is independent of arbitrary choice. So that denial of willing, that entry into freedom, cannot be forced by a resolution. It comes out of the innermost relation between knowing and willing in the human being. It therefore comes suddenly, as if flown in from outside.

That is exactly why the church called it the *effect of grace*. But the church also makes this depend on the acceptance of grace. In the same way, the working of the quietive is in the end an act of freedom of the will. As a result of such an effect of grace, the whole nature of the human being is changed from the ground up and turned around. He no longer wants anything of all that he wanted so violently before. It is as if a new man really takes the place of the old one. So the church called this result of the effect of grace *rebirth*. For what it calls the *natural man*, to whom it denies every capacity for good, is precisely the will to life. This will must be denied if we are to win redemption from an existence like ours. For behind our existence there is something else, and it becomes accessible to us only when we shake off the world.

The Christian creed does not look at individuals, as the principle of sufficient reason does. It looks at the Idea of the human being in its unity. It symbolizes *nature*, the *affirmation of the will to life*, in Adam. His sin, which we inherit (that is, our unity with him in the Idea, which presents itself in time through the bond of procreation), makes all of us share in suffering and in eternal death. On the other hand, it symbolizes *grace*, the *denial of the will*, *redemption*, in the God who became man. He is free of all sinfulness, that is, of all will to life. So he cannot have come, as we do, from the most decided affirmation of the will. Nor can he have a body, as we do, that is through and through only concrete will, appearance of the will. Born of the pure Virgin, he has only an apparent body. This last is the view of the Docetists, that is, of some Church Fathers

who were very consistent on this point. Apelles taught it in particular, and Tertullian rose against him and his followers. But even Augustine comments on the passage Rom. 8, 3: "Deus filium suum misit in similitudinem carnis peccati", in these words: "Non enim caro peccati erat, quae non de carnali delectatione nata erat: sed tamen inerat ei similitudo carnis peccati, quia mortalis caro erat" (Liber 83, quaestion. qu. 66). In his work called the opus imperfectum, I, 47, the same Augustine teaches that original sin is sin and punishment at once. It is already present in newborn children, he says, but shows itself only when they have grown up. Still, the origin of this sin is to be derived from the will of the one who sinned. This sinner was Adam, but we all existed in him. Adam became unhappy, and in him we have all become unhappy.—The doctrine of original sin (affirmation of the will) and of redemption (denial of the will) really is the great truth that makes up the core of Christianity. The rest is mostly only dress and covering, or extras. So Jesus Christ should always be taken in a general way, as the symbol, or the personification, of the denial of the will to life. He should not be taken as an individual, whether in his mythical history in the Gospels or in the probable true history that lies under it. For neither of these will easily satisfy completely. Either history is only the vehicle of the first way of taking him, for the people, who always demand something factual.—That in recent times Christianity has forgotten its true meaning and degenerated into flat optimism is no concern of ours here.

There is a further doctrine that is original and evangelical in Christianity. Augustine defended it, with the agreement of the heads of the church, against the platitudes of the Pelagians. Luther made it the main goal of his efforts to clear it of errors and bring it out again, as he states expressly in his book "De servo arbitrio". It is the doctrine that the *will is not free*, but is originally subject to the inclination to evil. For that reason its works are always sinful and defective and can never satisfy justice. So in the end it is not these works but faith alone that saves. This faith itself does not arise from resolution and free will, but through the *effect of grace*, without our doing anything, and comes to us as if from outside.—Not only the doctrines mentioned just now, but this last, truly evangelical dogma also, belongs to those that a crude and flat view rejects

as absurd today, or covers over. This view, in spite of Augustine and Luther, is attached to the ordinary Pelagian common sense, which is just what present-day rationalism is. It treats as obsolete precisely these profound dogmas, which are peculiar and essential to Christianity in the narrowest sense. Instead it holds on to the dogma that comes from Judaism and was kept, and that is joined to Christianity only by the path of history[55] [56] How far this is so can be seen from the following. All the contradictions and incomprehensibilities contained in the Christian dogmatics that Augustine systematized consistently, and that led precisely to the opposite, Pelagian flatness, vanish as soon as one sets aside the basic Jewish dogma and recognizes that the human being is not the work of another but of his own will. Then everything is at once clear and right. Then there is no need of freedom in the operari, for it lies in the esse, and there too lies sin, as original sin. And the effect of grace is our own.—On today's rationalist view, by contrast, many doctrines of the Augustinian dogmatics, which is founded in the New Testament, appear quite untenable, even outrageous, for example predestination. Because of this one rejects what is properly Christian and comes back to crude Judaism. But the mistake in the calculation, or the original defect of Christian dogmatics, lies where nobody ever looks for it. It lies in just what is treated as settled and certain and withdrawn from all examination. Take that away, and the whole dogmatics is rational. For that dogma ruins theology, as it ruins all the other sciences. If you study the Augustinian theology in the books "De civitate Dei" (especially book 14), you experience something like trying to make a body stand whose center of gravity falls outside it. However you turn and set it, it topples over again. Here too, in spite of all Augustine's efforts and sophisms, the guilt of the world and its torment always fall back on the God who made all things and everything in them, and who, moreover, knew how things would go. I have already shown that Augustine himself was aware of the difficulty and became very puzzled by it, in my prize essay on the freedom of the will (chap. 4, pp. 66–68 of the first edition).—Likewise the contradiction between God's goodness and the misery of the world, and between the freedom of the will and God's foreknowledge, was the inexhaustible theme of a controversy lasting almost a hundred years among the

Cartesians, Malebranche, Leibniz, Bayle, Clarke, Arnauld and others. In it the one dogma on which the disputants agreed was the existence of God, with his attributes. They all turn round and round in a circle without end, as they try to bring those things into agreement. That is, they try to solve a sum that never comes out. Its remainder shows up now here, now there, after it has been covered over somewhere else. But that the source of the trouble is to be looked for in the basic assumption occurs to nobody, although it forces itself on you plainly. Only Bayle lets it show that he notices it. alone, and makes it the main thing. —We, however, recognize in the doctrine mentioned above a truth that agrees fully with the result of our reflections. For we see that genuine virtue and holiness of disposition have their first origin not in deliberate choice (works) but in knowledge (faith). That is just what we also developed from our main thought. If it were works, which spring from motives and deliberate resolution, that led to blessedness, then virtue would always be only a shrewd, methodical, farsighted egoism, however you may turn it.—The faith, however, to which the Christian church promises blessedness is this. Through the fall of the first man we all share in sin and have fallen to death and ruin. In the same way we are all redeemed only through grace and through the divine mediator taking over our enormous guilt, and this entirely without any merit of ours (of the person). What can come from the deliberate doing of the person (determined by motives), namely works, can never justify us, absolutely and by its very nature, just because it is *deliberate* doing, brought about by motives, opus operatum. So this faith contains, first, that our condition is originally and essentially hopeless, and that we need *redemption* from it. It contains, next, that we ourselves belong essentially to evil and are so firmly bound to it that our works, done according to the law and the commandment, that is, according to motives, can never satisfy justice or redeem us. Redemption is won *only* through faith, that is, through a changed mode of knowledge, and this faith itself can come only through grace, thus as if from outside. This means that salvation is something wholly foreign to our person, and it points to a denial and abolition of this very person, which is necessary for salvation. Works, the following of the law as such, can never justify, because they are always acting on motives. *Luther*

demands (in the book "De libertate Christiana") that once faith has set in, good works should come out of it quite of themselves, as its symptoms, its fruits. They are in no way to make a claim in themselves to merit, justification or reward, but to happen quite freely and without payment.—In the same way we too let first only free justice, then love, up to the complete abolition of egoism, and finally resignation, or denial of the will, come out of the ever clearer seeing through of the principium individuationis.

I have drawn in these dogmas of the Christian creed, which are in themselves foreign to philosophy, only for this reason: to show that the ethics that comes out of our whole inquiry, and agrees and hangs together exactly with all its parts, may be new and unheard of in its expression, but is by no means so in its substance. It agrees fully with the properly Christian dogmas, and was even contained and present in those, in what is essential. It likewise agrees exactly with the doctrines and ethical precepts of the holy books of India, which are presented again in quite other forms. At the same time, the reminder of the dogmas of the Christian church served to explain and clarify the apparent contradiction between two things. On one side is the necessity of all expressions of the character when motives are put before it (the realm of nature). On the other is the freedom of the will in itself to deny itself and to abolish the character, together with all the necessity of motives founded on it (the realm of grace).

71 Here I end the basic outlines of ethics, and with them the whole development of that one thought which it was my purpose to communicate. There is an objection that strikes this last part of the account. I do not want to hide it at all. I want rather to show that it lies in the nature of the matter, and that it is absolutely impossible to remedy. It is this. Our inquiry has finally arrived at the point where, in perfect holiness, we have before our eyes the denial and giving up of all willing, and by that very fact the redemption from a world whose whole existence presented itself to us as suffering. Now this very thing appears to us as a passing over into empty *nothingness*.

About this I must first remark that the concept of *nothing* is essentially relative and always refers only to some definite something which it negates. People (Kant in particular) have attributed this property only to the nihil privativum, which is what is marked with—as opposed to a +, and that—, seen from the reverse point of view, could become +. In contrast to this nihil privativum they have set up the nihil negativum, which would be nothing in every respect. As an example of it they use the logical contradiction that cancels itself. On closer view, though, no absolute nothing, no wholly real nihil negativum, is even thinkable. Everything of this kind, looked at from a higher standpoint or subsumed under a wider concept, is always again only a nihil privativum. Every nothing is thought as such only in relation to something else, and presupposes this relation, and so also that other thing. Even a logical contradiction is only a relative nothing. It is no thought of reason, but that does not make it an absolute nothing. For it is a combination of words. It is an example of the unthinkable, which logic needs in order to demonstrate the laws of thought. So if one goes looking for such an example for this purpose, one will hold on to the nonsense as the positive thing one is seeking, and skip over the sense as the negative. Thus every nihil negativum, or absolute nothing, if it is subordinated to a higher concept, will appear as a mere nihil privativum, or relative nothing. This can always exchange signs with what it negates, so that the latter would then be thought of as negation, and the nothing itself as position. The result of the difficult dialectical inquiry into nothing that Plato carries out in the "Sophist" (pp. 277–287, Bip.) agrees with this: Την *του έτερου φυσιν* αποδειξαντες ουσαν τε, και κατακεκερματισμενην επι παντα τα οντα *προς αλληλα*, το προς το ον έκαστου μοριον αυτης αντιτιθεμενον, ετολμησαμεν ειπειν, ὡς αυτο τουτο εστιν οντως *το μη ον*. (Cum enim ostenderemus, *alterius* ipsius naturam esse, perque omnia entia divisam atque dispersam *invicem*; tunc partem ejus oppositam ei, quod cujusque ens est, esse ipsum revera *non ens* asseruimus.)

What is generally taken to be positive, which we call *the existent*, and whose negation the concept *nothing* expresses in its most general meaning, is just the world as representation. I have shown that this world is the objectivity of the will, its mirror. This will and this world are also just ourselves, and representa-

tion in general belongs to the world as one side of it. The form of this representation is space and time. So from this standpoint everything that exists must be somewhere and sometime. The denial, the abolition, the turning of the will is also the abolition and vanishing of the world, its mirror. If we no longer see the will in this mirror, we ask in vain where it has turned. Then, since it has no where and no when any more, we complain that it has been lost in nothing.

The opposite standpoint, if it were possible for us, would exchange the signs. It would show what exists for us as nothing, and that nothing as what exists. But as long as we ourselves are the will to life, we can know and name that second thing only negatively. The old saying of Empedocles, that like is known only by like, takes away all knowledge from us precisely here. Conversely, the possibility of all our real knowledge, that is, the world as representation, or the objectivity of the will, in the end rests on this same saying. For the world is the will's self-knowledge.

Suppose it were still insisted, at any price, that we obtain some positive knowledge of what philosophy can express only negatively, as denial of the will. Then nothing would be left to us but to point to the state that all those who have reached the complete denial of the will have experienced. People have given it the names ecstasy, rapture, illumination, union with God, and so on. But this state cannot properly be called knowledge, because it no longer has the form of subject and object. Besides, it is accessible only to one's own experience, which cannot be passed on any further.

We, however, who remain entirely on the standpoint of philosophy, must be content here with negative knowledge. We can be satisfied to have reached the last boundary stone of positive knowledge. We have known the being in itself of the world as will, and in all its appearances only the will's objectivity. We have followed this objectivity from the unknowing drive of dark natural forces up to the most fully conscious action of the human being. So we do not shrink from the consequence that, with the free denial and giving up of the will, all those appearances are now abolished too. Abolished is that constant pushing and driving, without goal and without rest, at all levels of objectivity, in which and through which the world exists. Abolished is the manifold of forms follow-

ing one another by degrees. With the will its whole appearance is abolished, and finally also the general forms of that appearance, time and space, and also its last basic form, subject and object. No will: no representation, no world.

Before us, of course, only nothing remains. But what resists this dissolving into nothing, our nature, is itself only the will to life, which we ourselves are, as it is our world. That we hate this nothing so much is only another way of saying that we want life so much, and are nothing but this will, and know nothing but it.—But let us turn our eyes from our own poverty and confinement to those who have overcome the world. In them the will, having come to full self-knowledge, found itself again in everything and then freely denied itself. All that they still wait for is to see its last trace vanish, together with the body it animates. Then what shows itself to us is this. In place of the restless pushing and driving, in place of the constant passing from wish to fear and from joy to sorrow, in place of the never satisfied and never dying hope of which the life-dream of the willing human being consists, we see that peace which is higher than all reason. We see that total calm of the sea in the mind, that deep rest, unshakable confidence and cheerfulness. The mere reflection of it in the face, as Raphael and Correggio have painted it, is a complete and sure gospel. Only knowledge has remained; the will has vanished. We then look at this state with deep and painful longing. Next to it, by contrast, the wretchedness and hopelessness of our own state appears in full light. Yet this reflection is the only one that can console us lastingly. We have, on the one hand, recognized incurable suffering and endless misery as essential to the appearance of the will, the world. On the other hand, when the will is abolished, we see the world dissolve and keep only empty nothing before us. So in this way, by considering the life and conduct of the saints, we have to drive away the dark impression of that nothing which hovers behind all virtue and holiness as the final goal, and which we fear as children fear the dark. It is rare to meet such saints in our own experience. But their recorded histories bring them before our eyes, and art does too, vouched for by the stamp of inner truth. We do this instead of evading that nothing ourselves, as the Indians do, with myths and words empty of meaning, such as reabsorption into *Brahm*, or the *Nirvana* of the Buddhists. We rather admit it freely:

what remains after the complete abolition of the will is, for all those who are still full of the will, certainly nothing. But the reverse is also true. For those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this world of ours, so very real, with all its suns and Milky Ways, is—nothing.

Appendix: Critique of Kantian Philosophy



Critique of the *Kantian Philosophy.*

C'est le privilège du vrai génie, et surtout du génie qui ouvre une carrière, de faire impunément de grandes fautes.

Voltaire.

It is much easier to point out the faults and errors in the work of a great mind than to give a clear and complete account of its value. For faults are particular and finite, so they can be surveyed completely. But the stamp that genius presses on its works is precisely this: their excellence cannot be fathomed or exhausted. That is why they become the teachers of many centuries in a row, and never grow old. The finished masterpiece of a truly great mind will always have a deep and far-reaching effect on the whole human race. The effect is so great that it cannot be calculated how distant the centuries and countries are to which its enlightening influence may reach. It will always have this effect. However educated and rich the age in which the work arose, genius always rises above the soil in which it is rooted, like a palm tree.

But an effect of this kind, deep and widespread, cannot come suddenly, because of the wide distance between genius and ordinary humanity. The knowledge that this one man drew directly from life and the world in *one* lifetime, won, and laid out to others already won and prepared, still cannot at once become

the property of humanity. For humanity does not have even as much power to receive as he had to give. Rather, the knowledge must first get through a struggle with unworthy opponents, who dispute the life of that immortal knowledge at its birth and would like to smother the welfare of humanity in the bud (compare the serpent at the cradle of Hercules). Even after that, it must still travel the detours of countless false interpretations and crooked applications. It must survive the attempts to unite it with old errors. So it lives in conflict, until a new, unprejudiced generation grows up to meet it. This generation receives part of the content of that source, already in youth, from a thousand derived channels. Little by little it assimilates it, and so comes to share in the benefit that was meant to flow to humanity from that great mind. So slowly goes the education of the human race, the weak and at the same time stubborn pupil of genius.—In the same way, the full power and importance of Kant's teaching will become plain only through time. One day the spirit of the age itself, gradually reshaped by the influence of that teaching and changed in what is most important and innermost, will give living testimony to the power of that giant mind. I, here, do not at all want to take over the thankless role of Calchas and Cassandra by presumptuously running ahead of events. But after what I have said, let me be allowed to regard Kant's works as still very new. Today many regard them as already out of date. They put them aside as finished with, or, as they put it, have them behind them. Others, made bold by this, simply ignore them. With brazen faces they go on philosophizing about God and the soul under the assumptions of the old realistic dogmatism and its scholasticism. That is as if someone wanted to bring the teachings of the alchemists back into modern chemistry.—Besides, Kant's works do not need my feeble praise. They will themselves praise their master for ever. And if not in his letter, then at least in his spirit, they will always live on earth.

Of course, if we look back at the first success of his teachings, that is, at the attempts and events in the field of philosophy during the time that has passed since, a very depressing saying of Goethe is confirmed for us: "As the water that a ship pushes aside closes up again right behind it, so error too, when superior minds have pushed it aside and made room for themselves, closes up again very

quickly behind them, naturally." (Dichtung und Wahrheit, part 3, p. 521.) Yet this period has been only an episode. It belongs among the fates of every new and great piece of knowledge mentioned above, and it is now unmistakably near its end, because the soap bubble that has been blown up so long is finally bursting. People are generally beginning to realize that real and serious philosophy still stands where Kant left it. At any rate, I do not admit that anything has happened in it between him and me. So I connect directly with him.

What I intend in this Appendix to my work is really only a justification of the doctrine I have presented in it, so far as it disagrees with the Kantian philosophy on many points, indeed contradicts it. A discussion of this is necessary, because my train of thought, however different its content is from Kant's, is plainly under his influence. It necessarily presupposes it and starts from it. I admit that, next to the impression of the intuitive world, I owe the best of my own development both to Kant's works and to the sacred writings of the Hindus and to Plato.—I can justify my contradictions of Kant, which exist nevertheless, only by accusing him of error on those very points and by exposing mistakes that he made. So in this Appendix I must proceed polemically against Kant throughout, and with earnestness and with all my strength. For only in this way can the error that clings to Kant's teaching be ground away, so that its truth shines the brighter and stands the more securely. So no one should expect that my reverence for Kant, which I certainly feel deeply, will extend to his weaknesses and faults too. No one should expect that I must therefore uncover these only with the most careful consideration, which would make my presentation weak and dull through roundabout wording. Toward a living person such consideration is needed. Human weakness bears even the most just refutation of an error only with soothing and flattery, and even so with difficulty. And a teacher of the centuries and benefactor of humanity at the very least deserves that we spare his human weakness too, so as not to cause him pain. But the dead man has thrown off this weakness. His merit stands firm, and time will purify it more and more of every overestimation and belittling. His faults must be separated from it, made harmless, and then given over to oblivion. So in the polemic against Kant that I am to strike up here, I have

my eye entirely on his faults and weaknesses alone. I stand opposed to them as an enemy and wage a merciless war of extermination on them. I am always careful not to cover them up kindly, but rather to put them in the brightest light, so as to destroy them the more surely. For the reasons given above, I am aware of no injustice and no ingratitude toward Kant in this. Still, I also want to remove every appearance of malice in the eyes of others. So first I will show my deeply felt reverence and gratitude toward Kant by stating briefly his chief merit as it appears to me. I will do so from such general points of view that I am not forced to touch also on the points on which I shall afterward have to contradict him.

Kant's greatest merit is the distinction of appearance from the thing in itself—on the basis of the proof that between the things and us there always stands the *intellect*, so that they cannot be known as they may be in themselves. He was led onto this path by *Locke* (see Prolegomena zu jeder Metaph., §. 13, Note 2). Locke had shown that the secondary qualities of things, such as sound, smell, color, hardness, softness, smoothness and the like, are founded on the affections of the senses and so do not belong to the objective body, the thing in itself. He assigned to it only the primary qualities, that is, those that presuppose nothing but space and impenetrability, so extension, shape, solidity, number and mobility. But this easily found distinction of Locke's stays on the surface of things. It was, as it were, only a youthful prelude to Kant's. For Kant starts from an incomparably higher standpoint. He declares that everything Locke had allowed to stand as qualitates primarias, that is, qualities of the thing in itself, equally belongs only to its appearance in our faculty of apprehension. And he does so precisely because the conditions of that faculty, space, time and causality, are known by us a priori. So Locke had subtracted from the thing in itself the share that the sense organs have in its appearance. Kant now subtracted in addition the share of the functions of the brain (though not under that name). As a result the distinction of appearance from the thing in itself now received an infinitely greater importance and a much deeper sense. To this end he had to make the great separation of our knowledge a priori from our knowledge a posteriori. Before him this had never been done with the proper

strictness and completeness, or with clear awareness. So this became the main subject of his profound investigations.—Here let us note at once that Kant's philosophy has a threefold relation to that of his predecessors. First, it confirms and extends Locke's, as we have just seen. Second, it corrects and uses Hume's. This is stated most clearly in the preface to the "Prolegomena". That book is the most beautiful and most easily grasped of all Kant's main writings, and it is read far too little, although it makes the study of his philosophy extraordinarily easier. Third, it is decidedly polemical and destructive toward the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy. One should know all three of these doctrines before going on to study the Kantian philosophy.—Now, as stated above, the distinction of appearance from the thing in itself, and so the teaching of the complete difference between the ideal and the real, is the basic feature of the Kantian philosophy. The claim of the absolute identity of the two, which appeared soon afterward, therefore gives a sad proof of Goethe's saying mentioned earlier. This is all the more so because that claim rested on nothing but the humbug of intellectual intuition. Accordingly it was only a return to the crudeness of the common view, disguised by the show of a distinguished air, bombast and gibberish. It became the worthy starting point for the still grosser nonsense of the clumsy and mindless Hegel.—Now *Kant's* separation of appearance from the thing in itself, understood in the way set out above, far surpassed in profundity and sound judgment in its grounding everything that had ever existed. In the same way its results were infinitely rich in consequences. For he found it entirely out of himself, in a wholly new way, from a new side and on a new path. In doing so he presented the same truth that *Plato* had already repeated tirelessly, and for the most part expressed in his language like this: this world that appears to the senses has no true being, only an unceasing becoming. It is, and also is not. To grasp it is not so much knowledge as delusion. This is also what Plato expresses in myth in the most important passage of all his works, which I already mentioned in the third book of the present work. It is the beginning of the seventh book of the Republic. He says that human beings, chained fast in a dark cave, see neither the genuine original light nor the real things. They see only the poor light of the fire in the cave and the shadows of real things that pass by that fire

behind their backs. Yet they think the shadows are reality, and that determining the succession of these shadows is true wisdom.—The same truth, presented again in a quite different way, is also a main doctrine of the *Vedas* and *Puranas*, the doctrine of Maya. By this too nothing else is understood than what Kant calls the appearance, as opposed to the thing in itself. For the work of Maya is given as exactly this visible world in which we are, a conjured-up magic, an unstable semblance without being in itself, comparable to optical illusion and to the dream. It is a veil that wraps human consciousness, a something of which it is equally false and equally true to say that it is as to say that it is not.—But Kant not only expressed the same doctrine in a wholly new and original way. By means of the calmest and soberest presentation he also made it a proved and indisputable truth. Plato and the Indians, on the other hand, had based their claims merely on a general intuition of the world. They put them forward as the direct utterance of their consciousness, and they presented them more in myth and poetry than in philosophy and clear terms. In this respect they stand to Kant as the Pythagoreans Hicetas, Philolaus and Aristarchus, who already asserted the motion of the earth around the resting sun, stand to Copernicus. Such clear knowledge, and such calm, considered presentation, of this dream-like character of the whole world is really the basis of the whole Kantian philosophy. It is its soul and its very greatest merit. He accomplished it by taking apart the whole machinery of our faculty of knowledge, by means of which the phantasmagoria of the objective world comes about, and showing it piece by piece, with admirable sound judgment and skill. All earlier Western philosophy, which seems unspeakably clumsy beside the Kantian, had failed to see that truth. For that very reason it had really always talked as in a dream. Kant first woke it suddenly out of this. That is why the last sleepers (Mendelssohn) called him the all-crusher. He showed that the laws that rule in existence, that is, in experience in general, with unbreakable necessity cannot be used to derive and explain *existence itself*. So their validity is only relative. That is, it begins only after existence, the world of experience in general, is already posited and present. Consequently these laws cannot be our guide when we set out to explain the existence of the world and of ourselves. All earlier Western philoso-

phers had imagined that these laws, according to which appearances are linked to one another, were absolute laws, conditioned by nothing at all, aeternae veritates. I sum all of them up under the expression of the principle of sufficient reason: time and space as well as causality and inference. These philosophers imagined that the world itself existed only as a result of those laws and in conformity with them, and that the whole riddle of the world must therefore be solvable by following them as a guide. The assumptions made for this purpose, which Kant criticizes under the name of the Ideas of reason, really served only to raise the mere appearance, the work of Maya, the shadow world of Plato, to the one and highest reality. They put it in the place of the innermost and true being of things, and so made real knowledge of that being impossible. In a word, they put the dreamers to sleep still more soundly. Kant showed those laws, and so the world itself, to be conditioned by the subject's mode of knowledge. From this it followed that, however far one might go on inquiring and inferring with those laws as a guide, one would not advance a single step in the main matter, that is, in knowing the being in itself of the world apart from representation. One would only move like the squirrel in the wheel. So all the dogmatists can be compared to people who thought that if they only walked straight ahead long enough they would reach the end of the world. Kant, then, would be the one who sailed around the world and showed that, because it is round, one cannot get out by horizontal movement, though perhaps it is not impossible by vertical movement. One can also say that Kant's teaching gives the insight that the end and beginning of the world are to be sought not outside us but within us.

All of this rests on the fundamental difference between dogmatic philosophy and *critical*, or *transcendental philosophy*. Anyone who wants to make this difference clear to himself, and see it in an example, can do so very briefly. He should read, as a specimen of dogmatic philosophy, an essay by *Leibniz* with the title "De rerum originatione radicali". It was first printed in Erdmann's edition of the philosophical works of Leibniz, vol. 1, p. 147. Here, entirely in the realistic-dogmatic manner, using the ontological and the cosmological proof, the origin and the excellent constitution of the world are demonstrated a

priori, on the ground of the veritatum aeternarum.—Along the way it is admitted once that experience shows exactly the opposite of the excellence of the world demonstrated here. But experience is then told that it understands nothing about this and should keep its mouth shut when a priori philosophy has spoken.—Now as the opponent of this whole method there has appeared, with Kant, the *critical*
philosophy. It makes its problem of precisely those veritates aeternas that serve as the foundation of every such dogmatic structure. It searches for their origin, and then finds it in the human head, where they grow out of the forms that belong peculiarly to it and that it carries in itself for the purpose of apprehending an objective world. So here, in the brain, is the quarry that supplies the material for that proud dogmatic building. But to reach this result the critical philosophy had to *go beyond* the veritates aeternas, on which all earlier dogmatism was based, in order to make them themselves the object of investigation. That is how it became *transcendental philosophy*. From this it follows further that the objective world as we know it does not belong to the being of things in themselves. It is merely the *appearance* of that being, conditioned by just those forms that lie a priori in the human intellect (that is, the brain). So it can contain nothing but appearances.

Kant did not, of course, reach the knowledge that the appearance is the world as representation and the thing in itself is the will. But he showed that the appearing world is conditioned as much by the subject as by the object. He isolated the most general forms of its appearance, that is, of representation. In doing so he demonstrated that we can know these forms, and survey the whole of their lawfulness, starting not only from the object but equally from the subject. For they are really the boundary between object and subject, common to both. And he concluded that by following this boundary one penetrates neither into the inside of the object nor into that of the subject, and so never comes to know the being of the world, the thing in itself.

He did not derive the thing in itself in the right way, as I shall soon show. He did it by an inconsistency, and he had to pay for it through frequent and irresistible attacks on this main part of his teaching. He did not know the thing in

itself directly in the will. But he took a great, path-breaking step toward this knowledge. He presented the undeniable moral significance of human action as entirely different from the laws of appearance and not dependent on them, and as never explicable in accordance with them. He presented it as something that touches the thing in itself directly. This is the second main point of view for his merit.

We can regard as the third the complete overthrow of Scholastic philosophy. By that name I would like here to mean in general the whole period beginning with the Church Father Augustine and closing just before Kant. For the main character of Scholasticism is surely the one that *Tennemann* gave very correctly: the guardianship of the ruling national religion over philosophy. Philosophy was really left with nothing to do but prove and decorate the main dogmas that religion prescribed to it. The Scholastics proper, up to Suarez, admit this without concealment. The philosophers who followed do it more unconsciously, or at least without admitting it. People let the Scholastic philosophy run only until about a hundred years before Descartes. Then they let a whole new epoch begin with him, of free inquiry independent of all positive creed. But such an epoch cannot in fact be attributed to Descartes and his successors [1] but only a semblance [2] Bruno and Spinoza must be wholly excepted here. Each stands for himself and alone, and belongs neither to his century nor to his part of the world, which repaid the one with death and the other with persecution and disgrace. Their miserable existence and dying in this West is like that of a tropical plant in Europe. Their true spiritual home was the banks of the holy Ganga. There they would have led a quiet and honored life among men of like mind.—Bruno, in the following verses, with which he opens the book della causa principio ed uno, for which he got the stake, expresses clearly and beautifully how lonely he felt in his century. At the same time he shows a foreboding of his fate. It made him hesitate to set out his cause, until the drive to communicate what one has recognized as true, which is so strong in noble minds, overcame it:

Ad partum properare tuum, mens aegra, quid obstat; Seclo haec indigno sint tribuenda licet? Umbrarum fluctu terras mergente, cacumen Adtolle in clarum, noster Olympe, Jovem.

Whoever this main work of his, as well as his other Italian writings, once so rare, now accessible to everyone through a German edition, of it, and at most a striving for it. Descartes was a most distinguished mind, and, if one takes his time into account, he accomplished very much. But if one sets this consideration aside and measures him by the liberation of thought from all fetters and the opening of a new period of unprejudiced, independent inquiry that is credited to him, then one must find that his skepticism lacks real earnestness and so settles down again so quickly and so badly. With it he does put on a show of wanting to throw off, all at once, all the fetters of opinions instilled early and belonging to his time and nation. But he does this only for appearance, for a moment, in order to take them up again at once and hold them all the more firmly. The same holds for all his successors down to Kant. So Goethe's verse applies very well to a free thinker of this kind:

"He seems to me, by your Grace's leave, like one of those long-legged grasshoppers, that always flies and, flying, jumps—and at once sings its old little song in the grass."—

Kant had reasons for putting on the show as if he too meant it only so. But this time the pretended jump, which was granted because people already knew that it leads back into the grass, became a flight. And now those who stand below can only look after him, and can no longer catch him again.

So Kant dared to show, from his teaching, that all those dogmas, supposedly proved so often, cannot be proved. Speculative theology, and the rational psychology connected with it, received their death blow from him. Since then they have vanished from German philosophy, and one must reads, will find with me that among all philosophers he alone comes somewhat near Plato, in the strong addition of poetic power and bent beside the philosophical, and shows this too especially in a dramatic way. Think of the tender, spiritual, thinking being that he presents himself as in this writing of his, in the hands of crude, raging priests as his judges and executioners. And thank the time that brought on a brighter and milder century, so that posterity, whose curse was to fall on those devilish fanatics, is now already the contemporary world. not let oneself be misled by the fact that here and there the word is kept after the thing has been given up,

or that some wretched philosophy-professor has his master's fear before his eyes and lets truth be truth. The greatness of this merit of Kant's can be measured only by someone who has noticed the harmful influence of those concepts on natural science as well as on philosophy, in all the writers of the 17th and 18th centuries, even the best. In German scientific writings the change in tone and in metaphysical background since Kant is striking. Before him it stood with them as it still does in England.—This merit of Kant's is connected with the fact that thoughtless pursuit of the laws of appearance had completely ruled all earlier philosophy, ancient, medieval and modern. These laws were raised to eternal truths, and so the fleeting appearance was raised to the real being of the world. In short, *realism*, undisturbed in its delusion by any reflection, had ruled. *Berkeley*, who, like *Malebranche* before him, had recognized how one-sided and indeed false realism is, could not overthrow it, because his attack was limited to *one* point. So it was reserved for *Kant* to help the idealistic basic view to rule in Europe, at least in philosophy. In the whole of Asia that is not Islamized, this view is essentially even that of religion. Before Kant, then, we were in time; now time is in us, and so on.

Ethics too had been treated by that realistic philosophy according to the laws of appearance, which it held to be absolute and valid also of the thing in itself. So ethics was founded sometimes on the doctrine of happiness, sometimes on the will of the creator of the world, and finally on the concept of perfection. In and for itself this concept is wholly empty and without content. It marks a mere relation, which gets meaning only from the things to which it is applied. For "to be perfect" means nothing more than "to correspond to some concept presupposed and given for the case". So this concept must have been set up beforehand, and without it perfection is an unnamed number and by itself says nothing at all. But suppose someone makes the concept of "humanity" a silent presupposition here, and accordingly makes striving for perfect humanity the principle of morals. Then he says only: "Human beings should be as they should be"—and is as wise as before. For "perfect" is almost only a synonym of "complete in number". It says that in a given case, or individual, all the predicates that lie in the concept of its species are represented, and so are really present. So

the concept of "perfection", when used absolutely and in abstracto, is a word empty of thought, and so is the talk about the "most perfect being" and the like. All this is mere word-trash. Nevertheless in the last century this concept of perfection and imperfection had become current coin. Indeed it was the hinge on which almost all moralizing and even theologizing turned. Everyone had it in his mouth, so that in the end a real abuse was made of it. Even the best writers of the time, Lessing for example, we see most lamentably entangled in perfections and imperfections and struggling with them. Yet every head that thinks at all must at least dimly have felt that this concept has no positive content, since, like an algebraic sign, it indicates a mere relation in abstracto.—Kant, as already said, separated the undeniable great ethical significance of actions entirely from appearance and its laws. He showed that significance as concerning directly the thing in itself, the innermost being of the world. Appearance, that is, time and space and everything that fills them and orders itself in them according to the law of causality, is on the other hand to be regarded as an unstable dream without being.

This little, which by no means exhausts the subject, may suffice as a testimony of my recognition of Kant's great merits. I give it here for my own satisfaction, and because justice demanded that those merits be called to mind for everyone who wants to follow me in the unsparing exposure of his faults, to which I now proceed.

That Kant's great achievements had to be accompanied by great faults can be gauged already from history alone. He brought about the greatest revolution in philosophy. He put an end to Scholasticism, which, understood in the wider sense given, had lasted fourteen centuries, in order to begin a really new, third world epoch of philosophy. Yet the immediate result of his appearance was almost only negative, not positive. He did not set up a complete new system to which his followers could have held for any length of time. So all noticed that something very great had happened, but none rightly knew what. They saw well enough that all philosophy until then had been fruitless dreaming, from which the new age was now waking. But what they should now hold to, they did not know. A great emptiness, a great need, had set in. General attention,

even that of the wider public, was aroused. Prompted by this, and not driven by inner impulse and feeling of strength (which show themselves even at the most unfavorable moment, as with Spinoza), men without any distinguishing talents made manifold, weak, absurd, even sometimes mad attempts. The public, once aroused, still gave them its attention and for a long time lent them its ear, with a great patience such as is found only in Germany.

It must have gone in nature once as it does here, when a great revolution changed the whole surface of the earth, sea and land had exchanged their places, and the ground for a new creation had been leveled. Then it took a long time before nature could bring forth a new series of lasting forms, each in harmony with itself and with the others. Strange monstrous organisms came out. In disharmony with themselves and with one another, they could not last long. But their remains, which still exist, are just what has brought down to us the memory of that wavering and trying of nature taking new shape.—That in philosophy Kant brought about a crisis quite like that, and an age of monstrous freaks, as we all know, already allows the conclusion that his merit cannot have been perfect. It must have been burdened with great defects, and have been negative and one-sided. We will now trace these defects.

First we want to make clear to ourselves the basic thought in which the aim of the whole Critique of Pure Reason lies, and to examine it.—Kant took the standpoint of his predecessors, the dogmatic philosophers, and so started with them from the following assumptions. 1) Metaphysics is the science of what lies beyond the possibility of all experience.—2) Such a thing can never be found by principles that are themselves drawn from experience (Prolegomena, §. 1). Only what we know *prior to* experience, and so independently of all experience, can reach further than possible experience.—3) In our reason some principles of this kind are really to be found. They are grouped under the name of knowledge from pure reason.—So far Kant goes along with his predecessors. Here, though, he parts from them. They say: "These principles, or knowledge from pure reason, are expressions of the absolute possibility of things, aeternae veritates, sources of ontology. They stand above the order of the world, as fate stood above the gods of the ancients." Kant says: they are mere forms of our

intellect. They are laws, not of the existence of things, but of our representations of them. So they hold only for our apprehension of things, and accordingly cannot reach beyond the possibility of experience, which, according to item 1, was the whole point. For the very apriority of these forms of knowledge can rest only on their subjective origin. This cuts us off for ever from knowledge of the being in itself of things, and confines us to a world of mere appearances. So we cannot know things as they may be in themselves even a posteriori, let alone a priori. Metaphysics is therefore impossible, and in its place comes the critique of pure reason. Against the old dogmatism Kant is completely victorious here. That is why all the dogmatic attempts that have appeared since have had to take quite different paths from the earlier ones. According to the declared aim of the present critique, I shall now lead up to the justification of my own path. For on closer examination of the above argument, one will have to admit that its very first basic assumption is a petitio principii. It lies in the sentence (set out clearly in Prolegomena, §. 1 especially): "The source of metaphysics must absolutely not be empirical. Its principles and basic concepts must never be taken from experience, either inner or outer." Nothing at all is offered to support this cardinal claim except the etymological argument from the word metaphysics. In truth the matter stands like this. The world and our own existence present themselves to us necessarily as a riddle. Now it is simply assumed that the solution of this riddle cannot come out of a thorough understanding of the world itself. It must be sought in something wholly different from the world (for that is what "beyond the possibility of all experience" means). And it is assumed that everything of which we could in any way have *direct* acquaintance (for that is what possible experience, inner as well as outer, means) must be excluded from that solution. The solution must instead be sought only in what we can reach merely indirectly, namely by inferences from general propositions a priori. After the main source of all knowledge had been shut off in this way, and the straight road to truth blocked, it is no wonder that the dogmatic attempts failed and that Kant could show the necessity of this failure. For it had been assumed in advance that metaphysics and knowledge a priori are identical. But for that, one would first have had to prove that the material for solving the

riddle of the world absolutely cannot be contained in the world itself. It would have to be proved that it can only be sought outside the world, in something that we can reach only by following those forms known to us a priori. As long as this is not proved, we have no reason, in the most important and most difficult of all tasks, to stop up the richest in content of all sources of knowledge, inner and outer experience, in order to operate only with forms empty of content. I say, therefore, that the solution of the riddle of the world must come out of the understanding of the world itself. So the task of metaphysics is not to fly over the experience in which the world stands, but to understand it from the ground up. For experience, outer and inner, is certainly the main source of all knowledge. So the solution of the riddle of the world is possible only through the proper connection of outer experience with inner at the right point, and through the union thus achieved of these two such different sources of knowledge. Even so, it is possible only within certain limits that cannot be separated from our finite nature. In other words, we reach the right understanding of the world itself, without reaching a closed explanation of its existence that would cancel all further problems. So est quadam prodire tenus, and my way lies in the middle, between the teaching of omniscience of the earlier dogmatism and the despair of the Kantian critique. The important truths discovered by Kant, though, by which the earlier metaphysical systems were overthrown, have supplied data and material to mine. Compare what I said about my method in chapter 17 of the second volume.—So much for Kant's basic thought. Now we want to consider its execution and the particulars.

Kant's style bears throughout the stamp of a superior mind, of genuine, firm originality and quite unusual power of thought. Its character can perhaps be aptly described as a *brilliant dryness*. By means of it he is able to seize and pick out concepts with great sureness, and then toss them back and forth with the greatest freedom, to the reader's astonishment. I find the same brilliant dryness again in the style of Aristotle, although that is much simpler.—Nevertheless Kant's presentation is often unclear, indefinite, inadequate and sometimes obscure. This last, admittedly, can be partly excused by the difficulty of the subject and the depth of the thoughts. But whoever is clear to himself to the bot-

tom, and knows quite plainly what he thinks and wants, will never write unclearly. He will never set up wavering, indefinite concepts. He will not gather very difficult, complicated expressions from foreign languages to name them, in order afterward to use them constantly. That is how Kant took words and formulas from the older, even Scholastic philosophy and combined them for his purposes, for example "transcendental synthetic unity of apperception". In general he always put "unity of synthesis" where "union" alone was enough. Such a person will also not keep explaining over and over what has already been explained once, as Kant does, for example, with the understanding, the categories, experience and other main concepts. Such a person will not keep repeating himself without end, and yet in each new presentation of a thought that has come up a hundred times leave in it exactly the same obscure places. Instead he will say his meaning once, clearly, thoroughly, exhaustively, and leave it at that. "Quo enim melius rem aliquam concipimus, eo magis determinati sumus ad eam unico modo exprimendam", says Descartes in his fifth letter. But the greatest harm done by Kant's obscure presentation in places is that it worked as an exemplar vitiis imitabile. It was even misread as a corrupting authorization. The public had been forced to see that what is obscure is not always senseless. At once the senseless took refuge behind obscure presentation. *Fichte* was the first to seize this new privilege and use it heavily. *Schelling* at least equaled him in it, and an army of hungry scribblers, without mind and without honesty, soon outdid both. But the greatest impudence in serving up bare nonsense, in smearing together senseless, raving tangles of words, such as had until then been heard only in madhouses, finally appeared in *Hegel*. It became the instrument of the clumsiest general mystification that ever was, with a success that will seem fabulous to posterity and will remain a monument of German niaiserie. Meanwhile *Jean Paul* wrote in vain his fine paragraph "higher appreciation of philosophical madness on the professor's chair and of poetic madness on the stage" (aesthetic after-lesson). For *Goethe* had already said in vain:

"So people chatter and teach undisturbed. Who wants to bother with the fools? Usually a person believes, if he only hears words, that there must be something to think in them too."

But let us return to *Kant*. One cannot help admitting that the ancient, grand simplicity, that naïveté, ingénuité, candeur, are entirely lacking in him. His philosophy has no analogy with Greek architecture, which offers large, simple proportions that reveal themselves to the eye all at once. It very much recalls Gothic building instead. For a quite individual peculiarity of Kant's mind is a curious pleasure in symmetry, which loves the many-colored multiplicity in order to arrange it and repeat the arrangement in subordinate arrangements, and so on without end, just as in Gothic churches. Sometimes he even carries this to the point of playing games. Out of this inclination he goes so far as to do obvious violence to truth and to treat it as the old-fashioned gardeners treat nature. Their work is symmetrical avenues, squares and triangles, pyramid-shaped and ball-shaped trees, and hedges wound into regular curves. I will support this with facts.

He treated space and time in isolation. Then he dismissed this whole world of intuition that fills space and time, in which we live and are, with the empty words "the empirical content of intuition is given to us". After that he arrives at once, in a single leap, at the *logical foundation of his whole philosophy*, the *table of judgments*. From this he deduces a proper dozen categories, laid out symmetrically under four headings. Later these become the terrible bed of Procrustes, into which he forces all things in the world and everything that goes on in a human being. He shrinks from no violence and scorns no sophism, if only he can repeat the symmetry of that table everywhere. The first thing derived symmetrically from it is the pure physiological table of general principles of natural science: namely axioms of intuition, anticipations of perception, analogies of experience and postulates of empirical thought in general. Of these principles the first two are simple. The last two, however, each put out three shoots, symmetrically. The bare categories were what he calls *concepts*. These principles of natural science, however, are *judgments*. By his highest guide to all wisdom, namely symmetry, it is now the turn of the *inferences* to prove fruitful, and they do so again symmetrically and in step, to a beat. For just as experience, together with its principles a priori, grew up for the *understanding* by the application of the categories to sensibility, so the *Ideas* of *reason* arise by the application of

inferences to the categories. This is the business that *reason* performs, according to its supposed principle of seeking the unconditioned. It goes like this: the three categories of relation give three, and only three, possible kinds of major premises for inferences. These inferences accordingly also fall into three kinds, and each of them is to be regarded as an egg out of which *reason* hatches an Idea. From the categorical kind of inference comes the Idea of the soul, from the hypothetical the Idea of the world, and from the disjunctive the Idea of God. In the middle one, the Idea of the world, the symmetry of the table of categories is repeated once more. Its four headings bring forth four theses, each of which has its antithesis as a symmetrical counterpart.

We do pay our admiration to the really most acute combination that called forth this elegant building. But later we will examine it thoroughly in its foundation and in its parts.—First, though, the following considerations must be sent ahead.

It is astonishing how Kant follows his way without further reflection, going after his symmetry, ordering everything by it, without ever taking one of the subjects so treated into consideration for itself. I will explain myself more closely. He considers intuitive knowledge only in mathematics. The rest of intuitive knowledge, in which the world lies before us, he neglects entirely. He holds only to abstract thinking, which in fact gets all its meaning and value from the intuitive world, which is infinitely more significant, more general and richer in content than the abstract part of our knowledge. Indeed, and this is a main point, he nowhere distinguishes intuitive and abstract knowledge clearly. For that very reason, as we shall see afterward, he entangles himself in irresolvable contradictions with himself.—After he has dismissed the whole world of the senses with the empty "it is given", he makes, as said, the logical table of judgments the cornerstone of his building. But here too he does not reflect for a moment on what is really lying before him now. These forms of judgments are in fact *words* and *combinations of words*. The first question should have been what these directly signify. It would have been found that they are *concepts*. The next question would then have been about the nature of *concepts*. From the answer it would have emerged what relation these have to the intuitive repre-

sentations in which the world stands. There intuition and reflection would have come apart. It would then have had to be investigated not only how pure and merely formal intuition a priori comes into consciousness, but also how its content, empirical intuition, does. Then it would have been shown what share the *understanding* has in this. So it would also have been shown, in general, what the *understanding* is and what, by contrast, *reason* really is, whose critique is being written here. It is most striking that he does not once determine this last properly and sufficiently. He gives only incomplete and incorrect explanations of it, now and then, as the context of the moment requires. This is quite in conflict with the rule of Descartes cited above [3].

[4] Let me remark here that I cite the "Critique of Pure *Reason*" throughout by the page number of *the first edition*, since this page number is given throughout in Rosenkranz's edition of the collected works. In addition I add, with a V put in front, the page number of the fifth edition. All the others, from the second on, are identical with this one, and so presumably also in page number.

For example, on p. 11; V, 24, of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, reason is the faculty of principles a priori. On p. 299; V, 356, it is said again that reason is the faculty of *principles*, and it is set against the understanding, which is said to be the faculty of *rules*! Now you would think there must be an enormous difference between principles and rules, since it entitles him to assume a separate faculty of knowledge for each. But this great difference is supposed to lie only in this: what is known a priori from pure intuition, or through the forms of the understanding, is a *rule*, and only what comes a priori from mere concepts is a principle. We will come back to this arbitrary and unjustified distinction later, in the Dialectic. On p. 330; V, 386, reason is the faculty of inferring. Mere judging he often declares (p. 69; V, 94) to be the business of the understanding. What he is really saying by this is: judging is the business of the understanding as long as the ground of the judgment is empirical, transcendental, or metalogical (Treatise on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, §. 31, 32, 33). But if the ground is logical, which is what an inference consists of, then a quite special and far superior faculty of knowledge acts here, reason. What is more, on p.

303; V, 360, he explains that immediate inferences from a proposition are still the work of the understanding, and only those that use a mediating concept are carried out by reason. As an example he gives this: from the proposition "All men are mortal," the conclusion "Some mortals are men" is still drawn by the mere understanding; but the conclusion "All scholars are mortal" requires a quite different and far superior faculty, reason. How could a great thinker put forward something like this! On p. 553; V, 581, reason suddenly becomes the lasting condition of all voluntary actions. On p. 614; V, 642, it consists in our being able to give an account of our claims; on pp. 643, 644; V, 671, 672, in its uniting the concepts of the understanding into Ideas, just as the understanding unites the manifold of objects into concepts. On p. 646; V, 674, it is nothing other than the faculty of deriving the particular from the general.

The *understanding* too is defined again and again. In seven places in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: on p. 51; V, 75, it is the faculty of producing representations itself. On p. 69; V, 94, it is the faculty of judging, that is, of thinking, that is, of knowing through concepts. On p. 137, fifth edition, it is in general the faculty of cognitions. On p. 132; V, 171, it is the faculty of rules. But on p. 158; V, 197, we are told: "it is not only the faculty of rules, but the source of principles, according to which everything stands under rules"; and yet above it was set against reason, because reason alone was supposed to be the faculty of principles. On p. 160; V, 199, the understanding is the faculty of concepts; but on p. 302; V, 359, it is the faculty of the unity of appearances by means of rules.

I have set up definitions of these two faculties of knowledge that are firm, sharp, definite, simple, and always in agreement with the usage of all peoples and all times. I will not need to defend them against such truly confused and groundless talk about the subject, even though it comes from Kant. I have cited it only as proof of my charge that Kant pursues his symmetrical, logical system without thinking enough about the subject he is treating in this way.

Now, as I said above, suppose Kant had seriously investigated how two such different faculties of knowledge, one of which is what distinguishes human beings, make themselves known, and what reason and understanding mean according to the usage of all peoples and all philosophers. Then he would never

have split reason into a theoretical and a practical reason, with no further authority than the scholastics' *intellectus theoreticus* and *practicus*, which are used in a quite different sense, and he would never have made the latter the source of virtuous action. In the same way, before Kant so carefully separated concepts of the understanding (by which he means partly his categories, partly all common concepts) from concepts of reason (his so-called Ideas), and made both the material of his philosophy, which for the most part deals only with the validity, use, and origin of all these concepts—before that, I say, he really should have investigated what a *concept* is in the first place. But unfortunately this necessary investigation too was left out entirely. That contributed much to the disastrous mixing up of intuitive and abstract knowledge, which I will soon point out.—The same lack of reflection with which he passed over the questions "What is intuition? What is reflection? What is a concept? What is reason? What is understanding?"—also made him skip these equally unavoidable investigations: What do I call the *object* that I distinguish from the *representation*? What is existence? What is an object? What is a subject? What are truth, illusion, error? But without stopping to think or look around, he follows his logical scheme and his symmetry. The table of judgments is supposed to be, and must be, the key to all wisdom.

Above I named it as Kant's chief merit that he distinguished appearance from the thing in itself, declared this whole visible world to be appearance, and therefore denied that its laws have any validity beyond appearance. It is certainly striking that he did not derive that merely relative existence of appearance from the simple, obvious, undeniable truth "*No object without a subject*." That would have shown, right at the root, that the object, because it is always there only in relation to a subject, depends on that subject and is conditioned by it, and so is mere appearance, which does not exist in itself or unconditionally. Berkeley, to whose merit Kant is unjust, had already made that important proposition the cornerstone of his philosophy and so earned himself an immortal memory, although he did not himself draw the proper conclusions from it, and it was then partly not understood and partly not given enough attention. In my first edition I explained Kant's avoidance of this Berkeleyan proposition as an evi-

dent fear of outright idealism, while on the other hand I found that idealism clearly stated in many passages of the *Critique of Pure Reason*; and so I accused Kant of contradicting himself. This charge was also well founded, as far as one knows the *Critique of Pure Reason* only in the second edition, or in the five later editions printed after it, as was my case then. But when I later read Kant's main work in the *first* edition, which has already become rare, I saw to my great joy all those contradictions disappear. I found that Kant, although he does not use the formula "no object without a subject," nevertheless declares, with the same decisiveness as Berkeley and I, that the external world laid out in space and time is mere representation of the subject that knows it. So, for example, on p. 383 of that edition he says without reserve: "If I take away the thinking subject, the whole bodily world must fall away, since it is nothing but the appearance in the sensibility of our subject and a kind of representation of it." But the whole passage from p. 348 to p. 392, in which Kant sets out his decided idealism with great beauty and clarity, he suppressed in the second edition, and in its place put a mass of statements that conflict with it. As a result, the text of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as it circulated from 1787 to 1838, became disfigured and corrupted, and the book contradicted itself, so that for that very reason its meaning could be completely clear and understandable to no one. I have set out the details about this, and also my guesses about the reasons and weaknesses that may have moved Kant to disfigure his immortal work in this way, in a letter to Professor Rosenkranz. Rosenkranz took the main passage of that letter into his preface to the second volume of the edition of Kant's complete works that he edited, and I refer the reader to it there. As a result of my urging, in 1838 Professor Rosenkranz found himself moved to restore the *Critique of Pure Reason* to its original form, by having it printed in that second volume from the *first* edition of 1781. By this he earned an inestimable merit for philosophy, and perhaps even saved the most important work of German literature from destruction; and he should never be forgotten for it. But let no one imagine that he knows the *Critique of Pure Reason* and has a clear concept of Kant's teaching if he has read it only in the second or one of the later editions. That is

absolutely impossible: for he has read only a mutilated, corrupted, and in a way spurious text. It is my duty to state this here emphatically, as a warning to everyone.

But the way Kant introduces the *thing in itself* stands in undeniable contradiction with the decidedly idealist basic view stated so clearly in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. This is without doubt the main reason why in the second edition he suppressed the idealist passage I mentioned and declared himself outright against Berkeley's idealism. But by doing so he only brought inconsistencies into his work, without being able to cure its main defect. As is well known, that defect is the introduction of the *thing in itself* in the way he chose. G. E. Schulze showed at length in the "Aenesidemus" that this way is untenable, and it was soon recognized as the indefensible point of his system. The matter can be made clear in very few words. Kant bases the assumption of the thing in itself, though he hides this under various turns of phrase, on an inference according to the law of causality: namely that empirical intuition, or more correctly the *sensation* in our sense organs from which it starts, must have an external cause. Now, according to his own correct discovery, the law of causality is known to us a priori, and is therefore a function of our intellect, hence of *subjective* origin. Further, the sensation of the senses itself, to which we here apply the law of causality, is undeniably *subjective*. And finally even space, into which by means of this application we place the cause of the sensation as an object, is a form of our intellect that is given a priori, and so *subjective*. Thus the whole of empirical intuition remains throughout on *subjective* ground, as a mere event in us, and nothing completely different from it and independent of it can be brought in as a *thing in itself*, or proved to be a necessary assumption. Empirical intuition really is, and remains, our mere representation: it is the world as representation. We can reach the essence in itself of this world only by the entirely different path that I have taken, by drawing in self-consciousness, which makes known the will as the in-itself of our own appearance. But then the thing in itself becomes something different *toto genere* from the representation and its elements, as I have shown in detail.

The great defect of the Kantian system on this point, which as I said was pointed out early, confirms the beautiful Indian proverb: "No lotus without a stem." The faulty derivation of the thing in itself is the stem here. But only the manner of derivation is at fault, not the recognition of a thing in itself behind the given appearance. *Fichte* misunderstood it in this latter way. He could do that only because he cared not about truth but about making a stir, to advance his personal ends. So he was bold and thoughtless enough to deny the thing in itself altogether and to set up a system in which not only the merely formal side of representation, as with Kant, but the material side too, its whole content, was supposedly derived a priori from the subject. In doing so he counted quite correctly on the public's lack of judgment and its *niaiserie*. The public accepted bad sophisms, mere hocus-pocus, and senseless drivel as proofs. So he succeeded in drawing its attention from Kant to himself and in giving German philosophy the direction in which Schelling later carried it further, and which finally reached its goal in the senseless sham wisdom of Hegel.

I now return to the great fault of Kant that I touched on above: he did not properly separate intuitive and abstract knowledge. This has produced a disastrous confusion, which we must now look at more closely. If he had sharply separated intuitive representations from concepts thought merely in abstracto, he would have kept the two apart and would have known each time which of them he was dealing with. Unfortunately this was not the case, although the charge has not yet been raised loudly, and so may come as a surprise. His "object of experience," which he talks about constantly, the real object of the categories, is not the intuitive representation, but it is also not the abstract concept. It is different from both, and yet both at once, and a complete non-thing. For he lacked, incredible as this seems, either the reflection or the good will to settle this with himself and to explain clearly to himself and others whether his "object of experience, that is, of the knowledge produced by applying the categories," is the intuitive representation in space and time (my first class of representations), or only the abstract concept. Strange as it is, he always has before

his mind something in between the two. That is where the unhappy confusion comes from, which I must now bring to light. For that purpose I have to go through the whole doctrine of elements in general.

The *Transcendental Aesthetic* is such an extremely meritorious work that it alone could be enough to make Kant's name immortal. Its proofs have such full power to convince that I count its doctrines among the irrefutable truths. They also undoubtedly belong among the most fruitful in consequences. They are therefore to be regarded as the rarest thing in the world, namely a real, great discovery in metaphysics. The fact he strictly proved, that a part of our knowledge is known to us a priori, allows no other explanation than that this knowledge makes up the forms of our intellect. Indeed this is less an explanation than just the plain statement of the fact itself. For a priori means nothing other than "not gained by way of experience, and so not come into us from outside." But what is present in the intellect without having come from outside is just what originally belongs to the intellect itself, its own nature. Now if what is present in it in this way consists in the general manner in which all its objects must present themselves to it, then that means it is the forms of its knowing, that is, the fixed manner, settled once and for all, in which it carries out this function. So "knowledge a priori" and "the intellect's own forms" are at bottom only two expressions for the same thing, and in a way synonyms.

I would therefore not know what to take away from the doctrines of the Transcendental Aesthetic, only a few things to add. In particular, Kant did not think his thoughts through to the end in this: he did not reject the whole Euclidean method of demonstration, although he had said on p. 87; V, 120, that all geometrical knowledge has immediate evidence from intuition. It is highly remarkable that even one of his opponents, and the sharpest of them, G. E. Schulze (Critique of Theoretical Philosophy, II, 241), draws the conclusion that a quite different treatment of geometry would follow from Kant's teaching than the one actually in use. He thinks he is thereby giving an apagogic proof against Kant, but in fact he is starting a war against the Euclidean method without knowing it. I refer to §. 15 in the first book of the present work.

After the detailed discussion, *given* in the Transcendental Aesthetic, of the general *forms* of all intuition, one expects to get some explanation of its *content* as well: of how *empirical* intuition comes into our consciousness, and how the knowledge of this whole world, so real and so important for us, arises in us. But on this the whole of Kant's teaching really contains nothing except the often repeated, empty phrase: "The empirical element of intuition is given from outside."—Because of this, Kant goes on here from the *pure forms of intuition*, by a jump, to *thinking*, to *transcendental logic*. Right at the entrance to it (*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 50; V, 74), where Kant cannot avoid touching on the material content of empirical intuition, he takes the first false step and commits the πρωτον ψευδος. "Our knowledge," he says, "has two sources, namely receptivity of impressions and spontaneity of concepts: the first is the capacity to receive representations, the second the capacity to know an object through these representations: through the first an *object* is given to us, through the second it is thought."—That is false. For according to this, the *impression*, for which alone we have mere receptivity, which therefore comes from outside and is alone really "given," would already be a *representation*, indeed already an *object*. But it is nothing more than a mere *sensation* in the sense organ. Only by applying the *understanding* (that is, the law of causality) and the forms of intuition, space and time, does our *intellect* turn this mere *sensation* into a *representation*. This representation now stands there as an *object* in space and time. It can be distinguished from the object only when one asks about the thing in itself; otherwise it is identical with it. I have set out this process in detail in the Treatise on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, §. 21. With that, though, the work of the understanding and of intuitive knowledge is finished. It needs no concepts and no thinking for this; that is why animals too have these representations. If concepts and thinking are added (to which spontaneity can indeed be attributed), then *intuitive* knowledge is left entirely behind, and a quite different class of representations, namely non-intuitive, abstract concepts, enters consciousness. This is the activity of *reason*, which, however, gets the whole content of its thinking only from the intuition that came before it, and from comparing that with other intuitions and concepts. But in this way Kant already brings thinking

into intuition, and lays the foundation for the disastrous mixing of intuitive and abstract knowledge that I am busy criticizing here. He has intuition, taken by itself, be without understanding, purely sensory, and so entirely passive, and has an *object* grasped only through thinking (the category of the understanding). So he brings *thinking into intuition*. But then in turn the object of *thinking* is an individual, real object. By this, thinking loses its essential character of generality and abstraction, and gets individual things for its object instead of general concepts. So he in turn brings *intuiting into thinking*. From this arises the disastrous mixing I mentioned, and the consequences of this first false step extend over his whole theory of knowledge.

Running through the whole of it is the complete blending of the intuitive representation with the abstract one into something in between the two. He presents this as the object of knowledge through the understanding and its categories, and calls this knowledge *experience*. It is hard to believe that Kant himself thought anything quite definite and really clear in connection with this object of the understanding. I will now prove this, by the enormous contradiction that runs through the whole of transcendental logic and is the real source of the obscurity that wraps it.

For in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 67–69; V, 92–94; pp. 89, 90; V, 122, 123; and further V, 135, 139, 153, he repeats and insists: the understanding is no faculty of intuition, its knowledge is not intuitive but discursive; the understanding is the faculty of judging (p. 69; V, 94), and a judgment is mediate knowledge, a representation of a representation (p. 68; V, 93); the understanding is the faculty of thinking, and thinking is knowledge through concepts (p. 69; V, 94); the categories of the understanding are by no means the conditions under which objects are given in intuition (p. 89; V, 122), and intuition needs the functions of thinking in no way (p. 91; V, 123); our understanding can only think, not intuit (V, pp. 135, 139). Further, in the Prolegomena, §. 20: intuition, perception, *perceptio*, belongs to the senses alone; judging belongs to the understanding alone; and §. 22: the business of the senses is to intuit, that of the understanding to think, that is, to judge.—Finally also in the *Critique of*

Practical Reason, fourth edition, p. 247; Rosenkranz edition p. 281: the understanding is discursive, its representations are thoughts, not intuitions.—All of this is Kant's own wording.

From this it follows that this intuitive world would be there for us even if we had no understanding at all, and that it gets into our head in a completely inexplicable way. He often indicates this by his odd expression that intuition is *given*, without ever explaining this vague and figurative expression any further.

But now his whole remaining teaching about the understanding, its categories, and the possibility of experience, as he presents it in transcendental logic, contradicts all that I have quoted in the most glaring way. Namely: *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 79; V, 105, the understanding through its categories brings unity into the manifold of *intuition*, and the pure concepts of the understanding apply a priori to objects of *intuition*. P. 94; V, 126, "the categories are the condition of experience, whether of the *intuition* or of the thinking that is met with in it." V, p. 127, the understanding is the originator of experience. V, p. 128, the categories determine the *intuition* of objects. V, p. 130, everything that we represent to ourselves as combined in the object (which surely is something intuitive and not an abstraction) has been combined only through an act of the understanding. V, p. 135, the understanding is defined once more, as the faculty of combining a priori and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception; but by all usage of language apperception is not the thinking of a concept but *intuition*. V, p. 136, we even find a supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to the understanding. V, p. 143, there is even a heading saying that all sensory intuition is conditioned by the categories. In the same place the *logical function of judgments* also brings the manifold of given *intuitions* under one apperception in general, and the manifold of a given intuition necessarily stands under the categories. V, p. 144, unity comes into *intuition* by means of the categories, through the understanding. V, p. 145, the thinking of the understanding is explained, very strangely, by saying that it synthesizes, connects, and orders the manifold of *intuition*. V, p. 161, experience is possible only through the categories and consists in the connection of *perceptions*, which surely are intuitions.

V, p. 159, the categories are knowledge a priori of objects of *intuition* in general.—Further, here and at V, pp. 163 and 165, a main doctrine of Kant is stated, this: that the *understanding* first makes *nature* possible, by prescribing laws a priori to it, with nature conforming to its lawfulness, and so on. Now nature surely is something intuitive and not an abstraction; the understanding would then have to be a faculty of intuition. V, p. 168, it is said that the concepts of the understanding are the principles of the possibility of experience, and that experience is the determination of appearances in space and time in general; and these appearances surely are present in intuition. Finally, pp. 189–211; V, 232–265, comes the long proof (the incorrectness of which is shown in detail in my Treatise on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, §. 23) that the objective succession and also the simultaneity of the objects of experience are not perceived by the senses, but are brought into nature by the understanding alone, nature itself being first made possible by this. Yet nature, the sequence of events, and the simultaneity of states are certainly all intuitive, and not something merely thought abstractly.

I challenge everyone who shares my reverence for Kant to reconcile these contradictions, and to show that in his teaching about the object of experience, and about how it is determined by the activity of the understanding and its twelve functions, Kant thought something quite clear and definite. I am convinced that the contradiction I have pointed out, which runs through the whole of transcendental logic, is the real reason for the great obscurity of its presentation. Kant was dimly aware of the contradiction. He struggled with it inwardly, yet either would not or could not bring it to clear consciousness. So he veiled it from himself and from others, and got around it by all sorts of back roads. Perhaps this also explains why he made of the faculty of knowledge such an odd, complicated machine, with so many wheels: the twelve categories, the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, inner sense, the transcendental unity of apperception, then the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding, and so on. And despite this great apparatus, not even an attempt is made to explain the intuition of the external world, which surely is the main thing in our knowledge. Instead this obtrusive demand is dismissed, in a really

poor way, every time by the same empty, figurative expression: "Empirical intuition is given to us." On p. 145 of the fifth edition we learn further that it is given by the object; so the object must be something different from the intuition.

Now if we try to find out Kant's innermost view, which he did not state clearly himself, we find that it is really such an object, different from *intuition* and yet by no means a *concept*, that is for him the real object for the understanding. Indeed, it is this odd assumption of such an unrepresentable object that is supposed to be what first turns intuition into experience. I believe that an old, deep-rooted prejudice, one no longer subject to any examination, is the ultimate ground in Kant for assuming such an *absolute object*, which is an object in itself, that is, even without a subject. It is by no means the *intuited* object. It is added in thought to the intuition by means of the concept, as something corresponding to it, and only now is the intuition experience and has value and truth. The intuition then gets these only through its relation to a concept (in diametrical opposition to our account, according to which the concept gets value and truth only from intuition). This adding in thought, to the intuition, of an object that cannot be directly represented is then the real function of the categories. "Only through intuition is the object given, which is afterwards thought according to the category." (*Critique of Pure Reason*, first edition, p. 399.) This becomes especially clear from a passage on p. 125 of the fifth edition: "Now the question is whether concepts a priori also come first, as conditions under which alone something, though not *intuited*, is still *thought* as an *object* in general," which he answers yes. Here the source of the error and of the confusion that wraps it shows clearly. For the *object* as such is always there only for *intuition* and in it, whether that intuition is carried out through the senses or, when the object is absent, through the imagination. What is *thought*, on the other hand, is always a general, non-intuitive *concept*, which at most can be the concept of an object in general. But thinking relates to *objects* only indirectly, by means of concepts, and objects themselves always are and remain *intuitive*. For our thinking does not serve to give reality to intuitions. They have this reality (empirical reality), as far as they are capable of it, through themselves. Rather

thinking serves to gather up what intuitions have in common and the results of intuitions, so as to keep them and handle them more easily. But Kant ascribes the objects themselves to *thinking*, in order thereby to make experience and the objective world depend on the *understanding*, without however letting the understanding be a faculty of *intuition*. In this respect he does distinguish intuiting from thinking, but he makes individual things objects partly of intuition and partly of thinking. In reality they are objects only of the former. Our empirical intuition is *objective* at once, precisely because it starts from the causal nexus. Its objects are directly the things, not representations different from them. Individual things as such are intuited in the understanding and through the senses. The *one-sided* impression on the senses is at once completed by the imagination. As soon as we pass over to *thinking*, on the other hand, we leave individual things and have to do with general concepts without intuitiveness, even though we afterwards apply the results of our thinking to individual things. If we hold on to this, the inadmissibility becomes clear of the assumption that the intuition of things first gets reality, and becomes experience, through the thinking of these same things that applies the twelve categories. On the contrary, empirical reality, and so experience, is already given in the intuition itself. But intuition can also come about only by applying the knowledge of the causal nexus, which is the sole function of the understanding, to the sensation of the senses. So intuition is really intellectual, which is exactly what Kant denies.

The assumption of Kant criticized here is found, besides the passage quoted, stated especially clearly also in the *Critique of Judgment*, §. 36, right at the beginning; likewise in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, in the note to the first definition of the "Phenomenology." But set out most clearly, with a naivety that Kant himself would least have dared on this awkward point, it is found in the book of a *Kantian*, namely Kiesewetter's *Outline of a General Logic*, third edition, Part I, p. 434 of the Exposition, and Part II, §. 52 and 53 of the Exposition; likewise in Tieftrunk's *Doctrine of Thinking in Purely German Dress* (1825). There one sees just how every thinker's pupils, who do not think for themselves, become a magnifying mirror of his faults. In presenting his doc-

trine of categories, once he had decided on it, Kant stepped quietly throughout; the pupils, however, step quite boldly, and so they expose what is false in the matter.

According to what has been said, the object of the categories in Kant is not the thing in itself, but it is the thing in itself's nearest relative: it is the *object in itself*, an object that needs no subject, an individual thing, and yet not in time and space, because it is not intuitive; it is an object of thinking, and yet not an abstract concept. So Kant really distinguishes three things: 1) the representation; 2) the object of the representation; 3) the thing in itself. The first is the business of sensibility, which for him includes, besides sensation, the pure forms of intuition, space and time. The second is the business of the understanding, which *adds it in thought* through its twelve categories. The third lies beyond all possibility of knowledge. (As proof of this see pp. 108 and 109 of the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.) Now, though, the distinction between the representation and the object of the representation is unfounded. Berkeley had already proved this, and it follows from my whole account in the first book, especially chapter 1 of the Supplements, and indeed from Kant's own fully idealist basic view in the first edition. But if one did not want to count the object of the representation as part of the representation and identify it with the representation, one would have to move it over to the thing in itself. In the end this depends on the sense one gives to the word object. But this always stands firm: when one reflects clearly, nothing more is to be found than representation and thing in itself. The unjustified insertion of that hybrid, the object of the representation, is the source of Kant's errors. With its removal the doctrine of the categories as concepts a priori also falls away. For they contribute nothing to intuition and are not supposed to hold of the thing in itself; we are supposed to use them only to think those "objects of representations" and thereby turn the representation into experience. For every empirical intuition is already experience, and every intuition is empirical that starts from a sensation of the senses. The understanding, by its sole function (knowledge a priori of the law of causality), relates this sensation to its cause. The cause thereby presents itself in space and time (forms of pure intuition) as an object

of experience, a material object, lasting through all time in space; and yet even as such it still remains representation, just as space and time themselves do. If we want to go beyond this representation, we stand at the question about the thing in itself, to answer which is the theme of my whole work, as of all metaphysics in general. Connected with Kant's error as set out here is the fault of his that I criticized earlier: he gives no theory of how empirical intuition arises, but simply lets it be *given*, identifying it with mere sensation of the senses, to which he adds only the forms of intuition, space and time, comprising both under the name sensibility. But from these materials no objective representation arises yet. Rather it absolutely requires that the sensation be related to its cause, so the law of causality must be applied, so the understanding is needed. Without this the sensation remains subjective and places no object in space, even when space is added to it. But for Kant the understanding was not allowed to be used for intuition: it was supposed only to *think*, in order to stay within transcendental logic. Connected with this again is another fault of Kant: for the a priori character of the law of causality, which he correctly recognized, he left it to me to give the only valid proof, namely the one from the possibility of objective empirical intuition itself, and instead gives one that is obviously false, as I have already shown in my Treatise on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, §. 23.—
From the above it is clear that Kant's "object of the representation" (2) is put together from what he has robbed partly from the representation (1) and partly from the thing in itself (3). If experience really came about only by our understanding applying twelve different functions, in order to think, through just as many concepts a priori, the objects that were previously merely intuited, then every real thing as such would have to have a number of determinations. These, as given a priori, could absolutely not be thought away, just like space and time, but would belong quite essentially to the existence of the thing, and yet could not be derived from the properties of space and time. But only a single determination of this kind is to be found: that of causality. Materiality rests on this, since the essence of matter consists in acting and it is through and through causality (see Vol. II, chap. 4). But materiality alone is what distinguishes the real thing from a figment of the imagination, which is, after all, only represen-

tation. For matter, as lasting, gives the thing its persistence through all time, as far as its matter goes, while the forms change in accordance with causality. Everything else in the thing is either determinations of space or of time, or its empirical properties, which all run back to its action, and so are closer determinations of causality. But causality already enters as a condition into empirical intuition, which is therefore the business of the understanding. The understanding already makes intuition possible, but beyond the law of causality it contributes nothing to experience and its possibility. What fills the old ontologies is, apart from what is stated here, nothing but relations of things to one another, or to our reflection, and a scraped-together farrago.

The way the doctrine of the categories is presented already gives a sign that it lacks any ground. What a distance in this respect between the transcendental *Aesthetic* and the transcendental *Analytic*! *There*, what clarity, definiteness, certainty, firm conviction, which speaks out openly and communicates itself infallibly! Everything is full of light; no dark hiding places are left. Kant knows what he wants, and knows that he is right. *Here*, on the other hand, everything is dark, confused, indefinite, wavering, uncertain; the presentation is anxious, full of excuses and of appeals to what is still to come, or even is held back. Also the whole second and third section of the Deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding was completely changed in the second edition, because it did not satisfy even Kant himself, and it is quite different from the first, but has not become clearer. One really sees Kant struggling with the truth, in order to push through his teaching, once decided on. In the transcendental *Aesthetic* all his doctrines are really proved, from undeniable facts of consciousness; in the transcendental *Analytic*, on the other hand, when we look at it in the light, we find mere assertions that it is so and must be so. So here, as everywhere, the presentation bears the stamp of the thinking from which it came: for style is the physiognomy of the mind.—It should also be noted that whenever Kant wants to give an example for closer discussion, he takes almost every time the category of causality, and then what he says turns out right—because the law of causality is the real, but also the only, form of the understanding, and the other eleven categories are only blind windows. The Deduction of the categories is simpler and

more straightforward in the first edition than in the second. He takes pains to show how, after the intuition given by sensibility, the understanding brings about experience by means of the thinking of the categories. In this the expressions recognition, reproduction, association, apprehension, transcendental unity of apperception are repeated till one is tired, and still no clarity is reached. But it is most worth noting that in this exposition he does not once touch on what must occur to everyone first, the relating of the sensation of the senses to its external cause. If he did not want to admit this, he had to deny it expressly; but he does not do that either. So he sneaks around it, and all the Kantians have sneaked after him in just the same way. The secret motive for this is that he is saving the causal nexus, under the name "ground of appearance," for his false derivation of the thing in itself; and next, that through the relation to the cause intuition would become intellectual, which he must not admit. Besides, he seems to have feared that if the causal nexus between sensation and object were allowed, the object would at once become the thing in itself and introduce Locke's empiricism. But this difficulty is removed by the reflection that reminds us that the law of causality is of subjective origin, as much as the sensation itself, and that moreover one's own body, insofar as it appears in space, already belongs to the representations. But his fear of Berkeley's idealism kept Kant from admitting this.

As the essential operation of the understanding by means of its twelve categories, "the combination of the manifold of intuition" is repeatedly named. But this is never properly explained, nor is it shown what this manifold of intuition is before it is combined by the understanding. Now time and space, the latter in all its three dimensions, are continua; that is, all their parts are originally not separate but connected. They are, however, the pervasive forms of our intuition. So everything that presents itself (is given) in them also appears originally as a continuum; that is, its parts already appear as connected and need no further combining of the manifold. But suppose one wanted to interpret that unification of the manifold of intuition as meaning that I relate the different sense impressions from an object to this one object. For example, in intuiting a bell, I recognize that what affects my eye as yellow, my hands as smooth and

hard, my ear as sounding, is nevertheless only one and the same body. That is rather a consequence of the knowledge a priori of the causal nexus (this real and only function of the understanding). By virtue of this, all those different effects on my different sense organs lead me nevertheless to only one common cause of them, namely the nature of the body standing before me, so that my understanding, despite the difference and multiplicity of the effects, apprehends the unity of the cause as a single object, which presents itself intuitively just by this. —In the fine recapitulation of his teaching that Kant gives in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 719–726, or V, 747–754, he explains the categories perhaps more clearly than anywhere, namely as "the mere rule of the synthesis of what perception has given a posteriori." Something seems to hover before him here, like this: that in constructing a triangle, the angles give the rule for putting the lines together. At least this picture is the best way to explain what he says about the function of the categories. The preface to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* contains a long note, which likewise supplies an explanation of the categories. It says that they "are not different in anything from the formal acts of the understanding in judging," except in that in the latter subject and predicate can at most exchange places; then it defines judgment in general there as "an act by which given representations first become knowledge of an object." According to this, animals, since they do not judge, would also not know any objects at all. In general, according to Kant, there are only concepts of *objects*, no intuitions. I, on the other hand, say: objects are in the first place there only for intuition, and concepts are always abstractions from this intuition. So abstract thinking must conform exactly to the world present in intuition, since only the relation to this gives concepts content. And for concepts we may assume no other form determined a priori than the capacity for reflection in general, whose essence is the forming of concepts, that is, of abstract, non-intuitive representations, which makes up the sole function of *reason*, as I showed in the first book. I therefore demand that we throw eleven of the categories out the window and keep only that of causality, but understand that its activity is already the condition of empirical intuition, which is accordingly not merely

sensory but intellectual, and that the object intuited in this way, the object of experience, is one with the representation, from which only the thing in itself is still to be distinguished.

After studying the *Critique of Pure Reason* repeatedly at different ages, I have become convinced of how transcendental logic arose, and I report it here because it greatly helps one to understand it. The only discovery founded on objective observation and the highest human clearheadedness is the insight that time and space are known by us a priori. Delighted by this lucky find, Kant wanted to follow its vein further, and his love of architectonic symmetry gave him the guide. For as he had found a pure intuition a priori underlying empirical intuition as its condition, so, he thought, certain *pure concepts* would likewise underlie the empirically acquired *concepts* as a presupposition in our faculty of knowledge, and actual empirical thinking would be possible only through a pure thinking a priori. This pure thinking would have no objects of its own, but would have to take them from intuition. So just as the *Transcendental Aesthetic* proves an a priori foundation of mathematics, there would have to be one for logic too; and then the former would get a symmetrical counterpart in a *transcendental logic*. From then on Kant was no longer unbiased, no longer in the state of pure inquiring and observing what is present in consciousness. He was led by a presupposition and pursued an aim, namely to find what he presupposed, in order to set on the so happily discovered Transcendental Aesthetic, as a second story, a transcendental logic analogous to it, and so corresponding to it symmetrically. For this he hit upon the table of judgments, from which he formed, as well as it would go, the *table of categories*, the teaching of twelve pure *concepts* a priori, which were to be the condition of our *thinking* of those same *things* whose *intuition* is conditioned a priori by the two forms of sensibility. So now a *pure understanding* corresponded symmetrically to *pure sensibility*. After this he fell upon one more consideration, which offered him a means to increase the plausibility of the matter, by assuming the *schematism* of the pure concepts of the understanding. But this is exactly where the course of his procedure, of which he himself was unaware, betrays itself most clearly. For as he set out to find an analogous a priori element for every

empirical function of the faculty of knowledge, he noticed that between our empirical intuiting and our empirical thinking, which is carried out in abstract, non-intuitive concepts, there often takes place (not always, but very often) a mediation. For now and then we try to go back from abstract thinking to intuiting. But we only try, really in order to convince ourselves that our abstract thinking has not moved far from the safe ground of intuition, and has not perhaps soared over it, or become mere word-mongering; roughly as we, walking in the dark, now and then reach for the guiding wall. Then we go back to intuiting, again only tentatively and for a moment, by calling up in the imagination an intuition corresponding to the concept that is occupying us just then. This intuition can never be wholly adequate to the concept, but is a mere temporary representative of it. On this I have already supplied what is needed in my treatise "On the Principle of Sufficient Reason," §. 28. Kant calls a fleeting phantasm of this kind, as opposed to the finished image of the imagination, a schema; he says it is, as it were, a monogram of the imagination. He now claims that, just as such a schema stands in the middle between our abstract thinking of empirically acquired concepts and our clear intuition through the senses, there are likewise between the a priori faculty of intuition of pure sensibility and the a priori faculty of thinking of pure understanding (that is, the categories) such schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding a priori. These schemata, as monograms of the pure imagination a priori, he describes piece by piece and assigns each of them to its corresponding category, in the odd "chapter on the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding." That chapter is famous as extremely obscure, because no one has ever been able to make sense of it. Its obscurity clears up, however, when one looks at it from the standpoint given here. From this standpoint the deliberateness of his procedure, and the resolution he had formed in advance to find what would correspond by analogy and could serve architectonic symmetry, come to light more than anywhere else; indeed, this is so here to a degree that brings the matter close to the comic. For in assuming schemata of the pure (contentless) concepts of the understanding a priori (categories) analogous to the empirical schemata (or representatives of our real concepts through the imagination), he overlooks

that the purpose of such schemata falls away here entirely. For the purpose of schemata in empirical (real) thinking relates solely to the material content of such concepts. Since these are abstracted from empirical intuition, we help and orient ourselves, in abstract thinking, by taking now and then a fleeting look back to the intuition from which the concepts were taken, to make sure that our thinking still has real content. But this necessarily presupposes that the concepts occupying us arose from intuition, and is a mere looking back at their material content, indeed a mere aid for our weakness. But with concepts a priori, which have no content at all yet, something like this evidently drops out necessarily. For they did not arise from intuition, but come to meet it from within, in order to receive a content from it first, so they have nothing yet to look back on. I am going on at length here because this very point throws light on the secret course of Kant's philosophizing. That course consists in this: after the happy discovery of the two forms of intuition a priori, Kant now, guided by analogy, strives to show for every determination of our empirical knowledge an a priori analogue. At last, in the schemata, he extends this even to a merely psychological fact. In this the apparent profundity and the difficulty of the presentation serve precisely to hide from the reader that its content remains a wholly unprovable and merely arbitrary assumption. But whoever finally penetrates the sense of such a presentation is then easily led to take this hard-won understanding for conviction of the truth of the matter. If, on the other hand, Kant had here too, as in the discovery of the intuitions a priori, behaved without bias and as a pure observer, he would have found that what is added to the pure intuition of space and time, when an empirical one is made out of it, is on the one hand sensation and on the other the knowledge of causality. This knowledge turns mere sensation into objective empirical intuition, and just for that reason is not first borrowed and learned from the latter, but is present a priori and is just the form and function of the pure understanding. It is also its sole function, yet one so rich in consequences that all our empirical knowledge rests on it.—If, as has often been said, the refutation of an error is complete only when one shows psychologically how it arose, then I believe I have done this above with respect to Kant's teaching on the categories and their schemata.

Having brought such big faults into the first simple basic outlines of a theory of the faculty of representation, Kant fell into many highly complicated assumptions. First among these is the synthetic unity of apperception: a very odd thing, very oddly presented. "The *I think* must be able to accompany all my representations." Must—be able: this is a problematic-apodictic enunciation; in plain words, a proposition that takes with one hand what it gives with the other. And what is the sense of this proposition, balanced so on the tip? That all representing is a thinking?—That is not so, and it would be disastrous; there would then be nothing but abstract concepts, and least of all a pure intuition free of reflection and will, such as that of the beautiful, the deepest grasp of the true nature of things, that is, of their Platonic Ideas. The animals too would then have to either think as well, or not even represent.—Or is the proposition perhaps supposed to mean: no object without a subject? That would be very badly expressed this way and would come too late. If we put Kant's statements together, we will find that what he understands by the synthetic unity of apperception is, as it were, the extensionless center of the sphere of all our representations, whose radii converge on it. It is what I call the subject of knowing, the correlate of all representations, and is at the same time what I described and discussed in detail, in chapter 22 of the second volume, as the focal point in which the rays of the brain's activity converge. I therefore refer there, so as not to repeat myself.

That I reject the whole doctrine of the categories and count it among the groundless assumptions with which Kant burdened the theory of knowing follows from the criticism of it given above; likewise from the demonstration of the contradictions in transcendental logic, which had their ground in the mixing of intuitive and abstract knowledge; and further from the demonstration of the lack of a clear and definite concept of the essence of understanding and reason, in place of which we found in Kant's writings only disconnected, inconsistent, meager and incorrect statements about those two powers of mind. Finally it follows from the explanations that I myself gave of the same powers of mind, in the first book and its Supplements, and in more detail in the treatise "On the Principle of Sufficient Reason," §. 21, 26 and 34. Those explanations are very

definite and clear, plainly result from looking at the nature of our knowledge, and agree fully with the concepts of those two powers of knowing that show themselves in the usage and writings of all times and peoples, though never brought to clarity. The defense of them against the very different Kantian account is for the most part already given by uncovering the faults of that account.—But since the table of judgments, which Kant lays at the bottom of his theory of thinking, indeed of his whole philosophy, is in itself, on the whole, correct, it remains for me to show how these general forms of all judgments arise in our faculty of knowledge, and to bring them into agreement with my account of it.—In this discussion I will always attach to the concepts understanding and reason the sense that my explanation gave them, which I therefore assume the reader is familiar with.

An essential difference between Kant's method and the one I follow lies in this: he starts from mediate, reflected knowledge, I from immediate, intuitive knowledge. He can be compared to a person who measures the height of a tower from its shadow, and I to one who lays the measuring rod directly against it. So for him philosophy is a science from concepts, for me a science in concepts, drawn from intuitive knowledge, the only source of all evidence, and put into general concepts and fixed there. This whole intuitive, many-formed world around us, rich in meaning, he jumps over, and keeps to the forms of abstract thinking. Underlying this, though he never says it, is the assumption that reflection is the copy of all intuition, so that everything essential in intuition must be expressed in reflection, and in very compressed forms and basic features that are therefore easy to survey. According to this, what is essential and law-governed in abstract knowing would put into our hands all the strings that set the colorful puppet play of the intuitive world in motion before our eyes.—If Kant had only stated this highest principle of his method clearly, and then followed it consistently, he would at least have had to separate the intuitive from the abstract cleanly, and we would not have to struggle with insoluble contradictions and confusions. But from the way he solved his task, one sees that this principle of his method hovered before him only very indistinctly; so even after thorough study of his philosophy one still has to guess it first.

As for the method and basic maxim themselves, they have much in their favor, and the thought is a brilliant one. The essence of all science already consists in this: we gather the endlessly manifold intuitive appearances under comparatively few abstract concepts, from which we arrange a system. From this system we have all those appearances fully in the power of our knowledge, and can explain what has happened and determine what is to come. The sciences, however, divide among themselves the wide domain of appearances, according to the particular, manifold kinds of the latter.

Now it was a bold and happy thought to isolate what is absolutely essential to concepts as such, apart from their content, in order to see from the forms of all thinking found in this way what is also essential to all intuitive knowing, and so to the world as appearance in general. And because this would be found a priori, owing to the necessity of those forms of thinking, it would be of subjective origin, and would lead exactly to Kant's aims.—But before going further, it should have been investigated what the relation of reflection to intuitive knowledge is (which of course presupposes the clean separation of the two that Kant neglected). It should have been investigated in what way reflection really reproduces and represents intuitive knowledge: whether quite purely, or already changed and partly made unrecognizable by being taken into its own (reflection's) forms. It should also have been asked whether the form of abstract, reflective knowledge is determined more by the form of intuitive knowledge, or by the nature that inseparably clings to reflective knowledge itself. In the latter case, even what is very heterogeneous in intuitive knowledge can no longer be told apart once it has entered reflective knowledge; and conversely some differences that we notice in the reflective mode of knowledge also arose from that mode itself, and by no means point to corresponding differences in intuitive knowledge. The result of this research would have been that intuitive knowledge, on being taken into reflection, suffers almost as much change as food on being taken into the animal organism, whose forms and mixtures are determined by the organism itself, and from whose composition the nature of the food can no longer be recognized at all;—or (because that says a little too much) at least it would have turned out that reflection stands to intuitive

knowledge not at all like the mirror image in water to the mirrored objects, but hardly even like the shadow of these objects to the objects themselves. This shadow reproduces only a few outer outlines, but also unites the most manifold in the same shape and represents the most different by the same outline; so that by no means could the shapes of things be constructed completely and surely starting from it.

The whole of reflective knowledge, or reason, has only one main form, and that is the abstract concept. It is peculiar to reason itself and has directly no necessary connection with the intuitive world. That world therefore exists for animals entirely without it, and could also be quite different, and yet that form of reflection would fit it just as well. The uniting of concepts into judgments, however, has certain definite and lawful forms, which, found by induction, make up the table of judgments. These forms are for the most part to be derived from the reflective mode of knowing itself, that is, directly from reason, namely insofar as they arise through the four laws of thought (called by me metalogical truths) and through the *dictum de omni et nullo*. Others of these forms, however, have their ground in the intuitive mode of knowing, that is, in the understanding. But they do not at all give notice of just as many special forms of the understanding; rather they are to be derived wholly from the single function the understanding has, namely the immediate knowledge of cause and effect. Still others of those forms, finally, arose from the meeting and joining of the reflective and the intuitive modes of knowing, or really from the taking up of the latter into the former. I will now go through the moments of judgment one by one and show the origin of each from the sources named. From this it follows by itself that a deduction of categories from them drops out, and that the assumption of the categories is as groundless as their presentation has been found confused and self-contradictory.

1) The so-called quantity of judgments arises from the nature of concepts as such. Its ground therefore lies solely in reason, and it has no immediate connection at all with the understanding and intuitive knowledge.—For as explained in the first book, it is essential to concepts as such that they have an extent, a sphere, and that the wider, less determinate concept includes the narrower,

more determinate one. The latter can therefore also be singled out. This can happen in either of two ways: one can mark it merely as an indeterminate part of the wider concept in general, or one can determine it and set it off completely by giving it a special name. The judgment that carries out this operation is called particular in the first case, universal in the second. For example, one and the same part of the sphere of the concept tree can be isolated by a particular and by a universal judgment, namely "Some trees bear gallnuts," or: "All oaks bear gallnuts."—One sees that the difference between the two operations is very small, and that the possibility of it depends on the richness of the language in words. Nevertheless Kant declared that this difference reveals two fundamentally different acts, functions, categories of the pure understanding, which by just these determines experience a priori.

Finally one can also use a concept to arrive by means of it at a determinate, individual, intuitive representation, from which it was itself abstracted, along with many others. This happens through the singular judgment. Such a judgment marks only the border between abstract and intuitive knowledge, to which it passes directly: "This tree here bears gallnuts."—Kant has made a special category out of this too.

After all that has gone before, no further polemic is needed here.

2) In the same way the quality of judgments lies entirely within the domain of reason. It is not a shadow of any law of the understanding that makes intuition possible; that is, it gives no pointer to such a law. The nature of abstract concepts, which is just the essence of reason itself grasped objectively, carries with it, as also explained in the first book, the possibility of uniting and separating their spheres. On this possibility, as their presupposition, rest the general laws of thought, of identity and of contradiction. Because they spring purely from reason and cannot be explained further, I have ascribed to them metalogical truth. They determine that what is united must stay united, what is separated must stay separated, so that what has been posited cannot at the same time be canceled again. So they presuppose the possibility of joining and separating spheres, that is, judging itself. This, however, as to its form, lies solely and only in reason, and this form is not carried over from the intuitive knowledge of the

understanding, as the content of judgments is; so no correlate or analogue for it is to be sought there. After intuition has come into being through the understanding and for the understanding, it stands there complete, subject neither to doubt nor to error, and so knows neither affirmation nor negation. For it speaks for itself, and does not, like the abstract knowledge of reason, have its value and content merely in relation to something outside it, according to the principle of sufficient reason of knowing. It is therefore all reality; all negation is foreign to its nature. Negation can be added in thought only by reflection, but for that very reason always stays in the domain of abstract thinking.

To the affirmative and negative judgments Kant adds, borrowing a whim of the old scholastics, the infinite ones. This is a subtly contrived stopgap that does not even need discussing, a blind window, like the many that he has put in for the sake of his symmetrical architectonic.

3) Under the very wide concept of relation Kant has put together three quite different kinds of judgments, which we therefore must examine one by one in order to see their origin. a) The hypothetical judgment in general is the abstract expression of that most general form of all our knowledge, the principle of sufficient reason. That this has four quite different meanings, and in each of them has its root in a different power of knowledge, and also concerns a different class of representations, I showed as early as 1813, in my treatise on it. From this it follows sufficiently that the origin of the hypothetical judgment in general, this general form of thought, cannot be merely, as Kant wants, the understanding and its category of causality. Rather the law of causality, which according to my account is the only form of knowledge of the pure understanding, is only one of the shapes of the principle of sufficient reason, which embraces all pure or a priori knowledge. And the principle of sufficient reason, in each of its meanings, has this hypothetical form of judgment as its expression.—We see quite clearly here how kinds of knowledge that are entirely different in origin and meaning nevertheless appear in one and the same form of joining of concepts and judgments when thought by reason in abstracto, and then can no longer be told apart in this form. To tell them apart one has to go back to intuitive knowledge, leaving the abstract altogether. So the path Kant took, of try-

ing to find from the standpoint of abstract knowledge the elements and innermost workings even of intuitive knowledge, was thoroughly wrong. Incidentally, my whole introductory treatise "On the Principle of Sufficient Reason" can in a way be regarded as only a thorough discussion of the meaning of the hypothetical form of judgment; so I do not dwell on it further here. b) The form of the categorical judgment is nothing other than the form of judgment in general in the strictest sense. For strictly speaking, judging means only thinking the combination, or the incompatibility, of the spheres of concepts. So the hypothetical and the disjunctive combination are not really special forms of judgment. They are applied only to judgments already finished, in which the combination of the concepts remains unchanged the categorical one; they in turn connect these judgments, the hypothetical form expressing their dependence on each other, the disjunctive their incompatibility. Mere concepts, however, have only one kind of relation to each other, namely the one expressed in the categorical judgment. The closer determination, or the subspecies, of this relation are the overlapping and the complete separation of the concept spheres, that is, affirmation and negation. From these Kant made special categories under a quite different title, that of quality. Overlapping and separation again have subspecies, depending on whether the spheres overlap wholly or only in part, which determination makes up the quantity of judgments. From this Kant again made a quite special category title. So he separated what is very closely related, indeed identical, the easily surveyed modifications of the only possible relations of mere concepts to each other, and united under the title of relation, on the other hand, what is very different.

Categorical judgments have as their metalogical principle the laws of thought of identity and of contradiction. But the ground for connecting concept spheres, which gives truth to the judgment that is just this connection, can be of very different kinds. According to it the truth of the judgment is then logical, or empirical, or metaphysical, or metalogical, as set out in the introductory treatise, §. 30–33, and need not be repeated here. From this it follows how very different the immediate cognitions can be that all present themselves in abstracto through the connection of the spheres of two concepts as subject and

predicate, and that one can by no means put forward a single function of the understanding as corresponding to them and producing them. For example the judgments: "the water boils; the sine measures the angle; the will decides; occupation distracts; the distinction is difficult" express by the same logical form the most various kinds of relations. From this we get once more confirmation of how wrong it is, in order to analyze immediate, intuitive knowledge, to take one's stand on the standpoint of the abstract.—Incidentally, the categorical judgment arises from a real knowledge of the understanding, in my sense, only where a causality is expressed by it; but this is the case also with all judgments that mark a physical quality. For when I say: "this body is heavy, hard, fluid, green, sour, alkaline, organic, and so on," this always marks its action, and so a knowledge that is possible only through the pure understanding. Now after this knowledge, just like many quite different from it (for example the subordination of highly abstract concepts), has been expressed in abstracto by subject and predicate, people have carried these mere relations of concepts back over to intuitive knowledge, and have supposed that the subject and predicate of the judgment must have in intuition a proper, special correlate, substance and accident. But I will make clear below that the concept substance has no other true content than that of the concept matter. Accidents, however, are exactly equivalent to modes of action, so that the supposed knowledge of substance and accident is still that of the pure understanding of cause and effect. How the representation of matter actually arises is discussed partly in our first book, §. 4, and more accessibly in the treatise "On the Principle of Sufficient Reason," at the end of §. 21, p. 77; partly we will see it still more closely in the examination of the principle that substance persists. c) Disjunctive judgments arise from the law of thought of the excluded middle, which is a metalogical truth. They are therefore entirely the property of pure reason, and do not have their origin in the understanding. The derivation of the category of community or reciprocity from them is, however, a quite glaring example of the acts of violence that Kant sometimes permits himself against the truth, merely to satisfy his pleasure in architectonic symmetry. The untenability of that derivation has often been rightly criticized and shown on several grounds, especially by G. E. Schulze in

his "Critique of Theoretical Philosophy" and by Berg in his "Epicritique of Philosophy."—What real analogy is there between the left-open determination of a concept by mutually exclusive predicates, and the thought of reciprocity? The two are even quite opposite, since in the disjunctive judgment the actual positing of one of the two members of the division is at the same time a necessary canceling of the other; whereas if one thinks two things in the relation of reciprocity, the positing of the one is a necessary positing of the other as well, and vice versa. The real logical analogue of reciprocity is therefore undeniably the circulus vitiosus, in which, just as supposedly in reciprocity, the grounded is also in turn the ground, and conversely. And just as logic rejects the circulus vitiosus, the concept of reciprocity too must be banished from metaphysics. For I am quite seriously resolved to show now that there is no reciprocity in the proper sense at all, and that this concept, however popular its use is, precisely because of the indefiniteness of the thought, shows itself on closer examination to be empty, false and void. First remember what causality is in general, and for help see my account of it in the introductory treatise, §. 20, also in my prize essay on the freedom of the will, chap. 3, p. 27 ff., and finally in the fourth chapter of our second volume. Causality is the law according to which the states of matter that occur determine their place in time. Causality is concerned only with states, indeed really only with changes, and neither with matter as such nor with persisting without change. Matter as such does not stand under the law of causality, since it neither comes to be nor passes away. So the whole thing, as people usually say, does not stand under it either, but only the states of matter. Further, the law of causality has nothing to do with persistence: for where nothing changes there is no action and no causality, but a lasting state of rest. If such a state is changed, then either the newly arisen one is again lasting, or it is not, but at once brings about a third state. The necessity with which this happens is exactly the law of causality, which is a shape of the principle of sufficient reason and so cannot be explained further, because the principle of sufficient reason is just the principle of all explanation and all necessity. From this it is clear that being cause and being effect stand in exact connection and necessary relation with the sequence of time. Only insofar as the state A precedes the

state B in time, and their succession is a necessary and not a contingent one, that is, no mere following after but a following from;—only so far is the state A cause and the state B effect. The concept of reciprocity, however, contains this: that both are cause and both effect of each other. But this means just as much as that each of the two is the earlier and also the later: so a non-thought. For that both states are at the same time, and indeed necessarily at the same time, cannot be assumed: because as necessarily belonging together and being at the same time they make up only one state. For this state to persist, the lasting presence of all its determinations is indeed required. But then there is no longer any talk of change and causality, but of duration and rest, and nothing more is said than that if one determination of the whole state is changed, the new state thereby arising cannot last, but becomes the cause of change in all the other determinations of the first state too, whereby again a new, third state occurs. All this happens only according to the simple law of causality and does not found a new one, that of reciprocity.

I also assert flatly that the concept of reciprocity cannot be backed up by a single example. Everything one might offer for it is either a state of rest, to which the concept of causality, which has meaning only for changes, finds no application at all, or it is an alternating succession of like-named states that condition one another, for whose explanation simple causality is entirely enough. An example of the first kind is given by the scale brought to rest by equal weights. Here there is no action at all, for there is no change; it is a state of rest. Gravity pulls, evenly distributed, as in every body supported at its center of gravity, but cannot show its force through any effect. That the removal of one weight gives a second state, which at once becomes the cause of the third, the sinking of the other pan, happens according to the simple law of cause and effect and needs no special category of the understanding, not even a special name. An example of the other kind is the continued burning of a fire. The combination of oxygen with the combustible body is the cause of heat, and this is in turn the cause of the renewed occurrence of that chemical combination. But this is nothing other than a chain of causes and effects whose links are alternately like-named: the burning A produces free heat B, this a new burning C (that is, a new effect

that is like-named with the cause A, but not individually the same), this a new heat D (which is not really identical with the effect B, but the same only in concept, that is, like-named with it), and so on forever. A neat example of what is called reciprocity in ordinary life is supplied by a theory of deserts given by Humboldt (*Views of Nature*, second edition, vol. 2, p. 79). It does not rain in sandy deserts, but it does on the wooded mountains bordering them. The cause is not the attraction of the mountains on the clouds; rather the column of heated air rising from the sandy plain keeps the vapor bubbles from breaking down and drives the clouds up high.

In the mountains the vertically rising air current is weaker, the clouds sink, and the precipitation falls in the cooler air. So the lack of rain and the lack of plants in the desert stand in reciprocity: it does not rain because the heated sand surface radiates more heat; the desert does not become steppe or grassland because it does not rain. But evidently here again, as in the example above, we have only a succession of like-named causes and effects, and nothing at all essentially different from simple causality. The swinging of the pendulum is just the same, and so is the self-preservation of the organic body. There too every state brings on a new one that is the same in kind as the one by which it was itself brought about, but is individually a new one. Only here the matter is more complicated, since the chain consists no longer of links of two kinds but of links of many kinds, so that a like-named link returns only after several others have come between. But always we see before us only an application of the single and simple law of causality, which gives the rule to the sequence of states, and not anything that would have to be grasped by a new and special function of the understanding.

Or perhaps someone might even cite, as proof for the concept of reciprocity, that action and reaction are equal? But that lies in just what I insist on so strongly and showed in detail in the Treatise on the Principle of Sufficient Reason: cause and effect are not two bodies but two successive states of bodies. So each of the two states also implies all the bodies involved, and the effect, that is, the newly occurring state, for example in a collision, extends to both bodies in the same proportion. As much as the body that is struck is changed, just as

much is the striking body changed (each in proportion to its mass and velocity). If one likes to call this reciprocity, then absolutely every effect is reciprocity, and for that reason no new concept enters, still less a new function of the understanding, but we merely have a superfluous synonym of causality. Kant, however, states this view outright, thoughtlessly, in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, where the proof of the fourth theorem of mechanics begins: "all external action in the world is reciprocal action." How then can different functions a priori lie in the understanding for simple causality and for reciprocity, so that even the real succession of things is possible and knowable only through the former, and their simultaneity only through the latter? According to that, if every effect is reciprocity, succession and simultaneity would also be the same, and hence everything in the world would be simultaneous.—If there were true reciprocity, then the perpetuum mobile would also be possible and even certain a priori. Rather, the assertion that it is impossible rests on the a priori conviction that there is no true reciprocity and no form of the understanding for it.

Aristotle too denies reciprocity in the proper sense. For he notes that two things can indeed be causes of each other, but only in such a way that this is understood in a different sense for each. For example, one acts on the other as a motive, but the latter acts on the former as the cause of its movement. We find the same words in two places: Physic., Lib. II, c. 3, and Metaph., Lib. V, c. 2. Εστι δε τινα και αλληλων αιτια· οιον το πονειν αιτιον της ευεξιας, και αυτη του πονειν· αλλ' ου τον αυτον τροπον, αλλα το μεν ως τελος, το δε ως αρχη κινησεως. (Sunt praeterea quae sibi sunt mutuo causae, ut exercitium bonae habitudinis, et haec exercitii: at non eodem modo, sed haec ut finis, illud ut principium motus.) If he assumed in addition a real reciprocity, he would list it here, since in both places he is busy enumerating all possible kinds of causes. In the Analyt. post., Lib. II, c. 11, he speaks of a circle of causes and effects, but not of reciprocity.

4) The categories of modality have, over all the rest, the advantage that what is expressed by each of them really does correspond to the judgment form from which it is derived. This is almost never the case with the other categories,

which are mostly deduced out of the judgment forms by the most arbitrary force.

That the concepts of the possible, the actual and the necessary are what give rise to the problematic, assertoric and apodictic form of judgment is perfectly true. But that those concepts are special, original forms of knowing of the understanding, not derivable any further, is not true. Rather they come from the one original form of all knowing, which is therefore known to us a priori: the principle of sufficient reason. And the knowledge of necessity comes directly from it; the concepts of contingency, possibility, impossibility, actuality, on the other hand, arise only when reflection is applied to this. All of these therefore by no means have their root in one power of mind, the understanding, but arise through the conflict of abstract knowing with intuitive knowing, as will be seen at once.

I claim that being necessary and following from a given ground are entirely interchangeable concepts and completely identical. We can never know something as necessary, or even think it so, except insofar as we regard it as the consequence of a given ground. The concept of necessity contains absolutely nothing beyond this dependence, this being posited by another, and this unfailing following from it. So it arises and exists solely through the application of the principle of sufficient reason. Therefore, according to the different forms of this principle, there is a physically necessary (the effect from the cause), a logically necessary (through the ground of knowing, in analytic judgments, inferences, and so on), a mathematically necessary (according to the ground of being in space and time), and finally a practically necessary. By this last we do not mean being determined by a supposed categorical imperative, but the action that necessarily occurs, given the empirical character, according to the motives present.—But everything necessary is so only relatively, namely on the presupposition of the ground from which it follows. Absolute necessity is therefore a contradiction.—For the rest I refer to §. 49 of the Treatise on the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

The contradictory opposite, that is, the negation of necessity, is contingency. The content of this concept is therefore negative, namely nothing more than this: the lack of the connection expressed by the principle of sufficient reason. Consequently the contingent too is always only relative: it is such in relation to something that is not its ground. Every object, of whatever kind, for example every event in the real world, is always necessary and contingent at once: necessary in relation to the one thing that is its cause; contingent in relation to everything else. For its contact in time and space with everything else is a mere coincidence, without necessary connection; hence also the words chance, συμπτωμα, contingens. So an absolutely contingent is no more thinkable than an absolutely necessary. For the former would be an object that stood to no other in the relation of consequent to ground. But the unrepresentability of such a thing is exactly the content, expressed negatively, of the principle of sufficient reason, which would therefore first have to be overturned in order to think an absolutely contingent. But then this itself would also have lost all meaning, since the concept of the contingent has meaning only in relation to that principle, and means that two objects do not stand to each other in the relation of ground and consequent.

In nature, insofar as it is intuitive representation, everything that happens is necessary: for it arises from its cause. But if we consider this single thing in relation to the rest, which is not its cause, then we know it as contingent. This, however, is already an abstract reflection. If we now abstract further, in an object of nature, entirely from its causal relation to the rest, and so from its necessity and contingency, then this kind of knowledge is covered by the concept of the actual. With this one considers only the effect, without looking around for the cause, in relation to which one would otherwise have to call it necessary, and in relation to everything else contingent. All this rests in the end on the fact that the modality of judgment marks not so much the objective nature of things as the relation of our knowledge to them. But since in nature everything arises from a cause, every actual thing is also necessary; but again only insofar as it is at this time, in this place: for only to that does the determination by the law of causality extend. If we leave intuitive nature, though, and

pass over to abstract thinking, we can in reflection represent to ourselves all the laws of nature, known to us partly a priori, partly only a posteriori. This abstract representation contains everything that is in nature at any time, in any place, but with abstraction from every determinate place and time. And by this, by such reflection, we have entered the wide realm of possibility. But what finds no place even here is the impossible. It is evident that possibility and impossibility exist only for reflection, for the abstract knowledge of reason, not for intuitive knowledge; although it is the pure forms of the latter that supply reason with the determination of the possible and the impossible. Depending on whether the laws of nature from which we start in thinking the possible and the impossible are known a priori or a posteriori, the possibility or impossibility is a metaphysical or only a physical one.

From this account, which needs no proof because it rests directly on the knowledge of the principle of sufficient reason and on the development of the concepts of the necessary, the actual, and the possible, it is sufficiently clear how entirely groundless Kant's assumption is of three special functions of the understanding for those three concepts, and that here again no scruple has disturbed him in carrying out his architectonic symmetry.

To this, however, is added the very great fault that he, admittedly following earlier philosophy, has confused the concepts of the necessary and the contingent with each other.

That earlier philosophy, namely, made the following misuse of abstraction. It was evident that whatever has its ground posited follows unfailingly, that is, cannot not be, and so is necessary. But people held on to this last determination alone, and said: necessary is what cannot be otherwise, or whose opposite is impossible. They neglected the ground and root of such necessity, overlooked the relativity of all necessity that results from it, and so made the quite unthinkable fiction of an *absolutely necessary*, that is, of a something whose existence would be as unfailing as the consequence from the ground, but which would still not be a consequence from a ground and would therefore depend on nothing. This addition is just an absurd petition, because it conflicts with the principle of sufficient reason. Starting from this fiction, people then declared, diamet-

rically opposed to the truth, everything that is posited by a ground to be the contingent. They looked, that is, to the relative character of its necessity and compared this with that *absolute* necessity, taken entirely out of the air and contradicting itself in its concept [5]. Kant too keeps this thoroughly perverted determination of the contingent and gives it as the definition: *Critique of Pure Reason*, V, pp. 289–291; 243. V, 301; 419. V, 447, 486, 488. In this he even falls into the most striking contradiction with himself, saying on p. 301: "Everything contingent has a cause," and adding: "Contingent is that whose non-being is possible." But what has a cause, whose [6] See Christian Wolf's "Rational Thoughts on God, World and Soul," §. 577–579.—It is odd that he declares contingent only what is necessary according to the principle of sufficient reason of becoming, that is, what happens from causes, whereas he also recognizes as necessary what is necessary according to the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason, for example what follows from the *essentia* (definition), so the analytic judgments, and also the mathematical truths. As the ground for this he gives that only the law of causality yields endless series, whereas the other kinds of grounds yield finite ones. This, though, is not the case at all with the forms of the principle of sufficient reason in pure space and time, but holds only of the logical ground of knowing; and mathematical necessity he took to be such a one.—Compare: Treatise on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, §. 50.

non-being is absolutely impossible: so it is necessary.—Incidentally, the origin of this whole false definition of the necessary and the contingent is to be found already in Aristotle, namely in De generatione et corruptione, Lib. II, c. 9 et 11, where the necessary is defined as that whose non-being is impossible. Opposed to it is that whose being is impossible; and between these two lies that which can be and also not be—that is, what comes to be and passes away, and this would then be the contingent. After what was said above, it is clear that this definition, like so many of Aristotle's, arose from staying with abstract concepts without going back to the concrete and intuitive, in which the source of all abstract concepts lies, and by which they must therefore always be checked. "Something whose non-being is impossible" can at any rate be thought in

abstracto; but if we go with it to the concrete, the real, the intuitive, we find nothing to back the thought, even as a possible one, except just the consequence of a given ground mentioned, whose necessity, however, is relative and conditional.

On this occasion I add a few more remarks on those concepts of modality.—Since all necessity rests on the principle of sufficient reason, and for that very reason is relative, all *apodictic* judgments are originally and in their ultimate meaning *hypothetical*. They become *categorical* only through the addition of an *assertoric* minor premise, and so in the conclusion. If this minor is still undecided, and this undecidedness is expressed, that gives the *problematic* judgment.

What is apodictic in general (as a rule) (a law of nature) is always only problematic with regard to a single case, because first the condition must actually occur that puts the case under the rule. And conversely, what is necessary (apodictic) in the individual case as such (every single change, necessary through its cause) is, stated in general and universally, again only problematic. For the cause that occurred met only the single case, and the apodictic, always hypothetical judgment always states only general laws, not individual cases directly.—All this has its ground in the fact that possibility exists only in the domain of reflection and for reason, the actual in the domain of intuition and for the understanding, and the necessary for both. Indeed the difference between necessary, actual and possible exists really only in abstracto and in concept; in the real world, on the other hand, all three fall together into one. For everything that happens, happens *necessarily*; because it happens from causes, but these themselves again have causes; so that all events of the world, great and small, are a strict chain of what necessarily occurs. Accordingly everything actual is at the same time something necessary, and in reality there is no difference between actuality and necessity; and likewise none between actuality and possibility. For what has not happened, that is, has not become actual, was also not possible; because the causes without which it could never have occurred themselves did not occur, nor could they occur, in the great chain of causes. It was therefore something impossible. Every event is accordingly either necessary or impossible. All this holds only of the empirically real world, that is, the complex of individual

things, so of the wholly individual as such. If, on the other hand, we consider things in general by means of reason, grasping them in abstracto, then necessity, actuality and possibility come apart again. We then recognize everything conforming to the laws a priori that belong to our intellect as possible in general; what corresponds to the empirical laws of nature as possible in this world, even if it never became actual; so we clearly distinguish the possible from the actual. The actual is indeed in itself always also something necessary, but is grasped as such only by him who knows its cause. Apart from this cause it is, and is called, contingent. This consideration also gives us the key to that *contentio* περι δυνατων between the Megarian Diodorus and Chrysippus the Stoic, which Cicero presents in the book *de fato*. Diodorus says: "Only what becomes actual was possible; and everything actual is also necessary."—Chrysippus, on the other hand: "Much is possible that never becomes actual; for only the necessary becomes actual."—We can explain this as follows. Actuality is the conclusion of an inference to which possibility supplies the premises. But for this not the major alone but also the minor is required: only both give full possibility. For the major gives a merely theoretical, general possibility in abstracto; but this makes nothing possible in itself, that is, capable of becoming actual. For that the minor is also needed, which gives the possibility for the individual case by bringing it under the rule. By this the case at once becomes actuality. For example:

Major. All houses (and so also my house) can burn down. Minor. My house catches fire. Conclusion. My house burns down.

For every general proposition, so every major, determines things, with regard to actuality, always only under a presupposition, and so hypothetically. For example, being able to burn down has as its presupposition catching fire. This presupposition is supplied in the minor. The major always loads the cannon; but only when the minor brings the fuse is the shot fired, the conclusion. This holds throughout of the relation of possibility to actuality. Now since the conclusion, which is the statement of actuality, always follows *necessarily*, it follows from this that everything that is actual is also necessary. This can also be seen from the fact that being necessary means only being the consequence of a given

ground; in the case of the actual this ground is a cause; so everything actual is necessary. Here we see the concepts of the possible, the actual and the necessary coincide, and not merely the last presuppose the first, but also the reverse. What keeps them apart is the limitation of our intellect by the form of time: for time is the mediator between possibility and actuality. The necessity of the single event can be fully seen through knowledge of all its causes. But the coming together of all these different causes, independent of one another, appears to us as *contingent*; indeed their independence of one another is just the concept of contingency. But since each of them was the necessary consequence of its cause, whose chain has no beginning, it turns out that contingency is a merely subjective appearance, arising from the limitation of the horizon of our understanding, and as subjective as the optical horizon in which the sky touches the earth.
Since necessity is the same as following from a given ground, it must also appear as a special kind in each form of the principle of sufficient reason, and also have its opposite in possibility and impossibility, which always arises first by applying the abstract consideration of reason to the object. So the four kinds of necessity mentioned above are matched by just as many kinds of impossibility: physical, logical, mathematical, practical. It may also be noted that if one stays wholly within the domain of abstract concepts, possibility always attaches to the more general concept, necessity to the narrower: for example "an animal *can* be a bird, fish, amphibian, and so on"—"a nightingale *must* be a bird, this an animal, this an organism, this a body."—Really because logical necessity, whose expression is the syllogism, goes from the general to the particular and never the reverse.—In intuitive nature, on the other hand (the representations of the first class), really everything is necessary, through the law of causality. Only reflection, coming in, can grasp it at the same time as contingent, by comparing it with what is not its cause, and also as merely and purely actual, by disregarding all causal connection. Only in this class of representations does the concept of the *actual* really apply, as the derivation of the word from the concept of causality already shows.—In the third class of representations, pure mathematical intuition, if one stays wholly within it, there is nothing but necessity. Possibility arises here too only by relation to concepts of reflection:

for example "a triangle *can* be right-angled, obtuse-angled, equiangular; it *must* have three angles that add up to two right angles." So here one arrives at the *possible* only by passing from the intuitive to the abstract.

After this account, which presupposes memory of what was said both in the Treatise on the Principle of Sufficient Reason and in the first book of the present work, there will hopefully be no more doubt about the true and very varied origin of those forms of judgment that the table sets before the eyes, nor about the inadmissibility and total groundlessness of the assumption of twelve special functions of the understanding to explain them. Of this latter point some individual and very easily made remarks already give notice. For example, it takes great love of symmetry and much trust in a guide taken from it to assume that an affirmative, a categorical and an assertoric judgment are three things so fundamentally different that they entitle one to assume a quite peculiar function of the understanding for each of them.

Kant himself betrays his consciousness of the untenability of his doctrine of categories by omitting, in the second edition, several long passages of the first edition (namely pp. 241, 242, 244–246, 248–253) in the third chapter of the Analysis of Principles (phaenomena et noumena). These passages laid the weakness of that doctrine bare too openly. For example he says there, p. 241, that he has not defined the individual categories because he could not define them even if he had wanted to, since they admit of no definition.—Here he had forgotten that he had said on p. 82 of the same first edition: "I deliberately spare myself the definition of the categories, although I may well be in possession of it."—So this was, sit venia verbo, wind. He did, however, let this last passage stand. And so all those passages he wisely left out afterwards betray that nothing clear can be thought in connection with the categories and that this whole doctrine stands on weak feet.

This table of categories is now supposed to be the guide according to which every metaphysical, indeed every scientific consideration is to be carried out. (Prolegomena, §. 39.) And in fact it is not only the foundation of the whole Kantian philosophy and the type according to which its symmetry is carried out everywhere, as I have already shown above; it has also truly become the bed

of Procrustes, into which Kant squeezes every possible consideration, by an act of violence that I will now examine somewhat more closely. What lengths the *imitatores, servum pecus*, must have gone to on such an occasion! One has seen it. That violence, then, is exercised by setting aside and forgetting entirely the meaning of the expressions that name the titles, forms of judgments and categories, and holding only to these expressions themselves. In part these have their origin in Aristotle's Analyt. priora, I, 23 (περι ποιοτητος και ποσοτητος των του συλλογισμου ὁρων: de qualitate et quantitate terminorum syllogismi), but are chosen arbitrarily; for the extent of concepts could well have been marked otherwise than by the word *quantity*, although this word fits its subject better than the other titles of the categories do. Even the word *quality* was evidently chosen only from the habit of setting quality against quantity; for the name quality is seized on quite arbitrarily enough for affirmation and negation. Now Kant, in every consideration he makes, brings every quantity in time and space, and every possible quality of things, physical, moral and so on, under those titles of categories, although between these things and those titles of the forms of judging and thinking there is not the least thing in common except the accidental, arbitrary name. One must keep in mind all the respect one otherwise owes Kant in order not to express one's displeasure at this procedure in harsh terms.—The next example is supplied at once by the pure physiological table of general principles of natural science. What on earth has the quantity of judgments to do with the fact that every intuition has an extensive magnitude? What has the quality of judgments to do with the fact that every sensation has a degree?—The former rests rather on the fact that space is the form of our outer intuition, and the latter is nothing more than an empirical and moreover wholly subjective perception, drawn merely from considering the nature of our sense organs.—Further, in the table that lays the ground for rational psychology (*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 344; V, 402), the *simplicity* of the soul is listed under quality. But this is precisely a quantitative property, and has no relation at all to affirmation or negation in judgment. Yet quantity was supposed to be filled by the *unity* of the soul, which is already contained in simplicity. Then modality is squeezed in, in a ridiculous way: the soul stands, namely, in relation

to *possible* objects. But relation belongs to Relation, and that is already occupied by substance. Then the four cosmological Ideas, which are the material of the antinomies, are traced back to the titles of the categories; for more on this see below, in the examination of these antinomies. Several examples, if possible still more glaring, are supplied by the table of the *categories of freedom!* in the *Critique of Practical Reason*;—further, in the *Critique of Judgment*, the first book, which goes through the judgment of taste according to the four titles of the categories; and finally the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, which are cut entirely to the table of categories, by which perhaps the false element, mixed here and there into the true and excellent of this important work, was mainly caused. Just look at the end of the first chapter, at how the unity, plurality, totality of the directions of lines is supposed to correspond to the categories named in this way after the quantity of judgments.

—The principle of the *permanence of substance* is derived from the category of substance and inherence. But we know this category only from the form of categorical judgments, that is, from the joining of two concepts as subject and predicate. So this great metaphysical principle is made to depend, by sheer force, on a simple, purely logical form! But that was done only for form's sake and for symmetry. The proof given here for the principle sets aside its supposed origin in the understanding and in the category altogether, and is drawn from the pure intuition of time. But this proof is entirely wrong too. It is false that in mere time there is *simultaneity* and *duration*. These representations arise only from the union of *space* with time, as I have already shown in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, §. 18, and as I have explained further in §. 4 of the present work. I have to assume both discussions for what follows to be understood. It is false that time itself *stays* through all change. On the contrary, time itself is exactly the thing that flows. A time that stays is a contradiction. Kant's proof cannot be defended, however much he has propped it up with sophistries. In fact he falls into the most obvious contradiction in doing so. First he wrongly sets up *being at the same time* as a mode of time (p. 177; V, 219). Then he says, quite correctly (p. 183; V, 226): "Being at the same time is not a mode of time, since in time no parts are at the same time, but all are one

after another."—In truth space is implied in being at the same time just as much as time is. For if two things are at the same time and yet are not one thing, they differ through space. If two states of *one* thing are at the same time (for example the glow and the heat of iron), they are two simultaneous effects of *one thing*. So they presuppose matter, and matter presupposes space. Strictly speaking, being at the same time is a negative determination. It says only that two things or states are not different through time, so their difference has to be sought somewhere else.—Still, our knowledge of the permanence of substance, that is, of matter, certainly must rest on an insight a priori. It is beyond all doubt, so it cannot have been drawn from experience. I derive it from this: the principle of all becoming and passing away, the law of causality, of which we are conscious a priori, essentially concerns only the *changes*, that is, the successive *states* of matter. So it is limited to form and leaves *matter* untouched. In our consciousness, then, matter stands as the foundation of all things that is subject to no becoming or passing away, and so has always been there and will always remain. A deeper ground for the permanence of substance, drawn from an analysis of our intuitive representation of the empirical world as a whole, is found in our first book, §. 4. There it was shown that the essence of *matter* consists in the complete *union of space and time*. This union is possible only by means of the representation of causality, and so only for the understanding, which is nothing but the subjective correlate of causality. For this reason matter is never known except as acting, that is, through and through as causality. In matter, being and acting are one, as the German word for reality, *Wirklichkeit*, already indicates by its link to *wirken*, "to act." The close union of space and time, causality, matter, reality: these are therefore one thing, and the subjective correlate of this one thing is the understanding. Matter has to carry the conflicting properties of the two factors it comes from. It is the representation of causality that removes the conflict between them and makes their existing together comprehensible to the understanding. Matter exists only through and for the understanding, and the understanding's whole power consists in knowing cause and effect. So for the understanding, the unstable flow of time, appearing as the change of accidents, unites in matter with the rigid immobility

of space, which presents itself as the persistence of substance. For if substance passed away as the accidents do, the appearance would be torn completely away from space and would belong to mere time alone. The world of experience would be dissolved by the destruction of matter, by annihilation.—So the principle of the permanence of substance, which everyone recognizes as certain a priori, had to be derived and explained from the share that *space* has in matter, that is, in all appearances of reality. Space is the opposite and counterpart of time, and so, in itself and apart from its union with time, it knows no change at all. The principle could not be derived from mere time, to which Kant quite absurdly has attributed a *staying* for this purpose.

The incorrectness of the proof that now follows, which tries to establish the a priori character and necessity of the law of causality from the mere temporal sequence of events, I have shown in detail in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, §. 23. So I need only appeal to it here [7]. The same is true [8] With that refutation of Kant's proof by me, you can compare as you like the earlier attacks on it by *Feder*, Ueber of the proof of reciprocity, whose concept I even had to present above as void.—Enough has also already been said about modality, the exposition of whose principles now follows.—

I still have many details to refute as I follow the transcendental analytic further. But I fear I would tire the reader's patience, so I leave them to the reader's own reflection. Again and again, though, in the Critique of Pure Reason we run into Kant's main and fundamental error, which I criticized at length above: his complete failure to distinguish abstract, discursive knowledge from intuitive knowledge. This failure spreads a constant obscurity over Kant's whole theory of the faculty of knowledge. It never lets the reader know what is really being talked about at any given point. So the reader, instead of understanding, can only guess, trying to take what is said now as about thinking and now as about intuiting, and always staying in suspense. This incredible lack of reflection on the nature of intuitive and abstract representation leads Kant, as I will discuss more closely in a moment, to a monstrous claim in the chapter "On the Distinction of All Objects into Phenomena and Noumena." He claims that without thinking, that is, without abstract concepts, there is no knowledge of

an object at all, and that intuition, because it is not thinking, is not knowing either, and is nothing but a mere affection of sensibility, mere sensation! Even more: that intuition without concept is entirely empty, while concept without intuition is still something (p. 253; V. 309). This is exactly the opposite of the truth. Concepts get all their meaning and all their content only from their relation to intuitive representations. They have been abstracted from these, drawn off, that is, formed by letting everything unessential fall away. So when the underlying intuition is taken away from them, they are empty and void. Intuitions, on the other hand, have an immediate and very great meaning in themselves (for in them time, space and causality; § 28; and by *G. E. Schulze*, Critique of Theoretical Philosophy, vol. 2, pp. 422–442.
thing in itself is objectified). They stand in for themselves, they speak for themselves, and they do not have merely borrowed content, as concepts do. For the principle of sufficient reason rules over them only as the law of causality, and as such it determines only their place in space and time. It does not condition their content and significance, as it does with concepts, where it applies as the ground of knowing. Besides, here it looks as if Kant really means to draw the distinction between intuitive and abstract representation: he reproaches Leibniz and Locke, saying that Leibniz made everything into abstract representations and Locke made everything into intuitive ones. But no distinction is actually reached. Even if Locke and Leibniz really committed those errors, Kant himself is charged with a third error that includes both. He so mixed the intuitive and the abstract that a monstrous hybrid of the two came about, an absurdity of which no clear representation is possible, and which therefore could only confuse his students, stun them, and set them quarreling.

Of course, thinking and intuition come apart more than anywhere else in that chapter, "On the Distinction of All Objects into Phenomena and Noumena." But the way the distinction is made there is wrong from the ground up. It says, p. 253, V, 309: "If I take away all thinking (through categories) from an empirical cognition, no cognition of an object remains. For through mere intuition nothing at all is thought, and the fact that this affection of sensibility is in me does not make any relation of such representations to any object."—This sen-

tence contains, in a way, all of Kant's errors in a nutshell. It shows that he has misconceived the relation between sensation, intuition and thinking. As a result he identifies intuition, whose form is supposed to be space, and in all three dimensions at that, with mere subjective sensation in the sense organs. And he lets the knowing of an object come in only afterward, through thinking, which is different from intuiting. I say the opposite: objects are first of all objects of intuition, not of thinking, and all knowledge of *objects* is originally and in itself intuition. Intuition is by no means mere sensation. The understanding already shows itself active in it. *Thinking*, which is added only in human beings and not in animals, is mere abstraction from intuition. It gives no knowledge that is new from the ground up. It does not first posit objects that were not there before. It only changes the form of the knowledge already won through intuition, making it abstract, in concepts. In this way intuitiveness is lost, but combining the knowledge becomes possible, and that extends its usefulness immeasurably. The *material* of our thinking, on the other hand, is nothing other than our intuitions themselves. It is not something that, not contained in intuition, is first brought in by thinking. So everything that occurs in our thinking must have its material demonstrable in our intuition. Otherwise it would be empty thinking. Thinking works over this material and reshapes it in many ways. Still, it must be possible to restore the material from that work and to trace the thinking back to it. It is like a piece of gold: after all its dissolutions, oxidations, sublimations and compounds, it can finally be reduced again and presented once more as pure metal, undiminished. That could not be so if thinking itself had added something to the object, let alone the main thing.

The whole chapter on amphiboly that follows is merely a critique of Leibniz's philosophy. As such it is correct on the whole, although its whole layout is made only for the love of architectonic symmetry, which guides Kant here too. To bring out the analogy with Aristotle's Organon, for example, he sets up a transcendental topic. It consists in this: one should consider every concept from four points of view, in order first to settle which faculty of knowledge it belongs to. But these four points of view are chosen quite arbitrarily, and with

equal right ten others could be added. Their number, four, matches the titles of the categories, and so Leibniz's main doctrines are distributed among them as well as can be done. This critique also, in a way, stamps as natural errors of reason what were merely false abstractions of *Leibniz*. Instead of learning from his great philosophical contemporaries, Spinoza and Locke, he preferred to serve up his own strange inventions. At the end of the chapter on the amphiboly of reflection it is said that there could possibly be a kind of intuition entirely different from ours, to which our categories would nevertheless be applicable. The objects of that supposed intuition would then be the *noumena*, things that we can only *think*. But the intuition that would give that thinking its meaning is lacking to us, and is in fact wholly problematic. So the object of that thinking would also be only a completely indeterminate possibility. Above, by quoting passages, I showed that Kant, in the greatest contradiction with himself, presents the categories now as a condition of intuitive representation and now as a function of merely abstract thinking. Here they appear only in the latter sense, and it seems quite as if he wants to attribute to them only a discursive thinking. But if that is really his opinion, he necessarily should have characterized thinking in general at the beginning of the transcendental logic, before specifying the various functions of thinking at such length. He should have distinguished it from intuiting, and shown what knowledge mere intuiting gives and what new knowledge thinking adds. Then we would have known what he is really talking about. Or rather, then he would have spoken quite differently: first about intuiting and then about thinking, instead of dealing, as he now does, always with a hybrid of the two, which is an absurdity. Then there would also not be that great gap between the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental logic. There, after presenting the mere form of intuition, he just dismisses its content, the whole empirical perception, with the words "*it is given*," and does not ask how it comes about, *with or without the understanding*. Instead he jumps to abstract thinking, and not even to thinking in general but at once to certain forms of thought. He says not a word about what thinking is,

what a concept is, what the relation of the abstract and discursive to the concrete and intuitive is, what the difference is between human knowledge and animal knowledge, and what reason is.

It was exactly this distinction between abstract and intuitive knowledge, which Kant overlooked completely, that the ancient philosophers marked with φαινομενα and νοουμενα [9]. Their opposition and incommensurability gave them so much trouble: in the philosophemes of the Eleatics, in Plato's doctrine of Ideas, in the dialectic of the Megarians, and later for the Scholastics, in the dispute between nominalism and realism, whose germ, developing late, was already contained in the opposite mental orientations of Plato and Aristotle. But Kant inexcusably neglected altogether the very matter for which the words φαινομενα and νοουμενα were already taken. Now he seizes the words as if they were still ownerless, to label with them his things in themselves and his appearances.

—After I have had to reject Kant's doctrine of the categories just as he himself rejected Aristotle's, I still want to point out here, as a suggestion, a third way to reach the intended goal. What both of them were looking for under the name of categories were in any case the most general concepts, under which all things, however different, must be subsumed, and through which therefore everything that exists would finally be thought. For this very reason Kant took them to be the *forms* of all thinking.

Grammar stands to logic as the garment stands to the body. So should not these highest of all concepts, this ground bass of reason, which is the foundation of all more special thinking and without whose use no thinking can go on at all, in the end lie in concepts that, precisely because of their boundless generality (transcendentality), are expressed not in single words but in whole classes of words, since in every word, whichever [10] See Sext. Empir. Pyrrhon. hypotyp., Lib. I, c. 13, νοουμενα φαινομενοις ἀντετιθη Αναξαγορας (intelligibilia apparentibus opposuit Anaxagoras). it may be, one of them is already thought along with it; so that one would have to look for their designation not in the dictionary but in grammar? So should it not in the end be those differences among concepts by virtue of which the word expressing a concept is a noun, or an

adjective, a verb, or an adverb, a pronoun, a preposition, or some other particle: in short, the partes orationis? For beyond doubt these mark the forms that all thinking first takes on and in which it moves directly. That is precisely why they are the essential forms of language, the basic components of every language, so that we cannot imagine a language that did not consist at least of nouns, adjectives and verbs. Under these basic forms we would then have to place those forms of thought that are expressed by the inflections of these, that is, by declension and conjugation. In the main it does not matter whether one takes in the article and the pronoun to help in marking them. But let us examine the matter a little more closely and raise the question anew: what are the forms of thinking?

1) Thinking consists throughout of judgments. Judgments are the threads of its whole fabric. For without using a verb our thinking does not move from the spot, and whenever we use a verb, we judge.

2) Every judgment consists in knowing the relation between subject and predicate, which it separates or unites with various restrictions. It unites them, starting from knowing the real identity of the two, which can occur only with reciprocal concepts. Then it unites them in knowing that the one is always thought along in the other, though not the reverse—in the universal affirmative proposition. It ends in knowing that the one is sometimes thought along in the other, in the particular affirmative proposition. The negative propositions go the opposite way. So in every judgment subject, predicate and copula must be found, the copula being affirmative or negative, even if each of these is not marked by a word of its own, as however is mostly the case. Often one word marks predicate and copula, as in "Caius grows old." Sometimes one word marks all three, as in concurritur, that is, "the armies come to blows." From this it is clear that the forms of thinking are not to be sought so directly and immediately in the words, nor even in the parts of speech. The same judgment can be expressed in different languages, and even in the same language, by different words and even by different parts of speech, and yet the thought stays the same, and so does its form. For the thought could not be the same if the form of thinking itself were different. But the verbal shape can be different while the

thought and its form are the same, since the verbal shape is merely the outer dress of the thought, whereas the thought is inseparable from *its* form. So grammar only explains the dress of the forms of thought. The parts of speech can therefore be derived from the original forms of thought themselves, which are independent of all languages. Their purpose is to express these forms, with all their modifications. They are the instrument of the forms of thought and their garment, which must fit the frame of their limbs exactly, so that the frame can be recognized in it.

3) These real, unchangeable, original forms of thinking are indeed those of Kant's *logical table of judgments*. Only, on that table there are blind windows, put there for the sake of symmetry and of the table of categories, and these must all be dropped. The order is also wrong. So, roughly: a) *Quality*: affirmation or negation, that is, connection or separation of concepts: two forms. It belongs to the copula. b) *Quantity*: the subject concept is taken wholly or in part: totality or plurality. Individual subjects belong to the former: Socrates means "all Socrates." So there are only two forms. It belongs to the subject. c) *Modality*: really has three forms. It determines the quality as necessary, actual, or contingent. So it too belongs to the copula.

These three forms of thought spring from the laws of thought, of contradiction and of identity. But from the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of the excluded middle arises d) *Relation*. It comes in only when judgments are made about judgments already made. It can consist only in this: that it either states the dependence of one judgment on another (even in the plurality of both), and so connects them, in the *hypothetical* proposition; or states that judgments exclude one another, and so separates them, in the *disjunctive* proposition. It belongs to the copula, which here separates or connects the finished judgments.

The *parts of speech* and grammatical forms are ways of expressing the three components of the judgment, that is, subject, predicate and copula. They also express the possible relations of these, that is, the forms of thought just listed, and the closer determinations and modifications of these last. Noun, adjective and verb are therefore essential basic components of language in general, which

is why they must be found in all languages. Yet one could imagine a language in which adjective and verb were always fused together, as they sometimes are in every language. Provisionally one could say: for the expression of the *subject* are meant noun, article and pronoun;—for the expression of the *predicate*: adjective, adverb, preposition;—for the expression of the *copula*: the verb, which, however, with the exception of esse, already contains the predicate. Philosophical grammar has to teach the exact mechanism of the expression of the forms of thought, as logic has to teach the operations with the forms of thought themselves.

Note. As a warning against a wrong path and as an illustration of the above, I mention S. Stern's "Vorläufige Grundlage zur Sprachphilosophie," 1835, as a wholly failed attempt to construct the categories from the grammatical forms. He quite confused thinking with intuiting. So instead of the categories of thinking, he wanted to deduce from the grammatical forms the supposed categories of intuiting, and thus put the grammatical forms in direct relation to *intuition*. He is caught in the great error that *language* relates immediately to *intuition*. In fact it relates immediately only to thinking as such, that is, to *abstract concepts*, and only by means of these to intuition, to which it has a relation that brings about a complete change of form. What is there in intuition, including the relations arising from time and space, does indeed become an object of thinking. So there must also be language forms to express it, but always only in abstracto, as concepts. The nearest material of thinking is always concepts, and the forms of logic relate only to these, never *directly* to intuition. Intuition always determines only the material truth of propositions, never the formal truth, which depends on the logical rules alone.

—I return to the Kantian philosophy and come to the *transcendental dialectic*. Kant opens it with the definition of *reason*, the faculty that is supposed to play the main role in it, since until now only sensibility and understanding were on the stage. Among his various definitions of reason, I have already spoken above also of the one given here, "that it is the faculty of principles." Here it is taught that all the cognitions a priori considered so far, which make pure mathematics and pure natural science possible, give only *rules* and no *principles*. That is

because they come from intuitions and forms of knowledge, not from mere *concepts*, which is required for something to be called a principle. Such a principle is therefore supposed to be a cognition *from mere concepts* and yet synthetic. But this is simply impossible. From mere concepts nothing but *analytic* propositions can ever come. If concepts are to be combined synthetically and yet a priori, this combination must necessarily be mediated by a third thing, by a pure intuition of the formal possibility of experience, just as synthetic judgments a posteriori are mediated by empirical intuition. So a synthetic proposition a priori can never come from mere concepts. In general, we are conscious a priori of nothing further than the principle of sufficient reason in its various forms. So no other synthetic judgments a priori are possible than those that come from what gives that principle its content.

Meanwhile Kant finally comes forward with a so-called principle of reason that matches his requirement, but only with this *one*, from which other consequent propositions then flow. It is the proposition that Chr. Wolf sets up and explains in his "Cosmologia," sect. 1, c. 2, §. 93, and in his "Ontologia," §. 178. Above, under the title of amphiboly, mere Leibnizian philosophemes were taken for natural and necessary wrong turns of reason and were criticized as such. In just the same way, the same thing happens here with Wolf's philosophemes. Kant presents this principle of reason put into a twilight by obscurity, indefiniteness and fragmentation (p. 307; V, 361, and 322; V, 379). But stated clearly, it is this: "If the conditioned is given, then the totality of its conditions must also be given, and with it also the *unconditioned*, through which alone that totality becomes complete." One feels the apparent truth of this proposition most vividly if one imagines the conditions and the conditioned as the links of a chain hanging down, whose upper end, however, cannot be seen, so that the chain could go on to infinity. But since the chain does not fall but hangs, there must be at the top a link that is first and fastened somehow. Or more briefly: reason would like to have a point of attachment for the causal chain that points back to infinity. That would be convenient for it. But let us test the proposition not with pictures but in itself. It is synthetic, to be sure. For analytically nothing follows from the concept of the conditioned except the concept of the con-

dition. But it has no truth a priori, and none a posteriori either. It sneaks its appearance of truth in a very subtle way, which I must now uncover. Immediately and a priori we have the cognitions that the principle of sufficient reason expresses in its four forms. All abstract expressions of the principle of sufficient reason are already borrowed from these immediate cognitions, and so are mediate. Its consequent propositions are even more so. I have already explained above how *abstract* knowledge often unites many different *intuitive* cognitions in *one* form or *one* concept, so that they can no longer be told apart. In this way abstract knowledge stands to intuitive knowledge as the shadow stands to the real objects, whose great variety it reproduces in *one* outline that takes them all in. This shadow is what the so-called principle of reason now uses. It wants to infer from the principle of sufficient reason the unconditioned, which directly contradicts that principle. So it cleverly leaves the immediate, intuitive knowledge of the content of the principle of sufficient reason in its individual forms. It uses only the abstract concepts that are drawn from that knowledge and have value and meaning only through it, in order to smuggle its unconditioned somehow into the wide range of those concepts. Its procedure shows most clearly in dialectical dress, for example like this: "If the conditioned is there, its condition must also be given, and given entirely, that is, completely. So the totality of its conditions must be given, and, if they make up a series, the whole series, and so also its first beginning, that is, the unconditioned."—Here already it is false that the conditions of a conditioned, as such, can make up a *series*. Rather, for each conditioned, the totality of its conditions must be contained in its *nearest* ground, from which it follows directly and which only through this is a *sufficient* ground. Take for example the various determinations of the state that is a cause, all of which must have come together before the effect occurs. The series, for example the chain of causes, arises only because we again regard what was just now the condition as a conditioned. But then the whole operation immediately starts from the beginning, and the principle of sufficient reason comes forward again with its demand. There can never be, for a conditioned, a real successive series of conditions that would be there merely as such and for the sake of the final conditioned. It is always an alternating

series of conditioned and conditions. At each link left behind, though, the chain is broken and the demand of the principle of sufficient reason is wholly canceled. It begins again, as the condition becomes the conditioned. So the principle of *sufficient* reason always demands only the completeness of the *nearest condition*, never the completeness of a series. But this very concept of completeness of the condition leaves open whether it is to be simultaneous or successive. And when the latter is chosen, the demand for a complete series of conditions following one after another arises. Only by an arbitrary abstraction is a series of causes and effects regarded as a series of nothing but causes, which would be there only for the sake of the last effect, and which therefore would be demanded as its *sufficient* ground. On a closer and more reflective look, descending from the indefinite generality of abstraction to the individual, determinate real thing, one finds instead that the demand for a *sufficient* ground goes only to the completeness of the determinations of the *nearest* cause, not to the completeness of a series. The demand of the principle of sufficient reason is wholly extinguished in each sufficient ground that is given. But it begins again at once, as this ground is regarded as a consequence in turn. It never directly demands a series of grounds. If, on the other hand, instead of going to the thing itself, one stays within abstract concepts, those differences vanish. Then a chain of alternating causes and effects, or of alternating logical grounds and consequents, is passed off as a chain of nothing but causes or grounds for the last effect. And the *completeness of the conditions*, through which a ground first becomes *sufficient*, appears as the completeness of that assumed *series* of nothing but grounds, which would be there only for the sake of the last consequent. Then the abstract principle of reason comes forward very boldly with its demand for the unconditioned. But to recognize that this demand is invalid, no critique of reason by means of antinomies and their resolution is needed. All that is needed is a critique of reason in my sense: an investigation of the relation of abstract knowledge to immediately intuitive knowledge, by descending from the indefinite generality of the former to the firm determinateness of the latter. This then shows that the essence of reason by no means consists in demanding an unconditioned. For as soon as reason proceeds

with full reflection, it must itself find that an unconditioned is simply an absurdity. Reason, as a faculty of knowledge, can always only have to do with objects. But every object for the subject is necessarily and irrevocably subject to the principle of sufficient reason and has fallen under it, both a parte ante and a parte post. The validity of the principle of sufficient reason lies so deep in the form of consciousness that one absolutely cannot represent anything objectively about which no further Why could be demanded, that is, no absolute Absolute, like a board in front of the head. That someone's convenience tells them to stop somewhere and assume such an Absolute at will can accomplish nothing against that unshakable certainty a priori, not even if they put on very distinguished airs. In fact, all the talk about the Absolute, which is almost the only theme of the philosophies attempted since Kant, is nothing other than the cosmological proof incognito. After the trial Kant brought against it, this proof was declared stripped of all rights and outlawed, and may not show itself in its true form any more. So it appears in all kinds of disguises: sometimes in distinguished ones, cloaked by intellectual intuition or pure thinking, sometimes, in the more modest philosophemes, as a suspicious vagabond who half begs and half extorts what he gets. If these gentlemen absolutely want to have an Absolute, I will put one in their hands that satisfies all the demands on such a thing much better than their drivel of foggy shapes: it is matter. It is unproduced and indestructible, so really independent, and *quod per se est et per se concipitur*. From its womb everything comes forth and into it everything returns. What more can one ask of an Absolute?—But rather, those on whom no critique of reason has taken hold should be called out to:

Are you not like the women, who keep coming back only to their first word, when someone has spoken reason to them for hours?

That going back to an unconditioned cause, to a first beginning, is by no means grounded in the essence of reason is also proved as a matter of fact. The original religions of our species, which even now have the greatest number of followers on earth, namely Brahmanism and Buddhism, neither know nor allow such assumptions. They lead the series of appearances that condition one another up to infinity. On this I refer to the note that follows further below, in the cri-

tique of the first antinomy. One can also consult Upham's "Doctrine of Buddhaism" (p. 9), and in general any authentic report on the religions of Asia. Judaism and reason are not to be identified.—

Kant also by no means wants to assert his so-called principle of reason as objectively valid but only as subjectively necessary. Even as such, he deduces it only by a shallow sophism, p. 307; V, 364. The sophism is this: because we try to subsume every truth known to us under a more general one as long as that is possible, this is supposed to be nothing other than already the hunt for the unconditioned, which we presuppose. In truth, though, by such seeking we do nothing but apply reason and use it purposefully to simplify our knowledge by overview. Reason is that faculty of abstract, general knowledge which distinguishes the reflective, speaking, thinking human being from the animal, the slave of the present. For the use of reason consists precisely in this: that we know the particular through the general, the case through the rule, and this rule through the more general rule, so that we look for the most general points of view. Through such overview our knowledge is made so much easier and more perfect that out of it comes the great difference between the animal and the human course of life, and again between the life of the educated and that of the uneducated person. Now the series of *grounds of knowledge*, which exists only in the realm of the abstract, that is, of reason, always does come to an end at the unprovable, that is, at a representation that according to this form of the principle of sufficient reason is not conditioned further. That is, it ends at the immediately intuitive ground, a priori or a posteriori, of the highest proposition of the chain of inference. I have already shown in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, §. 50, that here the series of grounds of knowledge really passes over into grounds of becoming or of being. But to want to use this circumstance to prove something unconditioned according to the law of causality, even if only as a demand—one can do this only if one has not yet distinguished the forms of the principle of sufficient reason at all, but holds to the abstract expression and confuses them all. Yet Kant even tries to ground this confusion by a mere play on words with Universalitas and Universitas, p. 322; V, 379.—It is therefore quite false that our search for higher grounds of knowl-

edge, for general truths, springs from the presupposition of an object unconditioned in its existence, or has anything whatever in common with that. How could it be essential to reason to presuppose something that it must recognize as an absurdity as soon as it reflects? Rather, the origin of that concept of the unconditioned can never be traced to anything other than the laziness of the individual, who wants to be rid of all further questions, others' and their own, though without any justification.

Kant himself denies this so-called principle of reason objective validity, but still gives it out as a necessary subjective presupposition. In this way he brings an irresolvable split into our knowledge, which he soon makes appear more clearly. For this purpose he unfolds that principle of reason further, p. 322; V, 379, by his favorite architectonic-symmetrical method. From the three categories of relation arise three kinds of inference. Each of them gives the guiding thread to the search for a particular unconditioned, and so there are again three of these: soul, world (as an object in itself and a closed totality), God. Here a great contradiction can be noticed at once, which Kant takes no notice of, because it would be very dangerous to symmetry. Two of these unconditioned are themselves conditioned again, by the third: soul and world are conditioned by God, who is their producing cause. So the first two do not share with God the predicate of unconditionedness, which is what matters here, but only that of being inferred according to principles of experience, beyond the realm of the possibility of experience.

Setting this aside, in the three unconditioned ones, which according to Kant every reason, following its essential laws, must arrive at, we find again the three main subjects around which the whole philosophy under the influence of Christianity turned, from the Scholastics down to Christian Wolf. However accessible and familiar those concepts have become to mere reason through all those philosophers, this by no means settles that, even without revelation, they must come out of the development of every reason, as a product that belongs to the essence of reason itself. To settle this, we would have to call in historical inquiry. We would have to find out whether the ancient peoples and the non-European peoples, especially the Hindustani, and many of the oldest Greek

philosophers really did arrive at those concepts. Or perhaps it is merely we, too good-natured, who attribute them to those peoples, just as the Greeks found their gods everywhere, by quite wrongly translating the Brahm of the Hindus and the Tien of the Chinese as "God." Perhaps real theism is to be found only in Judaism and the two religions that came out of it. For this very reason their adherents lump the followers of all other religions on earth together under the name of heathens. That, incidentally, is a most simple-minded and crude expression, which should at least be banished from the writings of scholars, because it identifies Brahmanists, Buddhists, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, Germans, Gauls, Iroquois, Patagonians, Caribs, Tahitians, Australians and others, and stuffs them into one sack. For priests such an expression is fitting. In the learned world it must be shown the door at once. It can travel to England and settle in Oxford.—That Buddhism in particular, the religion most numerously represented on earth, contains no theism at all, and in fact abhors it, is a fully established fact. As for Plato, I am of the opinion that he owes to the Jews the theism that came over him from time to time. For this reason Numenius (according to Clem. Alex. Strom., I, c. 22, Euseb. praep. evang., XIII, 12, and Suidas, under Numenius) called him Moses graecisans: Τι γαρ εστι Πλατων, η Μωσης αττικιζων; and he reproaches him with having stolen (αποσυλησας) his teachings about God and creation from the Mosaic writings. *Clement* comes back often to the point that Plato knew and used Moses, e.g. Strom. I, 25.—V, c. 14, §. 90 ff.—Paedagog., II, 10, and III, 11; also in the Cohortatio ad gentes, c. 6. In the preceding chapter of that work he has scolded and mocked all the Greek philosophers like a Capuchin friar, because they were not Jews. Here he praises Plato alone and breaks out into loud jubilation that Plato learned his theism from the Jews, just as he learned his geometry from the Egyptians, his astronomy from the Babylonians, magic from the Thracians, and much also from the Assyrians: Οιδα σου τους διδασκαλους, κἂν αποκρυπτειν εθελῃς, ————————δοξαν την του θεου παρ' αυτων ωφελησαι των Εβραιων (tuos magistros novi, licet eos celare velis,————————illa de Deo sententia suppeditata tibi est ab Hebraeis). A touching scene of recognition.—But I discover a curious confirmation of the matter in the following. According to Plutarch (in

Mario) and better according to Lactantius (I, 3, 19), Plato thanked nature that he had been born a human being and not an animal, a man and not a woman, a Greek and not a barbarian. Now in Isaak Euchel's Gebete der Juden, aus dem Hebräischen, second edition, 1799, p. 7, there is a morning prayer in which they thank and praise God that the one praying has been made a Jew and not a heathen, a free man and not a slave, a man and not a woman.—Such a historical investigation would have spared Kant a bad necessity into which he now falls. He lets those three concepts arise necessarily from the nature of reason, and yet shows that they are untenable and cannot be grounded by reason, and so he makes reason itself a sophist. He says, p. 339; V, 397: "They are sophistications, not of man, but of pure reason itself, from which even the wisest cannot free himself, and perhaps, after much effort, can guard against the error, but can never get rid of the illusion that unceasingly pinches and mocks him." According to this, those Kantian "Ideas of reason" would be comparable to the focus where the rays reflected convergingly from a concave mirror come together a few inches in front of its surface. As a result, by an unavoidable process of the understanding, an object presents itself to us there that is a thing without reality.

The name *Ideas*, however, was chosen very unluckily for those three supposedly necessary products of pure theoretical reason, and it was torn away from Plato. He used it for the imperishable forms that, multiplied by time and space, become visible imperfectly in the countless individual, perishable things. Plato's Ideas are therefore thoroughly intuitive, as the word he chose also indicates so precisely. It could be translated fittingly only by "intuitivenesses" or "visibilities." And Kant has appropriated it to designate something that lies so far from all possibility of intuition that even abstract thinking can reach it only halfway. The word Idea, which Plato first introduced, has also since then, throughout twenty-two centuries, always kept the meaning in which Plato used it. For not only all the philosophers of antiquity, but also all the Scholastics, and even the Church Fathers and the theologians of the Middle Ages, used it only in that Platonic meaning, namely in the sense of the Latin word exemplar, as *Suarez* expressly states in his twenty-fifth Disputation, Sect.

1.—That later the English and the French were led by the poverty of their languages to misuse that word is bad enough, but of no weight. Kant's misuse of the word Idea is therefore in no way to be justified. He substitutes a new meaning, which he drags in on the thin thread of not being an object of experience, a feature that the word shares with Plato's Ideas but also with all possible chimeras. Since the misuse of a few years does not count against the authority of many centuries, I have always used the word in its old, original, Platonic meaning.

The refutation of *rational* psychology is much more detailed and thorough in the first edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason" than in the second and later ones, so one absolutely has to use the first here. This refutation has on the whole very great merit and much truth. Yet I am quite of the opinion that Kant, only for love of his symmetry, derives the concept of the soul as necessary from that paralogism, by applying the demand for the unconditioned to the concept of *substance*, which is the first category of relation. He accordingly claims that in this way the concept of a soul would arise in every speculating reason. If that concept really had its origin in the presupposition of a last subject of all predicates of a thing, then one would have assumed a soul with equal necessity not only in man but in every lifeless thing, since such a thing too demands a last subject of all its predicates. In general, though, Kant uses a quite impermissible expression when he speaks of a something that could exist only as subject and not as predicate (e.g. "Critique of Pure Reason," p. 323; V, 412; "Prolegomena," §. 4 and 47), although a precedent for it can already be found in Aristotle's "Metaphysics," IV, ch. 8. As subject and predicate nothing at all exists, for these expressions belong exclusively to logic and designate the relation of abstract concepts to one another. In the intuitive world their correlate or stand-in is supposed to be substance and accident. But then we need not look any further for what always exists only as substance and never as accident, since we have it immediately in matter. It is the substance of all properties of things, which are its accidents. It really is, if one wants to keep the expression of Kant's that I have just criticized, the last subject of all predicates of every empirically given thing, namely what is left over after subtracting all its properties of

every kind. This holds of man as of animal, plant or stone, and it is so evident that, in order not to see it, a determined unwillingness to see is required. That matter is really the prototype of the concept of substance, I will soon show.—Subject and predicate, though, stand to substance and accident rather as the principle of sufficient reason in logic stands to the law of causality in nature. Just as impermissible as it is to confuse or identify these two, so is it to confuse or identify the other two. Kant, however, drives this latter confusion and identification to the highest degree in the "Prolegomena," §. 46, in order to let the concept of the soul arise from that of the last subject of all predicates and from the form of the categorical syllogism. To uncover the sophistication of this paragraph one need only recall that subject and predicate are purely logical determinations that concern solely and exclusively abstract concepts, and indeed according to their relation in the judgment. Substance and accident, on the other hand, belong to the intuitive world and its apprehension in the understanding, but are found there only as identical with matter and form or quality. More on that at once.

The opposition that gave occasion to the assumption of two fundamentally different substances, body and soul, is in truth that of the objective and the subjective. If a person grasps themselves objectively in outer intuition, they find a being extended in space and altogether bodily. If instead they grasp themselves in mere self-consciousness, that is, purely subjectively, they find a mere willing and representing, free from all forms of intuition, and so without any of the properties that belong to bodies. Now they form the concept of the soul, like all the transcendent concepts that Kant called Ideas, by applying the principle of sufficient reason, the form of every object, to what is not object, here to the subject of knowing and willing. That is, they regard knowing, thinking and willing as effects, and look for their cause. They cannot accept the body as that cause, and so they posit a cause of them that is wholly different from the body. In this way the first and the last dogmatist prove the existence of the soul: Plato already in the Phaedrus, and Wolf still: namely from thinking and willing as the effects that lead to that cause. Only after the concept of an immaterial, simple, indestructible being had arisen in this way, by hypostatizing a cause corre-

sponding to the effect, did the school develop and demonstrate it from the concept *substance*. But the school had previously formed this very concept expressly for this purpose, by the following remarkable trick.

With the first class of representations, that is, the intuitive, real world, the representation of matter is also given. The reason is that the law of causality that rules in that world determines the change of states, and these themselves presuppose something that persists, whose change they are. Above, at the proposition of the permanence of substance, appealing to earlier passages, I showed that this representation of matter arises because in the understanding, for which alone it exists, time and space are intimately united by the law of causality (its only form of knowledge). The share of space in this product presents itself as the persistence of *matter*, and the share of time as the change of its *states*. Purely by itself matter can be thought only in abstracto, and not intuited, since it always appears to intuition already in form and quality. Of this concept of matter, *substance* is in turn an abstraction, and so a higher genus. It arose by leaving standing, of the concept of matter, only the predicate of persistence, and thinking away all its other essential properties: extension, impenetrability, divisibility and so on. Like every higher genus, then, the concept *substance contains less in itself* than the concept *matter*. But it does not, in return, contain *more under itself*, as a higher genus otherwise always does, since it embraces no several lower genera besides matter. Matter remains the only true species of the concept substance, the only thing that can be pointed to, by which its content is realized and gets a proof. The purpose for which reason otherwise produces a higher concept by abstraction, namely to think in it at once several species that differ by additional determinations, does not occur here at all. So that abstraction was either undertaken quite purposelessly and idly, or it has a secret ulterior aim. This now comes to light as a second species, the immaterial, simple, indestructible substance, the soul, is placed under the concept substance as coordinate with its genuine species, matter. The smuggling in of this concept took place because already in forming the higher concept *substance* the procedure was unlawful and illogical. In its lawful course reason forms a higher generic concept only by placing several specific concepts side

by side. It then proceeds comparatively, discursively, and by leaving out their differences and keeping their agreements it obtains the generic concept that embraces them all but contains less. From this it follows that the specific concepts must always precede the generic concept. In the present case it is the reverse. Only the concept matter was there before the generic concept *substance*, which was formed from it without occasion and so without justification, idly, by arbitrary omission of all its determinations but one. Only afterward was the second, spurious species placed next to the concept matter and thus slipped in. For forming this, nothing further was needed than an express negation of what one had previously already left out silently in the higher generic concept, namely extension, impenetrability, divisibility. So the concept *substance* was formed merely to be the vehicle for smuggling in the concept of immaterial substance. It is therefore very far from being able to count as a category or necessary function of the understanding. Rather it is a most dispensable concept, because its only true content already lies in the concept of matter. Beside this content it contains only a great void, which can be filled by nothing except the smuggled-in side species *immaterial substance*, and it was also formed solely to receive that. For this reason, strictly speaking, it is to be rejected wholly, and the concept of matter is to be put in its place everywhere.

—The categories were a bed of Procrustes for every possible thing, but the three kinds of inference are so only for the three so-called Ideas. The Idea of the soul had been forced to find its origin in the categorical form of inference. Now it is the turn of the dogmatic representations about the world as a whole, insofar as it is thought, as an object in itself, between two limits, that of the smallest (atom) and that of the largest (limits of the world in time and space). These now must come out of the form of the hypothetical inference. Here, in itself, no special force is needed. For the hypothetical judgment has its form from the principle of sufficient reason, and in fact all those so-called Ideas arise from the thoughtless, unconditioned application of this principle and then the arbitrary setting aside of it—not just the cosmological ones. This happens in that, according to that principle, only the dependence of one object on another is ever sought, until finally the weariness of the imagination puts an end to the

journey. In this, one loses sight of the fact that every object, indeed the whole series of them and the principle of sufficient reason itself, stands in a much nearer and greater dependence, namely on the knowing subject. That principle is valid only for the subject's objects, that is, representations, since it determines merely their place in space and time. The form of knowledge from which only the cosmological Ideas are here derived, namely the principle of sufficient reason, is the origin of all reasoning hypostases. So this time no sophisms are needed for deriving them. But all the more are needed to classify those Ideas under the four titles of the categories.

1) The cosmological Ideas with regard to time and space, that is, about the limits of the world in both, are boldly regarded as determined by the category of *quantity*. They obviously have nothing in common with it except this: logic happens to designate the extent of the subject concept in a judgment by the word quantity, a figurative expression for which another could just as well have been chosen. But for Kant's love of symmetry this is enough to use the lucky accident of this naming and to tie the transcendent dogmas about the extent of the world to it.

2) Still more boldly Kant ties the transcendent Ideas about matter to *quality*, that is, to affirmation or negation in a judgment. Here not even an accidental similarity of words lies at the base. For the mechanical (not chemical) divisibility of matter relates precisely to its quantity and not to its quality. But what is more, this whole Idea of divisibility does not belong at all among the consequences according to the principle of sufficient reason, from which, as the content of the hypothetical form, all the cosmological Ideas are supposed to flow. For Kant bases himself on the claim that the relation of the parts to the whole is that of the condition to the conditioned, and so a relation according to the principle of sufficient reason. That claim is a subtle but groundless sophism. That relation rests rather on the law of contradiction. For the whole is not through the parts, nor are they through it. Both are necessarily together, because they are one, and their separation is only an arbitrary act. On this it rests, according to the law of contradiction, that if the parts are thought away, the whole is thought away too, and the reverse. It does not at all rest on the

parts as *ground* conditioning the whole as *consequence*, so that according to the principle of sufficient reason we would be necessarily driven to look for the last parts in order to understand the whole from them as its ground.—Such great difficulties does the love of symmetry overcome here.

3) Under the title of *relation* the Idea of the first cause of the world would properly belong. But Kant has to save this Idea for the fourth title, that of modality, for which otherwise nothing would be left. He then squeezes that Idea under it by this: that the contingent (that is, according to his explanation, which is diametrically opposed to the truth, every consequent from its ground) becomes necessary through the first cause.—As the third Idea, therefore, for the sake of symmetry, the concept of *freedom* comes up here. But really it means only the Idea of the cause of the world, the only one that fits here now, as the note to the thesis of the third conflict says plainly. The third and fourth conflicts are at bottom tautological.

Beyond all this, however, I find and maintain that the whole antinomy is mere sham fighting, a pretended contest. Only the assertions of the *antitheses* really rest on the forms of our faculty of knowledge, that is, if one expresses it objectively, on the necessary, a priori certain, most general laws of nature. Their proofs alone are therefore conducted from objective grounds. By contrast the assertions and proofs of the *theses* have no ground other than a subjective one. They rest wholly on the weakness of the reasoning individual, whose imagination grows weary at an infinite regress and so puts an end to it by arbitrary presuppositions, which it tries its best to gloss over, and whose power of judgment is moreover paralyzed at this point by prejudices stamped in early and firmly. For this reason the proof for the thesis in all four conflicts is everywhere only a sophism. The proof for the antithesis, on the other hand, is an unavoidable inference of reason from the laws of the world as representation, of which we are conscious a priori. Kant too has been able to maintain the thesis only with much effort and art, and to have it make apparent attacks on the opponent, who is endowed with original strength. His first and constant trick in this is the following. He does not do what one does when one is aware of the truth of one's proposition, namely bring out the nervus argumentationis and put it

before the eyes as isolated, bare and clear as possible. Rather, on both sides he introduces it covered and mixed up under a flood of superfluous and long-winded sentences.

The theses and antitheses that appear here in conflict call to mind the δικαιος and αδικος λογος that Socrates lets appear in dispute in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. But this resemblance extends only to the form, not to the content, however much those would like to assert it who ascribe to this most speculative of all questions of theoretical philosophy an influence on morality, and therefore seriously take the thesis for the δικαιος and the antithesis for the αδικος λογος. I will not stoop to take account of such narrow and perverse little minds. I give the honor not to them but to the truth, and I will uncover the proofs that Kant gives for the individual theses as sophisms, while those of the antitheses are conducted quite honestly, correctly and from objective grounds.—I assume that in this examination one always has the Kantian antinomy itself before one.

If one were to let the proof of the thesis in the first conflict stand, it would prove too much. It would apply just as well to time itself as to the change in it, and would therefore prove that time itself must have had a beginning, which is absurd. For the rest, the sophism consists in this. In place of the beginninglessness of the series of states, which was the topic at first, the endlessness (infinity) of it is suddenly substituted. Then it is proved, what no one doubts, that being completed logically contradicts this endlessness, and yet that every present is the end of the past. But the end of a beginningless series can always be *thought* without harm to its beginninglessness, just as, conversely, the beginning of an endless series can be *thought*. Against the really correct argument of the antithesis, however, that the changes of the world *backward* absolutely necessarily presuppose an infinite series of changes, nothing at all is brought forward. The possibility that the causal series might one day end in an absolute standstill we can think; but the possibility of an absolute beginning we cannot think at all [11].

With regard to the spatial limits of the world, it is proved that if the world is to be called a *given whole*, it must necessarily have limits. The consequence is correct; only its antecedent was exactly what was to be proved, and it remains

unproved. Totality presupposes limits, and limits presuppose totality; both together are here presupposed arbitrarily.—The antithesis, however, supplies for this second point no such satisfying proof as for the first, because the law of causality gives necessary determinations only with regard to time, not to [12] That the assumption of a limit of the world in time is by no means a necessary thought of reason can even be shown historically. The Hindus do not teach such a limit even in their popular religion, let alone in the Vedas. Instead they try to express mythologically, by a monstrous chronology, the infinity of this appearing world, this tissue of Maya without permanence or essence. At the same time they bring out very ingeniously the relativity of all lengths of time in the following myth (Polier, Mythologie des Indous, Vol. 2, p. 585). The four ages, in the last of which we live, together comprise 4,320,000 years. Each day of the creating Brahma has 1000 such periods of four ages, and his night again 1000. His year has 365 days and as many nights. He lives, always creating, 100 of his years; and when he dies, a new Brahma is at once born, and so from eternity to eternity. The same relativity of time is also expressed by the special myth retold from the Puranas in Polier's work, vol. 2, p. 594. There a Rajah makes a visit of a few moments to Vishnu in his heaven. On his return to earth he finds that several million years have passed and a new age has begun, because each day of Vishnu equals 100 recurrences of the four ages. space, and gives us a priori the certainty that no filled time could ever border on an empty time that preceded it and that no change could be the first, but not the certainty that a filled space cannot have an empty one next to it. In this respect no decision a priori would be possible about the latter. Yet the difficulty of thinking the world in space as limited lies in this: space itself is necessarily infinite, and so a limited, finite world in it, however great it may be, becomes an infinitely small magnitude. In this disproportion the imagination finds an insurmountable stumbling block, since it is left only the choice of thinking the world as infinitely large or infinitely small. The ancient philosophers already saw this: Μητροδωρος, ὁ καθηγητης Επικουρου, φησιν ατοπον ειναι εν μεγαλῳ πεδιῳ ἑνα σταχυν γεννηθηναι, και ἑνα κοσμον εν τῳ απειρῳ (Metrodorus, caput scholae Epicuri, absurdum ait, in magno campo spicam unam produci, et unum in

infinito mundum). Stob. Ecl., I, c. 23.—Therefore many of them taught (as follows right after) απειρους κοσμους εν τῳ απειρῳ (infinitos mundos in infinito). This is also the sense of the Kantian argument for the antithesis; only he has disfigured it with a scholastic, stilted presentation. One could use the same argument against limits of the world in time too, if one did not already have a much better one along the thread of causality. Further, on the assumption of a world limited in space, the unanswerable question arises what privilege the filled part of space could have had over the infinite part that remained empty. A detailed and very readable presentation of the arguments for and against the finitude of the world is given by Jordanus Brunus in the fifth dialogue of his book "Del infinito, universo e mondi." For the rest, Kant himself maintains seriously and from objective grounds the infinity of the world in space, in his "Natural History and Theory of the Heavens," Part II, ch. 7. Aristotle also professes it, "Phys.," III, ch. 4, which chapter along with the following ones is very readable with regard to this antinomy.

In the second conflict the thesis at once commits a not at all subtle petitio principii, by opening: "Every *composite* substance consists of simple parts." From the compositeness arbitrarily assumed here it afterward proves the simple parts very easily, to be sure. But the very proposition "all matter is composite," on which everything depends, remains unproved, because it is a groundless assumption. For the simple is opposed not by the composite but by the extended, what has parts, the divisible. Really, however, it is tacitly assumed here that the parts were there before the whole and were put together, and that the whole arose in this way. For that is what the word "composite" says. But this can no more be asserted than the opposite. Divisibility says merely the possibility of dividing the whole into parts; it does not say at all that the whole is composed of parts and arose that way. Divisibility asserts the parts only a parte post; compositeness asserts them a parte ante. For between the parts and the whole there is essentially no relation of time. Rather they condition each other reciprocally and are in that respect always simultaneous. For only insofar as both are there does the spatially extended exist. So what Kant says in the note to the thesis, "space should properly be called not a compositum but a totum," and so on,

holds fully of matter too, which is merely space become perceptible.—By contrast, the infinite divisibility of matter, which the antithesis asserts, follows a priori and irrefutably from that of the space it fills. This proposition has nothing at all against it. So Kant also presents it as objective truth, p. 513; V, 541, where he speaks seriously and in his own person, no longer as spokesman for the αδικος λογος. Likewise in the "Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science" (p. 108, first edition) the proposition "matter is infinitely divisible" stands as an established truth at the head of the proof of the first theorem of mechanics, after it had appeared as the fourth theorem in dynamics and had been proved there. Here, however, Kant spoils the proof for the antithesis by the greatest confusion of presentation and a useless flood of words, in the cunning intention that the evidence of the antithesis should not put the sophisms of the thesis too much in the shade. The atoms are not a necessary thought of reason, but merely a hypothesis for explaining the difference in specific weight of bodies. That we can explain this too in another way, and even better and more simply than by atomism, Kant himself has shown in the Dynamics of his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science; though Priestley, "On matter and spirit," Sect. 1, had already prepared the way for him, and the basic idea of it is already to be found in Aristotle, "Phys." IV, 9.

The argument for the third thesis is a very subtle sophism and really Kant's alleged principle of pure reason itself, quite unmixed and unchanged. It wants to prove the finitude of the series of causes by this: that a cause, in order to be sufficient, must contain the complete sum of the conditions from which the following state, the effect, proceeds. The argument now substitutes for this completeness of the determinations present together in the state that is cause the completeness of the series of causes through which that state itself first came to reality. And because completeness presupposes closedness, and closedness presupposes finitude, the argument infers from this a first cause that closes the series, and so an unconditioned cause. But the sleight of hand is plain. To grasp the state A as the sufficient cause of the state B, I presuppose that it contains the completeness of the determinations required for it, by whose being together the state B follows unfailingly. By this my demand on it as sufficient

cause is wholly satisfied, and the demand has no immediate connection with the question how the state A itself came to reality. Rather this question belongs to a quite different consideration, in which I regard the very same state A no longer as cause but itself again as effect. It is then another state that must again relate to A just as A itself related to B. The presupposition of the finitude of the series of causes and effects, and accordingly of a first beginning, nowhere appears as necessary in this, any more than the presence of the present moment has as its presupposition a beginning of time itself. Rather it is added only by the laziness of the individual who is moving along. That this presupposition lies in the assumption of a cause as sufficient ground is therefore smuggled in and false, as I showed above at length in considering the Kantian principle of reason, which coincides with this thesis. To illustrate the assertion of this false thesis, Kant is not ashamed, in the note to it, to give his getting up from a chair as an example of an unconditioned beginning, as if it were not just as impossible for him to get up without a motive as for a ball to roll without a cause. The groundlessness of his appeal to the philosophers of antiquity, inspired by a feeling of weakness, I probably need not first prove from Ocellus Lucanus, the Eleatics and so on, not to mention the Hindus. Against the proof of the antithesis, as against the preceding ones, there is nothing to object.

The fourth conflict is, as I have already remarked, really tautological with the third. The proof of the thesis too is in essentials again the same as that of the preceding ones. Its claim that every conditioned presupposes a complete series of conditions, and therefore one ending with the unconditioned, is a petitio principii, which one must simply deny. Every conditioned presupposes nothing but its condition. That this in turn is conditioned begins a new consideration, which is not immediately contained in the first. A certain plausibility in the antinomy I tried to ward off.

Yet it is remarkable that no part of the Kantian philosophy has met with so little contradiction and found so much recognition as this most paradoxical doctrine. Almost all philosophical parties and textbooks have let it stand and repeated it, and indeed worked on it. Almost all of Kant's other doctrines have been attacked, and there has never been a lack of individual crooked heads who

rejected even the transcendental aesthetic. The undivided applause that the antinomy has found, by contrast, may in the end come from this: that certain people look with inner satisfaction at the point where the understanding is really supposed to stand still, having bumped into something that is and is not at the same time, and they also determine that as a simple series of conditions; accordingly they would really have before them here the sixth trick of Philadelphia, in Lichtenberg's poster.

Kant's critical decision of the cosmological dispute, which now follows, is not what he gives it out to be, if one investigates its real sense. He presents it as the resolution of the dispute by the disclosure that both parties, starting from false presuppositions, are both wrong in the first and second conflicts, but both right in the third and fourth. It is in fact the confirmation of the antitheses by the explanation of what they say.

First, Kant asserts in this resolution, quite plainly wrongly, that both parties proceed from the presupposition, as major premise, that with the conditioned the completed (that is, closed) series of its conditions is also given. Only the thesis laid this proposition, Kant's pure principle of reason, at the base of its assertions. The antithesis, by contrast, denied it everywhere expressly, and asserted the opposite. Further, Kant charges both parties with the presupposition that the world exists in itself, that is, independently of being known and of the forms of knowing. But this presupposition too is again made only by the thesis. It lies so little at the base of the assertions of the antithesis that it is even wholly incompatible with them. For it directly contradicts the concept of an infinite series that it should be given as a whole. It is therefore essential to such a series that it exists only in relation to going through it, and not independently of that. By contrast, the presupposition of determinate limits also contains that of a whole, which exists for itself and independently of the carrying out of its measurement. So only the thesis makes the false presupposition of a world-whole existing in itself, that is, given before all knowledge, to which knowledge would merely be added. The antithesis is at odds with this presupposition from the start. For the infinity of the series, which it asserted merely on the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason, can only be there insofar as the regress is car-

ried out, not independently of it. For as the object in general presupposes the subject, so also the object determined as an endless chain of conditions necessarily presupposes in the subject the kind of knowing that corresponds to it, namely the constant following of the links of that chain. But this is exactly what Kant gives as the resolution of the dispute and repeats so often: "The infinity of the magnitude of the world is only through the regress, not before it." This resolution of the conflict by Kant is therefore really only the decision in favor of the antithesis. That truth already lies in the antithesis's assertion, just as it is wholly incompatible with the assertions of the thesis. Suppose the antithesis had asserted that the world consists of infinite series of grounds and consequents and yet at the same time exists independently of the representation and its regressive series, that is, exists in itself and therefore makes up a given whole. Then it would have contradicted not only the thesis but itself. For an infinite can never be given as a whole, nor can an endless series exist except insofar as it is run through endlessly, nor can a limitless make up a whole. Only the thesis, then, has that presupposition of which Kant claims that it led both parties astray.

It is already a doctrine of Aristotle that an infinite can never be actu, that is, real and given, but only potentia. Ουκ εστιν ενεργειᾳ ειναι το απειρον·————— αλλ' αδυνατον το εντελεχειᾳ ον απειρον (infinitum non potest esse actu: ————sed impossibile, actu esse infinitum). Metaph. K, 10.—Further: κατ' ενεργειαν μεν γαρ ουδεν εστιν απειρον, δυναμει δε επι την διαιρεσιν (nihil enim actu infinitum est, sed potentia tantum, nempe divisione ipsa). De generat. et corrupt., I, 3.—He develops this at length in Phys. III, 5 and 6, where he gives in a way the quite correct resolution of all the antinomic oppositions. He presents the antinomies in his short way and then says: "an arbiter (διαιτητου) is needed." He then gives the resolution that the infinite, both of the world in space, in time, and in division, is never before the regress or progress but in it.—So this truth already lies in the correctly grasped concept of the infinite. One misunderstands oneself, then, when one imagines the infinite, of whatever kind it may be, as something objectively present and finished, and independent of the regress.

Indeed, if one proceeds the other way around and takes as the starting point what Kant gives as the resolution of the conflict, the assertion of the antithesis follows directly from this very thing. Namely: if the world is no unconditioned whole and does not exist in itself, but only in representation, and if its series of grounds and consequents are not there before the regress of the representations of them, but only through this regress, then the world cannot contain determinate and finite series. Their determination and limitation would have to be independent of the representation, which would then merely be added afterward. Rather all its series must be endless, that is, not to be exhausted by any representation.

On p. 506; V, 534, Kant wants to prove the transcendental ideality of the appearance from the wrongness of both parties, and begins: "If the world is a whole existing in itself, it is either finite or infinite."—But this is false: a whole existing in itself cannot be infinite at all.—Rather, that ideality could be inferred from the infinity of the series in the world as follows. If the series of grounds and consequents in the world are altogether without end, then the world cannot be a whole given independently of the representation. For such a whole always presupposes determinate limits, whereas infinite series presuppose an infinite regress. The presupposed infinity of the series must therefore be determined by the form of ground and consequent, and this form by the mode of knowledge of the subject. So the world, as it is known, can exist only in the representation of the subject.

Whether Kant himself knew or not that his critical decision of the dispute is really a pronouncement in favor of the antithesis, I cannot decide. For it depends on whether what Schelling somewhere very aptly called Kant's system of accommodation extends so far, or whether Kant's mind here is already caught in an unconscious accommodation to the influence of his time and surroundings.

The resolution of the third antinomy, whose subject was the Idea of freedom, deserves a special consideration. It is very remarkable for us that Kant is compelled to speak at greater length about the thing in itself, which until now had been seen only in the background, precisely here, with the Idea of freedom.

This is quite explicable to us, now that we have recognized the thing in itself as the will. In general, here lies the point where Kant's philosophy leads on to mine, or where mine grows out of it as its stem. One will be convinced of this by reading with attention in the Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 536 and 537; V, 564 and 565. With this passage compare also the introduction to the Critique of Judgment, pp. XVIII and XIX of the third edition, or p. 13 of the Rosenkranz edition, where it even says: "The concept of freedom can represent in its object (that is after all the will) a thing in itself, but not in intuition; whereas the concept of nature can represent its object in intuition, but not as a thing in itself." But especially read, on the resolution of the antinomies, §. 53 of the Prolegomena, and then answer honestly the question whether everything said there does not sound like a riddle to which my doctrine is the answer. Kant did not come to the end of his thinking; I have merely carried his work through. Accordingly, what Kant says of the human appearance alone I have transferred to all appearance in general, which differs from the human appearance only in degree. I mean that the being in itself of every appearance is an absolutely free thing, that is, a will. How fruitful this insight is, together with Kant's doctrine of the ideality of space, time and causality, appears from my work.

Kant nowhere made the thing in itself the subject of a special discussion or clear derivation. Instead, whenever he needs it, he brings it in at once through the inference that the appearance, that is, the visible world, must have a ground, an intelligible cause, which is not appearance and therefore does not belong to any possible experience. He does this after he has incessantly insisted that the categories, and so also that of causality, have a use restricted entirely to possible experience. They are mere forms of the understanding that serve to spell out the appearances of the sensible world, beyond which they have no meaning at all, and so on. For this reason he forbids their application to things beyond experience in the strictest terms, and from the violation of this law he explains, rightly, all earlier dogmatism, and at the same time overthrows it. The incredible inconsistency that Kant committed here was soon noticed by his first opponents and used for attacks to which his philosophy could offer no resistance.

For we do indeed apply the law of causality entirely a priori and before all experience to the changes sensed in our sense organs. But for exactly that reason this law is of just as subjective an origin as those sensations themselves, and so does not lead to the thing in itself. The truth is that on the path of representation one can never get beyond representation. It is a closed whole and has in its own resources no thread leading to the being of the thing in itself, which is toto genere different from it. If we were merely representing beings, the way to the thing in itself would be wholly closed to us. Only the other side of our own being can give us information about the other side of the being in itself of things. This is the path I have taken. Kant's inference to the thing in itself, though forbidden by himself, gains some excuse, however, from the following. He does not, as the truth requires, simply and absolutely posit the object as conditioned by the subject, and the reverse. He posits only the manner and way of the appearance of the object as conditioned by the forms of knowledge of the subject, which therefore also come to consciousness a priori. What, in contrast to this, is known merely a posteriori is already for him the immediate effect of the thing in itself, which becomes appearance only in passing through those forms given a priori. From this view it is to some extent explicable how it could escape him that being an object in general already belongs to the form of the appearance and is conditioned by being a subject in general, just as well as the mode of appearance of the object is conditioned by the forms of knowledge of the subject. It escaped him, then, that if a thing in itself is to be assumed, it cannot be an object at all, which he however always presupposes it to be. Such a thing in itself would have to lie in a realm toto genere different from representation (knowing and being known), and could therefore least of all be inferred according to the laws of connection of objects with one another.

With the demonstration of the thing in itself Kant fared exactly as with that of the a priori character of the law of causality: both doctrines are right, but their proof is false. They belong, then, to the correct conclusions from false premises. I have kept both, but have grounded them in quite another and secure way.

I have neither smuggled in nor inferred the thing in itself, according to laws that exclude it, since these already belong to its appearance; nor have I reached it at all by roundabout ways. Rather I have demonstrated it immediately, where it lies immediately, in the will, which reveals itself immediately to everyone as the in-itself of their own appearance.

And this immediate knowledge of one's own will is also what gives rise in human consciousness to the concept of freedom. For the will as world-creating, as thing in itself, is indeed free from the principle of sufficient reason and thus from all necessity, and so is completely independent, free, indeed omnipotent. But in truth this holds only of the will in itself, not of its appearances, the individuals, who are already, precisely by the will itself, unalterably determined as its appearances in time. In ordinary consciousness, not purified by philosophy, however, the will is at once confused with its appearance, and what belongs only to the will is attributed to the appearance. This produces the illusion of the unconditioned freedom of the individual. For this reason Spinoza rightly says that even a thrown stone, if it had consciousness, would believe it was flying of its own free will. For the in-itself of the stone too is indeed the sole free will, but, as in all its appearances, here too, where it appears as stone, it is already fully determined. But of all this enough has already been said in the main part of this work.

Kant, by failing to recognize and overlooking this immediate origin of the concept of freedom in every human consciousness, now places, p. 533; V, 561, the origin of that concept in a very subtle speculation. Through this speculation, namely, the unconditioned, which reason is always supposed to be after, brings about the hypostatization of the concept of freedom, and on this transcendent Idea of freedom the practical concept of it too is supposed first of all to be grounded. In the Critique of Practical Reason, §. 6, and p. 185 of the fourth, p. 235 of the Rosenkranz edition, however, he derives this latter concept again differently, from the fact that the categorical imperative presupposes it. For the sake of this presupposition, that speculative Idea would then be only the first origin of the concept of freedom; here, however, it would really get meaning and application. Neither is the case. For the delusion of a perfect freedom of

the individual in their single actions is liveliest in the conviction of the crudest human being, who has never reflected, and so is not founded on any speculation, though often carried over into it. Free from it, on the other hand, are only philosophers, and indeed the deepest ones, as are also the most thoughtful and enlightened writers of the Church.

According to all that has been said, then, the real origin of the concept of freedom is in no way essentially an inference, neither from the speculative Idea of an unconditioned cause, nor from the fact that the categorical imperative presupposes it. Rather it springs immediately from the consciousness in which each person recognizes themselves, without further ado, as the will, that is, as that which as thing in itself does not have the principle of sufficient reason as its form, and which itself depends on nothing, while everything else depends on it. What each person does not do at the same time, with philosophical criticism and reflection, is distinguish themselves, as an appearance of this will that has already entered into time and is determined (one could say an act of will), from that will to life itself. And so, instead of recognizing their whole existence as an act of their freedom, they look for this freedom rather in their single actions. On this I refer to my prize essay on the freedom of the will.

Now if Kant had merely inferred the thing in itself, as he pretends here, and apparently did on earlier occasions as well, and had done so with the great inconsistency of an inference forbidden by himself, what a strange coincidence it would be that here, where for the first time he approaches the thing in itself more closely and sheds light on it, he at once recognizes in it the will, the free will that makes itself known in the world only through appearances in time!—I therefore really assume, although it cannot be proved, that Kant, whenever he spoke of the thing in itself, always thought indistinctly of the will in the darkest depth of his mind. Evidence of this is given in the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, pp. XXVII and XXVIII, in the Rosenkranz edition p. 677 of the Supplements.

For the rest, it is just this intended resolution of the supposed third conflict that gives Kant occasion to express very beautifully the deepest thoughts of his whole philosophy. So in the whole "sixth section of the Antinomy of Pure

Reason," but above all in the exposition of the opposition between empirical and intelligible character, pp. 534–550; V, 562–578, which I count among the most excellent things ever said by human beings. (A parallel passage in the "Critique of Practical Reason," pp. 169–179 of the fourth edition, or pp. 224–231 of the Rosenkranz edition, is to be regarded as a supplementary explanation of this one.) It is all the more regrettable, though, that this does not stand here in the right place. In part it was not found by the path that the presentation indicates, and so would have to be derived differently from the way it is. In part it also does not fulfill the purpose for which it stands there, namely the resolution of the supposed antinomy. From the appearance there is an inference to its intelligible ground, the thing in itself, through the inconsistent use of the category of causality beyond all appearance, which has been criticized enough already. As this thing in itself, for this case, the will of man is set up (which Kant, most impermissibly, with unforgivable violation of all linguistic usage, entitles reason), by appeal to an unconditioned ought, the categorical imperative, which is simply postulated.

Instead of all this, the pure and open procedure would have been to start immediately from the will, to demonstrate it as the in-itself of our own appearance, known without any mediation, and then to give that presentation of the empirical and intelligible character. It would have shown how all actions, although necessitated by motives, are nevertheless ascribed necessarily and absolutely, both by their author and by an outside judge, to that author himself and to him alone, as depending only on him, so that guilt and merit are assigned to him in proportion to them.—This alone was the straight way to the knowledge of what is not appearance, and so is not found according to the laws of appearance either, but is that which reveals itself through the appearance, becomes knowable, objectifies itself: the will to life. This would then have had to be presented, by mere analogy, as the in-itself of every appearance. But then of course it could not have been said (p. 546; V, 574) that in lifeless nature, and indeed in animal nature, no faculty is to be thought of as other than sensibly conditioned. In Kant's language this really says that the explanation according to the law of causality exhausts the innermost essence of those appearances too,

whereby then, very inconsistently, the thing in itself drops out for them.—Through the wrong place, and the roundabout derivation suited to it, which the presentation of the thing in itself received with Kant, the whole concept of it has also been falsified. For, found through inquiry into an unconditioned cause, the will, or thing in itself, enters here into the relation of cause to effect with the appearance. But this relation takes place only within the appearance. So it presupposes the appearance, and cannot connect the appearance itself with what lies outside it and is toto genere different from it.

Furthermore, the intended purpose, the resolution of the third antinomy, is not achieved at all by the decision that both parties, each in a different sense, are right. For both thesis and antithesis speak in no way of the thing in itself, but entirely of the appearance, the objective world, the world as representation. It is this, and absolutely nothing else, of which the thesis wants to show by the sophism pointed out that it contains unconditioned causes, and it is this too of which the antithesis, rightly, denies the same. Hence the whole presentation given here, in justification of the thesis, of the transcendental freedom of the will insofar as it is a thing in itself, however excellent in itself, is here really a μεταβασις εις αλλο γενος. For the transcendental freedom of the will presented there is by no means the unconditioned causality of a cause that the thesis asserts. A cause must essentially be appearance, not something toto genere different lying beyond all appearance.

When cause and effect are spoken of, the relation of the will to its appearance (or of the intelligible character to the empirical) must never be dragged in, as happens here, for it is wholly different from the causal relation. Meanwhile here too, in this resolution of the antinomy, it is said in accordance with the truth that the empirical character of the human being, like that of any other cause in nature, is unalterably determined, and that accordingly actions proceed from it necessarily, in proportion to external influences. So, notwithstanding all transcendental freedom (that is, independence of the will in itself from the laws of connection of its appearance), no human being has the power to begin a series of actions by themselves, whereas the latter was what the thesis asserted. So freedom too has no causality. For only the will is free, and it lies outside nature

or appearance, which is just its objectification. But the will does not stand to the appearance in a relation of causality. That relation is found only within the appearance, and so presupposes it, and cannot include the appearance itself and connect it with what expressly is not appearance. The world itself is to be explained only from the will (since it is just the will itself insofar as it appears) and not through causality. But in the world causality is the only principle of explanation and everything happens purely according to laws of nature. So the right lies wholly on the side of the antithesis, which stays with what was being talked about and uses the principle of explanation that holds of it, and so needs no apology. The thesis, by contrast, is to be pulled out of the matter by an apology, which first jumps to something quite other than what the question was about, and then carries over a principle of explanation that cannot be applied there.

The fourth conflict is, as already said, tautological with the third in its innermost sense. In the resolution of it Kant develops still more the untenability of the thesis. For the truth of the thesis, however, and its supposed coexistence with the antithesis, he brings forward no ground, just as, conversely, he is unable to set any ground against the antithesis. He introduces the assumption of the thesis only by way of request, and himself calls it (p. 562; V, 590) an arbitrary presupposition, whose object in itself may well be impossible. He shows merely a wholly powerless effort to procure for the thesis somewhere a safe little spot before the sweeping power of the antithesis, only so as not to uncover the nullity of the whole pretense, which he once took a liking to, of the necessary antinomy in human reason.

There follows the chapter on the transcendental Ideal, which at once sets us back into the rigid Scholasticism of the Middle Ages. One thinks one is hearing Anselm of Canterbury himself. The ens realissimum, the sum total of all realities, the content of all affirmative propositions, appears, and indeed with the claim to be a necessary thought of reason!—For my part I must confess that such a thought is impossible for my reason, and that at the words which designate it I am unable to think anything determinate.

I do not doubt, moreover, that Kant was driven to this strange chapter, unworthy of him, merely by his fondness for architectonic symmetry. The three main objects of Scholastic philosophy (which, as said, understood in the wider sense, can be let run down to Kant), the soul, the world and God, were to be derived from the three possible major premises of inferences, although it is obvious that they have arisen and can arise solely through the unconditioned application of the principle of sufficient reason. Now that the soul had been squeezed into the categorical judgment and the hypothetical had been used for the world, nothing was left for the third Idea but the disjunctive major premise. Fortunately preparatory work was found for this purpose, namely the ens realissimum of the Scholastics, together with the ontological proof of the existence of God, rudimentarily set up by Anselm of Canterbury and then perfected by Descartes. Kant used it with joy, perhaps also with some reminiscence of an earlier Latin work of his youth. Meanwhile, the sacrifice that Kant makes to his love of architectonic symmetry through this chapter is exceedingly great. In defiance of all truth, the, one must say, grotesque representation of a sum total of all possible realities is made into a thought essential and necessary to reason. To derive it Kant seizes on the false pretense that our knowledge of single things arises through an ever further going limitation of general concepts, and so also of a most general one that would contain all reality in itself. In this he stands in contradiction both to his own doctrine and to the truth. For just the other way around, our knowledge, starting from the single, is extended to the general, and all general concepts arise by abstraction from real, single, intuitively known things. This can be continued up to the most general concept of all, which then comprehends everything under itself but almost nothing in itself. Kant has thus turned the procedure of our faculty of knowledge directly on its head here, and might for this reason even be accused of having given occasion to a philosophical charlatanry that has become famous in our days. Instead of recognizing concepts as thoughts abstracted from things, this charlatanry makes the concepts the first, conversely, and sees in things only concrete concepts. In this way it brings the world turned upside down to market, as a philosophical buffoonery, which naturally had to find great applause.—

Even if we assume that every reason must, or at least can, arrive at the concept of God even without revelation, this plainly happens solely on the guiding thread of causality, which is so evident that it needs no proof. So Chr. Wolf also says (Cosmologia generalis, praef. p. 1): Sane in theologia naturali existentiam Numinis e principiis cosmologicis demonstramus. Contingentia universi et ordinis naturae, una cum impossibilitate casus, sunt scala, per quam a mundo hoc adspectabili ad Deum ascenditur. And before him Leibniz had already said, in reference to the law of causality: Sans ce grand principe nous ne pourrions jamais prouver l'existence de Dieu (Théod., §. 44). And likewise in his controversy with Clarke, §. 126: J'ose dire que sans ce grand principe on ne saurait venir à la preuve de l'existence de Dieu. By contrast, the thought carried out in this chapter is so far from being one essential and necessary to reason that it is rather to be regarded as a real masterpiece among the monstrous products of an age that had fallen, through strange circumstances, into the oddest wrong turns and perversities, such as Scholasticism was, which stands in world history without parallel, and can never return. This Scholasticism, to be sure, when it had come to its perfection, drew the main proof for the existence of God from the concept of the ens realissimum and used the other proofs only alongside, accessorily. But this is merely a method of teaching and proves nothing about the origin of theology in the human mind. Kant here took the procedure of Scholasticism for that of reason, which has happened to him more often generally. If it were true that, according to essential laws of reason, the Idea of God came forth from the disjunctive inference, under the form of an Idea of the most real being, then this Idea would have shown up among the philosophers of antiquity too. But of the ens realissimum there is nowhere a trace, in none of the ancient philosophers. Some of them did teach a creator of the world, but only as the giver of form to matter that existed without him, δημιουργος, whom they however infer solely according to the law of causality. Sextus Empiricus (adv. Math., IX, §. 88), to be sure, cites an argument of Cleanthes that some take for the ontological proof. But it is not that; it is a mere inference from analogy. Experience teaches that on earth one being is always more excellent

than another, and that man, as the most excellent, closes the series, though he still has many faults. So there must be still more excellent beings, and finally a most excellent of all (κρατιστον, αριστον), and this would be God.

On the detailed refutation of speculative theology that now follows, I have only to remark briefly that it, like the whole critique of the three so-called Ideas of reason, and so the whole dialectic of pure reason, is in a way the goal and purpose of the whole work. Yet this polemical part does not properly, like the preceding doctrinal one, that is, the aesthetic and the analytic, have a wholly general, lasting and purely philosophical interest. Rather its interest is more temporal and local, since it stands in special relation to the main points of the philosophy that ruled in Europe until Kant. The complete overthrow of that philosophy through this polemic, however, earns Kant an immortal merit. He eliminated theism from philosophy, since in philosophy, as a science and not a doctrine of faith, only what is either empirically given or established by tenable proofs can find a place. Naturally only real philosophy is meant here, seriously understood, directed at truth and nothing else, and by no means the joke philosophy of the universities, in which, as before, speculative theology plays the main role; and likewise the soul there, as a known person, appears as before without ceremony. For that is the philosophy furnished with salaries and fees, and even with titles of court councillor, which, looking proudly down from its height, takes no notice at all, for forty years, of little people such as I am, and would be heartily glad to be rid of old Kant with his Critiques, in order to cheer Leibniz with all its heart.—It is further to be remarked here that, as Kant was admittedly led to his doctrine of the a priori character of the concept of causality by Hume's skepticism about that concept, so perhaps Kant's critique of all speculative theology likewise has its occasion in Hume's critique of all popular theology, which Hume had set out in his so readable "Natural history of religion" and the "Dialogues on natural religion"; indeed Kant wanted in a way to supplement these. For Hume's first-named work is really a critique of popular theology, whose wretchedness it wants to show, while it respectfully points to rational or speculative theology as the genuine one. Kant, however, now uncovers the groundlessness of the latter, but leaves the popular untouched and even

sets it up in ennobled form, as a faith supported on moral feeling. The philosophasters later twisted this into perceptions of reason, consciousnesses of God, or intellectual intuitions of the supersensible, the Godhead and the like; whereas Kant, when he tore down old, venerable errors and knew the danger of the matter, had wanted only, through moral theology, to slip in a couple of weak supports for the time being, so that the collapse would not strike him, but he would gain time to get away.

As for how the refutation is carried out, no critique of reason was needed at all to refute the ontological proof of God's existence. Even without presupposing the Aesthetic and the Analytic, it is very easy to show that this ontological proof is nothing but a hairsplitting game with concepts, with no power to convince. The Organon of Aristotle already contains a chapter that refutes the ontotheological proof so completely that it might have been written for that very purpose. It is the seventh chapter of the second book of the Analyt. post. Among other things it says there, in so many words: το δε ειναι ουχ ουσια ουδενι: that is, existentia numquam ad essentiam rei pertinet.

The refutation of the cosmological proof applies the doctrine of the Critique, as set out up to that point, to a particular case, and there is nothing to object to in it.—The physicotheological proof is a mere enlargement of the cosmological proof, which it presupposes. Its full refutation comes only in the Critique of Judgment. On this point I refer my reader to the heading "Comparative Anatomy" in my work On the Will in Nature. As I said, in criticizing these proofs Kant deals only with speculative theology and keeps to the schools. If he had also had real life and popular theology in view, he would have had to add a fourth proof to the three. This fourth proof is the one that really works on the great mass of people. In Kant's technical language the most fitting name for it would be the keraunological proof. It rests on a person's feeling of helplessness, powerlessness and dependence in the face of natural forces that are infinitely superior, unfathomable and mostly threatening. To this is added his natural tendency to personify everything, and finally the hope of accomplishing something by begging and flattering, and perhaps by gifts as well. In every human undertaking there is something that is not in our power and does not fall

within our calculation. The wish to win this over to our side is the origin of the gods. Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor is an old true saying of Petronius. Hume, who appears throughout as Kant's forerunner, criticizes this proof above all in the writings mentioned earlier.—But the people whom Kant has put in lasting embarrassment by his critique of speculative theology are the professors of philosophy. They are paid by Christian governments, so they may not abandon the chief article of faith[13]. How do these gentlemen get out of it?—They simply claim that God's existence is self-evident.—Indeed! After the old [14] Kant said: "It is very absurd to expect enlightenment from reason and yet to prescribe to it beforehand which side it must necessarily come out on." (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 747; V, 775.) By contrast, here is a piece of naivety from the mouth of a philosophy professor of our own time: "If a philosophy denies the reality of the basic ideas of Christianity, then it is either false, or, even if true, still unusable—" scilicet for professors of philosophy. It was the late Professor Bachmann who, in the Jena Literary Gazette of July 1840, No. 126, so indiscreetly blabbed out the maxim of all his colleagues. Meanwhile it is worth noting, as a characterization of university philosophy, how bluntly truth is shown the door here when it will not accommodate and submit: "Get out, Truth! We have no use for you. Do we owe you anything? Do you pay us?—Then get out!"

world has worked miracles, at the cost of its conscience, to prove it, and the new world has brought ontological, cosmological and physicotheological proofs into the field, at the cost of its understanding,—it is self-evident to these gentlemen. And from this self-evident God they then explain the world. That is their philosophy.

Up to Kant, a real dilemma stood firm between materialism and theism. That is, either blind chance, or an intelligence ordering from outside according to purposes and concepts, had brought the world about, neque dabatur tertium. So atheism and materialism were the same thing. That is why people doubted whether an atheist could really exist, that is, a man who could truly credit blind chance with the extravagantly purposive arrangement of nature, especially organic nature. See, for example, Bacon's essays (sermones fideles), essay 16, on

Atheism. In the opinion of the great mass of people, and of the English, who in such matters belong entirely to the great mass (mob), things still stand this way, even with their most famous scholars. Look only at R. Owen's Ostéologie comparée, of 1855, préface p. 11, 12, where he still stands before the old dilemma between Democritus and Epicurus on one side and an intelligence on the other, in which la connaissance d'un être tel que l'homme a existé avant que l'homme fit son apparition. All purposiveness must have come from an intelligence: to doubt that has never occurred to him, even in a dream. In the lecture he gave on September 5, 1853, at the Académie des sciences, a somewhat modified version of this préface, he said with childlike naivety: La téléologie, ou la théologie scientifique (Comptes rendus, Sept. 1853). To him these are immediately one and the same! If something in nature is purposive, well then, it is the work of intention, deliberation, intelligence. Of course, what do the Critique of Judgment, or even my book On the Will in Nature, matter to such an Englishman and to the Académie des sciences? These gentlemen do not look down so deep. These illustres confrères despise metaphysics and la philosophie allemande:—they stick to old wives' philosophy. But the validity of that disjunctive major premise, that dilemma between materialism and theism, rests on the assumption that the world before us is the world of things in themselves, and that there is therefore no other order of things than the empirical one. But after Kant had made the world and its order a mere appearance, whose laws rest mainly on the forms of our intellect, the existence and nature of things and of the world no longer had to be explained by analogy with the changes in the world that we perceive or bring about. Nor did what we grasp as means and end have to have come about as the result of such a cognition. So by his important distinction between appearance and thing in itself Kant took away the foundation of theism, and on the other side he opened the way to explanations of existence of an entirely different and more profound kind.

In the chapter on the final aims of the natural dialectic of reason, it is claimed that the three transcendent Ideas are valuable as regulative principles for the advance of our knowledge of nature. But Kant can hardly have been serious in making this claim. At least the opposite, that those presuppositions hold back

and kill all research into nature, will be beyond doubt for every student of nature. To test this with an example, consider whether the assumption of a soul as an immaterial, simple, thinking substance would have helped, or hindered in the highest degree, the truths that Cabanis set out so beautifully, or the discoveries of Flourens, Marshall Hall and Ch. Bell. Indeed, Kant himself says (Prolegomena, § 44) "that the Ideas of reason are contrary and hindering to the maxims of the rational cognition of nature."—

It is certainly not among the smallest merits of Frederick the Great that Kant could develop under his reign and was allowed to publish the "Critique of Pure Reason." Under any other government a salaried professor would hardly have dared such a thing. Even to the great king's successor Kant had to promise to write no more.

I could consider myself excused here from criticizing the ethical part of Kant's philosophy, since I gave a fuller and more thorough criticism of it 22 years after the present one, in the "Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics." Still, what I have kept here from the first edition could not be dropped, if only for the sake of completeness. It can serve as a suitable preliminary to that later and much more thorough criticism, and so for the main part I refer the reader to it.

Out of love for architectonic symmetry, theoretical reason also had to have a counterpart. The intellectus practicus of the Scholastics, which in turn descends from the νους πρακτικος of Aristotle (De anima, III, 10, and Polit., VII, c. 14: ο μεν γαρ πρακτικος εστι λογος, ο δε θεωρητικος), supplies the word. But here it names something entirely different. It is not, as there, reason directed at technique. Here practical reason appears as the source and origin of the undeniable ethical significance of human action, and likewise of all virtue, all nobility of character, and every attainable degree of holiness. All this, then, would come from mere reason and would need nothing but reason. To act reasonably and to act virtuously, nobly, holily would be one and the same thing. And to act selfishly, maliciously, viciously would be simply to act unreasonably. Yet all ages, all peoples and all languages have always distinguished the two sharply and held them to be two quite different things. So do all those today who know nothing of the language of the new school, that is, the whole world

except a small band of German scholars. All of them mean two entirely different things by a virtuous way of life and a reasonable course of life. If someone said that the sublime founder of the Christian religion, whose life is held up to us as the model of all virtue, was the most reasonable of men, people would call that a very unworthy way of speaking, even a blasphemous one. They would say nearly the same if someone said that his precepts contain only the best instruction for a perfectly reasonable life. Take next a man who follows these precepts. Instead of thinking ahead about himself and his own future needs, he always simply relieves the greater present want of others, with no further thought. He even gives everything he owns to the poor, and then, stripped of all means, goes out to preach to others the virtue he has practiced himself. Everyone rightly honors this. But who dares to praise it as the height of reasonableness? And finally, who praises it as an exceedingly reasonable act that Arnold von Winkelried, with overflowing nobility of character, gathered the enemy spears against his own body to win victory and rescue for his countrymen?—On the other hand, suppose we see a man who from his youth, with rare deliberation, is intent on getting the means for a secure living, for supporting a wife and children, for a good name among people, for outward honor and distinction. He does not let himself be thrown off by the attraction of present pleasures, or by the itch to defy the insolence of the powerful, or by the wish to avenge insults he has suffered or humiliation he did not deserve, or by the pull of useless aesthetic or philosophical pursuits of the mind, or of trips to countries worth seeing. By all this and the like he does not let himself be confused or tempted ever to lose sight of his goal. With great consistency he works toward that alone. Who dares deny that such a philistine is extraordinarily reasonable? This holds even if he has allowed himself some means that are not praiseworthy but are without danger. Indeed, more: suppose a villain, with calculated cunning and by a well-thought-out plan, helps himself to riches, to honors, even to thrones and crowns. Then with the subtlest treachery he entangles neighboring states, overpowers them one by one, and becomes a conqueror of the world. He is not thrown off by any regard for right or humanity, but with sharp consistency tramples and crushes everything that stands in the way of his plan. Without

pity he plunges millions into misfortune of every kind, millions into blood and death. Yet he rewards his followers and helpers royally and always protects them, never forgetting anything, and in this way reaches his goal. Who does not see that such a man had to go about his work in an extremely reasonable way? Just as a mighty understanding was needed to draw up the plans, so their execution required perfect mastery of reason, indeed really practical reason. Or are the precepts that the shrewd and consistent, deliberate and far-sighted Machiavelli gives to the prince perhaps unreasonable too?[15]

Just as malice goes very well together with reason, and is truly terrible only in this union, so conversely nobility of character is sometimes found joined with unreason. The deed of Coriolanus can be counted here. For years he had spent all his strength on getting revenge on the Romans. Now that the time has finally come, he lets himself be softened by the pleading of the Senate and the weeping of his mother and wife. He gives up the revenge he had prepared so long and with so much trouble. He even dies for those Romans, whose ingratitude he knows and whom he had wanted to punish with such great effort, since by this he brings on himself the just anger of the Volscians.—Finally, for completeness' sake let it be mentioned that reason can very well be joined with lack of understanding. This is the case when a stupid maxim is chosen but carried out consistently. Princess Isabella, daughter of Philip II, gave an example of this. She vowed not to put on a clean shirt until Ostend was taken, and she kept her word for three years. All vows belong here in general, when their origin is a lack of [16] In passing: Machiavelli's problem was to solve the question of how the prince can keep himself on the throne without fail, despite enemies within and without. His problem was therefore by no means the ethical one, whether a prince as a human being ought to want such a thing or not. It was purely the political one, how he can carry it out if he does want it. To this he gives the solution, the way one writes instructions for playing chess, where it would be foolish to miss an answer to the question whether it is morally advisable to play chess at all. To reproach Machiavelli with the immorality of his book is just as much to the point as it would be to reproach a fencing master for not opening his instruction with a moral lecture against murder and manslaughter.

insight according to the law of causality, that is, lack of understanding. Nevertheless it is reasonable to fulfill them, once a person is of such limited understanding as to vow them.

In keeping with what has been said, we also see writers who appeared just before *Kant* setting conscience, as the seat of moral impulses, against reason. So Rousseau in the fourth book of Emile: La *raison* nous trompe, mais la *conscience* ne trompe jamais; and a little further on: il est impossible d'expliquer par les conséquences de notre nature le principe immédiat de la *conscience* indépendant de la *raison* même. Still further: Mes sentimens naturels parlent pour l'intérêt commun, ma *raison* rapportait tout à moi.———On a beau vouloir établir la vertu par la *raison* seule, quelle solide base peut-on lui donner? In the Rêveries du promeneur, prom. 4ème, he says: Dans toutes les questions de morale difficiles je me suis toujours bien trouvé de les résoudre par le dictamen de la *conscience*, plutôt que par les lumières de la *raison*. Indeed, Aristotle already says expressly (Eth. magna, I, 5) that the virtues have their seat in the αλογῳ μοριῳ της ψυχης (in parte irrationali animi) and not in the λογον εχοντι (in parte rationali). In keeping with this, Stobaeus (Ecl., II, c. 7), speaking of the Peripatetics, says: Την ηθικην αρετην ὑπολαμβανουσι περι το αλογον μερος γιγνεσθαι της ψυχης, επειδη διμερη προς την παρουσαν θεωριαν υπεθεντο την ψυχην, το μεν λογικον εχουσαν, το δ' αλογον. Και περι μεν το λογικον την καλοκαγαθιαν γιγνεσθαι, και την φρονησιν, και την αγχινοιαν, και σοφιαν, και ευμαθειαν, και μνημην, και τας ὁμοιους· περι δε το αλογον, σωφροσυνην, και δικαιοσυνην, και ανδρειαν, και τας αλλας τας ηθικας καλουμενας αρετας. (Ethicam virtutem circa partem animae ratione carentem versari putant, cum duplicem, ad hanc disquisitionem, animam ponant, ratione praeditam, et ea carentem. In parte vero ratione praedita collocant ingenuitatem, prudentiam, perspicacitatem, sapientiam, docilitatem, memoriam et reliqua; in parte vero ratione destituta temperantiam, justitiam, fortitudinem, et reliquas virtutes, quas ethicas vocant.) And Cicero (De nat. Deor., III, c. 26–31) explains at length that reason is the necessary means and instrument of all crimes.

I have defined *reason* as the *faculty of concepts*. Concepts are a class of their own: general representations that are not intuitive, and are symbolized and fixed only by words. This class is what separates man from the animal and gives him rule over the earth. The animal is the slave of the present. It knows no motives except directly sensory ones, so when these present themselves it is drawn or repelled by them as necessarily as iron is by a magnet. In man, by contrast, the gift of reason has brought the power of reflection to life. Looking back and ahead, he can easily survey his life and the course of the world as a whole. It makes him independent of the present and lets him go about things deliberately, by plan and with forethought, for evil as for good. But whatever he does, he does with full self-consciousness. He knows exactly how his will decides, what he chooses each time, and what other choice was really possible. From this self-conscious willing he learns to know himself and sees himself mirrored in his deeds. In all these relations to human action, reason is to be called *practical*. It is theoretical only insofar as the objects it deals with have no bearing on the thinker's own action, but only a theoretical interest, and very few people are capable of that. What is called *practical reason* in this sense is fairly well indicated by the Latin word prudentia, which, according to Cicero (De nat. Deor., II, 22), is a contraction of providentia. Ratio, on the other hand, when used of a power of the mind, mostly means reason proper, the theoretical kind, although the ancients did not observe the distinction strictly.—In almost all people reason has this almost entirely practical direction. But suppose even this direction is abandoned, and thinking loses its rule over action. Then we have the saying scio meliora, proboque, deteriora sequor, or "le matin je fais des projets, et le soir je fais des sottises." The man lets his action be guided not by his thinking but by the impression of the present, almost as an animal does. Then we call him *unreasonable* (without charging him with moral badness), although what he lacks is really not reason but the application of it to his action, and one could say in a way that his reason is merely theoretical and not practical. He can still be quite a good man. Some people cannot see an unfortunate person without helping him, even at a sacrifice, and yet leave their own debts unpaid. An unreasonable character like this is quite incapable of committing great crimes,

because the planning, pretense and self-control these always require are impossible for him. But he will hardly reach a very high degree of virtue either. However strongly he is inclined to good by nature, the vicious and malicious impulses that every person is subject to cannot fail to arise, and unless reason shows itself practical and sets unchanging maxims and firm resolutions against them, they must turn into deeds.

Finally, *reason* shows itself as *practical* in the fullest sense in the truly reasonable characters, whom people therefore call practical philosophers in ordinary life. They are marked by an uncommon evenness of mind in unpleasant events as in pleasant ones, by a steady mood, and by firm persistence in resolutions once made. In fact it is the predominance of reason in them—that is, their knowing that is more abstract than intuitive, and so their survey of life through concepts, in general, as a whole and on the large scale—that has made them acquainted once and for all with the deceptiveness of the momentary impression, the instability of all things, the shortness of life, the emptiness of pleasures, the changes of fortune, and the great and small tricks of chance. So nothing comes to them unexpected. What they know in the abstract does not surprise them or throw them off balance when it now confronts them in reality and in the particular case. It is different with the less reasonable characters. On them the present, the intuitive, the actual, has such force that the cold, colorless concepts recede entirely into the background of consciousness. They forget resolutions and maxims and are left at the mercy of emotions and passions of every kind. I explained at the end of the first book that, in my view, Stoic ethics was originally nothing but instruction in a really reasonable life in this sense. Horace too recommends such a life repeatedly, in very many places. His Nil admirari belongs here, and so does the Delphic Μηδεν αγαν. To translate Nil admirari as "Admire nothing" is quite wrong. This saying of Horace is aimed not so much at the theoretical as at the practical, and what it really means is: "Value no object unconditionally; do not gape at anything; do not believe that the possession of any one thing can bring happiness. Every wretched craving for an object is only a teasing chimera, which you can get rid of just as well, but much more easily, by knowledge made clear than by hard-won possession."

Cicero uses admirari in this sense too, De divinatione, II, 2. What Horace means, then, is the αθαμβια and ακαταπληξις, also called αθαυμασια, which Democritus already praised as the highest good (see Clem. Alex. Strom., II, 21, and compare Strabo, I, p. 98 and 105).—With such reasonableness of conduct, virtue and vice are not really in question. But this practical use of reason makes good the real privilege that man has over the animal, and only in this respect does it make sense, and is it permissible, to speak of a dignity of man.

In all the cases described, and in every conceivable case, the difference between reasonable and unreasonable action comes down to whether the motives are abstract concepts or intuitive representations. That is why my definition of reason agrees exactly with the usage of all times and peoples. That usage should not be taken as something accidental or arbitrary. We should see that it has arisen from the difference among the various powers of the mind, which every person is aware of. Language speaks according to that awareness, though of course it does not raise it to the clarity of an abstract definition. Our ancestors did not make words without giving them a definite sense, say so that they would be ready for philosophers who would come centuries later and want to decide what should be thought by them. They used them to mark quite definite concepts. So words are no longer ownerless. To give them a quite different sense from the one they have had so far is to abuse them. It is to introduce a license under which anyone could use any word in any sense he pleased, and boundless confusion would have to result. Locke already showed at length that most disagreements in philosophy come from the wrong use of words. To illustrate, just look at the shameful abuse that philosophasters poor in thought nowadays make of the words substance, consciousness, truth and others. The statements and explanations about reason by all philosophers of all times, except the newest, agree with my explanation of it no less than the notions that prevail among all peoples about that privilege of man. See what Plato, in the fourth book of the Republic and in countless scattered places, calls the λογιμον or λογιστικον της ψυχης. See what Cicero says, De nat. Deor., III, 26–31, and what Leibniz and Locke say about it in the passages already cited in the first book. There would be no end to the citations here, if one wanted to show how

all philosophers before Kant spoke of reason on the whole in my sense. They did so even though they did not know how to explain its nature with perfect precision and clarity by reducing it to one point. Two essays by Sulzer in the first volume of his miscellaneous philosophical writings show on the whole what people understood by reason shortly before Kant appeared. One is "Analysis of the Concept of Reason," the other "On the Reciprocal Influence of Reason and Language." Now read, by contrast, how reason is talked about in the most recent time, under the influence of Kant's error, which has since grown like an avalanche. One is forced to conclude that all the sages of antiquity, and all philosophers before Kant, had no reason at all. For the immediate perceptions, intuitions, apprehensions and intimations of reason that have now been discovered have remained as foreign to them as the sixth sense of bats is to us. As for me, I must confess that in my limitation I cannot make that reason intelligible or imaginable to myself, any more than I can the sixth sense of bats. I mean the reason that directly perceives, or apprehends, or intellectually intuits the supersensible, the absolute, together with the long stories that go on with it. But one must give credit to the invention, or discovery, of such a reason, which at once directly perceives anything one pleases. It is an incomparable expédient for getting oneself and one's chosen pet ideas out of the affair in the easiest way in the world, in defiance of all *Kants* and their critiques of reason. The invention, and the reception it has found, do honor to the age.

Although, then, the essential nature of *reason* (το λογιμον, ἡ φρονησις, ratio, raison, reason) was on the whole and in general correctly recognized by all philosophers of all times, though not determined sharply enough or reduced to one point, what the *understanding* (νους, διανοια, intellectus, esprit, intellect, understanding) is has not become so clear to them. So they often mix it up with reason, and just for that reason they also fail to reach a perfectly complete, pure and simple explanation of the nature of reason. With the Christian philosophers the concept of reason then received a quite foreign secondary meaning, through its contrast with revelation. Starting from this, many then maintain, rightly, that the knowledge of our obligation to virtue is possible from mere reason too, that is, without revelation as well. This consideration

certainly had an influence even on Kant's presentation and use of words. But that contrast is really of positive, historical significance. It is therefore an element foreign to philosophy, and philosophy must be kept free of it.

One might have expected that in his critiques of theoretical and practical reason Kant would have started from a presentation of the nature of reason in general. Having determined the genus in this way, he would then have gone on to explain the two species, showing how one and the same reason expresses itself in two such different ways and yet, by keeping its main character, proves itself to be the same. But nothing of all this is to be found. I have already shown how inadequate, wavering and discordant are the explanations he gives here and there, in passing, in the Critique of Pure Reason of the faculty that he is criticizing. *Practical* reason already turns up unannounced in the Critique of Pure Reason. Afterward, in the critique devoted especially to it, it stands there as a settled matter, with no further account. The usage of all times and peoples, which is trampled underfoot, and the definitions of the greatest earlier philosophers are not allowed to raise their voices. On the whole one can gather from the separate passages that Kant's opinion runs like this: the knowing of principles a priori is the essential character of reason. Now the knowledge of the ethical significance of action is not of empirical origin. So it too is a principium a priori and therefore comes from reason, which then, in this respect, is *practical*. —I have said enough about the incorrectness of that definition of reason. But apart from that, how superficial and unthorough it is to use here the one mark of independence from experience in order to unite the most heterogeneous things, overlooking in the process their other, fundamental, immeasurable distance from one another. For suppose, though I do not grant it, that the knowledge of the ethical significance of action sprang from an imperative lying in us, an unconditional ought. How utterly different such a thing would still be from those general *forms of knowledge* that he shows in the Critique of Pure Reason we are conscious of as a priori. By virtue of that consciousness we can say in advance an unconditional *must*, valid for all experience possible to us. The difference between this must, this necessary form of every object already determined in the subject, and that ought of morality, is as wide as heaven and so

obvious that one can put forward the meeting of the two in the mark of non-empirical kind of knowledge as a witty comparison, but not as a philosophical warrant for identifying the origin of both.

Incidentally, this child of practical reason, the *absolute ought* or categorical imperative, was not born in the Critique of Practical Reason. It was born already in the Critique of Pure Reason, p. 802; V, 830. The birth is a violent one. It succeeds only with the forceps of a *therefore*, which boldly and brazenly, one might even say shamelessly, plants itself between two sentences that are complete strangers to each other and have no connection, in order to join them as ground and consequence. Kant's starting point is the sentence that not only intuitive but also abstract motives determine us. He puts it like this: "Not merely what stimulates, that is, what directly affects the senses, determines human choice. We have a faculty of overcoming the impressions on our sensory faculty of desire by representations of what is useful or harmful even in a remote way. These deliberations about what is desirable with regard to our whole condition, that is, good and useful, rest on reason." (Perfectly correct. If only he always spoke so reasonably about reason!) "Reason *therefore!* also gives laws, which are imperatives, that is, objective laws of freedom, and which say what ought to happen, even though perhaps it never happens."—! So, with no further credentials, the categorical imperative leaps into the world to rule there with its unconditional ought—a scepter of wooden iron. For in the concept *ought* there lies, essentially and unavoidably, a reference to a threatened punishment or a promised reward, as a necessary condition. It cannot be separated from it without canceling the concept itself and robbing it of all meaning. So an *unconditional ought* is a contradictio in adjecto. This fault had to be pointed out, however closely it is related to Kant's great merit in ethics. That merit consists in just this: he freed ethics from all principles of the world of experience, in particular from every direct or indirect doctrine of happiness, and showed in the fullest sense that the kingdom of virtue is not of this world. The merit is all the greater because all the ancient philosophers, with the single exception of Plato, namely the Peripatetics, Stoics and Epicureans, tried by very different devices to make virtue and happiness depend on each other, now according to

the principle of sufficient reason and now by identifying them according to the principle of contradiction. The same reproach applies no less to all the philosophers of modern times, up to Kant. His merit in this is therefore very great. Still, justice requires us to remember two things here. First, his presentation and working out often does not match the tendency and spirit of his ethics, as we shall see in a moment. Second, even so, he is not the very first to have cleansed virtue of all principles of happiness. Plato already, especially in the Republic, whose main tendency is just this, teaches expressly that virtue is to be chosen for its own sake alone, even if misfortune and disgrace were inevitably bound up with it. Christianity preaches a completely disinterested virtue even more. This virtue is practiced not for the sake of a reward in a life after death, but quite gratuitously, out of love of God. For works do not justify; faith alone does, and virtue accompanies faith as its mere symptom, so to speak, and therefore arrives quite gratuitously and of itself. Read Luther, De libertate Christiana. I will not even count the Indians, in whose sacred books the hope of a reward for one's works is everywhere described as the path of darkness, which can never lead to blessedness. Yet we do not find Kant's doctrine of virtue so pure. Or rather, the presentation has fallen far behind the spirit, and has even fallen into inconsistency. In his *highest* good, which he treats afterward, we find virtue wedded to happiness. The ought, so unconditional at the start, afterward postulates a condition for itself after all. In reality it does so to get rid of the inner contradiction that burdens it and that it cannot live with. The happiness in the highest good is, to be sure, not supposed to be the motive for virtue. Still it stands there like a secret article, whose presence turns everything else into a mere sham contract. It is not really the reward of virtue, but it is still a voluntary gift, to which virtue, after the work is done, secretly holds out an open hand. One can convince oneself of this from the "Critique of Practical Reason" (pp. 223–266 of the fourth edition, or pp. 264–295 of Rosenkranz's edition). His whole moral theology has the same tendency, and for just that reason, through it, morality really destroys itself. For, I repeat, all virtue that is practiced for the sake of a reward in any way rests on a clever, methodical, farsighted egoism.

The content of the absolute ought, the basic law of practical reason, is the famous one: "Act so that the maxim of your will could always at the same time hold as a principle of universal legislation."—This principle gives the person who asks for a regulator for his own will the task of looking for one for the will of everyone. Then the question is how such a regulator is to be found. Obviously, to find the rule for my conduct, I am supposed to consider not myself alone but the whole of all individuals. Then, instead of my own well-being, the well-being of all, without distinction, becomes my aim. But that aim is still well-being. I then find that all can be equally well off only if each sets other people's egoism as a limit to his own. From this it follows, of course, that I should wrong no one. For if this principle is adopted as universal, I too will not be wronged. But this is the only reason why I, who do not yet possess a moral principle but am only looking for one, can wish this one to become universal law. Obviously, though, on this account the wish for well-being, that is, egoism, remains the source of this ethical principle. As a basis for the theory of the state it would be excellent. As a basis for ethics it is no good. For in order to set up, as that moral principle requires, a regulator for the will of all, the person looking for it must himself again have a regulator, or else everything would be a matter of indifference to him. This regulator can only be his own egoism, since only on that does the conduct of others have an effect. So only by means of it, and with regard to it, can he have a will concerning the actions of others and not be indifferent to them. Kant himself admits this quite naively on p. 123 of the "Critique of Practical Reason" (Rosenkranz's edition, p. 192), where he works out the search for the maxim for the will like this: "If everyone looked on the distress of others with complete indifference, and *you belonged* to such an order of things, would you consent to it?"—Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam! would be the regulator of the consent being asked for. It is the same in the "Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals," p. 56 of the third edition, p. 50 of Rosenkranz's edition: "A will that decided to help no one in distress would contradict itself, since cases can occur in which *it needs the love and sympathy of others*," and so on. When looked at in the light, this principle of ethics is nothing but an indirect and veiled expression of the old, simple

maxim, quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris. So it refers first and directly to the passive side, to suffering, and only then by means of this to doing. For that reason, as I said, it would be quite usable as a guide for setting up the *state*, which is aimed at preventing the suffering of wrong and would like to secure for each and all the greatest sum of well-being. But in ethics, where the subject of the inquiry is *doing as doing* and in its direct significance for the *doer*, and not its consequence, suffering, or its relation to others, that consideration is not admissible at all. For at bottom it comes down once more to a principle of happiness, that is, to egoism.

So we cannot share Kant's delight either that his principle of ethics is not material, that is, does not set up an object as the motive, but is purely formal, so that it corresponds symmetrically to the formal laws that the Critique of Pure Reason has taught us. To be sure, instead of a law it is only the formula for finding one. But for one thing, we already had this formula, shorter and clearer, in quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris. For another, an analysis of this formula shows that it gets its content solely and entirely from regard for one's own happiness. So it can serve only the reasonable egoism to which all lawful constitution also owes its origin.

Another fault is the pedantic rule that an act, to be truly good and meritorious, must be done solely out of respect for the known law and the concept of duty, and by a maxim of which reason is conscious in the abstract. It must not be done from any inclination, not from felt goodwill toward others, not from tender-hearted sympathy, pity or an upwelling of the heart. According to the "Critique of Practical Reason" (p. 213; Rosenkranz's edition, p. 257), such feelings are even very troublesome to well-thinking persons, since they confuse their deliberate maxims. Instead the act must be done unwillingly and with self-compulsion. This fault is often criticized, because it offends everyone's feeling, and Schiller mocked it in an epigram. Remember that, even so, the hope of reward is not supposed to enter in, and weigh the great absurdity of the demand. But, what is more, it runs directly against the true spirit of virtue. What makes an act meritorious is not the act but the doing of it gladly, the love from which it springs and without which it is a dead work. That is why Christianity rightly

teaches that all outward works are worthless unless they come from that true disposition, which consists in real willingness and pure love. It teaches that it is not works performed (opera operata) that save and redeem, but faith, the true disposition, which only the Holy Spirit gives, and which is not produced by the free, deliberate will that has only the law before its eyes.—Kant's demand that every virtuous action should come from pure, deliberate respect for the law and its abstract maxims, coldly and without any inclination, indeed against all inclination, is exactly like claiming that every true work of art must arise by the well-considered application of aesthetic rules. The one is as perverse as the other. The question whether virtue can be taught, which Plato and Seneca already treated, must be answered no. In the end we will have to decide to see what also gave rise to the Christian doctrine of election by grace. It is that virtue, in its main part and inner nature, is in a way innate, like genius. Just as all professors of aesthetics together cannot give anyone the ability to produce works of genius, that is, true works of art, so all professors of ethics and preachers of virtue cannot make a base character into a virtuous, noble one. The impossibility of this is far more evident than that of turning lead into gold. And the search for an ethics and a supreme principle of it that would have practical influence and really transform and better the human race is just like the search for the philosophers' stone.—The possibility, however, of a complete change in a person's whole way of thinking (rebirth), brought about not by abstract (ethics) but by intuitive knowledge (the working of grace), was discussed at length at the end of our fourth book. The content of that book in general relieves me of any need to dwell longer on it here.

Finally, Kant also shows by his doctrine of the highest good that he has by no means penetrated to the real meaning of the ethical content of actions. He makes the highest good the necessary union of virtue and happiness, and in such a way that virtue would be the worthiness for happiness. A logical objection already strikes him here. The concept of worthiness, which supplies the standard here, itself presupposes an ethics as its standard, so he should not have taken it as his starting point. In our fourth book it emerged that all true virtue, once it has reached its highest degree, finally leads to a complete renunciation in

which all willing comes to an end. Happiness, on the other hand, is satisfied willing. So the two are incompatible from the ground up. For anyone to whom my presentation has been convincing, no further discussion is needed of the total perversity of this Kantian view of the highest good. And apart from my positive presentation, I have no negative one to give here.

Kant's love of architectonic symmetry meets us again in the "Critique of Practical Reason." He gave it entirely the cut of the "Critique of Pure Reason" and brought in the same titles and forms again, with obvious arbitrariness, which becomes especially visible in the table of the categories of freedom.

The Doctrine of Right is one of Kant's latest works, and it is so weak that, although I disapprove of it entirely, I think a polemic against it is unnecessary, since it must die a natural death of its own weakness, just as if it were not the work of this great man but the product of an ordinary child of earth. So with regard to the Doctrine of Right I give up the negative procedure and refer to the positive one, that is, to the short outline of it that is set out in our fourth book. Only a few general remarks on Kant's Doctrine of Right need stand here. The faults that I criticized, as clinging to Kant everywhere, in my examination of the "Critique of Pure Reason" appear in the Doctrine of Right in such excess that one often thinks one is reading a satirical parody of the Kantian manner, or at least hearing a Kantian. But there are two main faults. He wants to separate the doctrine of right sharply from ethics (and many have wanted this since). Yet he does not want to make it depend on positive legislation, that is, on arbitrary compulsion, but wants to let the concept of right stand on its own, pure and a priori. But this is not possible. Action, apart from its ethical significance and apart from its physical relation to others and so to outward compulsion, allows no third view of it, not even as a possibility. So when he says, "A duty of right is one that *can* be enforced," this *can* must be understood either physically, in which case all right is positive and arbitrary, and likewise all arbitrary power that can make itself prevail is right. Or the *can* must be understood ethically, and we are back in the field of ethics. So with Kant the concept of right hovers between heaven and earth and has no ground to stand on. With me it belongs to ethics. Second, his definition of the concept of right is entirely

negative and therefore insufficient [17]: "Right is that which is compatible with the coexistence[18] Although the concept of right is really a negative one, in contrast to wrong, which is the positive starting point, the explanation of these concepts still must not be negative through and through. of the freedoms of individuals side by side under a universal law."—Freedom (here the empirical, that is, physical, not the moral freedom of the will) means not being hindered, and so is a mere negation. Coexistence has exactly the same meaning again. So we remain with pure negations and get no positive concept. We do not even learn what is really being talked about, unless we already know it from elsewhere.—In the working out, the most perverse views then develop. One is that in the natural state, that is, outside the state, there is no right to property at all, which really means that all right is positive, and by which natural right is made to rest on positive right, when the case should be the reverse. Others are the grounding of legal acquisition on taking possession, the ethical obligation to establish a civil constitution, the ground of criminal law, and so on. As I said, I do not think any of this is worth a special refutation. Meanwhile these Kantian errors too have proved a very harmful influence. They have confused and obscured truths that had long been recognized and stated, and have given rise to strange theories and much writing and quarreling. Of course this cannot last, and already we see truth and sound reason making their way again. Of the latter, in contrast to so many twisted theories, J. C. F. Meister's Natural Right in particular gives evidence, though I do not therefore regard it as a model of achieved perfection.

On the *Critique of Judgment* too I can be very brief, after what has gone before. One must admire how Kant could win a great and lasting merit in the philosophical study of art and the beautiful. Art has probably remained very foreign to him, and to all appearances he had little receptivity for the beautiful. He probably never even had a chance to see a significant work of art. And finally he seems to have had no knowledge of his giant brother Goethe, the only man of his century and his nation who can be set beside him. It is, I say, to be admired that with all this Kant could earn such a merit. The merit lies in this. However many reflections had been made on the beautiful and on art, people had really

always looked at the matter only from the empirical standpoint. They investigated, resting on facts, what quality distinguished an object called *beautiful* from other objects of the same kind. On this path they came first to very specific propositions, then to more general ones. They tried to separate true beauty in art from false, and to find marks of this genuineness that could in turn serve as rules. What pleases as beautiful and what does not, what should therefore be imitated and aimed at and what avoided, what rules could be set up, at least negatively, in short, what the means are for arousing aesthetic pleasure, that is, what the conditions in the *object* for it are—this was almost exclusively the subject of all reflection on art. Aristotle had taken this path, and on it we still find in the most recent times Home, Burke, Winckelmann, Lessing, Herder and others. It is true that the generality of the aesthetic propositions found led back in the end to the subject too. People noticed that if the effect in the subject were properly known, one could then also determine a priori the cause of it that lies in the object, and only in this way could this inquiry reach the certainty of a science. This led now and then to psychological discussions. But with this aim Alexander Baumgarten especially set up a general Aesthetics of all that is beautiful, starting from the concept of the perfection of sensory, and so intuitive, knowledge. With him, though, once this concept is set up, the subjective part is at once disposed of, and he moves on to the objective part and the practical matters that relate to it.—It was reserved for Kant, here too, to examine seriously and deeply the *arousal itself*, because of which we call the object that causes it *beautiful*, in order to find, if possible, its components and conditions in our mind. His investigation therefore took a wholly subjective direction. This was obviously the right path. To explain an appearance that is given in its effects, one has to know this effect itself exactly first, in order to determine the nature of the cause thoroughly. But Kant's merit in this really does not extend much further than having shown the right path, and having given by a provisional attempt an example of roughly how it must be followed. For what he gave cannot be regarded as objective truth and real gain. He gave the method of this investigation and broke the trail, but otherwise missed the goal.

In the critique of aesthetic judgment, the first remark that will force itself on us is that he kept the method that is peculiar to his whole philosophy and that I examined at length above. I mean starting from abstract knowledge in order to get to the bottom of intuitive knowledge, so that abstract knowledge serves him as a sort of camera obscura in which to catch and survey intuitive knowledge. In the Critique of Pure Reason the forms of judgments were supposed to give him information about the knowledge of our whole intuitive world. In the same way, in this critique of aesthetic judgment he starts not from the beautiful itself, the intuitive, immediate beautiful, but from the *judgment* about the beautiful, the judgment of taste, as it is called, a very ugly name. This is his problem. What especially attracts his attention is the fact that such a judgment is obviously the statement of a process in the subject, and yet is as universally valid as if it concerned a property of the object. This struck him, not the beautiful itself. He always starts only from the statements of others, from the judgment about the beautiful, not from the beautiful itself. It is therefore as if he knew it entirely by hearsay and not directly. A highly intelligent blind man could do almost the same: from exact statements that he heard about colors, he could put together a theory of them. And in truth we may regard Kant's philosophical theories about the beautiful almost only in this light. Then we shall find that his theory is very ingenious, and that here and there apt and true general remarks are made. But his actual solution of the problem is so untenable, and stays so far below the dignity of the subject, that it cannot occur to us to take it for objective truth. So I even consider myself spared a refutation of it, and here too I refer to the positive part of my work.

As to the form of his whole book, it is to be noted that it sprang from the whim of finding the key to the problem of the beautiful in the concept of *purposiveness*. The whim is then deduced, which is never hard, as we have learned from Kant's successors. So arises the baroque union of the knowledge of the beautiful with that of the purposive in natural bodies, in one faculty of knowledge called the *power of judgment*, and the treatment of the two heterogeneous subjects in one book. Afterward all sorts of symmetrical-architectonic amusements are carried out with these three powers of knowledge, reason, the power of

judgment and understanding. It is a fondness that shows itself many times in this book, already in the layout of the Critique of Pure Reason, forcibly fitted onto the whole, and most of all in the far-fetched antinomy of the aesthetic power of judgment. One could also make a charge of great inconsistency out of this: in the Critique of Pure Reason it is repeated without letup that the understanding is the faculty of judging, and the forms of its judgments are made the cornerstone of all philosophy. And now a quite peculiar power of judgment appears, completely different from the understanding. As for what I call the power of judgment, namely the ability to carry intuitive knowledge over into abstract and to apply the latter correctly to the former again, that is worked out in the positive part of my work.

By far the best thing in the critique of the aesthetic power of judgment is the theory of the sublime. It has succeeded incomparably better than that of the beautiful. Like that one, it gives the general method of the investigation, but it also gives a piece of the right path to it. So much so that, even if it does not give the real solution of the problem, it comes very close to it.

In the critique of the teleological power of judgment, because the material is so simple, one can perhaps see more clearly than anywhere else Kant's strange talent for turning one thought this way and that and putting it in many different ways until a book has come out of it. The whole book wants only this. Organized bodies necessarily appear to us as if they had been put together according to a concept of purpose that came before them. Yet this does not entitle us to assume that it is so objectively. For our intellect is given things from outside and indirectly. So it never knows their inside, through which they come to be and to last, but only their outer side. It cannot make a certain feature peculiar to organic products of nature intelligible to itself except by analogy, by comparing them with works that people make on purpose, whose character is determined by a purpose and the concept of it. This analogy is enough to make the agreement of all their parts with the whole intelligible to us, and even to supply a guiding thread for investigating them. But it must never for that reason be made the real ground for explaining the origin and existence of such bodies. For the necessity of thinking of them in this way is of subjective

origin.—That, roughly, is how I would sum up Kant's doctrine on this. In its main points he had already set it out in the Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 692–702; V, 720–730. But in the knowledge of *this* truth too we find David Hume as Kant's honorable forerunner. He too had sharply contested that assumption, in the second part of his Dialogues concerning natural religion. The difference between Hume's criticism of that assumption and Kant's is mainly this: Hume criticizes it as an assumption resting on experience, Kant as an a priori one. Both are right, and their presentations complete each other. Indeed, we find the essence of Kant's doctrine on this already stated in the commentary of Simplicius on the Physics of Aristotle: ἡ δε πλανη γεγονεν αυτοις απο του ἡγεισθαι, παντα τα ἑνεκα του γινομενα κατα προαιρεσιν γενεσθαι και λογισμον, τα δε φυσει μη οὑτως ὁραν γινομενα. (Error iis ortus est ex eo, quod credebant, omnia, quae propter finem aliquem fierent, ex proposito et ratiocinio fieri, dum videbant, naturae opera non ita fieri.) Schol. in Arist. ex. edit. Berol. p. 354. Kant is perfectly right in the matter. It was also necessary that, once it had been shown that the concept of effect and cause cannot be applied to nature as a whole as regards its existence, it should also be shown that as regards its character nature cannot be thought of as the effect of a cause guided by motives (concepts of purpose). Consider how plausible the physicotheological proof looks, which even Voltaire held to be irrefutable. It was therefore of the greatest importance to show that the subjective element in our way of grasping things, to which Kant has assigned space, time and causality, extends to our judging of natural bodies as well. So the compulsion we feel to think of them as premeditated, as having come about according to concepts of purpose, that is, by a route on which the *representation of them would have come before their existence*, is of just as subjective an origin as the intuition of space, which presents itself so objectively. It therefore must not be put forward as objective truth. Kant's exposition of the matter is excellent, apart from its tiring long-windedness and repetition. He rightly maintains that we shall never succeed in explaining the character of organic bodies from merely mechanical causes, by which he means the unintended, law-governed working of all the general forces of nature. Here, however, I still find a gap. He denies the possibility of such an

explanation only with regard to the purposiveness and apparent intentionality of *organic* bodies. But we find that, even where these are absent, the grounds of explanation cannot be carried over from one domain of nature to another. As soon as we enter a new domain they leave us, and new basic laws appear in their place. There is no hope of explaining these from the laws of the previous domain. So in the domain of the properly mechanical the laws of gravity, cohesion, rigidity, fluidity and elasticity rule. Taken by themselves (setting aside my explanation of all forces of nature as lower stages of the objectification of the will), these stand there as manifestations of forces that cannot be explained further. But they themselves make up the principles of all further explanation, which consists only in tracing things back to them. If we leave this domain and come to the appearances of chemical action, electricity, magnetism and crystallization, then those principles can no longer be used at all. Indeed, those laws no longer hold, those forces are overpowered by others, and the appearances go on in direct contradiction to them, according to new basic laws. Like the former ones, these are original and inexplicable, that is, they cannot be traced back to any more general ones. For example, it will never be possible by those laws of the properly mechanical to explain even the dissolving of a salt in water, let alone the more complicated appearances of chemistry. All this has already been set out more fully in the second book of the present work. A discussion of this kind would, I think, have been of great use in the critique of the teleological power of judgment and would have spread much light on what is said there. It would have been especially favorable to his excellent hint that a deeper knowledge of the being in itself, of which the things in nature are the appearance, would find one and the same final principle again both in the mechanical (law-governed) and in the seemingly purposive working of nature. This principle could then serve as the common ground of explanation for both. I hope to have given such a principle by setting up the will as the real thing in itself. Accordingly, in our second book and its supplements, and especially in my work "On the Will in Nature," insight into the inner nature of the apparent

purposiveness and of the harmony and agreement of the whole of nature has perhaps become brighter and deeper. So I have nothing more to say about it here.—

The reader who is interested in this critique of the Kantian philosophy should not fail to read the supplement to it in the second essay of the first volume of my Parerga and Paralipomena, under the heading "A Few More Explanations of the Kantian Philosophy." For one must consider that my writings, few as they are, were not all written at one time. They were written one after another over the course of a long life, with wide gaps between. So one must not expect everything I have said on a subject to stand together in one place.

Corrections.

Page 57, line 12 from the top, delete the comma at the end. Also 58, line 16 from the bottom, instead of: der read: die; 205, line 3 from the top, for: ἁπτοσθαι, read: ἁπτεσθαι; 229, line 8 from the bottom, for: daher read: dabei; 329, line 17 from the bottom, after "Worte" insert:, so understand not simile but idem.

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